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<td>TO: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.</td>
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<td>FROM: Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 15 NOV 1969. Other requests shall be referred to Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (Army), Washington, DC 20310.</td>
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AGDA (M)(27 Feb 70)  OR UT-694169  5 March 1970
SUBJECT:  Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 37th Aviation Battalion, 9 March 1970 (U)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:  

ROBERT E. LYNCH
Colonel, AG
Acting The Adjutant General

1 Incl

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15 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 307th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for Period ending 31 October 1969, RCS, CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

1. (C) SECTION I OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

   a. (C) MISSION: There has been no change in the battalion mission since last reporting period.

   b. (C) ORGANIZATION: There has been a change in the battalion organization, since last reporting period. This battalion lost the 199th Avn Co (Util Airplane) and gained the 147th Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel) on 1 Sep 69. On 4 Aug 69, the 13th Security Platoon was transferred from HHC, 307th Avn Bn (Cbt) to HHC, 164th Avn Gp (Cbt). There were also some changes for attachments as shown on the Organization and Station Chart, Incl 1.

   c. (C) COMMAND GROUP PERSONNEL:

      (1) The battalion had nearly a 100% stability rate in the principal staff and command positions.

      (2) Composition of the Battalion Command Group:

      | POSITION | RANK  | BRANCH | NAME/SSN          | ASSIGNED | RELEASED |
      |----------|-------|--------|-------------------|----------|----------|
      | Commander| LTC   | TC     | William H. Culton | 30 Jun 69| N/A      |
      | Exec Off | MAJ   | TC     | Karl A. Brugger   | 27 May 69| N/A      |
      | S1       | CPT   | INF    | Jerry L. Black    | 24 Jun 69| N/A      |
      | S2       | CPT   | ADA    | James H. Kurilko  | 23 Apr 69| N/A      |
      | S3       | MAJ   | INF    | John T. Colson    | 15 Sep 69| N/A      |
      | S3       | MAJ   | SC     | William A. Jugel  | 19 Aug 69| 12 Sep 69|

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SUBJ CT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 307th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for Period ending 31 October 1969, C5FGR-55 (G2) (U)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>RANK</th>
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<th>NAME/SS N</th>
<th>ASSIGNED</th>
<th>RELEASED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Howard W. Durks</td>
<td>15 Mar 69</td>
<td>19 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>ADA</td>
<td>Thomas J. Chapman</td>
<td>27 May 69</td>
<td>8/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Subordinate Unit Commander Changes:

(a) One of the subordinate unit commanders changed during the reporting period.

(b) Composition of subordinate commanders:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>BRANCH</th>
<th>NAME/SS N</th>
<th>COMMANDED FROM TO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>307th Avn Co</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>ADA</td>
<td>James R. Murphy</td>
<td>15 Jul 69 N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117th Avn Co</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>INF</td>
<td>Marvin E. Cox</td>
<td>16 Oct 69 N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117th Avn Co</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>TC</td>
<td>Frank R. Morgan</td>
<td>1 Sep 69 15 Oct 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>235th Avn Co</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>INF</td>
<td>Dewitt T. Long</td>
<td>6 Jul 69 N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>271st Avn Co</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Milton J. Brooks</td>
<td>30 Jul 69 N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>271st Avn Co</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>INF</td>
<td>William J. Hannigan</td>
<td>6 Jul 69 N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: 117th Avn Co (Asst Spt Htl) was not assigned to this battalion until 1 September 1969.*

(c) Subordinate unit executive officer turnovers were as follows: CPT Jerry L. Mefford, 299 - 32 - 2832 replaced CPT Richard G. Crump, 262 - 70 - 5529 on 1 Sep 69, in the 271st Avn Co; CPT Cleatus W. Snork, 310 - 35 - 5169 replaced CPT Daniel J. Clark, 527 - 72 - 7132 on 13 Aug 69, in the 235th Avn Co.

d. (C) UNIT STRENGTH AS OF 31 OCTOBER 1969:

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2
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SUNJ CT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 307th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for Period ending 31 October 1969, ACS, CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

