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10 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 38th Artillery Brigade, Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 38th Artillery Brigade (AD)
APO San Francisco 96570

EMAB-OP

25 NOV 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 38th Artillery Brigade (AD) for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSPOR-65 (AL) (U)

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   a. (U) The organizational structure of the 38th Artillery Brigade (AD) is indicated in Inclosure 1. The Brigade and its five subordinate battalions are organized under TOE 44-22, TOE 44-78, TOE 44-236D, TOE 44-236E, TOE 44-237D, TOE 44-237E, TOE 44-536D, TOE 44-536D, TOE 44-537D, TOE 44-537D.

   b. (U) During the period ending 31 October 1969, there were four (4) changes of command in the 38th Brigade. On 1 September 1969, LTC Daniel P. Christman took command of 4th Battalion (HERO), 4th Artillery from LTC Melvin C. Rice. On 7 September 1969, LTC Wayne L. Miller assumed command of 7th Battalion (HAWK), 2nd Artillery from LTC Wallace C. Rayl. On 30 September 1969, LTC Gary B. Hutchinson took command of 2nd Battalion (HAWK), 71st Artillery from LTC Paul Coronious. On 18 October 1969, COL James L. Hayden assumed the duties of Deputy Brigade Commander from COL Charles B. Mathews.

   c. (U) Brigade Operations: Significant Activities.

      (I) (U) Operation of the Battery Terminal Equipment AN/OSA-77.

      (a) After completion of the installation of the Battery Terminal Equipment, AN/OSA-77, in units of the 38th Brigade, numerous technical difficulties were encountered. The principal difficulty was the inability of organizational maintenance personnel and battalion level Missile Maintenance Technicians to repair the subject equipment using the card substitution maintenance concept presented in TM9-1130-580-1A. A visit by a contractor representative in September 1969 revealed the following inadequacies in the maintenance concept: The troubleshooting procedures in the TM were developed making the assumption that component failures would be complete and not of the marginal type.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

A partial breakdown of an electronic component which would effect the operation of the Battery Terminal might not be revealed by the card test procedure in the TM. A more definitive procedure for isolating malfunctions and a more reliable system for testing circuit cards was evolved with the aid of the contractor engineer representative. The recommendation for inclusion of the improved methods was forwarded by this headquarters on DA Form 2028 (Recommend changes to the TM) to USA/TCOM, COMUS, and was subsequently approved by USA/TCOM in October 1969. The recommended changes will be included in a future TM change.

(b) An additional recommendation for more comprehensive wiring lists, i.e., correlative missile systems wiring identification in addition to the wiring diagrams for the Battery Terminal Equipment, was forwarded to and approved by USA/TCOM in October 1969.

(2) (c) AN/FSQ-4 Fire Distribution System

(a) Replacement of the Battalion Operations Central AN/FSQ-38 and AN/FSQ-18 with rebuilt equipment has been completed with the exception of the 6th Battalion (H.K.), 44th Artillery. Information from JN revealed that a review of the current depot overhaul program indicated that 6th Battalion (H.K). 44th Artillery Operations Central, S1 26, would be replaced by a rebuilt OC during 2d half of FY 70.

(b) Information from JN Directorate of Maintenance through Mr. C. Pitts, HUSA G4, concerning rebuild of the Operations Central AN/FSQ-38 indicated that:

1. There is no program established for rebuild of 38th Brigade MDCP Equipment (AN/FSQ-28B).
2. No funds are available for such a program.
3. No serviceable BIRDIE (AN/FSQ-5) system is available as a possible replacement.
4. Because of prohibitive costs, rebuild in COMUS is not feasible.
5. If requested by USA Command, rebuild in-country may be possible.
6. In message to USAFAC (361446Z Oct 69, Confidential), HUSA requested rebuild of AN/FSQ-28B and replacement of AN/FSQ-4 with second generation fire distribution equipment. Reply is pending.

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(c) The Operations Central M/H-30-2 is the portion of the M/H-30-4
System that communicates by data link to the Battalion Operations Central
from Army Air Defense Command Posts (AADCPs) 1 and 2. This system is therefore a vital link in the coordination and control of I-D missile fire distri-
bution. The present maintenance condition of the AADCP equipment prohibits
its effective use. Extensive repair, much of which is beyond the capabilities of field maintenance personnel, will be required before the systems can be
returned to an operational condition.

(3) (U) Intelligence and Security: The availability of Sentry Dog
Handlers is now matching Brigade requirements. Physical Security Surveys
are presently being conducted by the Provost Marshal's Office (Camp Humphreys). These surveys were initiated within the last month and will continue into
November. Primary emphasis is upon security of administrative areas to prevent
theft and pilferage. Increased emphasis is being placed on more timely and accurate
incident reporting. Directives have been sent to subordinate units emphasizing the need for liaison between all surrounding Republic of Korea (ROK), Korean
National Police (KNP) and Homeland Defense Reserve Force (HDRF) units for timely
incident reporting. A letter has also been sent to EUSA requesting that assistance be given to this headquarters in obtaining cooperation from ROKA and
KNP headquarters on this subject.

