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AGDA (M) (13 Mar 70) FOR OT UT 694095

19 March 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry, Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

The subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

Information contained in this report is provided to ensure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 7TH SQUADRON 17TH CAVALRY
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96262

AVBACB-GC

8 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry, Period Ending 31 October, RCS CS FCR-65 (R2) (U)

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1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities:

   a. (C) General.

      (1) This report covers the period 1 August 1969 through 31 October 1969, and is submitted in accordance with AR 525-15, USAV Regulation 525-15, and 17th Aviation Group (Combat) Regulation 525-15.

      (2) Mission. To perform reconnaissance, surveillance and security for Free World Forces in the II Corps Tactical Zone. To engage in combat as an economy of force unit and provide limited anti-tank defense. One or more of the units may be placed in support of a major ground unit.

      (3) Organizational Structure. The Headquarters, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry is located at CAIP ENARI (AR612355), DRAGON MOUNTAIN, Republic of Vietnam, and is commanded by Lieutenant Colonel George S. Hurry. The Squadron has its full complement of cavalry troops as per MTOE 17-98T. The Squadron is currently assigned Operational Control (minus Troop C) to the 13th Infantry Division, CAIP ENARI, DRAGON MOUNTAIN, Republic of Vietnam. Troop C is assigned Operational Control to the 173d Airborne Brigade.

         (a) Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, CAIP ENARI, DRAGON MOUNTAIN, Republic of Vietnam, is organized in accordance with MTOE 17-98T and is equipped with five (5) UH-1H helicopters.

         (b) Troop A, CAIP RADCLIFF, (BR661566), AN KHE, Republic of Vietnam, is organized in accordance with MTOE 17-98T and is equipped with AH-1G, OH-6A and UH-1H helicopters. The 568th TC Detachment and the 286th Signal Detachment provide direct support maintenance and avionics support to the troop.

         (c) Troop B, CAIP ENARI, DRAGON MOUNTAIN, Republic of Vietnam, is organized in accordance with MTOE 17-98T and is equipped with AH-1G, OH-6A
and UH-1H helicopters. The 569th TC Detachment and the 141st Signal Detachment provide direct support maintenance and avionics support to the troop.

(d) Troop C, LANE Army Helicopter (BR940260), AN SOW, Republic of Vietnam, is organized in accordance with HQCE 17-90T and is equipped with AH-1G, CH-54A and UH-1H helicopters. The 141st TC Detachment and the 238th Signal Detachment provide direct support maintenance and avionics support to the troop.

(e) Troop D, CALIP ENARI, DRAGON MOUNTAIN, Republic of Vietnam, is a standard wheel vehicular mounted ground cavalry troop organized in accordance with HQCE 17-99T.

(f) During the reporting period there was only one significant change in the tactical posture of the Squadron. Troop B and Troop D were assigned Operational Control to Task Force Fighter, a 4th Infantry Division element, and deployed all combat essential personnel and equipment to BAN IE THUOT - EAST (AQ873019) on 31 August 1969, to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance operations in general support of the 23d Division, Army of Republic of Vietnam.

b. (C) Personnel.

(1) During the reporting period the following major changes in command and staff positions occurred:

(a) LTC George S. Hurry, 178-2h-1616, assumed command of 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry on 16 Sep 69 replacing LTC Calvin R. Bean, 367-2h-9399.

(b) MAJ Robert L. Rackley, 2h1-4h-8326, assumed duties as Squadron Executive Officer on 1 Sep 69 replacing MAJ James A McCracken, 415-52-1215.


(d) MAJ Billy J. Bowling, 417-3h-3016, assumed command of Troop B on 7 Sep 69 replacing MAJ Scott T. Lyman, 526-3h-6916.

(e) MAJ Tracy A. Maness, 238-4h-5l9h, assumed duties as the Squadron Chaplain on 31 Oct 69 replacing CPT Clarence M. Brooks, 2h2-50-1180.


(g) CPT Kenneth G. Lininger, 161-3h-8021, assumed command of Troop D on 12 Sep 69 replacing CPT Robert D. Bruegger, 560-60-6610.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CS FOR-65 (R2) (U)

(h) CPT Henry G. Wall, Jr., 266-74-1458, assumed duties as Squadron S-2 on 16 Aug 69 replacing LTL Charles L. Campbell, 249-74-0501.

(i) CPT Guy W. Fussell, 262-56-0708, assumed duties as Squadron Signal Officer on 5 Dec 69 replacing CPT William T. Hunt, Jr., 403-60-0871.

(j) CPT Joseph P. Chollak, Jr., 201-32-2170, assumed duties as Squadron Flight Surgeon on 30 Sep 69 replacing CPT David Wallack, 059-32-7791.

(k) WO1 Alan L. Enochs, 448-28-5762, assumed duties as Squadron S-5 on 26 Sep 69 replacing LTL Reginal Short, Jr., 340-32-8956.

(2) The following are personnel occupying major command and staff positions:

(a) Squadron Commander
(b) Squadron Executive Officer
(c) S-1
(d) S-2
(e) S-3
(f) S-4
(g) S-5
(h) Chaplain
(i) Signal Officer
(j) Flight Surgeon
(k) Safety Officer
(l) Maintenance Officer
(m) CO, Headquarters Troop
(n) CO, Troop A
(o) CO, Troop B
(p) CO, Troop C

LTC George S. Hurry
MAJ Robert L. Rackley
CPT Vincent J. Falconio
CPT Henry G. Wall, Jr.
CPT Robert D. McCleary
CPT Jimmie A. Yerger
WO1 Alan L. Enochs
MAJ Trace A. Maness
CPT Guy W. Fussell
CPT Joseph P. Chollak, Jr.
CPT Randall Ramsey
CPT Steven L. White
CPT Samuel E. Begley
MAJ Ronald G. Manson
MAJ Billy J. Bowling
MAJ Joseph A. Tobin

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CS FCR-65 (R2) (C)

(q) CC, Troop D  
CPT Kenneth G. Liningor  

(r) Squadron Sergeant Major  
SGT Robert H. Couch  

(3) Unit strength and miscellaneous related data is attached in enclosure 1.

(c) (C) Intelligence.

