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IN REPLY REFER TO
AGDA (M) (12 Feb 70) FOR OT UT 694241

19 February 1970

SUBJECT. Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 2d Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl

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SECRET
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2d Infantry Division, for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RG5 CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

THRU: Commanding General, I Corps (Up), ATT: EACIO-T, APO San Francisco 96353
Commanding General, Eighth US Army, ATT: EACIO-T, APO San Francisco 96301
Commanding General, USARPAC, ATT: SFUR-UT, APO San Francisco 96553

TO: ACSFOR, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (S) Section I. Operations: Significant Activities.
   a. Background:
      (1) The primary mission of the 2d Infantry Division is to defend in sector in event of hostile attack. Other missions are:
         (a) Implement US responsibilities under the Armistice Agreement of 1953 in sector.
         (b) Conduct anti-infiltration, anti-raiding, counter-espionage, and counter-sabotage activities.
         (c) Implement 2d Infantry Division portion of EUSA Cold war program.
      (2) To accomplish these missions, the Division is organized with five infantry, two mechanized infantry, two armor battalions, and the normal ROAD infantry division base. A five platoon Counter Agent Company is organized provisionally from assigned Division KATUSA personnel and is used for special counter agent patrolling, rear area security, and as a Division reaction force. A brigade headquarters and an infantry battalion of the 7th Infantry Division are serving on the I.MZ under the operational control of the 2d Infantry Division. The 97th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) is under the OPCON of the Division and occupies the left sector of the Division. The 97th RCT is normally

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organized with three infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, a reconnaissance company, and other supporting units. However, the 2d ROK Division augments the Regimental Combat Team Division to 2d Infantry Division with an additional reconnaissance company, giving the 2d ROK Division two reconnaissance companies.

(3) To accomplish its primary mission, the Division is prepared to occupy its main defensive positions with three brigade equivalents occupying the FDLA, and one brigade in Division reserve. To implement US responsibilities under the Armistice Agreement of 1953, the Division is responsible for maintaining MDL markers, safe lanes, and access roads within the zone. By direction of G8, Eighth Army, however, no maintenance of MDL markers has been performed since 15 March 1969 when a 2d Infantry Division military demarcation line (MDL) work party was taken under fire by the North Koreans. Additionally, this command provides security forces for Joint Observer Teams (JOT) whenever they have occasion to enter the DMZ. In implementing the Division's Cold War Plan, the Division supports 14 orphanages, presents two hours of English language to US Army (KATUSA) personnel weekly, provides regular cultural heritage tours of Korea for Division soldiers, and provides English language instruction to ten Korean Middle Schools and five Korean High Schools. In addition, the Division participates in a cultural exchange program with Korean universities and presently has 16 active projects which consist of providing building materials to public schools and orphanages under the Armed Forces Assistance to Korea Program.

(4) For counter-infiltration operations, the Division is deployed with two brigade headquarters, four infantry battalions, one mechanized infantry battalion, and two artillery batteries on a rotational basis north of the Imjin River. These units conduct counter-infiltration operations by occupying guard posts, conducting patrols in the demilitarized zone, manning the barrier fence along the DMZ, and conducting other appropriate surveillance and security operations.

b. Current Activities:

(1) During the months of August and September 1969, the 2d Infantry Division received 20 M551 AR/AAAAs. New Equipment Team training was conducted for the 4-7 Cavalry Squadron and 702d Maintenance Battalion during the period 13 August through 8 September 1969. During the last week of the training, 4-7 Cav fired both the conventional rounds and the missiles. The 4-7 Cav personnel participating in the training were highly pleased with the performance of the weapons and vehicles. The 4-7 Cav became operational with the M551 as of 26 September 1969.
(2) A tactical bridge was emplaced across the I Dii. River in the Division sector on 13 September 1969 after being removed 10 July 1969 due to heavy rains and river currents. The bridge consists of 760 feet of rockfill causeway, four rock islands connected by AVLB spans, and 2/2 feet of MTB6 float bridging.

(3) Relocation of the chain link barrier fence south of the DMZ is planned in five areas in order to take maximum advantage of terrain offering the best observation, and where possible to move fighting positions out of low lying rice paddy areas. Relocation of the fence in the first area was completed during this reporting period; work began on 13 September 1969 on the priority two area. The priority two fence relocation project is now 17% completed. In addition, construction of a chain link fence around Guard Post Lucy is virtually complete.

