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SECURITY

MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

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Subject: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, United States Army Support Command, DaNang, Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

By order of the Secretary of the Army:

Robert E. Lynch
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

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10 December 1969


THRU: Commanding General
1st Logistical Command
ATTN: AVCA-GO-O
APO 96384

Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-DST
APO 96375

Commander in Chief
United States Army Pacific
ATTN: GROP-OT
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (C) Section I, Operation: Significant Activities.

a. The following personnel changes occurred within the US Army Support Command, Da Nang:

(1) Colonel Homer D. Smith replaced BG James W. Gunn on 15 October 1969 as Commanding Officer, Da Nang Support Command.

(2) Colonel John P. Dring replaced Colonel Walter B. Schlotterbeck on 25 October 1969 as Chief of Staff.

(3) LTC Harold D. Jensen, ACofS, Maintenance, departed for CONUS without replacement on 16 October 1969.

(4) LTC Howard D. Burtchett assumed the duties of ACofS, Services, on 1 September 1969 replacing LTC Clarence A. Lange, who departed.

(5) MAJ Bill G. Belcher replaced Captain Fredric Weisberg on 21 August 1969 as Secretary of the General Staff.

b. The US Army Support Command, Da Nang (USASUPCOM, DNG) continued to provide logistical support to all US Army units operating in the 1st Corps Tactical Zone (1CTZ).
Mortuary and property disposal services were provided to all US Forces in the ICTZ and in support of Free World Military Armed Forces (FWMAF) as directed. During this reporting period, the USASUPCOM, DNG was engaged in logistical support for 92 days. The logistical operations involved deployment of the Command's units in direct support of the Americal Division in Southern I Corps; 101st Airborne Division (AM) operating in the vicinity of Phu Bai; 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) operating in the vicinity of Quang Tri and; 3rd Squadron, 5th Armored Cavalry Regiment operating in the vicinity of Camp Evans. In addition, all non-divisional Army units operating within ICTZ were supported. Class I was provided to the Marines in the Phu Bai area and the Naval Detachment at Sa Huynh. Inclosure 1 contains the organizational chart.

c. Assistant Chief of Staff, Comptroller.

(1) Established a Cost Reduction Program within the Support Command to include an orientation briefing to the Cost Reduction Monitors of the Headquarter's staff and subordinate commands. Received a $500,000 goal from Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command for FY 70.

(2) Established a system to account for manpower utilized through the Support Command.

(3) Made feasibility study for locating a branch office of Chase Manhattan Bank in 80th General Support Group compound. Study showed:

(a) 64th Finance Section would have to secure the funds, but it lacks adequate space to handle the increase of funds.

(b) The only service the branch office would offer is the receipt of deposits.

(c) Amount of personnel to benefit from branch office was insignificant, compared to the work involved to establish and maintain the branch.

(4) Coordinated Conversion Day operation with 64th Finance Section. No unusual problems were experienced in this area.

(5) Made order-ship time study on requisitions filled at Da Nang Depot.

d. Assistant Chief of Staff, Security, Plans and Operations.

(1) Security Division.

(a) The ACofS, SP&O Security Division continued its normal functions during the past three months.
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2. Emphasis was also placed on weapons security to preclude weapons incidents involving Support Command personnel.

3. Enemy activity throughout ICTZ continued at a low level. The majority of enemy units avoided contact with friendly units and were mostly engaged in food gathering missions in preparation for the monsoon season. Enemy interdiction of LOC's remained at a low level. Several bridges were blown, and there were several instances of convoys being hit with command detonated mines. Convoy ambushes were light.

4. The 524th Military Intelligence Detachment continued to provide counterintelligence support for the command and its subordinate units.

(b) The 524th MI Detachment made counterintelligence inspections of the following during the period 1 August - 31 October: eight elements of the 80th General Support Group (GSG); nine elements of the 26th GSG; and one element of the 34th Supply and Service Battalion. Inspected units took appropriate actions to correct all deficiencies and were urged to insure that they did not recur in the future.

(c) Maps continued to be supplied by the Security Division to subordinate units. A complete map inventory was completed and necessary maps requisitioned.

(d) The Security Division, in conjunction with the Da Nang IG team, conducted six inspections of 80th GSG units; five inspections of 26th GSG units; four inspections of 34th Supply and Service Battalion units; and one inspection of 528th Quartermaster Battalion (Patri) units.

(e) The Security Division expanded its intelligence gathering and now receives intelligence information from the Air Force OSI Det 5003 and 5th Special Forces. The Security Division continued close liaison with Headquarters, III Marine Amphibious Force, Headquarters, I Corps, and Headquarters, XXIV Corps to insure timely collection and dissemination of intelligence to 1st Logistical Command and subordinate units.

(f) Enemy activity has been light to moderate during the period 1 August to 31 October. Most enemy initiated activity occurred during the month of August and slacked off to an uncommonly low level during October. The heaviest fighting and most severe contacts centered around the Hiep Duc area. On the whole, the enemy was content to limit itself to attacks by fire and small sapper type attacks.

1. The VC/NVA have been forced to send most of their units on food gathering missions to sustain them during the monsoon season. The VC/NVA have reportedly had difficulty in procuring rice and have been hindered greatly by allied operations, which have uncovered many large food caches.

2. The enemy has continued to use terrorist, proselyting and propaganda techniques against the civilian populace. Recent reports indicate the VC/NVA have attempted, in their propaganda techniques, to exploit the anti-war effort in CONUS. At this time, this has not appeared to have a significant effect on the civilian populace.
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(a) With the advent of the northeasterly monsoon season, the weather became a major factor in accomplishing the combat service support mission of the command during the month of October. Record rainfall was recorded in NICZT during this period, with primary LOC's being interdicted for periods of time. Routes and number of days interdicted were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ROUTE</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>DAYS CLOSED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>QL-1</td>
<td>Da Nang to Phu Bai</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QL-1</td>
<td>Hill 29 to Da Nang</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QL-1</td>
<td>Chu Lai to Quang Ngai</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QL-1</td>
<td>Quang Ngai to Duc Pho</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QL-1</td>
<td>Duc Pho to Sa Haynh</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Rainfall during the period 1-31 October was recorded as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>RAINFALL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phu Bai</td>
<td>75.06 inches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Da Nang</td>
<td>39.90 inches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chu Lai</td>
<td>44.05 inches</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No major logistical problems were encountered because of these conditions, as prior planning for the monsoon season had included provision for ample stockage at all supply points for just such a contingency.