UNIT OFFICER AUTH 0/H AUTH 0/H EL. AUTH 0/K AUTH 0/K TOTAL

147th Avn Co 15 8 26 22 227 206 268 236
235th Avn Co 17 14 39 33 198 192 254 239
244th Avn Co 19 25 22 3 250 289 331 317
271st Avn Co* 15 11 26 24 227 217 268 252
76th FA Det 0 1 0 0 8 8 9 9
774th Med Det 1 1 0 0 7 10 3 11
Cobra Nat Team 3 6 12 8 56 66 71 80
HHC 307th Avn BN 19 15 3 6 86 88 108 109
307th Avn BN (Cbt) 89 81 129 96 1099 1076 1317 1253

* Note: One officer and five warrant officers are OH-6A aviators who fly for the 164th Avn Gp OH-6A flight platoon

(c) CIVILIAN

UNIT VN TECH EXP

147th Avn Co 9 12 4
235th Avn Co 12 8 0
244th Avn Co 2 2 2
271st Avn Co 0 2 2
774th Med Det 2 3 0
HHC 307th Avn BN 6 5 0
307th Avn BN (Cbt) 31 32 8

(E) AWARDS PRESENTED 1 AUGUST TO 31 OCTOBER 1969:

AWARD 147TH 235TH 244TH 271ST HHC 307TH BN

Silver Star 1 1
DFC 3 3
Bronze Star 3 7 6 5 21
ARCOM 9 7 20 5 4 55
Air Medal 31 115 21 30 52 249
Purple Heart 2 2

(E) AIRCRAFT STATUS PRESENTED 1 AUGUST TO 31 OCTOBER 1969:

UNIT UH-1 CH-47 AL-16 OH-1 U-6 OH-6

147th Avn Co 16 16 2 0

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CONFL 10-PC

15 November 1969


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>CH-4</th>
<th>CH-5</th>
<th>UH-1</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>w/n 02/1</td>
<td>w/n 02/1</td>
<td>w/n 02/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>235th Avn Co</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>206th Avn Co</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>271st Avn Co</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cobra Iat Ts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC 307th Bn</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>31</td>
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*C-6's on hand all long to the 307th Battalion Fighting Platoon.

h. (U) R & R ALLOCATIONS FOR 1 AUGUST TO 31 OCTOBER 1969:

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<th>CITY</th>
<th>AUGUST</th>
<th>SEPTEMBER</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taipei</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manilla</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>73</td>
<td></td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

i. (C) OPERATIONAL SUPPORT AID TO VC

(1) VC incidents in the month of August. In the month of August one VC initiated incident, and a VC tent and vehicle was destroyed. In September, two incidents occurred; the 11th and 12th; the VC placed explosives in a building. No injury to individuals occurred. In the month of October the VC employed one round from a position 7 miles southeast of Can Tho. Two rounds, one dud 75mm recoilless round was found near the VC base.

Agent reports did reflect an increase in VC activity in Can Tho City during the reporting period. The VC also stated that the VC planned to initiate through August 6 incidents per month. August and September did contain the objective.
the month of October two days of high-points occurred and continued at a
very low rate. The highest day of incidents during the reporting period,
took place on the eve of Ho Chi Minh’s death, 4 through 5 September. The
incidents increased from 18 reported incidents on 3 through 4 September to
35 incidents on 4 through 5 September and on 5 through 6 September the
incidents dropped to 29. During the burial of Ho Chi Minh the VC declared
a cease-fire on 8 through 11 September, however during that time, the VC
violated their own cease-fire a total of 32 times, by harassment of the
CVF outposts and watch towers.

Infiltration of VC/VA troops continue to take place throughout the delta,
however, the incident rate still remains at a 16 per day avg for this
reporting period. There were no new units reported as operating in Phong
Dinh Province, but agent, FI, and Ho Chi Minh reports indicated that the
enemy units in Phong Dinh Province were slowly being built up to strength
for future missions.