(4) (U) Aviation Section: The following is a listing of operational
missions submitted to the 38th Artillery Brigade (AD) Aviation Section for
the period 1 August - 31 October 1969:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MISSION REQUESTS</th>
<th>AUGUST</th>
<th>SEPTEMBER</th>
<th>OCTOBER</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>38th Arty Bde</td>
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<td>Forwarded to EA</td>
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<td>60</td>
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</table>

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SUBJECT: Operational Reports Lessons Learned

TOTAL FOR QUARTER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MISSION RESULTS</th>
<th>APPROVED</th>
<th>DISAPPROVED</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>38th Arty Bde</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To EA</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forwarded to EA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**d. Battalion Operations: Significant Activities**

1. (U) 7th Battalion (HAWK), 2d Artillery
   - (a) On 9 September 1969, "A" Battery successfully passed a 38th Artillery Brigade (AD) Command Inspection.
   - (b) During the reporting period, all line batteries were deeply involved in training for Annual Service Practice. Approximately 80% of the personnel involved in this training had not previously participated in ASP. Command and control, administration and primary tactical mission accomplishment were emphasized in the units. Increased efficiency and job knowledge of all personnel concerned resulted from this intensified training.
   - (c) There were no Eighth United States Army or 38th Artillery Brigade (AD) CEMHS conducted in this battalion during the reporting period.
   - (d) Battalion Air Defense Exercises continued during the reporting period at a rate of approximately two (2) per month. The results of these exercises are extremely favorable and they are scheduled to continue.
   - (e) The Battalion Operations Central was operational during the reporting period. Successful electronic integration was accomplished with all sites using automatic data link (ADL). Primary training emphasis has been placed on the "Independent Mode" of operation using ADL and manual plot-tell procedures.
   - (f) The major problem affecting the status of the TPQ-21 Training Simulator is the lack of repair parts for the oscilloscope used in aligning the simulator to the HAWK system. Both 38th Arty Bde units and supporting FASCOM DSU's experience long delays in obtaining these required parts. Continuous follow-up action is being taken by this battalion.

2. (U) 7th Battalion (HAWK), 5th Artillery
   - (a) The four firing batteries participated in the first phase of the Annual Service Practice (ASP), the Tactical Effectiveness Evaluation (TEE).
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This evaluation was conducted by the 38th Artillery Brigade evaluators at Battery C using the M1/TPQ-21 simulator. The results of the evaluations were: A-100 points, B-100 points, C-150 points, and D-140 points. The maximum attainable score was 150 points.

(b) The 38th Artillery Brigade conducted command inspections of the following batteries on the dates indicated:

A Battery - 27 August 1969
B Battery - 7 October 1969

The units received overall satisfactory ratings; however, the S2 and S3 areas revealed numerous deficiencies which required corrective action.

(c) During the quarter each firing battery participated in Annual Service Practice conducted at the Eighth US Army Special Sea Range on the dates indicated below:

C Battery - 29 September - 3 October 1969
A Battery - 13-17 October 1969
B Battery - 20-24 October 1969
D Battery - 27-31 October 1969

In preparation for ASP the battalion S3 and Electronic Maintenance Officer conducted extensive training at each unit. Additionally, each unit conducted training on another HAWK system in order to obtain training on use of an unfamiliar system. All units received Satisfactory "S" ratings.

(d) During the quarter Eighth United States Army CMIs were conducted at the following batteries on dates indicated:

B Battery - 8 September 1969
HQ Battery - 1 October 1969
D Battery - 15 October 1969
C Battery - 16 October 1969

All units except C Battery received a Satisfactory rating.
(3) (U) 4th Battalion (Mrire), 4th Artillery

(a) A complete exchange of Fire Control systems at Batteries P and A was completed as of 23 August 1969 and 27 September 1969, respectively. However, system grounding problems at Battery A have caused excessive down time. MICON technical representatives have continually worked with the battalion on such problems, and progress is being made even though the specific trouble had not been pinpointed at the end of this reporting period.

(b) On 23 September 1969, a rotation of the infantry battalion in support of 4th Battalion (Mrire), 4th Artillery was effected. The changeover was efficiently and professionally conducted by the 3rd Battalion, 32nd Infantry which is now in support of this battalion. Due to the professional attitude of the 3rd Battalion staff, the infantry detachments adapted to their new mission quickly and effectively.

(c) Commencing 1 October 1969, the Battalion Combat Readiness Evaluation (CRE) Team implemented a program to evaluate readiness on a 24-hour basis. Previous practice had been to conduct CREs only during daylight hours. Additionally the 33 has organized two complete CRE teams in order to conduct more frequent and more comprehensive evaluations. These two teams are composed of personnel cross-trained to work with the CRE teams but who are actually assigned and working within the S3 Section. The necessity for two teams results from the 24-hour evaluation schedule and the time and distance factors involved in traveling to widely dispersed fire units. The Battalion CRE Team conducts spot inspections of all areas of TPI, CMP, security, and training as part of the evaluation. The CRE is scheduled to take advantage of battery training schedules. Implementation of this policy will reduce the number of scheduled battalion inspections and provide continual training motivation for the battery in all areas. Previously, as a result of announced inspections from all higher headquarters, batteries tended to emphasize only one area at the expense of all others.