(b) During the period August to October, this command lost 17 units through redeployment to CONUS under Keystone Eagle, Clear Adjust, or Keystone Cardinal. Sixteen of the units were reserve units, which deployed to Vietnam during the fall of 1968, and the seventeenth was a zero strength unit. Twelve replacement units were received, to continue the mission of the redeploying units. Units were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REDEPLOYING UNIT</th>
<th>REPLACEMENT UNIT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>452nd Supply Company</td>
<td>490th Supply Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>978th Army Postal Unit</td>
<td>40th Army Postal Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>630th Transportation Company</td>
<td>805th Transportation Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173rd Quartermaster Company</td>
<td>528th Quartermaster Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>336th Ordnance Battalion</td>
<td>528th Quartermaster Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126th Supply and Service Company</td>
<td>226th Supply and Service Company</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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REDEPLOYING UNIT

737th Transportation Company
259th Quartermaster Battalion
842nd Quartermaster Company
513th Maintenance Battalion
1002nd Supply and Service Company
426th Personnel Service Company
295th Ordnance Company
237th Maintenance Company
413th Finance Section
1018th Supply and Service Company
274th Fortification and Construction Platoon

REPLACEMENT UNIT

None
None
848th Quartermaster Platoon
2nd Maintenance Battalion
148th Supply and Service Company
None
661st Ordnance Company
555th Maintenance Company
None
334th Supply and Service Company
None

(c) The 101st Airborne Division (AM) in NICTZ redeployed Brigade size elements during the period as adjustments were made to compensate for the withdrawal of the 3rd Marine Division. Major changes were as follows:

1. The 1st Brigade was moved from the vicinity of Tam Ky in NICTZ to Camp Eagle in NICTZ, completing the move on 11 August 1969. Operational control of the Brigade passed from the American Division to the 101st effective with the move. The Brigade had been participating in Operation Lamar Plain with the American during the period May - August. The 26th GSG assumed responsibility for support of the Brigade at Camp Eagle as the Brigade deployed from the 80th GSG area.

2. The 3rd Brigade, which had been operating in the A Shau Valley for the past months, redeployed from the area back to Camp Evans on short notice in September. Fire Support Bases Blaze and Rendezvous, utilized by the Brigade in the A Shau Valley, were closed. In early October, the Brigade with two Infantry Battalions redeployed to the Mai Loc area and established an operational base at the former Mai Loc Special Forces Camp. The 26th GSG provided assistance in the moves and provided continuous logistic support throughout the period.

(d) On 15 August, the boundary between the American Division and the 1st Marine Division was shifted approximately 10 kilometers south by order of Headquarters, III MAF, to correspond with the Provincial boundaries between Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces. This boundary move required the 196th Infantry Brigade to relocate their base camp from Landing Zone Baldy to Fire Support Base Hawk Hill, with the 7th Marine Regiment occupying LZ Baldy. The Brigade completed the move on 15 October. Concurrent with the move, Logistic Support Activity 57-2, operated by elements of the 80th GSG at LZ Baldy, was phased out as the US Marine Corps Force Logistic Command assumed responsibility for providing support to the Marine elements redeployed there.

(e) Elements of the USARVCOM, DNG provided the necessary technical guidance and maintenance support in assisting the 1/46th Field Artillery Battalion (PA) in its equipment as the battalion prepared for redeployment from the Republic of South Vietnam on 19 November under Operation "Keystone Cardinal." Assistance was also provided...

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To Battery B, 6/33rd Field Artillery Battalion. This battery is scheduled to transfer all its equipment to the 14th ARVN Artillery Battalion o/a 5 November, as the battery is being inactivated.

(f) The division established a Command Operation Center/Logistics Operations Control Center. The purpose of the COC/LOGC is to centralize communications systems and logistical reporting with higher, lower and subordinate units.

(3) Civil Affairs Division.

(a) On 17 August 69, the four scouting chapters in Da Nang held a campout at the Vocational Training School in Thanh Binh. Da Nang Support Command provided materials and portions of refreshments for the two-day ceremony. BG James W. Gunn, LTC Robert H. Ratcliff, MAJ Gregory F. Coseo and LT Clifford Lehmann attended the opening ceremony. Awards were given to personnel attending for their interest and assistance in scouting. Brigadier General Gunn's appearance in the ceremony extended feeling of goodwill to the people and showed the US is interested in the development of a strong youth activities program.

(b) On 30 August 1969, a program to distribute uneconomically recoverable property to Vietnamese and American civilian agencies was initiated.

1. Approximately 4,000 pounds of nails and 4,300 pounds of napkins were received from the 625th Supply and Service Company in Quang Tri. To date, about 3,000 pounds of nails have been utilized by the five Province Senior Advisors in I Corps for refugee resettlement camp construction, three vocational training schools, and the Dung Phuoc Refugee Camp in Da Nang. UNICEF was provided 2,000 pounds of napkins for use at milk feeding stations in the Da Nang area.

2. On 19 October, some 12,000 damaged writing tablets were delivered to seven schools in Da Nang; three orphanages in Da Nang; and one child care center in Quang Ngai.

(c) Civil Military Operations. The Civil Affairs Imprest Fund had expenditures totaling 24,060 VN$. 

(4) Signal Division.

(a) In this quarter, the Signal Division continued to maintain and service existing local wire communication, even though this section does not, at present, have installation or repair capabilities. The repair and maintenance was accomplished by the Signal Division, with special assistance from personnel of the 58th GSC Signal Section.

(b) Installation and operation of a selective inter-communications system was accomplished in October. This will allow subscribers to communicate within this headquarters selectively. Continual improvement is being made on long distance dialing.
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capabilities. Ten new trunk circuits are presently being installed, five to Phu Bai, five to Chu Lai, allowing class "C" subscribers the capability of dialing direct into these areas. Installation should be completed during the next quarter.