(2) Airfield Security:

During this reporting period several changes were made concerning
the airfield perimeter and security. This battalion published OPL 5-59,
307th Amn in (Oct) which delineated new responsibilities for tenant units
of Can Tho Army Airfield and also incorporated the responsibilities of
units who provided daytime guards. The daytime guard was formerly admin-
istered by the airfield security detachment. Additional bunkers were
constructed to strengthen the perimeter and flood lights were installed
around the entire airfield complex. The man/dog teams scheduled for assign-
ment to the airfield were approved pending construction of kennels and
team offices. The construction plans are currently being studied for a
detailed cost analysis with final approval still pending. One item of
significance occurred on 20 Sept. 1969 at 02:00 hours when 15 sampans
and several personnel were spotted near the airfield perimeter. The fire
fly flare ship was launched to provide illumination for the H-10 flying
night security and 19,000 rounds of minigun ammunition were expended into
the target area. A Vietnamese sweep of the area the following morning
revealed that all of the sampans were either burned or damaged and
several blood trails were found. The immediate response of the airborne
night security has proven invaluable in defense of the airfield
complex.

(3) Phantom III:

The battalion’s offensive operation, Phantom III, continued to

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obtain significant results of in my kiln一位该局 margin damaged. However, results have been sufficiently reported during most reporting periods. The strong influence of the southern provinces has reduced the need for the aviation task in the 12-G fire team. Periodically, though, the new 12-G battalions and a high kill ratio is established an em in which on 13 October 1969 when Phantom III was c rried.

The resultant for period 1 August 1969 through 31 October 1969 was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAYS</th>
<th>STRIKES</th>
<th>CONT/EST</th>
<th>COM/CB</th>
<th>EXP/EST</th>
<th>COM/EST</th>
<th>COM/OFF</th>
<th>COM/IND</th>
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<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>432/4</td>
<td>1/0</td>
<td>34/1</td>
<td>82/1</td>
<td>235</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the month of September 1969, the 5th was formed using the new night hunter/killer concept and gave up the responsibility of providing the air assets and control. This operation was named Night Phantom III. Night Phantom III consisted of (1) UV-1 ELIN aircraft, on (1) UH-1H C & C ship, and the controlling and control as its air assets. For ground control, the new 125th ATO Radar set-up supplied by the 125th ATO. The concept is as follows:

The enemy forces have been known to utilize airborne personnel in moving supplies through the Tram, an area with certain features in northwest Kien Giang Province. Previous attempts were made by air using this area to move supplies, but by 1969 low portions of South Vietnam, but all such attempts were used by the air assets, supplied by several units, were used by the controlling or new (7th) providing and controlling for the Tram.

The OV-1H ship was used to supply the supplies. The inflight road out from the UV-1
sit where an office from the OV-1

The radar scope and data link processed data to the UV-1

Data link process is also used with a scope on the OV-1

nor or more read out. This information is sent to the OV-1

who in turn relays it to the controlling.

plotted, the C & C ship and light fir the stru

alert status (due to the ground commander to the
target area by the radar controller. The vehicle of alarms to

air. From the appropriate agency will

flars and drops them on instructions from

The gunships are

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SUBJ: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 307th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for Period ending 31 October 1969, RSC, CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Visually from the light of the flares, on nights when there are no moving targets spotted, the package is vectored into intelligence target areas that were picked up either from OV-1 photo missions or other intelligence sources. Target coordinates are then relayed from all strikes to an O-1 unit that makes a first light BDA.

Results, at this time, indicate that the Night Phantom III serves as a positive deterrent to enemy movement through the Tram area. Prior to the start of the Tram operation, numerous moving targets were spotted in the area. Once the Night Phantom III began to judiciously search the Tram, a very great number of sightings were initially made, but over a period of nearly two months, these sightings began a steady decrease, which indicated that the operation was stopping most of the movement through the area. The concept worked so well in the Tram where flakette rockets could be employed because of the lack of friendly forces and populated areas that a similar operation was started on 31 October 1969 in the U Minh Forest, where there are virtually no populated areas and, again, where the VC have long had complete freedom of movement. The only difference in the concept of operations between the two areas is the type of target detection aircraft utilized. In the U Minh Forest very few moving targets were located but an OV-1 IR (infra-red) ship was able to locate numerous hot targets.

(4) Safety Statistics 1 Aug 69 to 31 Oct 69: 14,925 hours were flown during the reporting period; there were no aircraft lost to combat damage but there were two fatalities resulting from an aircraft accident.

