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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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KENNETH G. WICHIAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED
HEADQUARTERS II FFORCIV
PERIOD OF 1 AUGUST 1969 - 31 OCTOBER 1969

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. (U) Section I, Operations: Significant Activities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Command</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Personnel, Health, Morale, Safety, and Discipline</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Intelligence and Counterintelligence</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Operations, Plans, and Training</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Logistics and Transportation</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Communications</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Information</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. Inspector General</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k. Staff Judge Advocate</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. (U) Section II, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Personnel</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Intelligence</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Operations</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Organization</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Training</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Logistics</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Communications</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Material</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Other</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INCLOSURES

II FFORCIV Order of Battle........................................1
II FFORCIV Area of Operations........................................2
C130/C123 Sorties..........................................................3
Close Air Support............................................................4
B-52 Strikes.....................................................................5
Disposition of Enemy Forces..............................................6
II FFORCIV Troop List.......................................................7
Enemy Organization in the III CTZ....................................8

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1. (C) Section I, Operations: Significant Activities.
      (1) During the reporting period there were two major changes in the command group:
      
         (a) On 29 September, Major General Walter B. Richardson became Acting Commanding General of II Field Force Vietnam, while Lieutenant General Julian J. Ewell was on leave in CONUS.
         
         (b) On 3 October, Colonel Berkeley S. Gillespie replaced Brigadier General Burnside E. Huffman, Jr., as Chief of Staff.
      
         (2) During the reporting period, there were seven major changes in the staff of II FFORCEV:
      
         (a) On 13 August, Lieutenant Colonel John E. Mann became Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Daniel H. Wardrop.
         
         (b) On 25 August, Colonel Charles W. Hayward became Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, replacing Colonel Frederick C. Krause.
         
         (c) On 10 September, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas K. Lightcap became Deputy Staff Chaplain, replacing Lieutenant Colonel John D. Logan.
         
         (d) On 20 September, Lieutenant Colonel Steven T. Clark became Provost Marshal, replacing Colonel Saige Okazaki.
         
         (e) On 4 October, Colonel Joseph N. Hearin, Jr. became Commanding Officer of the 23d Artillery Group, replacing Colonel Walter Beinke. On the same day, Colonel John E. Baker replaced Colonel Hearin as Deputy Commander of II Field Force Vietnam Artillery.
         
         (f) On 17 October, Lieutenant Colonel Richard T. Lambert replaced Lieutenant Colonel J. T. Raley as Secretary of the General Staff.
         
         (g) On 25 October, Lieutenant Colonel Joe E. McConnell became Commanding Officer of Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command, replacing Colonel Alvin Ungerleider.
      
      (3) The overall assigned and attached strength of II FFORCEV increased substantially during the quarter as a result of reorganization in II FFORCEV.
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Artillery. A comparison at the end of the last four reporting periods follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>OFFICERS</th>
<th>WARRANT OFFICERS</th>
<th>M.P.S. Loss</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31 Jan 1969</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Apr 1969</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Jul 1969</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Oct 1969</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>4839</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Personnel, Morale, Safety, and Discipline.

(1) USARV General Order 3920, dated 21 October 1969, assigned the following units to II FFORCV Artillery:

- 2d Battalion, 32d Field Artillery
- 6th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery
- 7th Battalion, 8th Field Artillery
- Battery F, 16th Field Artillery
- 6th Battalion, 15th Field Artillery

(*scheduled for deployment)

The personnel sections of the battalions are consolidated under the supervision of the Sl, II FFORCV Artillery, and will accomplish personnel administration for all artillery units with the exception of the 5th Battalion (AW) (SP), 2d Artillery which will retain its organic personnel section until a later date. The personnel records and related functions for Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, II FFORCV Artillery, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 8th TAB, 25th Artillery, and 13 FA detachments were transferred from the II FFORCV AG Section to II FFORCV Artillery on 31 October 1969.

(2) The morale of the command remained at a satisfactory level.

(3) The awards and decorations processed, approved and issued are listed below.

