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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (13 Feb 70) FOR OT UT 694171

SUBJECT. Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division Artillery, Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 25th Infantry Division Artillery for Period Ending 31 October 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

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1. (C) Section 1 Operations - Significant Activities

a. General. During the period 1 August - 31 October 1969, the 25th Infantry Division artillery continued combat operations in support of Operation Toan Thang (Complete Victory) III.


c. Operations and significant activities.

(1) 7th Battalion 11th Field Artillery

(a) During the period 1 August through 31 October 1969, the 7th Battalion, 11th Field Artillery continued Phase III of Operation Toan Thang (Complete Victory) in the Tay Ninh area. The battalion remained headquartered at Tay Ninh Base Camp and its mission continued as direct support to the 1st Brigade. On the first of August the batteries were deployed as follows: Battery A at A-3 Creek, Battery B at FSB Buell, and Battery C at FSB Sedgewick. In addition to providing direct support to the 1st Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division, the battalion also provided artillery support to the 3d Squadron 4th Cavalry, the ARVN Airborne working in the Tay Ninh area, and the US Navy patrolling the Van Co Dong River. During the quarter the tactics of the brigade shifted from one to three day operations. Further emphasis was placed on platoon and squad-size patrols and ambushes. The primary effects on the artillery from the new tactics were: (1) the splitting up of forward observer parties, i.e., one artilleryman (FO, Recon Sgt, or RTO) with platoon size elements and (2) the moving of the artillery batteries to positions to support 3-day operations. In order to effectively support operations of the 1st Brigade it was necessary to move supporting artillery 90 times. The battalion controlled the fires of the following batteries: C-3/13 (GSR) located at Tay Ninh Base Camp, B-1/27 (GSR) located at FSB Stoneman, C-1/27 (GSR) at FSB Washington, A-6/15 (GSR) at FSB Lwains, 3-6/15 (GSR) at FSB Hunter, A-2/77 (attached) at FSB J&J, and the Philippine Civic Action Group's 105-mm battery located at Tay Ninh Base Camp. The arrangement whereby the 2/32 Artillery controlled the fires of C-7/11, A-2/77, B-6/15, and FOR OT UT 694171

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 25th Infantry Division artillery for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CGFOR-65 (R)

J-1/27 terminated on 3 August. The following maneuver elements were present in the 1st Brigade AO and received their artillery support through the 7th Bn, 11th FA: 3-22 Inf, 4-23 Inf (H), 2-34 Armor (-), 4-9 Inf, 2-22 Inf (M), and 3-4 Cav.

(b) The month of August 1969 was characterized by many (55) light to medium contacts. Fire Support Bases received standoff mortar and rocket attacks 33 times. Artillery in support of the 1st Brigade moved 34 times to support operations beyond artillery ranges of established FSB’s. Sixty-two preparations were fired in support of combat assaults and approximately 63,500 rounds were expended.

(c) On 3 Aug, B/7/11 and an ARVN Abn 105-mm battery moved to FSB Shol to support a combined operation of the ARVN Abn and the 2-22 Inf (H) in the Long woods for an indefinite period of time.

(d) At 1215 hours 6 Aug, 3/C/2-22 Inf made contact with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of XT 5037. Contact broke at 1345 hours, resumed at 1825 hours, and broke again at 1900 hours. There were 1 US killed and 8 US wounds.

A/2-77 (-) expended 81MM, B/7-11 expended 1905HE, C/7-9 expended 112HR (8”), and D/7-13 expended 30HE (8”) with surveillance of 2 VC KIA.

(e) At 1204 hours on 9 Aug, B/2-22 made contact with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of XT 49382. Contact was broken at 1632 hours and resumed again at 1730 hours. There were 6 US and 8 ARVN wounds.

A/2-77 expended 81MM, B/7-11 expended 813HR, A/2-77 expended 667HE, B/1-5 expended 281HE, A/1-27 expended 72HE, and C/2-37 expended 56HR (8”). Surveillance: 11 VC KIA.

(f) On 11 Aug, II FF Arty began the exchange of the 7th Bn 9th FA for the 6th Bn, 15th FA. Three tubes per battery were exchanged on 11 Oct and the remaining three were exchanged on 12 and 13 Oct. A/7-9 went to FSS ST Barbin, B/7-9 to FSS Rawlins, and C/7-9 to FSS Hunter.

(g) On 14 Aug, A/2-77 (-) departed FSB Wood and returned to the control of its parent unit, the ARVN Bn 105-mm battery located inside FSB Shol move to a position outside the FSB, C/7-9 move from FSS Hunter to FSS Shol, and A/7-11 returned to FSB Shol after a 12-day stay at FSB Wood.

(h) At 0835 hours on 15 Aug, C/3-22 Inf received approximately 15 60mm and 82mm mortar rounds. At 1003 hours they made contact with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of XT 093426. At 1655 hours LTC Hott, CO 7th Bn 11th FA, directed that B/7-11 move from FSS Shol to Coa Xa (XT 127520) to support C/3-27. They were in position ready to fire at 1805 hours and remained there to cover C/3-22 until 1730 hours 16 Aug.

(i) At 0205 hours on 17 Aug, the 1st ARVN Bn (CF at XT 143432) was attacked by an unknown size enemy force. The attack consisted of small arms and automatic weapons fire and approximately 200 rounds of mortar fire. At 0350 hours LTC Hott alerted B/7-11 for a move to Coa Xa (XT 127520) to support the 1st ARVN Bn. Battery B departed. FSS Shol at 0530 hours and was in position at Coa Xa and
CONFLICT

SUBJECT:  Opertional Report of 25th Infantry Division artillery for 1969

Ending 31 Oct 1969, (And CFPD-65 (11)

During the month of September, 25th Infantry Division artillery was involved in a number of operations in support of ground forces. The artillery was active in the vicinity of TF 2994 and TF 1771, providing direct fire support to infantry units. The artillery fired approximately 9,000 rounds during the month.