<table>
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<th>ACCIDENTS</th>
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<td>43.7</td>
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<tr>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>105.5</td>
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<td>HHC 307th En</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>307th Avn 2n(Obt)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Accident rate based on 100,000 flying hours.

(5) On 1 Sep 69 the 147th Avn Co (sault Jpt Hal) located at Yung Tau, NV, was assigned to the 307th Avn 2n (Obt); concurrently the 199th Avn Co (Utility Airplanes) was assigned to the 21st Avn 2n (Obt) located at Vinh Long, NV. The change of units produced two significant results:

a) the 199th Avn Co was located with its new battalion headquarters in
Winh Long and b) the addition of the 167th AVN Co to the 307th AVN BN (Combat) gave control of all OH-6 Aircraft operating in the IV CTZ to one headquarters. The changes took place with a minimum of problems with both staffs coming together for the sharing of documents and records.

The 167th AVN Co was able to continue its mission throughout the change. The 167th "Heliborne" was the first non-divisional OH-6 company in IV and the first OH-6 company to fly 80,000 hours in-country. They are currently flying toward 10,000 accident free hours.

(5) During the reporting period the 235th AVN Co (Attack Hel) furnished the IV Corps Tactical Zone with armed helicopter support. The results from total sortie flown and many MA's have indicated a decrease of activity from the last reporting period. The lower totals of this quarter's report versus last quarter's results might be attributed to the pacification program in the IV CTZ and the decreased rate of enemy activity. The company met its commitments of supplying eleven (11) to fourteen (14) aircraft per day for various mission assignments which included, Phantom III, support of VNCF, VIP escort, MEDEVAC cover at night, gun cover for d-foliation missions (supporting both Air Force F-105's and Air Force C-123's), IV Corps standby, night's security of Can Tho Army Airfield, and the new night Phantom III missions. At one time the unit was down to 16 AH-1G aircraft which required a tremendous maintenance effort to maintain aircraft available for all missions. In spite of this problem, the unit achieved an average of 85% aircraft availability for the reporting period. On 31 Aug 69 the unit moved from its billets and offices on the north side of Can Tho AB to the south side where the new company area is still under construction. The new area provided aircraft parking adjacent to the maintenance hangar and is very close to the company billets. With the unit drawn together into one area, operational control was increased greatly. A major portion of the move was completed in one day and the unit was able to continue its mission. Results for the reporting period appear on the Operational Statistics Chart, Incl 2.

(7) Side looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) and Infrared (IR) were flown nightly in support of IV CTZ. Intelligence information received from surveillance efforts was disseminated by telephone and teletype to the using agency and inflight.to to appropriate sectors via radio from the aircraft. Visual photographic missions were flown daily on a preplanned reconnaissance and immediate priority request basis. In addition to the regularly scheduled missions flown in support of IV CTZ, the 264th Aviation Company (Surveillance/Photog) accomplished the following special missions during this reporting period.
During the reporting period this unit suffered the loss of three aircraft. At approximately 2000 hours 7 September 1969, the pilot and observer of an OV-1B experienced an electrical fire in the cockpit and ejected over enemy territory. Both crewmembers were picked up uninjured within hours by a Dustoff Aircraft. On 10 September 1969, an OV-1C crashed in Kien Giang Province resulting in the death of both pilot and observer. During the month of October 1969, an OV-1B was involved in a major accident and was evacuated for repairs.

(B) The 271st Avn Co (Lt Col Spt Han) continued to provide the IV CTZ with tactical mobility in support of ARVN troops. The majority of the unit's aircraft were committed to the 21st ARVN Division operating in the South Delta. Because of a decrease in enemy activity, routine missions were run on a regulated and scheduled basis with very few aircraft diverted to tactical emergencies. The unit carried 9,190.7 tons of cargo and 39,000 troops during the reporting period. With a more efficient use of their aircraft, the 271st Avn Co was able to schedule more productive mission tasks than non-productive (flying to a mission area empty) ones and raise their productive mission tasks to nearly 60%. Also, during the reporting period, 177 aircraft recoveries were completed which was an increase of 64 more recoveries than the last quarter. The high point of aircraft recoveries was during the month of October when 66 aircraft were recovered. The 271st is approaching 13,000 accident free flight hours. The 164th Avn Gp OH-6A flight platoon's four OH-6A aircraft are maintained by the 271st. Two LOH's provide dedicated service to IV Corps CORPS (1) and the U.S. Navy (1).