(d) On 20 October 1969, the AN/FPS-71 Alternate Battery Acquisition Radar (ABAR) became operational to complete the installation at all firing batteries.

(e) Radar Signal Simulator Station (AN/MPS-T1) at Site 3, which is one of the two TI trainers in this battalion, was moved to battalion headquarters on 24 October 1969. It is presently being placed in operation by LCP personnel for use in conjunction with the Eighth Army Fire Control Maintenance Float System. It is anticipated that it will be operational within 30 days. The Fire Control Maintenance Float System is closely controlled to assure that it is not used as a source of repair parts for the tactical sites. The purpose of the move was to provide a more central location for the TI, to reduce the support requirement from Battery A, and to make the system more available to the battalion headquarters. It will be used for pre-ASP training, XO training, CRE Team training, and Air Defense Exercise training with the Bn CO.
SUBJECT: Operational Reports Lessons Learned

(f) As of 31 October 1969, five of the missile sites moved into newly completed Nuclear Security Areas (NSA), which have decreased the overall guard requirements at the sites while increasing missile storage, safety and security. The last site to be completed will be Battery E, and it is presently scheduled for mid-December 1969. Completion of NSA's will provide increased security for launcher areas, provide greater control of movement, and assure a stronger security position for units of the battalion.

(g) The maintenance float ABAR (AN/FPS-71) has been deployed at the Battalion Operations Central (Bn OC), Site 7, Fresno Hill. The radar came from a closed site in the St. Louis Defense and was received via boat on 11 August 1969. It is being placed into operation to augment the surveillance capability of the Bn OC. This radar is a large collection of electronic chassis hardware and associated items which cannot be operated unless installed in a building. Therefore, the decision was made to install it in a building at Site Fresno as a test bed. The radar was damaged during shipment because it was improperly dismantled and improperly packed in CORUS. A DD Form 6 (Report of Packaging and Handling; Deficiencies) was filed by 4th Battalion (Here), 44th Artillery. Due to the radar's condition upon arrival in Korea and a lack of authorization to requisition required major components, it will not be operational for at least another 60 days as of the end of this reporting period.

(h) The Battalion Operations Central has been in full tactical operation during the reporting period to include successful electronic integration with all sites over Automatic Data Link (ADL). Primary training emphasis has been placed on the "Independent Mode" of operation using ADL and manual plot-tell procedures.

(i) The major problem which is affecting the status of AN/TGC-47s today is repair parts. Both 38th Brigade units and the supporting ASCOM DSU's experience long delays in obtaining parts on "O2" priority. In some cases "O2" ASCOM requisitions have been lost in channels before being processed by depot; in other instances parts have been issued by depot, but never received by the customer.

(j) Training is being conducted in order to prepare personnel for Battalion Air Defense Exercises. During ASCOM LTC's FY 70, two (2) individuals of the battalion were stationed at one of the 38th Brigade ASCOM's in order to gain insight into operations and command and control procedures during a large-scale Air Defense exercise. It is anticipated that Battalion Air Defense Exercises will be beneficial in providing operator, crew, and SDD training on a battalion-wide basis.

(a) Construction on the double chain link fence and perimeter lighting
at the Reno Hill Tactical Site, started on 4 July 1969, is nearing completion. On 12 September 1969, construction was started on a 43 men barracks at Headquarters Battery, Reno Hill. The Battalion Headquarters was visited by the Brigade Commander, Brigadier General Lloyd L. Losey, on 29 October 1969. This was a farewell visit prior to his assignment in COMUS. On 1 November 1969 the Non-Commissioned Officers and troops from the Headquarters battery conducted a change of command ceremony honoring Command Sergeant Major Robert E. Johnson who departed for a new assignment in COMUS. Sergeant Major Stanford L. Knight assumed the duties of Battalion Sergeant Major.

(b) Two augmented Assault Fire Unit movements were completed by units of this command during the reporting period. Units were Battery C on 4-6 August 1969 and Battery A on 18-20 August 1969.

(c) The following inspections were conducted by 38th Artillery Brigade:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battery</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CI Btry C</td>
<td>19 Sep 69</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRE Btry D</td>
<td>1 Sep 69</td>
<td>Superior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRE Btry C</td>
<td>5 Sep 69</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRE Btry C</td>
<td>9 Sep 69</td>
<td>Superior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPTI Btry</td>
<td>19-20 Sep 69</td>
<td>Unsatisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CI Btry A</td>
<td>24 Sep 69</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRE Btry B</td>
<td>26 Sep 69</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) The following inspections were conducted by units outside the 38th Artillery Brigade (AD):

- Physical Security Survey by DSS, 23d Direct Support Group:
  - Btry D 6 Oct 69
  - Btry D 14 Oct 69
  - Hq Btry 15-17 Oct 69
  - Btry C 15-17 Oct 69

- Unannounced II inspections by 502d Military Intelligence Battalion:
  - Bn Hq 25 Sep 69 Rating Excellent
  - Btry C 22 Oct 69 Rating Excellent
SUBJECT: Operational Reports from Vietnam

Command Maintenance Management Inspection by Headquarters Eighth US Army.