The artillery support was provided in support of the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. The artillery fired a total of 9,947 rounds during the month.

At 0030 hours on 21 Aug, B/4-23 Inf (M) received an incoming contact with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of TF 2994. At 0100 hours, FSB 1st Battalion, 25th Infantry Division received an incoming contact with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of TF 1771. At 0300 hours, FSB 2nd Battalion, 25th Infantry Division received an incoming contact with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of TF 2994.

At 0345 hours, FSB 3rd Battalion, 25th Infantry Division received an incoming contact with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of TF 1771. At 0530 hours, FSB 4th Battalion, 25th Infantry Division received an incoming contact with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of TF 2994.

At 0700 hours, FSB 5th Battalion, 25th Infantry Division received an incoming contact with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of TF 2994. At 0800 hours, FSB 6th Battalion, 25th Infantry Division received an incoming contact with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of TF 1771.

At 0900 hours, FSB 7th Battalion, 25th Infantry Division received an incoming contact with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of TF 2994. At 1000 hours, FSB 8th Battalion, 25th Infantry Division received an incoming contact with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of TF 1771.

At 1100 hours, FSB 9th Battalion, 25th Infantry Division received an incoming contact with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of TF 2994. At 1200 hours, FSB 10th Battalion, 25th Infantry Division received an incoming contact with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of TF 1771.

At 1300 hours, FSB 11th Battalion, 25th Infantry Division received an incoming contact with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of TF 2994. At 1400 hours, FSB 12th Battalion, 25th Infantry Division received an incoming contact with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of TF 1771.
AVDCR-HO

15 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 25th Infantry Division Artillery for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (nl)

3/10-11 expended 1304 HE, 128/W, 1 m 47 smk; 3/7-9 Exp 1296/6 W, 121 W, 6 x 50 1 smk; 3/2-32 Exp 75 HE 8". Casualties were 2 US KIA, 5 WIA, and 4 MIA. Enemy losses were 47 KIA (31 KPA) and 1 P04.

(n) On 18 Sep, one tube from 3/7-11 went with 2-34 Armor to XT 276015 with the mission of firing CS into caves with direct fire. They were able to place several rounds deep inside some caves but received no surveillance.

(o) On 21 Sep, the Thin Igon CIDG made contact with a large NVA force in the vicinity of XT 1817 and suffered heavy casualties. 1st Brigade task force consisting of A/3-22 Inf and 3/7-11 FA was airlifted to the Thin Igon CIDG camp on 22 Sep with a mission of bolstering the defense of the camp. 3/7-11 had a secondary mission of offering additional fire support to the CIDG. 3/7-11 was given a warning order at 1730 hours 22 Sep, the order to move was issued at 1859 hours, the first CH-47 sortie departed FSB Quinn at 1735 hours, and the battery was in position ready to fire at Thin Igon on 1805 hours. Thirty-four sorties were made to move the battery. Re-supply was accomplished by CH-47 aircraft. The battery moved back to FSB Quinn on 25 Sep; however, the return trip was accomplished by CH-47 and C-130 aircraft (3 sorties). All class L and V and the water trailer were returned by CH-47. The howitzer sections and vehicles were airlifted from the Thin Igon airstrip by C-130 aircraft.

(p) The month of October brought a general reduction in enemy activities within the brigade area with incoming rockets or mortars being received only twelve times during the month. The infantry tactics generally evolved from company size operations to battalion and squad size maneuvers. This resulted in many small skirmishes and an increase in helicopter and combat assaults. Support operations during the month, artillery moved 25 times, fired 87 projectiles, and expended approximately 83,700 rounds.

(q) On 5 October, the AVN ABn began operations in a new AO north and west of Tay Ninh Base Camp. They moved two 105-mm batteries to support their operations; one went to the vicinity of the old Tri Bi airstrip (XT 113692) and the other just south of Lo Cong (XT 130640). The third battery which was previously split between Cau A and bon Soi was consolidated at Ben Soi (XT 090474). Coordination was effected with the AVN ABn to provide a 2400 meter blanket cleared area at all times around both US fire support bases (Crook and Washington) in their AO. Usually at night blanket clearance was also granted through their AO except for buffer zones around their night locations.

(r) At 0850 hours on 10 Oct, while firebombing to XT 106759 to support 2-22 Inf and AVN ABn operations, C/3-13 load 11139 detonated a mine in the road at XT 115110. The KIA was a combat loss and two members of the battery were wounded. As far as can be determined from available records, this was the first occurrence of the loss of a field artillery piece to a mine in the 1st Brigade AO.
AVDCA-80

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 25th Infantry Division Artillery for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

(s) At 1220 hours 12 Oct, the Dau Tieng - Cu Chi convoy received mortars and 31 caliber fire from the vicinity of XT 430450. The attack was countered by B/4-23 Inf (H) and artillery fire from FSB Wood and Dau Tieng Base Camp. The quick response of the artillery can be credited to the detailed coordination effected between 7-11 FA and 1-5 FA (1st Inf Div Arty) concerning artillery coverage of the convoy along rout. 239 from FSB Hunter (CP 120) to Dau Tieng.

(t) On 13 October the mission of A/7-9 was changed to a straight GS mission. Priority of fires, enjoyed since the battery occupied FSB St. Barbara was lost; however, the battery continued to monitor one of the FD nets of 7/11 FA to answer calls for fire from elements within range.

(u) FSB Sodwick was closed on 17 and 19 October with Battery C moving to FSB Hunter. Thirty-four CL-47 and 2 CL-36 sorties were used during the movement. To minimize the consumption of high oil, a landing zone was selected at XT 31-3, 32-7 and 111 equipment and ammunition, with the exception of four sorties, were moved from the landing zone to FSB Hunter.

