<table>
<thead>
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<td>Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.</td>
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| FROM:                  |
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<table>
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19 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 11th Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to ensure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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11th Aviation Battalion
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat), for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969, HCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities.
   a. (U) Mission. There were no mission changes.
   b. (U) Organization.
      (1) Under provisions of General Order 35, Headquarters, 12th Aviation Group (Combat), dated 28 September 1969, the 391st Quartermaster Detachment was reassigned to the 145th Aviation Battalion (Combat), APO 96277. (See Inclosure 1.)
      (2) An organizational chart depicting the composition of the 11th Aviation Battalion may be found at Inclosure 2.
   c. (U) Command and Staff.
      (1) Significant changes in the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) command and staff structure during this period were:
         Command
         Staff
            (b) On 6 August 1969, NWJ Lanny Standridge, Inf, 409-54-4467, replaced NWJ Fred E. Lyssy, ARP, 457-50-6878, as Battalion Executive Officer.
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AVBACA-AC

13 November 1969

SUBJECT: ORLL for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(c) On 10 September 1969, MAJ John W. Johnson, IN, 253-52-0048, replaced CPT John L. Calvert, TC, 427-86-5743, as Battalion S1.


(e) On 18 October 1969, WO1 Jefferson R. Clater, AVI, 231-56-0944, replaced CW4 Lawrence D. Kelly, AVI, 326-26-8144, as Battalion S5.


Unit Commanders

(2) The current command and staff structure is reflected at Enclosure 3.

d. (U) Unit Strengths (as of 31 October 1969).

(1) Military.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>432d Hq Det</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128th Avn Co (Aslt Hol)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173d Avn Co (Aslt Hol)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>759th Hq Det</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205th Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hol)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>213th Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hol)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL 11th Avn Bn (Cbt)</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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AVBACA-AC

13 November 1969

SUBJECT: ORLL for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(2) Civilian.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>DAC</th>
<th>V/I</th>
<th>3d A.T. L</th>
<th>TECH REP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12 10 1 1</td>
<td>0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>432d Med Det</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 1 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128th Avn Co (Aslt Hel)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10 9 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173d Avn Co (Aslt Hel)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9 4 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>759th Med Det</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 1 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205th Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9 9 0 0 1 1</td>
<td>1 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>213th Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10 9 0 0 1 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL 11th Avn Bn (Cbt)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>52 43 1 1</td>
<td>2 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. (U) Aircraft Status. See Inclosure 4.

f. (U) Operational Results. See Inclosure 5.

g. (U) Employment. The 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) was engaged daily in support of tactical operations during the quarter. Continuous training of new personnel was accomplished concurrently with the conduct of normal combat operations.

h. (U) Personnel, Morale, Discipline and Information.

(1) Personnel records. An average of 1243 records were maintained during the period. Processing totals were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In Processed</th>
<th>Out Processed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officer</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted Men</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL 3
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SUBJECT: ORLL for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOK-65 (R2) (U)

(2) Awards and Decorations. The following awards and decorations were processed this period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Submitted</th>
<th>Award</th>
<th>Received</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Silver Star</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Legion of Honor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Distinguished Flying Cross</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Soldier’s Medal</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Bronze Star V</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Air Medal V</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Army Commendation Medal V</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>Bronze Star</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2034</td>
<td>Air Medal</td>
<td>1610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>162</td>
<td>Army Commendation Medal</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Purple Heart</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. (C) Intelligence and Security.

(1) Intelligence.

(a) The S2 section obtained intelligence from II Field Force, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), 1st Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division, 3d Brigade 82d Airborne Division, 23d Artillery Group, 1st Aviation Brigade, 12th Aviation Group (Combat), and 7th Air Force. These reports provided intelligence coverage of the 11th Aviation Battalion area of operation. From these sources, a weekly briefing was presented to the Battalion Commander and staff, and periodic briefings for subordinate units. Emphasis was placed on antiaircraft activity, to include use of “Redlog” and “Thunder Flanks” messages.

1 Codeword to report enemy antiaircraft fire and request artillery suppression.

2 Codeword to report suspected enemy radar-controlled antiaircraft weapons.

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(b) The position of Assistant 32/Security Platoon Leader was created to supervise the Battalion area of the Phu Loi Post perimeter defense, flight line, maintenance and administrative/billing area security. An Infantry lieutenant filled this position.