(c) With the acquisition of a FRC-93 radio, this headquarters was able to enter into the 1st Logistical Command SSB Radio Command Net. Additional radio equipment is expected next quarter which will allow greater command and control capabilities with subordinate units.

e. Assistant Chief of Staff, Ammunition.

(1) During the month of August, a temporary inability of the ammunition supply system to respond to the changing tactical situation resulted in diminished assets for approximately two weeks. There were no major problems as the system "caught up" within the cited time frame.

(2) The USMC turned over one module (five pads) to the US Army at ASP 107, Da Nang. This increased the rated storage capacity from 5500 to 6400 short tons. The increase in capacity provides only partial relief from safety violations during periods of particularly heavy receipts. Additional capacity is still desirable. The 2000 short ton capacity ASP at Hill 63 was turned over to the USMC upon relocation of the 196th Infantry Brigade. There was a transition period during which there was a skeleton crew of US Army personnel left at Hill 63, to insure support of Army elements by maintaining limited stockage on several items of ammunition and coordinating loans with the USMC which were paid back from Chu Lai the day after the issue was made. Complete turnover and release by the US Army took place on 18 October 1969.

(3) There were two major revisions to the stockage objectives. The first resulted from receipt of a major revision from 1st Logistical Command and the second in preparation for takeover of the Marine portion of the Quang Tri ASP.

f. Assistant Chief of Staff, Supply.

(1) In October, the 34th Supply and Service Battalion Bakery and the 490th Class I Platoon were transferred from the 34th Supply and Service Battalion to the 26th GSG as provisional units. Both platoons will remain in the Phu Bai area. This arrangement will give the 26th GSG more positive control over these units and should result in a more efficient Class I Operation.

(2) With the impending takeover of the Class I support mission from the Marines in the Quang Tri/Dong Ha area, the 26th GSG was assigned the mission of operating a Class I Point in Quang Tri. Estimated takeover date is 15 November 1969.

(3) Class I assets at LZ Baldy, in support of the Americal Division were moved to Hill 29 in September 69. Available reefer space is adequate to support the current stockage objective of two days (A-rations).

(4) Project Fill has been continued during the reporting period. This is a program designed to reduce habitual zero balances on critical items at the DSU/GSU's and Depot. DSU/GSU's screen their ASL's to identify items which are at zero balance or are in critical short supply. This information is forwarded to the Depot, which in turn furnishes a consolidated list to the ICCV.

(5) A program has been underway in ICTZ for the exchange of black barrel M16 rifles for chrome barrel M6A1 rifles. The 625th Supply and Service Company and 148th Supply and Service Company (formerly the 1002nd Supply and Service Company) have been the distributing points in this program. The operation is a direct exchange of black barrel for chrome barrel rifles. The black barrel rifles are retrograded to Okinawa for re-fitting with chrome barrels and returned to Vietnam for issue to other units. It is planned to extend this program to SICTZ when sufficient stocks of chrome barrel M6A1 rifles are on hand. During the reporting period, 1946 rifles were retrograded.

(6) The CCIL program (Commanders Critical Items List) continued with excellent results during this period. One addition to this program was the addition of logistcal Command support commands to the list of those units authorized to submit CCIL's. This program brings equipment shortages to the attention of commanders at the highest level of command and assures that critically needed equipment will be issued to units needing the equipment. The addition of support commands to the list of units authorized to submit CCIL's should help eliminate serious shortages of mission essential equipment in USASUPCOM, DNG units.

(7) Another innovation that greatly increased Project Red Ball support to USA-SUPCOM, DNG units and customers, was the providing of trailers to the USAF, DNG to line haul Red Ball releases to customer units. Each day, trailers filled with Red Ball releases are sent by convoy to the units. This program has greatly reduced shipping time and increased the overall confidence and satisfaction in the Red Ball system. Further, since 7 September 69, Red Ball requisitions have been passed directly to the ICCV, instead of going to the USAF, Qui Nhon. This has eliminated extra processing time. Also, the listing of vehicles authorized Red Ball special handling was revised and updated. Both these procedures greatly improved and updated the entire Project Red Ball program.

(8) During this period, both operation Keystone Eagle and Keystone Cardinal were implemented. Both operations dealt with the redeployment and/or inactivation of units from RVN; involved extensive redistribution of equipment from departing units to relocating units; changed supply support from one unit to another; and created extensive shortages and overages of equipment.

(9) Project Clean (NCR 500) was initiated on 20 March 69, as a management tool by which DSU/GSU's would conduct a 100 percent review of stock record ledgers on a cyclic basis. As of 31 October, a total dollar value of $640,638.03 has been realized on 39,122 cancelled requisitions. Total value of excess identified is $935,787.25. These were 40,909 requisitions submitted under Project Clean with a value of $874,928.84.
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(10) Project Count II, Conference Number 7 (final conference) was held at HQ, USASUPCOM, Cam Ranh Bay on 13 August 69. The purpose of the conference was to discuss the problems, procedures and techniques of inventory and to present the final reports on Project Count II. (USASUPCOM, DNG and the USAFD, DNG were represented at the conference.)

(11) A conference was held at the USASUPCOM, Cam Ranh Bay to discuss inventory policies and procedures to be used by depots during Project Count Always. The conference was conducted 4 August 69 and was attended by representatives from USASUPCOM, DNG and the USAFD, DNG.

(12) In August, throughput of Sea-Land refrigerated vans from DNG to Phu Bai was initiated. The concept of operation is to pull vans over the road or to ship them by water on LCU boats via Tan Hy Ramp. Use of Sea-Land vans to replace refrigerated barges has greatly improved the efficiency of resupply to Phu Bai as well as insuring that chill and freeze items arrive in top quality.

(13) The Phu Bai Bakery continued to present problems during the reporting period, because the equipment is old and requires considerable maintenance to keep it operational. To date, the new mixer make-up trailer that was ordered in May 1969 has not been received. Three bakery ovens, that were released by ICCV during the last ORLL reporting period, arrived at Phu Bai in September 1969 and are fully operational. New proof cabinets were not received during the reporting period.