HQ & Hq Btry 10 Sep 69 Rating Satisfactory
Btry D 12 Sep 69 Rating Satisfactory
Btry A 17 Oct 69 Rating Unsatisfactory

(a) Units of this command have completed the following construction and 
AFAK projects.

Btry A, 3 Sep 69, dedicated the addition of six rooms to the O Sun; 
Fiddle School at Oanh, Forest.

Btry C, 14 Oct 69, 30-ton barracks in the administrative area.


Btry C, completed their erosion control project to increase water 
drainage and decrease loss of soil.

(b) The following Combat Operations by Batteries were conducted by this command:

Btry A 21 Aug 69 Superior LOR
29 Sep 69 Unsatisfactory MOR
27 Oct 69 Unsatisfactory MOR
28 Oct 69 Superior LOR

Btry B 22 Aug 69 Satisfactory MOR

Btry C 5 Sep 69 Satisfactory LOR

Btry D 14 Aug 69 Satisfactory MOR
1 Sep 69 Superior LOR
9 Oct 69 Unsatisfactory MOR
12 Oct 69 Unsatisfactory MOR

(5) (II) 3d Battalion (H-1) 7th Artillery

(a) During the 2d Quarter FY 69, efforts were made to coordinate the 
Site ground defense with local ARVN troops. These plans have been
improved during the 3rd quarter to the extent that they now include the Battalion Helicopter CRF and the ROK Helicopter HP used in conjunction with the ground defenses. Communications with local ROK units established several months ago by land-line have been strengthened by the addition of FM radio back-up. The 26th ROK Division has provided our units with frequencies and has assigned a call sign to each unit. Combined exercises made our batteries aware of available support, created a realistic situation and developed a working relationship with the ROK units.

(b) Each battery in 2d Battalion (H/M), 71st arty except Battery D, has successfully completed their Annual Service Practice. Battery D is scheduled for the first week in November. Overall scores clearly indicate that the level of unit training is above that required to accomplish the assigned mission. Preparation for SF was conducted by a joint Battery - Battalion training plan, wherein the fire units conducted on-site training and were evaluated by the Battalion REE Term. MATISs were used on the ASP crews as a reward for their hard work and demonstrated professional abilities.

(c) Battalion Air Defense Exercises, initiated during 1968, continued this quarter. They are continually becoming more successful and the training gained from them is of significant value. Each Wednesday afternoon the Air Force provides sorties to fly air strikes against the battalion’s tactical sites with the exception of Site A2 which is located in the center of the Kimpo Airfield approach. Each battery is brought to “Blazing Skies” and conducts simulated engagements on the aircraft. The pilots are instructed to attack the site as they would if they were on actual air strikes. The fencers also initiate missile evasion tactics after the simulated release of their ordinance. The training is particularly beneficial to the COA operators as they have live, high-speed, low-altitude targets. With the cooperation of the Direct Air Support Center (DASC) assigned to I US Corps (BP), a FAC is sent to each tactical site to control the aircraft. Since the aircraft are under positive ground control by the FAC, the problems presented by the NO FLX Line are eliminated.

(d) The battalion initiated a program of training on equipment march order and convoy procedures in conjunction with state VII time. Operational and fire orders are put into effect and the Battalion Commander and other members of the staff are on site to evaluate and detect problem areas. The exercise includes a complete March Order of all tactical equipment and a 5 mile road march using correct convoy procedures. A program such as this insures that a battery move is not an annual affair. Shortcomings and mistakes detected during the exercises are corrected immediately. The exercise also insures that the knowledge and organization required to move a battery is passed on smoothly to new personnel as they arrive both in the battery and the battalion.
SUBJECT: Operational Reports: Lessons Learned.

(a) On three occasions each week, the battalion utilized a UH-ID helicopter from 1 US Corps (GC) to distribute parts to the line batteries. This program reduced equipment down time, vehicle repair, damage to sensitive electronic equipment, vehicle accident exposure, and the amount of time valuable personnel are absent from their unit.

(f) The battalion participated in Exercise Focus Lens FY 70 by furnishing an Air Defense Element to 1 US CORPS (GC), and logistics players to the CFX portion of the exercise.

(g) Site hardening continued throughout the quarter. Movements were built to protect equipment and bunkers were constructed to provide personnel fighting positions against ground attack. Bunkers were constructed with a cinder-block wall and then sand-bagged. Ten-by-ten lumber was utilized for overhead cover and then sand-bagged. Extreme care was taken to insure that the bunkers would not collapse when hit by enemy fire or erode when exposed to water. This was accomplished by reinforcing the bunkers with four-foot lumber and sand bags, or concrete retaining walls. Drainage systems were installed in many bunkers and concrete sumps were dug. Communications trenches were constructed between bunkers on some sites. In many cases cinder-block buildings replaced conex containers used for J-Boxes and Quonset huts used for storage and living quarters.


a. Personnel

(1) (U) The value of experienced senior maintenance non-commissioned officers.

(a) Observation: The limited supply of experienced senior maintenance personnel in many battalions of this Brigade has caused great hardship. A short tour area needs experienced maintenance people in the system at all times to provide continuity in maintenance management. One battalion has been especially hurt with the loss of a large proportion of its senior maintenance NCO's due to the build-up of personnel during one short period of time.