2. (C) SECTION II. LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMPANY ACTION.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 307th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for Period ending 31 October 1969, R & S, CP-65 (R2) (U)

A. (U) PERSONNEL: None.

B. (U) INTELLIGENCE: None

C. (C) OPERATIONS:

1. Air Movement of 155mm Howitzers

(a) OBSERVATION: Battalion requested that CH-47’s no longer be required to move 155mm Howitzers.

(b) EVALUATION: Weight of the 155mm Howitzer is 12,950 pounds and will on most occasions in RVN exceed the lift capability of the CH-47B. In the past, with newer aircraft, several CH-47B’s were able to lift 155’s. However, with the resultant strain placed on the aircraft and the average time on the aircraft of 1350 hours, the older aircraft are not able to lift the 155’s and stay within the established limits.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That CH-47B aircraft not be committed to airlift 155mm Howitzers.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: A letter was forwarded through channels on 14 Oct 69 setting in detail the facts and reasoning involved in making this recommendation.

2. Tactical Ground Radar Use

(a) OBSERVATION: The tactical ground control radar working in conjunction with the OV-13 (SLAR) side looking airborne radar and the OV-1C (IR) infrared, with an immediate strike aircraft capability on standby alert, is effective for vectoring aircraft for night hunter/killer operations.

(b) EVALUATION: A new concept of interdicting enemy infiltration is currently being evaluated by the battalion. A suspected area of high activity is chosen and missions are pre-planned for that area. Moving target detection is accomplished by maintaining continuous surveillance over the area with an OV-13 (SLAR) aircraft flying a racetrack pattern at an optimum altitude of 7,000 feet AGL. Heat emitting targets are discovered by the OV-1C (IR) flying pre-planned canals and roads at 1,500 feet AGL. When a possible target is detected by the aircraft it is plotted and relayed to the tactical operations center. If ground data terminal stations are used, the targets are plotted at the station and passed to the operations center. The operations center evaluates the target.
AVN: 3WE-PC
SUBJECT: Op. rational Report - Lessons Learned, 307th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for Period ending 31 October 1969, RCS, C3POR-65 (R2) (U)

information and relays this to the strike aircraft. The strike aircraft being used is the Army AH-1G "Cobra". The strike aircraft then contacts the tactical ground control radar and is vectored to the target area. The advantages of utilizing ground control radar are:

1. The guidance of strike aircraft directly to the target.
2. Aircraft separation within the target area.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the possible use of ground control radar with a strike force capability be disseminated to all concerned aircraft units.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: This concept is still under evaluation. However, initial results indicate that operations of this nature are very effective in deterring infiltration.

D. (U) ORGANIZATION: None.
E. (U) TRAINING: None.
F. (C) LOGISTICS:

CH-47 Sling Loads

(a) OBSERVATION: Units supported by this battalion for air movement and sling loads utilizing CH-47 aircraft are using unserviceable rigging gear and improper rigging techniques.

(b) EVALUATION: During this reporting period, twelve (12) sling loads were dropped or partially damaged because of improper rigging procedures and/or unserviceable rigging gear. Seven (7) loads dropped were lost or destroyed because the rigging broke. Four (4) loads came apart in the air because of improper rigging and were either partially or completely destroyed. One load was dropped because of a malfunctioning hook. Also, insufficient amounts of serviceable rigging gear have caused undue delays on multiple-sortie missions because of the need to use the same set of slings and rigging equipment on each sortie.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That since the majority of missions are in support of ARVN troops, this information be passed through the Vietnamese logistical channels for action. And, that consideration be given to supplying U.S. units with an appropriate amount of rigging equipment.
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15 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 307th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for Period ending 31 October 1969, HCS, CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Dropped load reports are submitted as they occur and are forwarded through channels to the 1st Aviation Brigade.

