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<td>AGO D/A ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980; AGO D/A ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980</td>
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

AGDA (M) (24 Feb 70) FOR OT UT 694117

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry, Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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[Signature]
ROBERT E. LYNCH
Colonel, AG
Acting The Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS
3RD SQUADRON, 17TH CAVALRY
APO SF 96250

NOV 15 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report; Lessons Learned of 3rd Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 October 1969, NGS CSFOR-65 (R2)

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SECTION 1

Significant Activities

1. (U) MISSION: The squadron's basic mission has been that of providing
reconnaissance, surveillance, security, and economy of force
to the major units operating in the III Corps Tactical Zone.

2. (FOUO) PERSONNEL:

   a. PERSONNEL CHANGES: Following is the command group and
      principal staff as of 31 October 1969, with the changes during the period:

   LTC ROBERT A. ARNET (566-32-4462) CO
   Replacement LTC JOHN B. FITCH
   (0156-20-9534) on 7 Aug 69

   MAJ WILLIAM E. CAKES (414-56-7471) XO
   Replacement MAJ BURNETT R. SANDERS
   (407-44-5920) on 2 Aug 69

   MAJ ARTHUR S. DERVAN III (263-48-8592) S3
   Lt JAMES P. CAUSEY JR. (216-42-7801) S1
   Replacement Lt DONALD W. HACKETT
   (422-44-5069) on 17 Aug 69

   CPT HERBERT G. DREZINS (507-56-5264) S2
   Replacement CPT HAROLD A. HILTZ
   (015-32-3259) on 31 Aug 69

   CPT LESTER R. BELL (556-46-7961) S4
   Replacement CPT SCHUYLER N. CUNNIF
   (095-30-8885) on 20 Oct 69

   CPT JAMES R. THOMAS (407-52-4461) HHT CO
   Replacement CPT DONALD A. DAVIS
   (555-58-0504) on 24 Aug 69

   CPT DONALD A. DAVIS (555-58-0504) SGN MNT
   Replacement CPT JAMES P. SCHUYLER
   (521-56-4461) on 24 Aug 69

   MAJ HAROLD L. SMITH (406-42-1454) A Trp CO
   Replacement MAJ WILLIAM D. CONKLIN
   (440-36-8919) on 16 Aug 69

   MAJ RICHARD A. JONES (436-50-0226) B Trp CO
   Replacement MAJ WILLIAM J. BLUSHER
   (449-36-4309) on 13 Oct 69

   MAJ FRED E. LYSSE (457-60-6878) C Trp CO
   Replacement MAJ WILLIAM G. WHITE JR.
   (521-50-8752) on 2 Aug 69

   CPT WILLIAM R. CONDOS JR. (240-72-9619) D Trp CO
   Replacement CPT WILLIAM A. WESTERAUHL
   (523-56-9442) on 57 to CO NO CHANGE

   CPT WILLIAM A. WESTERAUHL (523-56-9442) 575 TO CO NO CHANGE

For OT UT

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

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Inclosure

694117
UNIT STRENGTHS AS OF 31 OCTOBER: The squadron is authorized 85 Officers, 103 Warrant Officers, and 848 enlisted men. Assigned strength at the end of the reporting period was 98 Officers, 77 Warrant Officers, and 782 enlisted men (See inclosure 3).

c. INFUSION: During the reporting period there were no infusions of officers, warrant officers, or enlisted men.

d. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS: Three hundred and forty one awards were recommended within the squadron during the reporting period, One hundred and eleven were approved, two hundred and fifty are still pending (See inclosure 4).

e. FRIENDLY LOSSES: Friendly losses for the period were one KIA and eleven WIA. No personnel were MIA (See inclosure 5).

3. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. General: The Squadron conducted extensive aerial reconnaissance and surveillance missions, providing its various control headquarters with valuable and timely information concerning the enemy. The Squadron's efforts were concentrated in Bien Duong, Hau Nghia, Gia Dinh, Long An, Bien Hoa and Long Khanh Provinces and to a limited extent, in Phuoc Tuy and Binh Tuy Provinces. Attention centered on known and suspected enemy base camp areas and lines of communications. The intelligence gathered provided the basis for ground operations, tactical and strategic air strikes, and artillery strikes.

b. Terrain: The relief in the Squadron's area of operation ranged from flat Delta in the south to gently rolling hills in Bien Hoa and Long Khanh Provinces. Drainage is provided by the Saigon, Nha Be, Dong Hai, Van Co Dong, Van Co Tay, and Mekong Rivers and their tributaries. Vegetation consists of extensive rice crops in the Delta regions, extensive rubber plantations in parts of Bien Duong and Long Khanh Provinces, and extensive broad-leaved evergreen forests elsewhere.
OPERATIONAL REPORT: LESSONS LEARNED OF 3RD SQUADRON, 17TH CAVALRY
PERIOD ENDING 31 OCTOBER 1969, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2)

(1) Observation and Fields of Fire: Observation and fields of fire ranged from extremely limited in the wooded areas of Binh Duong and Long Khanh Provinces to excellent as one moved south in the Delta areas.

(2) Obstacles: Neither natural nor artificial obstacles in the TAOR had any effect on Squadron operations.

(3) Cover and Concealment: The enemy has limited natural cover; however, he is an expert at building tunnel and bunker complexes which provide him excellent protection against direct and indirect fire, as well as air strikes. The enemy has excellent concealment in jungle and plantation areas, as well as among nipa palm and pineapple bushes, which frequently line rivers and canals in the Delta areas. He also makes maximum use of darkness and camouflage to conceal his movement or presence in an area.

(4) Key Terrain: Highways 1, 4, 15, and 20, and the Dong Nai Saigon, Van Co Dong, Van Co Tay, and Mekong Rivers together with their major tributaries are considered key terrain. The highways are selected because of their importance as lines of communication - not only for military traffic but for civilian traffic as well. The major rivers also serve as important lines of communications and enable allied forces to ship large quantities of materials to inland ports. For the same reason, rivers form important lines of communication for the enemy.

(5) Avenues of Approach: The following VC/NVA avenues of approach into the Squadron's area of operation are considered significant:

   (a) Parrot's Beak (XS 3192) and Van Co Tay River.
   (b) Parrot's Beak, Bo Bo Canal, Pineapple Plantation (XS 5890), Saigon.
   (c) Ba Thu (XT 2703), My Thang Dong (XT 4402), Tan Nhut (XS 7083), Saigon.
   (d) Angel's Wing (XT 3113), An Ninh (XT 4013), Hau Nghia Swamp, Saigon.
   (e) Angel's Wing/Ba Thu, Van Co Dong River, Pineapple Plantation, Saigon.
   (f) Fishhook (XT 5890), Michelin Plantation, Boi Loi Woods, Saigon River, Binh My (XT 5318), Saigon.

c. Weather: During the reporting period the Squadron's area of operation was characterized by extensive cloudiness and monsoon rains almost every day. During August and September III CTZ was under the

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SUBJECT: Operational Report; Lessons Learned of 3rd Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

influence of the Southeast Monsoon. The Southeast Monsoon set in with
heavy showers and thunderstorms usually occurring in the afternoons and
evenings. This condition prevailed on through September. Friendly
operations were hampered to a certain extent by low ceilings, periodic
showers, and thunderstorms. Temperatures during this period ranged from
minimums of 71 to 78 degrees to maximums of 80 to 95 degrees. October
was characteristic of the transition period between the rainy season
and dry season. During this period, III CTZ was under the influence of
the Northeast Monsoon. Good weather prevailed during October with isolated
showers and thunderstorms. Minimum temperatures ranged from 71 to 80
degrees with maximum temperatures from 89 to 96 degrees, although maximums
in the low 100s were not uncommon.

4. (C) OPERATIONS: The 3/17 Air Cavalry area of operation was located
primarily in the central, southern, western, and eastern areas of III Corps
Tactical Zone (See inclosure 6). The squadron, with its troops OPCON or
in direct support of several major units during the reporting period
conduct reconnaissance, security, surveillance and economy of force
operations throughout the major portion of the III Corps Tactical Zone.

The squadron's operational area was bounded on the west by the
Cambodian border, on the south by the southern III Corps boundary,
on the east by the eastern boundary of Long Khanh Province, and on
the north by the northern and western boundary of Long Khanh Province
and a general line from Xom Cat (YR 529) to Phu Cong (XT 8014) to
the Parrot's Beak (XS 3095).