(b) Evaluation: Turnover of experienced senior maintenance personnel should be monitored more closely. With a constant turnover of a small percentage of senior maintenance personnel, proper continuity of maintenance management can be accomplished in a short tour area. A one month overlap of senior NCO's would be ideal.

(c) Recommendation: That all levels of the Army more effectively control the turnover of senior maintenance personnel.
SUBJECT: Operational Reports Lessons Learned

(2) (ii) Correctional Custody

(a) Observation: The forfeiture, reduction and restriction punishments permitted under Article 15, USMC, have often proven less than adequate deterrents to future misconduct. A means of giving an offender a taste of real confinement while at the same time avoiding the stigma of a federal criminal conviction has long been sought by this command. The provisions for correctional custody set forth in Article 15, USMC, appeared to be an ideal solution.

(b) Evaluation: In October, a form of correctional custody was initiated at Camp Paxon, the location of 7th Bn (HAWK), 5th Artillery. At present, use of the facility is limited to punishments of correctional custody imposed under a Field Grade Article 15. The punished individuals from the battalion are then transferred to Headquarters Battery for the length of their correctional custody. During the working days they are put on details at the battery and allowed to eat their meals with the regular troops. The restrictive period begins immediately after supper. The restricted individuals, after reporting to the Provost Marshal’s Office, are watched closely by the Military Police. The following morning they are returned to Headquarters Battery. Periods of restriction are from ten to thirty days.

(c) Recommendation: Although the correctional custody program is in its development stage, it is already apparent that the program is a worthwhile effort - not only for the restricted individuals but as a deterrent to the other men of the battery. While changes will possibly have to be made after enough time has elapsed to permit re-evaluation, it is felt that the use of correctional custody will prove to be a significant part of the battalions’ disciplinary program. It is recommended that this program be monitored closely for positive results, and that consideration be given to implementing similar facilities in other areas of Korea.

b. Operations

(1) (ii) San Range Communications

(a) Observation: Communications between the AN/MRC 69 Terminal at San Range Bocch and the firing units is presently accomplished with WD-1 field wire. Due to the distance involved and the method employed in installation of the field wire a large drop in signal strength is suffered between the VHF Terminal and the firing units.
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(b) Evaluation: By design, WD-1 field wire is used where temporary installation is planned and only one circuit point-to-point is needed. At Sea Range Beach, numerous lines are run overhead as far as possible utilizing existing poles, and then run along the ground. By running all lines overhead, signal strength would be improved and cable maintenance reduced to a minimum.

(c) Recommendation: That communications wiring at Sea Range be done on a permanent basis utilizing multiple pair cable and overhead construction.

(2) (C) Secure Communications:

(a) Observation: The 38th Artillery Brigade has no means of organic secure voice or teletypewriter communication within its resources. An evaluation test, consisting of passing a classified message to all organic units within the Brigade, took an unsatisfactory length of time because of the absence of secure communication equipment.

(b) Evaluation: The Army Air Defense is dependent upon a reliable means of secure communications for the rapid exchange of tactical information from the firing battery to Army Air Defense Command Posts (AADCPs). Also a secure Radio-Teletype (RATT) Net between the command posts and battalions must be employed for the exchange of administrative and logistical information not pertaining directly to air battle operations.

(c) Recommendations: In order that the 38th Artillery Brigade be fully capable of performing its mission, the full TOE level of SSB AM Radio and RATT Sets must be issued to this headquarters. In addition, supplementing secure voice equipments must be made available to this command as soon as possible. Secure voice utilizing TSEC/KY-8 was requested by letter to EUSA on 9 May 1969 so that a secure means of communications would be available down to battery level.

(3) (U) ABAR Resolver Amplifier Failure Nike Hercules.

(a) Observation: There have been numerous failures of Alternate Battery Acquisition Radar (ABAR) resolver amplifiers.

(b) Evaluation: Resolver amplifier failure was determined to result predominantly from a partial failure of power supply voltage control tubes.

(c) Recommendation: That power supply voltage control tubes be closely monitored and replaced before failure occurs in the resolver amplifier.
(4) (U) Preparation of Tactical Sites for the Winter Months:

(a) Observation: Winter in Korea presents many equipment, personnel and operational problems. Tactical sites must be prepared for winter prior to 1 November. Snow causes the majority of problems during the winter months. In many instances tactical site roads are inaccessible.