G. (U) COMMUNICATIONS: None.

H. (C) MATERIAL:

(1) RESISTOR MODIFICATION.

(a) OBSERVATION: After 150 hours of operation in the CH-47 the different channels in the flight controls (pitch, yaw, and roll) began to pick up inputs from the Stability Augmentation System (SAS).

(b) EVALUATION: Avionics personnel qualified in SAS evaluated the problem and found that the resultant inputs in the faulty system were due to erroneous signals sent by the SAS variable resistor, RN 590-856-6884, removing the variable resistor from the link, they discovered that by just sliding the plunger back and forth a notch could be felt. Upon removing the plastic side plates from the resistor a large notch could be seen in the rails on one side plate. The opposite side plate was not damaged.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: To stop the loss of many dollars, it is recommended that the side plate with the large rails on it be placed into the supply system as a separate item. The cost should be only a fraction of the $80,76 for the entire resistor. This recommendation is an immediate solution. To stop wear on the tracks resulting in the groove, it is recommended that the following areas be evaluated: heat factor, the possibility of constructing the tracks out of stainless steel, the possibility of making a wiper arm that is more compatible to the tracks, or going to a completely new type resistor.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: The only means at this time to correct the problem is to replace the entire resistor. As a means to slow down the wear on the resistor, require the SAS to be disengaged during ground taxi. As a long range corrective action, two EIR's have been submitted. (EIR numbers: V30866 and 096604)

I. (C) OTHER:

AH-1G Revetments.

(a) OBSERVATION: Revetments previously built at Can Tho AAF for AH-1Gs are unsafe during the "dry" season when the aircraft are positioned correctly.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 307th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for Period ending 31 October 1969, RCS, CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(b) EVALUATION: The "L" shaped revetments are constructed so the AH-1Gs, when correctly positioned, are facing west. The AH-1G (Cobra) is critical howing downwind or hovering facing downwind with a left quartering tail wind. During the "dry" season the prevailing wind is southeast, causing an almost constant critical condition when the "Cobras" are hovered into and out of the revetments. An alternative to hovering in and out is landing to the ramp and ground handling the aircraft into and out of the revetments; this is impractical as a solution for the following reasons:

1. Most "Cobras" on the line are fully loaded with fuel and rockets. Ground handling wheels are constructed to handle empty aircraft only and will not stand up under loaded ships.

2. A part of the unit's mission is a 5 minute standby (5 minutes from alert to airborne) and it would be impossible to use the revetments with the ground handling method and meet this requirement.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that future AH-1G revetments be constructed under the below mentioned new style to facilitate hovering into and out of the confined revetment areas.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: A work order was submitted on 29 Oct 69 to alter the present "L" shaped revetments to extend the long side allowing parking in two directions. Until modifications are complete, the pilots are instructed to park on the ramp and ground handle the aircraft when the wind is from the east.

[Signature]
WILLIAM H. CULLEN
LTC, TC
Commanding
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBAGS (15 Nov 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 307th Aviation Battalion
(Combat) for Period Ending 31 October 1969, NGS CSFOH-65 (H2) (U)

DA, HQ, 164TH AVIATION GROUP (Combat), APO 96215, 28 November 1969

TO: Department of the Army, ATTN: AVBAG-0
Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBAG-0, APO 96344

1. (U) The attached 307th CAB O&M for the period ending 31 October 1969
has been reviewed by this headquarters.

2. (U) The following addressees should be inserted between the subject
and paragraph 1:

GJAUSAB, ATTN: GPOF-DT
Commanding General, USAV, ATTN: AVBAG (DT)
Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVGA-G
Commanding Officer, 164th Aviation Group (Combat)