(4) Effective 2d September 1969, A Company, 2d Aviation Battalion was released from attachment to FASCOM and returned to the operational control of 2d Infantry Division. To provide adequate space for the unit, redistribution of facilities at Stanton Army Airfield was required. Additional administrative, maintenance, billeting, and aircraft parking space resources were identified, and critical facilities were re-allocated to ensure utilization to full capacity. The relocation of the unit to Stanton Army Airfield was completed on 31 October 1969. The return of A Company provides the 2d Infantry Division with organic UH-1 aircraft and broadens the scope of aviation support available for training and operational requirements. Aviation assets assigned to the 2d Infantry Division have now increased to 19 OH-23 and 12 UH-1 helicopters. All fixed-wing aircraft were transferred from the Division to provide facilities to accommodate the additional UH-1 aircraft at Stanton Army Airfield, now closed to fixed-wing traffic except during emergencies or hostilities.

(5) During September and October, the Division Aviation Officer planned and supervised three CH-47 helicopter missions involving emplacement of pre-formed concrete foxholes along the barrier fence. A total of 14 of these foxholes were emplaced in areas not easily accessible by ground transportation.

(6) In the 2d Div sector of the DMZ on 18 October 1969, four US personnel assigned to 1-32d Inf (7th Inf Div Rotational Bn) to 2d Inf Div) were ambushed and killed by a team of four hostile individuals while returning from Guard Post Turner. It is apparent that this was a deliberately pre-planned act rather than an ambush of opportunity and that the incident may be a prelude to increased Communist activity in the demilitarized zone.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2d Infantry Division for Period ending 31 October 1969 RGS CPFOR-65 (R) (U)

(7) Effective 16 October 1969, the five battalions located along the DMZ were directed to reposition their units committed to barrier and DMZ operations so as to retain at least one company in reserve. Guard post and patrol manning is now provided by the reserve company and elements of the battalion headquarters company. The purpose of the reconfiguration was to achieve a higher degree of tactical integrity and to permit more rapid deployment from a counter-infiltration posture to a wartime configuration.

(8) A male body was recovered from the DMZ River vicinity CS 064467 on 13 October 1969 and a second male body was recovered from the DMZ River vicinity CS 021928 on 19 October 1969. Based on the equipment and written material discovered with the bodies, it was ascertained that these two individuals were members of a three-man North Korean agent team that had been operating within the ROK, including the 2d Infantry Division area, during the period 27 September 1969 to 18 October 1969. The team was apparently trying to exfiltrate after completion of a photo reconnaissance mission in the ROK. Equipment found with the agents included 2 PPS-43 submachine guns, other weapons and ammunition, clothing (including fatigues with South Korean Army officer insignia), medicine, food, two Pentax cameras and a 500mm telephoto lens. Exposed film found with the equipment was developed and contained 23 useable negatives of military compounds and radar sites located in the Republic of Korea. Additional film had incurred water damage.

(9) During the period 1 October through 1 November 1969 the division was directed to increase its readiness posture. Measures taken were as follows:

(a) All compound commanders reviewed compound defense plans. Additional compound defense plan rehearsals and external compound patrols were conducted.

(b) Army aircraft flights were reduced to the minimum essential for operational requirements.

(c) Operating instructions and implementing procedures were reviewed by key personnel with emphasis on rules of engagement.

(d) Commanders increased intelligence surveillance to insure timely reporting of unusual North Korean activity in the DMZ.

(e) Weather permitting, a daily airborne personnel detector flight was conducted over known refugee areas along the DMZ River.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2d Infantry Division for Period
Ending 31 October 1969 RGS GSRH-65 (K) (U)

(f) Additional stakeout positions were manned on known infiltration/
exfiltration routes.

(g) Additional rear area searches were conducted by units north of
the IMJIN River.

(10) CPX FOCUS LENS FY 70: During the period 22-31 October 1969
Headquarters, 2d Infantry Division; Headquarters, 2d Infantry Division
Support Command; and Headquarters, 2d Infantry Division Artillery participated
in the JCS Command Post Exercise FOCUS LENS FY 70.

(11) The mission and organization of the Counter Agent Company (CAC)
has been reviewed and a proposed reorganization to better utilize the
CAC in event of an outbreak of hostilities has been approved. For future
use, the company will train for and maintain the additional capability of
long range reconnaissance patrolling.