(b) Evaluation: Prior to the first snow fall, field ranges, immersion heaters, galvanized cans, and other mess equipment should be stored on the tactical site. The operational load of rations should be checked. The breakfast meal should be brought to the tactical site with the evening chow truck. This eliminates the need for a run on the road during the early morning hours when roads are still frozen. A cook should be assigned to the manning crew. Action should be taken to minimise the effects of the snow by prepositioning sand and gravel on hills, curves, and other areas on and off the site. There cannot be too many sand piles on the tactical site. Rock salt or calcium chloride should be requisitioned early and stored in large quantities (10,000 pounds minimum). This material can be used on paved roads or concrete pads, but should not be used around items of equipment. The reason for this is that the temperature will rise during the day. On hard surfaces the water will collect and form ice when it freezes at night. These areas should be cleared of snow and sanded. Battery personnel should prepare themselves for a severe snow storm every time they go to the tactical site. They should bring toilet articles, a change of underwear, and a clean uniform. The senior NCO should check each man prior to movement to the tactical site to insure that he has all of his winter clothing (gloves, parkas, insulated boots, etc.). The commanders of the relief must insure that each guard is dressed properly prior to being posted. Vehicle movement to the tactical site should be restricted until the road is cleared. It is very easy for a heavy vehicle to slide off the road when driving up a snow-covered hill. If possible, troops should hike up the hill and not ride in the rear of trucks when the road is icy. When it becomes apparent that vehicles will not be able to reach the tactical site, water should be immediately rationed and a latrine opened only during meal hours and for one or two hours in the evening. A field trench latrine should be constructed as it will save many gallons of water. Fuel is extremely critical during the winter months and must be replenished on the tactical site at every opportunity. The operational load of diesel fuel and motor gasoline should be utilised only when absolutely necessary. All heaters should be kept on low for maximum conservation. When all storage tanks are full, the fuel truck should be filled and parked on the tactical site.

(c) Recommendation:

(1) That the operational load of fuel on the tactical sites be increased by fifty per cent during winter months.

(2) That each unit submit work orders to procure sufficient quantities of rock salt or calcium chloride from Post Engineers to stock each tactical site with ten thousand pounds.
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(3) That each unit insure that their personnel are properly briefed on cold weather hazards and that each man has the proper winter gear available to them prior to 1 November.

(5) Failure of actuators in 45kw generators.

(a) Observation: The actuators in 45kw generators tend to leak hydraulic fluid after long use or in many instances, improper preventive maintenance. In both cases one of the main reasons is because impure hydraulic fluid has fouled the actuator. The down time on 45kw generators resulting from actuator malfunction significantly impairs operations and materiel readiness.

(b) Evaluation: The actuator is designed to control voltage and frequency in circuits as the load on the generator changes by keeping the 416 volts, 3 phase, 400 cycle power steady. Hydraulic fluid is used to help produce the pressure needed to operate the system. When foreign particles are present in the fluid, actuators malfunction. Operators must be aware of this problem and of the preventive maintenance checks which insure that hydraulic fluid is clean and free of foreign particles. Down time is held to a minimum by this simple task. In many cases, generator down time has been decreased by unit personnel carefully cleaning the actuator and replacing the "O" ring in a cylinder of the actuator.

(c) Recommendation: That units thoroughly observe proper preventive maintenance procedures concerning the use of hydraulic fluid in 45kw generators.

(6) Construction of Protective Buildings.

(a) Observation: Because of increased North Korean infiltration attempts and intelligence indicating a possible attack on one or more isolated sites, a program of site hardening was initiated. The purpose of the site hardening program was to protect personnel and vital air defense equipment from small arms and flying shrapnel. The program was also designed to give limited protection to equipment when attacked by enemy air strikes.

(b) Evaluation: Experiments were conducted with many types of bunkers and revetments. Around the launchers fifty-five gallon drums were placed in a horseshoe shape and filled with sand. The barrels were then sand-bagged four deep to a height of five to seven feet. Another experiment was conducted utilizing cement blocks in a horseshoe shape around launchers and radars with earth piled against them. A roof was placed over the top of the walls around radars, slanted to allow for runoff and positioned so as not to interfere with the movement of the antenna. The roof was sealed by placing removable plywood sections and canvas around the radar antenna base and a door built across the open end of the structure sealing the building and permitting easy access and
exit of the radar. Sandbags were placed four deep around the outside of the building. This type of revetment has two advantages. First, it provides protection for the cabinet of the radars, which hold the majority of the electrical components. Secondly, it provides protection which gives maintenance personnel an opportunity to work on the radars during any type of weather. Cabinets may be opened without water getting into them. Heat, generated by the radar, will provide warmth in the building during the winter months. Electrical outlets and lighting fixtures may also be installed in the building.

(c) Recommendation: That site hardening programs be expedited through systematic construction of protective buildings. Engineering support organizations could be tasked with the requirement of developing standardized construction plans based on (1) the item of equipment to be protected, (2) the types of material most readily available for use in construction, and (3) the degree of protection desired for both personnel and equipment.

c. Training: NONE

d. Intelligence:

(1) (U) Sentry Dog Handlers:

(a) Observation: The supply of MOS-trained dog handlers has now begun to match Brigade demands.

(b) Evaluation: Sentry Dog Teams are best able to perform their mission when utilizing MOS-trained personnel. The immediate result is improved security for the unit.

(c) Recommendation: Continued emphasis must be placed on acquiring MOS-trained Sentry Dog Teams to neutralize the effects of loss through DEROS.

(2) (U) Incident Reporting:

(a) Observation: Excessive time lag has recently been noticed in incident reporting which could result in adverse effects on site security. This time lag has often resulted in information which is incomplete and inaccurate.

(b) Evaluation: Early warning from local Republic of Korea forces is the best defensive measure available to units of this command. Proper coordination and liaison between Brigade units and Republic of Korea Forces will provide a method of timely incident reporting.