A Troop remained in direct support of the Capital Military
Assistance Command (CMAC), Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command (BHTAC), and the
Royal Thailand Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF). B Troop remained in direct
support of the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division and provided occasional
support to the U.S. Navy at Nha Be for special missions in the Rung Sat
Special Zone. C Troop provided support to 18th ARVN Division, 199th
Light Infantry Brigade, and provided occasional support to the U.S. Navy
at Nha Be. D Troop remained OPCON to BHTAC during the reporting period
and provided a ready reaction force for BHTAC, as well as a ready reaction
force for the II Field Force long range patrols. Headquarters and Headquarters
Troop remained in general support of the squadron during this period.

a. SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONS:

(1) The mission of A Troop has included reconnaissance of
major infiltration routes, aerial checkpoint missions (ACP), road,
bridge, and convoy security, reconnaissance of the rocket belt around
Digon and Bien Hoa, and ready reaction to agent reports and radar sightings.
To accomplish its missions, A Troop provided daily aerial visual reconnaissance,
conducted personnel detector (sniffer) missions and provided reconnaissance
and fire team cover to convoys and ground units. The troop used its aerorifle
platoon at the discretion of the troop commander for small search and clear
operations, as security for downed aircraft, for aerial checkpoint missions
in conjunction with the National Police Force, and as security for BHTAC
sensor placement.
(a) While performing a VB mission for BHTAC on 23 August 69, A Troop engaged a bunker area in the vicinity of YS 081928 killing one NVA soldier. Later, the aerorifle platoon was inserted in the same area and discovered two caches within four kilometers of the earlier engagement. Recovered enemy equipment included two cooking stoves, dishes, cooking utensils, several pounds of medicine, ninety one (91) fragmentation hand grenades, boots and a poncho.

(b) In the period from 8 to 12 September 69, A Troop accounted for 3 KBA’s, a structure and sampan destroyed, and 250 pounds of rice taken from the enemy in a ten kilometer area centered around YS 250900.

(c) From 3 to 6 October 69, A Troop participated in operations in the vicinity of XS 483960 and XS 601900 in support of CMAC. A Troop was credited with ten enemy killed during this period.

(d) During heavy contact with the enemy on 13 October 69, A Troop accounted for twenty-one NVA body count at YS 213883. On the same day a second team in support of CMAC was credited with three KBA’s at XS 703803.

(e) On 31 October 69, an A Troop hunter-killer team found fresh activity in an area around YS 097194 and the aerorifle platoon was inserted to develop the situation. In the contact that resulted, two VC were killed and a cache consisting of one M-1 carbine, one clip of M-1 ammo, six AK-47 clips with ammo, five pounds of medicine, three fragmentation hand grenades, three pounds of documents, and 300 pounds of rice was confiscated from the VC.

(2) B Troop’s mission during the quarter included aerial visual reconnaissance, people sniffer, ranger insertion, psyops, and night hawk missions. The aerorifle platoon was inserted at times when it was felt further development of the situation or recovery of enemy equipment was necessary. The aerorifles were also used as a security force for downed aircraft. When supported units came under heavy contact, helicopter fire teams were formed and deployed to provide fire support.

(a) On 3 Aug 69 while in support of the 5th Bn, 60th Inf., working in the area of XS 345957 near the Cambodian border, hunter-killer teams from D Troop accounted for 17 NVA KBA’s. As a result of this operation an entire NVA company was eliminated in a trap closed by the hunter-killer teams.

(b) On 5 August 69, B Troop provided a team in support of the Navy in the Rung Sat Special Zone.

(c) In a series of small engagements from 6 to 10 August 69, B Troop accounted for 3 KIA’s, 1 POM, 6 structures and 3 bunkers destroyed in Long An Province.
Operational Report: Lessons Learned of 3rd Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(d) During the remainder of August, heavy losses were inflicted on the enemy in a series of scattered engagements. B Troop received credit for 30 KBA's in the vicinity of Tan An and the area south of Saigon. B Troop provided support to the U.S. Navy at Nha Be and flew aerial visual reconnaissance in the Rung Sat Special Zone on 11, 20 and 26 August.

(e) On 17 September 69, B Troop accounted for 10 enemy KBA's at XS 665733, while covering an airmobile operation for the 5th Bn 60th Inf.