(14) Naval Support Activity Depot, Da Nang was hit by an enemy rocket attack on 6 September 1969. Explosions from the rockets, and secondary explosions from an adjacent ARVN ammunition storage area, destroyed 236,000 cubic feet of reefer storage space. This represented approximately 45 percent of the pre-attack capacity. Every effort was made to reclaim damaged supplies and ship them immediately to Class I supply points throughout I Corps. Considerable food was recouped. However, the Navy estimated that over $600,000.00 worth of Class I was lost. Plans are to rebuild to pre-attack capacity of 550,000 cubic feet or 4.0 cubic feet per man supported. Despite the hardship placed on the NSA Depot by the attack, Class I supply was virtually uninterrupted.

(15) The continuous flow ice cream plant, located at Quang Tri, came off of deadline in October. The plant had been deadlined since April awaiting repair parts from CONUS. It is anticipated that the Quang Tri Plant can furnish ice cream for all Army troops in the Quang Tri/Dong Ha area.

(16) Reports of Survey, combat losses and quarterly reports of operational loss: 

(a) This staff acted on 64 Reports of Survey during the reporting period. Total loss to the government was $264,664.71. Five individuals were found pecuniarily liable for a total of $593.00.

(b) Sixteen Combat Loss Reports were processed during the reporting period, involving twenty-one items with a dollar value of $120,081.00.
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(c) Forty-one Quarterly Reports of Operational Loss were acted upon during this report period. Dollar value of droppage allocated was $4,052.56.

g. Assistant Chief of Staff, Maintenance.

(1) A field survey of all office machines was conducted during this quarter. Information received will be used as the basis for a local FR&C to cover typewriters, calculators, and all other machines not presently under contract. Estimated machine density in this category is approximately 3000.

(2) The M107/M110 Phase II Modification Program was started in June. Briefly, the modification consists of installation of: engine coolant surge tanks; new fan sheaves and belts; fuel cell stiffeners; fuel filter access door; turret traversing decelerating device; loader-rammer control valve; and spade shut-off valve. These modifications are performed by a specially trained team from the 156th HEM Company. The necessary parts are in a kit. This modification is to be performed on all weapons issued since 30 June 1968. To date, 24 of the 34 weapons requiring modification have been completed. Fifteen of these modifications were performed in the field and nine in depot.

(3) The M107/M110 (175mm SP Gun/8" Howitzer) R&R Program continued throughout the quarter. To date, 47 weapons have been through R&R out of 52 which are subject to the program. The remaining five are of relatively recent issue. A weapon normally remains on R&R for seven days; however, if the weapon requires additional repairs beyond the seven day time frame, it is removed from R&R and deadlined for the specific deficiency.

(4) The non-operational rate for M48A3 tanks produced an unfavorable trend during August and September, because of maintenance and waiting parts. The waiting parts portion was for both major assemblies such as engines, transmissions, and final drives, and small items such as blower motors, generators, voltage regulators, and suspension parts. In October, this unfavorable trend reversed and non-operational readiness took a sharp drop, primarily due to fewer vehicles being deadlined for time consuming repairs.

(5) In October, the unfavorable trend of August and September of the non-operational rate for the M113 family was reversed to the 10 percent range, which was the average of the previous quarter. The quarterly average non-operational rate of 12.4 percent is below the MACV tolerance of 15 percent. The high deadline rates for August and September were caused by an increase in the number of vehicles deadlined for such items as oil line leaks, wiring and electrical problems, fan lower pulleys, radiators and fuel cells. The drop in October occurred because fewer vehicles were deadlined for time consuming items, such as electrical and fuel problems.

h. Assistant Chief of Staff, Petroleum.

(1) During this quarter, petroleum activities centered on obtaining greater efficiency in operations.
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(a) The pipelines from Tan My/Dong/Quang Tri were active; however, the Quang Tri/Dong Ha pipeline operation was discontinued on 27 August 69 as the requirements at Dong Ha diminished to less than 5,000 gals per day. The take-off line at Camp Evans was activated, thereby eliminating JP-4 line haul requirements to this site.

(b) Several large leaks were located and repaired along the pipeline, but an accidental break at the river crossing in Hue proved time consuming in effecting repairs and resulted in an extremely large fuel loss.

(2) A project to reduce losses has been initiated, to include:

(a) Burying a portion of the pipeline from Tan My to Hue in order to reduce losses caused by pilferage.

(b) The purchase of check valves to be installed along the pipeline to reduce linefill loss in event of pipeline rupture.

(c) The procurement and installation of six-inch flow meters to monitor amounts of flow between points along the buried line, in an effort to locate leaks. Pending availability of the six-inch meters, four-inch meters have been procured for the same purpose.

(d) Attempts to reduce fuel losses through military civic actions programs, which stress the dangers inherent in exposure to petroleum fumes.

(3) Maintenance of equipment has been given greater attention. Due to the lack of proper maintenance support for pumps, particularly in regard to parts procurement, an extremely large percent of pumps were inoperative. Contact through ACoS M, Maintenance with MECOM technical representatives resulted in a detailed inspection of all pumps and engines. Procurement of required parts for repairs and PLL was initiated and training, to provide maintenance support, was conducted.

(4) The base laboratory became operational during August in Da Nang. A request to change the 527th QM Detachment from KC to KB for operation of the base laboratory was submitted. The mobile petroleum laboratory in Da Nang was transferred to Coi Co Island tank farm and is being operated by the laboratory section of the 527th QM Det.

(a) A weekly fuel sampling flight was established with the Americal Division in which a representative from the 262nd Mobile Petroleum Laboratory in Chu Lai visits all FOL sites in SICTZ and procures fuel samples.

(b) In an effort to upgrade quality of tests and procedures in petroleum laboratories, actions for calibration of instruments and equipment, establishment of a correlation testing program, and preparation of a quality surveillance directive were initiated.

(5) The withdrawal of the Third Marine Division and its support elements from CoK Viet/Dong Ha will require USASUPCOM, Da Nang to support units previously supported by the USMC. FOL support included bulk fuels (AVGAS, HOGAS and DF-2) for the Quang Tri
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Tank Farm and the fuel transfer point at Cua Viet, which allows NSA to barge fuel upriver to Dong Ha.

(6) Also, of significance was the GAO visit during September. The GAO representatives spent most of their time with the Naval Support Activity and one day only with the Petroleum office. They mentioned no discrepancies during the visit.