(2) Security. An evaluation of the Battalion perimeter and aircraft defense requirements resulted in the following improvements:

(a) Chain link cyclone fence screens were constructed in front of each bunker to minimize the effectiveness of rocket-propelled grenades (RPG). Screens were positioned 12 feet in front of the bunker and cover approximately 120 degrees of bunker frontal area.

(b) In addition to Vietnam in-country training, members of the Security Platoon received training emphasizing rules of engagement, sapper tactics, weapons familiarization and techniques of night perimeter defense. Training conducted by security platoon cadre included maximum practical work with weapons, rigging and detonation of various types of munitions (e.g., claymore mines, fougasse barrels and flares).

(c) All aircraft guards were armed with 12-gauge pump shotguns to reduce the danger of wounding friendly troops inside the Phu Loi perimeter. The basic load of ammunition consists of 10 rounds of 00 buckshot.

(d) Additional personnel were dispatched to the flight line during periods of increased alert readiness to counter the increased threat of sapper attacks and inspect aircraft for explosives. Upon completion of aircraft inspection, personnel are used to reinforce the flight line perimeter.

3. (C) Plans, Operations and Training.

(1) Plans. All 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) OPLUS remained in effect.

(2) Operations.

(a) The 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) supported the following major tactical units: II Field Force, 1st Infantry Division, 9th Infantry Division, 5th Ann Division, Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF), Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command (ZMAC), Capital Military Assistance Command (ZMAC), Military Assistance Command Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (MACVORDS), 5th Special Forces Group, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 3d Brigade 82d Airborne Division and the 1st Australian Task Force.
(b) Operation Toan Thang (Complete Victory) Phase III, initiated on 17 February 1969, continued through this period. In support of the operation, the 11th Aviation Battalion transported 190,650 passengers and 47,616 tons of cargo while flying 79,814 sorties in 24,380.6 flying hours. (See Inclosure 5.) Mission results for this period are listed at Inclosure 5. Ammunition expenditures by type and amount are found at Inclosure 6.

(c) Throughout this period airmobile combat assaults (CA), tactical extractions and direct combat support (DCS) missions were conducted daily by the Battalion. Three battalion assaults, involving two assault helicopter companies were conducted during this period.

(d) The 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) continued primary support of the 1st Infantry Division, although the battalion’s two assault support helicopter companies provided general and direct support for all major units in III Corps Tactical Zone.

(e) The 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) was assigned five holl-bucket missions (CH-47 “Chinooks” equipped with two 350-gallon buckets). Three of these missions, representing sixty percent of the total, were canceled prior to the aircraft arriving on station. The remaining two missions were completed successfully. A total of 17 sorties were flown and 11,900 gallons of water was dispensed on fires of various types. Due to frequent rains during the wet season, holl-buckets have not been required to suppress dust in pick-up zones.

(f) During this period the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) conducted eight ladder missions, the first of this type to be conducted since January 1968. Section II contains a detailed discussion of troop ladder operations.

(g) The 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) Pathfinder Detachment continued to provide daily support for CH-47 “Chinook” missions. Pathfinders conducted 654 missions consisting of 77 troop sorties transporting 3,413 passengers and 5,333 equipment sorties involving 21,462 tons of cargo.

(h) The 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) pathfinders participated in three troop ladder missions with the 1st Infantry Division and, in conjunction, conducted special classes on selection and clearing of LZs.

(i) The Battalion light ship (Firefly) flew 43 hours and was employed on 14 missions. The recent addition of the Night hawk system has improved the operational effectiveness of the firefly aircraft.

3GAU-2B/4 minigun with independently mounted searchlight and night observation devices (NOD).
AVBACA-AC

13 November 1969

SUBJECT: ORLL for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(3) Training.

(a) During this period 105 personnel (100 percent of those eligible) completed Vietnam in-country training required by USARV Regulation 350-1. This training was conducted by the 1st Infantry Division Replacement Training Center at Di An. Training previously provided by the 82nd Airborne Division Replacement Training Detachment was discontinued.

(b) The 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) Pathfinder Detachment assisted Battalion Mobile Training Teams (BTTs) in conducting 11 classes for infantry and artillery units. Instruction covered correct procedures for rigging external loads, maintenance of rigging equipment, aircraft capabilities, PZ/LZ requirements and proper aircraft utilization.