(f) From 27 to 28 September 69, B Troop provided one team per day to the Navy at Nha Be. These missions were flown in support of waterborne check point operations by ARVN forces in the Rung Sat Special Zone.

(g) From 29 September to 19 October 69 there were scattered contacts throughout the Long An Province. During this time, B Troop accounted for 32 enemy KBA's and 1 POW, along with numerous sampans and bunkers destroyed.

(h) The Navy was again supported by two hunter-killer teams every day from 20 to 23 October 69 by B Troop. There were no significant results during this period.

(3) Throughout the quarter, C Troop performed visual reconnaissance and aerial check point missions in Long Khanh Province. The aerorifle platoon was employed at the discretion of the troop commander to develop promising situations. People sniffer missions were run throughout the period in an effort to locate a deceptive enemy. Infrequent night operations were also performed by C Troop.

(a) On 10 August 69, a C Troop scout received fire at YT 328385 and his Cobra engaged the target resulting in five enemy dead. During the post strike reconnaissance, the LOH spotted about 30 bunkers, 200 meters of trench line and an unknown number of people inside the structures. The same day another team found a base camp area in the same vicinity and accounted for four more KBA's.

(b) On 15, 27, and 28 August 69, C Troop released two VR teams from support of the 199th LIB to work for HMTAC and the RINVF.

(c) On 28 August 69, while on a VR of heavy trail activity, a LOH received heavy automatic weapons fire from three directions. The aircraft crashed. The pilot and the observer were wounded. The heavy fighting that followed resulted in a body count of 21 NVA KBA.

(d) From 29 August until 3 September 69, C Troop had a series of small engagements that resulted 16 KBA's and one possible KBA. Several bunkers and structures in northern Long Khanh Province were also destroyed.
(e) On 6, 10, and 16 September 69, C Troop again provided BHTAC with two hunter-killer teams each day.

(f) On 17 September 69, C Troop began a five day operation for the Navy in the Rung Sat Special Zone. The results of this operation were nine KBA’s, six large bunkers destroyed and three structures destroyed in the area around YS 1677.

(g) C Troop had a series of missions for the Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command on 28 and 30 September, 6 and 15 October 69. Two hunter-killer teams were provided in support each day. There were no significant results.

(h) While supporting the 18th ARVN Div on 17 October 69, a C Troop aircraft took hits from enemy ground fire at YT 542095. Significant enemy contact followed. At the end of the day C Troop had been credited with eight KBA’s.

(i) On 19 and 20 October 69, C Troop teams discovered a series of base camps in the southern portion of Long Khanh Province. The results of engagements were ten KBA’s and thirteen structures destroyed.

(4) During the quarter, D Troop supported Company D, 151st Infantry, Long Range Patrol, as its ready reaction force. The troop also conducted daylight operations and night ambush patrols in the BHTAC area. D Troop’s organic mortars provided counter mortar/rocket and H and I fires in the BHTAC AO.

b. SUMMARY: While flying 28,754 sorties, the squadron lifted 12,710 troops, 62 tons of cargo, and was credited with 307 enemy KIA, 453 structures destroyed, and 59 sampans destroyed (See inclosure 7). During this quarter the squadron was engaged in numerous small scale operations, but visual reconnaissance remains the primary mission.

5. (U) ORGANIZATION: The squadron is organized under TOE/MTOE 17-95T dated June 1965 and USAF PAC General Order 401 dated August 1968. In addition, RL/KD teams are attached (one per air cavalry troop) by 12th Combat Aviation Group General Order 55 dated July 68 and General Order 60 dated August 68. The current organization structure and unit locations are listed in inclosures 1 and 2.

6. (U) TRAINING: During this reporting period, the squadron had maximum participation in all allocated school courses. All new in country replacements received training at the 1st Infantry Division Replacement Training Center, located at Di An.

a. All training within the squadron was conducted with no reduction in the operational status of the unit.
b. Training days - 0

c. Tactical moves - 0

d. Operational days - 92

e. School quotas filled by squadron during the period:

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<th>Quota</th>
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<tr>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-63 Engine</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-53-L-13 Engine</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escape and Evasion</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Armament Subsystems - Enlisted</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aircraft Armament Subsystems - Officers</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>UH-1H Airframe</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>AH-1G Airframe</td>
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In-Country Replacement Training 191

AH-1G Transition 1

OH-6A Transition 0

Instructor Pilot - OH-6A 2

Instructor Pilot - AH-1G 1

Instructor Pilot - UH-1H 0

f. During the period 6 to 10 October 1969 the Squadron underwent an Annual General Inspection. Out of 275 areas inspected one (1) was outstanding, two hundred and thirty seven (237) were excellent, thirty two (32) were satisfactory, and five (5) were unsatisfactory.