(c) Recommendation: Continuous emphasis at all levels must be placed on insuring that timely and accurate reports are transmitted to coordinating units.
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(3) (U) Site Access Procedures:

(a) Observation: Serious delays causing much wasted effort and loss of government time and money have resulted from persons attempting to gain access to missile sites of the 38th Arty Bde (AD) without following proper procedures.

(b) Evaluation: A large number of different organizations deal both directly and indirectly with units of the 38th Arty Bde (AD). Many of these are indigenous contractors hired by FASCOM agencies. Air defense security procedures require verification of all individuals seeking access to the sites of this Brigade.

(c) Recommendation: That all Eighth Army agencies be informed of the need to notify the battalion, through Brigade channels, of all anticipated site visits prior to the arrival of those requiring entrance. This could be done through Eighth Army's weekly bulletin.

e. Logistics.

(1) (U) Generator replacement.

(a) Observation: Timely replacement of over-hour generators has not been accomplished. As a result, an excess amount of downtime of tactical power generators has reduced our ability to accomplish the air defense mission.

(b) Evaluation: Replacement generators must be introduced into supply channels. Procurement of these generators should be of high priority.

(c) Recommendation: That all over-hour generators be replaced immediately and replacement generators be introduced into the supply system in a timely manner.

(2) (U) Replacement of DX clothing and initial issue of winter clothing.

(a) Observation: The time consumed in replacement of DX clothing is becoming excessive. DX items have been on requisition for as long as three months. Some personnel are presently wearing clothing which should be salvaged. There are also many individuals lacking foul-weather gear. Most delays in replacing DX clothing and in providing foul-weather gear are apparently caused by lack of sufficient quantities of equipment in the proper sizes.

(b) Evaluation: Due to the lack of proper clothing, both individual and organizational, it is anticipated that in the coming winter months this command will lose the service of a considerable number of its personnel due to illness. A man cannot perform his work efficiently if he is cold, wet and ill.
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(c) Recommendation: That commanders maintain continuous follow-up action to eliminate the delay in replacement of DX clothing and the lack of winter/foul-weather clothing by improving quantities and size distribution.

(3) (U) Delay in Delivery of Aircraft

(a) Observation: Due to the insufficient number of aircraft assigned to the 38th Artillery Brigade (AD) Aviation Section, it is impossible to accomplish all the missions requests even though they are valid and should receive air support. Unit commanders are often reluctant to submit air mission requests because of the frequent disapproval of previous mission requests.

(b) Evaluation: If the 38th Artillery Brigade (AD) Aviation Section were to be augmented with additional UH-1D aircraft, more missions could be accomplished by the Section. Commanders would not be as reluctant to submit valid requests for air support. Brigade operational capability and efficiency would be greatly improved if additional aircraft were available. The augmentation of the 38th Arty Bde (AD) Aviation Section would also reduce the number of mission requests forwarded to EUSA for support, thereby releasing more Eighth Army aircraft for other missions. Although approval was granted by EUSA in July 1969 for the addition of two (2) UH-1D aircraft to the Aviation Section, these aircraft have not yet been received by this command.

(c) Recommendation: That the two (2) additional UH-1D aircraft approved for the 38th Artillery Brigade (AD) Aviation Section be furnished on a priority basis.

f. Materiel.

(1) (U) Site hardening materials.

(a) Observation. The procurement of site hardening materials (i.e., cement, cement blocks, and reinforcing steel rods) is time-consuming and often unsuccessful. Accomplishment of site hardening is progressing behind schedule.

(b) Evaluation. Completion of site hardening must be accomplished in accordance with existing directives. To accomplish this, timely supply of needed materials is required.
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(c) Recommendation. The release of funds to supply facilities for use in procurement of needed material.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl

Bde Structure

JAMES L. HAYDEN
Colonel, ADA
Deputy Commander

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1 - Commanding General, Eighth US Army, ATTN: TACG-T, APO 96301
1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed subject report. The following comments supplement the report.

2. (C) Reference item concerning the value of experienced senior maintenance noncommissioned officers, page 11, para 2a(1). Concur. The large rotation of senior maintenance NCOs during a short period of time that is now being experienced in the 38th Artillery Brigade is a problem common to all grades and MOSs throughout Eighth Army. It is due to a large personal buildup following North Korean aggressions such as the Pueblo, Blue House, and 26-121 incidents. To alleviate a concentrated personal loss following this buildup, Eighth Army instituted the Ramp Reduction Program. Extensions and curtailments were used to spread losses out over a greater time span. While this procedure does not eliminate the immediate problem, it does prevent the recurrence of the same problem in the following year. It is recommended that 38th Artillery Brigade employ this same means to avoid concentrated senior maintenance MOS losses. Curtailments will cause temporary shortages, but compensation will come in long-range benefits.

3. (U) Reference item concerning Correctional Custody, page 12, para 2a(2). Concur, except for that portion of the Evaluation which reads: "The restrictive period begins immediately after supper." Eighth Army Reg 192-3 requires that positive restraint of either a physical or moral nature must be imposed at all times on a soldier undergoing correctional custody. During working hours a detainee is placed, as a minimum, under moral restraint by an order defining the geographical limits to which he must abide. This policy is in effect at the Correctional Custody Facility located at Camp Page.