INCL 2

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May 69 - Jul 69</th>
<th>Aug 69 - Oct 69</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SILVER STAR</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOLDIERS MEDAL</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRONZE STAR MEDAL</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>1282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIR MEDAL</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMY COMMEMATION MEDAL</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PURPLE HEART</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1783</td>
<td>4717</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Effective 17 October 1969, the following units were assigned to II Field Force Artillery and came under the decorations and awards authority of CQ, II Field Force:

- 6th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery
- 6th Battalion, 15th Field Artillery
- 2d Battalion, 32d Field Artillery
- Battery F, 16th Field Artillery
- 7th Battalion, 8th Field Artillery
- 234th FA Detachment (Radar)
- 260th FA Detachment (Radar)
- 258th FA Detachment (Radar)

(5) Postal Activities, 44th Army Postal Unit:

(a) During the quarter, the 44th APU sold $905,200.00 in money orders, processed 91 tons of incoming mail and 41 tons of outgoing mail. Effective 15 September, all active duty military personnel in Vietnam were INCL

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authorized to purchase postal money orders without paying a fee. On 10
October, the procedure for purchasing money orders was further modified
so that personnel desiring to purchase money orders were required to
furnish the postal clerk a pre-addressed envelope, with MACV Form 5
(Currency Control Plate) and the ID Card. The postal clerk now mails the
envelope.

(b) The period 1 October to 31 December was designated by MACV as a
period of increased postal activity and has been termed "CHIKIHI-65 -
bull". In preparation for "OPERATION SNAKEHANDLE", the 44th APU has been
augmented with four personnel and 2½ ton mail vans.

(6) The military personnel injury rate for 1st quarter, FY 70 is
35.4% below the FY 69 rate as shown on the chart below. The Army motor
vehicle accident rate remained the same.

**II FORCV ASSIGNED, ATTACHED, AND OPEN UNITS, FY 69**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>FY 69</th>
<th>1st Qtr FY 70</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military personnel injury rate</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Injuries per one million man-days)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army motor vehicle accident rate</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Accidents per one million miles)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(7) Weapons accidents involving small arms and/or grenades produced
91 injuries and 12 fatalities, accounting for 41.5% of the total. Army
motor vehicle accidents accounted for 29 military personnel injuries
and seven fatalities. Additionally, there were 26 Vietnamese injuries
11 killed in accidents involving Army motor vehicles. Injuries for
conditions was the primary cause of Army motor vehicle accidents, and
failure to clear weapons upon entering a secure area was the major factor
in weapons accidents.

(8) The status of discipline, law and order within the command re-
mained relatively stable. Quarterly statistics for the 1st quarter of
FY 70 indicate that offense rates for II FORCV assigned, attached and
units remain relatively stable when compared with the previous three
quarters. Miscellaneous and military offenses continued to decline as
an increase was experienced in crimes against persons and property.
Downturn in previously increasing traffic offenses reflected increased
command interest and selective enforcement. Unit standdown and larger
troop densities in base camps associated with the tactical lull can be viewed as primary causes of increased incidents. The last three quarters of FY 69 and the first quarter of FY 70 comparative rates computed on the basis of 1000 troops are listed below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFFENSE CATEGORY</th>
<th>2d Qtr 69</th>
<th>3d Qtr 69</th>
<th>4th Qtr 69</th>
<th>1st Qtr 70</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crimes Against Persons and Property</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>2.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous Offenses</td>
<td>5.08</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>6.29</td>
<td>6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Offenses</td>
<td>22.18</td>
<td>20.09</td>
<td>19.16</td>
<td>17.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic Offenses</td>
<td>13.31</td>
<td>16.89</td>
<td>21.59</td>
<td>17.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Intelligence aspects of tactical operations conducted in the II Field Force Vietnam (II FFORCEN) Tactical Area of Interest (TAO) are discussed in the Operational Report—Lessons Learned submitted by units under the operational control of this headquarters.

(2) Intelligence Collection.

(a) The daily briefing of selected agent reports was continued by Collection Division. The purpose of this briefing was to inform the G2 of enemy movement, supply, subordination, strength, and intentions as well as to better evaluate intelligence produced by agents and to determine the reliability of the sources. This, in turn, enables the agency which employs the sources to decide which agents warrant retention and which should be released.

