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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (2 Feb 70) FOR OT UT 694286
9 February 1970

SUBJECT. Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1 Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

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Subject: Operational Report-Lessons Learned Headquarters First Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS GSPD-65 (h2)

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities

a. Intelligence.

(1) General. Intelligence operations during the quarter ending 31 October were geared to supplementing intelligence gained by units in the field to form an overall picture of enemy activity in I Corps. There has been an increased exchange of intelligence among FWMAF. Joint allied intelligence efforts have contributed to a rise in the number of friendly operations. An increased emphasis was placed on intelligence being received from the DIOCC's and PIOCC's.

(2) Enemy Order of Battle.

(a) Disposition of NVA, VC Main Forces and VC Local Forces is shown at Inclosure 1.

(b) Changes in Order of Battle holdings during the period:

| Units Accepted: K-631 NVA Battalion
| Confirmed 385
| (Merger of 966th NVA Battalion and the K-31 Artillery Battalion) |

| 96th Local Force Battalion
| Confirmed 510
| (Merger of 11th Battalion, 10th NVA Regiment and the 85th Local Force Battalion) |

| K-13 Local Force Battalion
| Confirmed 300 |

Inclosure 1
SUBJECT: Operational report-Lessons Learned Headquarters First Field Force, Vietnam, period ending 31 October 1969, HQ USFOR-69 (Hz)

250 Transportation Regiment
0-2 Transportation Battalion
406th Main Force Sapper Battalion

2 Units removed:
T-29 Local Force Battalion
11th Battalion, 10th NVA Regiment
13th Battalion, 10th NVA Regiment
10th NVA Regiment Headquarters and Support Units
85th Local Force Battalion
Y66th NVA Battalion
K-31 NVA Artillery Battalion
7th Battalion, 18B Regiment

2 Changes in subordinations: The 10th NVA Division was deactivated during the period. The 12th Battalion is believed to be resubordinated under the Southern Sub-region, Military Region 5; 11th Battalion merged with the 29th Local Force Battalion to form the 96th Local Force Battalion subordinate to PHU YEN Province Committee, and the 13th Battalion was also subordinated under the PHU YEN Province Committee as the K-13 Local Force Battalion.

(3) Significant Enemy Tactics and Techniques. Enemy activity in I Corps decreased in both intensity and quantity during the reporting period. The activity was characterised by standoff attacks on allied installations and ground attacks on isolated allied units. According to declarations of POW's, Ho Chi Minh, and captured documents, it is possible to determine that the enemy had planned for three offensives or "high points" during the last six months of 1969. However, no large scale attacks occurred; there were only shellings, sapper attacks, New Life Hamlet infiltrations and other acts of terrorism. The enemy situation has gradually calmed until 25 October and 29 October at which times high points occurred in PHU THAI and western QUANG DUC Provinces, respectively. A number of planned attacks were discovered and neutralized in QUANG DUC, Binh Dinh, Binh Thuan, and Tinh DUC. Different sources have reported an enemy trend in
transforming a number of NVA units into Provincial Main Force or Regional units. This is possibly being done in order to reduce the number of NVA units in South Vietnam should hostilities suddenly end. In spite of the fact that many sources stated that the enemy was determined to carry out large scale and continuous operations, with the intent of inflicting maximum casualties on FWMAF and destroying their war potential, at least two Phu's declared that regular force units would withdraw to safe bases and limit to the minimum, their attacks and rocket shelling until after allied forces had withdrawn or significantly decreased.

(4) Enemy Losses and Strengths.

(a) Total enemy military losses in II Corps for August, September and October 1969. (DOW is 35% of KIA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>August</th>
<th>September</th>
<th>October</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>1814</td>
<td>1191</td>
<td>1168</td>
<td>4173</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOW</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>1461</td>
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<tr>
<td>FW</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>147</td>
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<td>64</td>
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<td>SA</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>1695</td>
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<tr>
<td>C/S</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>99</td>
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*Denotes military HOI CHANHS only, not total HOI CHANHS.

(b) Enemy strengths at the beginning and end of the quarter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 August 1969</th>
<th>31 October 1969</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NVA</td>
<td>12,650</td>
<td>12,090</td>
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<tr>
<td>AR/LP</td>
<td>10,890</td>
<td>11,820</td>
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<tr>
<td>Admin</td>
<td>4,895</td>
<td>4,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrilla</td>
<td>10,790</td>
<td>10,841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>17,160</td>
<td>16,262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>56,385</td>
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Subject: Operational Report - Lessons Learned Headquarters First Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, HCM C55A-65 (A2)

(5) Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Probable Courses of Action.

(a) Capabilities:

1. In KONKU Province the enemy forces can conduct standoff attacks or combination standoff/sapper attacks against allied installations anywhere in the province. The enemy can employ mortars up to 105mm, 75mm AK rifles and rockets up to 140mm, 85mm/100mm/105mm artillery may be deployed against installations near the Cambodian border. He can conduct ground attacks against friendly installations in up to reinforced battalion strength with supporting artillery, primarily in the area of DAK TQ/Phùm hàt and DAK Saigon. The enemy also has the capability to interdict QL-14N and Route 512 as well as other lines of communication. Friendly air activity may be somewhat restricted with fire from small arms, automatic weapons, 127mm, 14.5mm and 37mm anti-aircraft weapons. A limited armor threat still exists in the vicinity of BnN hàt.

2. PHAIKU Province is also confronted with a variety of enemy capabilities, to include: Selective attacks on PHAIKU City, PL&IKU Camps, or PWAP ENANG Resettlement Center, THANH AN District Headquarters and LE THUONG District Headquarters in multi-battalion strength supported by mortar, rocket and recoilless rifle fire; attack PHAIKU City, US/ARVN bases, CIVIK camps, district headquarters, and resettlement areas using 82mm mortar, recoilless rifle and 122mm/140mm rocket fire and sappers; set ambushes along QL-19E and QL-14 supported by 75mm recoilless rifle and 60mm/82mm mortar fire; attack lines of communication 500, 437, TL7C, and LG7C with VC elements using anti-tank grenades, recoilless rifle and mortar fire. The possibility of limited armor and artillery capability exists in the vicinity of DUC CO.

3. In PHU BON Province the enemy is capable of conducting company size attacks against CHAO HEO and the district headquarters utilizing 60mm and 82mm mortars, 82mm rockets, small arms and possibly 107mm rockets.

4. In QUANG UOC Province the enemy can conduct attacks on the province headquarters, district headquarters, and the CIVIK camps with up to a battalion size force. Enemy forces in multi-regimental strength, with supporting artillery, are capable of attacking GIA NGHIA-HUONG CO, B4 PHUONG and DUC LAP from base areas in III Corps and/or Cambodia adjacent to QUANG DUC Province. The enemy is capable of employing rockets of up to 122mm and 82mm mortars and artillery up to 85mm.

5. In WAKLAC Province the enemy is capable of attacking the district headquarters of BUON HO and LAC THIN and isolated hamlets in up to
reinforced battalion strength. He can conduct ambushes and harassing activities along highways QL-14 and QL-21 and attack Ben Ha Thuot with a battalion size unit, employing 75mm recoilless rifle, 60mm/82mm/120mm mortars, and 107mm rockets.

6. In Can Hau Province the enemy is capable of conducting company size attacks on allied installations and hamlet defenses and continuing interdiction on QL-20.

7. In Minh Thuan Province the enemy has the ability to conduct attacks on allied installations and hamlet defenses in up to battalion strength, continue attempts to interdict QL-1 and QL-11, and attack Phan Rang Air Base with 107mm rockets and 82mm mortars.

8. In Nuyen Duc Province enemy, employing 82mm mortars and 107mm rockets, can conduct standoff and sapper attacks on SVN air base installations and ground attacks on these targets in up to battalion strength.

9. In Minh Thuan Province the enemy is able to conduct attacks by fire, employing 82mm mortars and 107mm rockets, and strike hamlet defenses and allied installations in up to multi-battalion strength.

10. In Khanh Hoa Province the enemy can conduct standoff attacks against allied installations in the Cam Kanh way and Kha Trang areas with 82mm mortars, 107mm and 140mm mortars. He can also conduct reinforced company size ground attacks against lightly populated areas. The enemy has a sapper/swimmer capability in the Cam Kanh way and Kha Trang areas.

11. In Phu Yen Province the enemy is capable of attacking population centers and allied installations in multi-company strength. The enemy can conduct terrorist and sapper activities and standoff attacks against friendly controlled areas and restrict movement along lines of communication.

12. In Binh Dinh Province, the enemy has the capability to attack the population centers, US/QVN/ARVN installations and units in multi-battalion strength and can impede movement on QL-1 and QL-19 by employing ambushes and mines or conducting standoff attacks and harassing friendly convoys and installations on and along these routes. The enemy is capable of engaging in sapper and terrorist activities against friendly installations along the coastline.

13. The enemy can employ chemical agents, using various delivery systems during any attack.
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AVFA-GC-H1ST

15 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned Headquarters First Field
Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS GSFQR-65 (R2)

14. The enemy can continue disruption of the GVN nation-building effort
by assassination, kidnapping, and other terrorist acts.

15. The enemy can withdraw forces to base areas and sanctuaries for
replacements, resupply and retraining.

16. The enemy is capable of entering outlying villages without opposition
or as a result of minor contact to conduct propaganda lectures, recruit
personnel, impress civilians as laborers/porters and to obtain provisions
and information.

17. The enemy can establish limited political entities, i.e., Peoples
Revolutionary Committees in contested and VC controlled hamlets and villages.

18. The enemy has the ability to reinforce with reserves located in
sanctuaries in the Cambodian, Laotian, I CTZ and II CTZ border areas.
Some enemy units which are currently active in I CTZ and II CTZ could be
expected to employ to II CTZ if the enemy shifts his area of interest to
II CTZ. The size of reserves or reinforcements in sanctuaries is not known.

19. The enemy is capable of employing combinations of the above capabili-
ties.

(b) Vulnerabilities.

1. Enemy supply areas are generally insecure, rendering supply caches
vulnerable to friendly search and destroy operations.

2. The enemy has limited logistical support, and cannot conduct extend-
ed offensive operations unless he is near sanctuary areas.

3. He is vulnerable to superior allied fire power when he masses near
an objective and during withdrawal from the same.

4. Low morale exists in many units, owing to food shortages, sickness,
heavy losses and continuing defeats. Thus, the enemy is susceptible to
friendly psychological operations.

5. Enemy reliance on local civilians as a labor source makes larger
operations vulnerable to friendly intelligence efforts.

(c) Probable Courses of Action.
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15 November 1969
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Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, HCS CSFOR-65 (A2)

1 The enemy's most probable course of action in the next quarter is to
mount several corps wide offensives or high points. Instead of follow-
ing previous tactics, it is expected that the enemy will pose a major threat
in the highlands by spreading his forces to several areas instead of the
mass concentration such as at ben het/uik lo in the summer of 1969. Evi-
dence of this spreading of forces is found in the fact that major enemy
units are located in Quang Duc Province, Pleiku Province and reportedly in
Kontum Province, each capable of conducting major attacks in those areas.
Enemy emphasis on targets in AK-6 should also increase due to an influx of
AVA replacements. Probable target areas in the Southern Provinces are
Phan Thiet, Song Mac and Dalat. Increased sapper, terrorist, and stand-
off attacks against allied installations in metropolitan areas are con-
sidered a definite possibility.

2 In Kontum Province no large scale actions are anticipated. Possible
main force elements near ia A Pek can be expected to harass the units from
that camp, and local force units and guerrillas will continue interdiction
attempts on QL-14, with harassing attacks on EP/PP forces throughout the
province.

3 In Pleiku Province, US firebases and lines of communication will be
the most likely enemy targets. Throughout the remainder of the provinces,
antipacification attacks and minings of the lines of communication are
expected to continue with a possible highpoint occurring in the Pleiku
City area.

4 In Daklac Province, EP units are expected to continue with haras-
sing and anti-pacification activities. The K394 bn is expected to conduct
operations against Ban Me Thuot and Lac Thien as in the past. Attacks by
fire are most likely, although major ground action is possible.

5 In Quang Duc Province little change in activity is expected to occur
in the province, although the threat to the Bu Prang area and possibly Duc
Lap exists due to the presence of large enemy units suspected to be in the
area.

6 In Phu Bon Province, Cheo Hao and the district headquarters continue
to remain the most likely targets for standoff attacks and light ground
attacks.

7 In Lam Dong Province, reliable reports revealing movement of enemy
forces indicate that a possible increase in the number of attacks against
allied installations can be expected. The enemy is capable of conducting

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company size attacks on allied installations and hamlet defenses and continuing interdiction of QL-20.

8 In Ninh Thuan Province enemy forces can be expected to conduct ground attacks in squad to platoon strength and to utilize standoff attacks against defenses and installations; and interdiction of QL-1.

9 In Ninh Thuan Province the enemy is capable of conducting multi-battalion size operations, but is likely to continue to conduct platoon and company size attacks. ARVN and US forces remain prime targets for limited ground operations and standoff attacks, particularly in Thi Qo and Phan Ly Cham Districts.

10 In Tuyen Duc Province, an increase can be expected in the number of standoff and ground attacks directed at GVN pacification areas and allied military installations and defenses. Ambush, sniping, and mining incidents in an attempt to interdict the LOC's will probably increase. Arrow action Teams and other small local units will likely continue to attempt to disrupt pacification mainly by abduction and extortion.

11 In Binh Dinh Province, enemy forces will probably continue harassing attacks and terrorist activities against allied installations and populated centers. There is, however, the possibility that the enemy has completed his resupply and is capable of more aggressive attacks.

12 In Phu Yen Province, the majority of enemy activity will concern itself with rice collection and will be characterized by low scale hit and run type attacks. It is felt that the enemy can increase his activity at any time.

13 In Khanh Hoa Province attacks by fire and possibly a sapper attack in the Cam Ranh Bay or Nha Trang area are the most probable course of action.

(6) Significant Sources, Agencies and Techniques.

(a) Changes in Sources, Agencies, and Techniques. During the quarter the 1 FFORCAV Operations Division continued to improve on the collection and analysis of low level intelligence required in pacification operations. The QUICK COM communications system for the rapid reporting of information directly from districts to the 1 FFORCAV TLOC became effective. This system also allows for intelligence information of immediate concern to the subordinate headquarters, to be disseminated in a most expedient manner. A one day school was presented to the DIUCC/FIUC advisors to familiarize them with the new communication system and to explain its use...
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15 November 1969
SUBJ: Operational Report—Lessons Learned Headquarters First Field Force Vietnam, Period ending 31 October 1969, HCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned

The necessity of centralizing all intelligence information here at 1 FFORC&V. The school provided the intelligence advisor with a working knowledge of the principles, techniques, and procedures for systematic collection, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence, to include development of immediate and potential enemy targets. During the period an informal order of battle conference was held at 1 FFORC&V to discuss the many facets of the enemy. Topics discussed included current order of battle holdings, infiltrations, training, morale, and new units formed by consolidations. Attending the one day conference were representatives from II Corps (advisor), 4th Inf Div, 173d Abn Bde, TF South, and G2 Operations Staff members.

(b) G2 Air.

1 During the quarter the G2 Air continued to make available an OV-1 Mohawk aircraft from the 225th Surveillance Airplane Company to the 4th Infantry Division, 173d Brigade, Task Force South and Province Senior Advisor in Quang Binh. One aircraft is furnished daily to the 4th Infantry Division while the others receive one aircraft every other day. This has proven to be one of the most responsive photographic systems available in II CTZ.

2 During the reporting period the 225th Surveillance Airplane Company continued to provide SLAR coverage along the border areas in accordance with the MACV Recce Plan requirements. In addition SLAR coverage was provided along the 11/III CTZ boundary during September and October.

3 The preponderance of aerial reconnaissance and surveillance assets were concentrated along known or suspected infiltration routes and base areas. Extensive reconnaissance and surveillance was also scheduled in areas selected by the CG for intensive reconnaissance efforts. During the period an average of nine intensive reconnaissance areas were covered. These areas were covered by OV-1 Mohawk SLAR and Infra Red sensors and Air Force Infra Red and photography. Visual reconnaissance was provided twice daily in each by OV-1 aircraft of division, brigade and/or province as directed by this headquarters.

4 On 6 Aug 69 an Aerial Reconnaissance Work Conference was held at 1 FFORC&V headquarters for G2/S2 Air personnel from the major subordinate units in II CTZ as well as representatives from II Corps and HOK FFORC&V. The purpose of the conference was to present a thorough orientation on the aerial surveillance and reconnaissance program in II CTZ and to familiarize G2/S2 Air personnel with the assets available to them and how they may best be utilized. Problem areas were discussed and recommendations solicited as to how to make the system more responsive and effective.
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AVF-6C-HLST
15 November 69

Subject: Operational Report-Lessons Learned Headquarters First Field
Force Vietnam, Period ending 31 October 1969, ROG OSRF-65 (hz)

5 A representative of the G2 Air Division attended the II Corps
Intelligence Advisor Conference conducted at the MACV Compound, II Corps
HQ on 15 Oct 69 and presented a one hour briefing on the aerial surveil-
lance program in II CTZ. As a result AKVN use of infra red and photography
has increased 300% during the last 15 days of the quarter. To further
AKVN participation in the Aerial Surveillance Program it has been requested
that II Corps send one AKVN officer and MOS from their G2 Air section along
with a G2 AIR MOS advisor for Iraq in the 172nd Cav G2 Air Division. Plans
call for II, III Corps to be fully integrated into the aerial surveillance system
on 2 Dec 69 and work directly with TAS, JS MACV and Tac 7th Air Force.

6 During the period 1 August through 31 October the OV-1 Mohawks
flew 133 photo, 463 infra red and 863 SlAM targets during the reporting
period. The Air Force flew 1556 infra Red and photo targets in 1639 sorties.
The results of the completed missions were furnished to the commanders
concerned.

(g) G2 Collection. During the period 1 Aug 69 - 31 Oct 69 all cap-
tured weapons and material was processed and evacuated through SL/G4
channels. During the period, T/W teams screened and classified 265 detain-
ees and as a result of these interrogations a total of nine PHM's and
IRM's were produced and distributed. Captured enemy documents were screened
and 30 6th of documents were forwarded to UAC for further exploitation.
T/W teams translated a total of 124 enemy documents.

(a) Detachment N, 1st AI BN (ARS). During the period 1 Aug 69 - 31
Oct 69, Detachment D, 1st M1 BN (ARS) interpreted 1,052 photographic ob-
jectives (222,268 prints) and prepared 11 reports which contained 911 new
items or items with significant changes. The reproduction section processed
121,816 feet of paper to meet requirements of 321 reproduction requests.
The delivery section flew 227 sorties in support of all Free World Military Assistance Forces in II CTZ, transporting 5,855 pounds of cargo. hand-
held photographic missions continued to receive emphasis within the detach-
ment's overall operation. It flew 74 hand-held missions resulting in 7,956
developed prints. During the period, Detachment D, 1st AI BN (ARS) conducted
two hand-held photographic courses at Nha Trang and supervised one T/W
course at HaiKu. These courses resulted in the training of three US Army,
Air Force, and nine AKVN personnel.

(c) For the period 1 Aug 69 - 31 Oct 69, the 55th Military Intelligence
Detachment, Imagery Interpretation Section, received 347 in-country mis-
sions and processed 249. In addition, 15 French Leave missions were pro-
cessed. A total of 22 Special Photo Interpretation Reports were submitted
which included 11 area studies in RVN. In addition to reports submitted,
the following was accomplished by the section:

10

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1. Partially completed five area studies covering approximately 4,395 square kilometers. Work on the areas is continuing.

2. Interpreted numerous missions covering the NVA road network and border area, and provided current information on these areas to the G2, DASC Alpha and the 64th Engineer Detachment (T).

3. Maintained updated master plates covering the II Corps Tactical Zone in support of the 64th Engineer Detachment (T).


5. Major a.i. Bowling, Chief II Section, 55th MI Detachment (Corps), attended the Senior Intelligence Officers Conference conducted at MACV Compound at II Corps HQ, Pleiku, 15 Oct 69.

(f) Company C (Ranger), 75th Infantry. Throughout the reporting period Company C (Ranger), 75th Infantry has remained under the operational control of Task Force South. The company deployed 163 teams into 11 operational areas in Binh Thuan and Binh Tuy Provinces which resulted in 115 separate enemy sightings and 177 enemy killed (EC). Through enemy contacts, the order of battle for the 840th Main Force battalion has been updated and information has been gained on elements of the headquarters of Military Region 6.

(g) The 64th Engineer Detachment. During the quarter the detachment accomplished the following tasks:

1. Completed overprinting and distribution of seventy-two 1:50,000 scale map sheets with tactical data information. The entire T20 series of II CTZ has been updated.

2. Continued to produce special terrain studies as requested by various agencies in anticipation of future tactical operations.

3. Completed the bilingual Dalat Military Academy Study that was initiated last quarter.

4. Revised, printed, and made distribution of the second edition of the most popular II CTZ Briefing map which was initially introduced last quarter.

5. Initiated work on a corps wide geological study which will be overprinted on the 1:100,000 scale map series. The project is presently 30% complete and publication and distribution is planned for January 1970.
ASSISTED AG in producing the I FFORCEW Staff Directory.

A total of 67 product production requests were processed by detachment personnel during this reporting period. These products include Tactical Data Overprints, Line of Communication Study, Infiltration Route Study, and the II CTZ Briefing Map.

Detachment 31, 5th Weather Squadron - During this period the following types of weather support were furnished to agencies and units in II CTZ:

1. I FFORCW: Forecasting, Staff Support, Climatological Support and Mobile Observation Teams.
2. 4th Infantry Division: Forecasting, Staff Support, Observing and Climatological Support.
3. AN Khe: Observations and forecasts as required.
4. DALAT (CAG LY Airfield): Observations and Forecasts as required.
5. English AI: Observations and Forecasts.
6. PHAN THIET AI: Observations and Forecasts.
7. Task Force South: Forecasting and Climatological support.

Deviations from current Intelligence Doctrine: None.

Recommendations of New Techniques and Changes in Doctrine and/or Organization: None.

Comments and Explanation of Significant Changes in Variance with the Previous Report: None.

Weather:

(a) General - Seasonal light to moderate southwest monsoonal flow prevailed over II Corps through mid-September. A ridge of high pressure was located over II CTZ from 14-31 August and better than seasonal weather prevailed during this time. The monsoonal trough fluctuated over the CTZ from mid-September to early October, during the transition period from the southwest to northeast monsoonal flow, giving light and variable gradient level flow with extensive cloudiness and precipitation. The northeast monsoon officially set in on 10 October, however, winds were variable until the 19th of October, light easterly between the 19th and 26th and northeasterly after the 26th.
Coastal — Generally fair to partly cloudy skies prevailed over the coast between 1 Aug and 15 Sep. During this time thunderstorms and rainshowers formed over the mountains during the day and moved over the coast during the late afternoon and evening. Occasional surges in the southwest flow brought partly cloudy to cloudy skies with an increase in shower activity. Between 15 Sep and 10 Oct the monsoonal trough fluctuated over the CTZ and gave periods of cloudy skies with moderate to heavy afternoon and evening rainshowers. During this time light rain frequently lasted until the early morning. During Sep all stations north of NHA TRANG more than doubled their normal monthly rainfall amounts.

Interior — Skies were generally cloudy to partly cloudy with scattered afternoon and evening thunderstorms and rainshowers. Extensive low stratus, fog, and rain or drizzle usually formed along the western slopes and in the highlands between 2100H and 0000H and persisted until 1000H. From 14 Aug to 1 Sep and after 15 Oct improved weather conditions prevailed over the interior. Sky conditions during this time were partly cloudy to fair with a few afternoon and evening thunderstorms and rainshowers. Low stratus and fog were patchy during this period between 0400H and 1000H. The heaviest rainfall fell along the southern slopes of the northern highlands with PLEIKU reporting 23.67 inches in Aug, 22.25 inches in Sep, and the Oasis and Camp MAIKI reporting over 21 inches in Sep and over 23 inches in Oct.

Effects on operations. There were 363 TAC sorties cancelled due to weather and 783 reconnaissance sorties cancelled due to weather during the period. No other effects are known.

b. Operations and Training Activities.

(1) Plans: During the reporting period, two OPLANs, two studies, and one quarterly summary were published. In addition, the 2d and 3d Quarterly Reviews were held.

(a) Plans:

1. OPLAN 183-69, concerned with redeployment planning, was published on 2 Sep 69. Further discussion of the OPLAN is precluded by the classification of this report.

2. OPLAN 1-69 (General War Plan (U)) was published on 13 Sep 69. Further discussion of the OPLAN is precluded by the classification of this report.

(b) Studies:

1. The Facilities Utilizations Study, concerned with US facilities requirements in the PLEIKU area, was completed on 1 Aug 69. The study
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includes a discussion of combat support and combat service support facilities required in the PLKIU Area.

2 A study concerning artillery support for ARVN in the PLKIU/KONTUM area was completed on 16 Aug 69. Further discussion of this study is precluded by the classification of this report.

(c) Quarterly Summary: The third Quarterly Summary Report of the status of implementation of the II CTZ Combined Campaign Plan was submitted to MACV on 12 Oct 69.

(d) Quarterly Review:

1 The 2d Combined Quarterly Review was held at I FFQKCAV on 12 Aug 69. The conference reviewed the status of implementation of AM 144 in II CTZ, and was presented to Chairman, JGS, COMUSMACV, CG, ROKFV, and CG, USARV.

2 The 3d Combined Quarterly Review was held at ROKFV Field Command Headquarters on 28 Oct 69. Major areas of interest reviewed included HQK, ARVN and US operations, intelligence, and the status of pacification. Attendees included DEPCOMUSMACV, Chairman, JGS, DEPCOMUSMACV for COMUS, DCG, USARV, and CG, ROKFV.

(2) Summary of Ground Operations:

(a) Major Operations: (See Incl 2) During the reporting period, the Arvnization of Kontum Province continued with the redeployment of the 2d Bde 4th Inf Div to Binh Dinh Province. 24 STZ will assume responsibility for the southern portions of Kontum Province on 1 November 1969. Provisions remain in effect to provide US combat support as required. The intensified pacification campaign, began 15 April, continued to receive increased emphasis in Binh Dinh Province and portions of Pleiku and Binh Thuan Province. Main objectives remained as security of the population, elimination of the VCI/guerrilla force and destruction of main force elements that attempt to disrupt the campaign. Operations against enemy base areas increased during the reporting period. These attacks were designed to disrupt enemy staging areas and preempt his ability to conduct harassing attacks against pacification operations.