(v) On 21 October, the 3-22 Inf initiated a battalion-size offensive operation on Mui Ba Den and on the auxiliary peak Mui Cau. The operation included 7 with a seven battery preparation, 15 minutes in length. To support the operation, Battery C, 3-13 FA moved from Tay Ninh Base Camp to the vicinity of 11 FSB Bragg, and remained there for the duration of the 4-day operation. A jump W and a transmission unit were located with Battery C to facilitate communications with forward observers located on the northeast side of the mountain. Elements of 3-22 Inf lagged on the mountain three nights, but the only significant contact during the operation was made by A/2-34 Armor and an RF C in blocking position on the northeast side of the mountain. On the first night of the operation they surprised a company-size element digging in in the vicinity of XT 287 616 and engaged with tanks and a heavy volume of artillery fire resulting in a body count of 30 VC. There was 1 friendly (ARVN) soldier wounded.

(w) The battalion received M102 howitzers on 21 October. The battalion, assisted by the 2nd S&T battalion, convoyed to Long Binh to pickup the weapons. M102's were issued to Battery B and A on 24 and 25 October respectively. M102's were in full use after two days training. Training assistance was obtained from an officer from 2-32 FA and an NCO from 2-19 FA. The issue of M102's to Battery C was delayed because of parts missing at the time of issue from Long Binh.

(x) The idea of the establishment of a Combined Fire Support Coordination Center (CFSCC) for the 1st Brigade/Tay Ninh Province area was conceived early in the quarter. Liaison and coordination were effected with the Province Chief via the Senior and Deputy Senior advisors. Construction of the facility began on 10 Sep by Co A, 65th Engr Bn, assisted by a group of personnel from the 7-11 FA. Capt Robert E. Gunter Jr. was assigned to the battalion from DIVARTY as OIC of the construction, organization, and operation of the CFSCC. The basic construction was completed on 23 October. Furnishings of the interior (self-help) began on 20 October and the CFSCC began full operation on 24 October with personnel from the following: US Army artillery, ARVN artillery, USAF, US Air Force, and US Navy.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 25th Infantry Division Artillery for Period Ending 31 October 1969. RCS CSFD-65 (E1)

(2) 1st Battalion, 8th Field Artillery

(a) The battalion continued support of the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry in Operation Toan Thang Phase III. On 2 August, Alpha and Delta companies, 2/14th Infantry received small arms fire at XT 57803. Flares, tactics, and artillery were placed on the target. The aircraft flew ground fire while interjecting their ordnance. J/1-8 expended 280, A/3-13 expended 107, and D/3-13 expended 36 HE Q rounds on the contact area. Contact was broken at 2000 hours. There were 5 US KIA and 14 WIA. 13 VC body count by air and ground troops resulted.

(b) On 8 August, J/1-8 closed F5J Scary enroute to their new position at Cu Chi base Camp. The battery was laid up and ready to fire at 0025 hours. The next morning, 1 platoon from J/1-8 was airlifted to PJ Hunsley XT 57803 to provide fire support for the elements of the 2/14th Infantry as they pushed to the base. The guns were operational at 1045 hours.

(c) After a general 10-day lull the 2/14th Infantry at PJ Hunsley received 10-15 82mm mortar rounds resulting in 17 WIA. The platoon from J/1-8 at Hunsley expended 73 "Killer Junior" (HE time fused rounds fired at short ranges) on a suspected mortar location. A/3-13 reinforced their fire with 30 HE rounds on grid 611269.

(d) The 31st of September marked a significant day in the history of the 1/8 artillery in Vietnam. On this day at F5J Porshing MG Ellis Williamson, CO 25th Infantry Division, fired the 900,000th round from the 1/8 artillery since its arrival in Vietnam in 1966. Attending the ceremony were Col. St. John, Div Arty CO, LTC Crowe 1/8 Artillery CO, and the officers and men of Battery SF Crosby, chief of firing battery, issued the command to the cannoners as he had done in 1966 when commanding the gun that fired the first round by 1/8 Artillery in Vietnam.

(e) A Co 2/12 Infantry found 23 NVA bodies in graves on 11 September at grid 555288. They showed evidence of having been killed by artillery. B/1-8, D/1-8, and A/3-13 had fired on grids in the general vicinity on the 6th of September. B/1-8 - 7 JC; C/1-8 - 4 JC; A/3-13 - 5 JC; and D/3-13 - 7 JC were credited.

(f) After a relatively quiet period, fierce fighting broke out on 19 September just northwest of Cu Chi. Gunships enroute to refuel at Cu Chi drew ground fire at grid XT 615169. They spotted two NVA platoons and immediately engaged with organic ordnance. The S3, 1/3 was conducting a VR at the time of the engagement and immediately diverted his mission to adjust artillery fires upon the fleeing enemy. Air strikes were requested. C/1-8 expended 524 HE rounds and was credited with 6 JC and 1 tunnel entrance uncovered. A/3-13 expended 214 HE rounds and was credited with 3 secondaries. The gunships claimed 10 JC.
(g) Activity increased significantly toward the end of the month of September. PPS-5 sightings recorded a total of 193 events, the most significant being a spot of 40-60 VC at grid 599273. C/1-8 engaged 176 HE rounds and was credited with 26 JC. At 1130 hours C/3 2/12 Infantry received S/A and FPO fir. at grid 513327. They attacked the well fortified enemy with artillery, air strikes, and gunships. When contact was broken at 1355 hours, C/1-8 had expended 1,172 HE rounds and was credited with 6 JC. C/7-9 expended 823 rounds and received 1 JC; B/3-13 expended 60 HE rounds and was credited with 3 JC. Air strikes claimed 10 DF and infantry ground troops claimed 10 JC. Friendly losses were 1 KIA and 4 WIA sustained. This action took place on 26 September 1969.