(b) Collection Division was also responsible for insuring that all necessary Specific Intelligence Requirements (SICR) were published and levied on the appropriate collection agencies. In addition, Collection Division coordinated the collection of intelligence on specific subjects and informed subordinate units as to which SICR's were current by publishing a quarterly II FFORCEN Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements Registry. The Registry indexed all SICR's by number and by collection.

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Operational Report—Lessons Learned of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65(R2) (U)

agency. During the past quarter, 7 MACV SICR's and 2 II FFORCEV SICR's were cancelled, while 18 new MACV and no new II FFORCEV SICR's were levied. Two MACV collection plans, Black Beard and Rapid Shave, were revised and one MACV collection plan, Empty Flask, was cancelled, its requirements being incorporated into Black Beard. One new collection plan was implemented, the II FFORCEV Intelligence Collection Plan III CTZ against local force units in III CTZ.

(c) During the period 1 August to 31 October 1969, Collection Division continued to analyse agent reports for more complete exploitation of all reported information. Specific area of interest examined were: enemy sanctuaries and base areas; movement — particularly of regimental and divisional forces; caches; intelligence which would contribute to the identification and selection of targets by the G2 Target Division; and information regarding enemy activities on interior waterways patrolled by the US Navy, which is passed to the Navy IHO, II FFORCEV.

(3) Counterintelligence/PHOENIX.

(a) Operations of the Province and District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers (DIOCC) improved considerably as compared to the previous quarter. This improvement was borne out by the increased rate of VCI neutralisations, (monthly average of 221 VCI neutralisations for first six months of 1969, as compared to 350 for this reporting period). This increase was attributable to (1) increased emphasis by the GVN on the Phung Hoang Program; (2) upgrading the US advisory effort to the Phung Hoang Program; (3) increased use of specific targeting; (4) increased rate of Doi Chanh; and (5) extension of GVN control over additional hamlets. The GVN Phung Hoang Program was extended down to the village level in three provinces in III CTZ. These village organizations were designed to serve as intelligence collection agencies and, hopefully would involve village officials to a greater extent in the attack on the infrastructure. The Big Mack Intelligence Collection Program continued to improve. During this quarter, 40 personnel from II FFORCEV OPCON units attended the PHOENIX School presented by MACCORS/PHOENIX.

(b) Emphasis continued on the Volunteer Informant Program (VIP) but the results continued to fall short of expectations. The limited response to the program was attributed to the overall decline in military activity. Additionally, Vietnamese civilians were still restricted from entering the forested areas of III CTZ. The VIP was not seriously affected by the austere funding conditions existing throughout South Vietnam.
The analysis of terrorist incident locations, which began last May, continued through the past quarter. In general, the analysis indicated that terrorism occurred along lines of communication in contested areas. This result was predicted at the time the analysis was initiated. Over the past six months, it was shown that terrorism followed no definite pattern. One thing which was learned from the analysis, however, was that a need existed for a more precise definition of terrorism. The definition used by MACV is: Terrorism includes those acts by the enemy directed primarily against the civilian population. The key word in this definition is "directed". This required a decision as to the intent of the persons responsible for the incident. For example, a mine is planted on a road. If a military vehicle detonates the mine, it was not listed as a terrorist incident. However, if a tri-lambretta hits the mine, it was terrorism. Another common example was a rocket landing in a hamlet near a military installation. Was the rocket aimed at the hamlet; or was it unsuccessfully aimed at the installation and missed? Monitoring terrorism did provide an indication of the progress of pacification efforts. During the past quarter, terrorism steadily declined, from 211 incidents in July, to 180 in August, to 123 in September. At the time of preparation of this report, it was too early to forecast any trend for the month of October.