(1) During the reporting period the S-2 Section activities included:

SECRET clearances validated - 70  
SECRET clearances granted - 18  
SECRET clearances initiated - 9  
CONFIDENTIAL clearances granted - 7  
TOP SECRET clearances validated - 11  
TOP SECRET clearances initiated - 2  
Security Debriefings - 127

(2) Intelligence Summary for the Squadron's tactical area of interest is as follows:

(a) KOUTUM Province: During the month of August, main force North Vietnamese Army units such as the 28th and 66th Regiments, and elements of the 10th Artillery Regiment continued to conduct resupply and reorganization activities in their Cambodian sanctuaries following their summer offensive in the DAK TO - NHA PHU area. To fill the void left by the North Vietnamese Army forces, the 30th Local Force Battalion increased its activities during August and initiated standoff attacks against KON HOMANG, TAIIH BINH and DAK TO. The KOUTUM CITY area was the scene of the month's most significant activity. On 25 August, KOUTUM CITY received a rocket and mortar attack from what was believed to be an element of the 16th Artillery Battalion, and on the same day, a bridge was destroyed and several minor incidents occurred. These attacks were attributed to elements of the 10th Sapper Battalion. Elsewhere in the province, KOU KLAEO Village received a Battalion size attack from the 5th Battalion, 114th Regiment. Documents and a prisoner attested to the fact that the 914th Group had the responsibility of protecting the northern infiltration and resupply route running from the Laotian Border east to the 3rd North Vietnamese Army Division location in I Corps. The 914th Group was also given the responsibility to conduct harassing attacks in the HANG BUK area. Enemy activity decreased throughout KOUTUM in September as the activity was characterized by mining of Highway 1, north between KOUTUM CITY and DAK TO and sporadic village harassment. The most significant attack occurred on 25 September when the village of TRI DAC received three separate standoff attacks and light ground probes from estimated company size elements. Activity remained at a minimum until the first week of October when enemy activity was noted.
in the DAK PEK area. During the 1st week of October, Special Forces elements made frequent contact with elements ranging from squad to company strength. The enemy forces were identified as North Vietnamese or Vietnamese Communist but no unit designation has been obtained to date and no identified North Vietnamese Army or Vietnamese Communist forces are known to be operating in the area. In addition to the activity in the DAK PEK area, frequent enemy reconnaissance activity has been noted in the DAK TO - TETN HET area, possibly indicating a renewal of an enemy offensive in the Tri-Border area.

(b) PLEIKU Province: Following the termination of the enemy summer offensive in July, both North Vietnamese Army and Vietnamese Communist main force units withdrew into their base areas to refit and resupply. During the month of August, enemy activity in PLEIKU Province was limited to harassing attacks by guerrilla forces against villages and hamlets located in rural areas. Enemy forces appeared to be content with limited disruption of the government pacification effort. These harassing activities increased in intensity until the highpoint was reached in mid-September. During this period of time, villages and hamlets were subjected to harassing attacks by small size local guerrilla units utilizing small scale hit and run tactics. In addition, elements of the K-631 Composite Battalion operating out of the southern CHU PA Mountains, staged infrequent standoff attacks on friendly installations following the mid-September high-point, increasing reconnaissance activity by elements of the 6th Battalion, 24th North Vietnamese Army Regiment in the PLEIrong area and the K-631st Composite Battalion in the PLEIKU area indicated that enemy forces were once again making preparation for a new offensive. Contacts and sightings to the west and northwest of PLEIKU during the first week of October confirmed enemy movement out of the CHU PA Mountains. It was also believed that the 6th Battalion and remnants of the 24th North Vietnamese Army Regiment would shortly move back into the CHU PA Mountain from their Cambodian Sanctuary. Increased contacts with enemy forces around PLEIKU area had indicated that the 24th Regiment had completed resupply and staging operations and were prepared to initiate attacks on villages and friendly installations in the PLEIrong area and also commenced interdiction of Highway 1 between PLEIKU and KONUM. In late October, elements of the 4th Infantry Division encountered platoon and company size North Vietnamese Army forces on a daily basis. Documents captured during these contacts identified elements of both the 6th and 6th Battalions, 24th Regiment, as operating in the area. Elsewhere in PLEIKU, the K-631 Composite Battalion reestablished their offensive and subjected Landing Zone OASIS to their first rocket and mortar attack in more than five months.

(c) DAKLA Province: Enemy activity in DAKLA Province remained constant with previous months. As in the past, BAN DE THUOT CITY continued to provide the most lucrative target. In August BAN DE THUOT CITY was
subjected to two standoff attacks from elements of the K-394th Composite Battalion. Elsewhere enemy activity was limited to sporadic ground probes in an area south of the city. It was at this time that attention was diverted to the II-III Corps border area where reliable intelligence indicated the movement of enemy forces into this area. During September, enemy elements concentrated on harassing outposts and villages to the north and northeast of BAN HE TRUOT CITY. The attacks on BAN HE TRUOT itself ceased. It was later learned from prisoners that the K-394 Composite Battalion had moved into Base Area 740 to conduct training. The K-394 Composite Battalion had, however, left behind an element to harass the city. Activity increased in October as enemy elements intensified interdiction of Highway 21 east of the city. In mid-October, documents were captured north of the city identifying elements of the 301st Local Force Battalion. Although the 301st Local Force Battalion was believed to have left their old area of operation, vicinity BP200900, this was the first verification obtained that indicated that the 301st Local Force Battalion could be responsible for the increased activity in the BAN HD area (BQ60330).

(d) QUANG DUC Province: In the II-III Corps border area, during October Troop B, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry obtained their first indication of movement in the BU PRANG area. Contact was limited to ground-to-air incidents and sporadic observations of 1-2 individuals until late in the month when standoff attacks and mortar attacks were directed at fire bases in the area and at BU PRANG. At the end of the month the enemy activity increased with attacks on fire bases in force supported by artillery. Also, evidence of larger concentrations of enemy troop movements were noted.

(e) BINH DINH Province: During the month of August in BINH DINH Province, the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, continued their operations targeted against the 16th North Vietnamese Army Regiment in their extensive base area to the northeast of AN KHE. Elements of the 16th North Vietnamese Army Regiment have continually evasion to the north since mid-July in an effort to avoid decisive contact with the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division forces. Sporadic contact with small size units occurred throughout the month of August. Elsewhere in BINH DINH, the K-2 Battalion, 95-B Regiment increased their interdiction of Highway 19 between the HANU YANG Pass and Landing Zone ACTION during August. The K-2 Battalion conducted two coordinated attacks on convoys in the area between the HANU YANG Pass and Landing Zone ACTION during the month and increased their mining efforts and pipe line interdiction. In late August, a multitude of APD readings, sensor activations, and visual reconnaissance sightings indicated that possibly elements of the battalion were moving from north of Highway 19 to the south on their way to their base area for resupply. On 1 September, 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division terminated their operation against the 16th North Vietnamese Army Regiment northeast of AN KHE. The Brigade had successfully thrust the 16th Regiment out of their new base area and had accounted for over 300 North Vietnamese/Viet Cong killed and 5000 pounds of rice cap-
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tured. In mid-September, 1st Brigade, 7th Infantry Division, completed operations aimed at the 95th B Regiment which resulted in numerous enemy losses of personnel and equipment and a scattering of enemy elements.

d. (c) Operations. (Operational statistics attached at enclosure 2).