(12) Operations in and along the IMJIN River were modified by 2d
Infantry Division OPRD 7-70 (KICKAPOO). This order replaced Phase III
of 2d Infantry Division OPRD 61-69 (CHESSMAN) and provides for the
employment of three phases of operational readiness. Phase I is utilized
day to day operations during low levels of known agent activity. Phase
II of operation KICKAPOO, which increases surveillance along the IMJIN
River, is implemented during periods of increased agent activity, and Phase
III, providing for maximum surveillance measures, is implemented when
maximum agent activity is anticipated. Although the number of personnel
employed in surveillance of the river has been reduced, the effectiveness
of counter-infiltration operations has not been decreased by the use of
surveillance devices (starlight scopes, night observation devices, Xenon
searchlights, and ground surveillance radar) has increased the Division's
capability for observation of the river.

(13) Rehabilitation of Guard Posts: 2d Infantry Division Guard
Posts located within the DMZ are being rehabilitated to provide additional
protection for personnel and to enable personnel to remain in position
for longer periods of time, thus reducing traffic through the DMZ to
and from the Guard Posts. Each CP will have a CP bunker, sleeping bunker,
latrine, aower, reinforced concrete fighting positions, and treated
timber revetted trenches. Rehabilitation of two of the eleven CPs
located in the 2d Infantry Division sector of the DMZ has now been completed.
Rehabilitation of the remaining guard posts is approximately 15-20% complete and it is anticipated that rehabilitation of all guard posts
can be completed in the fall of 1970.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2d Infantry Division for Period
Ending 31 October 1969 ROK CSMR-65 (R1) (6)

(14) Rome Flow Clearing: To reduce the number of infantry
personnel committed to provide security for vehicles traveling to and
from Guard Posts, the 2d Infantry Division is clearing a 200 meter strip
of trees and brush on each side of access roads to Guard Posts. Rome
Flows (mounted on HD16 Allis-Chalmers bulldozers) are used to accomplish
this and other clearing operations. Clearing to date has totaled 2562
acres. The 300 meter cleared strip on GPs Jane, Repul, Olivet, and Pan-
Nun-ton Road has been re-cleared this period. The priority two fence
relocation area was also cleared. Further Rome Flows have been supplemented
with two Garden Brush Cutters.

(15) 1/2 Ton Truck Frame Repair: Inspection of all M715 and M726 1/2
ton vehicle frames in the 2d Infantry Division revealed that approximately
20% of the M726 1/2 ton vehicles on hand had defective frames. The firm of
Midland Ross is currently repairing the damaged vehicles in the 2d Infantry
Division area.

(16) Turn-in of Excess Supplies and Equipment: An accelerated program
for the identification and turn-in of excess supplies and equipment was
initiated during October. Those items determined to be excess in
accordance with the latest RTOS and MDUs are to be identified by 15 Nov 69,
with turn-in to begin concurrently.

(17) ARPA Fence Installation: In conjunction with an extensive
program to deny North Korean infiltration efforts, the 2d US Infantry
Division is scheduled to receive a 14 kilometer section of ARPA fence.
This fence is a six strand, instrumented, barbed wire fence that activates
an alarm when the fence is cut or a tension of 10 pounds is exerted on
the strands. Four of the wires are instrumented to detect tension
changes and cutting while the remaining two ground and return wires
detect only cutting. Detectors, placed at 100 meter intervals, localize
alarms to 100 meter segments. Current plans call for installation of a
14 km section of this fence by two ARPA representatives, contract
personnel, and OIF personnel of the 2d Infantry Division; the remainder of the
fence is planned to be installed by 2d Infantry Division personnel.

At the end of this reporting period a total of 2 km of ARPA fence was
operational.

(18) STAKO Evaluation:

(a) The 2d Infantry Division is participating in the Department of
The Army directed STAKO evaluation. The overall STAKO project is a two-
year operational evaluation to determine material requirements, doctrine,
organization, training requirements, and logistical support elements of
the US Army Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Righ Observation (STAR)
system. The 2d Infantry Division evaluation is one of three overseas
evaluations in progress as a part of the first phase of the STAKO evaluation.

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Ending 31 October 1969 MAC Vietnam (A) (U)

(b) The purpose of the 2d Infantry Division evaluation is to 
provide data on night operations during barrier/DMZ operations. This 
evaluation is based on data collected during surveillance and night 
operations by the 1-34th Infantry Battalion during the summer and fall 
months of 1969.