(c) The 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) received one allocation for Jungle Environmental Survival Training School (JEST). At present, the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) has one school-trained escape and evasion officer.

(d) Although the Battalion experienced an overall decrease in allocations for Army Aviation Refresh Training School (AATS) courses, there was an increase in allocations for the CH-47 Maintenance Supervisor Course. Twenty-five allocations were received for the following courses:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>COURSE</th>
<th>NO of ALLOCATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Inspector Course</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Supply Course</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-47 Maintenance Supervisor Course</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-47 Airframe Repairman Course</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-55-L-7 Engine Repairman Course</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-55-L-11 Engine Repairman Course</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-53-L-11 Engine Repairman Course</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-53-L-13 Engine Repairman Course</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UI-1D/H Airframe Repairman Course</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7

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(a) Boeing-Vertol technical representatives conducted maintenance refresher training for the 205th and 213th Aviation Companions (Assault Support Helicopter) during the quarter. Classes, which included demonstrations and supervised practical exercises, were conducted in conjunction with normal daily maintenance requirements.

(f) A comprehensive training program was conducted to familiarize pilots, gunners, and light operators with the Night Hawk system. Night Hawk training missions were conducted on four occasions for a total of eight flying hours. In addition, 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) pilots and crewmen observed and participated in Night Hawk operations conducted by the 1st Aviation Battalion.

k. (U) Logistics.

(1) During this quarter the Battalion received a complete issue of SPII-4 flight helmets. PLLs for the helmet cannot be established until receipt of the technical manual. Repair parts are not available at direct support maintenance facilities.

(2) Sufficient quantities of Nomex flight suits were received during this quarter to permit issue of two sets to each aviator and enlisted crewman.

(3) Lack of school trained maintenance supervisors, MOS 63C40, and automotive repairmen, MOS 63B20, continued to be a problem. A program of on-the-job training partially alleviated the shortage.

(4) Shortages of field maintenance repair parts for 2 1/2-ton trucks such as clutches, wheel cylinders, engines, and power train components, coupled with excessive order/ship time were contributing factors to an excessively high deadline rate.

(5) Lack of repair parts at all echelons for the 3/4-ton truck continued to be a problem area and accounted for excessive equipment down time.

(6) Prescribed Load Lists (PLLs) continued to show an excessively high number of zero balances. This was attributed to long order/ship times for normal replacement repair parts.

(7) "A-level" calibration teams arrived in the Battalion during the quarter. "A-level" calibrations, previously overdue, were accomplished and records updated as required.
AVBACA-AC

13 November 1969

SUBJECT: ORR for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSF0A-65 (R2) (U)

1. (C) SIGNAL. With the modification of three aircraft for ZYR-ZYS installation during this period, all but three of the Battalion aircraft have been retrofitted. In addition, refresher training on the KY-28 system was given to unit CNESEC and avionics personnel.

m. (C) MAINTENANCE.

(1) For all units of the Battalion the average aircraft density was 14 UH-1B/C, each operating an average of 75.7 flying hours per month; 42 UH-1D/H aircraft, obtaining an average of 109.4 hours each and 30 CH-47A/C helicopters averaging 75 hours per month. (See Inclosure 7.) Sixteen UH-1 aircraft were turned in; 15 replacements were received. The assault support helicopter companies retrograded six CH-47 helicopters and received two replacements.

(2) Based on NVIC authorizations at the close of the quarter, the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) was short three UH-1B/C and six UH-1D/H aircraft. The 213th Aviation Company (Assault Support Helicopter) operated with 15 CH-47C aircraft, one less than authorized due to a major accident. The 205th Aviation Company (Assault Support Helicopter) was assigned 14 CH-47A aircraft. The company lost two aircraft during the period, one due to a major accident and the other to combat damage.

(3) The 213th Aviation Company (Assault Support Helicopter) continued operations exclusively with the CH-47C aircraft. Accumulated high-low time aircraft in the unit at the close of the period were 943 and 627 hours, respectively. Shortages of repair parts peculiar to the CH-47C helicopter continued to present a significant problem. Fourteen aircraft were EDF a total of 113 days during the quarter, as compared with a zero rate for the unit assigned CH-47A aircraft. The higher EDF rate for the 213th Aviation Company (Assault Support Helicopter) was reported as an excessive Not Operationally Ready Supply (NORS) status on the monthly Army Aircraft Inventory Status and Flying Time report, DA Form 1352.