1 US Operations:

a Elements of the 1st Bde 4th Inf Div conducted search and clear operation GAFKFL BLUE North of An Khe from 5 to 25 August against elements of the 18th NVA Regiment in response to increased activity noted in that area.
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B-52 Air Strikes and ground follow up resulted in 100 enemy killed with only 4 friendly killed and 13 wounded. 1st Bde 4th Inf Div terminated pacification support operation WAYNE JAVELIN in western Binh Dinh Province as scheduled on 18 October. This operation began 15 April and was designed to support the intensified pacification program. It transferred responsibility of the large western portions of Binh Dinh Province from the 173d Abn Bde to the 4th Inf Div. Final results were 21 friendly forces killed, 139 wounded with 554 enemy killed and 38 small arms and 5 crew served weapons captured. The 1st Bde continued operations in Binh Dinh province throughout the reporting period with the 1st Bn 8th Inf conducting search and clear operation WAYNE BOULDER from 11 September to 11 October against increased enemy activity of the GIA LAI Provincial Unit in Western Binh Dinh Province. Final results were 3 friendly killed and 15 wounded, with 93 enemy killed.

b In preparation for deployment to Binh Dinh Province, 2d Bde 4th Inf Div terminated search and clear operation PUTNAM TIGER in northern Pleiku and southern Kontum Province on 27 September. This operation began on 22 April targeted against elements of the 24 NVA Regiment. Results were 81 friendly killed and 245 wounded with 563 enemy killed with 10 prisoners, 47 small arms and 11 crew served weapons captured. In its new area of operation the 2d Bde 4th Inf conducted search and clear operation PUTNAM COUGAR from 21 September to 27 October against elements of the 18th NVA Regiment in the western portions of Base area 226. This operation was closely coordinated with the CAP 101 Inf Div operation in eastern Base Area 226. Results were 4 friendly KIA, 15 wounded and 94 enemy killed, 103 small arms, 11 crew served weapons, 3 tons of rice, 48,700 rounds of small arms ammunition and 838 mortar rounds captured.

c On 4 August 3d Bde 4th Inf Div terminated search and clear operation GREENS ORANGE III. This operation was begun south of Pleiku City on 5 May against elements of the 24th NVA Regiment. Results were 83 enemy killed, 21 small arms and 1 crew served weapon captured with only 3 friendly wounded. The 3d Bde has continued search and clear operations and pacification support operations in the southern districts of Pleiku Province throughout the reporting period.

d The 173d Abn Bde has continued operation WASHINGTON GAZELLE which began on 15 April in support of the intensified pacification program in the northern four districts of Binh Dinh Province. The four battalions have conducted coordinated operations with ARVN and RF/PP
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Forces working very closely with district headquarters to advance the pacification goals as outlined in the 1969 Combined Campaign Plan. Results of this operation as of 31 October were 67 friendly killed, 725 wounded with 638 enemy killed, 54 prisoners and 152 small arms captured.

TF South conducted numerous small unit operations in support of pacification. The three battalions concentrated operations along Highway 1 and the populated areas in Binh Thuan Province. For the three month period TF South accounted for 305 enemy killed and 88 small arms captured with 17 friendly killed and 127 wounded.

1 ROK Operations:

a August proved to be ROK forces best month with a total count of 870 enemy killed and a kill ratio of 29 to 1. Twelve operations of battalion size or larger were conducted, all with good results. DONG BO 27/8 was conducted by the 2d Battalion 30th ROK Regiment from 31 July to 7 August northwest of Phan Rang against the HT 225 Local Force Company. Results were 106 enemy killed with 45 small arms and 3 crew served weapons captured without any friendly losses. BUN KAB 7 was conducted by the Cavalry ROK Regiment, 1st Battalion, 1st ROK Regiment and 1st Battalion, 26th ROK Regiment from 12 to 23 August against elements of the 18th NVA Regiment, east of An Khe. Results were 8 friendly killed and 9 wounded with 111 enemy killed, 88 small arms and 4 crew served weapons captured. DONG BO 1-14 was conducted by the 1st Battalion, 30th ROK Regiment from 16 August - 24 August northeast of Phan Rang against local enemy force. Results were 81 enemy killed with 40 small arms and 1 crew served weapon captured without friendly loss.

b Operations in September continued on a lesser scale. 3d Battalion, 30th ROK Regiment conducted operation DONG BO 3-12 from 30 August to 4 September northeast of Nha Trang against the Dien Khanh C-2 Company. Results were 29 enemy killed and 19 small arms captured without friendly loss. DO KAE 89/14 was begun on 18 September by the 28th ROK Regiment west of Tuy Hoa in Base Area 236. Final results were 6 friendly killed and 12 wounded with 167 enemy killed and 92 small arms and 5 crew served weapons captured.

c The CAP ROK Inf Div deployed 28 companies in a search and clear operation CHANH KOOH KY WION from 2 to 19 October against elements of the 18th NVA Regiment and the Binh Dinh Revolutionary Party Committee in the eastern portions of Base Area 226 north of Binh Khe in Binh Dinh Province. A large number of guarded caches were found in cave yielding large amounts of enemy arms and equipment. Results were 14 friendly killed and...
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31 wounded with 116 enemy killed, 24 prisoners, 140 small arms, 59 crew served weapons, 19 radios, 8 telephones, 2 switchboards, 416,400 rounds of small arm ammunition, 24,600 rounds of .50 caliber ammunition, 19 tons of rice and numerous other items.

The series of operations conducted by the ARVN Forces support the overall pacification program. The search and clear operations were designed to seize the initiative and keep the enemy forces constantly off balance. The success of these tactics were attested to by the low number of enemy attacks against ARVN defended areas.

ARVN Operations: ARVN Operations have been mostly aimed at pacification gains with short term search and clear, reconnaissance in force and road security missions on the edges of populated areas. 22d Division conducted search and clear and pacification support operation DAN THANG 69 throughout the reporting period. The 44th and 41st ARVN Regiment conducted this operation in the northern four districts of Binh Dinh Province as part of the intensified pacification program against local infrastructure. 223 District Force Company and elements of the 14th NVA Regiment. This operation which began on 15 April and continues into the next reporting period has accounted for 146 enemy killed, 288 prisoners, 126 small arms and 4 crew served weapons captured with 135 friendly killed and 639 wounded. 22d Phu, 47-10, the pacification operation in the Tuy Hoa area, run by elements of the 44th ARVN Regiment on a rotating basis through the quarter concluded on 25 September. Friendly casualties were 28 killed and 116 wounded while the enemy lost 71 killed, 27 small arms and 3 crew served weapons. 23d Division and 24th Special Tactical Zone units localized battalion sized pacification operations and search and clear operations. These short term operations have a collective stabilizing effect on the security of the populace even though no single operation had significant results.

Highland Provinces (August).

US Operations: On 28Jul47H Aug in Ban Me Thout City at AQ050455 the 155 Assault Helicopter Company received 27 rounds of 82mm mortar. Results: Frd - 11 WIA, 5 helicopters and 10 trucks damaged. On 12Jul30H Aug 44 km east of Pleiku at 1*224497, 4th Division UP Team engaged an unknown size enemy force. Results: Frd - 2 OTA, 1 KIA, 1 WIA.

ARVN Operations: On 28Jul30H Aug at AQ782034 in Ban Me Thout City, 853d ARVN Ordnance Company compound received 3 107mm rounds. Results: Frd - 2 KIA (ARVN), 8 WIA (5 ARVN and 3 Civilians).
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3 RF/PF Operations: On 290100H Aug 14 km WSW of Ban Me Thuot City at ZU176864, the 10th PF Platoon at Buon Baor Hamlet received 20 rounds of 82mm mortar. Results: Frd - 8 KIA, 12 WIA.

4 CIDG Operations: On 011415H Aug 22 km SSW of Dac To at Y892105, NSP Recon Company discovered the bodies of sixteen buried CIDG, previously carried as missing. On 9 Aug, 20 km south of Plateau Gi at H8075981, CSF elements engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in ten enemy killed. On 121345H Aug at AS950515 10 km NW of Hang Buk (1 Corps TAOR), Hanh Buk CSF Co engaged an estimated enemy platoon. Results: Frd - 7 KIA (2 CIDG, 1 PF, 4 Civilians), 11 WIA (1 CIDG, 10 Civilians); an - 18 KIA, 3 SA.

5 Other Operations: On 120230H Aug 8 km south of Ban Me Thuot City at AP849957, Trong Son Team 16 securing a hamlet was engaged by an unknown size enemy force using small arms and B40 rocket fire. Results: Frd - 1 KIA, 9 WIA. On 210230H Aug at AR823197 15 km south of Pleiku City approximately twenty enemy cut the perimeter wire and entered Pei breng Hamlet and abducted 21 civilians and took fourteen small arms.

(c) Binh Dinh Province (August).

1 US Operations: On 021440H Aug 12 km NW of Vinh Thanh at H8495676, A Troop, 7th Sqd, 17th Cav observed and engaged a company size enemy force with artillery and tactical air strikes resulting in 83 enemy killed. On 041745H Aug 35 km north of An Khe at H850787, A Troop, 7th Sqd, 17th Cav engaged an unknown number of enemy with gunships and tactical air strikes resulting in 24 enemy killed. Between 061220H and 061510H Aug 35 km NW of An Khe at H855682, elements of A Troop, 7th Sqd, 17th Cav received small arms fire from enemy ground elements. Gunships returned fire and killed 11 enemy. Units also found 10 enemy bodies killed by Tac Air in the same area. Between 071110H and 071525H Aug 40 km NW of An Khe vicinity H854830 in two contacts with the enemy, A Troop, 7th Sqd, 17th Cav with tactical air support killed 31 enemy. On 081855H 32 km NW of An Khe at H855935, C Co, 3d BN 8th Inf engaged an estimated NVA platoon. Results: Frd - 2 KIA; En - 1 KIA, 2 SA captured. At 111310H Aug 22 km SW of Bong Son at H8655836, Team 12, Co C, 75th Infantry ( Ranger) ambushed an unknown number of enemy. Results: Frd - neg, En - 10 KIA, 2 FW, 1 SA captured. On 121425H Aug 18 km NW of Tam Quan at B3738224, C Troop, 7th Sqd, 17th Cav engaged 15 enemy in bunkers resulting in eight enemy killed. Between 121220H and 121320H Aug 15 km NW of Hammond Air Field vicinity H762616, elements of B Troop, 7th Sqd, 17th Cav engaged three unknown size enemy forces resulting in twelve enemy killed. On 171420H Aug at B37622 26km NW of Bong Son, C Troop, 7th Sqd, 17th Cav killed eleven enemy with
gunships and tactical air strikes. On 27/10/69 Aug at BR920750 5 km NNW of Phu My, 1st Pl (Abn) 503d Inf received 7 rounds of 82mm mortar resulting in twelve friendly wounded. On 30/11/69 Aug at BR262310 25 km SW of An Khe, gunships of A Troop, 7th Sqd, 17th Cav engaged and killed 6 enemy.

2 ROK Operations: On 01/610H Aug 22 km SW of Qui Nhon at BR951058, a GRID SF TM ambushed an enemy squad. Results: Frd - neg; En - 6 KIA, 4 SA captured. On 02/110H Aug 28 km SW of Qui Nhon at BR16025, 10th Co Cav ROK Regt engaged an enemy force resulting in seven enemy killed and two small arms captured. On 05/110H Aug 14 km SW of Phu My at BR860367 the 11th Co, 1st ROK Regt ambushed an estimated enemy platoon resulting in thirteen enemy killed and eight small arms captured. On 06/110H Aug 27 km East of An Khe at BR746436, the 7th Co, Cav ROK Regt ambushed an unknown size enemy force. Results: Frd - neg; En - 6 KIA, 4 SA captured. On 10/125H Aug 20 km East of An Khe at BR657425, 3rd Co Cav ROK Regt engaged an enemy force during an ambush resulting in ten enemy killed, three small arms and one crew served weapon captured. At 11/110H Aug 18 km East of An Khe at BR644449 a convoy from Qui Nhon Support Command was ambushed by an estimated enemy company with small arms, B40 rockets and mortar fire from both sides of QL-19. 2d and 3d Co Cav ROK Regt reacted with gunship support. Results: Frd - 1 KIA (US), 4 WIA, 3 KIA, 1 FM, 8 SA, 2 CS. At 11/130H Aug 10 km SW of Phu My at BR820595, 11th Co 1st ROK Regt engaged an enemy force resulting in fifteen enemy killed and three small arms captured. On 15/09/69 Aug 6 km NE of Binh Khe, 2d bn ROK Cav Regt killed fourteen enemy and captured ten small arms with one friendly killed. On 23/10/69 Aug vicinity CR087278 6 km NW Qui Nhon, elements of 2d Bn, 1st ROK Regt engaged an unknown number of enemy. Results: Frd - 7 KIA, 8 WIA; En - 36 KIA, 1 FM, 14 SA, 1 radio CIA. On 28/05/69 Aug at BR770558 18 km SW of Phu Cat, Grid SF TM killed 9 enemy.

3 ARVN Operations: On 10/75H Aug 8 km NW of Bong Son at BS925016, the 2d Co, 1st Bn 40th Regt engaged an enemy force in a cave. Results: Frd - neg; En - 16 KIA, 13 PW, 3 SA. Between 12/020 and 12/100H Aug 6 km NW of LZ English at BS930044, 3d Co, 2d Bn, 40th Regt in three contacts engaged and killed seven enemy with two friendly wounded. On 12/030H Aug 11 km NNW of Bong Son at BS843036, 3d Co, 1st Bn 40th Regt and RD TM 65 defending Ca Cong Hamlet were attacked by an unknown number of enemy resulting in twelve friendly wounded. On 23/1525H Aug at BS923025 4 km SW of Phu My 1st Co 4th Bn, 41st Regt engaged an estimated enemy company. Results: Frd - neg; En - 9 KIA, 2 PW, 5 SA.
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1 RF/PF Operations: On 030900H Aug 9 km N of Lo English at BR936754, 298 RF Co engaged an estimated VC platoon. Results: Frd - 1 WIA; Kn - 7 KIA. On 120900H Aug 11 km N of Vinh Thanh at BR653617, 119 PF Platoon and 989 RF Co engaged an estimated enemy company. 991 RF Co reacted. Results: Frd - 2 WIA; Kn - 12 KIA. On 120200H Aug 7 km N of Bong Son at BR937997, 22 PF Platoon and 29 RF Co engaged an estimated enemy company. Results: Frd - 2 WIA; En - 12 KIA. On 120300H Aug 13 km S of Bong Son at BR228286, the 983 RF Co engaged an unknown number of VC Co. Results: 982 RF Co reacted. Results: Frd - 4 KIA, 9 WIA.

2 OTHER Operations: At 110040H Aug in Bong Son at BR866953, the district dispensary received an unknown number of M79 rounds resulting in one RF killed and ten civilians wounded. On 123450H Aug An Nhon City at BR963957 received 10-15 rounds of 60mm mortar fire resulting in one civilian killed and ten wounded. On 172000H Aug at CR088235, an unknown type device was exploded in Qui Nhon City in a restaurant. Results: Frd - 14 WIA (6 civilians, 5 ARVN, 1 VNAF, 2 NP). On 190100H Aug at BR963957, An Nhon City received 15-20 rounds of mortar fire resulting in two civilians killed and fourteen wounded. On 201210H Aug at CR035255, 6 km west of Qui Nhon, a civilian convoy of ROK contractors was ambushed by gun trucks from 196th and 264th Trans Co's (US) was ambushed by an enemy force. 93d MP Co reacted. Results: Frd - 1 KIA (US), 13 WIA (2 US, 11 civilians). In I Corps TAOR on 221300H Aug at BR882985, the 6th Convalescent Center and 22d Replacement Station received a sapper attack from an unknown number of enemy. Results: Frd - 1 WIA, 2 WIA; Kn - 5 KIA, 2 PW, 2 SA, 1 CS. On 262030H Aug at BR882985, 15 km SE of Phu My, four hand grenades were dropped in a town meeting. Results: 26 civilians killed and 100 wounded. Four boys were captured who admitted throwing the grenades.

(d) Coastal Provinces (August).

1 US Operations: On 070240H Aug in Nha Trang City vicinity of CP09590, the 86th Engineer Co and 459 Signal Co received 9 rounds of 82mm mortar. Results: Frd - 1 KIA, 14 WIA. On 070120H Aug in Cam Ranh Bay at CP06517, the 6th Convalescent Center and 22d Replacement Station received a sapper attack from an unknown number of enemy. All damage and casualties were caused by satchel charges. Results: Frd - 1 KIA, 9 WIA.
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CP050317, 6th Convalescent Center in Cam Ranh received 82mm rounds resulting in 21 friendly wounded.

2 ROK Operations: On 02121OH Aug 25 km NW of Ninh Hoa at BQ920049, 6th Co 29th ROK Regt engaged and killed six enemy and captured two small arms. Between 050900H and 052325H Aug 20 km SSE of Tuy Hoa vic Q286279, the 7th Co 28th ROK Regt engaged 3 enemy forces. Results were six enemy killed and three small arms captured. On 101140H Aug 8 km SSE of Dong Khoi at BQ999702, 10th Co, 26th Regt engaged and killed 6 enemy. On 162350H Aug at CP023432S 15 km SSE of Tuy Hoa, 1st Co. 28th ROK Regt engaged an estimated VC squad killing 6 enemy and capturing 2 small arms. On 26121OH Aug at BP722797 40 km NW of Nha Trang, 11th Co 29th ROK killed 11 enemy and captured 6 small arms. On 280930H Aug at BQ732275 15 km SW of Son Hoa, 12th Co 28th ROK Regt killed 7 enemy and captured 2 small arms. On 281500H Aug at CP096740 12 km SSE of Minh Hoa, 9th ROK Div LRRP Tm made contact with an unknown size enemy force. Results: Frd - neg; En - 7 KIA, 1 SA. On 301625H Aug 9th Co 30th Regt (ROK) reported 11 enemy killed and 7 small arms captured.

2 ARVN Operations: On 021520H Aug 12 km WNW of Tuy Hoa at QQ059522, 1st Co 1st BN, 47th Regt received an unknown number of 57mm RR rds, 10 rounds 60mm mortar, and 10 rounds 82mm mortar. Artillery and gunships supported the contact. Results were 11 friendly wounded. On 040915H Aug 15 km WSW of Tuy Hoa at QQ057394 a Medical Team from 3d BN, 47th Regt enroute to Cam Thack Hamlet detonated a mine on QL-7B. Results: Frd - 6 KIA, 1 WIA. On 130300H Aug 9 km SW of Tuy Hoa at QQ074323, the Recon Plat, 47th Regt was engaged by an estimated VC platoon. Results: Frd - 1 KIA, 6 WIA; En - 10 KIA, 5 SA. On 210315H Aug at QQ057437 9 km WSW of Tuy Hoa, 1st Co 4th BN, 47th Regt was attacked by estimated VC Company using B40 and small arms. Results: Frd - 2 KIA, 9 WIA.

4 RF/PF Operations: On 011230H Aug 12 km SE of Dong Khoi at QQ073737, 286 RF Co detonated two booby traps resulting in thirteen friendly wounded. On 120030H Aug 8 km SW of Dong Khoi at BQ907703, the 2-51 RF GP Headquarters received 10 rounds of 82mm mortar and a ground probe. Artillery and mortar supported. Results: Frd - 2 WIA; En - 9 KIA, 1 PW, 6 SA, 1 GS. On 110815H Aug 8 km west of Tuy Hoa at QQ15465, 204 RF Co received small arms fire. 1/4 RF Co reacted and both units in a sweep of the area found an enemy base area. TAC AIR and gunships supported. Results: Frd - 3 KIA, 1 WIA; En - 8 KIA, 3 SA. On 150610H Aug at QQ103493 8 km NNW of Tuy Hoa, 219 RF Co was engaged by an unknown number of enemy resulting in 9 friendly killed and 9 wounded. On 200030H Aug at QQ044739 9 km NNW of 21

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Tuy An. 709 RF Co was attacked by estimated enemy company. Results: Frd - 6 KIA, 12 WIA, 2 MIA, 6 SA and 1 radio lost. On 211130H Aug CQL4079A 17 km SW of Tuy Haa, elements of 136 RF Co in a 5 ton truck hit pressure mine on Hwy 7B. Results: Frd - 6 KIA, 1 WIA.

5 OTHER Operations: On 250955H Aug 9 km NW of Dong Xuan at B097867, a lambretta detonated a mine on Hwy 6B. Results: Frd - 8 KIA (7 civilians, 1 ROK passenger), 2 WIA (civilians).

(a) Southern Provinces (August).

US Operations: On 011229H Aug 12 km NNM of Song Mao at BN365544, Tm 25, C Co, 75th Infantry (Ranger) engaged an unknown size enemy force. D Troop, 2d Sqd, 1st Cav reacted and gunships supported. Results: Frd - 2 KIA (US), 8 WIA (6 US, 2 ARVN); En - 24 KIA. On 130730H Aug 7 km north of Phan Thiet, 3d Platoon, B Co, 3d "n 503d Abn Inf received small arms and B40 rocket fire. Results: Frd - 1 KIA, 13 WIA. On 141110H Aug 33 km NW of Phan Thiet at B020360, C Troop 2d Sqd, 1st Cav., 877 RF Co and MAT Tm 25 behind a stalled civilian bus received mortar, B40 rocket and small arms fire. Results: Frd - 7 KIA (1 US, 6 RF), 18 WIA (11 US, 2 RF, 2 Civilian); En - 12 KIA. On 301352H Aug at AM879490 40 km North of Phan Thiet, Tm 31, C Co, 7th Infantry (Ranger) engaged an estimated twenty enemy resulting in seven enemy killed and four small arms captured.

ROK Operations: On 010945H Aug 29 km NNM of Phan Bang at BP730774, 6th Co, 30th ROK Regt engaged an enemy force resulting in thirteen enemy killed and five small arms captured. On 011608H Aug 14 km NNM of Phan Bang at BP743052, 11th Co, 30th ROK Regt engaged and killed fifteen VC and captured seven small arms. On 021640H Aug at Phan Bang Airbase, 2d En, 30th ROK Regt had two contacts with an unknown size enemy force. Results: Frd - neg; En - 10 KIA, 5 SA. On 031055H Aug 29 km NNM of Phan Bang at BP7106, 6th Co, 30th ROK Regt had two contacts with an unknown size enemy force resulting in twenty-two enemy killed with eleven small arms and one crew served weapon captured. On 031010H Aug 31 km NNM of Phan Bang at BP7107, 6th Co, 30th ROK Regt had two contacts with an unknown size enemy force. Results: Frd - neg; En - 21 KIA, 8 SA, 1 GS. On 051010H Aug 23 km NNM of Phan Bang at BP75015, the 5th Tc, 30th ROK Regt engaged and killed eight enemy in a cave and found three bodies. On 180940H Aug at BN930850 13 km NE of Phan Bang, 1st Co 30th ROK Regt killed nineteen enemy and captured ten small arms. On 191605H Aug at BN9593 27 km NNM of Phan Bang 2d Co, 30th ROK Regt had two contacts resulting in nineteen enemy killed with five small arms and one crew served weapon captured. On 201135H Aug at BP912817 18 km NE of Phan Bang Results: Frd - 6 KIA, 1 WIA.
1 ARVN Operations: On 191330 Aug at BH857925 15 km north of Phan Rang, a civilian truck with the 52d ARVN Security Platoon hit a pressure type mine resulting in one ARVN killed, ten wounded (nine ARVN, one civilian) and two train cars damaged and one destroyed.

2 RF/PF Operations: On 120100H Aug, 20 km south of Dalat at BN313995, the 305 RF Co received an unknown number of 840 rockets, 60 and 82mm mortar rounds followed by a ground attack from an estimated enemy company. Results: Frd - 9 KIA, 16 WIA. On 291810H Aug at YT913627 20 km SW of Bao Loc, 34 RF Co received one B40 rocket resulting in three friendly killed and five wounded.

3 OTHER Operations: On 200830H Aug at AN925255 19 km NNE of Phan Thiet, a civilian bus on Highway 1 detonated a mine resulting in ten civilians killed and twenty-two wounded.

(f) Highland Provinces (September).

1 US Operations: On 031340H Sep at ZA072537 20 km west of Pleiku, A Troop, 1st Sqd, 10th Cav observed 8-10 bunkers and an undetermined number of enemy. A Co, 1st En, 22d Inf reacted and swept the area. Results: Frd - 2 WIA; En - 6 KIA, 2 SA. On 040925H Sep at BR125223 40 km SE of Pleiku, A Troop, 7th Sqd, 17th Cav helicopter observed and expended on one individual in a bunker area. After initial contact gunships again expended in the area resulting in 9 enemy killed and 2 suspects detained. On 041042H Sep at ZA194667 22 km NNW of Pleiku, a 20th Engineer Battalion convoy on QL14 and elements of 2d En, 8th Inf at LZ Joyce were engaged by estimated enemy squad employing small arms and B40 rocket fire. Elements of A Co, 2d En, 8th Inf conducted sweep. Results: Frd - 4 WIA; En - 6 KIA. On 051155H Sep at BR107239 37 km east of Pleiku, A Troop, 7th Sqd, 17th Cav helicopter observed and engaged 8 NVA near a hut complex. Six enemy were killed and 4 small arms were captured. On 181745H Sep at AR995196 32 km SW of Pleiku A Co, 1st En, 14th Inf observed 8-10 enemy approaching FSB Melody and engaged with small arms fire. Results: Frd - neg; En - 7 KIA, 1 SA. On 290915H Sep at YA662653 43 km SSW of Kontum while engaged in a combined S&C Operation, an element of B Company 2d En, 35th Inf
was engaged by an estimated enemy company in bunkers and prepared firing positions. Enemy employed small arms and 82mm mortar fire. B Co 2d Bn 25th Inf joined in the action and a Plei Djereng CSF Company which had been sweeping on a different axis was alerted and requested to reinforce. Results: Frd - 2 KIA, 8 WIA, En - 25 KIA.

2 ARVN Operations: On 040200H Sep at AQ826185 16 km north of Ban Me Thuot, 1st Battalion 53d Inf was attacked by an estimated enemy company using 82mm mortar and small arms. Results: Frd - 11 KIA, 14 WIA, En - 5 KIA, 2 SA. On 211215H Sep at YU844560 20 km south of Duc Lap 45th ARVN Rcn Co 2½ ton vehicle hit a command detonated mine resulting in 1 ARVN killed, 14 ARVN wounded, and the vehicle destroyed. On 231755H Sep at BQ305175 55 km NE of Lac Thien, all Scout Co on Highway 2l was engaged by 3 enemy. Results: Frd - 3 KIA, 9 WIA. On 250855H Sep at AP805931 10 km south of Ban Me Thuot 1st Co 4th Bn 45th Infantry was engaged by estimated enemy platoon. Results: Frd - 5 KIA, 3 WIA, 1 MIA; En - 6 KIA. On 250255H Sep at ZB158088 20 km NW of Kontum, elements of 3d Troop, 3d ACAV and 105 RF Company received 3 combined mortar and ground attacks between 0255 and 0405H from an estimated enemy company. Results: Frd - 1 KIA (civilian); 19 WIA (12 ARVN, 5 RF, 2 civilian), 1 APC destroyed; En - 6 KIA, 4 CS.

CIDG Operations: On 191125H Sep at YB840222 4 km SW of Ban Hat, Duc Co CSF found 11 MSP bodies and 12 NVA bodies results of DAK TO/BHN Hêt Campaign in June. On 260800H Sep at YB895732 22 km NW of Dak Sut a platoon sized element from Dak Pek CIDG Camp engaged an estimated enemy company resulting in 5 enemy killed and 2 small arms captured. On 271000H Sep at YB895731 15 km NW of Dak Pek, a Dak Pek CSF Platoon was engaged by an estimated reinforced enemy company. Another Dak Pek CSF company reacted and linked up with the platoon. Results: Frd - neg; En - 10 KIA.

OTHER Operations: On 050105H Sep at XU94218 4 km south of Gia Nghia, Khiam D, Khiam Binh, & Nghia Duc Hamlets received small arms fire and 2 or 3 rounds of unknown type mortar resulting in 1 Civilian killed and 18 wounded (15 Civilians and 3 PSDF). On 050105H Sep at YV952249 4 km south of Gia Nghia, MACV Compound received 7 rounds of 82mm mortar, 1st Co 2d Bn, 45th Inf swept area with negative contact. Results: Frd - 2 KIA, 12 WIA (10 civilians and 2 PSDF; 1 THUNG SON), En - 2 SA.

US Operations: On 060905H Sep at BR321778 37 km NW of An Khe
A Troop 7th Sqd 17th Cav helicopter received small arms fire and expended on an enemy force resulting in 10 enemy killed. On 0615Z Sep at BR365815 40 km NW of An Khe, A Troop 7th Sqd 17th Cav supported 2 contacts resulting in 18 enemy killed. On 070930H and 071035H Sep at BR3581 40 km NW of An Khe, A Troop, 7th Sqd, 17th Cav gunships had 2 contacts resulting in 6 enemy killed. On 0718Z0H Sep at BS843211 24 km north of Bong Son Team G. N Co, 75th Infantry (Ranger) engaged 40 NVA/VG 200 meters to the east of their position. Results: Frd - 1 KIA, 2 WIA, 25 KIA, 1 SA.