(h) On 15 October an aircraft spotted an NVA base camp, complete with bunkers and a supply area at grid 545345. D/3-13 expended 101 HE rounds and was credited with 7 JC, 2/3 base camp destroyed, including 9 bunkers. B/1-6 expended 407 HE rounds and was credited with 10 BC and 10 bunkers destroyed.

(i) Coupled with the upswing in heavy infiltration, 4/3-12 Infantry became engaged in the most significant contact of the month on the 24th of October. Inserting troops on grid 571301, the tanks received ground fire from grid 573303. The initial contact began at 1315 hours and for the next 5 hours only scattered resistance was encountered as the infantry troops swept the area. At 1735 hours, C Co 2/12th Infantry, reinforced by one Platoons from C Troop 3/4 Cavalry, engaged a firmly entrenched enemy armed with automatic weapons and HEFP's at a distance of less than 10 meters. The battle, although short in duration, was the fiercest to date in fighting over 5 months. Due to the close proximity of friendly troops, all types of fire support could not be utilized. The infantry troops under the protective fire of the APC's and Shortington's of the 3/4 Cavalry, consolidated and reorganized their position into a more favorable location. When this was accomplished, massive artillery, tactical air, and gunship fire power were brought to bear on the enemy. An additional two companies were airlifted into the contact area to establish a night position not more than 500 meters from the contact area. Artillery expenditures were over one thousand rounds in the contact area. On a sweep of the area, next day, the bodies of 65 NVA were counted while friendly casualties were 10 KIA, and 17 WIA.

(j) During the quarterly reporting period the three battalions of 1st Battalion 8th Field Artillery were credited with 340 VC/NVA (BC), 31 VC/NVA (POSS), destruction of 35 buildings and 32 bunkers, and 69 secondary explosions.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 25th Infantry Division Artillery for Period Ending 31 October 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

(3) 2d Battalion 77th Field Artillery

(a) The 2d Battalion, 77th Artillery was actively engaged in support of Operation Toan Thang (Complete Victory) III which continued from the previous quarter. During this period, 4/2-27 was inserted into a "hot" LZ, Patrol Base Rittgers received a heavy ground attack, and Patrol Base Kotro received a light ground probe. Each time 2d Battalion 77th Artillery, with supporting artillery units, provided the fire superiority to defeat the enemy. Reinforcement training of replacements, as well as on-the-job and proficiency training, continued.

(b) On 12 August 1969, Patrol Base Rittgers was to be established via XT 3514. A/2-27 Infantry was scheduled to combat assault into the area at 0700 hours, and A/2-27 Artillery would follow after the LZ had been secured. At 0710 hours, A/2-27 was inserted via XT 3514 and immediately began receiving heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire. Fire was returned with organic and artillery. Units firing were B/2-27, B/3-13, and D/3-13. This contact continued throughout the day and at 1340 hours D/2-27 was inserted to reinforce 4/2-27. At 2000 hours the contact was broken. During this period, the artillery continually pounded the enemy location. During the contact, US casualties were reported as 7 US KIA and 13 US WIA; light damage to 4 UH-1B and 1 UH-1D; mortar damage to 2 UH-1H and heavy damage to 1 UH-1H. A sweep of the contact area was made with the following results: 57 NVA (.50) and 74 NVA KIA (POSS). The following enemy equipment was captured: 11 AK-47 rifles, 1 pistol, 4 RPG launchers, 2 30 caliber machine guns, 1 radio and SOI, 5 pounds of medical supplies, and 5 pounds of documents. The following enemy equipment was destroyed: 2 51 caliber machine guns, 2000 rounds of AK-47 ammo, 5 RPG rounds and 2 anti-personnel mines. The final artillery expenditures fired during the contact were as follows: 4/2-27 3680 HE; D/3-13 1220 HE; and D/3-13 193 HE.

(c) At 0120 hours, 5 September 1969, Patrol Base Rittgers XT 3514 began receiving intense small arms fire and incoming mortar and RPG rounds. At 0230 hours, enemy sappers began charging for the wire. They were able to penetrate the outer wire without setting off the trip flares strung along the outer fence. A/2-27 immediately began firing Killer Junior and B/2-27, B/3-13 and D/3-13 were adjusted onto the charging enemy. At 0223 hours, two of the gun pits took direct hits. One received a direct hit from a mortar and the other from a satchel charge. One had a tire blown by the mortar and the gun crew was wounded, but the gun continued to fire. During this period, the artillery continually pounded the reinforced NVA company. A body count of nine was found inside the wire. At 0430 hours, the enemy forces began withdrawing. The artillery pounded the enemy as they made their withdrawal. During the contact US casualties were reported as 2 US KIA; 22 US WIA, 12 of whom were members of A/2-27; 1 Prs-5 radio damaged; and 1 105mm howitzer damaged. NVA casualties were reported as 11 NVA KIA. A sweep around the patrol base was made at daybreak with the following results: 29 NVA (.50), 1 NVA PGM. The following enemy equipment was captured: 2 AK-47 rifles; 6 AK-47 magazines; 5 RPG launchers, 31 RPG rounds; 5 Chi Com
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SUbject: Operational Report of 25th Infantry Division Artillery for Period
Ending 31 October 1969, NSC CP016-65 (A)

Claymores; 111 Chi Com hand grenades; and 1 Chi Com radio. The final artillery
explosives during the contact were: 4/2-77 410 HE; 4/2-77 1070 HE; 4/3-13
250 HE; and D/3-13 80 HE.