Ground Reconnaissance. Company D (Ranger), 151st Infantry continued its operations in U1 Province, Eastern SR-5, and southern War Zone D. Initially, the unit screened the northern approaches to the Long Binh - Binh Hoa complex, while in September and October, Company D was targeted against elements of the 74th Artillery Regiment. As the quarter progressed, more frequent use of the ready reaction force was noted along with more aggressive employment of the team. Utilizing saturation patrolling techniques, there were 241 teams inserted which resulted in 30 contacts, 53 sightings, 17 enemy killed and 4 prisoner. In mid-October, Company D entered into an extensive training program as the National Guard personnel were replaced by active Army personnel.

(5) G2 Air.

While Air Force photography continued to be the photographic mainstay because of its ability to cover relatively larger areas than the OV-1 Mohawk, increasing use was made of Mohawk photography using the KA-30 camera. The most suitable lens was found to be the six-inch lens, which produced greater clarity at large scales (1:1500 - 1:3000). This was excellent photography for exploiting small areas of interest originally detected on smaller scale Air Force photography. Experience showed that
the two systems, Air Force and Army, complement each other most effectively in the counter-insurgency environment in the III Corps Tactical Zone. The Mohawk photography at a 2X enlargement has made a substantial contribution in the area of targeting and monitoring enemy activity.

(b) Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) aircraft covered the entire III CTZ five times a night plus once during the day in an attempt to detect any movement within and on the periphery of the corps area. Surveillance patterns placed a heavy emphasis along the Cambodian border, Angel’s Wing, Tay Ninh Province, the Fishhook, and the northern and southern TAD’s. Movement remained fairly constant on all approaches into the Saigon area with the exception of the Adam’s Road Corridor where above normal movement was detected throughout the majority of the reporting period.

(c) Infrared (Red Haze) surveillance was flown to detect enemy activity, base camps, staging areas, and assembly areas within III CTZ. During this period, emphasis was placed on the surveillance of the areas adjacent to the Cambodian border, Tay Ninh, Binh Long, and Phnom Long Provinces, and War Zones C and D. Coverage was also provided, almost nightly, over the Song Be Corridor, Michelin Plantation, Bo Bo and Boi Loi Woods, Filhol Plantation, the Phnom Vinh Funnel Area, the Catcher’s Mitt, and the area south of Trang Bom. Also, possible rocket launch sites around Long Binh/Bien Hoa area and around Saigon were given high priorities. The monsoon season drastically reduced the quantity of recorded Red Haze emissions because of weather aborts, atmospheric attenuation, and the high content of moisture in the jungle canopy and soil.

(d) On 16 September 1969, the recommendations of the CIT-1 Mohawk Direct Support Concept Evaluation were realized with the publication of General Orders attaching the Aerial Surveillance and Target Acquisition (ASTA) Platoons of the 1st US Infantry Division and 1st US Cavalry Division (AK) for all purposes to the 73d Aviation Company (Surveillance Airplane).

(e) The height of the southwest monsoon during the months of August and September reduced the Air Force target attempts, and completions fell from the usual 50 per cent of all RVN to approximately 35 per cent. The southwest monsoon subsided early in October, resulting in the coverage of many backlogged targets (exact figures not yet available). During this period the organization of preplanned targets in III Corps increased by 90 per cent to constitute 71 per cent of all preplanned targets in RVN.
CLOSHER coordination was established with Detachment 1, 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (TRW) which utilized the RS-10-A real time Red Haze sensor to increase flexibility and responsiveness. Availability of this sensor increased by 100 per cent in October; however, full effectiveness will not be realized until December because of the influx of inexperienced crew members.

The efficiency of film processing and interpretation of the 460th TRW at Tan Son Nhat was increased by the 45th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (TRS) acquiring its own Portable Photographic Interpretation Facility (PPIF). In the near future, the 12th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron (RTS) will also acquire a PPIF to further increase the Air Force support.

G2 Targets Division.

The G2 Targets Division's primary function continued to be the development and evaluation of targets for B-52 strikes. In conjunction with this function, an extensive data base of hard installations drawn on acetate maps, to encompass III Corps Tactical Zone, continued to evolve. The data base portrayed enemy bunkers, base camps, fighting positions, tunnels, and other hard installation data. Since friendly units were often not in an AO for a sufficient period of time to have a complete "feel" for the previously constructed hard installations, G2 Targets alleviated this problem in the areas of Long Thanh, Catcher's Mitt, Gang Toi and traditional areas of the 274th Regiment by providing friendly units involved in the above stated areas with a comprehensive and current acetate overlay of enemy hard installation data in their respective AO's.