On 081520H Sep at ER26071C 36 km NW of An Khe A Troop, 7th Sqd, 17th Cav supported 2 contacts resulting in 18 enemy killed. On 071630H Sep at BS843211 24 km north of Bong Son Team G. N Co, 75th Infantry (Ranger) engaged 40 NVA/VG 200 meters to the east of their position. Results: Frd - 1 KIA, 2 WIA, 25 KIA, 1 SA.

On 091010H Sep at BR26071C 36 km NW of An Khe A Troop, 7th Sqd, 17th Cav helicopter observed an estimated enemy company armed with AK47's. Escorting gunships expended. D Co 1st Bn, 8th Inf inserted at 1135. Results: Frd - neg, 25 KIA, 1 SA.

On 091930H Sep at BR26071C 36 km NW of An Khe A Troop, 7th Sqd, 17th Cav gunships also engaged and killed 4 additional enemy for total results of 14 enemy killed. On 162005H Sep at BS977245 10 km west of Qui Nhon, 173d Support Battalion guard tower observed 25 enemy vicinity BR974248 and engaged with small arms and automatic weapons resulting in 1 enemy killed. At 2230 camp received 4 B40 rockets and a ground attack by 2 enemy squad with small arms and automatic weapons resulting in 1 friendly wounded (US) and 1 enemy killed. On 181530H Sep at ER889371 26 km NE of An Khe, A Troop, 7th Sqd, 17th Cav observed estimated 110 bunkers and 70 NVA under trees. Gunships engaged resulting in 20 enemy killed. On 201015H Sep at ER685598 20 km NE of An Khe A Troop, 7th Sqd, 17th Cav helicopter received small arms fire. Gunships expended and tactical air strikes supported resulting in 18 enemy killed. On 211025H Sep at ER694616 29 km NE of An Khe, A Troop, 7th Sqd, 17th Cav received 3 contacts and reported 16 enemy killed. On 231223H Sep at ER694616 25 km NE of An Khe, A Troop, 7th Sqd, 17th Cav helicopter observed 15 bunkers. Tactical air strikes resulted in 37 enemy killed. On 242055H Sep at ER902130 17 km north of Bong Son Bridge Security Team from E Co 17th Cav received 1 B40 rocket from 50 meters west. Bridge was slightly damaged and 12 friendly were wounded. (9 US and 3 civilians) On 271610H Sep at ER776606 33 km NE of An Khe ARP from A Troop, 7th Sqd, 17th Cav engaged an enemy platoon with small arms. Gunships on station expended. Results: Frd - neg; 8 KIA, 1 SA.

2 ROK Operations: On 021025H Sep at ER833283 22 km west of Qui Nhon,
the 12th Co Cav Regt reported 6 enemy killed and 4 small arms captured. On 12114H Sep at H285924B 25 km west of Qui Nhon 12th Co Cav ROK Regt reported 6 enemy killed, 4 small arms captured. On 251110H Sep at BQ909995 30 km SW of Qui Nhon 10th Co Cav ROK Regiment engaged enemy force resulting in 6 enemy killed and 2 small arms captured.

3 RF/PF Operations. On 072330U Sep at H8616605 25 km NE of An Khe 991 RF Company received 50 B40 rockets from an estimated enemy company. Results: Frd - 7 KIA, 4 WIA, En - 14 KIA, 3 SA. On 120108H Sep at H8901673 vic Phu My City an estimated two enemy squads entered Phu My from east and threw a hand grenade and set fire to 30 houses. Enemy fled east. Results: Frd - 1 KIA, 15 WIA. (3 RF, 12 Civilians) On 122230H Sep at H8610625 22 km NE of An Khe an estimated platoon of NVA attacked L20 PF Platoon at Dinh Than Hamlet with B40 rockets and automatic weapons fire. 990 RF Company reacted at 2330H. Results: Frd - 1 PF KIA, 10 PF WIA, En - 4 KIA, 1 NW, 2 SA.

1 ROK Operations. On 040210H Sep at C9203331 15 km South of Tuy Hoa 3d Co 28th ROK Regt ambushed 7 enemy. Results: Frd - 2 WIA, En - 7 KIA, 4 SA. On 031800H Sep at B917647 16 km NW of Nha Trang 11th Co 30th ROK Regt located enemy position and called for artillery resulting in 6 enemy killed and 3 small arms captured. On 200800H Sep at BQ858539 12 km NNW of Son Hoa 1st & 3d Co's 28th ROK Regt had two contacts resulting in 10 enemy killed and 4 small arms captured. On 210700H Sep at B9771528, 11 km NE of Son Hoa 7th Co 28th ROK Regt engaged and killed 8 enemy and captured 4 small arms. On 211145H Sep at BQ864523 12 km NE of Son Hoa, 10th Co 28th ROK Regt engaged and killed 7 enemy and captured 3 small arms. On 220930H via B9673032 22 km north of Minh Hoa elements of 29th ROK Regt had 6 contacts resulting in 26 enemy killed, 10 small arms and 1 crew served weapon captured. On 240545H Sep at BQ 874599 20 km NE of Son Hoa 24 Co 28th ROK Regt engaged an enemy force. Results: Frd - neg; En - 8 KIA, 3 SA. On 240820H Sep at B017537 16 km NE of Son Hoa, 7th Co 28th ROK Regt engaged and killed enemy force resulting in 6 enemy killed and 2 small arms captured. On 250800H Sep at B918562, 18 km NE of Son Hoa, 5th Co 28th ROK Regt engaged and killed 8 enemy and captured 3 small arms. On 261115H Sep at BQ993597 16 km south of Dong Xuan, 1st, 9th and 10th Co's
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28th ROK Regt engaged enemy force resulting in 6 enemy killed and 4 small arms and documents captured. On 271610H Sep at BQ987537, 2d Co 28th ROK Regt engaged and killed 8 enemy and captured 3 small arms. On 280814H Sep at CQ003569 18 km WNW of Tuy Hoa 10th Co 28th ROK Regt engaged an unknown size enemy force. Results: Frd - 1 KIA, 1 WIA; En - 11 KIA, 4 SA.

Between 290615H and 291440H Sep vic of CQ00151D 17 km WSW of Tuy Hoa, elements of the 28th ROK Regt engaged an unknown size enemy force in two separate contacts and reported 7 enemy killed and 3 small arms captured. On 291930H at CQ019561 20 km WNW of Tuy Hoa, 6th Co 28th ROK engaged an unknown size enemy force in a cave. Results: Frd - neg; En - 7 KIA, 2 SA.

2 ARVN Operations: On 060001H Sep at CQ104494, 8 km WNW of Tuy Hoa 2d Co, 2d Bn 47th Inf ambushed an estimated enemy squad. Small arms fire was exchanged resulting in 6 enemy killed and 3 small arms captured.

2 RF/PF Operations: On 060030H Sep at BP911214, 9 km NW of Cam Ranh, Nam Gmoi Refugee Hamlet with 169 RF Co and PSDF defending was overrun, looted and terrorized by estimated 200 VC/NVA/Montagnards for 24 hours. Enemy raised VC flag and destroyed generator shack, 4 ML6's and 2 PRO's. Results: Frd - 10 KIA (6 RF, 1 PSDF, 3 civilians), 11 WIA (4 RF, 5 PSDF, 2 civilians); En - 1 KIA. On 140024H Sep at CQ111165 5 km west of Tuy Hoa 587 RF Co was engaged by an estimated enemy company from east and north. Small arms and automatic weapons fire was exchanged. 735 RF Company reacted. Results: Frd - neg; En - 6 KIA, 4 SA. On 150320H Sep at BP967753 4 km South of Ninh Hoa RD Tm 20 and 42 PF Platoon received 10 rounds of 82mm mortar while in ambush position. Results: Frd - 6 KIA, 10 WIA; En - 6 KIA.

4 Other Operations: On 060030H Sep at BP270209, 5 km East of Dalat National Police FF Training Center received 40 rounds of 82mm mortar from the north. Results: Frd - 5 KIA, 26 WIA.

1) Southern Provinces (September).

US Operations: On 111200H Sep at BM345463 5 km east of Song Mao, B Troop 2d Sqd, 1st Cav found 16 graves with enemy bodies. They had died from small arms fire and shrapnel wounds. On 151345H Sep at AM793442, 33 km north of Phan Thiet Tm 23, Co C 75th Infantry (Ranger) observed a company size NVA/VC unit. As reaction landed, enemy fled to the north. Team 23 directed gunships into the enemy positions resulting in 20 enemy killed. Enemy fled back toward team which engaged them with small arms fire resulting in 30 enemy killed. As reaction force was moving toward extraction point they received small arms fire. Fire was returned resulting
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in 8 more enemy killed. Final results were 58 enemy killed. On 17/335H Sep at AN941336, 27 km NW of Phan Thiet, Team 13 C Co 75th Infantry (Ranger) engaged an estimated enemy platoon. Result: Frd - 3 KIA; En - 14 KIA.

2 ARVN Operations: On 151015H Sep at BM420400, 15 km SE of Song Mao, 1st Bn 44th Inf convoy on QL7 was engaged by an estimated enemy company. Elements of 2d Sqd 1st Cav were requested for support at 1015H. Results: Frd - 9 WIA; En - 4 KIA, 1 FW, 1 SA. On 110220H Sep at AN815815, 1 km East of Di Linh 3d Bn, 53d Inf CP, 906 RF Co and an ARVN prison camp were attacked by 12 snipers from the west under supporting small arms, automatic weapons and 60/82mm mortar fires. The enemy destroyed the majority of 53d Regiment Ammunition dump and 4 buildings. Di Linh #2 Hamlet had four hamlet offices completely destroyed. Results: 18 KIA (10 ARVN, 7 ARVN prisoners, 1 RF), 54 WIA (18 ARVN, 23 ARVN prisoners, 8 RF, 5 civilians), 1 MIA, 144 SA destroyed (115, M16, 6 M79, 23 pistols), 3 CS destroyed (2 .50 Machine guns and 1 60mm mortar), 2 PRC-25 destroyed.

2 RF/PF Operations: On 11030H Sep at BM080409 21 km WSW of Song Mao, 287 RF Co and 97 PF platoon received unknown number of mortar and B40 rounds. Small arms fire was also received from estimated 2 VC platoons. B Troop 2d Sqd 1st Cav was requested at 0350 as a reaction force. Results: Frd - 3 KIA (RF), 9 WIA (7 RF and 2 civilians); En - 4 KIA. On 130030H Sep at BM00375 15 km SE of Song Mao 238 RF Co engaged a VC squad resulting in 1 ARVN wounded and 6 enemy killed.

(j) Highland Provinces (October).

1 US Operations: On 121620H Oct at ZA145703 29 km NW of Pleiku, C Co 2d Bn, 8th Inf engaged enemy company. Results: Frd - 1 US KIA, 3 US WIA; En - 6 KIA. On 191150H Oct at ZA097229 31 km NW of Pleiku, a vehicle from C Co, 2d Bn, 8th Inf hit a mine on a trail and immediately received small arms fire and one B-40 rocket. Escorting gunships expended. Results: Frd - 2 KIA, 11 WIA; En - 12 KIA. On 19445H Oct at BM016746 36 km NE of Pleiku, a helicopter from the 4th Div received small arms fire from six enemy. Escorting gunships expended and killed all 6 enemy. On 201015H Oct at ZA088725 32 km NW of Pleiku, C Co 2d Bn, 8th Inf received two B-40 rockets from an enemy squad. The enemy fled to the southeast and were engaged by Plei Krong OSF Co. Results: Frd - neg; En - 6 KIA, 1 FW. On 211705H Oct at ZA109721, 33 km NW of Pleiku, B Co, 2d Bn, 8th Inf while attempting to recover an APC was engaged by an estimated enemy company. The enemy employed small arms fire and B40 rockets. Results: Frd - 1 US KIA, 2 US WIA; En - 24 KIA. On 231200H Oct at ZA106736 32 km NW of
Pleiku, A Co, 2d Bn, 8th Inf found a bunker containing 13 enemy bodies. On 251010H Oct at A101733 32 km NNW of Pleiku, Co A, 2d Bn, 8th Inf was engaged by an enemy platoon employing B-40 rockets and small arms fire. Results: Frd - 1 KIA, 10 WIA; En - 2 KIA. On 291045H Oct at YA944611 38 km WNW of Pleiku, 2d Plt, B Co, 3d Bn, 12th Inf was engaged by an enemy company employing small arms and mortar fire. Results: Frd - 2 KIA; En - 8 KIA. On 300630H Oct at YA935585 37 km NNW of Pleiku, LZ Delta received 40 rounds of mortar. The mess hall and FDC took direct hits resulting in 18 friendly wounded. On 300915H Oct at YA981583 31 km WNW of Pleiku, LRP R-34, K Co, 75th Infantry (Ranger) engaged 25 enemy resulting in 7 enemy killed. On 311400H Oct at YA949622 39 km WNW of Pleiku City, C Co, 3d Bn, 12th Inf was engaged by an estimated enemy platoon, resulting in 2 friendly killed and 13 wounded.

2. ARVN Operations: On 250910H Oct at YB905273 17 km west of Dak To, 2d Troop, 11th ARVN Cav and 11th Ranger Bn on Hwy 512 were engaged by an enemy platoon using small arms and B40 rockets. Results: Frd - 1 KIA, 10 WIA; En - 8 KAI, 5 SA, 3 CS. On 261236H Oct at ZB079262 2 km SE of Dak To, MAT 71, 439 RF Co and 3d Co, 42d Inf on a bomb damage assessment operation received small arms fire from an enemy platoon. Results: Frd - 11 ARVN WIA, 1 ARVN MIA, 1 SA lost. On 230850H Oct at YU804630 17 km SSW of Duc Lap, 3d Co, 2d Bn, 45th Inf was engaged by an enemy company. Captured documents indicate the enemy unit was Co 4/K394 Bn. Results: Frd - 12 KIA, 10 WIA, 9 SA lost; En - 9 KIA, 1 SA, 1 CS. On 302225H Oct at AQ846144 14 km NW of Ban Nai Thost, 1st Bn, 45th Inf CP received B40 rocket, mortar and small arms fire from an enemy platoon. Results: Frd - 2 ARVN KIA, 12 ARVN WIA, 2 SA lost; En - neg.

3. RF/PF Operations: On 262240H Oct at BQ093346 8 km NE of Buon Ho, 1st RF Co engaged enemy company. Results: Frd - neg; En - 7 KIA, 1 CS CIA. On 300130H Oct at YU856782 4 km NW of Duc Lap, 178 RF Co received an unknown number of 82mm mortar rounds. Results: Frd - 6 KIA, 2 WIA, 1 MIA; En - neg.

4. CIDG Operations: On 071725H Oct at YB925684 15 km north of Dak Sut, Dak Fek CIDG Co engaged 3 enemy. The CSF element pursued and was engaged by an estimated company. Results: Frd - 1 KIA (USSF); En - 15 KIA. On 141510H Oct at YB878267 1 km north of Ben Het, Plateau G1 CSF left Ben Het to get water and observed an enemy force. Ben Het camp dispatched a patrol which engaged an enemy platoon. Results: Frd - 4 KIA, 13 WIA; En - neg. On 221206H Oct at ZU45624 20 km SE of Duc Lap, DUC LAP CSF engaged an enemy platoon. Results: Frd - 4 CSF WIA; En - 8 KIA, 400 KG rice destroyed. On 251615H Oct at ZA100733 33 km NW of Pleiku, Plie Mroes CSF Co engaged an enemy company. Results: Frd - neg; En - 22 KIA, 1 PV (WIA), 3 SA, 3 CS, 1 PRC 25 radio CIA. On
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280950H Oct at YU478505, 37 km NW of Kien Duc, CSF Co from Bu Prang received sniper fire. Gunships on station supported immediately. Results: Frd - 1 CSF KIA, 3 CSF WIA; En - 10 KIA.

5 OTHER Operations:

On 302245H Oct at AQ948192, 21 km NE of Ben Me Tho, Trung Son Cadre at Buon Ho Hamlet received small arms and B40 rocket fire. Results: Frd - 12 KIA (9 RD, 3 Civ), 9 WIA (RD), 20 MIA (Civ), 4 SA, 1 CS lost; En - 3 KIA.

(k) Binh Dinh Province (October).

US Operations:

On 050012H Oct at BR260764, 40 km NW of An Khe, the CP of the 1st Bn, 8th Inf at FSB Larry was attacked by a reinforced sapper platoon under supporting small arms and 60/82mm mortar fires. At 0630H FSB Larry received 9 rounds of unknown type mortar. Results: Frd - 2 US KIA, 6 US WIA; En - 6 KIA, 4 SA, 15 one pound satchel charges captured. On 061145H Oct at BR290840, 45 km NW of An Khe, Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Bn, 8th Inf engaged an unknown size enemy force. Results: Frd - neg; En - 19 KIA, 1 SA. On 060950H Oct at BR689576, 18 km NE of An Khe, B Co, 3d Bn, 8th Inf found a cave with 4 levels containing an enemy weapons cache of 7 GS, 75 SA, 100 B40 rockets, 20 AT mines, 200 rifle grenades, 401 rds 81mm mortar, 400 rds 82mm mortar, 53,500 rds AK-47 ammo, 2000 ft time fuse, and 60 82mm mortar fuses. On 211655H Oct at BR160513, 36 km east of Pleiku, the 8th Trans Bn Convoy on QL-19 received small arms fire and 9 B40 rockets from an estimated enemy platoon. Fire was returned resulting in 10 enemy killed. On 260830H Oct at HR502458, 2 km north of An Khe, Scout Platoon, 1st Bn, 69th Armor, was engaged by an estimated NVA squad with small arms and B40 rockets. 5 APD's and 1 tank reinforced. At 0930H, another sweep found 2 bunkers with overhead covering at HR508457. Results: Frd - 1 KIA, 8 WIA; En - 16 KIA, 4 SA and 1 B40 rocket launcher captured. On 281120H Oct at HR542572, 16 km NNE of An Khe, A Troop, 7th Sqd, 17th Cav engaged and killed 7 enemy. On 291750H Oct at HR527465, 5 km NE of An Khe, D Co, 1st Bn, 8th Inf received small arms fire and B40 rocket fire. Gunships engaged the enemy resulting in 20 enemy killed. On 311658H Oct at HR528727, 7 km NE of An Khe, D Co, 1st Bn, 8th Inf was engaged by an estimated enemy platoon using small arms. Results: Frd - 4 KIA, 8 WIA; En - neg.

2 ROK Operations:

On 031115H Oct at HR752622, 13 km SW of Phu My, the 4th Co, 1st ROK Regt found a defended cache, engaged the enemy and reported 7 enemy KIA, 25 SA and 3 CS CIA. On 051400H Oct at HR745609, 31 km NNE of An Khe, 5th Co, 1st ROK Regt engaged and killed 6 enemy and captured 4 small arms. On 051525H Oct at HR758606, 31 km NE of An Khe, 10th Co, 1st ROK Regt found a cache of 3 60mm mortars, 300 HG, 5300 rds SAA and 30 57mm rds. On 051605H Oct at HR749609, 30 km NE of An Khe, 3d Co, 1st ROK Regt on a search operation engaged an enemy force. Results: Frd - neg; En - 10 KIA, 2 SA, 1 CS CIA. On 060545H Oct at CR090245, 20 km north of Qui Nhon, 2d Co, 1st ROK Regt engaged 30-40 enemy. Results: Frd - 5 KIA, 7 WIA; En - 4 KIA. On 121350H Oct at HR698565, 25 km ENE of...
An Khe 1d Co 26th BOK Bgt found 15 tons of rice and 5 small arms. On 26 Oct at BS701558 27 km NNE of An Khe, 4th Co., 26th BOK Bgt during a search operation found a cave containing 8 light MG’s, 7 submachine guns, 1 57mm recoilless rifle, and 5 840 rocket launchers.

Between 130830H and 131110H Oct at BS7057 25 km ENE of An Khe, in operation Chang Koon Kyo, CAP BOK Inf Div, had 13 contacts and cache finds resulting in: Frd - 3 WIA, En - 5 KIA, 15 SA, 1 CS, 100 rounds 82mm mortar, 61 rds 8mm Br. 2 122amm rocket, 10 rds 120mm mortar, 1 box 82mm mortar parts, 1 box LMG parts, 200 kg. 3 boxes of TMT fuses, 200 blasting caps, & 1 radio. Between 141310H and 141800H Oct at BS7257 28 km ENE of An Khe in op Chang Koon Ky Nyom CAP BOK Inf Div had 14 contacts and cache finds resulting in: Frd - 5 WIA, En - 4 KIA, 6 SA, 2100 rds of SA Ammc. 1200 rds 50 cal ammo, 5 AP mines, 200 lbs TNT CIA. On 151425H Oct vic BS7057 30 km ENE of An Khe in op Chang Koon Ky Nyom CAP BOK Inf Div reported 13 contacts and cache finds resulting in: Frd - 5 WIA, En - 14 KIA, 14 SA, 9 CS CIA, 8070 rds of SA ammc, 100 rounds 60mm mortar, 20 HG, 2 switchboards, 1 camera, 6 radios CIA. Between 151430 - 151800 vic BS7537, 28 km ENE of An Khe in Op Chang Koon Ky Nyom CAP BOK Inf Div reported 12 contacts and cache finds resulting in: Frd - 1 WIA, En - 6 KIA, 8 FW, 6 SA, 3000 rds SAA, 50 rds 60mm ammc, 40 rds 840 ammc, 2 M77 radios, 2600 lbs TNT and 150 HG. Between 160520H and 161533H Oct vic BS7258, 30 km ENE of An Khe in Op Chang Koon Ky Nyom CAP BOK Inf Div reported 21 contacts and cache finds resulting in: Frd - 4 KIA, 3 WIA, En - 19 KIA, 2 FW, 19 SA, 4 CS, 2230 rds SAA, 500 rds 50 cal ammc, 23 rds 122mm rockets, 66 RPG’s, 15 HG, 3652 lbs of rice, 100 blasting caps CIA. Between 170905H and 171255H Oct vic BS7257, 30 km ENE of An Khe in Op Chang Koon Ky Nyom CAP BOK Inf Div had 4 contacts and 6 cache finds resulting in 18 enemy killed and 10 small arms captured. On 271000H Oct at BS641410 16 km S of An Khe, 112 PP Platoon was engaged by one enemy platoon, 168 RP Co and 2d & 3d Co’s Cav BOK Bgt were requested as a reaction force and arrived at 1200. Results: Frd - 2 BOK KIA, 17 BOK WIA; En - 26 KIA, 3 FW, 9 SA, 4 CS CIA.

3 ARVN Operations: On 181240H Oct at BS915074 13 km NNE of Bong Son, 1st Co 4th BN, 40th Inf engaged an enemy squad. Results: Frd - 1 ARVN KIA, En - 7 KIA, 1 SA and documents CIA. On 260100H Oct at BS902066 13 km NNE of Bong Son, 24 Co, 24 BN, 40th Inf engaged an enemy. Small arms fire was exchanged. Results: Frd neg. En - 8 KIA, 2 SA, 8 HG, 30 blasting caps CIA.

4 RF/PF Operations: On 080145H Oct at Hh411066 34 km NW of An Khe, 31
Recon Platoon, 49 RF Group ambushed a VC platoon. Results: Frd - neg; En - 8 KIA, 2 SA, 15 HG.

5 OTHER Operations: On 180225H Oct at BS922128 18 km NNE of Bong Son, elements of 4th Bn, 503d Abn Inf, on south side of hamlet received 20-30 rds of small arms fire. At the same time on the other side of Truong Xuan Hamlet, PSDF & 163 RF Co received 2-3 rds 60mm mortar, 4 HG and 30-40 rds small arms fire from an estimated enemy squad. The enemy penetrated the perimeter and threw an explosive device into a civilian house. Results: Frd - 6 KIA (1 PSDF, 5 civ), 11 WIA (2 RF, 1 PSDF, 8 civ), 11 PSDF MIA, 10 SA MIA; En - 2 detained, 4 HG CIA. On 191415H Oct at CQ088234, in Qui Nhơn City an unknown type explosive was detonated in a theater. Results: Frd - 2 civ KIA, 34 WIA (1 ROK, 1 ROK civ, 26 civ and 6 ARVN). On 280845H Oct at ER899518 16 km south of Phu Ky. Three hand grenades were thrown into the market place at Hoa Hai Hamlet. An element of 12th Co, 1st ROK Regt reacted immediately and detained 6 suspects. Results: Frd - 8 civ KIA, 43 civ WIA (D/O); En - 6 VCS detained.

1 ROK Operations: On 010830H Oct at CQ007484, 18 km west of Tuy Hoa, 1st Co, 28th ROK Regt engaged the enemy and reported 7 enemy killed. On 011225H Oct at CQ01463, 17 km west of Tuy Hoa, 4th Co, 28th ROK Regt engaged an enemy force. Results: Frd - neg; En - 6 KIA, 2 SA CIA. On 011225H Oct at CQ022516, 17 km WNW of Tuy Hoa, 4th Co, 28th ROK Regt engaged and killed 6 enemy and captured 4 small arms. On 021345H Oct at CQ030560, 17 km WNW of Tuy Hoa, 7th, 8th, 9th and 11th Co's of the 28th Regt in 4 separate contacts with the enemy reported 11 enemy killed and 6 small arms and 1 crew served weapon captured. On 02130H Oct at CQ028606, 14 km WNW of Tuy Hoa, Recon Co, 28th ROK Regt observed and engaged seven enemy guarding an ammunition cache. Results: Frd - neg; En - 7 KIA, 22 SA, 3 CS, 30 60mm mortar rounds and 1 AN/PRC-25 radio CIA.

2 ARVN Operations: On 102230H Oct at BP815854, 16 km west of Minh Hoa, Lam Son Training Center received 30 rounds of 82mm mortar. Results: Frd - 11 ARVN KIA, 28 ARVN WIA; En - neg. On 232155H Oct at CQ014549, 17 km WNW of Tuy Hoa, 3d Co, 1st BN, 47th Inf was engaged by a sapper platoon employing 540 rockets, satchel charges, and small arms fire. Results: Frd - 2 ARVN KIA, 11 ARVN WIA, 6 SA lost; En - neg. On 290910H Oct at CQ063517, 14 km WNW of Tuy Hoa, 2d Co, 1st BN, 47th Inf engaged an enemy platoon. Results: Frd - 2 KIA, 10 WIA; En - 2 KIA.
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3 RF/PF Operations: On 272135H at BQ008594, 32 km SW of Cheo Reo, Buon Bleck Camp received 15 rounds of 82mm mortar resulting in 11 RF wounded.

4 OTHER Operations: On 110450H Oct at CPF0454, Nha Trang Air Base and surrounding area received 18-20 mixed rocket fire and 1 suspected satchel charge resulting in 4 civilians killed and 17 wounded (16 civ, 1 CIDG). On 150010H Oct at COP85498, 6 km SE of Nha Trang, the SS Kin Wah, a Panamanian freighter at anchor was sunk by 2 explosive charges. Main channel was not blocked. Results: Frd - 5 KIA, 20 WIA (all crew); En - neg.

(m) Southern Provinces (October).

1 US Operations: On 111045H Oct at AN775396 30 km NNW of Phan Thiet D Troop, 2d Sqd, 1st Cav observed approximately 100 enemy. Escorting gunships expended resulting in 26 enemy killed and 6 bunkers destroyed. On 101145H Oct at BN058234 27 km NE of Phan Thiet in Hai Long Dist 1st Plt, B Troop, 2d Sqd, 1st Cav found 8 bodies in graves.