(a) At 2255 hours, 12 October 1969, 4/2-27 ambush patrol via AT333161
observed and engaged 5 VC with organic weapons. Those VC had been picked-up
by radar and engaged with artillery. In an attempt to get away from the ar-
tillery they walked into the 4/2-27. Several of the VC were killed and one was
taken prisoner. At 0100 hours, 13 October 1969, Patrol was Kotre (AT391417)
beginning receiving a large number of 82mm mortars; RGR small arms fire; and 4/2-77
Infantry observed 40-60 VC around their location. This enemy force was engaged
with organic weapons and artillery was adjusted onto the enemy location. Units
firing were 4/2-77, 4/2-77, 4/3-13, and D/3-13. At 0228 hours, the patrol base
again received intense small arms fire. During the contact US casualties were
reported as 2 US WIA (both were members of 4/2-77), a sweep around the patrol
base was made at daylight with the following results: 11 VC (3); 7 VC KIA;
(POSS); and 2 VC WIA (one of whom was the XO of the VC battalion). The fire
was enemy equipment was captured: 4 AK 47 rifles; 1 grenade charge (12 lbs.)
1 bamboo rocket launcher; 1 ammo pouch; 1 backpack (ID); 3 RPG rounds; 5 RPG
bustard; 1 local VC hand grenade. The final artillery explosions during
the action were: 4/2-77 225 HE; 12 FG; 4/2-77 455 HE; 4/3-13 145 HE; D/3-13
60 HE; and 8 FG.

(b) On 1 September 1969, 2/77th Arty received word that it was scheduled
to receive 13 new M102 howitzers. Plans and schedules immediately became the
order of the day. A 3-day training session was coordinated with the 1/3 Arty.
During this period, 3 battalion executive officers; 3 chiefs of firing battery;
and 18 section chiefs received instruction and training in the new howitzers.
This training included firing; battery procedures; platforms; and support for
the howitzers; and maintenance of the howitzers. On 10 September 1969 the
batteries began receiving the new howitzers and the changeover was complete
on 20 September 1969 with the exception of the 2 howitzers at Patrol Base Flack.
On 24 October 1969 the remaining 2 howitzers were airlifted to Patrol Base
Handel. 2/77 Arty is now providing timely and accurate fire upon the enemy
with the highly mobile M102 howitzers.

(f) Personnel status slightly decreased during the quarter. The Battalion
reached 95% of its authorized strength by the close of the first quarter of
fiscal year 1970. During the quarter 87 valor (including 8 Silver Stars and 45
Bronze Stars); 75 Achievement, and 166 service awards were recommended for
members of the battalion.

(g) During the past quarter, logistic operations consisted of coordinating
re-supply activities in support of the firing units. Ammunition supplies
were approximately the same as last quarter and the firing units were stock-
ing the prescribed amount of ammunition. One emergency re-supply of ammunition
was necessary to 4/2-77 Arty on 5 September 1969. Requisitioning has continued at
normal pace and supplies of all classes have been regularly received.

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(h) During the quarter, intelligence reports indicated that the enemy movement within the 31 Dha Bu was in the increase. Several PF-54, PK-5, and TP-25 radars were strategically located throughout the Dha Bu, approx. 150 individuals were picked up by the enemy. These pick-ups were accompanied by mortars and the following rounds were expended: 175mm - 2500 HE, 375 PC; 155mm - 500 HE, 30 PC; 105mm - 250 HE, 75 PC. During this quarter, the S2, 5/77 and 2/77 arty, received numerous reports of enemy bunkers, positions, and fighting positions. Numerous reports by fire of medium with 8", 175mm, 155mm, and 75mm were received. 8" - 12" of fire; 175mm - 5" of fire, 155mm - 100 HE; and 175mm - 110 rounds were expended with 76 bunkers destroyed. 10 firing positions destroyed, 1 sampot destroyed, and 7 secondary explosions also received during this quarter were intelligence reports from the S2, 5/77 and 2/77 arty, concerning enemy locations; stations; snipers; and enemy 2 and 6113 bunkers destroyed; and 1 firing positions. A nightly program of firing on these intelligence targets was developed. During this quarter the following rounds were expended on these targets: 175mm - 12, 500 HE; 155mm - 30; 150mm - 350 HE; in 3" - 550 HE.

(i) The 2/ Battalion 77th artillery S5 section and medical section remained active in MEDCAPS and civic affairs programs. MEDCAPS were conducted on a recurring basis in two areas, namely, an area at (15414215) and an area near Khau Boc (1575075). The medical section has treated approximately 100 Vietnamese civilians during this quarter. In addition, the S5 section has distributed approximately 100,000 leaflets.

(4) 3/ Battalion 13th Field Artillery

(a) The mission assigned to Battery A throughout the reporting period was general support reinforcing the fires of the 1st Battalion 3rd Artillery. During this period, Battery A received credit for destroying 37 bunkers, 24 VC/NVA KBA, 32 mortars destroyed, 35 secondary explosions, 3 firing positions destroyed, and 2 pontoon bridges destroyed. The battery fired 816 missions.

(b) Battery B's mission during this reporting period was general support reinforcing the fires of the 2/ Battalion 77th Artillery. The battery received credit for 32 VC/NVA KBA, 3 bunkers destroyed, 17 secondary explosions, and 1 .51 caliber machine gun destroyed. The battery fired 367 missions.

(c) The mission assigned to Battery C during this reporting period was general support reinforcing the fires of the 7th Battalion 11th Artillery. Battery C disclosed two new locations within the 31 Dha Bu total of 10 times during this reporting period. The areas of displacement were Fort Support Base (FSB) Mitchell 13-20 October, War Zone C 17 October 1967, Fort Dorn 13-20 October 1967 and proximity of Dinh Ba on 21 October 1969. After each of these operations the battery moved back to Tay Ninh Base Camp. During this period Battery C received credit for 29 VC/NVA KBA, 14 bunkers destroyed, 17 secondary explosions.