(c) The evaluation is being conducted for the battalion commander 
by a field grade project officer assigned to 2d Infantry Division and 
by NET and evaluation personnel from COMUS.

(d) The STAN Evaluation team arrived in 2d Infantry Division in 
July 1969. After an initial period of equipment training, 
equipment of 
the STAN devices commenced in the DMZ when the 1-33th Infantry rotated 
to the DMZ in August 1969. An In-Process-Review was conducted on 9 October 
1969 with representatives of the Combat Development command. Data collection 
for the evaluation will continue until mid-November 1969.

(e) A garrison VHF system was installed from headquarters, 2d 
Infantry Division to each of the Brigades and Division Artillery. The 
system is now operational on a 24 hour basis and provides a backup to 
the existing underground cable system.

(20) The following changes in command occurred within the 2d Infantry 
Division between 1 August and 31 October 1969:

(a) Headquarters, 2d Infantry Division:

1 MG S. H. Matheson assumed command of 2d Infantry Division from 

2 BG C. M. McQuarrie assumed duties as ADC(S), 6 August 1969.

3 MAJ S. F. C. Demyanenko assumed duties as G2 from CCL J. V. Prysock, 
2 September 1969.

4 LTC I. L. Slavich assumed duties as G3 from LTC C. J. Jones, 
9 August 1969.

5 LTC L. C. Rupple assumed duties as G5, 5 October 1969.

6 LTC F. Fuentes assumed duties as Division Finance Officer from 
MAJ P. A. Tomolonius, 1 October 1969.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2d Infantry Division for Period ending 31 October 1969 RUS C5FOR-65 (II) (U)

1 LTC D. J. McPherson assumed duties as Division Surgeon from Maj R. V. McWorter, 22 August 1969.

2 MAJ C. G. Colburn assumed duties as Division Chemical Officer 15 September 1969.

3 MAJ D. A. Moreland assumed duties as Staff Judge Advocate from Maj P. T. Andrews, 3 August 1969.

4 Maj J. A. Grundbarg assumed duties as Post Engineer from LTC J. A. Niemi, 1 August 1969.

(b) 1st Brigade, 2d Infantry Division:

1 COL L. M. Erek assumed command of 1st Brigade from COL W. N. Naurn, 6 August 1969.

2 LTC R. T. Zargan assumed command of 2-72d Armor Battalion from Maj A. Rober, 2 August 1969.

(c) 2d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division:

1 COL J. M. Russell assumed command of 2d Brigade from COL J. H. Cahalan, 1 August 1969.


3 LTC J. E. Colson assumed command of 1-72d Armor Battalion from LTC J. B. Hilburn, 15 August 1969.

(d) 4th Brigade, 2d Infantry Division: LTC W. L. McElhaney assumed command of 1-33rd Infantry Battalion from LTC R. W. Von Schlemmer, 3 September 1969.

(e) 2d Infantry Division Artillery:

1 COL T. J. Perkins assumed command of 2d Infantry Division Artillery from COL D. C. Piec, 4 August 1969.

2 LTC W. T. Panttaja assumed command of 7-17 Artillery Battalion from LTC W. K. Evans, 30 August 1969.

(f) 2d Infantry Division Support Command:

1 COL J. J. Tominec assumed command of 2d Infantry Division Support Command from COL J. A. Manning, 2 August 1969.
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SAGDO-0
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2d Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 October 1969 RCS USFOR-65 (R) (U)

2 LTC S. H. Spicely assumed command of the 2d Infantry Division Supply and Transportation Battalion from LTC W. F. Bieber, 4 October 1969.

(g) 2d Infantry Division Troops: LTC C. H. Hilt assumed command of 4-7 Cavalry Squadron from LTC J. P. Hausmann, 3 September 1969.

2. (C) Section II. Lessons Learned: Commanders Observation, Evaluation, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel: Officer Replacement Forecasts.

(1) Observation: This command is informed on a monthly basis of projected officer assignments and in many cases names and STAs of the incoming officers are furnished. This information is then used by the Division to project forthcoming assignments and by name fills. In some instances officers do not arrive as forecast with no advance information to this headquarters of changes being made.

(2) Evaluation: Due to the present shortage of officers in the 2d Infantry Division, particularly in the grade of Captain and Major and in Field Artillery and Armor Lieutenants, the lack of advanced notice of officers not arriving on schedule causes unnecessary turbulence.