2 ARVN Operations: On 050900H Oct at BN355448 7 km NE of Song Mao, Recon Co and 1st Co, 4th BN, 44th Inf found a weapons repair facility containing 40 small arms, 18 claymore mines, 10,000 rounds of ammunition and 4 forges.

3 RF/PF Operations: On 090025H Oct at AN804114 4 km NW of Phan Thiet, 148 IF Co was engaged by 20-30 VC. Results: Frd - 4, RF KIA, 11 RF WIA, 3 SA lost; En - neg. On 090300H Oct at ZT235064 17 km WSW of Phan Thiet, an enemy battalion overran a security outpost of the 234 RF Co on Bridge 18 (QL1). The enemy employed 8/0 rockets, Bangalore torpedoes, satchel charges and small arms. The bridge was 40% damaged. Results: Frd - 4 KIA, 11 WIA, 3 MIA, 1 CS, 20 SA, 3 MRS phones, 3 PRC-25 radios and 1 PRC-10 radio lost; En - neg. On 100005H Oct at ZT268745 10 km SW of Di Linh, a platoon of the 166 RF Co was engaged by a VC platoon entering Djira Moor Hamlet. RF withdrew into hamlet but were forced out by VC. The enemy used the school house for an aid station and then withdrew. Results: Frd - 3 RF KIA, 6 WIA (3 RF, 3 civ), 6 SA lost, 2 105 howitzers were 20% damaged; En - 5 KIA. On 110025H Oct at ZT106759 5 km SE of Bao Loc, a VC company entered Baur Hamlet and engaged
PSDF & 18th PF Plt with small arms and B40 rockets. Results: Frd - 9 KIA
(1 RF, 8 PF), 5 WIA (3 PF, 2 civ), 31 SA lost. Aid station/meeting hall
damaged. En - neg. On 171115H Oct at BP170070 14 km SSW of Dalat, 302
RF Co and MAT 61 engaged an enemy platoon. Results: Frd - 6 RF WIA; En -
7 KIA.

Other Operations: On 111400H Oct at BQ152335 12 km ENE of Buon
Ho, a PRU element ambushed an enemy platoon. Documents captured indicated
that the enemy element belongs to the 301st VC Bn having a strength of
150 individuals. Results: Frd - 2 PRU WIA; En - 7 KIA, 2 SA. On
112010H Oct at AN816103, 2 km west of Phan Thiet, an unknown type charge
detonated during a wedding ceremony on Opi Tai Hamlet. Results: Frd - 4
KIA (1 RF, 3 civ), 19 civ WIA; En - neg.

(3) Organization and Training Activities.

(a) All units that were assigned, attached or under the operational
control of this headquarters as of 31 Oct 69 are listed at Incl 3.

(b) The command relationship between IX Corps, ROKFV-FC and
I FFORCJCV is at Incl 4.

(c) The 6th Bn, 84th Arty was inactivated on 7 Aug 69 by USARPAC
General Order 609, dated 31 Jul 69. The battalion's personnel were
absorbed by units in I FFORCJCV and its equipment was transferred to AHVN
in support of the Multi-Improvement Program.

(d) Training.

1 Assigned and attached units, less artillery groups and battalions,
are inspected semi-annually by a representative of the G3 OAT Division,
who is a member of the Inspector General's Team. A total of 10 units
were inspected during the quarter and all were rated satisfactory.

2 The USARPAC AGI Team inspected the training program of Headquarters
and Headquarters Company, I FFORCJCV during the month of September, and
found the program properly administered and implemented.

3 G3 OAT acted as the coordinating office for a team of officers
representing CONARC, who were inspecting training within the I FFORCJCV AO.
The US CONARC Team was looking for ways to improve stateside training
to better prepare personnel at the service schools before they depart
for duty in Vietnam.

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4. G5 OOT was action office for the presentation ceremony held at Headquarters, I FFORCEV to present the Meritorious Unit Commendation to HQ & HQ Company I FFORCEV, 41st Civil Affairs Company, 55th Military Intelligence Detachment, 13th Military History Detachment, 5th Public Information Detachment, 6th Engineer Detachment, 272d Military Police Company and 297th Transportation Company. LTG Mildren, Dep CG USARV, presented the award to the selected units on 2 Oct 69.

5. G5 OOT acted as action agency in formulating plans for a Forward Mobile Staff from I FFORCEV. The mission of the I FFORCEV Forward Mobile Staff is to:
   a. Coordinate US support of ARVN operations.
   b. Assure adequate plans for security of US forces.
   c. Forecast requirements for US commitments.
   d. Prepare operational plans and orders for US forces when directed by CG I Field Force Vietnam.
   e. Provide emergency support to the advisory teams when requested.
   f. Assure coordination of military and civilian efforts.

   (e) Research and Development (R&D) Activities: Requests for information on R&D items from USARV and ACTIV are monitored by this headquarters. During this quarter there were no requests for ENSURE (Expediting Non-Standard Urgent Requirements for Equipment) items submitted by this headquarters or its assigned, attached and OPCON units.

   (f) Doctrine: The monthly publication of "Tactical Notes" continues to be an effective means of providing subordinate units with new ideas and lessons learned regarding operational and intelligence matters. With the September issue the "Monthly Highlight" was initiated to give the readers new ideas and concepts which are exceptionally noteworthy. "Tactical Notes" was published and distributed in August, September, and October.

   (g) ARVN Modernization: The modernization program is progressing well and has significantly increased the combat effectiveness of ARVN Regular Forces, thus, enabling them to assume a more important role in the conduct of the war. Areas of significant interest are:

1. Personnel. There are 44,883 ARVN personnel authorized in II Corps ARVN units and 42,946 assigned. In addition, there are 9,098 ARVN with RF units as cadre bringing the total strength to 52,044.
Training. The training of ARVN personnel and units within II Corps was conducted at the 22d and 23d ARVN Division Training Centers, and the National Training Center at Duc My. Specialist training was conducted at other MACV schools throughout RVN. ARVN leadership has improved noticeably during 3d quarter CY 69 due to command emphasis at all levels to improve leadership capabilities through training. Leadership training was accomplished primarily at the Division Training Centers through the Company/Executive Officer Refresher Course, Platoon Leader Course, Squad Leader Course and the Heavy Weapons Loader Course. A total of 664 personnel have graduated from these courses this year. All units have filled all quotas for specialist schools since July 1969. This is also a result of command emphasis at all echelons. The overall training program is progressing well and is a major factor in the modernization program.

Equipment. II Corps ARVN Regular Forces have been issued 40,890 M-16 rifles and the training centers have been issued 10,775 for a total of 51,655. All combat forces are at 100% of authorized M-16's. The combat support and service elements are issued weapons as they become available within II Corps. AN/FRC-10 radios are being replaced by AN/FRC-25's and a total of 2,219 AN/FRC-25 radios and 1,603 M-60 machine guns have been issued to ARVN Regular Forces.

Chemical

Herbicide operations during this reporting period have included both crop and defoliation missions. Unfavorable weather conditions throughout II CTZ have resulted in the cancellation of 47% of the scheduled sorties.

The results of US Air Force UC-123 missions are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Sorties Flown</th>
<th>Hectares Defoliated (est)</th>
<th>Hectares of Crops Sprayed (est)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Binh Dinh</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>924</td>
<td>2940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binh Thuan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darlac</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khanh Hoa</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kontum</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lam Dong</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1020</td>
<td>720</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Sorties Flown</th>
<th>Defoliated (est)</th>
<th>Crops Sprayed (est)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ninh Thuan</td>
<td>5 (cont'd)</td>
<td>0 (cont'd)</td>
<td>600 (cont'd)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Bon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Yen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleiku</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quang Duc</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1440</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuyen Duc</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>5544</td>
<td>6017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Units in II CTZ are continuing to use UH-1 and CH-47 helicopters and truck-based power spray apparatus to spray small areas not conducive to spray by UC-123 aircraft. The results of these spray operations are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Hectares Defoliated (est)</th>
<th>Hectares of Crops Sprayed (est)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ, I FFORCEV</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROKFV-FC</td>
<td>1770</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Inf Div</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA, II Corps</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF South</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173d Abn Bde</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2100</td>
<td>1159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Riot control agents (RCA) are being employed in both offensive and defensive operations. Most offensive uses were in conjunction with gunships, artillery or TAG air. On 19 Aug 69, via HR 303400, 8/7/17 gunships received SA fire and expanded in the area. CS was employed with three enemy KIA. On 28 Aug 69, 173d Abn Bde used 40 jugs of

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1. The summary of APD operations in II CTZ is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>APD Missions</th>
<th>Hours (est)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ROKPV-PC</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Inf Div</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>482±15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173d Abn Bde</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>58±55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TP South</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>105±20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22d ARVN Div Adv Tm</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23d ARVN Div Adv Tm</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDC Nha Trang</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>112±30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>750</strong></td>
<td><strong>931±40</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Artillery and air strikes were placed on high APD readings obtained by 1st Cal Det on 12 Sep 69, with two KIA. A sweep of a high reading area (1st Cal Det) hit by air strikes and artillery on 7 Sep 69 located 16 fresh graves with bodies which had sustained small arms and shrapnel wounds. On 15 Sep 69, a C/75 Ranger Team engaged 12 VC about 700m from a high reading obtained by 1st Cal Det; two VC were KIA. On 16 Sep 69, airstrikes were called in on high readings (1st Cal Det) with three huts destroyed. On 3 Oct 69, a Cobra Team discovered 41 bunkers and 5 huts in the vicinity of high readings obtained by the 1st Cal Det on 25 Sep 69; area had been used in the last three days. Huts were discovered in the vicinity of 1st Cal Det high readings on 16 Oct 69. On 18 Oct 69, an agent reported...
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seeing two VC companies in the vicinity of 1st Cal Det high readings on
17 Oct 69. A Co, 1/50th, inserted in area of 18 Oct 69 high readings
(1st Cal Det) and discovered various equipment and some booby traps.
On 30 Aug 69, 52d Arty Op fired on target initially acquired by APD;
17 bunkers were destroyed, 1 damaged and 4 secondary explosions
initiated.

(d) The enemy continued to use RCA on a small scale during offensive
operations. There have been 5 reported enemy initiated actions during
which enemy used riot control agents. On 4 Aug 69, what was later
confirmed to be CS was found in a bag dropped by enemy personnel near
the Vung Chua Signal Site. On 12 Aug 69, vic BR 264470, 3/12 Inf at
LZ ACTION received 28 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, including eight CS
rounds; there were no friendly casualties. On 25 Aug 69, vic ZB 1148150,
Kon Horing Village received 20 rounds of 60mm mortar and 15 rounds of
82mm mortar fire, eight of which contained CS agent; there were three
friendly WIA. On 28 Aug 69, vic Bq 245925, the 600th and 610th RF
Companies at Camp My Lien received 20 rounds of mixed 60mm and 82mm
mortar fire, including two CS rounds; seven friendly were WIA. On 25
Oct 69, vic ZB 059267, Dak To Distriot Headquarters received 13 rounds
of 82mm mortar fire, including five CS rounds; there were no friendly
casualties.

(5) 03 Air Operations.

(a) There were a total of 6,030 tactical air sorties (4,061 pre-
planned and 1,969 immediate) averaging 65.5 sorties per day. These
sorties were flown in the following target categories:

1. Troops in Contact (TIC) - 367
2. Confirmed Enemy Location (CEL) - 573 (Changed as of 31 Sep to
   Known Enemy Location (KEL) - 674
3. Acquired Enemy Location (AEL) - 1,569 (Dropped as of 31 Sep).
4. Suspected Enemy Locations (SEL) - 1,922
5. Fixed Target Destruction (FTD) - 45
6. Troop Assault Preparation (TAP) - 94 (Changed as of 31 Sep to
   Landing Zone Preparation (LNP) - 79
7. Landing Zone Clearing (LZC) - 487
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(b) Of the total sorties flown this quarter, 4,677 were in support of US/FWMAF operations in II CTZ with the following results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>SORTIES/DAY</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4th Inf Div</td>
<td>2210</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>169 KBA (Conf), 34 KBA (Est), 57 secondary explosions, 39 secondary fires, 123 bunkers destroyed, 8 bunkers damaged, 433 structures destroyed, 33 structures damaged, 4 road cuts, 3 caves destroyed, 9 caves damaged, 5 foxholes destroyed, 6 trail cuts, 3 small bridges destroyed, 1 small bridge damaged, 1 damaged C-7A destroyed, 2 occupied 50 cal positions destroyed, 1 unoccupied AAA position destroyed, 1 unoccupied AAA site destroyed, 1 sampan destroyed and 7 spider holes destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF South</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27 KBA (Conf), 21 secondary explosions, 21 secondary fires, 73 bunkers destroyed, 3 bunkers damaged, 22 structures destroyed, 14 structures damaged, 100 meters of trench uncovered, 1 trail cut, 4 foxholes destroyed, and 7 crop fields destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173d Abn Bde</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8 KBA (Conf), 2 KBA (Est), 5 secondary explosions, 1 secondary fire, 267 bunkers destroyed, 17 bunkers damaged, 95 structures destroyed, 23 structures damaged, 27 caves destroyed, 11 foxholes destroyed, 5 foxholes damaged, 2 tunnels destroyed and 80 feet of trench destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th ROK Div</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1 KBA (Conf), 7 KBA (Est), 15 secondary explosions, 14 secondary fires, 11 bunkers destroyed, 3 bunkers damaged, 25 structures destroyed, 9 structures damaged, 6 caves destroyed, 3 caves destroyed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT SUPPORTED</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>SORTIES/DAY</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAP ROX Div</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24 KBA (Conf), 28 secondary explosions, 30 secondary fires, 11 bunkers destroyed, 6 caves destroyed, 10 meters of trench line destroyed, 1 unit convoy destroyed, 5 units of convoy damaged, 2 sampans destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I FFORCBV &amp; Others</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(Includes 7th Air Force Special Interdiction sorties) BDA unknown.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) During the period there were 1,353 tactical air sorties flown in support of GVN (ARVN) operations in II CTZ. The following results were obtained: 57 KBA (Conf), 44 KBA (Sat), 92 secondary explosions, 430 secondary fires, 377 bunkers destroyed, 94 bunkers damaged, 395 structures destroyed, 121 structures damaged, 126 caves destroyed, 31 caves damaged, 9 sampans destroyed, 12 rafts destroyed, 2 rafts damaged, 56 foxholes destroyed, 6 foxholes damaged, 2 active 50 cal gun positions destroyed, 3 unoccupied AA positions destroyed, 1 active 61mm mortar position destroyed, 4 spider holes destroyed, 11 pack animals destroyed, 3 unoccupied gun positions destroyed, 76 trail outs, 19 rice fields destroyed, 9 food caches destroyed, 2 foot bridges destroyed, 14 crop fields destroyed, 14 crop fields damaged, 1 camp site destroyed, 50 pounds marijuana destroyed, 38 units pack train destroyed, 10 acres rice destroyed, 500 pounds rice destroyed, 1300 pounds corn destroyed, 100 feet of trench destroyed, 1 supply cache destroyed, 1 downed O2A aircraft destroyed and 1 downed F100 destroyed.

(b) Security.

(a) During the reporting period the division continued to exercise staff supervision for highways, railroads, pipelines, and installation security. Activities during the quarter included:

1. Semi-annual security inspections of five critical installations. The installations inspected were Phu Cat, Pleiku, Tuy Hoa, Phan Rang, and Pr'Line/Lang Bian Signal sites. Overall, the defense posture of these...
installations was found to be satisfactory. Some of the more frequent deficiencies noted were:

a. Poorly constructed and poorly maintained perimeter barriers.

b. Lack of sufficient perimeter lighting.

c. Lack of cleared zones to permit adequate observation of the perimeter barrier and ground adjacent to the barrier.

d. Insufficient bunkers and towers around perimeter to provide interlocking fires and observation of the entire perimeter.

e. Defense plans were not fully implemented and coordinated.

2. The Security Division continued to provide a representative for the I FFORCEV/CRDS Command Inspection Team. During the quarter Kontum, Binh Dinh, and Ninh Thuan Province Advisory Teams were inspected. The security portion of the inspection is designed to evaluate the level of knowledge of personnel with respect to air and artillery support, chemical agents, overall operational capabilities and defense posture. The provinces inspected received an overall security rating of satisfactory. The most frequent deficiency noted was the lack of integrated compound and area defense plans.

3. During the quarter predeployment conferences were held in Ban Me Thuot, Tuyen Duc, and Lam Dong Provinces to coordinate security arrangements for highway design field crews working to upgrade highways QL-14, 20, and 11.

4. Security was coordinated for 24 logistical convoys running from Cam Ranh Bay to Ban Me Thuot. These convoys consisted of those regularly scheduled and emergency resupply. No significant problems were encountered in coordinating the security arrangements.

5. The division reviewed plans, progress, and significant activities of the Vietnamese Railroad restoration and security programs. The Vietnamese Railway Service initiated action to relocate ARVN Companies of the Rail Security Battalions out of railyards in major cities to remote stations along the rail line. Subsequently, one company was moved south from Qui Nhon to Thuoc Lam. Since then enemy initiated incidents against this section of the rail line have been virtually nonexistent.
6. Providing security for the 160 miles of pipeline in the II CTZ has been one of the most difficult problems faced by the division during the quarter. Losses of POL from pipelines, resulting from enemy action and pilferage, has prompted increased security efforts. Actions taken to reduce POL losses are as follows:

a. The assistance of the Commanding General, II Corps in increasing pipeline security was requested. The Commanding General, II Corps issued a memorandum to Division Commanders and appropriate Province Chiefs directing action to be taken to reduce pilferage and sabotage of the pipelines.

b. The 17th Combat Aviation Group was directed to provide aircraft support to the 240th Quartermaster Battalion to overfly the pipeline on a daily basis. The helicopter support has improved daylight security and shortened repair time.

g. ROK Forces were requested to conduct operations near the 3 KM portion of the Phan Rang pipeline experiencing sabotage.

h. Requests were made to USARV recommending the operating strength of the element of Company C, 54th Infantry securing the Tuy Hoa pipeline be one full strength platoon. The platoon was subsequently withdrawn from the area. ROK and RP/PF Forces are currently providing this security.

i. Pipeline burial projects have been completed along four sections of line receiving the most frequent damage.

7. The effect of these increased security measures have resulted in a reduction of POL losses, but have not reduced losses to an acceptable level.

8. The division continued to coordinate security for both civilian and military engineer construction crews working on all major highways in the II CTZ. The engineer effort crossed unit, district, and province boundaries and thus required multi-unit and multi-national coordination for providing continuous and adequate security. Enemy initiated incidents against construction crews remained low throughout the quarter.

(7) Army Aviation Operations.

(a) The major objective in employing the tactical aviation assets available to I FFORCENV remains as stated in operational directives.
1. Provide air mobility to combat elements of FWMAF in the II CTZ.

2. Provide aviation support to the Province Senior Advisors and COM喝了 personnel in II CTZ for tactical operations, command and control, administrative missions and resupply.

3. Support the MACV and I FFORCEV aerial reconnaissance and surveillance programs.

(b) Resources available from 17th Aviation Group (Cbt) are:

1. Assault helicopter assets (UH-1H):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>SUPPORT MISSION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10th Combat Aviation Battalion</td>
<td>GS Southern Coastal Region; GS Southern Highlands; Task Force South, Reconno School; 5th SFG(a); 23d ARVN Div; 9th ROK Inf Div; Project Delta; Salem House.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48th AHC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92d AHC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155th AHC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>192d AHC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>281st AHC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52d Combat Aviation Battalion</td>
<td>GS Northern Highlands; Prairie Fire; 4th Inf Div; 24th STZ; Highway Coordinator; Company B; 5th SFG(A).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57th AHC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115th AHC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170th AHC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>189th AHC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>268th Combat Aviation Battalion</td>
<td>GS Northern Coastal Region; 173d Abn Bde; CAP ROK Inf Div; 22d ARVN Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61st AHC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129th AHC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134th AHC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. The 335th AHC was transferred by General Order, 1st Aviation Brigade from the 17th Aviation Group (Cbt) to the 164th Aviation Group (Cbt) effective 1 July 1969.

3. The 7th Sqdn, 17th Air Cavalry remains assigned to 17th Aviation Group (Cbt), OPCON to I FFORCENV, and further OPCON to the 4th Inf Div, and is stationed at Camp Enari. "A" Troop, 7th Sqdn, 17th Air Cavalry is located at An Khe. "B" Troop, 7th Sqdn, 17th Air Cavalry which remains OPCON to the 4th Inf Div has been further employed effective 1 Sep 69 in GS of the 23d DTA and is temporarily located at Ban Me Thuot (E). "C" Troop, 7th Sqdn, 17th Air Cavalry remains OPCON to the 173d Abn Bde and is located at Lane AAF, An Son.

4. Heavy Helicopter assets (CH-54):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPANY</th>
<th>BATTALION</th>
<th>SUPPORT MISSION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>355th HHC</td>
<td>268th CAB</td>
<td>GS II CTZ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Assault support helicopter assets (CH-47):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPANY</th>
<th>BATTALION</th>
<th>SUPPORT MISSION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>179th ASHC</td>
<td>52d CAB</td>
<td>GS Northern Highlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>180th ASHC</td>
<td>268th CAB</td>
<td>GS Central Coastal Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>196th ASHC</td>
<td>268th CAB</td>
<td>GS Northern Coastal Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>243d ASHC</td>
<td>10th CAB</td>
<td>GS Southern Coastal Region</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Armed helicopter companies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPANY</th>
<th>BATTALION</th>
<th>SUPPORT MISSION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>238th Avn Co (E)</td>
<td>268th CAB</td>
<td>GS II CTZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>361st Avn Co (E)</td>
<td>52d CAB</td>
<td>GS II CTZ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. The 183d, 185th, 203d, and 219th Reconnaissance Airplane Companies support the I FFORCENV visual reconnaissance program and provide GS throughout the II CTZ.

8. The 225th Surveillance Airplane Company is employed throughout II CTZ in an aerial reconnaissance and surveillance role.
The 16th Utility Airplane Company provides GS utility support throughout the II CTZ and in support of III MAF operations in I CTZ, the 5th Special Forces Group (A), and JUSPAC.

(c) Major accomplishments:

1. The following major US operations were supported during the periods indicated:

   WAYNE JAVELIN    13 Apr - Present    1st Bde, 4th Div
   PUTNAM TIGER     22 Apr - 22 Sep     2nd Bde, 4th Div
   GREENE ORANGE III 5 May - 4 Aug     3rd Bde, 4th Div
   GREENE ACE       5 Aug - Present     3rd Bde, 4th Div
   GAFFEY BLUE      5 Aug - 25 Aug      1st Bde, 4th Div
   WAYNE BOULDER    11 Sep - 11 Oct      1st Bde, 4th Div
   PUTNAM COUGAR    21 Sep - Present    2nd Bde, 4th Div
   WASHINGTON GREEN 15 Apr - Present    173d Abn Bde

2. ROKA Forces were allocated one assault helicopter company per division on a daily basis. In addition, average hook allocations were 3 daily to CAP ROK Inf Div and 2 daily to 9th ROK Inf Div. Airmobile assets supported the following ROKA operations during the periods indicated:

   XUAN WOO 5     28 Jul - 8 Aug   2nd Bn, 26th Regt
                   3rd Bn, 26th Regt
   BUN KAE 6      30 Jul - 3 Aug   3rd Bn, Cav Regt
   DONG BO 2-18   31 Jul - 7 Aug   2nd Bn, 30th Regt
   BAK JEE 2-9    1 Aug - 14 Aug   2nd Bn, 29th Regt
   BAK JEE 1-11   5 Aug - 12 Aug   1st Bn, 29th Regt
   BUN KAE 7      12 Aug - 23 Aug  Cav Regt
   DONG BO 1-14   16 Aug - 24 Aug  1st Bn, 30th Regt
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1. ARVN forces in II CTZ received approximately two assault helicopter companies daily to support their operations. Numerous small scale operations were conducted in support of pacification. Major operations conducted were:

   - DAN THANG 69
     18 Apr - Present
     40th & 41st Regt's

   - DAN PHU 47-10
     20 Apr - 26 Sep
     47th Regt

2. Airmobile assets were provided for the following special operations as directed by MACV: Prairie Fire, Salem House, Project Delta, Recondo School.
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5. Airmobile assets were provided to the following units or agencies on a general support basis:

HQ I FFORCEV IDC - Nha Trang II ALC (ARVN)
21st Signal Group MACV V ALC (ARVN)
18th Engr Bde US Navy Spt Fac CORDI
Cam Ranh Bay Spt Cmd 100th Log Cmd (ROK)
IPFV Arty Qui Nhon Spt Cmd

c. Logistics Activities.

(1) Supply

(a) The overall supply of troop requirements continues to be satisfactory. There are no shortages of supplies and equipment which significantly impair the operational capability of the command.

(b) There are 13 items under ASR control at the end of the quarter; a decrease of 7 items from last quarter. The items under ASR control are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B 535</td>
<td>CTG, 40mm WS Para</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C 226</td>
<td>CTG, 81mm, Illum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C 449</td>
<td>CTG, 105mm, Illum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C 468</td>
<td>CTG, 105mm, G3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C 706</td>
<td>CTG, 4.2&quot;, Illum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D 505</td>
<td>Proj, 155mm, Illum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D 572</td>
<td>Proj, 175mm, HE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H 459</td>
<td>RKT, 2.75 Flechettes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H 490</td>
<td>RKT, 2.75, LT, HE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(c) During the quarter a total of 59 Reports of Survey were submitted to this headquarters for Installation Commander action. Losses to the government on these Reports of Survey amounted to $267,814.75.

(d) Sandbags and lumber (1X, 2X, 4A, plywood) were placed under intensified management and are released for issue through an allocation system.

(2) Transportation. A gradual decrease in II CTZ cargo movements was realized over the past quarter. This decrease was the result of a decrease in in-country requirements. Cargo movements required the utilization of all modes of transportation. Passenger movements remained at a relatively constant level.

(a) Air. The discussion of air movements will include only movements processed by Headquarters, I FFORCEV. Included will be Emergency Air Missions, Special Air Missions and missions flown utilizing the C7A aircraft that are dedicated daily to I FFORCEV.

1. There was an overall increase in Emergency Airlift movements over the past quarter. This increase was the result of movements made in expectation of an increase in enemy activity.

Emergency Airlift (1968 - 1969):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>C-130*</th>
<th>C-123*</th>
<th>C7A*</th>
<th>PAX</th>
<th>S/T Cargo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov - Jan</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3,199</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb - Apr</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6,736</td>
<td>1,309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May - Jul</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2,161</td>
<td>411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug - Oct</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td>547</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sorties
2. Special Air Missions have been included for the first time in this quarter's ORLL. The majority of all passengers and cargo moved on this type mission involved unit moves. Much of the data for this quarter represents the movement of the 3d Bn (Abn), 503d Inf, 1st Bn (Mech), 50th Inf and Mobile Strike Forces.

Special Air Missions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>C-130*</th>
<th>C-121*</th>
<th>PAX</th>
<th>S/T Cargo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug - Oct</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>8,399</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Movements made by IFFORCEV - dedicated C7A aircraft decreased during the past quarter. As a result of a re-allocation of MACV C7A assets on 23 Sep 69, Headquarters, IFFORCEV's assets were reduced from 7 to 5 aircraft daily.

Dedicated C7A Airlift (1968 - 1969):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>PAX</th>
<th>S/T Cargo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov - Jan</td>
<td>6,108</td>
<td>45,984</td>
<td>2,938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb - Apr</td>
<td>6,100</td>
<td>41,502</td>
<td>3,019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May - Jul</td>
<td>6,220</td>
<td>35,707</td>
<td>3,248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug - Oct</td>
<td>5,519</td>
<td>30,828</td>
<td>2,269</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Highway: The major highways in II CTZ remained open throughout this quarter, with high volume of convoy traffic noted. Tonnage noted below represents port and beach clearance, local haul and line haul.