(1) Units Supported and Maintenance Standdowns: (Number of Days).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>1st BDE</th>
<th>2d BDE</th>
<th>3d BDE</th>
<th>TF FIGHTER</th>
<th>73d</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
<th>DONUT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TRP A</td>
<td>69 1/2</td>
<td>13 1/2</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRP B</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12 1/2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1/2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRP C</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRP D</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) 1st Infantry Division Operations Supported:

(a) The 1st Infantry Division's general operations plan is Operation HUÉS. The mission for Operation HUÉS is to conduct sustained, coordinated and combined offensive operations to destroy enemy main and local force units, destroy or neutralize enemy base areas, interdict high-speed infiltration routes, conduct operations wherever possible with Army Republic of Vietnam and Government of Vietnam agencies to assist in the protection of urban areas, and to support Government of Vietnam pacification efforts and civil programs.

(b) The Squadron provided support to the 1st Infantry Division's participation in the FY 1969 Government of Vietnam Pacification and Development Plan (WASHINGTON CHARGE).

(c) During the reporting period, Troop A operated exclusively within a 10 kilometer radius of Air Base in support of the 1st and 2d Brigades, 1st Infantry Division. The troop was targeted against elements of the 16th and 95th B North Vietnamese Army Regiments. Troop A was extremely successful in locating the enemy base areas, bunker complexes, and infiltration routes. The aero rifle platoon was inserted a total of 42 times in developing situations and searching suspected enemy locations and complexes. The infantry brigades were very successful in exploiting situations developed by the air cavalry troop's reconnaissance efforts. By employing organic firepower, airstrikes, and artillery, Troop A was instrumental in inflicting devastating destruction on the enemy forces.

(d) Troop B provided reconnaissance and security support for all three brigades of the 1st Infantry Division during the month of August. The troop supported the 1st Brigade a total of 12 days during the month. During these
12 days, Troop B developed the situation in 6 different locations of the 1st Brigade's area of operation to such a degree that a decision was made by the 4th Infantry Division Commander to conduct multi-battalion operations in all 6 areas. All 6 operations were conducted and were highly successful. The troop's support of the 2d and 3d Brigades had no significant activities. On 31 August 1969, Troop B was assigned Operational Control to Task Force Fighter, a 4th Infantry Division element, and deployed to BAN HE THUOT - EAST. The mission of the troop was to conduct reconnaissance, security and surveillance operations in general support of the 23d Division, Army Republic of Vietnam in the vicinity of BU PRANG Special Forces Camp (YU92560). Bad weather hampered the troop's operations during the entire month of September and a majority of October. The troop located and destroyed numerous bunker and structure complexes throughout the assigned area of operations. Most of the complexes were occupied or indicated signs of recent usage. Numerous high speed trails with heavy recent use were discovered throughout the area of operations. Initially, only small groups of individuals were observed and engaged. Contact rapidly intensified the last week of October. During the period, Troop B inserted the area rifle platoon a total of 17 times.

(c) Troop C provided reconnaissance, security, and surveillance support for the 173d Airborne Brigade during the entire reporting period. The majority of the significant activities of the troop were conducted in the All LCA Valley and surrounding mountainous terrain. Enemy contact varied from small groups to reinforced company size forces. Numerous bunkers, cave and tunnel complexes were discovered by the troop. All of the complexes were either occupied or indicated signs of recent usage. Troop C inserted the area rifle platoon 19 times during the reporting period.

(f) Troop D conducted two reconnaissance-in-force operations in the CAMP EUNARI tactical area of responsibility during the month of August with no significant incidents. The troop was assigned Operational Control to Task Force Fighter on 31 August 1969. The unit deployed to BAN HE THUOT - EAST with all organic vehicles in convoy. The troop was assigned the mission of providing one platoon for security of an ammunition supply point at BAN HE THUOT - EAST and the other two platoons were positioned at BU PRANG Special Forces Camp as an airborne immediate reaction force for Troop B. The troop had no significant incidents or activities during September and October.

a. (U) Organization. No change since last ORLL.

f. (U) Training.

(1) The Army Aviation Refresher Training School Program: The Squadron's maintenance program has been greatly enhanced as a result of refresher training provided by the Army Aviation Refresher Training courses.
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breakdown of allocations is included in inclosure 3.

(2) Aviation Training: (See inclosure 3)

(3) Special Training:

(a) Two individuals completed the Jungle Environmental Survival Training
course in the Philippine Islands.

(b) One individual completed the Avionics Maintenance Course in QUI
NHOI, Republic of Vietnam.

g. (c) Logistics,

(1) Supplies:

(a) Class I - Rations for Squadron elements at C/JP EMRI were drawn
from the 1st Infantry Division. Rations for Troop A were drawn from 1st
Brigade, 1st Infantry Division at AN KHE. Troops B and D were drawn from
1st Logistic Command Logistical Support Activity at AN KHE THUOT - EAST,
and Troop C drew their rations from the Logistical Support Activity at AN
SON.

(b) Class II - Supplies were requisitioned from 68th Supply and Ser-
vices Battalion at PHNUI, Republic of Vietnam.

(c) Class III - Package POL products were requisitioned through the
68th Supply and Services Battalion and issued by the S-4 to the troops.
POL for Troop A was supplied by the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division at
AN KHE. POL for Troop C was supplied by 1st Logistic Command Logistical
Support Activity at AN SON. POL for Troops B and D was supplied by the 1st
Logistic Command Logistical Support Activity at AN KHE THUOT - EAST.

(d) Class IV - Construction was requested through the local PA & E by
the unit commanders.

(e) Class V - Ammunition was requisitioned from Ammunition Supply
Points 340, 341, 1st Logistic Command Logistical Support Activity at
AN KHE THUOT - EAST, and QUI NHOI Support Command.

(f) Class VII - Major and items were requisitioned from 68th Supply
and Services Battalion.

(2) Requisitions submitted during quarter:

Nonexpendable - 287
Requisitions completed - 39
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Requisitions cancelled - 23
Turn-ins made - 112

(3) A reconciliation of all outstanding requisitions was made with 60th Supply and Services Battalion each month.

(4) Reports of Survey submitted - 13

(5) Combat losses submitted - 17

h. (U) Communications. Signal and Message Center Operations.