(3) Recommendation: That efforts be made by EUSA and Department of the Army to inform subordinate commands when forecast officer replacements are delayed or receive changes of orders.

b. Operations:

(1) Minefield Clearing with Tank Rollers:

(a) Observation: Approximately 75% of all mines detonated by the use of tanks with mine clearing expendable roller, model 1A were detonated by the tank treads rather than by the roller. Problems were also experienced with the roller becoming entangled in barbed wire and other entanglements.

(b) Evaluation: While the tank mine roller is effective in clearing roads, it is only partially effective in rough or brushy terrain. Tanks operating without rollers are more effective under these conditions as their maneuverability is not hampered by the rollers.

(c) Recommendation: That the tank roller be used only on flat level terrain which is clear of obstacles.

(2) Minefield Anti-Blast Boots:

(a) Observation: Since mine clearing operations were begun in November 1963, to clear the estimated 59,000 mines located in the vicinity
of the DMZ, there have been numerous injuries inflicted on friendly personnel by the M-14 mine. The most common injury has been traumatic amputation of part or all of the foot.

(b) Evaluation: On 26 July 1963, 2d Infantry Division received 158 pair of anti-blast boots and 168 pair of anti-blast overboots from Natick Laboratories. The boots were issued to the 21 Engineer Battalion for use by military and civilian mine-laying teams. On 14 September 1967, a Korean National (5’5” tall, weighing 123 lbs) working in a minefield area of the DMZ stepped on a 65 M-14 mine. At the time of the accident the Korean National was wearing both anti-blast boots and overboots, while the individual suffered a permanent partial disability, the anti-blast boots and overboots prevented more severe injury or amputation of his foot. The boots will not protect personnel from all injuries but will significantly reduce the extent of injury.

(c) Recommendations: That all personnel working in areas suspected of containing plastic mines which cannot be detected by conventional means be equipped with anti-blast boots and anti-blast overboots.

(3) Concrete Constructions:

(a) Observations: Since most of the concrete poured by the 2d Engineer Battalion must be transferred to dump trucks and hauled 4 to 6 miles to be poured, segregation of the mix and hardening of the concrete has been experienced before the mix arrives at the job site.

(b) Evaluation: Vibration of the trucks which cause the segregation cannot be halted and due to the large volume of some pours, the use of a 16 S concrete mixer on site is impractical. The addition of a small amount of air entraining mixture (4 ounce per sack of cement) to the concrete at the batch plant and a decrease in the amount of water added results in a concrete mixture which is less prone to segregation and at the same time is more manageable and easier to pour than a very wet mix.

(c) Recommendation: That a small amount of air entraining agent be added to all concrete that must be transported in dump trucks.

(4) Barrier Lighting System:

(a) Observations: Surveillance of the DMZ barrier system is presently accomplished through the utilization of visual observation, starlight scopes, night observation devices, 23” xenon searchlights, and 30” searchlights. The limited viewing time for night observation equipment and the noise associated with searchlight operations limit the effectiveness of this equipment. In addition surveillance is limited by fog and haze.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2d Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 October 1969 RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

(b) Evaluation: A barrier lighting system will increase the effectiveness of night observation equipment and will permit continuous visual surveillance of the barrier system during the hours of darkness increasing the effectiveness of detection of North Korean agents attempting to cross the lighted area. A two kilometer section of lighting has been installed for evaluation in the 2d Infantry Division sector.

(c) Recommendations:

1. That a complete lighting system be designed and installed along the 2d Infantry Division barrier fence.

2. That the use of barrier lighting systems be considered along the DMZ in other areas of Korea.

Training: None.

Intelligence: None.

Logistics: None.

Organization: None.

(1) Data Link Circuits:

(a) Observation: During OPER FOCUS LYNX it was noted that data links were not provided between FASCX agencies and the 2d Infantry Division Support Command. During garrison operations, two data links are operational on a daily basis, one between the 2d Supply and Transportation Battalion and the Inventory Management Center (INC) in Taegu, and one between the 702d Maintenance Battalion and the 457th Replacement Parts Company in Uijongbu. At the present time these circuits are passed over the garrison telephone system.