Cargo Moved by Highway (Jul - Sep 69):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>S/T Cargo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>347,335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>301,135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>327,915</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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(c) Water. Total tonnage discharged through II CTZ ports (Qui Nhon, Vung Ro, Nha Trang, Cam Ranh Bay, Phan Rang, Phan Thiet) July to September 1969 is noted below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>S/T Discharged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>217,625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>183,818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>199,563</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Rail. There was a decrease in passengers and cargo moved by rail during the last quarter. The majority of all cargo moved consisted of rock for RMK road construction, or base construction at Tuy Hoa and Phu Cat Air Bases. There were thirty enemy initiated incidents during the past quarter which resulted in a total of 63 days disruption along the right of way.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Rail Movements (Jul - Sep 1969):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PAX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>93,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>90,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>82,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Maintenance. (C7A Airmovement of Aircraft Parts). During the latter part of July 1969, it became apparent that aviation units within II CTZ were experiencing difficulty in receiving aircraft repair parts. A study revealed that the Air Force could hold shipments classified Category 1 for up to 5 days (120 hours) and was usually holding aircraft parts to the maximum time. This resulted in a total order-ship time of 10-14 days, which was considered unacceptable. Recommended solution was to utilize one of the C7A (Caribou) aircraft assigned to I FFORCEV, on a 3 times per week round robin flight from Depots A and B to the DSUs. These flights were initiated 8 Aug 1969. After two months experience with the C7A flights, the movement time has been reduced to 29.7 hours and order-ship time has been reduced to 5-6 days. Each flight during this period has carried an average of 6,177.3 lbs and an average of 227 EDP line items. An overall reduction in aircraft down time has been realized as a result of this program.
d. Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support

(1) Agriculture.

(a) A total of more than 10,000 farmers attended training sessions on rice production. The use of fertilizer and pesticides was emphasized at these meetings. Cadres continue to stress the need for requisitions of supplies in order to obtain higher yields and a higher net return. Supply of fertilizer is adequate except in some of the remote and insecure areas. Hurricane Camille in the U.S. caused a delay of the ship which was bringing fertilizer to Nha Trang in late September. Efforts were made by USAID to make the scheduled delivery as soon as possible.

(b) Provincial reports show plantings of more than 18,000 hectares towards the goal of 28,000 hectares of TH-8 rice plantings in the region. A second planting in November and December will exceed the regional goal. Leaf hoppers caused serious damage to about 300 hectares in August. Excessive flooding due to heavy September rains caused serious damage to approximately 400 hectares. Most damage was to the local varieties because of lodging. TH-8 is resistant to lodging and this characteristic proved an advantage over the local varieties.

(c) The Ly Tay Dam in Binh Dinh Province was built but failed because of faulty design and construction and lack of consultation with the GVN Irrigation Service. It was constructed a second time, again without consultation. These projects required extensive investments of time, plasterers and commodities.

(d) Construction on the Phuc Trach Dam in Khanh Hoa Province was started on 1 August 1969 and is approximately 60 per cent as of 31 October.

(e) The heavy rains during September caused a break in the North Main Canal of the Phan Rang irrigation system.

(f) Bids will be opened for the 4th time October 10 on the Nam Son Dam in Tuyen Duc. There were no bids on the first and second opening and only one bidder on the third. If there is no more than one bidder at the 4th opening, the irrigation service will hire labor and manage construction of the dam itself.

(g) The selection of 12 cooperators/demonstrators for the 1969 swine production is completed. The cooperators will attend a training session in Nha Trang November 11-14. The swine arrived in-country in October and after a month of quarantine in Saigon, will be moved to the cooperators.

(h) A Doctor of Veterinary Science, on contract with USAID, has been assigned to the region to advise and assist GVN in upgrading animal health programs.
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1. Results of using TREPIAL as a weed killer on IR-8 rice were outstanding. This product had two big advantages:
   a. 5,7.0 piasters per hectare cheaper.
   b. 1.7 tons more rice per hectare.

2. Education.
   a) The educational effort in II CTZ is directed toward the implementation of ten project agreements between USAID and GVH. These projects, operating in II CTZ area:
      1. Hamlet and elementary education
      2. Elementary teacher training
         (Southern Illinois University Contract)
      3. Secondary education
      4. Secondary teacher training
         (Ohio University Contract)
      5. Higher education
      6. Vocational education
      7. Agricultural education
      8. Instructional materials
      9. Leadership training
     10. Educational general support
         a. Teaching of English
         b. Adult education
         2. Library development
        3. Research and planning

   b) During the past quarter a maximum effort has been made to complete the 1967, 1968, 1969 classroom construction program of the Elementary and Secondary projects.
1. Nationally, the 1970 goal of the GVN and USAID was to have 85 percent of all elementary age children in school. This goal has almost been achieved on a national basis; 83 percent are now in school. However, in II CTZ only 57 percent of children 6-11 years old are now in school. However, the Minister of Education Mr. Nguyen Luu Vien stated that the new goal was to enroll 100 percent of the age group 6-11.

2. II Corps needs 4,147 more classrooms to enable 100 percent of the elementary aged children to enroll in school.

3. In secondary education the GVN-USAID goal is to have 25 percent of all 12-18 year old students in secondary schools by 1970. Nationally, 18 percent are now in school. In II Corps, 16 percent are also enrolled in secondary school. However the II Corps and National averages are misleading due to tremendous variations by province.

4. II Corps needs 565 more classrooms to enable 25 percent of the secondary aged children 12-18 to enroll in school.

(a) The Agricultural Education Project has received the added responsibility of nine Highlander Agriculture Training Centers. These Training Centers were taken over by MOB from the Ministry of Ethnic Minorities. In as much as the MOB had not funded for the operation of these Centers very little if any progress can be expected until CY 1970. However, plans are now being made for the full use of each of these centers.

(b) Under the Instructional Materials Project, some 35 titles totaling approximately 16,000,000 textbooks have been printed and distributed country wide. II CTZ has received its proportionate share of these textbooks, and they either have been or are now being distributed by the Provincial Education Chief. Also under the Instructional Materials Project, four workshops have been or are being conducted for the Highlanders. The purpose of these workshops conducted by the Summer Institute of Linguistics is to familiarize the Highlanders with the new textbooks printed in the tribal languages of Rade, Khoi, Jarai, and Bahmar. It is hoped that these textbooks will facilitate the teaching of the Highlanders.

(c) Under the Elementary Teacher Training Contract, a new normal school was completed and opened on 22 October 1969. This facility should greatly increase the number of teachers trained each year when it gets into full operation. At the present, much of the furniture for the classrooms and dormitories is not on site. However, it is
expected that this necessary furniture will be delivered by 31 December. Two new dormitories are now completed at the Qui Nhon Normal School. The II Corps Engineers plan to inspect the buildings for acceptance on 7 November 1969.

(3) Self-Help

(a) The latest figures on project status as of 25 October reveal a total of 4,375 projects approved and 1,497 completed. Of these totals, category IA projects numbered 3,341 with 1,298 completed and 855 underway; Category IB, 762 with 196 completed and 237 underway; Category II, 274 with 3 completed and 83 underway. The projects underway now total 1,175. Most of Category IA projects are income-producing with the majority of these dealing with livestock, predominately swine. An estimated 70% of the projects represent the people's aspirations. The remaining 30% could be the result of the influence of higher authorities and village officials as they try to submit projects to beat the deadline imposed by the phasing schedule.

(b) Budget situation. It is estimated that the budget of VN$448.1 million will be exhausted or obligated by the 20 December deadline. Latest figures indicate that VN$86.2 million remain to be appropriated which is about 20% of the total budget. Obligated funds amount to VN$285.9 million (63%) and VN$75.9 million reported expended (17%).

(c) The CDO's have been concentrating on following up current projects and providing instruction on completing the necessary forms required for projects. The automated data forms were released late so that lists of approved projects have been accumulating in the province level. However, Form #5 (from which the facts for the automated data form are compiled), is completed by the villages and some errors were found. Consequently, as of the reporting period, no print-outs have been received from Saigon. Evaluation teams from VSDB/CDD/CORDS/Saigon visited six provinces and one city (Cam Ranh) in Region II. They interviewed village officials on their impressions of the program and looked into the paperwork especially on the difficulties with Form #5. Reports of the evaluation have been rendered and copies furnished this headquarters.

(d) A conference of CDO's was held on the 25th of October. The agenda emphasized planning for a revitalized training and information campaign on the VSD program 1970. Work group sessions recommend courses of action to insure better information on the part of the villagers, village officials and other GVN and CORDS personnel concerned with the program. Recommendations for changes on the guidelines were also made.
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(a) In six provinces the GDO's are backstopping the Youth Affairs program; the education program in four provinces; and the refugee program in two provinces. The job is in addition to their function as advisors on the Village Self-Development program.

(4) Chieu Hoi Program

(a) For August and September the Chieu Hoi average was 240 returnees per month. In October the monthly figure jumped to 419. This great increase is the result of increased military and psychological operations to induce specific groups to rally. This specific target type operation was especially successful in Binh Dinh Province where 111 Hoi Chanh's returned together after coordinated, concentrated psychological operations to specifically induce them. This input brought Binh Dinh's rate for the quarter to 457 out of the total of 907, or just over 50%. In addition to Binh Dinh, only Binh Thuan, Darlac, Kontum and Pleiku contributed significant returnee figures for the quarter.

(b) The Armed Propaganda Team (APT) strength in the quarter has increased to 850 of the total allocation of 938. Because of an agreement in October by the 5th and 2d ADS&L Co's to release the Ministry of Defense weapons allocations of M2 carbines, BAR's and 30 cal. machine guns to APT Co's, total strength will probably increase to full allocation before the end of the year. APT training in Vung Tau began in September with 250 members attending. There will be 3 courses before the end of the year, so that all APT members are scheduled for formal training.

(c) The Regional Chieu Hoi Chief has agreed to use the new 16 building complex in Phu Yen as the Regional Chieu Hoi Center. This center was physically finished in October and only the finishing touches and official opening ceremony keep it from full operation. A December opening ceremony is expected. Also during October the Chieu Hoi Division received over 7,000 bags of cement to be distributed to the provinces to boost Chieu Hoi center defenses and facilitate repair. Allocations to provinces was based on need. The cement is now being distributed.

(d) Vocational training classes especially in the well equipped Province of Binh Dinh is going well. Political indoctrination classes are being conducted in all provinces where there are Hoi Chanh's and are more valuable than they once were. The issuance of permanent ID
cards to Hoi Chanh is still a slow and tedious process. Efforts to expedite this process have not yet proved successful.

(5) PHOENIX/PHUNG HOANG. Several developments occurred in the PHOENIX program during the August - October period which are worthy of note. The first development was the movement of the II Corps PHUNG HOANG Center staff from Pleiku to Nha Trang. The Center moved in order to remain close to the National Police Directorate which moved to Nha Trang at the same time, to obtain the better air support available in Nha Trang, to co-locate with the new PHUNG HOANG school, and to secure closer cooperation with the US advisory effort. The II Corps PHUNG HOANG training school opened on 27 October 1969. The school was established to provide basic techniques and skills to members of D/PIDCCs in II Corps. The course of instruction for the first class totals 104 hours. Stress is placed on files and filing techniques, organization and management methods, collation techniques and the role of other agencies (eg. VIS, PSYWAR) in the PHUNG HOANG effort. The first class is made up of National Policemen drawn from the Situation Sections of D/PIDCCs. The second class will consist of Military Security Service (MSS) representatives in D/PIDCCs. Renewed emphasis has been placed on the processing of detainees in relation to PHUNG HOANG objectives. An analysis of the entire legal processing procedure for VCI is now underway aimed at prosecuting the guilty and releasing the innocent. Preliminary indications are that a very small percentage of legitimate A and B category VCI are being convicted and sentenced through the GVH legal system. September and October also saw the renewal of visits by the Combined US/GVN PHUNG HOANG Inspection Team composed of the Director of the II CTZ National Police, Corps 02 and Corps 03 on the Vietnamese side and Director of PHOENIX, Deputy Director PHOENIX and the Corps 02 Advisor. Quang Duc, Phu Yen, Lam Dong and Pleiku Provinces have already been visited by the team. Real improvement was noted in the program in Lam Dong Province. Neutralization results for August were 364 and 391 for September, both well surpassing the II CTZ goal of 350 VCI.

(6) Revolutionary Development Cadre.

(a) In August the number of RD Cadre groups authorised in Binh Dinh and Binh Thuan was increased by 6 and 2, bringing their respective totals to 106 and 36. A pending reduction in the number of RD Cadre groups in Khanh Hoa and Cam Ranh by 9 and 6 will make their totals 41 and 6 respectively. When the increases and decreases in the number of groups are completed, there will be a total of 363 RD Cadre groups in II CTZ.
(b) Of 84 authorized Son Thon RD Cadre Groups, there are 84 currently on hand and all active except in Khanh Hoa, where one newly formed group is undergoing training.

(c) All phases of the changeover of support and management responsibility for the RD/3TRD Cadre program to MRRDRDS have been effected with several exceptions. The Project Agreement (PROAG) under which the RD Advisors’ vehicles will be transferred to SVN (MORD) has not been completed. There is currently no official means of support for these vehicles. Also pending are MDM directives covering the support of 3TRD Cadre groups. The US directives covering finance procedures has been published and will take effect during the October pay period.

(d) During the reporting period three RD/3TRD Cadre Advisors orientation courses were conducted at the National Training Center, Yung Tau, and in Saigon. These courses have contributed significantly to the newly assigned military advisors’ understanding of the RD Cadre program, and thus enhanced their effectiveness in working with the cadre.

(7) Refugee Program.

(a) This reporting period has seen significant shifts in emphasis from urgency for completion of war victim payments to resettlement, return home, and site development programs. Early in the quarter 23,738,355 SVN was distributed to war (and disaster) victims of prior months. This compares to only six and one-half million piasters paid out during the first half of the year. A concentration on resettlement payments, which together with the normalization of some self-resettled sites founded in 1967, produced the resettlement in place figure of 42,798.

(b) With increased security and the evident de-escalation in enemy harassment during the last forty-five days, the movement back to villages took on greatly increased proportions in the Northern Coastal Provinces of Binh Dinh and Phu Yen producing a total of 85, 319 for the quarter. The bulk of these were from outside of refugee centers. Smaller number of refugees from resettlement sites returned home in Binh Thuan and Khanh Hoa.

(c) With the completion of the refugee and war victim payments in several provinces more thought was given to coordinated efforts involving the services of the Ministries of Health, Agriculture, Education, Information as well as international agencies towards the upgrading and normalization of refugee resettlement sites. Vocational
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courses for adults and training courses for mobile cadre have increased the participation in agricultural and home industry projects. A greater voice is being given the refugee in determining the type of project in which he would participate. Volunteer agencies and Vietnamese social welfare institutions continue to make their valuable contribution.

(d) Preliminary data for October indicate that during the month, approximately 4,500 refugees were resettled and approximately 16,000 refugees were returned to their village.

(e) Comparative refugees statistics are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>January 1, 1969 to June 20th</th>
<th>June 21, 1969 to Sep 20th</th>
<th>Net for 3d Quarter CY 6y</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Temporary Refugees</td>
<td>40,463</td>
<td>11,872</td>
<td>28,591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Resettlement Process</td>
<td>86,514</td>
<td>70,307</td>
<td>10,207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside Center</td>
<td>25,999</td>
<td>110,860</td>
<td>125,139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL Refugees</td>
<td>360,976</td>
<td>193,059</td>
<td>167,937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Refugees this CY</td>
<td>5,410</td>
<td>6,364</td>
<td>954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return Home this CY</td>
<td>33,781</td>
<td>119,100</td>
<td>85,319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resettled in Place this CY</td>
<td>58,406</td>
<td>84,668</td>
<td>26,262</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Psychological Operations (Civilian).

(a) At the end of the last reporting period it was reported that problems had been encountered in the recruiting and training of village and hamlet information cadre as a result of the lack of defined responsibilities on the part of the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Information toward these cadres. Additionally it was indicated that a training program for village information cadre at the National Training Center in Vung Tau originally programmed to begin in June had been suspended due to incomplete planning for the course. Responsibilities were resolved for the administration of these cadres during the month of July and the recruiting and training of cadres, while delayed for approximately six weeks, has progressed during the quarter. Of paramount importance to the morale and effectiveness of the cadre was the payment of salaries which had not been paid during the months of May and June. With the responsibility for administration of these

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cadres assigned to the Ministry of Information, all cadres were paid back wages as of the end of July. The training of village cadre commenced with one class starting in July and a second class starting in September. A third class will begin 6 October 1969. Difficulties have been experienced with Montagnard village cadres attending the courses in Vung Tau because of limited capabilities of these cadres in understanding Vietnamese, and the courses have been more or less ineffective in respect to this group. However, initiative has been demonstrated by province and district VIS Chiefs in the highland areas and in most instances in-province training is being conducted to surmount the lack of communication at the National Training Center toward this group.

(b) As part of the overall nationwide program to motivate the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) to operate through its own resources and capabilities and to reduce the high dependence on U.S. support, all public TV and radio equipment to include ancillary equipment was inspected during the month of July by JUSPAO technicians and where inoperable equipment was found, it was exchanged with operational equipment. This equipment exchange was completed during the month of August. In continuation of this program, all of this type of equipment has been turned over to VIS at all levels as have the maintenance and repair facilities previously operated by JUSPAO in support of VIS with the objective of developing the ability of VIS to operate without complete dependence on U.S. support. To insure that the public TV and radio equipment program does not falter, JUSPAO's effort has been changed from that of actually accomplishing the program to that of advising and providing technical assistance.

(c) Principal programs during the period pointed toward friendly civilian audiences were the continued P3TOP support for the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan; support for land reform in the areas of freezing of land occupy and rent, and distribution of Government-owned lands; identification of the NLF/Provisional Revolutionary Government; replacement of U.S. forces in Vietnam by ARVN forces; exploitation of President Thieu's speech on 11 July 1969 covering his comprehensive proposals for peace; the Phan Khoi (Enthusiasm) Campaign; and support of village and hamlet elections during the month of September.

(d) In the media of radio, the parts required to repair the 50 KW station in Ben Ho Tho which were to have arrived in-country during this quarter did not arrive as projected. A requirement to fabricate mountings for certain parts of the transmitter in Australia has delayed shipment of the parts and it is now projected that the parts will be in-country by mid-November 1969. A grave matter of regression in the P3TOP program in II CTZ, was the notification that the completion date for the 4 station high-powered radio net had been slipped from 31 December 1969 to 15 February 1971.
(9) Military PSYOP.

(a) PSYOP activities during the third quarter CY 69 included the aerial dissemination of over 449,526,000 leaflets and 1,247 loudspeaker hours. ARVN and ROK operations included the hand dissemination of over 8,000,000 leaflets and 14,000 loudspeaker hours. The 8th PSYOP Bn printed 47,057,000 leaflets, 657,500 newspapers and 1,091,700 posters, booklets, and handbills.

(b) Major PSYOP campaigns conducted during the quarter were the GVN Nationwide Rewards Campaign, Frantic Goat, Camel Path, and the Nguyen Trai II Campaign. The Nguyen Trai II Campaign was originally scheduled to terminate on 15 September, however, due to the successes achieved during the campaign, the decision was made to extend it until 15 October. PSYOP appeals have been directed towards the NVA encouraging them to rally to the GVN and stay in the south to build a new life, or allow themselves to be captured and treated humanely as POW until the war is over and they can return to North Vietnam. US support for the Nguyen Trai II Campaign has been in the form of furnishing PSYOP media and aircraft support. PSYOP targeting and planning for aerial and ground operations was accomplished through the efforts of the Vietnamese counterparts.

(c) During the month of September the 8th PSYOP Battalion obtained the services of a KOHO interpreter. The addition of the KOHO interpreter has increased the 8th Bn's capability for production of PSYOP media in Montagnard to five dialects: Rhade, Mnong, Jarai, Bahnar and Koho. During the past quarter more than twenty leaflets, twenty tapes and fourteen posters were produced in the five Montagnard dialects. These figures represent a marked increase in Montagnard PSYOP production over the previous reporting period.

(d) Effective 2 September 1969 Radio Pleiku has once again resumed its regular programming at full power (50kw). Efforts are presently under way to determine the approximate coverage pattern of the radio station. The 75 kw generator which has been expected from Fort Bragg has arrived and is presently being installed at the station site. The Pleiku Radio Station broadcasts daily in Vietnamese and Montagnard dialects. The operating hours for this station run from 0530 to 0800 and from 1830 to 2400 hours. Initial comments made by Vietnamese personnel in the Nha Trang area concerning quality of reception and programming have been favorable. During this reporting period 900 mini-radios have been distributed in the remote areas where Radio Pleiku can be received. The distribution of the mini-radios is as follows: Darlac-200, Kontum-250, Pleiku-250, and Phu Bon-200.
(e) All provinces reported functioning PSYOP Coordinating Committees and Centers during the past quarter. These organizations have become the focal point from which PSYOP assistance is furnished to, and coordination takes place with, other provincial agencies i.e., Phoenix, RF/PP, RD Cadre, Cultural/Drama Teams and APTs. The efforts of the PSYOP committees and centers have resulted in more PSYOP requests being generated from the district level. During this quarterly period special emphasis was given to PSYOP media in support of the motivation and indoctrination training of the RF/PF. Total PSYOP efforts by the provincial agencies has resulted in more than 1,500,000 contacts in face-to-face activities in the past three months.

(f) The second meeting of the Regional PSYOP Coordinating Committee was held on 22 August 1969 in Nha Trang. The agenda for the meeting included a plan for increased production of PSYOP media in Montagnard dialects, inspections of the provincial PSYOP organization by the Vietnamese and a progress report on activities of the II CTZ PSYOP agencies (ARVN, ROK, US). The plan for inspection of the provincial organizations was approved during the meeting and two inspections were made during this reporting period. Phu Yen and Khanh Hoa provinces were inspected and the presence of a Vietnamese inspector appeared to have created a sense of urgency among the Vietnamese PSYOP personnel in both provinces. Written reports of each inspection will be made through Vietnamese channels and recommendations made, where appropriate, to assist in improving the provincial PSYOP programs. The Vietnamese Captain in charge of the Nha Trang Regional PSYOP Coordinating Center, who was also the originator of the inspection program, was reassigned in early October and suitable replacement has not been provided as of this report. This position is the keystone in the entire regional and provincial PSYOP Coordinating Centers and therefore, it is imperative that this officer be replaced by another Vietnamese officer of equal grade and ability.

(g) During this quarter the PSYOP Air support in the II CTZ was reduced by more than fifty percent. This reduction in air support for PSYOP in the II CTZ came about as a result of the transfer of B Flight, 9th Special Operations Squadron (USAF), from Pleiku to Bien Hoa in the III CTZ. The Nha Trang based C Flight has been transferred to Tuy Hoa and is the only air support now left in the II CTZ. A separate air operations section from the 8th PSYOP Battalion has been formed in Tuy Hoa to coordinate requests for PSYOP Aircraft from the Regional PSYOP Centers located in Nha Trang and Pleiku. The air operation section maintains facilities for leaflet storage and provides transportation of leaflets to the aircraft as needed. All air operations, with the exception of quick reaction missions, will
The following PSYOP Campaigns have been developed or are presently under development by the 8th PSYOP Battalion:

1. VC Rice Confiscation - A series of four leaflets have been developed, three of them are directed against the rural population and one is directed against the VC units involved in rice confiscation. Rice producing areas have been plotted and harvest times determined. The first leaflets supporting this program were dropped in Mid-August and drops will continue throughout the rice harvesting season.

2. RVNAF Image - A series of photo files have been developed which shows the activities of RVNAF training centers and installations. The photo files will be used to produce PSYOP media showing that RVNAF is strong, well trained and ready to assume the responsibilities from the departing US troops.

3. TET Campaign 1970 - PSYOP media requirements are being formulated to support the 1970 TET program. The initial planning phase began in II Corps with the meeting of the F-16 personnel on the 12th of August in Nha Trang. Recommendations concerning II Corps requirements were submitted to MACV ATTN: MACJ-11, for inclusion in the national PSYOP Campaign Plan for TET 1970.


(a) The continued lull in enemy activity has provided the opportunity to expand the efforts of US/FW&F in the pacification effort. The co-location of security squads and platoons with villages and hamlets has proved very effective. This is especially evident in Tam Quan District, Binh Dinh Province, where the village of Thien Chanh has increased its fishing fleet from 100 boats (period May - July) to 150 boats at present. The number of fishermen has also increased from 300 to approximately 600 during the same period. Also noteworthy, is the fact that fishing restrictions along the coast were lifted on 10 August 1969 by OVNI. The 173d Abn Bde continues to provide escort and security for the fishermen in this area.

(b) The 173d Abn Bde supports 19 schools, 12 orphanages, five hospital/dispararies, and three refugee centers within its area of operation.

(c) The 173d English Health School and Dispensary which was organized by 173d Abn Bde in October 1968, has completed twelve classes and graduated a total of 176 students. The school teaches Vietnamese students
the basic rudiments of medicine and sanitation. Graduates return to their hamlets and villages as health workers, health advisors, or work in local dispensaries. The LZ English Dispensary continues to treat approximately 900 patients per month.

(d) The 4th Infantry Division, operating in the Western Highlands, is conducting a very active civic action program. The harvest during September of "miracle rice" (IR-8) was enthusiastically received by the local villagers. Villagers that are able to obtain an ample supply of water are anxious to plant a second rice crop in late November. This is considered a significant achievement inasmuch as traditional varieties of rice plants are usually planted during the month of April. The ARVN NCA CA personnel assigned to the division have been integrated into units at battalion, brigade and division level. To provide an appreciation for all aspects of the division's programs, the ARVN NCO's will rotate through each level of command. This procedure known as "Operation Teamwork", is working very successfully. Through the MEDCAP program, division medical personnel have treated in excess of 335,000 people during this period.

(e) ROK support of civic action has been re-oriented to place primary emphasis on repair, reconstruction and clean-up campaign within hamlets. The ROKFV is not planning any major projects for the immediate future due to the belief that the current program is well received by the Vietnamese people, is more beneficial to them, and meets their desires.

(f) Within the past three months, the ARVN Civic Action School in II CTZ has graduated four classes of Civic Action Team Leaders. With the completion of these four classes, 219 team leaders will have been trained in II Corps. Class V will begin o/a 1 November 1969 with a projected input of 60 students. To date, six-man Civic Action Teams have been deployed in II Corps as follows: 22d Division - 36 teams; 23d Division - 48 teams; 24th STZ - 14 teams; and II Corps troops - 27 teams. In addition, 22 trained ARVN NCO's are working with US Civic Action Teams of the 4th Infantry Division. Six interpreters from the 4th Infantry Division, eight interpreters from the 173d Airborne Brigade, and 24 interpreters from ROK Forces II Corps have been trained and are being held in reserve for possible employment in their respective areas.

1. To assist these teams in their civic action work, and to improve the ARVN program in support of pacification, this headquarters forwarded a request to MACV on 25 September 1969 for contingency funding in the amount of 4,750,000 $VN.

2. The General Political Warfare Department, Saigon, is currently
studying the II Corps Civic Action Program to determine its application to ARVN units in other Corps areas.

(g) The Military Support of Pacification Fund (MSPF) for II CTZ was maintained at 7,667,000 $VN throughout the quarter. During the period, added emphasis was placed on maximizing expenditures for programs directly supporting the 1969 Pacification Plan, while at the same time minimizing expenditures not directly supporting the plan. Total expenditures on priority programs amounted to 5,568,311 $VN, or, 51% of the total funds expended. The amount of funds utilized for non-priority programs was 5,434,394 SVN, or, 49% of total expenditures. This is a significant improvement over the last quarter, during which the majority of expenditures were made for non-priority projects. The newly established program class, Phoenix, accounted for 5% of all expenditures during this quarter. It is anticipated that, in subsequent months, the MSPF will be utilized to a greater extent for the Phoenix program.