(1) During this quarter the total messages sent and received increased by 19%. This represents an increase of outgoing traffic by 16% and incoming by 20%. Total courier messages decreased by 10%, however, incoming courier messages increased by 11%. On 31 August 1969, a detachment from the communications platoon was dispatched to BAN IE THUOT - EAST, to take care of the traffic for the forward element and Troop B. The entire communications platoon is operating at 90% strength, while maintaining two separate communications facilities. Operational statistics are at enclosure 4.

(2) Switchboard operations indicate an average increase of 75 calls per day. This is an overall increase of 15%. The communications platoon is also maintaining a switchboard operation at BAN IE THUOT - EAST for forward elements.

i. (U) Material.

(a) Aircraft Maintenance:

(1) Aircraft maintenance support is provided to the Squadron by two Direct Support Units as indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT/LOCATION</th>
<th>DSU/LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq Troop - CAMP ENARI</td>
<td>60th DSU - CAMP HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop A - CAMP RUDCLIFF, LAM KHE</td>
<td>60th DSU - CAMP HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop B - CAMP ENARI</td>
<td>60th DSU - CAMP HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop C - LAM ARMY HELIPORT</td>
<td>79th DSU - QUI Nhon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Because of the wide dispersion of the units, coordination of heavy maintenance and supply has been a difficult problem.

(3) When Troop B deployed to BAN IE THUOT - EAST, a portion of the unit's maintenance element moved with the troop to perform unscheduled maintenance and light combat damage. All heavy maintenance, to include
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preventive maintenance periods were accomplished at CAMP BAY.

(b) Vehicle Maintenance: Vehicle maintenance support is provided to
the Squadron by three Direct Support Units as indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PSN/LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq Troop</td>
<td>62d Maintenance Battalion - PLEIKU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop A</td>
<td>560th Maintenance Battalion - IV KHE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop B</td>
<td>62d Maintenance Battalion - PLEIKU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop C</td>
<td>5th Maintenance Battalion - IV SON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop D</td>
<td>62d Maintenance Battalion - PLEIKU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

j. (U) Civil Affairs.

(1) General: Major areas of concentration during the last quarter were village defenses, sanitation, education and improvement of overall living conditions.

(2) Operation and Training Activities:

(a) PLEI POC 180 (AR003366): During the past quarter the Civil Affairs team assisted in organizing a People's Self Defense Force and gave basic training for weapons to aware. They also assisted the villagers in better methods of sanitation and improvement of living conditions. They assisted the school by supplying basic items such as blackboards, pencils, paper, etc.

(b) IV SON (AR617376): During the past quarter the Civil Affairs team started and is continuing the training of two nurses. The Civil Affairs team has assisted the Popular Forces Platoon in improving their perimeter defenses by supplying sandbags, concertina wire, etc. They also assisted in obtaining ammunition and weapons (K-16) for the Popular Forces. The Civil Affairs team, working with Division G-5, enrolled a small deaf boy in a school for the deaf at Saigon. Assistance was provided the villagers to improve sanitation and overall living conditions.

(3) Logistics - The Civil Affairs received support from LE TRUCK District, the Squadron Chaplain, PLEIKU Air Base S-5, and various other elements.

(b) Civil Affairs - The following is a list of projects completed during the last quarter.

(a) Health - Plague shots were given to personnel in both villages, supplies were given to a new dispensary, and training for two nurses was completed.
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(b) Education - All schools were supplied with the necessary equipment to start their term. Necessary repairs were made to the school building and a house was constructed for the school teacher.

(c) Sanitation - A general cleanup program was conducted throughout both villages. They were sprayed with insecticide and three latrines were constructed.

(d) Food Production - 600 fruit trees were planted.

(e) Transportation - Transportation was provided to move the people to the medical facilities and market. Maximum effort was made to transport the personnel to the polls on election day.

(f) Psychological Operations - Movies were shown on a monthly basis at each village.

(g) Other - Constructed 4 gates with archways at various needed locations such as entrance to Popular Force compound, entrance to school, entrances to villages.

k. (U) Accident Prevention.

(1) The accident rate (per 100,000 flying hours) was 29.5 for this quarter.

(2) Accident rate statistics for this quarter are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>TOTAL FLYING HOURS</th>
<th>NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS</th>
<th>RATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>6312</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>31.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>5353</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>56.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>5226</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>00.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Accident Summary for Quarter by Month:

(a) August: Two accidents.

1. 6 August 1969, AH-10, aircraft #67-15535, Major:

Pilot was covering a combat assault insertion. Upon climbout from gun run, the cockpit began to fill with smoke and RFI deteriorated rapidly. The pilot executed a forced landing, however the tail boom was severed on touchdown.

2. 13 August 1969, CH-6A, aircraft #67-16559, Major:
Pilot was conducting a test flight. Pilot entered autorotation to perform maintenance check and failed to initiate power recovery until aircraft was 150 feet above ground level. Full recovery was not completed prior to touchdown and aircraft landed hard severing tail boom.

(b) September: Three accidents.

1. 17 September 1969, AH-1G, aircraft #67-15649, Major:

Pilot was on take-off when tail rotor failure with fixed left pedal was experienced. Pilot continued flight and executed running landing at PJU CAF AFB. The pilot touched down with excessive airspeed (approximately 70 knots), aircraft slid off runway sustaining major damage.

2. 22 September 1969, OH-6A, aircraft #66-7886, Major:

Pilot in traffic pattern for POL when engine failed due to fuel exhaustion. Pilot entered autorotation and executed a forced landing. The tail boom was severed upon touchdown. Aircraft had been flown for 05+30 hours.

3. 22 September 1969, OH-6A, aircraft #67-16619, Major:

Instructor Pilot gave student simulated forced landing while on demand in traffic pattern. Engine failed when throttle was rolled off; IF took controls and autorotated to ground. Tail boom was severed upon touchdown.

(c) October: No accidents.

1. Religious Activities.

(1) During the quarter the Squadron Chaplain conducted a total of 15 Sunday and 14 Protestant services, with a total attendance of 1,063.

(2) Catholic Mass was conducted 12 times with a total attendance of 236.

(3) Religious services of both denominations were conducted at CLIP EMPL, LIEF AIRFIELD, AN KBK, BIH 1E THUOT - EAST and BU PRING.

(4) The Squadron Chaplain made 262 visits to the troop areas, contacted 1,077 individuals, and visited 14 men who were hospitalized.