(4) A shortage of qualified technical inspectors for UH-1 and CH-47 aircraft continued to present a problem. To compensate for reduced strength in technical inspectors (35 percent of the authorized number), the Battalion relied on increased utilization of on-the-job training and graduates from the Army Aircraft Refresher Training School. Although allotted quotas to the School have partially relieved the shortage, there were insufficient graduates to fill existing vacancies to a satisfactory level.

n. (U) AVIATION SAFETY. Six major accidents, ten incidents, four forced landings and ten precautionary landings resulted in a cumulative...
accident rate of 24.3 per 100,000 flying hours. This is a reduction of 0.1 from the last period. Three of the major accidents, representing fifty percent of the total, were caused by pilot error. Two accidents were caused by material failure. The third was attributed to maintenance error. Three of the 10 incidents were caused by material failure while the rest were attributed to pilot error. Material failure was the major contributing factor in all forced and precautionary landings.

o. (U) Medical. No significant medical activities transpired.


(1) Renovation of a portion of the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) Chapel was completed on 13 October 1969. The 20-day project completed by Vietnamese labor, included dismantling the memorial room, extending the chancel area, and constructing a new pulpit and altar table.

(2) Inclosure 8 contains a summary of religious activities during this period.

q. (U) Civic Actions.

(1) The 11th Battalion continued to support various civic action projects during this quarter. Headquarters and Headquarters Company and the 123rd Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter) sponsored the Lai Thieu School for Deaf Mutes, while the 205th and 213th Aviation Companies (Assault Support Helicopter) sponsored St. Joseph's Leprosarium near the village of Son Son. The 173rd Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter) continued to support the Lai Khe Elementary School.

(2) Members of the Battalion supported other civic action projects through Chapel contributions. Two offerings per month were designated to be used in support of various projects in the Phu Loi area.

2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. (U) Personnel. Done.

b. (U) Intelligence. Done.

c. (C) Operations.

(1) CH-47 Employment on Troop Ladder Missions.
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13 November 1969

SUBJECT: CORR for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(a) OBSERVATION: The first troop ladder missions in twenty-one months were conducted during this period. These operations lacked adequate planning and execution.

(b) EVALUATION: The CH-47, while hovering out of ground effect with personnel disembarking by ladder, is aerodynamically critical. Flight control problems are magnified by the constantly shifting center of gravity due to repositioning of troops internally and on the ladder. Depending on circumstances, the time required to insert troops by this method may negate the advantages. A recent study indicated an average of 27 minutes was required to disembark 25 personnel.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That troop ladder missions be utilized only as a tactical necessity.

2. That insertion aircraft be equipped with two ladders—one positioned as normal on the ramp of the aircraft and a second ladder installed in the lower rescue hatch of the cabin.

3. That an additional aircraft be utilized to sling load support equipment and supplies, if recommendation 2 is adopted.

(d) COMMAND ACTIONS: Liaison was established with supported units to insure an understanding of troop ladder operations. Unit commanders were briefed on considerations in selection of this method of insertion. Classes were conducted to instruct personnel on safety procedures and techniques of debarking CH-47 aircraft by ladder.

(2) Recovery of O-1 Aircraft by CH-47.

(a) OBSERVATION: A major accident occurred during sling load recovery of an O-1 by a CH-47. The fixed wing aircraft developed lift at the high speeds encountered during the relocation and flew into the aft rotor system of the helicopter. There were six fatalities and loss of both aircraft.

(b) EVALUATION:

1. Individual techniques of fixed wing recovery vary and instructions on recovery operations contained in the CH-47 technical manual (TM 55-1520-227-10) do not outline definite procedures.
2 Statements of the rigging crew indicate the O-1 was rigged in accordance with required procedures. A twenty-foot sling was used, spoilers (2x4 boards) were strapped to the top of the wings and controls were neutralized. A witness to the accident indicated no fault or failure of rigging.

3 The primary cause of the accident was excessive airspeed (100 knots) while transporting the O-1 by sling load.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS:

1 That O-1 aircraft be dismantled and carried internally.

2 That, when fixed wing aircraft are transported externally, wings be removed to improve handling and stability.

3 That maximum airspeeds for recovery of aircraft be established as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Aircraft</th>
<th>Maximum IAS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UH-1</td>
<td>65 Knots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH-13/OH-23</td>
<td>60 Knots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-1</td>
<td>40 Knots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>all others</td>
<td>as required to assure stabilized load</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4 That a standardized wing spoiler be constructed for use throughout the Army.