7. (c) LOGISTICS:

a. AMMUNITION TYPE:

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<tr>
<th>Type</th>
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<tr>
<td>CTG 12GA 00 Buckshot</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTG 5.56MM Tracer</td>
<td>1,348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTG 5.56MM Ball</td>
<td>13,470</td>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report; Lessons Learned of 3rd Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

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<th>Weapon Type</th>
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<tr>
<td>7.62MM Lhd M-60</td>
<td>59,348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62MM Kinigun</td>
<td>558,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 Cal Spotter Tracer</td>
<td>140</td>
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<tr>
<td>38 Cal Ball</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 Cal Ball</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 Cal Inc Ltd</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>40MM MP</td>
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<td>40MM HE</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Gren, Hand, Frag.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gren, Hand, Offensive</td>
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<td>Fuze, Gren, Hand, Offen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gren, Hand-Rifle, WP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gren, Hand, Smk, White HC</td>
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<td>Gren, Hand, Smk, Green</td>
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<td>Gren, Hand, Smk, Red</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gren, Hand, Smk, Violet</td>
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b. AIRCRAFT STATUS: Squadron aircraft status at the end of the reporting period was as follows:

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<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Authorized</th>
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<tr>
<td>OH-6A</td>
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<td>26</td>
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</table>

(See Inclosure 8)
SUBJECT: Operational Report: Lessons Learned of 3rd Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2)

8. COMMUNICATIONS: None

9. MATERIAL: None

10. (U) SAFETY:

   a. During the reporting period, there were nine accidents involving
      squadron aircraft. The type and number of accidents are listed below:

      - Engine failure: 3
      - Short shaft failure: 1
      - Mid-air collision: 1
      - Tail rotor drive shaft failure: 1
      - Fire: 1
      - Training: 1
      - Unknown: 1

      *NOTE: This accident is not included in the squadron’s accident rate
      because it was charged to the unit owning the second aircraft.

   b. Safety Record (August, September, October 1969). Listed below
      is a summary of the aircraft accident experience of the squadron during
      the reporting period:

      | UNIT  | TOTAL HOURS | ACCIDENTS | RATE  |
      |-------|-------------|-----------|-------|
      | HHT   | 891         | 0         | 00.0  |
      | A Trp | 5609        | 3         | 40.1  |
      | E Trp | 5746        | 2         | 25.1  |
      | C Trp | 6059        | 3         | 38.7  |
      | Squadron | 18305 | 8         | 34.6  |
11. (U) CIVIC ACTION:

a. During the quarter the Squadron continued its support of local orphanages with the main emphasis on the reconstruction of the Bethany Orphanage in Ho Hai Village. This quarter saw the completion of the project and the dedication of a new building late in October. A total contribution of VN $62,540 was made by the men and officers of the Squadron during the quarter bring the total contribution for this project to VN $257,830.

b. During September, the squadron planned and carried out a party for 300 dependent children of Vietnamese Marines living in the Tu Duc area. This party was a great success and all of the children had a good time. Projects of this nature help foster closer ties between Vietnamese nationals and the U.S. forces in RVN.

c. Approximately 1070 lbs. of food, 110 lbs. of clothing, 50 lbs. of health items and 200 health kits were contributed in addition to the financial support given to the orphanage. A total of 30 man-days were donated by the men of the squadron to make the collection and distribution of the above items possible. Future plans call for continued support of the orphanage and expanded programs of civilian participation.

d. Plans for the future include:

   (1) Building a tower for an overhead water tank.

   (2) Installation of a recently acquired pump on the wall.

   (3) Another children's day at DIAn, probably for Christmas.

   (4) Continued food and material assistance.

   (5) Continued financial assistance.
SECTIONS 2

Lessons Learned

A. (U) PERSONNEL: None

B. (U) INTELLIGENCE: None

C. (C) OPERATIONS:

1. OBSERVATION: AH-1G crew members are currently armed with only the .38 pistol as authorized by TOE 17-98T. This weapon is considered to be inadequate and insufficient for self defense, survival, and escape and evasion in a hostile environment.