(5) The Squadron Chapel contributed $216.05 to the Protestant Chaplain's Fund and $211.90 to the Catholic Fund.
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AVDSC-OC 8 November 1969
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RC5 GS FOR-65 (R2) (U)

(6) The Chaplain distributed 12 boxes of used clothing to the villagers of FLEX PCO 1100. The clothing came from the Pilgrim Congregational Church, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA.

m. (U) Medical Section.

(1) The medical section of this squadron consists of a flight surgeon, 11 medics, and one section sergeant. A medic is assigned to each of the three aero-rifle platoons and one to each of Troop D's three platoons. One medic operates a forward aid station at BAN IE THUOT - EAST. Since the last quarter, the troops have been deployed to forward areas where the main medical support is in the hands of another flight surgeon.

(2) At CAMP ENARI the Squadron aid station is supported by the 4th Medical Battalion with laboratory, X-ray, and medical supply. The troop medics receive support from this aid station on a local basis.

(3) With the forward deployment of the troops and the resultant decrease in living conditions, particularly in BAN IE THUOT - EAST and BAN PREJIG, greater emphasis has been placed on field sanitation. So far, the health of the command has not been adversely affected and remains at its previous high standard.

(u) Medical Statistics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PREVIOUS QUARTER</th>
<th>REPORTING QUARTER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patient visits</td>
<td>1394</td>
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<tr>
<td>Immunizations</td>
<td>1050</td>
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<tr>
<td>Venereal disease</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diarrhea</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hepatitis</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. (U) Personnel. None.

b. (U) Intelligence. None.

c. (C) Operations.

(1) Use of Rockets to Clear Triple Canopy Jungle.

(a) OBSERVATION: The area of operations in southern II Corps around
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CS PC8-65 (R2) (U)

BU PRAI1Q and BU QIA, Map, is 90% triple canopy jungle. The thick canopy prevented the scout aircraft from observing the ground in the majority of the area.

(b) EVALUATION:

1. When the scouts would locate an area in which enemy activity, structures, or firing positions were suspected, but obscured by the jungle canopy, the gunships would make a low angle run firing two to three pairs of rockets. The rockets would blow away the jungle canopy and afford the scouts an excellent view of the ground. It was determined that the 17 pound rockets were more effective than the 10 pound rockets.

2. This procedure is limited at times by the availability of rockets.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that other air cavalry units operating in similar type terrain employ the same method of clearing a suspected enemy area.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: This system has been adopted within the squadron whenever the situation dictates and the supply of rockets is available.

(2) Initial Entry into Area of Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: On many occasions while operating in the II Corps area the Command and Control aircraft would proceed to the area of operations ahead of the reconnaissance team and circle the area, then the reconnaissance team would enter the area led by the Cobra gunships. The noise of the gunships and the conspicuous circling of the Command and Control aircraft would provide good warning to any enemy personnel in the area that an operation was pending, and thus afford him time to take evasive action and seek cover and concealment.

(b) EVALUATION: The OH-6A is less conspicuous in size as well as noise level, than the UH-1H and AH-1G aircraft. It has been found that if the OH-6A's proceed to the area first, followed close behind by the gunships, and then the Command and Control aircraft, there would be a greater element of surprise on any enemy. This procedure has been utilized on numerous occasions catching unsuspecting enemy troops in the open.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that whenever feasible other air cavalry units employ this method of initial entry into an area of operations.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: This system has been adopted within the squadron when weather permits.
(3) Use of National Police in Conjunction with Last Light Perimeter Visual Reconnaissance.

(a) OBSERVATION: While conducting the last light visual reconnaissance around the BAN ME THUOT airfield, numerous suspicious personnel were observed. Some of the personnel would run into the underbrush and take evasive action when spotted by the observation aircraft. This presented a problem in that the civilians who lived in the area were supposedly friendly, and apprehension of these personnel (should they be innocent civilians) could be embarrassing. Weapons could not be fired as a warning device for fear of injuring other innocent personnel.

(b) EVALUATION: The National Police in BAN ME THUOT were requested to provide a small force (3 or 4 men). These personnel flew in a UH-1H aircraft (with a radio operator and an interpreter) as part of the visual reconnaissance team. When suspicious personnel were encountered, the National Police would be inserted. They would determine if the individual concerned should be detained or released. This procedure has been utilized very effectively in the BAN ME THUOT area, and on several occasions VC suspects were detained.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that other elements operating in similar areas, utilize the above procedures on their last light visual reconnaissance.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: This procedure has been adopted within the Squadron when the National Police are available.

(b) Use of Air Cavalry Troop Assets for Insertion/Extraction of Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP).

(a) OBSERVATION: During the past quarter one troop performed 23 insertion/extraction operations. Each of these missions normally require 2 gunships (AH-1G) and 1 troop ship (UH-1H) for approximately two hours.

(b) EVALUATION: The employment of the air cavalry troop for insertion/ extraction of LRRP's leaves the remaining troop assets unused. Although the troop does have the capability to perform the mission, the use of the gun team and the troop ship prevents the remaining troop elements from being productive.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that commanders who are given operational control of air cavalry assets be apprised of the loss of productive combat power in the assignment of LRRP insertion/extraction missions to air cavalry units.
AVIANE-OC

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CS RN-65 (R2) (U)

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Supported unit commanders are continually oriented on the disadvantages of using air cavalry assets for LRP missions.

(5) Ground Cavalry Reconnaissance Tactics.

(a) OBSERVATION: The vehicle mounted ground troop of the air cavalry squadron is often called upon to perform reconnaissance of areas that are populated by a large number of rivers and stream beds with overlooking high ground. It was observed that the reconnaissance platoons often used tactics equivalent to a single column operating as close to the river as possible.

(b) EVALUATION: While providing the greatest maximum firepower and good observation to the flank, hence possible enemy locations, this formation does little in providing for a full reconnaissance of the area. The use of two teams, each composed of two scout vehicles and one 106 gun jeep, provides for all round security as well as excellent reconnaissance. One team operates close to the river line, while the other operates in the high ground overlooking the stream. Either alternate or successive bounds can be employed by the scouts, while the 106 jeep can provide immediate heavy support for his team. The lower team conducts a close reconnaissance of the stream line, supported, if necessary, by the infantry section. The upper team flushes out possible ambushes from above, provides necessary supporting fire for the lower team and conducts a thorough area reconnaissance of the high ground. From this overlooking position it can observe enemy activity in the valley.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that the vehicle mounted ground units adopt this type reconnaissance in appropriate terrain.

(a) COMMAND ACTION: Terrain permitting, the ground unit of this squadron employs this technique.

c. (U) Organization. None.

c. (U) Training.

(l) Tail Rotor Failures Procedures.