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(1) Field's Divins and 1st months had two 3 inch Howitzer pads constructed to include ammunition and powder storage facilities. Also, constructed were personnel and F&C bunkers to enable the battery to displace up to 2 guns to either of the two fire support bases in a minimum amount of time with a minimum of equipment. The results have been faster displacement of the weapons and rapid fire support to the maneuver units of the division. Pre-stocking of ammunition at FSB Divins and FSB Troopman reduced the resupply necessary for rapid displacement to either location almost 100%. In addition this has reduced the number of vehicles required and at the same time it has eliminated maintenance problems for those vehicles. During this period the battery received credit for 13 VC/NAK KIA, 3 probable VC/NAK KIA, 37 fighting positions destroyed, and 23 meters of trenchline destroyed.

(2) During the past quarter the 3d Battalion 13th Field Artillery was given the mission of providing trained forward observers and radio telephone operators to the 31st Squadron 4th United States Cavalry and the 2d Battalion 34th Armor. In order to insure that radio telephone operators are well versed in the latest techniques for requesting and adjusting artillery fire, a three-day forward observer-radio telephone operators school was established in the battalion headquarters area at Phu Bai Doc Co. Two enlisted men selected from each of the four firing batteries in the battalion unit were from Headquarters Battery attend this. As the men successfully completed the school they replaced in an RTO pool to be called upon as needed in the field. Two classes have been completed. Subjects are equipment familiarization, communications security, operating instruments and aids, method of target location lessons learned in Vietnam, antennas, and radio procedures.

(3) During this reporting period the battalion was also given the mission of establishing a school for Ad/ApC-5 radar operations in the 25th Infantry Division. An instructors course was conducted in the battalion area from 12 October 1969 to 15 October 1969. The first class for students from the maneuver units of the division was conducted from 17 October 1969 to 23 October 1969.

(4) Headquarters and Headquarters Battery

(5) Intelligence Operations. Continuous emphasis has been placed on effective employment of counter mortar radars based on intelligence throughout the 25th Division AO. The 25th Infantry Division Artillery presently has two counter mortar radar assigned to each direct support battalion. One AN/MPQ-4A radar is OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division Artillery from II Field Force Artillery located at FSB Washington (XT1456). The AN/MPQ-4A radar organic to the 7th Battalion 11th Artillery is located at FSB Bucall (XT2153) to counter the threat from the Duc Ba Lien (mountain) area. The AN/MPQ-4A radar of the 1st Battalion 8th Artillery is located at FSB Patton to cover the area south of the Bia Loi Hills (XT5225). The AN/MPQ-4A of the 2d Battalion 77th Artillery is located at FSB Chamberlain (JS4302).
The receipt of operational control of the 315th Shore Artillery Division resulted in the addition of 2 AN/FPS-25 radars located at Quy Nhon (15/48) and Tan An (15/54). A total of 11 modified rocket sites were located by the six shore radar stations during this period. The majority of tracks were out of the primary sector of view of the AN/FPS-25 radars. The surveillance radar program was also greatly affected during this period. The Division Artillery AN/FPS-25 radar has operated from Quy Nhon (15/48) in the central region and is presently located at Gia Dinh (15/75), monitoring activity along the Ton and Mekong Rivers to the northeast and the Angles River (center of mass 15/47) to the southeast. The 25th Field Artillery Detachment was activated at Ty Hoa and obtained the 315th Shore Artillery Division (15/54) located in the 3d Brigade. The Division Artillery Division (15/54) has a relatively stationary surveillance radar in that area. The Division Artillery Division (15/54) has acquired an AN/FPS-25 radar assigned to the 25th Division and the AN/FPS-25 (5) radars assigned to the 3d Brigade. The Division Artillery Division (15/54) recommends the acquisition of a new radar in addition. Division Artillery Division (15/54) is conducting an AN/FPS-25 radar trials to familiarize operators with the operation of the radar system, thus greatly increasing their target acquisition capabilities. Eventually all AN/FPS-25 radar sites will receive training at this school. A total of 222 radar sightings were made by the AN/FPS-25 radars. A total of 222 radar sightings were made by the AN/FPS-25 radars resulting in a total of 222 engagements for both types of radars.

(a) Survey operations in this period consisted of recording previous established control points for electronic observation and ground traverse, in addition to the extension of survey control, for all radar installations throughout the 25th Division. Control points have been established within 1/2 mile of all semi-permanent type fire support bases. Radar observation centers have been surveyed to give greater accuracy location accuracy. A survey section is presently completing surveys for the observation towers at Ty Hoa and Phuoc Vinh. Radar information centers are continually updating trig lists with new data.

(b) Division Artillery Division (15/54) was used to exploit radar sightings and targets provided by the Division Artillery Division (15/54) and Division (15/54) observers flew many hours in support of ground observers. A course in Aerial Observation was conducted to train in qualify personnel.

(c) All meteorological electronic commitments for AN/FPS-25 and 25th Infantry Division were completed. No visual methods were used, due to the shortage of trained personnel and a training program is continually in progress to qualify trained personnel and upgrade the capability of meteorological personnel. The meteorological data is being broadcast to division personnel via radio in accordance with new AN/FPS-25 policy and schedules.

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15 November 1969

Subject: Operational report of the 25th Infantry Division artillery for ordnance 31 October 65. (CSG 366-65 (d))

(1) Civil Affairs activities increased during the reporting period. Although there have been no specific requests made by the village officials, several projects have been initiated throughout the district. One such project is providing desks and chairs, constructed from bamboo boxes, to schools in the district. In addition to the numerous dedications conducted in the district, several dedication have also been conducted by this headquarters. Current emphasis is being placed on civil affairs activities by this and higher headquarters.
2. (c) Section 2, Item 3: Commander, Observer, Evaluation, and Recommendation.

a. Personnel:

(1) Officer Personnel

(a) Observation. Revision of artillery personnel losses without timely replacements.