EVALUATION: Under combat conditions, the .38 pistol by itself does not afford adequate long range fires for self defense in the event the crew of an AH-1G is forced down. In addition, the weapons systems of the AH-1G cannot be dismounted and utilized by the crew for self defense as can the door guns on the UH-1 and the crew served weapons carried on the OH-6 type aircraft. Thus a downed AH-1G crew is limited in firepower to two .38 caliber pistols and a total basic load of less than fifty rounds of ammunition. They are limited to a maximum effective range of only 50 meters in which to engage the enemy. A longer range, high rate of fire weapon which will fit neatly into the limited space of the AH-1G crew compartment is required as an addition or augmentation to the current air cavalry troop TOE. The Submachine Gun 5.56mm FSN 1005-930-5595 (CAR 15) satisfies these requirements.

RECOMMENDATION: The Submachine Gun 5.56mm (CAR 15) should be authorized for issue to crew members of AH-1G aircraft in addition to the .38 pistol presently authorized. This or a similar weapon should be incorporated into future modifications of TOE 17-98T.

COMMAND ACTION: A request for change to TOE 17-98T is being submitted by this headquarters.

2. OBSERVATION: The VHF emergency transmitter T-366/ARC is inadequate for continuous use and is subject to frequent failure.

EVALUATION: Many older model UH-1 type aircraft are still equipped with the five-channel VHF transmitter T-366/ARC. This radio was not designed for continuous use under combat conditions. However, because there is a specific need for a VHF radio to provide additional air to air radio transmission capability, this radio is used extensively. Because the T-366/ARC is limited to five channels (including guard channels), its flexibility is extremely limited, and its common channels are crowded with transmissions from many units.
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AVBACA-GC

SUBJECT: Operational Report: Lessons Learned of 3rd Squadron, 17th Cavalry Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFGR-65 (R2)

RECOMMENDATION: The multi-channel, digital tuned VHF radio RT 742/ARC-51 BX should be installed in all UH-1 aircraft as the aircraft come in for general support maintenance. This radio has greater reliability and provides the commander with greater flexibility in frequency selection.

COMMAND ACTION: An EIR has been submitted.

3. OBSERVATION: Coordination of use of airspace in a tactical situation requires emphasis and training by commanders at all echelons of command in both aviation and ground units.

EVALUATION: During the reporting period, an AH-1G from the squadron was involved in a mid-air collision with a C & C aircraft from a supported unit. A hunter-killer team was supporting a company sized ground unit in contact and had engaged the enemy troops. The C & C aircraft, carrying the battalion and brigade commanders plus members of their staffs, had also reacted to the ground contact. As the C & C party became more involved in close supervision and control of a small unit in contact, they maneuvered their aircraft to a position at low altitude directly over the unit in contact. As the C & C aircraft pulled up abruptly to depart the area of contact, it flew directly into the orbiting AH-1G. The mid-air collision resulted in the loss of 12 lives and two aircraft.

RECOMMENDATION: Commanders of both ground and aviation units should place more emphasis on training of their subordinates in the proper use of Army Aviation assets. Commanders of ground combat units having organic or attached aviation assets should make full use of their aviation commanders in their capacity as aviation staff officers and advisors to establish guidelines for the proper use of airspace under their control and the proper procedures and techniques to be followed to insure coordination between all aircraft supporting a given unit. Army Service Schools should train future commanders in the proper use of the helicopter for command and control.

COMMAND ACTION: This unit has established a formal program for the indoctrination of supported unit commanders in the proper use of Army Aviation.

4. OBSERVATION: During the reporting period, this squadron has evaluated a new reconnaissance team concept to determine its feasibility for use in stability operations.