3. (C) The following comments are made on the report:

a. (U) Para 2 e (1) (b), page 10: The movement of the 155mm howitzer
by CH-47B obviously presents special problems even under good conditions.
Additional problems of environment in the IV CTZ and the age of the CH-47
aircraft increase the critical aspects of this operation. During the dry
season, the IV CTZ will have a higher density altitude, which reduces the
lift capability of any aircraft. Examination of the CH-47 operators manual
reveals that the movement of a 155mm howitzer during some of the weather
conditions which may be expected during the dry season will be impossible.
In the interests of mission accomplishment in the safest manner, the mission
of air movement of 155mm howitzers requires careful and detailed planning.
While on occasion it will be impossible for the CH-47 to lift a howitzer,
detailed planning of each requested mission will insure that the maximum
possible number of requested missions are safely accomplished. The weight
of the load, weather conditions, required fuel load, and aircraft and crew
capabilities are the major factors affecting the mission. Some weight
(approximately 500 pounds) may be reduced from the howitzer by removing
the gauges and other equipment. This weight although small, may make the
difference in the ability of the CH-47 to lift the howitzer. The gross
weight of the aircraft may be reduced by refueling the aircraft with only
the fuel required to complete the mission plus the required reserve. Reduc-
tion of the fuel load will significantly reduce the range of the aircraft,
and these two factors must be carefully considered during the planning
for the mission.

b. (U) Para 2 e (1) (c), page 10: This headquarters concurs that the
CH-47B aircraft should not be committed to airlift 155mm howitzers within
A.V.N. Further recommend that higher headquarters, restrict the transport
CONFIDENTIAL

AVIATION (15 Nov 69) 1st Feb 23 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational report - Lessons Learned, 307th Aviation Division
(Combat) for Period ending 31 October 1969, Avia 101/69 (Av)

of 155mm howitzers by Uh-47B helicopters.

c. (C) Para 2 c (1) (d) page 10: On 17 October 1969, this headquarters
recommended to Delta Military Advisory Command that Uh-47B should not be used
to transport 155mm howitzers. A draft message was prepared to be sent by
Delta to Division/Special Tactical Zone Senior Advisors stating that 155-
mm howitzers would not be transported by Uh-47 aircraft. Delta did not approve
this recommendation. This headquarters recommended that Delta directives
and SOPs reflect that 155mm howitzers will not be carried by Uh-47 aircraft
except as a special mission or in an emergency situation due to the
excessive weight of the howitzer.

d. (C) Para 2 c (2) (c), page 11: Concur, Through coordination with
the 165th Aviation Group, this headquarters has established three radar
sites at three locations within the IV Corps, the Coast Plant (V, 596356),
Vinh Long, and Soc Trang. The Coast Plant and Vinh Long radars are used in
conjunction with operationighth Phantom III and the Soc Trang radar is used
with the night hunter killer operation, a night interdiction border surve-


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AVBAC (15 Nov 69) 1st Ind 23 November 1969
SUBJ: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 307th Aviation Battalion
(Combat) for Period ending 31 October 1969, HQ DMZ-65 (n2) (U),
recommending approval, to 1st Aviation Brigade.


J. H. THLdSa
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

CONFIDENTIAL
AVERAC-O (15 Nov 69) 2d Ind

SUBJ: Operational Report: Lessons Learned, 307th Aviation Battalion
(Combat) for period ending 31 October 1969, CPT, C.F.-65

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BDE, APO 96304

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO 96307
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, APO 96307

To: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs with
the contents as indorsed.

2. (C) The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

a. Paragraph 2c(1), page 10, discusses limitations of CH-47B aircraft airlifting 155mm howitzers. This headquarters recognizes limitations posed by older aircraft and associated systems. Airframe hours, dynamic component wear, frequency of operating at or near maximum gross weight configurations and area of operation contribute substantially to aircraft efficiency. Most aircraft in the Republic of Vietnam operate at the extreme limits of their capability during the majority of missions in this environment, and as a result, lose a percentage of their operational efficiency. In transporting 155mm howitzers, CH-47B aircraft operate at or near maximum gross weight; therefore, any loss of aircraft efficiency would limit the ability to transport loads of this weight. In meeting a similar situation, one of the units in VIETNAM adopted the following procedure, which is also recommended by this headquarters:

(1) Require 12 to 24 hour notification.
(2) Plan lift prior to 0900 hours.
(3) Maximum temperature 26°C or 79°F.
(4) 155mm Howitzer stripped to minimum weight, 12,300 lbs.
(5) CH-47B fuel load adjusted to 2,000 lbs or less.
If necessary, reduce weight of aircraft by removing seats, tool boxes, footlockers, chains, straps, oil, etc.