(7) Operationally the weather gained importance. Heavy rains caused flooding and line haul distribution was interrupted several consecutive days. A tropical storm also severely damaged the HOGAS, DF-2 and AVGAS fill stands at Quang Tri Tank Farm.

(8) Total bulk petroleum issues for this period were 29,725,000 gallons. Of this amount 5,495,000 was pumped through the pipeline. The remaining 24,230,000 gallons were line hauled by 5,000 gallon tanker trucks. The total tonnage of packaged products issued was 1,612 short tons. During pipeline operations, the following fuel losses occurred:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Enemy</th>
<th>Friendly Operations</th>
<th>Mechanical Failures</th>
<th>Thefts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>312,000</td>
<td>57,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>310,000</td>
<td>24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>273,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A large portion of the mechanical failure losses are thought to be due to unlocated breaks in buried portions of the pipeline.

i. Assistant Chief of Staff, Retrograde and Disposal.

(1) In September, the 633rd CC&S Company received a 'Water Blaster.' This machine appears to be very sturdy and durable, but has not been in service long enough to evaluate. Complete evaluation will be conducted within the next 60 days. A WECOM representative accompanied the machine and instructed all personnel in proper operation and maintenance procedures.

(2) During this period, the "Soft Pack" machine was inoperative due to non-availability of repair parts. AMC personnel, assigned to 1st Logistical Command to assist in packing and preservation, have made numerous attempts to acquire necessary parts. Estimated arrival date for the parts is o/a 5 November 1969.

(3) A cable stripper, mechanical alligator shear, and smelting furnace were received at the property disposal yard.

(4) The new satellite activity at Chu Lai began operations with three enlisted men and one NCO assigned. Construction of facilities for the yard, with the exception of fencing, was completed early in October.
(5) The established retrograde quota during the reporting period was 13,000 short tons. This command shipped 10,437 short tons or 80 percent of the assigned quota. The quota for October was reduced from 5,000 short tons to 3,000 short tons, because the only items that are now counted as retrograde are repairables. In the past, material turned in to PDO counted toward the quota.

(6) Another request was submitted to the Naval Support Activity (NSA), during the quarter, for a staging area. The NSA approved this request and forwarded it to CONMAVFORY for final concurrence. The need for a staging area for retrograde material prior to shipment becomes more evident as the monsoon season progresses. Because of high seas and inclement weather, the amount of material that can be processed directly from the CC&GS yard to final staging area at Deep Water Pier has been reduced. Approval of the staging area will permit continued processing of retrograde material for shipment.

(7) During this period, 1460 short tons of useable property were transferred under the MAFEX program. Of this total tonnage, 202 H-Series vehicles were transferred to Republic of China and 86 were transferred to Republic of Korea. Also, 412 short tons of RNK-ARJ excesses valued at $246,148.00 were transferred to Republic of Korea during the quarter.

(8) Eleven property sales lists were submitted to the Foreign Excess Sales Office during this quarter, consisting of 3,164 short tons of useable property with an acquisition cost of $3,445,440.00. Useable property actually sold during the quarter amounted to $143,664.00, a 5.6 percent return on property sold which had an acquisition cost of $2,582,020.00.

(9) The scrap inventory at the Da Nang Disposal Activity increased sharply during the quarter, when the PDO assumed accountability for 6,989 short tons of scrap located at Chu Lai. Receipts at the Da Nang yard amounted to 7,140 short tons. During the same period, a total of 7,669 short tons were removed by the contractor from the Da Nang yard.

(a) Despite continuing problems with inadequate port facilities, the contractor was able to bring his ships into the commercial piers four times during the quarter.

(b) No scrap has been removed from the Chu Bai area since March of this year. A LST was due into the area during the first week of October, but heavy rains forced diversion to another port.

(c) Approximately 894 short tons of scrap were removed from the Chu Lai satellite activity. This was the first removal under provisions of the term contract awarded in January of this year for removal of scrap from Chu Lai.

i. Assistant Chief of Staff, Services.
During this period, activities were centered on the continuation of monitoring and coordination of MCA and O&MA construction, in support of Da Nang Support Command, Da Nang East.

(a) Principal construction involved was continuation of the Depot covered storage; start of two 40-man BOQ's, as part of the 876-man cantonment project; and messhall for 363d Transportation Company at Viking Compound.

(b) A letter from USARV, subject: Curtailment of Minor New Construction, dated 28 July 1969, resulted in a requirement for the submission of job order requests for all minor new construction which exceeded $500.00. The letter further required the DA Form 2761 to be certified by the major subordinate commander or his deputy as to essentiality and urgency.

(2) A USARV Facilities Review Board made a survey and analysis, during early October of all MCA and O&MA projects currently funded, to determine which projects would be authorized to proceed and which ones would be deferred and/or deleted. This review action was precipitated by a message from USARV, dated 6 August 1969. Final determination as to disposition of projects is pending.

(3) A cut in contract laundry funds, amounting to approximately 27 percent, was effected by the 1st Logistical Command; however, the reduction of funds in the Phu Bai area (101st Airborne Division; XXIV Corps; 1st Brigade, 5th Mechanized Division; and 108th Artillery Group) was subsequently restored. The reduction in the Da Nang and Chu Lai areas impacted upon the maintenance of clothing and equipment due to the lack of sufficient field laundry capability to compensate for the reduction in funds.

(4) Three contract laundries continue to provide laundry support in Phu Bai, Da Nang and Chu Lai. Slight increases in contract laundry costs were noted in August and September prior to the imposed reduction of 27 percent in the Da Nang and Chu Lai areas.

(5) Five laundries were in operation at Quang Tri, Camp Evans, Phu Bai, Chu Lai, Hill 63 and Duc Pho during the period.

(a) Two additional Eidal laundry units were obtained to fill TOE shortages in the 26th GSG area of operation, bringing to 16 the total number of Eidals being utilized to support the northern portion of ICTZ. Eight Eidals were employed in support of Southern ICTZ.

(b) The field laundry activity at Hill 63, consisting of two Eidals, was withdrawn as part of the withdrawal of Americal Division forces from that area. These machines were redeployed to Chu Lai and Duc Pho.