(a) OBSERVATION: Most of the new aviators arriving in this command are unfamiliar with the emergency procedures to follow when a tail rotor failure occurs.

(b) EVALUATION: The new aviator has a serious problem understanding procedures to be followed during a tail rotor failure. He does not under-
stand that he can control the "yawing" of the aircraft by adding or reducing power and that the proper power application or reduction can be used to safely land the aircraft. The new aviator has a tendency to apply a single solution for all types of tail rotor failures. This in itself is a prime example of his limited understanding and knowledge of this emergency procedure.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is felt that the student receives adequate classroom instruction on tail rotor failures but the problem arises from the lack of demonstration and experience. It is recommended that the US Army Aviation School place more emphasis on performing simulated tail rotor failures to provide the aviator with a higher degree of confidence, understanding and ability in performing this maneuver.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: All newly assigned aviators receive a thorough briefing by an IP on tail rotor failures and all other emergency procedures. During his initial in-country checkride the aviator is given instruction on tail rotor failures and must be able to satisfactorily perform this maneuver prior to being released to fly missions.

2) Improper use of AH-1G Forward Battery Compartment.

(a) OBSERVATION: This command has experienced two AH-1G forward battery compartment fires during the last three months.

(b) EVALUATION: Pilots and crewchiefs were using the forward battery compartment as a storage area for all types of extraneous objects and materials, including metal articles and oily rags. The forward battery compartment circuit breaker is being depressed by weight and motion of these articles and arcing or shorting occurs due to contact between metal objects and the battery cable.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all troop commanders inform all pilots and crew personnel in their respective units that the forward battery compartment is not a storage compartment and that it will be kept completely free of all extraneous materials in the future.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: All AH-1G instructor pilots and standardization instructor pilots are including this information on in-country and ninety day standardization rides. A letter has been distributed to all units in this command emphasizing inspection of the forward battery compartment during pre-flight and daily operation.

f. (U) Logistics. None.

g. (U) Communication. None.

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AVBACB-0C
8 November 1969
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry, Period Ending 31 October 1969, HCS CS FOR-65 (R2) (U)


(2) EVALUATION: Aircraft components have been deleted from this TB and cannot be found in the applicable aircraft TM. Aircraft condition change items have been changed to time change items, however the applicable TM's were not changed to state the TBO of the item. This publication has confused the technical inspectors in the field. Aircraft historical records cannot be maintained properly if the TM's sent to the field are inaccurate.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: When a change, or new manual, such as TB 55-1500-307-25 is published, the necessary changes to other manuals should be accomplished at the same time. The problem could be eliminated if all the information necessary to maintain records on time change components would be consolidated in one publication.

(4) COMMAND ACTION: All aircraft maintenance personnel have been informed of the conflict between the two publications. A recommended change was submitted to DA Publications, DA Form 2026.

II. (U) Medical. Malaria:

(1) OBSERVATION: The two cases of malaria in the squadron both occurred in personnel on RER or out-processing for DEHLS.

(2) EVALUATION: Personnel seem to feel that malaria chemoprophylaxis is an in-country activity and that as they leave Vietnam they can do away with the anti-malaria pills. This is despite the mandatory malaria debriefing. The importance of continued intake of Dapsone and Chloroquine-Primaquine is borne out by the number of people who develop malaria after leaving Vietnam. The malaria organism can be present in the body without the person being aware of it. It is almost always killed if the anti-malarial medicine is continued as directed upon leaving Vietnam. (One Dapsone pill daily for 30 days, and one Chloroquine-Primaquine pill weekly for eight weeks). If these are not taken in this manner, the malaria organism may be killed and malaria will result.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: More thorough malaria debriefing and classes on malaria seem warranted.

(4) COMMAND ACTION: All personnel are out-processed through the aid station and are briefed on the importance of continued consumption of the
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AVMCB-6C

SUSJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry, Period Ending 31 October 1969, AOS C9 F4b-65 (R2) (U)

pills upon leaving Vietnam. A series of classes have been instituted for all incoming personnel as well.


(1) OBSERVATION: This command has experienced 6 major AH-1G accidents in the last 12 months due to unsuccessful autorotations.

(2) EVALUATION: The program of instruction in the CONUS AH-1G transition/Gunnnery Courses does not include touchdown autorotations. The unit IP's have found that the majority of the AH-1G pilots have difficulty in judging rate of closure during autorotations and also with keeping the nose of the aircraft aligned with the runway at touchdown. The pilots also lack confidence in their ability to successfully execute an autorotation as is demonstrated by their refusal to jettison rocket pods during emergency descents (they feel the pods will prevent the aircraft from rolling over at touchdown). The shortcomings have seriously affected the pilots' ability to successfully cope with an inflight emergency.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: More emphasis be placed on touchdown autorotations during the AH-1G Transition course at the Army Aviation School.

(4) COMMAND ACTION: All AH-1C IP/SIP's are placing maximum emphasis on autorotational proficiency during in-country and 90 days standardization rides. Particular emphasis is placed on rate of closure, alignment with runway, and increasing the pilot's confidence in his ability to successfully execute a forced landing.

5 Incl
as
Incl 1 and 4 wd HQ, DA

George R. Kray
LTC, AR
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
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7 CG, 17th ACR (CBT), ATTN: AVMBC-6C, APO 96210

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CG, 4th Inf Div, ATTN: AVMBC-6C, APO 96262
1 Each Organic Troop

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AVExCi-tU (19 Nov 69) 1st Ind
SUBJCT: Operational report Lessons Learned of 7th Squadron, 17th
Cavalry for Period Ending 31 October 1969, ACS CSFM-65
(id) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 17TH AVIATION GROUP, APO 96240 25 November 1969

TO: Department of the Army (ACSFOH, DA), Washington, D.C. 20310
Commanding General, I Field Forces Vietnam, APO 96350

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the attached report, con-
siders it to be adequate, and concurs with the contents as stated,
except as indicated below.

2. (C) The following comments and recommendations are submitted:


   (1) Paragraph 1(a), Page 1, (U) List of subordinate units
   reflecting the organizational structure should be an inclosure to
   the report. Reference USAV Regulation 525-15, Para 5b(1)(b).

   (2) Paragraph 1c, Page 4, (C) Intelligence. The Intelligence
   portion should contain information of significant historical value.
   Paragraphs c(2)(a) through (e) contain an intelligence summary.
   This information should be omitted from future O&L Reports.

   (3) Paragraph 1f, Page 8, Training. (U) This paragraph should
   indicate the number of days during the reporting period that the unit
   engaged in training. Reference USAV Regulation 525-15, Para 5b(1)(c).

b. Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Eval-
   uations and Recommendations.