(b) Evaluation. It has been determined that the retention curve for officers can best be flattened by giving first priority to thirty day losses, and almost equal priority to sixty day and ninety day losses. When computed the slightly higher value of the ninety day loss will ensure equal distribution of incoming officers.

(c) Recommendation: that first priority be given to thirty day losses and nearly equal priorities to sixty and ninety day officer losses.

b. Training

(1) Direct Fire

(a) Observation. Need existed for a method of putting CS into places such as cave entrances in the side of a mountain (Nui Ba Den) which were inaccessible by air-dropped and indirect fire CS munitions.

(b) Evaluation. During an operation on the north side of Nui Ba Den (vic. XT2761) a single 105mm Howitzer section was used to fire the XM629, CS Cartridge (PD mode) into the cave entrance. 105mm howitzer (I) and 105/26 howitzer (II) projectiles were used in the phosphorus phase in order to generate the required supply of CS rounds. 105mm projectiles were used in order to ensure that CS can be delivered into places that are inaccessible by other delivery means or where heavy casualties might be sustained in advance of the target area or manned delivery. Although untried thus far, it is believed that bunker complexes, hedgerows, and other hard targets can be rapidly be attacked by direct fire with XM629 CS Cartridges.

(c) Recommendation: that the 105mm howitzer be considered for the direct fire (point detonating delivery) of the XM629 CS Cartridge into cave entrances, tunnel entrances, and bunkers.

(2) Accurate FFE data utilizing FIDAC in conjunction with PPS-5 Radars.

(a) Observation. At present, there is no rapid, reliable system available to determine the accurate unobserved fires shot in response to PPS-5 radar sightings.

(b) Evaluation. 3. As PPS-5 radars are collocated with artillery batteries and they both have survey data to their locations, it is possible for the radar to be oriented by the battery's aiming circle set up over the orienting station. Once this is accomplished, the radar is capable of giving accurate direction to acquired targets.

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When a target is acquired, the data is passed to the artillery battery and entered into the FABM at an initial range distance. By representing the location of the radar at an observer location, the FABM then computes accurate FFE data to the target. As the initial rounds are fired, the radar operator switches the radar to the Moving Target Indicator Mode. As the rounds impact upon the target, the target indicator blip on the screen widens. Varying widths of the target blip indicate the accuracy of the artillery fire.

(c) Recommendation. That this technique be disseminated to other units possessing the necessary survey data. In those locations where no orienting station is available (e.g., patrol bases), the radar can be laid by magnetic azimuth and a check round fired to verify the lay. The rest of the operation would be the same.

(3) Vectoring Night Hawk using TPS-25 and AN/MPQ-4A radars.

(a) Observation. Night Hawk aircraft frequently have difficulty finding the exact location of radar sightings and consequently are not able to conduct surveillance of sighting area.

(b) Evaluation. When sightings are made by TPS-25 and/or AN/MPQ-4A radars it is possible to have those same radars vector the Night Hawk into the target area utilizing the radar as the aircraft tracking device. The procedure for the TPS-25 varies slightly in that the Night Hawk must fly over the radar's location and be picked up and vectored out from that position. For the AN/MPQ-4A all the Night Hawk has to do is enter the scan and his position is known. At present, a greater success is being gained utilizing the AN/MPQ-4A due to its scan band being more oriented towards higher altitudes, while the TPS-25 is a ground-plane anti-personnel radar.

(c) Recommendation. That other units possessing the equipment use the TPS-25 and/or AN/MPQ-4A radars to precisely vector Night Hawk aircraft over surveillance areas.

(4) Night Hawk used with Field Artillery.

(a) Observation. Night Hawk can be used as a field artillery target surveillance system provided proper communication is established between battalion FDC and the patrol aircraft.

(b) Evaluation. Field artillery units fire extensively at night on targets acquired by radar, duffelbags, or other sensors, yet have no means for immediate surveillance. Night Hawk has also been used as a target acquisition means and has operated on the infantry battalion command net. Since the aircraft flies at an altitude between 500 and 1000 feet, it had been the practice of checkfiring relatively large areas while the Night Hawk was on patrol. If a target was acquired by other means in his patrol area, the battalion FDC contacted the artillery liaison officer at the maneuver battalion command post, who in turn had the Night Hawk notified of the artillery fires and requested surveillance after the mission was complete.
for time and distance hit. If the range was insufficient, in order to obtain a hit, the artillery fired at a greater range. The gunner was informed of the new distance and the fire was continued until it was determined that the range was such that a hit was possible.

(c) Recommendation: Artillery must continue to fire at a range of 1/8th of the distance the target is from the battery. This will be effective in all cases where the target is not clearly visible or where the target is moving. The battery may be used for firing in a semi-automatic mode, with a semi-automatic firing rate of 1/8th of the maximum rate.

(5) Special Artillery and Airfield Artillery

(a) Observation: Artillery must be able to observe and report on any target within the battery's range. Artillery must be able to observe and report on any target within the battery's range. Artillery must be able to observe and report on any target within the battery's range. Artillery must be able to observe and report on any target within the battery's range.

(b) Evaluation of hit. The hit is determined by the battery personnel. The hit is determined by the battery personnel. The hit is determined by the battery personnel. The hit is determined by the battery personnel.

(c) Recommendation: Artillery must continue to fire at a range of 1/8th of the distance the target is from the battery. This will be effective in all cases where the target is not clearly visible or where the target is moving. The battery may be used for firing in a semi-automatic mode, with a semi-automatic firing rate of 1/8th of the maximum rate.

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(a) Summary: 

1. Observation. During the course of the week under review it was noted that the artillery has continued to operate under adverse conditions.

2. Evaluation. It has been noted that due to the construction of the M109, as opposed to the M110, more emphasis must be placed on safety during firing missions for the 105mm cannon. Numerous incidents occurred with the 105mm cannon being brushed by the recoil mechanism of the howitzer.