(h) During the period, the US/TVNAF Civic Action and PSYWAR Fund has provided 242,000 $VN in support of Civic Action. The fund has been used primarily by the 2d Squadron, 1st Cav Regt, located in Binh Thuan Province. Expenditures were made to upgrade the quality of the education program and to repair and renovate classroom facilities. The US/ FWSAF Civic Action and PSYWAR Fund utilized by this headquarters and like funds utilized by tactical units, were reduced by fifty percent on 1 October 1969. That reduction has imposed serious limitations on the capability of tactical units to perform civic action.

(i) The four-day Civic Action Orientation Course, for US tactical units and advisory team personnel, scheduled for 17 September 1969, has been rescheduled for 19 November 1969.

(11) Territorial Forces.

(a) Regional and Popular Forces.

1. During the period 1 August to 31 October 1969 there have been a number of significant actions affecting II CTZ territorial forces.

2. Completion of the recruitment of the 125 PF platoons authorized in July was accomplished this quarter. Forty-two of these platoons had completed basic training by 31 October and had deployed as operational units. The remaining 83 platoons are in the training centers and will all be operational by 31 December 1969. In late October an additional increase of 2 RF companies and 25 PF platoons was authorized for recruitment in Binh Dinh Province to meet the demands of the expanding pacification program in that area.
During this quarter approval was also given for the conversion of five II CTZ CIDG camps to RF status. Approved conversions for the first half of 1970 are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camp</th>
<th>No of Companies</th>
<th>Conversion Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hang Buk (Kontum)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>31 Jan 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trung Dung (Khanh Hoa)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>31 Jan 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Loc (Darlac)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>31 Mar 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plateau Gi (Kontum)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>31 May 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nhon Co (Quang Duc)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>31 May 70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additionally, a portion of the CIDG Mobile Strike Force (MSF) units in Pleiku will convert into 7 RF companies on 30 June 1970.

4. As a result of the force structure increases discussed in para 1 and 2 above the current and proposed II CTZ force structure is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Currenty Authorized</th>
<th>Authorization As of 30 June 70</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RF Group Headquarters</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF Companies</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF Mechanized Platoons</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF Weapons Platoons</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF Intelligence Platoons</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF Intelligence Squads</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF Platoons</td>
<td>1353</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. During this quarter II CTZ accomplished a significant reorganization of the various PF training centers in the Corps. The province level PF training centers in Quang Duc, Lam Dong, Kontum and Phu Bon were closed and the training centers in Pleiku, Darlac and Tuyen Duc were expanded into Joint PF Training Centers. This reorganization will result in standardization of the PF training curriculum throughout II CTZ. Present PF training centers and the provinces they serve are:
6. Equipment modernization of RF/PF is nearing completion. RF units now have 100% of their authorized M-16 rifles and 90.4% of their AN/PRC-25 radios. PF have 73.9% of their M-16's. RF units will not receive the AN/PRC-25 radio until all RF radios are issued.

(b) National Police Operations.

1. Transfer of RF/PF and ARVN personnel to the National Police. In the II CTZ geographical area, the total National Police authorized personnel strength, including the Uniformed Branch, Police Special Branch and the National Police Field Forces is 16,047. This number includes the 3,500 personnel which are programmed to be transferred from RF/PF and ARVN units during 1 August 1969 to 31 December 1969. The RF/PF and ARVN units are required to transfer three personnel from each company sized unit and one man from each platoon sized unit. The JCS/RVNAF issued a directive whereby 2,810 of the 3,500 personnel would be transferred from RF/PF and ARVN units located within II Corps. Presently, 1,010 personnel have been transferred to the National Police under this program.

2. Village Police Stations. There are 561 Village Police Stations programmed to be established in the II CTZ by 31 December 1969. This increase of 38 over the initial goal is a direct result of additional villages being placed in the A, B or C category. Four hundred and twenty five or 73.7 percent of the VPS goal has been attained. To properly man these Village Police Stations, the 1969 Pacification Program requires that 50 percent of the Uniform National Police Force be assigned to District level and below. Currently, 43 percent are so assigned.

3. National Identification Registration Program (NIRP). In support of the NIRP, 14 trained teams are operational in the II CTZ. A total of 383,640 Vietnamese personnel have been registered to date. This number represents approximately 76 percent of the estimated 1,500,000 VN personnel which are eligible to be registered during this three year program.
4. **Resources Control.** Resources Control checkpoints continue to produce excellent results. Seventy separate Mobile Combined Patrols are operational, twenty seven of which operate on a 24 hour basis. Seven Marine Police Resources Control checkpoints are operational, and are located in Cam Ranh City, and Khanh Hoa and Binh Thuan Provinces. A land site has been selected for an additional Marine Police Base in Qui Nhon City, Binh Dinh Province, and Nha Trang, Khanh Hoa Province. Major seizures continue to be Post Exchange items, Marijuana and Military Payment Certificates. A significant decrease has been noted in POL pilferage. The most effective measure taken to reduce this pilferage was laying the pipeline six feet underground.

5. **Correction and Detection Centers.** Presently there are 5,996 prisoners confined in the II CTZ. Four thousand two hundred twenty one in Correction Centers, 1,392 in National Police Jails and 303 in the Au Tuc Regional Detention Facility. The Correction Center in Binh Dinh Province has received an additional 596 inmates. Ten new Screening and Detection Facilities are programmed to be constructed throughout the II CTZ. Three are presently under construction, and seven are scheduled for completion by the 26th of February 1970. These facilities will provide 2,000 additional man spaces.

6. **National Police Training Center, Cam Ranh.** This training center is 65 percent complete, with an estimated date of occupancy 15 December 1969. This facility will provide in-service training for National Police assigned within II Corps. The center will have a capacity of 150 students, and will graduate a class every six weeks.

(c) **Self Defense Division, Office of Territorial Forces.**

1. The PSDF program continues to gather momentum and develop stature in the over-all national defense and pacification effort. The organization phase of the program experienced tremendous growth and now has 410, 508 members organized, which is 150% of the goal of 260,477. Binh Thuan, Khanh Hoa, Binh Thuan and Phu Yen did especially well by organizing almost double the amount required by their goals. Training, although not keeping pace with the organization phase of the program has exceeded the goal of 224,425. There are presently 245,193 members trained which is 109% of the goal. The training programs in Binh Thuan, Cam Ranh and Khanh Hoa have been especially productive. To date 196 PSDF Cadre have been trained at the Vung Tau Training Center. The arming phase of the program has progressed on schedule and there are now 77,307 weapons in the hands of PSDF members which is 90% of the goal of 78,660. An additional 3,500 weapons were allocated to the II CTZ PSDF which are to be distributed to PSDF by the end of CT 69.
During the quarter a PSDF advisor packet was sent to PSDF advisors at province and district level. This packet contains all current guidance on PSDF in both English and Vietnamese and should prove to be a valuable aid to advisors.

A PSDF Impact Award System was begun by which advisors can award individual PSDF members up to 1,000 $VN worth of merchandise in recognition of outstanding actions. It is hoped that this program will aid in boosting the morale of the PSDF program by demonstrating the appreciation of U.S. advisors for outstanding PSDF actions.

During the past seven months some assessment of the effectiveness of the program has been made possible by collecting data from TOG incident reports, police reports and PSDF spot reports.

(12) Public Health.

(a) With the anticipated and then the actual change of the Minister of Health, activity in Public Health was somewhat slowed down during this period.

(b) The civilian war casualties have continued to decrease. There were 1,130 treated during the preceding quarter and 1,100 during this period. The U.S. military continues to give excellent support in this program.

(c) The 1969-1970 National Plague Program was begun throughout South Vietnam. The program is to be more flexible this year to allow for variations of plague incidence between regions and within the regions. The program in Region II is behind due to the late arrival of supplies and equipment. Based on experience gained in the last program, this year's program will place more emphasis on health education and individual cooperation. During this period 41,426 houses were dusted and 60,862 people were immunized against plague.

(d) With the general reduction of the Provincial Health Advisory Personnel, the main emphasis of the advisory effort is being shifted to the district, village and hamlet level. The increase in security during this period has permitted greater effort to be expended in upgrading the health activities at the district levels.
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Mobile Health Teams have been started in all provinces and these teams are serving to improve the health care in the outlying areas. The order for implementation of Joint Utilization of Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Health's Medical/Para-Medical staff and hospital facilities was signed on 18 September 1969. Lam Dong, Ninh Thuan and Quang Duc are the first three provinces in Region II to be affected by this order. The Joint Utilization is to begin first at the Civilian Hospitals and Sector Hospitals; then spread down to District Health Services and sub-sector dispensaries.

Material Support

(a) During the previous three months the Materiel Support Branch continued to expand its operation of providing logistical support to the MACORDS Province Teams operating in II CTZ. Internally, this was evidenced by a realignment of the Table of Distribution for the branch. The changes were basically a refinement of the eleven spaces and were geared to bring in specialists in the fields of maintenance, engineering, programming, supply and food service.

(b) The more notable highlights for this period included:

1. The submission of the second AR 711-5 report (Equipment Status Report). This report marked a major step toward improving property accountability records and identifying authorisations.

2. The implementation of new MACV tables of allowances for the province teams. The approval of these TA's provided a more manageable authority document for use by property book officers.

3. Expansion of the command inspection teams to include greater emphasis on maintenance operations at the team level.

4. The establishment of an operational maintenance facility in CORDS to provide responsive generator maintenance and repair parts support.

Personnel

(a) All Feeder Morning Reports from Advisory Teams were consolidated by this Headquarters for the first time on 10 September 1969. Consolidation of Feeder Morning Reports involves approximately 190 separate reports each month.

(b) A summary of major items and military personnel actions during the period Aug - Sep-Oct 1969 is as follows:

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UNIT
Processing Officer Efficiency Reports
Officer and Enlisted Promotions
Miscellaneous Personnel Actions
Awards and Decorations
R & R Requests

NUMBER OF ACTIONS
760
545
2220
750
612

(a) Production and distribution of Signal Operating Instructions (SOI) and Standing Signal Instructions (SSI) was started during the first week of September. KAC codes and authentication tables were also distributed for the first time by this office. These items are prepared by this office for all provinces and districts and eleven other units in II CTZ.

(b) Teletype terminals were installed in the compounds at Phu Yon and Cam Ranh Special Sector. This enabled the PSAs at these locations to have ready access to the incoming messages and immediate use of the terminal for the transmission of messages. The installation of these systems eliminated the need for advisory personnel to travel the roads during the hours of darkness or other unsafe periods to transmit and pickup messages.

(c) Coordination was effected with all HSAs and I FFORCEV Signal to speed the installation of the Quick Comm Radio Wire integration (KWI) system directed to be installed by the CG I FFORCEV. This system enables direct communication with all PoAs and IXAS from I FFORCEV TOC and visa versa. Technical assistance teams were deployed to all provinces and districts to assist in overcoming existing communications problems and to prevent future problems.

(d) A program was established to integrate local Vietnamese radio operators into the COMUS dedicated radio system as primary operators. Recruitment programs were established allowing selected individuals to be sent to Tu Duc Training Center in Saigon to qualify as radio operators and return to the CTZ to work.

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e. Personnel and Administration

(1) Roster of Headquarters I FFORCEV key personnel is at Incl 5.

(2) Personnel strengths of assigned, attached and OPCON units are at Incl 6.

(3) Personnel Management.

(a) At the beginning of the reporting period, I FFORCEV assigned strength was slightly greater than its authorized strength. Assigned strength at the close of the period will be slightly less than authorized. The decrease in strength was caused by a reduced flow of replacements in August and October (260 and 274, respectively, compared to 730 for September) and the addition of an understrength mechanized infantry battalion. A persistent shortage of middle grade noncommissioned officers has plagued the artillery and mechanized infantry battalions. Headquarters, USARV was apprised of the situation and advised that the shortage is command wide.

(b) The 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry was detached from the 4th Infantry Division on 1 September 1969 and the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 50th Infantry was detached from the 173d Airborne Brigade on 7 October 1969. Both units reverted to the control of I FFORCEV. To provide personnel support for the 1/50th, the unit personnel office of the 2/1st Cav was increased by seven EM. Administration is supervised by the 2/1st unit personnel officer. Two EM were provided to the 92d FIS at Cam Ranh Bay to assist with the maintenance of PDRF for the 1/50th.

(c) Beginning this reporting period, the strength status of CCRS Advisory Teams was reviewed each month to assure that all assets were effectively used. In the past, some teams had excess personnel and sometimes two individuals were applied against one position vacancy. These monthly strength reviews permitted prompt corrective action.

(d) On 17 August 1969, all except special port calls were cancelled by HQ, USARV and daily quotas of personnel to report to the replacement battalions were substituted. This was done to assure that the command did not exceed its authorized strength ceiling. Based on previously submitted HMOS Loss Reports, I FFORCEV was allotted spaces on departing aircraft which must be filled. Curtailments of foreign service tours were authorized when necessary.

(e) During October, a number of actions were taken to implement redeployment instructions for two inactivating units, Headquarters and
Headquarters Battery, 41st Artillery Group and the Camp Radcliff Security Detachment (Provisional). As a result of planning conferences at HQ, UJARV, detailed coordination was effected with the units to insure that they are reduced to zero strength by inactivation dates. These measures included in-country reassignments and accelerated rotations.

(4) Awards and Decorations. During the period, this headquarters assumed awards and decoration authority for the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry and the 1st Battalion (Mech), 50th Infantry. This added some 2,000 additional troops for which award recommendations might have to be processed over a 12-month period, or a potential workload increase of about 100 percent. Detailed coordination had to be made to effect a changeover from the roster method of awards submission which the two units had been utilizing under the 4th Infantry Division and the 173d Airborne Brigade respectively, to this headquarters' procedures which involve individual submission of recommendations and personalized citations. To partially counteract this increased workload this headquarters secured HQ, MACV's tentative approval for the Deputy Senior Advisor, I CTZ to submit recommendations for the Bronze Star, Army Commendation and Air Medals directly to HQ, MACV without sending them through this headquarters. The implementation of this expedited procedure will mean an approximate five percent reduction in this headquarters awards workload. A summary of awards and decorations is at Incls 7 through 9.

(5) Rest and Recuperation.

(a) RAR allocations were utilized by this command to send ten US Army aliens to Hawaii during the period 19-21 October to become citizens under the MACV Group Naturalization Program. It was the responsibility of this command to issue necessary orders and insure each individual was in possession of necessary credentials.

(b) Beginning in October 1969, I Field Force took over the responsibility of disseminating RAR allocations for the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry, which was formerly attached to the 4th Infantry Division. The unit contains approximately 10 percent of the total I Field Force strength, and this figure was used to compute the number of seats allocated to each RAR site.

(c) Ninety-three percent of all RAR allocations were used. An average of 637 allocations were received each month (Incl 10).

(d) Also during this period, this command received a total of 135 in-country RAR allocations. One hundred and twenty allocations were
for enlisted personnel and fifteen for company grade officers. The allo-
cations were distributed among all artillery units, 2/1st Cavalry and 41st
Civil Affairs Company. Maximum utilization has been achieved in this
area.

(6) Line of Duty Investigations. Beginning 1 August 1969, I Field
Force Vietnam took over the responsibility as reviewing authority on
all Line of Duty Investigations for units under our general court-
martial jurisdiction. The addition of the 173d Airborne Brigade alone
has increased the work load in this area by approximately 150 percent.
As reviewing authority it is the responsibility of this headquarters to
monitor the line of duty investigations of subordinate units and insure
that each investigation is complete prior to forwarding to USARV.

(7) Administrative Services.

(a) In August, a Model 914 Xerox copier was installed in the AG
Classified Message Center. It was in extremely poor condition and
functioned properly only five of the 40 days that it was installed.
The contractor replaced the 914 with a new machine on 22 October 1969.
No charges were made for use of the previous machine. Two Xerox
copiers, Model 720 are now on order. One will replace the new Model
914 copier.

(b) The need to improve incoming message reproduction prompted
liaison visits to MACV and USARV communications and message centers.
Both headquarters were using two-ply "Hecto" paper in the communica-
tions center teletype machines, and the message centers used the "Hecto"
master and a spirit processor to reproduce as many copies as were
required. During the later part of September, trial runs were made on
a small number of teletype machines in the I FFORCEV communications
center. Problems were initially experienced with the tactical tele-
type equipment because the striking force of the keys was not sufficient
to make a clear impression on the Hecto paper. Hecto masters were then
utilized in the Mode 5 computer teletype system and copies run off on
an electric spirit process duplicating machine in the message center.
This procedure has been so successful that 90 percent of the incoming
messages are now processed on Hecto paper with quality of reproduction
approaching that of the offset press process.

(c) The detachment and re-establishment of the 2d Sqdn, 1st Cav-
ALy has been completed. All administrative services have been estab-
lished, and I FFORCEV provides all necessary assistance.

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(d) During August, the 1st Bn, 50th Inf Div was relocated to Phan
Thiet, and the unit was detached from the 173d Abn Bde on 7 October 1969.
The unit has been brought under the administrative control of the 2d
Sqdn, 1st Cav. The following actions have been completed:

1. Reestablishment of the unit's publications accounts with
   Baltimore and St. Louis. Publications are currently being received.

2. Initial distribution of I FFORCEV publications was completed on
   27 August 1969. The unit has been added to the regular distribution
   scheme.

3. Forms Control and Records Management were established on 4 Octo-
   ber 1969.

4. Postal service is being provided by APO 96317 at Phan Thiet,
   and courier service is being provided by the 459th Signal Battalion.

5. Requests for special services activities, film accounts, book
   packets, and sports equipment, were initiated during the first part of
   October 1969 and will be completed during the next reporting period.

(e) Civilian Personnel Management

(a) Civilian personnel management during the period was satisfactory
in both administration and pay. Coordination was maintained throughout
the quarter between the area civilian personnel office and all levels of
command. During the period, the local national direct hire spaces
decreased from 482 to 289. The significant decrease was the transfer of
200 spaces from Hq, I FFORCEV to 4th Inf on 22 Oct 69. These spaces
pertain to the allocation of security guards for Camp Radcliff, An Khe.
The camp security mission was assumed by the 4th Inf Div on 1 Oct 69.

(b) I FFORCEV AK fund allocation from USARV for 4th Qtr CY 69
(2,215,200 $VN) was received and suballocated to units based on previ-
ous expenditure data and requirements. Funds were suballocated to
units of I FFORCEV as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq, I FFORCEV Artv</td>
<td>1,284,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Force South</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Sqdn, 1st Cav</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 50th Inf (Mech)</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54th SIG Bn</td>
<td>148,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55th MP Det</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned Headquarters First Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RUS CJFOR-65 (H.2)

41st CA Co 15,000
HQ Comdt, I FFORCV 89,000
297th Trans Co 79,000
272d MP Co 16,500
167th Sig Co 52,400
HQ IFFV Reserve 125,200

TOTAL 2,215,200 $VN

To be suballocated to assigned units by CG, I FFORCV Arty.

(a) Significant activities

1. The following personnel changes took place during the quarter. Chaplain (CPT) James A. Williams replaced Chaplain (CPT) Walter J. Kras as chaplain in 32d Chaplain Detachment, Advisory Team #33; Chaplain (MAJ) John W. Smecker replaced Chaplain (CPT) Donald R. Kochaneck as chaplain in 32d Chaplain Detachment, Advisory Team #24. Four new chaplains were assigned to Artillery. They were Chaplain (LTC) Jack Jan Dyken assigned to HQ, I FFORCV Arty; Chaplain (CPT) Daniel McCaffrey and Chaplain (MAJ) Robert E. Hess assigned to Provisional Arty Group; and Chaplain (CPT) Joseph Tumpkin assigned to 4/60th Arty Bn. Chaplain (CPT) Wilson C. Parks, 1/50th Mech Inf, also came under this headquarters when his unit did. Chaplain (MAJ) Robert W. Hopkins was assigned to I FFORCV for duty at 54th General Support Group Chapel at Camp McDermott, Nha Trang.

2. II CTZ has 129 Military Chaplains and 23 ROK Chaplains.

(a) Religious Services:

a. Military units in the II CTZ are being adequately covered by the Area Coverage Plan; "Areas for Coordination of Religious Activities." Under this plan all military personnel, regardless of branch of service and/or unit, receive Catholic and Protestant coverage by the appropriate chaplain assigned to that area. Responsibility for implementation of this plan rests with the commanders of the eight geographical areas. It can be reported that the meeting of all the Areas Coordinators of the
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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned Headquarters First Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

II CTZ, in August, was a fruitful one. There has been a definite improvement in coverage due to the Coordinators' complete knowledge of their zone responsibility and their awareness of just what is expected of them. The 16 Oct 69 meeting further solidified the progress being made. Consequent meetings should do likewise. Each soldier in the II CTZ will have a weekly opportunity to worship.

b. Jewish coverage in the II CTZ remains adequate. Lay leaders continue to be used to organize and conduct lay services for Jewish personnel in the II CTZ. The Jewish Chaplain visits the major units on a regularly scheduled basis each month to provide Worship Services and chaplain coverage.

(10) Provost Marshal.

(a) Security Inspection of Key and Critical Installations. The PM representative on the I FFORCEV Security Inspection Team during the last quarter inspected five (5) installations. Within these installations there were 15 separate compounds inspected. Areas of interest are the identification and control of local national employees, protective fencing, protective lighting and clear zones, key control for sensitive areas and the general physical security standards.

(b) Distinguished Visitor Security. The 272d MP Company provided security personnel on 32 occasions over the last three months. Security was provided for visiting DV's and flag officers or civilian equivalent personnel, in addition to providing a trail vehicle for the CG, I FFORCEV daily. Some visitors worthy of mention are Secretary of the Army, the Honorable Stanley R. Resor, Congressmen Dellenback and Lowenstein, CINCPAC, as well as COMUSMACV. Traffic control continued to be provided by the 272d MP Company for conferences, quarterly reviews, dining-ins, classified briefings and other special events.

(c) Blackmarket Suppression Program. A formal program for the suppression of blackmarket activities in Nha Trang was published. Copies of the program were sent to all commanders in the Nha Trang area down to and including separate number companies. A letter of transmittal signed by the Commanding General was used to distribute the program and directed addresses to initiate a blackmarket suppression program utilizing measures contained in the program published by this headquarters. The program is oriented toward stopping PX goods from reaching blackmarket retailers through closer control of personnel by commanders at all levels. To assist commanders in personnel control, the local Provost Marshal has been tasked to perform various control functions also aimed at preventing PX goods from reaching the blackmarket.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned Headquarters First Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(d) Customs Seminar. In anticipation of further troop withdrawal announcements, customs officials were invited to I FFORCEBV to conduct a seminar designed to familiarize attendees with the laws, basic steps and procedures for clearing personnel through customs. Any mass movement of troops or units would require in-country clearance by unit appointed inspectors. Military Police personnel from the 272d MP Company, 173d MP Platoon, 218th MP Company and the 16th MP Group attended.

(e) A Law Enforcement Meeting was held for the purpose of providing a general update on provost marshal problems and to exchange new ideas for improvement in various law enforcement areas. Attending were local, area, division, separate brigade and log command provost marshals from throughout the II CTZ.

(f) During the reporting period MPC conversion day required that all units implement their conversion day SOP's. Security was tightened at Roberts Compound, Grand Hotel Compound as well as the King Duy Tan Hotel. Specifically prohibited was the entry of local national personnel. The movements of US personnel were restricted to mission essential trips outside of US compounds. Additionally, extra patrols were furnished to the local Provost Marshal to patrol the town and attempt to limit the unauthorized holder's access to personnel authorized to convert MPC. The I FFORCEV Provost Marshal monitored the entire police effort implemented throughout II CTZ. It was evident from reports that a maximum effort was exerted to prevent illegal conversion of MPC.

(g) Vehicle Control Program. A program was drafted by the Provost Marshal Section directed toward establishing closer control over the dispatch and operation of US Government vehicles. The program was a composite of existing directives and regulations dealing with vehicle control. Further amplification of the use of existing forms dealing with vehicle utilization was presented and addressees were alerted to the fact that vehicle utilization and control would be an item of special interest for IG inspections by this headquarters. The program was distributed to the five Sub-Zone Coordinators for implementation by them on an area basis.

(h) In an attempt to follow-up on the blackmarket suppression program, meetings have been held with military and civilian officials, both Vietnamese and US. In order to monitor progress, the installation coordinator was directed to furnish a copy of all implementing instructions to the Provost Marshal, I FFORCEV. Although the program has only been in existence for six weeks, indications are that prices are rising which means the supply is dwindling.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned Headquarters First Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(1) Fatal Traffic Accidents. This continues to be a problem area. In an attempt to reduce the number of fatal traffic accidents, the following actions were taken:

1. A traffic safety program was written and is awaiting distribution throughout II CTZ.

2. Letters signed by LTG Corcoran were sent to all units that experienced fatal traffic accidents.

3. The month of September was designated Motor Vehicle Accident Prevention Month and Military Police and commanders devoted their full attention to the above subject. Police actions included assignment of full-time traffic prevention patrols, use of mirror boxes to check speed, roadside spot checks to insure compliance with dispatch and safety requirement and a review and analysis of past traffic accidents in order to better utilize preventive enforcement resources.

4. Frequent daily bulletin notices were used to emphasize safe driving habits and disseminate safety tips.

5. Local provost marshals were encouraged to have traffic control signs posted. In many areas, PM's fabricated and placed signs in an attempt to keep drivers informed of speed limits and hazardous road conditions.

(j) Emphasis on the Suppression of Narcotics is being continued by this headquarters. The Provost Marshal is a member of the Marijuana and Drug Suppression Council recently formed by this headquarters to coordinate and monitor the many facets of the drug suppression program. Within the II CTZ there have been 233 education briefings on the subject of drugs and narcotics. These briefings teach attendees to recognize suspicious actions, conduct effective spot inspections, and preserve evidence properly to insure successful prosecution. A recently developed "amnesty" program offers a way out for those who want to shake the habit without being prosecuted. This program has proven successful on a trial basis in the 4th Infantry Division. The Surgeon, Chaplain, and the Provost Marshal work in close coordination under this program.

(k) Relocation of Military Police Resources. During the reporting period, this office coordinated the movement of area support military police resources into the Bong Son and Phan Thiet areas in support of the 173d Airborne Brigade and Task Force South respectively. These additional MP's were provided by the 16th MP Group.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned Headquarters First Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(1) Prisoners of War.

1. Enemy captured during the period: OFF WO EM

a. 4th Inf Div
   b. 173d Abn Bde
   c. Task Force South

2. To reduce the II CTZ PW Camp population to an acceptable level, a total of 204 FWs were evacuated. Twelve (12) were evacuated to Bien Hoa from the Pleiku Camp. One hundred and eight (108) were evacuated to Phu Quoc from the Phu Tai Camp. Eighty-four (84) were evacuated to Bien Hoa from the Phu Tai Camp. As of 31 October 1969 the PW population of Phu Quoc Island is said to be approximately 21,000 with emergency conditions set at 25,000.

3. Over the last 3 months there have been 129 prisoners of war repatriated. Of these 65 were from Pleiku. This included 40 Montagnards and 25 elderly Vietnamese. The remaining 64 were released from Phu Tai. They included elderly female Vietnamese.

4. End of the quarter PW strengths of the 2 ARVN Camps are as follows:

a. Pleiku camp strength increased from 1135 on 31 July to 1293 on 31 Oct 69.

b. Phu Tai Camp strength increased from 1055 on 31 July to 1060 on 31 Oct 69.

(11) Medical.

(a) The general health of the command remains good. Units are continuing to maintain their malaria rates below those of last year with the 173d Airborne Brigade still staying at a level which is below the USARV average for all types of Army personnel. Widespread use of chloroquine urine tests and strong command interest is accounting for the reduction in this year's rates.