   (1) Paragraph 2e(2), Page 18, Improper use of AH-1G Forward
   Battery Compart. (U) 17th Aviation Group (Combat) SOP, Annex
   2, Policy File states that no item will be stored in any aircraft
   compartment other than the cargo compartment. This policy applies
   to all aircraft within the Group.

   (2) Paragraph 2h(1), Page 19, Material. (U) Non-concur. The
   two manuals in question are not in conflict with one another. Both
   are dated Aug 69, and it is presumed that the comment was based on
   comparison with an outdated -20.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

MARC I. TURNAS
CPT, ADA
Adjutant

CF: 7/17th ACS 21

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CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GG-HIST (8 Nov 69) 2d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry,
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350

TO: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO 96384

1. (U) This headquarters has evaluated subject ORLL and forwarding
endorsement and concurs.

2. (U) Reference paragraph 1g(1)(a)&(c): References to 1st Log Cmd
Logistical Support activity at AN SON should be changed to read USASC, QNH.

3. (C) Reference para 2c(2): Concur. The cited procedure for using
an OH-6A aircraft in lieu of a larger aircraft to scout a new AO
followed immediately by gunships and command and control aircraft is
excellent from the point of view of security. This procedure will
be disseminated to all units in II CTZ.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

FREDERICK E. HOLLAND
LT AGG
ASST AG

CF:
1 - CO, 17th Avn Gp (Cbt)
1 - CO, 7th Sqdn, 17th Cav
DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384 17 DEC 1969

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96325
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20330

1. This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs with the comments as indorsed, except as noted below.

2. The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

   a. Paragraph 2a(1), page 17 addresses inadequate tail rotor failure training. New aviators arriving in country since September 1969 have been given in-flight training in tail rotor failure procedures in UH-1 aircraft at the United States Army Aviation School (USAAVNS); however, these maneuvers are not currently taught in LOH and AH-1G aircraft. To improve pilot ability in adequately coping with actual tail rotor failures, recommend Headquarters USARV request USAAVNS to include simulated tail rotor failures in programs of instruction for the LOH and AH-1G aircraft.

   b. Paragraph 2h, page 19 addresses contradictions between TB 55-1500-307-25 and the aircraft -20. Nonconcur. TB 55-1500-307-25, dated 5 August 1969, currently has three changes; change one, dated 23 September 1969; change two, dated 13 October 1969, and change three, dated 21 October 1969. Each of these three changes was issued to correct omissions and/or errors in the basic publication. TB 55-1500-307-25 is a consolidation of all time change and condition change items for all types of aircraft. The only variation from these established standards is the organizational maintenance manual (-20). According to paragraph 5e(1) of TB 55-1500-307-25, the appropriate organizational maintenance manual (-20) will be used to determine the correct component time change life when there is conflicting information presented in TB 55-1500-307-25. This paragraph also requests submission of a DA Form 2028 when maintenance personnel become confused by the two publications.

   c. Paragraph 21, page 19 discusses malaria cases of personnel on leave and R&R. The requirement to take malaria prevention pills while on R&R and leave and after final departure from Vietnam has been stressed repeatedly in the past. In accordance with USARV Regulation 40-4 (Prevention of Malaria), commanders of replacement facilities are
required to assure that personnel departing Vietnam have the required number of malaria pills, read and sign the malaria debriefing statement (MACV Form 270) and receive instruction concerning the requirement to take the pills after DEROS. Informal inquiry indicates that the need for malaria chemoprophylaxis has not always been stressed at R&R departure points; however, the USARV Preventive Medicine Officer has been apprised of this situation and will accomplish the following:

(1) Request more emphasis be placed on malaria briefings given to departing personnel at R&R centers.

(2) Consider a change in USARV Regulation 40-4 to clarify the need for malaria briefings at R&R centers.

In addition, a reminder of the need for malaria pills while on R&R and leave will be placed in the 1st Aviation Brigade bulletin and repeated every other month.

d. Paragraph 2j(1), page 20 addresses lack of proficiency in touchdown autorotations. The lack of touchdown autorotations in the AH-1G transition course at USAAVNS has created an additional training requirement on the units in 1st Aviation Brigade. To eliminate this requirement, request Headquarters USARV initiate a request for inclusion of touchdown autorotations in the program of instruction for AH-1G transition training at the United States Army Aviation School, Fort Rucker, Alabama.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ARTHUR W. LITTLE

Copy 3d Ind Furn:
CO, 7th Sqdn, 17th Cav

CPT AGC
Asst Adj.
HEAVY-DUTY (8 Nov 69) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry,
Period Ending 31 October, RDS 06 FOR-65 (R2)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 27 JAN 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned
for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, 7th
Squadron, 17th Cavalry and comments of endorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning "Use of Rockets to Clear Triple Canopy
      Jungle", page 14, paragraph 2c(1); concur. This technique has been used
      by other units in RVN with successful results.

   b. Reference item concerning "Use of Air Cavalry Troop Assets for
      Insertion/Extraction of Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP)", page 16,
      paragraph 2c(4); concur. While the air cavalry troop has the capability
      to perform LRRP insertions/extractions, to use them in this role may reduce
      their ability to perform in their primary role of reconnaissance or security.
      Other aviation assets are normally available to conduct this mission. The
      commander should carefully evaluate the degradation to the cavalry troop's
      capability prior to committing it to LRRP insertion/extraction missions.

   c. Reference item concerning "Tail Rotor Failure Procedures", page 17,
      paragraph 2e(1) and 3d Indorsement, paragraph 2a; concur with the recommend-
      ation, command action and the 3d Indorsement. This matter has been
      brought to the attention of the USAAVHS and the school is currently teach-
      ing touchdown fixed neutral and fixed right pitch tail rotor procedures.
      USAV has requested copies of USAAVHS standardization of maneuver guides
      so that the procedures used in USAAVHS can be incorporated in the USAV
      standardization of maneuvers guides. This matter will be discussed with
      the USAV member of the COMARC Liaison Team during his visit to USAV
      in January 1970.

   d. Reference item concerning "Malaria", page 19, paragraph 21; 1st
      Indorsement, paragraph 2b(2) and 3d Indorsement, paragraph 2e; concur.
      This item was published in Commander's Notes, 31 October 1969.
AVCOC-DST (9 Nov 69) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 October, RGS 06 FOR-65 (R2)

   e. Reference item concerning "Inadequate Training of AH-1G Pilots",
page 20, paragraph 2j and 3d Indorsement, paragraph 2d; concur with the
recommendation, command action and the 3d Indorsement. This matter will
be discussed with the USAAVNS member of the COMARO Liaison Team during
his visit to USARV in January 1970.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L. D. MURRAY
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Oy furn:
7th Squadron, 17th Cav
1st Avn Bde
GPOP-OT (8 Nov 69) 5th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry for Period
Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 9 FEB 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]
C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Ass AG
### OPERATIONAL STATISTICS FOR THE PERIOD