5 That all units reevaluate and reemphasize procedures for fixed wing aircraft recovery.

6 That T4 55-1520-227-10 be revised to include specific procedures for recovery of aircraft.

(d) commands actions:

1 The 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) reviewed its SOP to insure standardized pilot techniques for aircraft recovery. Strict adherence to procedural guidelines and safety precautions were emphasized.
2. A liaison program was established with supporting units to insure consistent rigging of fixed wing aircraft in accordance with established procedures.

d. (U) Organization. None.

e. (C) Training.

Training for Night Airmobile Operations.

(a) Observation: A major accident involving a UH-1 occurred during a night combat assault.

(b) Evaluation: Investigation of cause factors revealed two principal deficiencies within the unit as follows:

1. A low level of crew experience in night flying which increased the margin for pilot error.

2. Lack of a comprehensive night training program.

(c) Recommendation: That a minimum of four hours of night training be conducted monthly. This training should include but is not limited to:

1. Night formation flying.

2. Normal approach to lighted facilities.

3. Approach to minimum lighted facilities.

4. Night navigation techniques.

5. Orientation on inherent problems of night flying; to include:

a. Night refueling techniques.

b. Night rearming techniques.

c. Use of flares and light ships.

d. Unit SOP for night operations.

(d) Command Action: A program consisting of weekly night training flights has been established by this command. All training is conducted under supervision of unit instructor pilots.
f. (U) Logistics. None.
g. (U) Communications. None.
h. (U) Material. None.
i. (C) Other.

(1) Covering Bunkers with Concrete.

(a) OBSERVATION: Sandbags used on perimeter fortifications deteriorated rapidly.

(b) EVALUATION: To check the rate of deterioration, "pene-prime" was used to preserve useful life of sandbags on bunkers. A recent fire established that this method of preservation was potentially unsafe.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That bunkers be capped with a two-inch cover of concrete, using narrow mesh wire for reinforcement.

(d) CONFLICTING ACTIONS: The recommendation listed above has been adopted consistent with availability of concrete and materials.

(2) One Hundred Percent Technical Inspection of UH-1 Aircraft.

(a) OBSERVATION: Due to a newly implemented USARV overhaul and retrograde program, 10 Battalion UH-1 aircraft will enter 100 percent technical inspection within two months.

(b) EVALUATION: Implementation of the USARV program required a detailed assessment of Battalion resources. The study determined that, based on assigned aircraft and programmed utilization, the Battalion could sustain operations with a maximum of two aircraft per month undergoing 100 percent inspection. By estimating average flying hours per month per aircraft, a projection of inspections was established. To adjust the schedule to avoid exceeding the maximum allowable number, aircraft were transferred between Battalion units or scheduled for inspection 100 hours early.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That units establish an inspection schedule using the method described in (b) above.

2. That units provide close management of flying hours to insure aircraft enter inspections at the projected time.
(d) **COMMAND ACTION:** The projected inspection schedule was disseminated to each unit concerned. Necessary aircraft transfers were projected and coordination with the direct support unit was accomplished to allow predesignated aircraft to undergo technical inspection 100 hours early.

---

8 Incl

1. General Order Number 35
   Headquarters, 12th Aviation Group (Combat)
2. Organizational Chart
3. Command and Staff Structure
4. Aircraft Status
5. Operational/Mission Results
6. Ammunition Expended
7. Aircraft Maintenance Statistical Summary
8. Chapel Statistics

Incls 1, 3 and 8 wd HQ, DA

DISTRIBUTION:
5 copies to CO, 12th Aviation Group (Combat)
2 copies to CG, 1st Aviation Brigade
2 copies to CO, USAF
2 copies to CINCUSA/PAC
1 copy to CC, 145th Aviation Battalion (Combat)
1 copy to CO, 210th Aviation Battalion (Combat)
1 copy to CO, 222d Aviation Battalion (Combat)
1 copy to CO, 269th Aviation Battalion (Combat)
1 copy to CO, 3d Sqdn, 17th Air Cav

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CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVN-CA-SC (13 Nov 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 11th Aviation Battalion
(Combat) for Period Ending 31 October 1969 RDA 154-64-65 86-22 (II)

G. HEADQUARTERS 12TH AVIATION GROUP (COMBAT), APO 95206 24 Nov 69

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, APO 95206

1. (II) In accordance with AR 525-15, the Operational Report - Lessons
Learned of 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for period ending 31 October
1969 is forwarded.