4. (U) Reference item concerning Sea Range Communications, page 12, para 2b(1). Concur. The construction of this overhead cable is within the capability of the 38th Artillery Brigade.

5. (C) Reference item concerning Secure Communications, page 13, para 2b(2). Concur. Emergency authorization request should be submitted to this headquarters, in accordance with DA Cir 310-HU, for equipment not presently authorized within the 38th Artillery Brigade. Evaluation of equipment requirements should be made with consideration of the present worldwide shortage of SSB AN radios.
9. (C) Reference item concerning failure of actuators on 65kW generators, page 15, para 2b(5). Concur. Maintenance technicians from the Pacific Mobility Support Office are assisting the 38th Artillery Brigade in resolving the problem of malfunctioning hydraulic actuators. Of the 103 actuators assumed to be unserviceable, 98 have been cleaned, tested and adjusted and reinstalled on generators and are operating satisfactorily. Recommend continued emphasis by the 38th Artillery Brigade on cleanliness during maintenance to prevent the entry of foreign particles into the actuator system.

9. (C) Reference item concerning Construction of Protective Buildings, page 15, para 2b(6). The site hardening program at the 38th Artillery Brigade facilities to protect personnel and equipment from small arms and flying shrapnel is an in-house program implemented by on-site personnel. Implementation to the extent indicated in the reference may continue to be supported but a requirement for technical assistance is indicated. An expansion of this program to a hardening program involving the systematic construction of protective buildings has not been programmed or funded in either the CHA or CHB construction programs of Eighth Army. Consequently no funds are available for these programs at this time for accomplishment of the construction recommended. If a site hardening program is anticipated, the requirement for design and construction should be placed on the supporting facilities engineer.

10. (C) Reference item concerning Sentry Dog Handlers, page 16, para 2b(1). Concur. In order to assure continued personnel support of MOS-trained dog handlers for critical security functions, 38th Artillery Brigade should requisition personnel for fill or projected vacancies well in advance of their rotation. In addition to requisitioning for dog handlers, the 38th Brigade can also send qualified personnel from within the Brigade to a three-week course for sentry dog handlers at Camp Zeller, conducted by the 820th Military Police Platoon (dog).
11. (C) Reference item concerning Incident Reporting, page 19, para 2d(2). Concur. It is essential that critical and isolated sites have agreements, communication, and close liaison with local G7K police, military, and paramilitary forces to insure timely notification and assistance in event of imminent enemy attack. Lack of timely notification could result in neutralization of the site by even a small agent party. To assist critical sites in receiving notification of agent and unidentified individual (UI) activity, duty personnel at the Eighth Army Tactical Operations Center plot all such reports. Critical and isolated sites located at or near the point of activity are notified immediately.

12. (U) Reference item concerning Site Access Procedures, page 17, para 2d(3). Concur. The 33rd Artillery Brigade has been informed of procedures for publishing notices in the Eighth Army Weekly Bulletin which is distributed to all Eighth Army and subordinate command agencies. Subsequently, an item was published notifying interested personnel of site access procedures.

13. (U) Reference item concerning Generator replacement, page 17, para 2e(1). Concur. The following procedures now prevail: Generators are replaced in accordance with Technical Bulletin (TB) 5-0100-201-15 and are also included in a closed loop to assure replacement within the applicable time frame. The combination and application of this TB and closed loop procedures are working effectively.

14. (U) Reference item concerning replacement of 25 clothing and initial issue of winter clothing, page 17, para 2e(2). Concur. Follow-up action should be taken if supplies are not received within the normal order/shipping time frame. However, follow-up action should be in consonance with published procedures and cannot be "continuous" as recommended. It is the requisitioner's responsibility to maintain past demand data as a basis for computing future supply requirements and to submit his requisitions for replacement on a timely basis. Depot stockage is considered to be adequate since it also is based on average past demands.

15. (C) Reference item concerning Delay in Delivery of Aircraft, page 18, para 2e(3). Concur. On 4 Dec 69, five CH-21B aircraft arrived in-country and two of these were issued to the 38th Artillery Brigade.
16. (c) Reference item concerning site hardening materials, page 17, para 2f(1). Nonconcur. The need for procurement of materials for site hardening is recognized. However, the FY 70 funding situation precludes accomplishing all approved projects at this time. Limited funds restrict project completions only to high priority and emergency requirements as approved by this headquarters. It is of paramount importance that every command action be taken toward conservation of funds throughout FY 70.
GPOP-DT (25 Nov 69) 2d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 38th Artillery Brigade (AD) for Period Ending 31 October 1969, BCS CSPOR-65 (R1) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 19 JAN 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C. L. Short
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF 30th ARTILLERY REGIMENT (AD)

TRANSMITTED

12TH BATTALION

5TH BATTALION

6TH BATTALION

4TH BATTALION

2B BATTALION

1ST BATTALION

HEADQUARTERS

(20th BATTALION)

(3rd BATTALION)

(7th BATTALION)

(4th BATTALION)

(2nd BATTALION)

(1st BATTALION)

Incl 1
Operational Report  Lessons Learned, HQ, 38th Artillery Brigade

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug 69 to 31 Oct 69.

CG, 38th Artillery Brigade

25 November 1969

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