#### 1. (C) Results:

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<thead>
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<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>TROOPS</th>
<th>CARGO</th>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Detainees: 86

Enemy Material Captured:

- 8 - NVA Packs
- 1 - Bolt Action Rifle
- 2 - SKS Rifles
- 6 - AK-47 Rifles
- 20 - AK-47 Rounds
- 3 - Cal .30 Machine Guns
- 1 - .12 Gauge Shotgun
- 3 - 60 Millimeter Rocket Rounds
- 1 - 60 Millimeter Rocket Launcher
- 10 - 60 Millimeter Mortar Rounds
- 2 - 81 Millimeter Mortar Rounds
- 4 - 82 Millimeter Mortar Rounds
- 10 - Cal .50 Machine Gun Rounds
- 13 - 57 Millimeter Rocket Launcher Rounds
- 4 - 75 Millimeter Rocket Launcher Rounds
- 1 - 105 Millimeter Rocket Round
- 5 - Chinese Grenades
- 101 - Pounds of Plastic Explosives
- 734,850 Plasters from a KIA

Enemy Material Destroyed:

- 6 - Sampans
- 470 - Pounds of Rice
- 6 - Bicycles
- 2 - Cal .50 Machine Guns
- 3 - AK-47 Rifles
- 1 - 60 Millimeter Rocket Launcher
- 4 - 60 Millimeter Rockets
- 3 - Fish Traps
- 1 - NVA Pack

#### 2. (C) Aircraft Lost and Damaged:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>LOST</th>
<th>DAMAGED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ TRP</td>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TROOP A</td>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>6 (NOTE #1)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TROOPB</td>
<td>CH-4A</td>
<td>2 (NOTE #2)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>1 (NOTE #3)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AH-10</td>
<td>1 (NOTE #5)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Incl. 2

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**TROOP C**
- **CH-6A**: 2 (NOTE #6)
- **UH-1H**: 5
- **AH-10**: 2 (NOTE #7)

**NOTE #1.** Two were crash damage, one was combat damage, and one was extensive maintenance.

**NOTE #2.** Both were crash damage.

**NOTE #3.** Three were crash damage, two were combat damage, and four were extensive maintenance.

**NOTE #4.** Extensive maintenance.

**NOTE #5.** Crash damage.

**NOTE #6.** Both were combat damage.

**NOTE #7.** Both were crash damage.

3. **(C) Flying Hour Statistics For The Period**:
   - **a.** The average flying hours by type aircraft:
     - **CH-6A**: 199.1
     - **AH-10**: 187.1
     - **UH-1H**: 220.1

   - **b.** The average flying hours by type aircraft by troop:
     - **HQ TROOP A**: 221.8
     - **TROOP C**: 181.8
     - **TROOP C**: 193.8
     - **TROOP B**: 1636
     - **TROOP B**: 1810
     - **TROOP B**: 1731
     - **TROOP C**: 1744
     - **TROOP C**: 1653
     - **TOTAL**: 5376

   - **c.** The cumulative flying hours by troop and by type aircraft:
     - **UNIT**: **OH-6A** | **AH-10** | **UH-1H** | **TOTAL**
     - **HQ TROOP**: 1193
     - **TROOP A**: 1719
     - **TROOP B**: 1819
     - **TROOP C**: 1731
     - **TOTAL**: 6383

---

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Incl 2
TRAINING AS OF 31 OCTOBER 1969

1. (U) The AARTS Program:

**ALLOCATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COURSES</th>
<th>AUGUST</th>
<th>SEPTEMBER</th>
<th>OCTOBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>REC'D</td>
<td>FILLED</td>
<td>REC'D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOH Airframe</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H Airframe</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G Airframe</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOH Engine</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G Armament for Off</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G Armament for EM</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tech Supply</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tech Inspector</td>
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2. (U) Transition:

**ALLOCATIONS**

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<th>SEPTEMBER</th>
<th>OCTOBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>REC'D</td>
<td>FILLED</td>
<td>REC'D</td>
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<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. (U) IP/SIP:

**ALLOCATIONS**

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<th>AUGUST</th>
<th>SEPTEMBER</th>
<th>OCTOBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>REC'D</td>
<td>FILLED</td>
<td>REC'D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOH</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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Incl 3
1. **Aircraft Strength as of 31 October 1969:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OH-6A</th>
<th>AH-1G</th>
<th>UH-1H</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AUTH/AOG</td>
<td>AUTH/AOG</td>
<td>AUTH/AOG</td>
<td>AUTH/AOG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ TROOP</td>
<td>10/9</td>
<td>9/9</td>
<td>8/8</td>
<td>7/5/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TROOP A</td>
<td>10/9</td>
<td>9/9</td>
<td>8/8</td>
<td>7/5/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TROOP B</td>
<td>10/9</td>
<td>9/8</td>
<td>8/8</td>
<td>7/5/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TROOP C</td>
<td>10/9</td>
<td>9/8</td>
<td>8/8</td>
<td>7/5/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>30/27</td>
<td>27/26</td>
<td>31/29</td>
<td>88/82</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

2. **Average Aircraft Availability by Troop by Type Aircraft:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>OH-6A</th>
<th>AH-1G</th>
<th>UH-1H</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>AUTH/AOG</td>
<td>AUTH/AOG</td>
<td>AUTH/AOG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ TROOP</td>
<td>60% OR</td>
<td>60% OR</td>
<td>70% OR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22% NCRS</td>
<td>20% NCRS</td>
<td>13% NCRS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10% NORM</td>
<td>20% NORM</td>
<td>13% NORM</td>
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<tr>
<td>TROOP A</td>
<td>73% CR</td>
<td>73% CR</td>
<td>73% CR</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11% NCRS</td>
<td>10% NCRS</td>
<td>13% NCRS</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13% NORM</td>
<td>17% NORM</td>
<td>13% NORM</td>
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<tr>
<td>TROOP B</td>
<td>76% CR</td>
<td>76% CR</td>
<td>76% CR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15% NCRS</td>
<td>13% NCRS</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9% NORM</td>
<td>8% NORM</td>
<td>9% NORM</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug 69 to 31 Oct 69.

CO, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry

**Report Date**
8 November 1969

**Contract or Grant No**

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