(b) Evaluation: During tactical operations it can be assumed that the 2d Infantry Division Support Command units will relocate, precluding use of existing circuits. At the present time an area communications capability to provide the data circuits for Support Command units in the field is not available in Korea.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2d Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 October 1969 RG 31 FOR-65 (RI) (II)

(a) Recommendation: That data link circuits be routed over the Army and Corps Command radio relay systems to the 2d Infantry Division and be extended through the use of Division systems to Support Command.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JOHN R. FRANKLIN
CPT, AGC

1st Inf
Division Organization
ASST AG
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2d Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS GSPOR-65 (RI) (U)

DA, Headquarters I Corps (Group), APO San Francisco 96358

TO: Commanding General, Eighth US Army, ATTN: EAGO-MH, APO San Francisco 96301

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, 2d Infantry Division.

2. (C) I Corps (Op) Signal is aware of the problem contained in paragraph 2g (1). Within the near future, a test will be conducted to determine if data traffic can be passed via a common user telephone circuit operating over the second generation AACS equipment.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

EDward K. ...    
Major AGC
Deputy Adjutant General

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SAGO-KH (13 Nov 69) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2d Infantry Division for period
ending 31 October 1969, G3 SGN-65 (a1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY, APO 96301

TO: COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES ARMY, PACIFIC, ATTN: G30-P-31,
APO 96368

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed subject report and forwarding
endorsement. The following comments supplement the report.

2. (C) Reference item concerning Officer Replacement Forecasts, page 9,
para 2a. This headquarters instituted the following procedures on 16 Oct 69.
When a forecasted officer replacement is delayed, or a change of
course is received, the gaining command is notified by telephone. This type of
information is also conveyed to all major subordinate commands by
the monthly SGN-50 report.

3. (C) Reference item concerning Minefield Clearing with Dog Handlers,
page 9, para 2b(1). Concur. Additionally, Eighth Army has initiated plans
to train mine-detecting dogs at the Limited War Laboratory, Aberdeen
Proving Ground, Maryland. If tests are successful, dogs and handlers,
capable of operating in rough terrain, will be deployed to Korea in the
spring of 1970.

4. (C) Reference item concerning Minefield Anti-blast Boots, page 9,
para 2b(2). Concur. Limited War Laboratory is also experimenting with
blast protective mats to be used by mine clearing personnel in conjunction
with mine-detecting dogs.

5. (U) Reference item concerning Concrete Construction, page 10, para
2b(3). Nonconcur. The addition of an entraining agent to the concrete
will not materially improve the segregation problem being experienced.
It is realized that transport of wet concrete by dump truck may be an
acceptable expedient, and that one 16 cubic yard mixer may be inadequate
at the site. However, it would be better to provide more than one mixer
at the site and transport this material dry. No action by 3d Arty or Sa
is recommended.

6. (C) Reference item concerning Barrier Lighting System, page 10,
para 2b(4). Concur. Eighth Army has initiated action to conduct an
operational evaluation of a DMZ barrier lighting system along the entire
2d Infantry Division barrier fence. Barrier lighting for the total 12
has been considered and requested in a proposal to DA, however this
project has not received funding approval to date.

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7. (c) Reference item concerning Data Link Circuits, page 11, para 2p(1); and last item, para 2. Concur. Tests should be conducted as soon as possible to determine feasibility of passing data traffic over tactical common user telephone systems. I Corps (Jp) indicates that this is being planned at this time.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Copies furnished:

C. 1 Corps (Jp), APO 96353 (incl only)
C. 2d Inf Div, APO 96321 (incl only)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 2d Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (K1) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 28 JAN 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORT
CPT, AOG
Asst AOG
### Secret

#### Organization of the 20th Infantry Division

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**33th (ROK) RCT**

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**Division Artillery**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1-15 Arty (105) (T)</th>
<th>7-17 Arty (105) (T)</th>
<th>5-38 Arty (105) (T)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6-37 Arty (155) (8&quot;)</td>
<td>1-12 Arty (HJ)</td>
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**Division Troops**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4-7 Cav Sqdn</th>
<th>2d Engr Bn</th>
<th>122d Sig Bn</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 2d Inf Div</td>
<td>2d MP Co</td>
<td>Counter Agent Co (ROK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2d MI Det</td>
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*1-32 Infantry from 7th Infantry Division under operational control of the 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division

**Brigade Headquarters from 7th Infantry Division under operational control of 2d Infantry Division

**33th ROK RCT from 32d ROK Division under operational control of 2d Infantry Division

Incl 1

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**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 2d Infantry Division**

**Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug 69 to 31 Oct 69.**

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**13 November 1969**

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