(b) During this reporting period there is still no indication that the transition from two to one Medical Group supporting II CTZ will decrease the quality of medical support. The 70th Medical Battalion is functioning in a satisfactory manner as a control headquarters for Northern II CTZ.
(c) There were two significant series of changes in medical support during this period. The first was the closing and return to CONUS of the 311th Field Hospital which was a reserve unit that had a POW commitment at Phu Thanh. This commitment was taken over by the 17th Field Hospital that was located at An Khe and the mission of the 17th Field Hospital was taken by the 7th Medical Detachment which was basically being held in reserve in Cam Ranh South. An agreement was reached for the ARVN to handle all POWs and the 17th Field Hospital was returned to An Khe and will begin to operate there early in November. The 7th Medical Detachment was moved to Phu Thanh for area medical support.

(d) The second significant series of changes began with the moving of the 1/568th Med Co (Clr) from Bao Loc to Phan Thiet. Medical support in Bao Loc will be performed by organic medics. The 1/568th relieved the 136th Medical Detachment at Phan Thiet who in turn moved to Cam Ranh South where they will operate a dispensary and free the 2/568th Med Co from their dispensary commitment. The 2/568th is now operating a small holding facility and is in a reserve capacity if needed.

(12) Morale and Services.

(a) The G1 continued to monitor the officer and enlisted open messes in the II CTZ. The consolidation program initiated by USARV and endorsed by MACV continued into the reporting period. One additional account was terminated during this reporting period bringing the total to 38 accounts either liquidated or consolidated since the inception of the program. Due to the relocation of personnel in Nha Trang the club system became somewhat unresponsive to the needs of the personnel. A realignment program was initiated which will shift club facilities to the population centers in Camp McDermott.

(b) During the reporting period an extensive study was made of the exchange system in Nha Trang. The goal of this study was to provide better service and also to increase control of sales. As a result of the study; a centralized Class VI, beer and soda outlet will be established at Camp McDermott, a troop store will be opened in Camp McDermott and warehouse and office space will be provided the Vietnam Regional Exchange at Camp McDermott. These moves will streamline the system making it more responsive and also increase control. Additionally, 4 leases will be terminated with an annual savings of $41,000.

(c) The relocation of US personnel from leased facilities in Nha Trang to US billets in Camp McDermott was completed during the period. This program returned approximately 70 leases to their owners, as a part of the continuing program of returning the local economy to normal.
OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned

Headquarters First Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS GSFOR-65 (R2)

(13) Safety and Accident Prevention.

(a) The I FFORCEV Safety Program was reviewed for the first quarter FY 70 and statistics are included at inclosures 11 and 12. The Army Motor Vehicle Accident Rate and Military Disabling Injury Rate decreased this quarter and both are well within the expectancy rates established for this command by USARV.

(b) USARV Motor Vehicle Accident Prevention Month (September) was highly successful. Three recordable accidents were reported which represents a rate of 3.58 accidents per 1,000,000 miles of vehicle operation. The expectancy rate for this command is 8.7.

(14) ARVN Interpreters

(a) At the end of this reporting period the total authorized strength of ARVN interpreters with US elements in II CTZ was 845 and the assigned strength was 818 which represents 96.9% fill. There have been no significant changes to authorization during the past quarter. Strength breakout for major commands within II CTZ is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Auth</th>
<th>ASOD</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ I FFORCEV*</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Includes 55th MID and 41st CA Co</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Inf Div</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>126</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>175th Abn Bde</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Force South</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Includes 3/506th, 2/1st Cav Sqdn, 1/50th Inf (Mech)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I FFORCEV Arty</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Corps Adv Gp</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>532</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>818</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*A shortage of interpreters exists in HQ I FFORCEV, but his shortage has minimum impact on mission accomplishment.

(b) A problem area arose in mid August with the 55th MID which was authorized nineteen (19) interpreters but was being assigned interpreters in excess to the authorization and in excess to what the detachment could utilize or support. The authorization was reduced to twelve (12), and six (6) excess interpreters were transferred, with II Corps approval, to the 2/1st Cav Sqdn at Phan Rang.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned Headquarters First Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(c) Strength reporting to USARV and this headquarters no longer appears to be a problem so far as I FFORCEV assigned, attached and OPCON units are concerned. Control and monitorship of II CTZ units directly under USARV control (18th Engineer Bde, 4th PSYOP Gp and 5th Special Forces) still present a problem due to lack of well established command relationships and channels of communication between this headquarters and all major commands located in II CTZ. The area coordinator concept is utilized in routine matters that arise, however, lack of a USARV interpreter regulation that clearly outlines inter-corps command relationships is at the center of the problem. When USARV will publish a regulation in this area is undetermined.

(d) There has been a drawdown on the number of interpreters being graduated from the Armed Forces Language School at Long Binh. USARV has informed this headquarters that there will be very few ARVN interpreters available for assignment to II CTZ units prior to April 1970. At present there are no critical interpreters shortages within II CTZ and linguistic coverage is considered adequate for the next quarter.

(e) ARVN Replacement and Strength Reporting.

(5) Overall the ARVN replacement system is working smoothly and II Corps units are at about 85% assigned fill. Two units that generated command interest during the quarter were the 42d and 45th Regiment. The 42d Regiment, operating independently in the critical Kontum area, achieved a long sought goal in late September of 102% assigned fill with 2973 personnel assigned of 2937 authorized. Additionally, MACV has assured this headquarters that October and November replacements would be adequate to maintain this level.

(6) The 45th Regiment, operating in the southwestern corner of II CTZ, became of command interest during the past quarter since it was scheduled to be committed immediately to any major combat action that developed in Quang Duc Province. MACV was made aware of the 45th's personnel situation (83% fill during July and August) in an effort to bring this unit up to an acceptable strength posture. Projected replacements for the entire 23d Division, if equally portioned to the division's three regiments, should be sufficient to bring the 45th Regiment up to about 90% fill by mid November.

(6) The ARVN strength reporting system has been improved somewhat with the initiation of a daily strength report for II Corps tactical units. Some units are still experiencing difficulty with timely submission due to inadequate wire and radio services.

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(d) The problem of obtaining strength, casualty and replacement data
for this headquarters was improved with the establishment of a weekly report
prepared by DSA II CTZ, AG Advisor, based on monitored QD 22 reports and
the 5 day casualty reports at H& II Corps. Units being reported to this
headquarters by DSA II CTZ are the regiments and battalions of the 22d
and 23d Div, 24th STZ (42d Regt), 2d Ranger Group, and 3d, 8th and 14th
Armored Cavalry Squadrons. Experience has shown that this report arrives
here approximately ten days after the as of date of the strengths.

f. Artillery

(1) Intelligences: Hostile artillery attacks during the period reached
a high point on 12 August when the enemy conducted 60 attacks and expended
457 rounds in conjunction with the reported initiation of the autumn offen-
sive. However, the offensive did not materialize and activity returned to
a low level shortly thereafter. Enemy activity was not concentrated in
any one area during the period and the vast majority of the attacks were
of low intensity. The Highland Provinces received the largest percentage
of activity with attacks occurring primarily in the vicinity of Kontum City,
Pleiku City, and Ban Me Thuot City. The 28th, 66th, and 40th NVA Regiments
remained unlocated in Cambodia; however, they are believed to have moved
towards II CTZ with intentions unknown. The majority of enemy activity
in the Coastal Provinces occurred in Binh Dinh Province, where attacks were
scattered throughout the province and were directed primarily against the
Allied Pacification Program. Several of the enemy units in the Coastal
Provinces have reportedly broken down into smaller size elements to operate
with and as guerrilla forces. The Phan Thiet area of Binh Thuan Province
continued to witness a cyclical pattern of activity as enemy attacks increased
during the last two weeks of August and the first two weeks of October.
Elsewhere in the Southern Provinces, Dalat received considerable activity,
particularly during the month of August, with activity being scattered and
of low intensity in the remaining provinces. Enemy artillery activity
increased sharply in the Bu Prang area (Quang Duc Province) during the last
week of October which was targeted against US firebases. There was no sus-
tained offensive and activity was spread throughout II CTZ.

(2) Operations:

(a) During the reporting period, artillery units with I FFORCEV con-
tinued support of ARVN, ROK, US, RF/PF, RD Teams and USSF/CIDG forces in
II CTZ. I FFORCEV Artillery units continued support of I FFORCEV maneuver
forces in providing maximum participation in pacification, fire planning,
and artillery protection for the greatest number of villages and hamlets
in the II CTZ.

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(b) Areas of responsibility remained unchanged with the groups continuing to operate in their AO's.

(3) Fire Support Coordination Element.

(a) Naval Gunfire Support for II CTZ was provided by an average of two ships each day. In all a total of 21 different ships, representing two countries, saw action in II CTZ during the three month period. The following is a summary of Naval Gunfire Support:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
<th>TARGETS</th>
<th>ROUNDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>463</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>16,867</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) During the reporting period, a daily average of 62 immediate reaction and hangfire targets were developed. Of these, a daily average of 42 were fired. Of those that were not fired, most could not be cleared or had been pretargeted. The following is a summary of targets developed and fired:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMMEDIATE REACTION</th>
<th>HANGFIRE</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEVELOPED</td>
<td>5006</td>
<td>564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIRED</td>
<td>3416</td>
<td>394</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) The Area Harassment program continues to be an effective means of harassing the enemy in those sanctuaries and base areas which are out of range of friendly artillery. Thirteen areas which change as the enemy moves within the Corps are constantly monitored. Every five days the best seven areas are selected in priority and targeted twice daily for tactical air and spooky and shadow missions. This provides current, lucrative targets throughout the corps that can be struck as aircraft become available. Summary of missions in support of the area harassment program:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGETS</th>
<th>A/C SORTIES</th>
<th># TOT'S</th>
<th>SPOOKY/SHADOW (RDS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>129,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) A daily average of 6 suppression orders were issued to 175mm guns throughout the Corps.

(e) A total of 127 Arc Light targets were struck during the period by a total of 470 aircraft. The following is a breakdown of ARC LIGHT Support:

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>TARGETS</th>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BINH DINH</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BINH THUAN</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KONTUM</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHU VINH</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHU YEN</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLEIKU</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUANG DUC</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUANG NGAI</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>82</strong></td>
<td><strong>356</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>TARGETS</th>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BINH DINH</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DARLAC</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KONTUM</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLEIKU</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>45</strong></td>
<td><strong>114</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(f) In order to implement uniform ARC LIGHT procedures throughout II CTZ which are compatible with current MACV requirements, a comprehensive regulation covering all aspects of the ARC LIGHT program was published in September. FSCB personnel also made frequent field trips to assist new personnel in the ARC LIGHT program. These visits included a detailed security inspection to insure that all units are complying with proper security requirements. During the latter part of October, an ARC LIGHT conference was sponsored by the FSCB to discuss planning and requesting techniques contained in the new regulation. Results of the security inspection were also reviewed at the conference.
(g) One new Artillery Warning Control Center was added to the II CTZ Artillery Warning System. There are now 24 operational centers. On 5 Aug 69 an AWCC conference was held at HQ, I FFORCEV to discuss the proposed changes to MACV Dir 95-13. Subsequent to this conference, an unclassified listing of II CTZ AWCC frequencies was developed and published. In October, the Assistant Chief of Staff, MACV J3, released the proposed MACV Dir 95-13, Artillery and Air Strike Warning System, for concurrence. The FSCE examined this document and forwarded it to the I FFORCEV Chief of Staff recommending several changes. The major change introduced by the proposed directive is the requirement to post air strike warnings in addition to normal artillery advisories. There are no foreseeable difficulties in complying with this major change. The FSCE is currently drafting a directive which will implement the MACV directive and establish standing procedures for the II CTZ Artillery and Air Strike Warning System.

(4) RVNAP Assistance Programs

(a) RVNAP Assistance Programs continued to show progress during the reporting period. As a result of training assistance furnished by US artillery units, the proficiency of ARVN units has shown continual improvement. Frequently, ARVN artillery has been used in support of US maneuver units in conjunction with US artillery support.

(b) Greater emphasis has been placed on the artillery assistance program for Civilian Irregular Defense Group camps. The 105mm howitzers, organic to the CIDG Camps and heretofore used in the direct fire role for perimeter defense, can now be used in the indirect fire support role of maneuver elements. This has been accomplished by I FFORCEV Arty units providing teams to train CIDG personnel in firing battery, fire direction and forward observer procedures.

(c) Training assistance to Territorial Force (RF/PP, RD) units has shown continual improvement. Forward observer training and technical assistance for the implementation of District Fire Support Plans have been rendered by I FFORCEV Arty units.

(d) As a part of the accelerated Phase II plan for RVNAP Improvement and Modernization, 6th Battalion, 84th Artillery, had been scheduled for turnover to the ARVN 45th Arty Battalion. Approval of the turnover was granted by MACV on 2 April 1969. This action was completed during the reporting period. A complete resume follows:

ACTION
Turnover of C Btry to ARVN

DATE
18 Apr 69
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Turnover of B Btry to ARVN 15 Jun 69
Turnover of A Btry to ARVN 14 Jul 69
Turnover of H B Btry to ARVN 29 Jul 69
Turn in of residual property to support unit or transfer to other US Units 18 Sep 69
Review of property book for verification of property accountability 20 – 22 Sep 69
Destruction of property book by I FORCEV Arty S4 as directed by USARV 23 Sep 69

(a) Non-divisional

I Field Force Vietnam Artillery

270th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
272d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (AW) (SP)
Battery B, 29th Artillery (SFM)
Battery E, 41st Artillery (MG)
Headquarters Battery, 8th Battalion, 26th Artillery (TAB)
54th Infantry Detachment (Radar Ground Surveillance)
77th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
237th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
241st Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
242d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
243d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
244th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
253d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
254th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
255th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
256th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)

41st Artillery Group

7th Battalion, 13th Artillery (105mm T)
7th Battalion, 15th Artillery (175mm/6" SP)
6th Battalion, 32d Artillery (175mm/8" SP)
Ammunition statistics for US Force Artillery during the reporting period.

(a) Ammunition expenditures by target category:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGET CATEGORY</th>
<th>AUGUST</th>
<th></th>
<th>SEPTEMBER</th>
<th></th>
<th>OCTOBER</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROUNDS</td>
<td>MISSIONS</td>
<td>ROUNDS</td>
<td>MISSIONS</td>
<td>ROUNDS</td>
<td>MISSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>16,651</td>
<td>837</td>
<td>11,210</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>11,853</td>
<td>685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquired</td>
<td>45,881</td>
<td>9,792</td>
<td>47,520</td>
<td>11,001</td>
<td>34,285</td>
<td>12,021</td>
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<tr>
<td>Counter Battery</td>
<td>3,842</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>1,639</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>1,334</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation</td>
<td>8,964</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>6,876</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>10,527</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdiction</td>
<td>5,892</td>
<td>3,763</td>
<td>5,602</td>
<td>2,542</td>
<td>4,921</td>
<td>2,361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Purpose</td>
<td>12,143</td>
<td>1,861</td>
<td>9,550</td>
<td>1,207</td>
<td>10,489</td>
<td>1,321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>832</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>1,396</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>2,078</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>94,205</td>
<td>17,483</td>
<td>83,793</td>
<td>16,368</td>
<td>95,487</td>
<td>17,476</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Ammunition expenditure by caliber:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>CALIBER</th>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>CALIBER</th>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>CALIBER</th>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>CALIBER</th>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>CALIBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ASC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ASC</td>
<td></td>
<td>ASC</td>
<td></td>
<td>ASC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUB TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>94,205</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td>21*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEP</td>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>59,274</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>155mm</td>
<td>7,274</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8 inch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>175mm</td>
<td>8,049</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>175mm</td>
<td>8,827</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8 inch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUB TOTAL</td>
<td>83,793</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>20*</td>
<td></td>
<td>89</td>
<td></td>
<td>CONFIDENTIAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>CALIBER</th>
<th>ROUNDS</th>
<th>% TOTAL</th>
<th>RDS/ROUND/DAY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OCT</td>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>64,868</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>155mm</td>
<td>10,514</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 inch</td>
<td>9,822</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>175mm</td>
<td>10,283</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SUB TOTAL</td>
<td>95,487</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>22*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GRAND TOTAL</td>
<td>273,485</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Prorated Average

(1) The continuing upgrade of communications systems and circuits within the II CTZ was the major concern of the Signal Section during the past quarter.

(2) Of major importance during the quarter was the implementation of I FFORCEV Signal Plan 1-69, code named "Quick Comm". Until the implementation of this plan, most of the 54 District Advisors in the II Corps Tactical Zone did not have telephone communications. As a result, an extremely important intelligence route between the districts and Hq I FFORCEV was not available. "Quick Comm" involved the upgrading of Province-District FM radio nets and the use of radio wire integration techniques to connect dedicated circuits between the I FFORCEV TOC and the provinces directly to the districts through the FM net. The dedicated circuits were requested and approved over the Integrated Communications System, the Corps Area Communications System, and the 54th Signal Battalion Multichannel System. During the months of September and October "Quick Comm" communications were established with eleven of the twelve provinces, utilizing fabricated RWI equipment. Requirements and justification were provided to CORDS for obtaining the necessary equipment, AN/GRA-39 and SB-22, for the final upgrade of the system to its design level.

(3) The 54th Signal Battalion continued to support units within the II CTZ. Two radio teletype facilities were established in Ban Me Thuot and Gia Nghia to support potential operations in Quang Duc Province. A new VHF multichannel system was established between Camp Enari and An Khe and several circuits in support of tactical operations were established over this system and the systems from An Khe to LZ English.

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52d Artillery Group

3d Bn, 6th Artillery (105mm SP) (-B Btry, 105 SP) with C/7/15 175mm/8” SP temporarily attached
6th Battalion, 14th Artillery (175mm/8” SP)
2nd Battalion, 17th Artillery (105mm T)
1st Battalion, 92d Artillery (155mm T)

I FORCEN Provisional Artillery Group

5th Battalion, 22d Artillery (175mm/8” SP)
5th Battalion, 27th Artillery (105mm T) (Attached B/3/6, 105mm SP)

(b) Divisional, Brigade and Separate Battalion

4th Infantry Division Artillery

2nd Battalion, 9th Artillery (105mm T)
5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (155mm/8” SP)
6th Battalion, 29th Artillery (105mm T)
4th Battalion, 42d Artillery (105mm T)

173d Airborne Brigade (Separate)

3d Battalion, 319th Artillery (105mm T)

3d Battalion, 506th Infantry, 101st Division (AM)

Battery D, 2nd Battalion, 320th Artillery (105mm T)

(6) Artillery strength. The following table reflects artillery tube strength by caliber for ARVN, ROK, US and USFR/CIDG Artillery units in II CTZ at the end of the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>105mm</th>
<th>155mm</th>
<th>8 inch</th>
<th>175mm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US Divisional</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK Divisional</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Force Artillery</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARVN Artillery</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Forces (CIDG)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>479</strong></td>
<td><strong>139</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
<td><strong>24</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GRAND TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>610</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Multichannel systems were also established in the Task Force South area of operations during short term operations by the 3/506th Inf Bn (AM).

(4) Conventional multi-ply teletype paper was replaced in the I FFORCEV Command with Hecto Paper in order to provide a convenient means of message reproduction. Plans were made and work order submitted to prepare the commcenter for the installation of Digital Subscriber Terminal Equipment to replace the present MODE V facilities on the AUTODIN circuit.

(5) The Signal Section, I FFORCEV, obtained digging permits, right of way clearances, and information about all underground and surface obstacles in connection with a new 1200 pair cable being installed to upgrade dial telephone service and permit removal of extraneous wire and cable in the Nha Trang area. This was accomplished through coordination with the Province Senior Advisor, Vinnell and SEPIA power companies, and the Nha Trang Public Works Bureau. HQS 1 FFORCEV received 400 pairs from this cable which will soon be extended to service the I FFORCEV Compound.

(6) The Signal Section supervised the installation of a Motorola Command or Call System. This system provides HQS I FFORCEV, I FFORCEV Arty, and CORDS with five Motorola Handle Talkie FM Radios which provide contact from the Nha Trang area into the Typhoon Switchboard for integration into the telephone system.

(7) The Signal Section continued its resolution of frequency interference, SOI compromise, and security problems. The section aided in various inspections conducted by the Headquarters, provided public address system support to special functions, published SOI items, processed circuit requests, distributed crypto material, and made communications studies directed at the overall improvement of systems in the I Corps Tactical Zone.

k. Engineer

(1) During the period of this report the engineer section directed efforts towards planning, coordinating and monitoring of engineer activities in II CTZ and maintaining close liaison with engineer units by frequent field trips. Major planning actions include:

(a) The I FFORCEV Engineer Section assumed greater control of land clearing operations in II CTZ during this quarter. Essentially, this section has moved from the position of monitoring land clearing to one of prescribing and directing specific land clearing projects. Changes to the established program now require concurrence of this headquarters. Guidelines have been established for security land clearing where Rome Plow blades are not feasible, and other management features which permit the program to be administered more efficiently.
A staff study was initiated during this report period concerning recommended changes of maintenance standards of II CTZ airfields used by Air Force aircraft. Input is required by I FFORCEV G3 and G4 and final action will be concluded in the next quarter.

(2) Support of Tactical Operations

(a) Dan An/Sheridan

1 Maintenance of QL-1 and LTL-6B: The 116th and 19th Engineer battalions performed continued maintenance on these routes to assure passage of tactical traffic. Major washout due to extensive flooding occurred on both these routes on 8 Sep. Elements of three engineer battalions of the 35th Engr Gp were required to reopen the routes. QL-1 was finally reopened on 12 October while work continues on LTL-6B at the close of the reporting period with an EDC of 2 Nov 69 for reopening.

2 Support of 2/1 Cav Sqdn: The 589th Engr Bn continued technical assistance in the construction of field fortifications and the restoration of facilities damaged by flood water. One water point continued to be operated by the 587th Engr Bn and two additional water points were installed early in October by the 19th Engr Bn.

3 Engineer Support to Artillery Units: The 19th Engr Bn continued to render technical and equipment assistance to units occupying LZ Sherry which included the construction of a water well at each of these sites and the initiation of work on an access road to LZ Sandy.

4 Camp Rock, Bao Loci: The 19th Engr Bn moved to Bao Loci during this quarter, performed road maintenance and construction on QL-20, assisted in the disassembly and relocation of structures of Camp Rock and accomplished the final leveling of Camp Rock after evacuation.

5 LZ Betty: Elements of the 35th Engr Gp initiated MER construction for TF South and 1/50th Mach in conjunction with their relocation to this LZ. MER construction continues at the end of this quarter with some problems causing delays due to non-availability of specific construction materials. Two (2) OV-2 revetments were constructed for additional FAC aircraft to be stationed at this LZ.

(b) Logistical Support Projects at Phan Thiet: Various projects to support the LSA at Phan Thiet were initiated or continued during this quarter to include the repair of the LST ramp.
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(c) Quang Duc Province

1. Support of Artillery Units. Elements of I FFORCEV Arty were deployed to fire bases throughout this report period to support ARVN operations. The 70th Engr Bn assisted in construction of fire bases Dorre, Helen and Susan.

2. Minesweeps. The 70th Engr Bn conducted minesweeps along QL-14 as required for movement of heavy artillery and military convoys.

3. Aircraft Revetments. The 70th Engr Bn constructed revetments at KB Me Thuot East and city airfields for elements of the 7/17th Air Cav and to increase CH-54 capabilities to support ARVN operations.

(d) Dan Quyen/Hines

1. An Khe Projects. The 299th Engr Bn improved Williams Bailey Bridge to sustain class 70 traffic, completed revetment of the power plant on 10 Oct, commenced construction on a counter mortar radar tower and started construction of 81 aircraft revetments due to be completed 19 Dec 69.

2. Ben Het Special Forces Camp. The 20th Engr Bn commenced an accelerated program for improvement of camp facilities in conjunction with Special Forces KB teams and CIDG labor. Program includes 58 living/fighting bunkers for CIDG troops and their dependents, mortar and recoilless rifle pits, a helicopter landing pad, a truck off-loading area and the improvement of internal road nets. EDC for project is 15 Nov 69.

3. Ben Het Artillery Positions. The 20th Engr Bn completed construction of two gun pads for 155mm howitzers of the 6/14th Arty and commenced construction of two howitzer pads with overhead cover for the guns. Due to be completed on or before 15 Nov 69.

4. Relocation of POL Berms at Dak To. The 20th ECB relocated POL berms at Dak To on 25 Aug to place them within the reduced perimeter established by the ARVN when they assumed responsibility for this fire base and airfield.

5. Artillery Positions at Kontum. The 20th ECB completed construction of two 8" gun positions and two 175mm howitzer pads on 31 Oct 69 for elements of the 6/14th Arty in Kontum adjacent to the 24th STZ compound.

6. Kontum Helipad Repair. Elements of the 937th Engr Gp repaired the helipad at the Special Forces FOB II Camp in August by leveling, shaping and applying penprime to reduce erosion effects of monsoon rains.
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7 Pleiku Guard Towers: Engineers of the 937th Engr Gp completed two guard towers on 8 Aug at the Pleiku POL tank farm.

8 Guard Towers at LZ Panther: The 20th ECB commenced construction of two guard towers at this LZ on 4 Aug which is occupied by a battery of 3/6th Arty and completed them on 10 October.

9 Pleiku Psyops Radio Station: Troops from the 937th Engr Gp performed alterations on this facility's generator shed and improved the radio van bunker. This project was 96% complete at the close of this quarter.

2 Washington - Green

1 Kim Song River Bridge: Elements of the 299th ECB commenced the construction of a class 22 timber trestle bridge at BR617300 on 20 Aug 1969 to provide year-round access to a population area of 4,000 previously isolated during the monsoon seasons and VC controlled during this isolation. The original EDC was 7 Nov 1969 but a flash flood occurring on 30 October washed out portions of the far shore abutment and part of one span. Repair operations and construction will continue into the next report period.

2 Upgrade of TL-3A: The 299th ECB started improvement of this route in the last quarter to facilitate land supply of LZ Orange as well as contribute to the overall Binh Dinh pacification program in this district. Work continued throughout this quarter and the placement of a 2 inch asphalt surface was initiated and continues, though currently hampered by monsoon rains.

3 Tuy Hoa Pipeline Burials: Work on this project commenced during the previous quarter and continues throughout this reporting period. As of 31 Oct the project is reported as 99.5% complete.

3 Airfield Upgrading and Repair

(a) An Khe (BR407447): Elements of the 299th Engr Bn worked sporadically on the parallel taxiway by placement of concrete runners designed to increase the load bearing capacity and permit temporary parking of large aircraft. The project was frequently interrupted due to monsoon rains.

(b) Bao Loc (ZT067572): The 19th Engr Bn repaired portions of the base by recompaction and performed welding of M8A1 matting as required.

(c) Ben Hie (YB672252): Major upgrade consisting of stripping of old matting, removal of several inches of existing base, placement and compaction of new fill and resurfacing with new M8A1 was started in October. EDC is 30 Nov, 1969.
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(4) Cheo Reo (BQ233818): Temporary repair by the 20th Engr Bn was completed on 29 Aug 1969. The 18th Engr Bde is currently compiling a study to determine the proper design required for major upgrading.

(5) Duc Co (YA843255): A partial failure of the sub-base on the west turn-around was repaired by the 20th Engr Bn during this quarter.

(6) Due Lap (YU819725): Repair of the T-17 membrane continued during this period. The field was open to aircraft for only short periods. The 18th Engr Bde has directed the 35th Engr Gp to effect permanent repair during the current highland construction season.

(7) Due Xuyen (AP882478): The repair of 350' of this airfield continued at a slow pace throughout this reporting period due to monsoon rains. Completion of repair is scheduled for 14 Nov, 1969 and will provide a Type I, C-7A capable field.