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EVALUATION: The reconnaissance team was task organized with two OH-6A and one AH-1G aircraft from the aerocout and aeroweapons platoons of the air cavalry troop. This team was given the mission of conducting visual reconnaissance in the relatively open terrain of the southern and western areas of the III Corps tactical zone. An evaluation of this technique based on daily combat operations determined that this type of reconnaissance can be used very effectively when there is a very prominent linear terrain feature in the specific area of operations. Canals, roads or trails, rivers etc., make very good linear dividers and enable the AH-1G crew to effectively control the OH-6A's while they make a detailed, low level reconnaissance of the areas adjacent to the terrain features and provides airspace separation for scout aircraft. When employed in this manner, the reconnaissance team is able to cover a relatively large segment of terrain in a comparatively short period of time. In the event of hostile action and a downed aircraft, the second scout aircraft can immediately extract the downed crew. It was determined that this type of reconnaissance team was not as effective when employed in terrain which had few distinctive landmarks. Each scout pilot had considerable difficulty in remaining oriented on the other scout pilot's constantly changing position. As a result the visual reconnaissance was less effective because the pilots attention was divided between reconnaissance and avoiding a possible mid-air collision. The crew of the AH-1G aircraft found it extremely difficult to keep track of both scout aircraft and to remain in a good position to provide fire support in the event of enemy activity.

RECOMMENDATION: Other air cavalry units should evaluate this concept to determine its possible uses in terrain common to their area of operation.

COMMAND ACTION: Continuing emphasis is being placed upon developing and evaluating new concepts in the employment of the air cavalry troop.

5. OBSERVATION: During the reporting period this squadron has continued to evaluate the Night Hawk concept of night reconnaissance in the southern and western areas of the III Corps Tactical Zone. It is evident that the enemy has become accustomed to the nightly employment of this system and is able to take simple measures to avoid detection until the threat is passed.

EVALUATION: When first employed, the Night Hawk concept provided a deterrent to enemy troop movement during the hours of darkness. This was due in part to the fact that it was a new concept and the enemy had not developed an effective defense against it. At that time the level of enemy activity was also considerably higher than it is at the present. During the past several months, the squadron has flown Night Hawk missions in the Delta region of southern III Corps on a nightly basis.
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AVIACL-CC

NOV 15 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report; Lessons Learned of 3rd Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (N2)

It was found that the enemy was easily able to detect by sound and sight an approaching helicopter at a great enough distance to allow him to hide and escape discovery. Even when the AL/VSS - 3 Xenon searchlight is used, it is difficult to detect an enemy hiding in the tall reeds or thick foliage characteristic of the area. Detection has become even more difficult with the decrease in enemy activity due to the fact that the enemy appears to be moving only in very small groups, which easily disperse when threatened with discovery. As a result, no significant enemy sightings or kills have been attributed to the Night Hawk concept.

RECOMMENDATION: Field evaluation of Night Hawk and similar helicopter borne night surveillance systems should continue to be conducted. Emphasis should be placed on the sharing between units of new ideas, problem areas and other experience factors.

COMMAND ACTION: This command will continue to further evaluate the Night Hawk concept.

D. (U) ORGANIZATION: None
E. (U) TRAINING: None
F. (U) LOGISTICS: None
G. (U) COMMUNICATIONS: None
H. (U) MATERIAL: None
I. (U) OTHER: None

8 ENCLOSURES:
1. Unit Organization
2. Unit Locations
3. Unit Strengths
4. Awards and Decorations
5. Friendly Losses
6. Operations Map
7. Operational Results
8. Aircraft Status
Incl 2, 3 and 4 wd HQ, DA

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AVLACA-GC

SUBJECT: Operational Report; Lessons Learned of 3rd Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2)

DISTRIBUTION:

10 - Commanding Officer, 12th CAC
2 - CINCUSARPAC
3 - Commanding General, USARV
5 - Commanding Officer, 1st Avn Bde
15 - SJ 3/17 Cav
CONFIDENTIAL

ATTN: CA-SC (31 Oct 69) 1st Ind

SUPT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 3rd Squadron, 17th Cavalry for Period Ending 31 October 1969 RCS C5F0.1-65 (32) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS 12TH AVIATION GROUP (COMBAT), APO 96266 24 Nov 69

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, APO 96266

1. (U) In accordance with A3 525-15, the Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 3rd Squadron, 17th Cavalry for the period ending 31 October 1969 is forwarded.

2. (U) Section 1, Significant Activities. Page 5, para 4a(2)(a) and numerous later references. "KBA" signifies Killed By Air.

3. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned.

a. Page 13, para C1. This headquarters concurs with the requirement for additional individual weapons for crew members of the AH-1G.

b. Page 14, para C2. "742/ARC-51BX" should be changed to read "742/ARC-51 or 73A". The ARC-51BX is a UHF radio and the ARC-73 is a VHF radio, the latter providing 68C channels.

c. Page 14, para C3. USAF Regulation 95-26 requires all aviation units to conduct formal training for all newly assigned aviators and Tactical Unit Commanders prior to their conducting tactical operations involving aircraft. There are unusual difficulties in accomplishing this however, because of conflicting schedules of the units presenting the instruction and the personnel attending. The aviation unit has no control over who is sent to command the ground units and when new commanders arrive, additional staff coordination and liaison is necessary. This required training is usually accomplished by on-the-job training (OJT) during airmobile operations.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

RONALD C. VINES
Major, Infantry
Adjutant

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

BCH BIR 3300.10
This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for the period ending 31 October 1969, as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

B.D. Macdonald
ILT, AGC
Asst AG
AVBAC-0 (15 Nov 69) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 3rd Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384 15 DEC 1969

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,
APO 96375
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs with the
contents, except as noted below.

2. (C) The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

a. Paragraph 10b, page 11 discusses accident rates. Change the
accident rate for A, B, C Troop and Squadron total as follows: A Troop -
53.3, B Troop - 34.6, C Troop - 49.5 and Squadron total - 43.6. Rate
changes were confirmed with the 3rd Squadron, 17th Cavalry Aviation
Safety Officer.

b. Paragraph 2C(1), page 13 discusses weapons for crew members of
AH-1G aircraft. Nonconcur with the recommendation to authorize a sub-
machine gun, 5.56mm (CAR 15) in addition to the .38 caliber pistol. A
limited amount of CAR 15's were issued to selected units of this command
as an ENSURE item. AR 310-34 provides the basis for aircrewsmen to be
armed with an adequate weapon. A review of aircraft crashes revealed
that in most cases shoulder fired weapons aboard were either lost or
destroyed upon impact. Additionally, the CAR 15 failed to pass service
tests and is being replaced by the M-16 rifle in all authorization doc-
uments.

c. Paragraph 2C(2), page 13 discusses the inadequacy of the T-366/ARC
emergency VHF transmitter. While it is true that the VHF transmitter
T-366/ARC is widely installed in the older UH-1 type aircraft, it was
intended as an emergency or back-up transmitter used in conjunction with
the VOR receiver. The recommendation to install the multi-channel, dig-
ital tuned VHF Radio, AN/ARC-51 BX is in error. The AN/ARC-51 BX is not
a VHF radio but rather a UHF radio and is installed in all UH-1's that
have been retrofitted with the new series of radios (ZVR'd). The

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AVBAGO-0 (15 Nov 69) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 3rd Squadron, 17th
Cavalry Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

AN/ARC-134, a new VHF radio which replaces the T-366/ARC is being in-
stalled in UH-1's S/N 66-15106 and subsequent numbers. Communications
assets are not available to retrofit all older aircraft in general
support maintenance.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

ARTHUR W. LITTLE
CPT AGC
Asst AG

Copy 3d Ind Fm:
CO, 3/17 Cav
AVHGC-DEST (15 Nov 69) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RG 8 FSDR-65 (R2)(G)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 2.5 JUN 65

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPO-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for
the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, 3d Squadron,
17th Cavalry and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Reference item concerning "An Additional Weapon for AH-1G Crew Members",
page 13, paragraph C1; 1st Indorsement, paragraph 3a and 3d Indorsement,
paragraph 2b: Concur in the requirement for a lightweight defensive shoulder
weapon for AH-1G crew members. This requirement should be referred to the US
Army Combat Developments Command for appropriate action.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L. D. MURRAY

Cpt. 3d Sqn, 17th Cav
1st Avn Bde
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 3rd Squadron, 17th Cavalry for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 29 JAN 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. Short
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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HEADQUARTERS
3D SQUADRON 17TH CAVALRY
QUARTER ENDING
31 OCT 69

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**HEADQUARTERS**

3D SQUADRON 17TH CAVALRY

QUARTER ENDING
31 OCT 69

### OPERATIONAL RESULTS, QUARTERLY BILL

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*Responsible for Security.*

DESIGNED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS.

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DISTRIBUTED WITHIN 15 MILES.

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DISTRIBUTED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS.
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