2. (C) Reference Paragraph 1, Operations: Significant Activities.
   a. Page 8, para k(4). Receipt of repair parts for 21 ton trucks,
specifically clutches and wheel cylinders, takes approximately 30 days.

   b. Page 8, para k(6). The 11th Avn Bn presently has 980 of 2,340
   FJ items at "O" balance. Average time to fill "O" balance line items
   is 28.2 days.

   c. Page 9, para m(4). A critical shortage of qualified technical
   inspectors for SH-4 and CH-47 continues throughout the command.

3. (II) Reference Paragraph 2, Lessons Learned: Page 14, para i(1)(c),
A letter of instruction will be distributed by this headquarters detailing
methods of prolonging the usefulness of sandbag bunkers and revetments.

FOR THE COMMAND:

[Signature]

R. C. BARTLETT
Major, Infantry
Adjutant

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD BM 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Da, Hq II FORCIV, APO San Francisco 96266 1 Dec 1969

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVIA-C, APO 96307
Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVIA-C(WST), APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: CSFOR-ST, APO 96558

TO: assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion for the period ending 31 October 1969, as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
B.G. MACDONALD
ILT, AGC
Asst AG

CONFIDENTIAL
AVBAGC-O (13 Nov 69) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for Period Ending 31 October 1969 ACS G145-65 (R2) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96394

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATM: AVBAGC DST, APO 96375
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATM: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs with the contents as indorsed, except as noted below.

2. The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

   a. Reference Paragraph 1k(1), page 8 discusses repair parts for SPH-I 4 helmet. Concur. USARV AVLOG has informed this headquarters that repair parts kits for the SPH-I 4 flight helmet will be force issued to all units as the kits arrive. The repair parts are expected to start arriving some time during the month of January 1970. The Basis of Issue (BOI) will be one kit per 100 helmets issued.

   b. Paragraph 1k(3), page 8 and paragraph 1m(4), page 9 discusses shortages in MOS's 63040, maintenance supervisor, 63B20, automotive repairman and 67440, technical inspector. These shortages exist throughout RVN and a constant effort is being made by HQ,USARV to alleviate the shortages. The Army Aviation Refresher Training School does provide upgrading of qualifications for MOS 67440 but is not a MOS producing school.

   c. Paragraph 1k(4)(5)(6), page 8 discusses vehicle repair parts shortages. Concur in part. The availability of critical parts has fluctuated in the supply system. The S-4, 12th Aviation Group (Combat) and the Battalion S-4 are aware of the situation and are attempting to resolve it at this time.

   d. Paragraph 21(1), page 14. Concur. Covering bunkers with a layer of concrete is an effective method of prolonging the service life and reducing maintenance support required. Bunkers built by the French in 1940 are still in a serviceable condition at Pleiku, and have received minimal maintenance. Protecting bunkers by this method is costly in terms of manpower, and requires a degree of initiative and skill, plus longer construction time. The initial construction costs are more than...
offset by the reduced maintenance support required to keep the bunker in a
satisfactory state of repair; however, duration of occupancy and time avail-
able for construction are prime considerations.

e. Paragraph 21(2)(c)(1), page 14. Nonconcour. It is a command respon-
sibility to schedule aircraft so as not to exceed the capabilities of the
maintenance organization. Proper maintenance management can only be exor-
cised if the flying hour programs are in balance with maintenance capabil-
ities. With proper scheduling units should be able to program their 22d
Preventive Maintenance Periodic Inspections (PMI) so as to avoid being un-
able to meet mission requirements. The 22d PMI's should not be performed
100 hours early for two reasons:

(1) First, there would be an eventual loss of 100 flying hours.