(6) A bath point was set up on a full-time basis at Camp Evans; other base camp areas had sufficient permanent showers to meet demands. In addition, a mobile
bath facility was employed on an on-call basis for use at various fire bases in the 101st Airborne Division AOR.

(7) Production:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>CONTRACT LAUNDRY ($)</th>
<th>YIELD LAUNDRY (lbs)</th>
<th>BATH (ea)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>$151,461</td>
<td>1,537,580</td>
<td>10,688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>159,544</td>
<td>1,525,370</td>
<td>6,313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>159,834</td>
<td>1,287,096</td>
<td>3,847</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(8) The construction of 112,000 square feet (34,000 SF) covered storage for the Da Nang Depot continued. On or about 1 October, construction on the small warehouse (24,000 SF) was suspended, pending possible receipt of excess covered storage from the RMK-BRj's turn back of current assets in the Da Nang area.

(9) Design effort was continued for the ADP Expansion for the USA Field Depot, with plans reaching the 20 percent completion phase. Design of depot security lighting was completed; however, a Notice to Proceed was not issued, pending re-evaluation of the need by the USARV Facilities Review Board.

(10) Three projects were completed during the period: water infiltration gallery; 60-ton scale for the Da Nang Property Disposal Activities; and a company-size mess hall for the 563rd Transportation Company.

(11) The real estate and facilities currently utilized by RMK-BRj contractor were allocated to US Army Support Command, Da Nang, by MACV action on 16 September 1969. During the reporting period, two requests for the acquisition of real estate were submitted to Commander Naval Forces Vietnam, Representative, Da Nang. These requests were for:

(a) The Camp Adenir Compound located on Marble Mountain Road in Da Nang East, which is presently occupied by MCB-4 of the 3rd Naval Construction Brigade.

(b) A temporary washing site (150 x 40 feet) for the 633rd CC&S retrograde activities, located on Marble Mountain Road in the vicinity of the ARVN POW Compound.

k. Assistant Chief of Staff, Transportation.

(1) Three incidents of enemy initiated action against Da Nang Support Command motor convoys were experienced. On 12 August 1969, the Sa Huynh to Da Nang convoy was ambushed, resulting in one 5-ton tractor destroyed and one 3000 gal tanker destroyed. One 5-ton tractor and one 5-ton cargo truck were damaged with 5 WIA. None of the other incidents caused serious damage or injury to Support Command personnel or equipment. Morale and esprit de corps of transportation units continued at a high level.

(2) The first Sea-Land van was moved by highway on 1 August 1969 from Da Nang to Camp Eagle, 101st Airborne Division. The van was hauled by 363rd Transportation Company and loaded with perishable Class I.

(3) The 39th Transportation Battalion and 57th Transportation Battalion continued to support Northern and Southern ICTZ respectively.

(4) During the reporting period 176,086 short tons of Army cargo were moved through the ports of the ICTZ.

(5) The Movement Control Center and its field offices processed 15,472 TCMD's accounting for 120,890 short tons of Army cargo.

(6) Transportation truck units moved 263,828 short tons of cargo in support of units throughout the ICTZ.

(7) A total of 14,780 short tons of Army cargo was processed through the major air fields in the ICTZ for movement throughout Vietnam.

(8) The railroad continued limited operation during the reporting period. There were four enemy-initiated incidents which caused a total of 10 days loss of operation. There was no damage to US Army-owned equipment or US Army cargo. Utilization of the railroad by the US Army is still dependent upon completion of the spur lines at Bridge Ramp, Da Nang and 26th GSG, Phu Bai. Estimated completion date of the spur line construction at both sites is mid-November.

(9) During this period, 676 Stake and Platform Trailers (S&P's) loaded with bunker kits for the Americal Division, were hauled by the 363rd Transportation Company. This large commitment was in response to an Americal Division requirement to construct fortifications in and around the perimeter of Hill 29.

(10) NSA Da Nang ceased operations, effective 29 October, for 30 days at Hue (Cornfield) Ramp to test the need for continued operation of the ramp.

(11) One hundred twenty-five new drop-side 5-ton cargo trucks have been issued to the 515th, 63rd and 37th Transportation Companies to replace the 5-ton cargo trucks (standard) and previously issued 2½ ton trucks which were issued in lieu of 5 tons pending their availability. A critical shortage of 12 ton S&P trailers exists. TOE authorization of trailers is 360; however, the three medium truck companies presently have on hand 226. Many of these trailers have inoperative landing legs, but they must be retained for operations pending receipt of replacement trailers.

(12) Seasonal monsoons, during the month of October, caused intermittent periods when QL-1 was closed north and south of Da Nang. The periods when the highway was closed lasted 2-4 days and did not materially affect combat support.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVCA DNG-GO-H


1. Provost Marshal.

(1) No major operational changes occurred during the period. Numerous coordination visits were made to this staff section by commanders and provost marshals of other units. Coordination/liaison visits by members of this staff section to units in outlying areas were made frequently during the quarter.

(2) LTC Thompson continued as Keystone Eagle Committee Chairman and also as Chairman of Keystone Cardinal, until completion of both phases of redeployment. Other significant events, which personnel of this office were active in, were the change of command ceremonies for Brigadier General Gunn that LTC Thompson was in charge of, and the visit made by General Haines, during which CPT Williams was in charge of the Security Escort.

(3) Liaison/coordination was conducted with all agencies/units directly involved with law enforcement and security operations in the Da Nang area. Visits were also made to the 504th Military Police Battalion, Americal Division Military Police Company and all major subordinate commands. In addition, 17 physical security inspections were conducted at unit level and 17 combination physical security/IG inspections were made.

m. Chaplain.

(1) Three Chaplain Training Conferences were conducted with 100 percent of the Command Chaplains attending.

(2) During this reporting period, there has been a marked increase in chapel attendance.

n. Staff Judge Advocate.

(1) Summary of military justice activities:

(a) Article 32 Investigation - 3.
(b) Special Court Martial - 60.
(c) Summary Court Martial - 2.
(d) Article 15's - 368.

(2) Summary of legal assistance - 735.

(3) Summary of claims activities:

(a) Number of US claims at beginning of period - 1.

(b) Number of US claims filed - 35.
(c) Number of US claims forwarded - 5.
(d) Number of US claims paid - 30.
(e) Number of US claims withdrawn - 0.
(f) Number of US claims at end of period - 1.