Derive maximum gross weight for hovering out of ground effect from -10 chart.

Reduce figure derived from -10 chart by 8% (6% for rebuilt engines plus 2% USARV required safety reserve).

Above procedure for use sea level to sea level, short haul or sea level to 1600 ft MSL only.

Direct coordination must be effected between supported units to insure compliance in all cases.

b. Paragraph 2a(2), page 10, discusses the use of tactical ground control radar to assist in night interdiction of enemy movement. Concur. The concept of utilizing tactical ground control radar to vector AH-1G aircraft to targets detected by OV-1B Side-Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR), and OV-1C Infrared (IR) aircraft is a sound procedure. Effectiveness is evidenced by the success of the 307th Aviation Battalion (Combat) in reducing enemy movement at night. The information on this technique has been disseminated to subordinate units of this command.

c. Paragraph 21(a), page 12, discusses the adequacy of AH-1G revetments at Can Tho AAF. This headquarters concurs with the evaluation, but nonconcurs with the recommendation. The AH-1G revetments at Can Tho were constructed as "L" shaped revetments at the request of the using unit. An exception to USARV gunship revetment criteria was obtained to allow the non-standard construction. Current USARV gunship revetment criteria provides for unrestricted hovering exit and entry by mission ready armed helicopters and permits parking in either of two directions to take advantage of the most favorable wind condition. These revetments also barricade the inadvertent firing of armed helicopter weapon systems. The gunship revetment entrance sides alternate in the revetment row to reduce multiple aircraft damage by mortar or rocket rounds bursting in hoverlanes. As an alternative, all revetment entrances may be on the same side in the revetment row when available real estate does not permit hoverlanes on both sides of the row. The work order submitted by the unit to reconfigure the revetments to USARV
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 307th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS, CSFRW-55 (R2) (U)

criteria has been approved by this headquarters as a self-help project and forwarded to USA RV for approval.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

ARTHUR W. LITTLE
CPT 1200

Copy 2d Ind Furn:
CO, 307th Avn Bn (Cbt)
AVHGC-DST (15 Nov 69) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 307th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 29 JAN 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, 307th Aviation Battalion (Combat) and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning "Air Movement of 155mm Howitzers", page 10, paragraph 2C(1); 1st Indorsement, paragraph 3a, 3b, and 3c; and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2a; concur with 2d Indorsement. Whenever possible CH-47C(-) or CH-47C helicopters should be used to lift sling loads exceeding 8,000 pounds.

   b. Reference item concerning "CH-47 Sling Loads", page 11, paragraph 2F, and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 3e; concur. Instructions for the rigging of external loads for air lift by helicopter are contained in TM 55-450-11, Air Transport of Supplies and Equipment: Helicopter External Loads Rigged with Air Delivery Equipment, and TM 55-450-12, Air Transport of Supplies and Equipment: External Loads for Sling, Nylon and Chain, Multiple Leg. Consideration is now being given to translating these manuals into Vietnamese for distribution to ARVN forces.

   c. Reference item concerning "AH-1G Revetments", page 12, paragraph 21, and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2c; concur with 2d Indorsement. No action by higher headquarters is required.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

I. D. MURRAY
CPI, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
307th CAB
1st AVN BDE
GPOP-DT (15 Nov 69) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 307th Aviation Battalion (Combat)
for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 & FPO 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]
C. L. SHORT
CPT, AG
Adj AG
ORGANIZATION CHART - 307TH AVN BN (CBT)
31 OCTOBER 1969

307TH

147TH

235TH

244TH

271ST

HHC

PATHFINDER DET

69TH INF DET

774TH MED DET

345TH ASD

76TH FA DET

Assigned less OFCON

Attached

Attached for Supply and Maintenance Support
### 307th Aviation Battalion (Combat)

**Operational Statistics**

1 August 1969 - 31 October 1969

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*Note: Statistics include data from 157th Op CH-6A Night Platoon*
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 307th Aviation Battalion

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug 69 to 31 Oct 69.

CO, 307th Aviation Battalion

15 November 1969

694169

N/A

N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310