(2) Secondly, through maintenance management experience, the UH-1
airframe sustains the majority of its deficiencies by the time it reaches
2200 flying hours. It is possible that a 100th inspection conducted 100
hours early would fail to detect all airframe deficiencies. The result
could be the appearance of a serious airframe deficiency shortly after
the 22d PMI had been completed. Such a deficiency might even necessitate
retrograding the aircraft. This would mean wasting hundreds of maintenance
man-hours.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

HELMO

Copy 3d Ind Furn:
3d, 11th Avn Bn (Combat)
AVHQC-DST (13 Nov 69) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat), for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSPQR-65 (R2) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning "SFH-4 Flight Helmets", page 8, paragraph 1k(1), and 3d Indorsement, paragraph 2a: Concur with 3d Indorsement. USAMC message, AMSME-MTP, 042317Z Dec 69, states that Change 3 to TM 10-8215-202-13 will be available in limited quantities in Jan 70 and that complete distribution will be made in approximately 120 days. Change 3 includes the repair parts list for the SFH-4. USARV message, AVHAV-LOG, 190107Z Dec 69, Subject: Helmet, Flyers, Protective SFH-4, Repair Parts, specifies the repair parts and supplies for the SFH-4.

   b. Reference item concerning "Technical Inspectors, MOS 67W40", page 9, paragraph 1m(4); concur. There is a critical shortage of qualified technical inspectors, MOS 67W, in USARV. This MOS has been on the critical MOS list since 1966. Records maintained at this headquarters disclose that the 1st Aviation Brigade's strength posture in all MOS's cited in this ORLL compares favorably with the overall USARV average. Department of the Army is aware of this command's critical MOS's. A USARV critical MOS list is forwarded to Chief of Personnel Operations, Department of the Army, monthly.

   c. Reference item concerning "Recovery of O-1 Aircraft by CH-47", page 11, paragraph 2c(2): Nonconcur with the recommendation; concur with the command action. It is impractical to dismantle an O-1 aircraft and carry it internally in a CH-47. Rigging procedures are adequate and recovery procedures depend upon the judgement of the aircraft commander in charge of the specific mission. Specific procedures cannot feasibly be written to cover the many variables associated with all fixed wing aircraft in various states of damage. Pilots must be aware of instructions pertaining to external load operations with aerodynamic loads as published in the -10 manual and apply the appropriate judgement to each situation.

   d. Reference item concerning "Training for Night Airmobile Operations", page 13, paragraph 2a; concur. However, the recommendation does not have country wide application and is dependent on the requirements of the major commanders supported. It is the responsibility of the aviation unit commander to insure that his unit is capable of performing its assigned mission.
AVBDG-13N (13 Nov 69) 4th Ind.
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of the 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969, RGS GSPOR-65 (R2) (0)

e. Reference item concerning "Covering Bunkers with Concrete", page 14, paragraph 21(1); 1st Indorsement, paragraph 3 and 3d Indorsement, paragraph 2d; nonconcour. The strike of a projectile will cause spalling which may present additional hazards to the bunker occupants. In addition, the cemented surface will conceal any void caused by deterioration of the sandbags or water intrusion. It is believed that the structures referred to in the 3d Indorsement are constructed of reinforced concrete. This is different than the thin cemented veneer which was recommended.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cy Furn:
11th Avn Bn (Cbt)
1st Avn Bde
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOA-65 (R2) (U)

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C.I. SNORT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
11TH AVIATION BATTALION (COMBAT)
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
AS OF 31 OCTOBER 1969

* NOTE: Reflects functional organization as opposed to iTOE.
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<thead>
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<th>UNIT</th>
<th>11th AB</th>
<th>21st AB</th>
<th>173rd AB</th>
<th>129th AD</th>
<th>131st AD</th>
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Inclosure 4
11TH AVIATION BATTALION (COMBAT)  
OPERATIONAL/MISSILE RESULTS  
FOR THE PERIOD 1 AUGUST 1969 THROUGH 31 OCTOBER 1969

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<th>UNIT</th>
<th>SORTIES FLOW</th>
<th>TROOPS LIFTED</th>
<th>CARGO TONS LIFTED</th>
<th>HOURS FLOW</th>
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Inclosure 5
**11th Aviation Battalion (Combat)**  
**Inclosure Expedited**  
**For the Period 1 August 1969 Through 31 October 1969**

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Inclosure 6
### Aircraft Incidence and Statistical Data for the Period 1 August 1969 Through 31 October 1969

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Inclosure 7
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 11th Aviation Battalion

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug 69 to 31 Oct 69.

CO, 11th Aviation Battalion

N/A

N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310