2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's observations, evaluations and recommendations.

a. Personnel. None.
b. Intelligence. None.
c. Operations. None.
d. Organization.

Item: Support to residual elements following a change in AO responsibility.

Observation: It is most important that support for residual elements be agreed upon and finalized prior to a major change in AO responsibility.

Evaluation: In ICTZ, AO responsibility is divided between two Services. Changes in areas of responsibility often result in residual elements of one Service being logistically supported by the other Service. This situation requires an agreement to either make reimbursements in kind or to initiate an ISSA. Experience reveals that extensive coordination is required and that agreements in principle between major headquarters should be reached at an early date. Final agreement and approval should be obtained prior to the start of troop movement.

Recommendation: That in future AO changes, the senior headquarters involved attempt to reach agreement in principle regarding interservice support at the earliest possible date. Detailed procedures can then be readily worked out by lower echelon headquarters on the scene.

e. Training:

Item: Enlisted surveillance inspectors.

Observation: There are insufficient enlisted men training in ammunition surveillance activities to insure that adequate surveillance standards are maintained.
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Evaluation: The shortage of DAC ammunition inspectors is compounded by two items:

(1) A formal training program has not been established in CONUS for enlisted personnel.

(2) The limited number of quotas available for the ammunition surveillance course prevents the command from establishing and maintaining a viable program, because the workload for ammunition surveillance exceeds the personnel available.

Recommendation: A formal training program for enlisted ammunition training inspectors should be established in the CONUS. The 1st Logistical Command Program should be restructured to allow for additional spaces for this SUPCOM, or provision of a mobile, on site training team.

f. Logistics.

(1) Item: Project Orange Ball.

(a) Observation: Project Orange Ball (POB) is designed to deliver dry batteries in a refrigerated state to users along with their Class I rations and envisions the pickup of POB batteries every few days. Some units place a requisition for batteries on their Class I supply point for 14 or more days. This procedure depletes on-hand balances and deprives other users of their needs.

(b) Evaluation: The above actions will cause Project Orange Ball to fail. Users must be made aware of the need for obtaining POB batteries on a regular basis, in order to insure the steady replenishment of items at the Class I points.

(c) Recommendation: That continued emphasis be placed on insuring that users understand the Project Orange Ball program, cooperate with their Class I points, and review their RO’s for dry batteries during the monsoon season.

(2) Item: Priority designators.

(a) Observation: The method of using priority designators for the movement of cargo has not proven a satisfactory procedure for non-requisitioned items, particularly ammunition.

(b) Evaluation: Ammunition is moved within the theater on an automatic replenishment basis, i.e., shipments are programmed into depots and ASP's based on actual and forecasted usage. Proper planning, using known issue experience, forecasted troop moves and operations, can result in shipments being offered to transportation for movement as much as two to three weeks before the Required Delivery Date (RED).
AVCA DNG/GO-H


1. Under the current system, these would be offered as 03 and 04 priorities, solely because prior planning allowed early determination of needed movements. On the other hand, MILSTRIp items got a priority designator determined by the requisitioner's urgency of need. Further, much cargo is offered on short notice, due to poor planning or sudden requirements. Since the time between offering RDD is short, these are assigned 02, 01 or 01-999 priorities.

2. Experience shows that ammunition cargo offered early on 03 priority will move closer to its RDD and even past it, while higher priority cargo with the same or later RDD moves ahead of it. As the ammunition cargo nears its RDD, the shipment becomes more urgent. If the shipment passes its RDD, high priority and even Combat Essential shipments become necessary to cover critical shortages of vital commodities.

3. Recognition of the "priority versus RDD" problem, coupled with close staff coordination between ACofS for Ammunition and Transportation, has resulted in meeting RDD's in ICTZ. The result has been better Class V support to the tactical units.

(c) Recommendation: Procedures for assignment of priorities to non-requisitioned cargo offered, and the method of booking cargo against available transportation, should be reviewed to insure that the RDD is realistic and that cargo is processed accordingly.

(5) Item: Kenco pump units.

(a) Observation: Kenco pump units equipped with fuel monitor GO-NO-GO gauge, are in use in TO&E units.

(b) Evaluation: TM 5-4320-248-15, dated October 1967, states the fuel monitor is capable of removing sediment and water from fuel up to a point beyond which fuel will no longer flow through the gauge. The problem is whether this device should be used with or without a standard filter/separator, since water or sediment above specified tolerances are supposed to stop the fuel flow. Further, the gauge is installed in the frame, with the pump, in a manner that makes it extremely difficult to insert the filter/separator.

(c) Recommendation: When new items of equipment are issued, manuals accompanying such equipment should state use limits for the equipment, particularly as to whether or not other related equipment may be deleted from the system in which it is used.

(6) Item: Submission of requisitions.

(a) Observation: This command has experienced a number of lost requisitions.

(b) Evaluation: Customers of the US Army Field Depot, Da Nang are now authorized
to submit requisitions in batches. The customer unit prepares a disposition form, listing all requisitions submitted during a particular period of time. The Depot Customer Assistance Branch counts the requisitions listed on the DF and acknowledges receipt by signing the DF. This receipt indicates that all requisitions listed were, in fact, received by the depot. This procedure has reduced the incident rate of lost requisitions occurring between the time requisitions are prepared at the DSU/GU and submitted to the Depot.

(c) Recommendation: That other depots initiate a similar program.

g. Communications: None

h. Material.

Item: Insufficient generator power.

Observation: The Eidal field laundry units are powered by a component 10 KW generator which does not have adequate power reserves to meet high surge requirements.

Evaluation: The extractor unit is powered by a five and one-half horsepower motor which accelerates from a pre-extract speed of 40 RPM to a full-extract speed of 800 RPM. During this period, and as measured on the load indicator located on each unit, the load on the generators measures in excess of 125 percent. As the accumulative number of hours of generator utilization over the life cycle of the equipment increases, the overload demand becomes more excessive, often resulting in complete stoppage of the generator and subsequent failure.

Recommendations:

(1) That a 30 KW generator be authorized for each laundry section consisting of two Eidal Laundry Units, or a 60 KW for a platoon of 6 Eidal units.