3. Recommendations: In order to prevent this from happening, a more stringent training program for personnel of the howitzer crews, with special emphasis being given to left-handed 105mm cannon crews, should be initiated. Material difficulty with this position. If they (the left-handed men) are unable to safely handle the rounds and if it the same time stay clear of the recoil, they should be reassigned to another position within the section. This training should be supervised closely by both the Battery Executive Officer and the 105mm Firing Officer.

b. Intelligence: None

c. Logistics: None

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f. Organization None

g. Other None

6 Incls
1. Listing of Units
2. Sketch of Junker
3. Sketch of Junker
4. Sketch of Junker
5. Und Card
6. Und Card
Incls 5 and 6 wd HQ, DA

DISTRIBUTION:
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15 AVEODA.HQ
1 ea CO, XO, Staff Section, Bn

U. M. D. STEWART
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding
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U.S. Army Commanding General, II Field Force, ATTN: MTFSC-RH, APO San Francisco 96246

Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO San Francisco 96375

Commander-in-Chief, USAFR, ATTN: GPO SD, APO San Francisco 96558

To: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army,
   Washington, D.C. 20310

(U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned
of the 35th Infantry Division Artillery for the period ending 31 October 1979.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. (C) Reference item concerning raising priority for 60 and 90 day loss
      officer replacement, Section 2, Paragraph a, Item 1, cannot take action at
      this level. Giving 60 and 90 day losses a priority nearly equal to that given
      30 day losses would require an overstrength posture that 25th Infantry Division
      does not have.

   b. (U) Reference all other items, concur.

A.T.H. C.S.

[Signature]

[Name]

LTC, G3

Acting Chief of Staff

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DR 5206.10
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AVPBC-RE-H (15 Nov 69) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 25th Infantry Division Artillery for Period Ending 31 October 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

DA, HQ II FORCED, APO San Francisco 96266

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHCC(DST), APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 25th Infantry Division Artillery for the period ending 31 October 1969, as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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AVHGC-Dt (15 Nov 69) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational report of 25th Infantry Division Artillery for Period Ending 31 October 1969, HQS CPOM-65 (R2)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, Att: San Francisco 94375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational report-Lessons learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division Artillery and comments of endorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Officer Personnel rotation", page 14, paragraph 2a(1); concur. However, this headquarters projects combat arms officer replacements on non-rated captains through lieutenant colonels about 30 days in advance of the officer's scheduled arrival. Lieutenants are assigned as they arrive in-country based on unit branch strengths at the time. Experience has shown that longer range projection of unit officer replacements is impractical because of the extreme personnel turbulence in this theater.

b. Reference item concerning "Direct fire of 105mm XM629 CS Cartridge", page 14, paragraph 2b(1); concur. Direct fire is always the most efficient method against hard targets.

c. Reference item concerning "Accurate FF data utilizing FADAC in conjunction with PPS-5 Radars", page 14, paragraph 2b(2); concur. This is a basic artillery procedure, you have to know where the target is before you can attack it. The use of radar assists greatly in determining the accuracy of artillery.

d. Reference item concerning "Vectoring Night Hawk using AN/TPS-25 and AN/MPQ-4A radars", page 15, paragraph 2b(3); concur. Vectoring Night Hawk with Radar has application to all units who have the capability; therefore, this item will be extracted and considered for inclusion in USARV's publication "Battlefield Reports - Tips for Commanders".

e. Reference item concerning "Night Hawk used with Field Artillery", page 15, paragraph 2b(4); nonconcur. The recommendation that direct support battalions be issued a UHF radio for direct contact with Night Hawks will duplicate the FM capability already existing. Further, direct requests to Night Hawk from the direct support battalion would, in effect, establish two agencies directing the activities of Night Hawks.
AVHGC-DST (15 Nov 69) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 25th Infantry Division Artillery for Period Ending 31 October 1969, HCS CSFUK-65 (Hz)

f. Reference item concerning "Preparation of Wind Carus for M102 (105mm) Howitzers", page 16, paragraph 2b(5); concur. However, the item as an official publication arrived in the unit after the report was forwarded.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cy furn:
25th Inf Div Arty
II FFV
GPOP-DT (15 Nov 69) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 25th Infantry Division Artillery for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 27 JAN 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]
C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Army AG
CONFIDENTIAL

15 November 1969

Subject: Operational 
report of the 25th Infantry Division artillery for period
Ending 31 October 1969. RCS 66-65.1

ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT

Organic Units
1/6 Artillery (105 How, Tow)
2/77 Artillery (105 How Tow)
3/13 Artillery (155/9" Str)
7/11 Artillery (105 How, Tow)

Attached Units
A/5/2 Artillery (Ad)(Sr)
- 31 Plt, Btry I, 22th Arty (SLT)
- 2d & 3d Sections, Btry D, 71st Arty (MG)

General Support Reinforcing
7/2 (-) Arty (135)
1/27 (-) Arty (155)
5/42 (-) Arty (155)

Incl 1

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Initial Construction: The halves that form the individual cubicles are nailed to the tops of the ammo boxes. PSP is laid across the top to form the base for the culvert halves in the center.

FIGURE 1
After the initial construction is completed, two layers of sandbags are used to cover the entire top of the bunker. Additional sandbags are used on the ends to reinforce the ammo boxes. Blast wall may also be constructed at each end of the center walkway. The ends of the individual cubicles may be blocked off using sandbags and one ammo box with screen for ventilation or a blast wall may be constructed approximately three feet out thus providing more room and better ventilation.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 25th Infantry Division Artillery

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug 69 to 31 Oct 69.

CO, 25th Infantry Division Artillery

15 November 1969

TOTAL NO OF PAGES 30

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N/A

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