(8) Phan Thiet (AN801068): The 19th Engr Bn performed continuous repair and maintenance consisting primarily of welding M8A1 panels. The 35th Engr Gp has prepared a design for major upgrade which is currently being evaluated by the 18th Engr Bde prior to submission to USARV for final approval.

(4) Land Clearing Operations

(a) A total of 5,389 acres were cleared by the 35th Engr Gp within their AO.

(b) A total of 4,140 acres were cleared by the 937th Engr Gp primarily along routes in the northern coastal provinces.

(5) Route Upgrading in II CTZ

(a) Within the seven (7) southern provinces of II CTZ composing the 35th Engr Gp AO the following LOC work was accomplished along QL-21, QL-21A, QL-11 and QL-20:

1. Sub-base: 57.75 km.
2. Base course: 51.35 km.
3. Asphalt concrete or DBST: 122.44 km.

(b) Within the five (5) northern provinces of II CTZ constituting the AO of the 937th Engr Gp the following LOC work was accomplished on QL-1 and QL-14:

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1. Sub-bases: 47.45 km.
2. Base course: 36.0 km.
3. Asphalt/concrete or DBST: 5.27 km.

(6) Miscellaneous Engineer Actions

(a) Personnel Shelters: The 864th Engr Bn constructed 31 personnel shelters at the new officer/NCO billets at Camp McDermott.

(b) Helicopter Revetments: The 589th Engr Bn constructed 15 helicopter revetments within the Army portion of the Phan Rang Airfield.

(c) Bong Song RR Bridge: Elements of the 299th Engr Bn completed the re-decking of the Bong Song RR bridge this quarter. The bridge handles QL-1 traffic in lieu of the major bridge to be constructed which is now in planning stage.

(d) Binh Dinh Pacifications: Elements of the 173d Abn Bde and the 299th Engr Bn continued on pacification projects throughout this period. These projects include improvement of secondary roads within the province, upgrading of 505 and the building of a causeway and bridge currently in the Tam Quan District.

1. Staff Judge Advocate Activities.

(1) There were 15 trials by General Courts-Martial convened by the Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, during the report period compared to 3 cases the previous period. One hundred sixty six special courts-martial and 50 summary courts-martial were reviewed for legal sufficiency. This reflects a decrease of 53 special and 30 summary courts-martial over the previous period. Also during this period there were 1449 Article 15's reviewed as compared with 1723 for the previous period.

(2) 57 claims of Army personnel for loss of, or damage to, personal property incident to service were adjudicated and paid, compared to 24 the previous quarter. The claims totaling $27,029.67 were approved for payment in the total amount of $20,474.69.

(3) 14 claims of Vietnamese nationals for personal injury or property damage were processed by this office.

(4) The legal assistance office provided advice and assistance on civil matters to 469 individuals during the quarter compared to 612 the previous quarter.
(5) Military justice clients numbered 235 during this quarter.

J. Inspector General Activities.

(1) During the period 1 Aug to 31 Oct 69, 124 Inspector General Action Requests were received. Broken down by major category these are:

(a) Requests for assistance 92
(b) Justified complaints 13
(c) Unjustified complaints 19

Over 90% of these action requests continue to be "walk-in" or direct complaints to the IG during command inspections. The magnitude and pattern of complaints do not include any significant change from previous reporting periods, and there is no indication of problem areas which could result in conditions detrimental to the efficiency or reputation of the command.

(2) Command inspections of the following units were conducted on the dates indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>54th Sig Bn</td>
<td>1 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>209th Sig Bn</td>
<td>1 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Bn, 14th Arty</td>
<td>3 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52d Arty Gp</td>
<td>11 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>167th Sig Bn</td>
<td>15 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn, 17th Arty</td>
<td>25 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co C (Ranger), 75th Inf</td>
<td>29 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41st GA Co</td>
<td>12 Sep 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Bn, 60th Arty</td>
<td>15 Sep 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kontum Prov</td>
<td>16 Sep 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binh Dinh Prov</td>
<td>23 Sep 69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11th PI Det</td>
<td>26 Sep 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55th MI Det</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64th Engr Det</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I FFORCEV Arty</td>
<td>10 Oct 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Bn, 26th Arty (TAB)</td>
<td>13 Oct 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minh Thuan Prov</td>
<td>21 Oct 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>272d MP Co</td>
<td>24 Oct 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Bn, 32d Arty</td>
<td>27 Oct 69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All units were rated satisfactory based upon a rating scale of satisfactory/unsatisfactory only.

(3) Memorandum, subject: Rights of Military Personnel to Present Complaints, was published and distributed on 1 Oct 69 to all assigned and attached units.

(4) The following Acting Inspector Generals were appointed during the period due to DRCRS, reassignment, etc:

(a) LEC James Bell     I FFORCEV Arty
(b) MAJ Roy Buff       6th Bn, 14th Arty
(c) MAJ Harry Hubbard  4th Bn, 60th Arty
(d) MAJ Homer Pederson 5th Bn, 22d Arty
(e) MAJ Bruce Martin   41st Arty Co

(5) There were eight (8) investigations/inquiries conducted during the period.

(6) Corrective action report, I FFORCEV AGI, FY 69, submitted to WAAPAC 15 Sep 69.

(7) I FFORCEV Special Inspection, FY 70, conducted by WAAPAC 15-20 Sep 69. Corrective action report submitted 16 Oct 69.

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(1) Representatives of the Information Office provided coverage for numerous awards and promotion ceremonies as well as for special events during the period, including:

(a) Presentation of Legion of Merit to Col Jack F. Senechal - 2 August 1969.

(b) Presentation of Legion of Merit to LTC William D. Col - 5 August 1969.

(c) Presentation of Legion of Merit to LTC Daniel H. Bauer - 9 August 1969.

(d) Presentation of Legion of Merit to LTC Stanley D. Ward - 21 August 1969.

(e) Presentation of Legion of Merit to Col Thomas F. Whalen - 9 September 1969.

(f) Presentation of Legion of Merit to Col James H. McClurkin - 21 September 1969.

(g) Presentation of Legion of Merit to LTC Eugene Hammond - 24 October 1969.

(2) Photographic coverage was provided for numerous distinguished visitors to include:

(a) Honorable Stanley R. Resor, Secretary of the Army, on 24 August 1969.

(b) LTC William P. Yarborough, Deputy Commander in Chief USBAPAC, 2 October 1969.


(d) Gen Sir John Wilton, Chief of the Chief of Staff’s Committee for Australia, 26 October 1969.

(e) Gen William B. Rosson, Deputy COMUSMACV, 28 October 1969.

(f) Gen Cao Van Vien, Chairman Joint General Staff, 28 October 1969.
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(3) The following media representatives were granted a G2/G3 briefing during the period covered by the report:

(a) Mr Nat Gibson, UPI
(b) Mrs Helen Gibson, UPI
(c) Mr Charles Arnott, ABC News
(d) Mr James Belden, Tele-News International

(4) Command Information Initial Orientation Briefings for personnel newly assigned to I FFORCEV were conducted each month.

(5) The 5th PID, under the supervision of the IO, I FFORCEV, published and distributed the "Morning News" on a daily basis, and a bi-weekly summary of news in II CTZ, the "WRAP-UP". The 5th PID also produced a weekly 15 minute radio program, the "Feature Page" and a 15 minute TV program, the "Armed Forces News Spotlight" every two weeks. The I FFORCEV magazine, the "TYphoon", was published in August, September and October. CPT Lewis H. Hay III, was assigned to the 5th PID on 28 October 1969.

(6) The 11th PID continued to provide transportation, escort, billets and handling during the period covered.

2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

   a. Personnel. None

   b. Intelligence.

   (1) Communications Security.

      (a) Observation. Both NVA and VC units have the capabilities of monitoring US and Allied communications with sophisticated and technical equipment. In addition to his monitoring capabilities, the enemy is capable of confusing or disrupting our communications by means of imitative communications deception (ICD) and frequency jamming.

      (b) Evaluation.

      1. Numerous incidents in the past have occurred where friendly units have discovered they had been subjected to enemy monitoring. Also enemy ICD has been attempted throughout Vietnam. Further confirmation of enemy's capabilities was established when elements of the 4th Infantry Division captured intercept equipment from the enemy on 18 September 1969 near An Khe.
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2. US Radio Research (RR) units have been assisting the US units throughout II CTZ with communications security (COMSEC). This includes the training of communicators and briefings on COMSEC awareness. Also RR units conduct monitoring of friendly units to assure they are following correct procedures and aiding and assisting them with any difficulties or discrepancies noted.

3. By totaling the number of transmission and violations and then comparing the ratio of transmissions per violation with the ratio derived during the first quarter, a substantial improvement in communications security can be seen due to the support rendered by the radio research units. During this quarter 48 violations were detected from nearly 246,000 monitored transmissions. This is a ratio of one violation per 5,148 transmissions as compared to one per 2162 transmissions last quarter. Another reason for improvement is due to maximum use of secure voice equipment (KY 8 and KY 38) by some units down to battalion level.

(c) Recommendations. Continued command emphasis is needed to stress upon all transmitters, using either radio or conventional telephone, that information passed through the air or wire is subject to enemy monitoring and exploitation. All units should be urged to seek COMSEC advice and assistance to enhance their communications security posture.

(2) Interrogation of Low Level Sources.

(a) Observation. Low level intelligence sources are frequently not interrogated.

(b) Evaluation. In an effort to help fill gaps in district intelligence, attempts are being made to fully exploit such low level sources of information as hamlet and village guerrillas, and VCI below district level. These sources are captured in II Corps on a regular basis. Additionally, over 200 guerrillas, sympathizers and VC supporters rally to GVN in II CTZ each month. These sources tend to be overlooked by Vietnamese for intelligence purposes. The more important or higher level prisoners receive immediate attention from police interrogators. Consequently, the lower level sources, whether evacuated as prisoners of war, or released to National Police as civil defendants, are most often considered of such little importance that they never receive a detailed interrogation for exploitation of information they might possess. Both Sector Intelligence Platoons and District Intelligence Squads have interrogation capability, and both PIIOCCs and DIOCCs are supposed to have the administrative capability of preparing and disseminating reports.
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(c) Recommendation. That the Phoenix Director, MACV, be advised of
this deficiency and encouraged to stress through Vietnamese channels the
importance of expliciting these sources and disseminating the information
obtained.

(3) Revision of PHUNG HOANG SOPs.

(a) Observation. In many provinces and districts confusion prevails
regarding the operational concepts of the PIOCCs and DIOCCs. This
situation is caused, in great degree, by the incompatibility of MACV
Directives and SOPs which do not explicitly define the integrated, but
distinct, missions of those centers. One of the basic misunderstandings
stems from the mistaken attitude that the PIOCCs and DIOCCs were estab-
lished to perform an isolated mission, i.e., elimination of the VC Infra-
structure. An equally important, but often disregarded mission, requires
that PIOCCs and DIOCCs be organized to carry out operations against VC/NVA
tactical units as well as the VCI. One result of this misconception,
which has been observed during inspections, is that PIOCCs and DIOCCs are
often located several kilometers away from the main Province/District
compounds, virtually cut off from the mainstream of activity. It is
apparent that in those localities where the PIOCCs and DIOCCs are inte-
grated with the other independent activities of the Provinces and
Districts, the effectiveness of the PHUNG HOANG Program is significantly
enhanced.

(b) Evaluation. Considering that PHUNG HOANG is tasked only with
an anti VCI mission, then PHUNG HOANG operations must be considered
subordinate to the broader intelligence and operational mission of each
PIOCC and DIOCC. The concept of an Intelligence and Operations Coor-
dinating Center (IOCC) and the PHUNG HOANG Program must not be considered
synonymous.

(c) Recommendation. That existing SOPs governing PHUNG HOANG opera-
tions be revised to contain clarification of basic organizational concepts
to include PHUNG HOANG's relationship with the PIOCCs and DIOCCs and with
other intelligence operational activities normally found at the Province
and District.

C. Operations.

(1) Helicopter Spray Crop Destruction Missions

(a) Observation. During helicopter spray crop destruction operations,
the danger of ground fire and the possibility of less than ideal target
coverage can be significantly reduced by proper employment of aircraft
assets.

(b) Evaluation. Although there is always a risk of enemy fire during
low-level helicopter operations, several precautions can be taken to limit
its occurrence. Prior to the mission, a visual reconnaissance should be made by fixed-wing aircraft to determine the best approaches in order to enter and leave the target area quickly; if possible, a low-level approach should be planned. During the actual spray mission, two gunships should accompany the spray ship, trailing it at a slightly higher altitude; having one or both gunships at a high altitude precludes timely reaction. A fixed wing FAC also tends to discourage enemy fire and enhances the capability of timely reaction in the event fire is received. Repeated flights, especially in the same direction, should not be made over a given target on the same day. To assure optimum employment of herbicide a high altitude Command and Control helicopter should be in constant radio contact with the spray ship in order to direct it to the densest portion of the cultivated areas. The spray ship must fly at 90-100 knots at 30-50 feet above the target area in order to properly disperse the herbicide and thus cannot ascertain the best course for crop destruction.

(c) Recommendation. That helicopter spray crop destruction missions consist of a spray ship, two gunships flying close support, a command and control ship to direct the course of the spray ship for optimum effect and if possible, a fixed-wing FAC. Further, that a pre-mission VR select the best approach for rapid entry into and departure from the target area and that consecutive missions not be flown in a given target area on the same day.

(2) Aircraft use for Pipeline Security.

(a) Observation. Analysis of helicopter support for pipeline security indicates a definite improvement in pipeline repair operations and a significant decrease in daylight POL losses.

(b) Evaluation. To evaluate aircraft employment for pipeline security, a helicopter was placed in support of pipeline pumping operations for a two week period. The helicopter was available from 0730 to 1730 daily. The trial period revealed that an observer can accurately and effectively detect pipeline damage from an aircraft. The overflights were highly successful in driving pilferers away from the POL lines. Pilferers, after being driven away by a helicopter, will run whenever they hear one approaching. A tremendous time saving was realized in detecting breaks, leaks and separations, and moving repair crews and parts. POL loss rates were drastically reduced during the period when the helicopter was employed.

(c) Recommendations.

1. That helicopter support for pipeline security be utilized to the fullest extent possible in reducing POL losses and time required for repair operations.
2. That aircraft fly at altitudes of 100 feet or lower, conditions permitting, at speeds of 80 knots or slower, and 50 to 100 meters to the side of the pipeline to permit adequate observation.

3. Observer personnel in the aircraft should be provided a means of communication to facilitate reporting of incidents to ground repair crews.

4. Every 50 sections of pipe should be marked with black or yellow markings to enable the aerial observers to pinpoint exact locations.

5. The same pilot, or group of pilots should be given the support mission each day in order to reduce the time required for the pilot to become familiar with the objectives of the flight.

6. That a Vietnamese National Police representative accompany the aerial observer to apprehend pilferers.

3) Expedient Construction of Landing Zones Utilizing Tactical Air.

(a) Observation. The use of tactical air in constructing landing zones for rotor aircraft is a highly expedient means of gaining rapid entry into terrain which is heavily forested.

(b) Evaluation. In pursuing the enemy it is often necessary to insert troops into heavily forested areas where no natural helicopter landing zones are available. Many methods of quick landing zone construction have been attempted. Use of Commando Vault is often restricted because of ordnance availability and radar coverage. One of the more successful substitute methods employs the use of Tactical Air with the M84, 2000 lb general purpose bomb and M117, 750 lb bomb with MIA fuze extenders. This combination of bombs provides a landing zone large enough to accommodate one UH-1 helicopter.

1. A flight of two planes carrying two, 2000 lb bombs each and M117 (750 lb) equipped with the MIA extenders (daisy cutters).

2. A flight of two planes carrying one, 2000 lb bombs each, coupled with M117 (750 lb) equipped with MIA extenders (daisy cutters). A salvo release is used. The F4 and A-1 aircraft are capable of carrying the M84. The advantage of this method of landing zone construction are many. Because the strike is delivered with FAC control, a high degree of bomb placement accuracy is possible. However, if weather precludes FAC operations, the ordnance may be Combat Sky Spotted. Other favorable aspects of this ordnance include its comparative availability, its effectiveness against any type of targeting, and its standing preplanned request procedure. The many advantages of this method of landing zone construction are many.
construction makes this a highly useful tool to the commander on the ground.

(c) Recommendation. Ground command should make use of Tactical Air in constructing rotor aircraft landing zones in heavily forested terrain.

d. Organization. None
e. Training. None
f. Logistics.

(1) Material Release Expeditors.

(a) Observation. Units which have Material Release Expeditors located at their supporting depot encounter fewer problems and less delays than other units.

(b) Evaluation. A Material Release Expeditor can act as liaison between supported unit and supporting activity. He is able to rapidly affect releases, arrange transportation of supplies and equipment and identify potential problems which could affect the supply status of his unit.

(c) Recommendation. That all divisions and separate battalions and brigades appoint a Material Release Expeditor (Officer or EM) to serve at their supporting supply activity.

(2) Unit Moves.

(a) Observation. Unit moves require close supervision of preparatory procedures i.e. packing, crating, documentation of cargo and submission of pertinent transportation documents.

(b) Evaluation. The execution of unit moves indicates that poor preparation was the primary cause of the difficulties experienced during relocation. The problem area is basically the lack of knowledge of packing and crating techniques, methods of preparation and submission of documents required to request transportation support, and the assistance available in the form of current directives, field manuals and supply and transportation personnel. Improper packing of Class II results in damage and pilferage which could have been avoided with the use of CONEX containers which the units often fail to request.

(c) Recommendation. Personnel directly concerned with the preparations for unit moves be oriented as to:
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1. The methods of packing and crating, and source of material.
2. The procedures for requesting CONEX containers.
3. The documents required to request transportation support.
4. The channels through which transportation is requested.
5. The directives and field manuals pertinent to preparation for unit moves.

6. Communications. None

h. Material.

(1) M60 Machine Gun Brass Catcher for M42A1s.

(a) Observation. Empty shell casings and links from the M60 machine gun mounted on the turret of the M42A1 can foul 40mm gun automatic loaders, and also enter the main engine components.

(b) Evaluation. Two incidents have occurred in which spent casings and links from the M60 machine gun mounted on the turret of the M42A1 caused equipment failure. In one incident, an empty shell casing fouled the automatic loader on one of the 40mm guns rendering it non-operational. In the other incident, a spent link fell through the main engine grill doors into the main engine compartment and was thrown by the engine fan into the oil breather, later resulting in a fire and total loss of the M42A1.

(c) Recommendation. That a catcher bag, such as the one used on the M73 machine gun system on UH-1 gunships, be added to the BILI for the M42A1 and used on the M60 machine gun mounted on the turret of the M42A1. A slight modification in the form of a fabricated pin, is necessary to adapt the bag, FSN 1005-903-1066, to the M60 machine gun.

(2) Heliotropes.

(a) Observation. It has been found, in survey work recently performed that a heliotrope results in greater accuracy and less time than an ordinary mirror for pin pointing forward and rear stations.

(b) Evaluation. Before the Survey Platoon obtained the heliotropes, an ordinary vehicle mirror was used to mark stations which were too far away for the instrument operator to see a range pole. This flashing mirror was difficult to sight on and many times resulted in errors in horizontal and vertical angles. The heliotrope on the other hand sends out a small constant beam of light. It is easier to sight on and results
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in greater speed and accuracy.

(c) Recommendation. That the heliotrope be adopted as a TOE item for all artillery 4th order survey parties.

1. Other.

(1) Diversification of Provincial Social Welfare Service Programs.

(a) Observation. There has been a slowing down of Social Welfare programs in some provinces this calendar year because of pressures to meet the goals in War Victims, Resettlement and/or Return to Village Programs. Under such pressures the Social Welfare Service Chiefs tend to avoid any involvement with developmental programs, resulting in annual budgets being allotted for this purpose but not utilized.

(b) Evaluation. It has been continually evident that most Service Chiefs cannot, or do not wish to, attempt to delegate to their staffs tasks involving more than one type of program at a time. Some have spent as much as six weeks on only one phase, such as, War Victim payments, while holding up action on all other needed programs.

(c) Recommendation. It is recommended that a special effort be made by Advisors to Ministry and Provincial Chiefs to instruct the Service Chiefs as to the need of diversifying the programs and staff organization.

(2) National, Regional and Provincial Cooperation on Refugee Program.

(a) Observation. The decentralization of responsibility for refugee payments and distribution in Binh Dinh and Phu Yen Provinces was intended by Provincial, Regional and National Officials to facilitate the physical distribution of these items by the delegation of responsibility to the Districts. Data processing in Binh Dinh Province of the Out-of-Camp Refugees made feasible the handling of the paper work involved in payment, but the actual physical distribution to 40,000 individuals or families demanded the delegation of this responsibility to other than the limited staff of the Service.

(b) Evaluation. During the Provincial meeting with the District Chiefs to work out the details it became evident that there still exists a cooperation and mutual trust gap between officials responsible to the Ministry and District Officials with their semi-autonomous position. In the end full authority and responsibility remained with the Ministry Officials. As a result of Province and Regional involvement in the resolution of the Refugee and Return-to-Village payment problem, the
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Ministry of Social Welfare has taken active steps through Communique No. 8924 to resolve the problem by granting additional authority to the Provincial Administration. Certain questions remain unanswered but discussions are being held between the MSW and the Refugee Directorate.

(c) Recommendation. That the Province Officials and Advisors continue to stress the urgency of decentralization of payments to district level.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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Incls 5 - 10 wd HQ, DA

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AVHGC-DST (15 Nov 69) 1st ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned headquarters, First Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CPOF-06 (12)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96275 12 JAN 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96255

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, 1st Field Force Vietnam.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. (C) Reference item concerning "Communications Security", page 101, paragraph 2a(1); concur. On 20 Nov 69, H. USARV distributed down to and including the company/battery echelon a CINC Pacific Operations Security (OPSEC) study on the INAV/VC communications intelligence threat to OPSEC in SVN. In addition, representatives of supporting radio research units are presenting special OPSEC briefings to subordinate commands regarding the existing enemy communications intelligence threat. Command emphasis is being placed on the maximum use of tactical secure voice communications equipment (TSVCE). Personnel from the CINC Pacific Logistics Support Center Vietnam, Long Binh are presenting a HSTOK Display/Demonstration at subordinate commands. Recommend that DA place increased emphasis on OPSEC training at USCOM and service schools.

   b. (C) Reference items concerning "Interrogation of Low Level Sources", page 102, paragraph 2b(2) and "Revision of RHV HMSC SOP's", page 103, paragraph 2b(3). The ACoS, G2 USARV has observed the validity of the observations made in both of these referenced items, particularly as applies to the confusion noted in District and Province Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers between operational intelligence missions in support of the district or province concerned and the relationship of these missions to the RHV HMSC Program. G2 concurs with the necessity for elimination of any confusion. However, this headquarters is not in a position to attribute the confusion primarily to HACV Directives and SOPs which address these operational concepts and relationships. The referenced items will be identified for consideration by HACV.

   c. (C) Reference item concerning "Helicopter Spray Crop Destruction missions", page 103, paragraph 2c(1); nonconcur. Maximum use should be made of USAF aircraft for crop destruction missions. Where selective defoliation or crop destruction is required, Army helicopters are capable of performing the mission. On these occasions, the composition of the team is dependent on the terrain and the enemy situation. On many occasions a minimum of a spray ship and a single gunship might suffice. Other situations might require the full complement recommended by I FFCECLV. The command and control ship may on many occasions not be required since navigation assistance can be provided by the gunship(s), the fixed wing surveillance aircraft, or the FAC.
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Vietnam, Period ending 31 October 1969, HCH-65-65 (42)

UsaV aviation also objects to the low altitude (below 1000 feet) employment
of gunships. At low altitudes the gunship is extremely vulnerable to enemy
car and the capability of the gunship to direct fire on a given target to
engage the spoor helicopter is questionable. Experience has proven that
the best altitude for the employment of the gunship(s) is between 1000 and
2000 feet depending on the terrain and enemy situation.

d. (C) Reference item concerning "Aircraft use for pipeline security", page 104, paragraph 2c(2); concur. Aerial observation of the pipeline during
daylight hours will help reduce damage to the pipelines. Additionally, use
of the Nighthawk system, when available, should reduce pilferage and misuse
during the hours of darkness.

e. (C) Reference item concerning "Expediting Construction of Landing
zones Utilizing Tactical Air", page 105, paragraph 2a(3); concur. Tactical
units should make maximum use of tactical air in constructing helicopter
zones in dense foliage. This item will be included in UsaV's battlefield
reports-Tips for Commanders.

f. (U) Reference item concerning "Logistics", page 106, paragraph 3(1); concur. UsaV regulation 700-24, General Supply Instruction for...dated
24 November 1969, authorizes any direct depot customer, regardless of the
unit size, to appoint a NA.

g. (C) Reference item concerning "M60 Machine Gun brass Catcher for
AWACs", page 107, paragraph 2h(2); concur. Adoption of a catcher bag (FSN
1005-993-1858) to the M60 machinegun will help to keep spent brass from
damaging M42 equipment. Additionally, consideration should be given to
using the machine gun spent brass deflector kit (FSN 1005-221-7592). This
deflection curtain prevents expended brass from falling into the vehicle.

h. (C) Reference item concerning "Heliotropes", page 107, paragraph
2h(3); concur. The recommendation that the heliotrope be adopted as a NA
item of equipment for all artillery 4th order survey parties appears to have
hurd. Recommended changes to 7006 are being prepared and submitted through
command channels to the US Army Combat Development Command and
all JAO-51

and all 317-44.

i. (U) Reference items concerning "Diversification of Provincial
Social Welfare Service Programs", page 108, para. para. 21(1) and "National,
Regional and Provincial Cooperation on Refugee Program", page 108, para. F-8

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AVHGC-UST (15 Nov 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned Headquarters, First Field Force
Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (12)

2i(2). These items can only be influenced or assisted by US Forces because
GWN establishes policy in these matters. These items will be identified
for consideration by MACV.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

I D. MURRAY
LT. AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

By turn:
I FFV
MACV

CONFIDENTIAL
GPOP-DT (15 Nov 69) 2d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, I Field Force Vietnam for Period
Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558  22 JAN 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

CPT, AGC
Asst AG
1. AO HINES (DAN QUyen)
   4th Inf Div

2. AO MccHALL
   1st & 2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

3. AO LEE (DAN CkONG)
   173d Abn Bde

4. AO SHERIDAN (DAN AN)
   TF South

5. DNERG AO
   DAP BkE Inf Div
   9th BkE Inf Div

Downgraded at 3 Year Intervals
Declassified After 12 Years
DOD Dir 5200.10
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(a)</th>
<th>MIL INJ</th>
<th>VN INJ (b)</th>
<th>AMV DOLLAR COST</th>
<th>Accident Rate per 1,000,000 Miles of Trip</th>
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(a) Reported Army Motor Vehicle Accidents resulting in a disabling injury or 3100 (+) cost of damage.
(b) Total RWN Nationals killed or injured in Army Motor Vehicle Accidents.
(c) Army Motor Vehicle Accident rate as compared with the USARV expectancy rate.

Notes: Cumulative Rate End of FY 69 - 7.39
      Cumulative Rate 1st Quarter FY 70 - 3.68

INCL 11

120
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<th>N.O. OF INJURIES (a)</th>
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<th>MAN DAYS</th>
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(a) Includes injuries resulting in death or disability necessitating hospitalization beyond midnight of the day following the accident.

(b) Based on empirical data contained in DA Cir 385-16, Fatality 84,800, Non-Fatal 8,284.

(c) Reflects injury rate as compared with the expectancy rate established by USARV.

NOTE: Cumulative Rate End of FY 69 - 49.40
Cumulative Rate End of 1st Quarter FY 70 - 43.40

INCL 12
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, I Field Force Vietnam

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug 69 to 31 Oct 69.

CG, I Field Force Vietnam

15 November 1969

N/A

694286

N/A

N/A

HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310