(2) That, where field laundry units are used as a fixed installation, commercial power be utilized whenever possible.

i. Other: None.

H. D. SMITH
Colonel, OrdC
Commanding
AVCA GO-MH (10 Dec 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the US Army Support Command, Da Nang for period ending 31 October 1969 HCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

LA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384 6 JAN 1970

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVIFC-DST APO 96375


2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning support of residual elements, page 18, paragraph d. Concur. Personnel from this headquarters have made two staff visits to DNG SUPCOM on this subject. In this case residual support is for the Navy and Air Force. To date no definitive guidance has been received from higher headquarters as to the Navy and Air Force requirements for support.

b. Reference item concerning enlisted surveillance inspectors, page 18, paragraph e. Concur. In addition to the regularly scheduled quarterly frequency, additional classes are held on as required basis. The latter action was taken to help resolve the problem outlined in the ORLL. Recommendation pertaining to establishing a formal training program in Gi'Nt has been accomplished.

c. Reference item concerning priority designators, page 19, paragraph f (2). Concur. Transportation of ammunition continues to be a problem, particularly in Da Nang Support Command. Recommend that HDD be used as basis for scheduling shipments, with priority used only when HDDs are the same. This would prevent higher priority items with a later HDD from "bumping" ammo from the shipment. Progress is being made toward resolving this problem with ACoFS, Transportation.

d. Reference item concerning Kenco pump units, page 20, paragraph f(5). USASUPCOM DNG should submit a DA Form 2028 and/or DA Form 2407 (EIR) to the proponent agency of TM 5-4320-248-15, dated October 1967. This will resolve the problem and allow the commodity manager to notify the field of his findings. This HQ will advise USASUPCOM DNG to submit appropriate action in separate correspondence.

e. Reference item concerning submission of requisitions, page 20, paragraph f(6). Concur. Proper implementation is now being written to establish this procedure at all depots in Vietnam.
AVCA GO-MH (10 Dec 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the US Army Support Command, Da Nang for period ending 31 October 1969 RCS CSRFOR-65 (R2)(U)

6 JAN 1970

f. Reference item concerning generator power, page 21, paragraph h. Concur in part. An EIR has been submitted concerning the underrating of the generators. Concur in the recommendation that fixed base power be used whenever possible. The use of one 30 KW generator for two units is not advisable inasmuch as the equipment should be configured to permit independent operation of the units.

3. Concur with the basic report as modified by this endorsement.

For the Commander:

TEL: LBN 4839

C.D. STAFFORD

CF: USASUPCON, DNG

ILT, AGC

Asst, AG
AVHG-DST (10 Dec 69) 2d Ind


HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, US Army, Support Command, Da Nang and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Support to residual elements following a change in AO responsibility", page 18, paragraph 2d and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2a; concur. USARV Regulation 700-13, Administrative and Logistical Support to Non-USARV Agencies and Organizations, and USARV Regulation 37-22, Procedures for Documentation and Reporting of Reimbursable Support, apply. Provisions exist to allow for emergency support to be provided pending final negotiations of an ISSA. The USARV ISSA officer has made three visits to the Da Nang area on this subject. Extensive coordination was initiated in October by USARV with NAVFORM, NSADNG, 7th AF, Force Logistics Command, USAID, Da Nang SPT COMD and other non-Army elements having continuing support requirements in I CTZ. ISSA's are now in effect providing for major support systems access. New requirements, as they are identified by any USARV element, should be submitted to HQ USARV, ATTN: AVHG-DSD IAW USARV Reg 700-13. Emergency support should be provided IAW USARV Reg 37-22.

b. Reference item concerning "Project Orange Ball", page 19, paragraph 2f(1); concur. A publicity flyer outlining the objectives and procedures of Project Orange Ball has been distributed to all USARV units.

c. Reference item concerning "Priority Designators", page 19, paragraph 2f(2) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2c; nonconcur. Procedure for offering cargo and booking of that cargo against available transportation must include consideration of both RDD and priority. In MILSTAMP Regulation, paragraph 3-3d, it is stated that, "The selection of the mode of transportation will be governed by the transportation priority, Required Delivery Date (RDD) when specified, weight and size of shipment, nature of material, cost of transportation, distance to be shipped, and modes of transportation available between consignor and consignee." At any given time within the transportation system, there will be numerous shipments awaiting movement to a single destination. It is conceivable that several of these will carry the same priority. When there is insufficient lift to move all shipments at one time, then some criteria must be used to determine which of the equal priority shipments moves first. The logical method is to use the RDD. The system, of course, is dependent upon the assignment of realistic RDD's. The RDD is not assigned by transportation...
AVHGC-DST (10 Dec 69) 2d Ind


personnel. For requisitioned items, this is the responsibility of the requisitioner. Although NON MILSERIP originated shipments have no requisitioner to assign an RDD, an RDD can and should be assigned by the activity issuing the supply directive.

d. Reference item concerning "Insufficient Generator Power", page 21, paragraph 2h and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2f; concur in part with the recommendation that fixed base power be used whenever possible. Non-concur with the use of 30KW or larger generator for use by two or more units as this would greatly reduce the deployment capability. If a larger generator is warranted, a 15KW should be provided for each laundry unit. USAV maintenance and MECOM representatives were informed of this recommendation. Since they have no record of this problem, the MECOM representative suggested that the generators in question could be due for 3000 hour or 6 month overhaul.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

L.D. Murray
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
DA NANG SPT COMD
1st LOG COMD
GPOP-DT (10 Dec 69) 3d Ind (U)
HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 5 FEB 1970
TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

D. A. TUCKER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
MISSION: A. PROVIDE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO ALL UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE AND PROVIDE BACKUP SUPPORT AS DIRECTED TO ASSIST OTHER 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND SUPPORT COMMANDS.

B. COMMAND ASSIGNED AND ATTACHED 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND UNITS IN ASSIGNED AREAS EXCEPT DESIGNATED EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DETACHMENTS FOR WHICH HEADQUARTERS, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND EXERCISES COMMAND AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, US Army Support Command, DaNang

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug 69 to 31 Oct 69.

CO, US Army Support Command, DaNang

10 December 1969

N/A

N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310
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