During this quarter, 504 B-52 strikes were targeted against lucrative base and staging areas within III Corps Tactical Zone. Fifty-seven per cent of the B-52 air assets available within Southeast Asia were allocated for strike to this headquarters by MACV. The most intensive targeting of the quarter was in August against the 1st NVA Division, 7th NVA Division, and 9th NVA Division located in northeastern Tay Ninh Province and western Binh Long Province. The 5th VC Division was also heavily bombarded in its base areas southeast of Bu Gia Map. In September, B-52 strikes were evenly dispersed in III CTZ with the exception of concentrations in northeastern Duc Phong targeted against the 5th VC Division and northeast of Bearcat against the 274th Regiment. In October, targeting emphasis continued against the 274th Regiment with emphasis also on infiltrating NVA/VC troop concentrations based along logistical
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Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65(R2) (U)

resupply points along the Seres Jungle Highway. One strike was targeted
against the 2145 Battalion in the Long Hai area located in southern Phuoc
Tuy Province and resulted in 46 secondary explosions, suggesting that the
area was probably being used for the storage of vast quantities of munitions.

(c) The 29th Chemical Detachment, under the operational control
of G2 Targets Division, remained one of the principal surveillance means
available to the division. This quarter, 212 hours were flown on air-
borne personnel detector (Sniffer) missions, compared to 164 hours for
the previous quarter. Units supported on "Sniffer" missions during the
quarter were as follows: 199th Light Infantry Brigade, RTAVF, 3d Brigade
of 82d Airborne, and BMTAC. Due to the rainy season, there were no
defoliation missions conducted or requited of this unit.

(7) Description and Recountulation of Enemy Order of Battle.

(a) Description: The Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN)
remained the supreme political military headquarters controlling all
Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) activities in the southern
half of the Republic of Vietnam. Military units in III CTZ are subordin-
ated either directly to COSVN or to one of eight secondary level headquarters
in III CTZ. (See Inclosure 8). There were no significant changes in the
enemy's military-political boundaries during the quarter and the area of
III CTZ continued to be divided into 13 major sub-divisions. There
appeared to be a shift in enemy tactics toward decentralisation and small
scale actions aimed at sustaining a steady attrition of US and allied
forces and protecting the VC political infrastructure, while keeping main
force strength intact for the long run. Most large VC and NVA maneuver
units were back in base areas preparing for the Winter-Spring Campaign,
but regional and sub regional commands appeared to have been given the
go ahead to plan and execute highpoints independently.

(b) Significant Order of Battle Developments.

1) Few significant changes in the number and effectiveness of enemy
units were noted in the II FFORCEN TAOI. The table below portrays the
combat effectiveness of regiments and separate battalions at the
beginning and end of the quarter. Units which were believed to be
present, but not confirmed, are shown in parentheses

10

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AVBC-R-E-H
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters, II Field
Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65(R2) (U)

Tables: Combat Effectiveness of Enemy Units

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<th>PCE</th>
<th>CE</th>
<th>MCE</th>
<th>NCE</th>
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PCE - Fully Combat Effective
CE - Combat Effective
MCE - Marginally Combat Effective
NCE - Not Combat Effective

1. The 12 Sapper/Reconnaissance Battalion of SR-2 and the 3d Artillery
Battalion of SR-3 were adopted by II FFORCEV Order of Battle as confirmed 
enemy combat support battalions during the reported period. Based on the 
criteria outlined in MACV Directive 381-12, the designation of the units 
were known, subordination had been established, and the locations had been 
determined by a minimum of two reports from VC/NVA prisoners, Hoi Chanh, 
or captured documents.

2. The Special Actions Elements of Saigon were adopted by II FFORCEV 
Order of Battle as confirmed combat support battalions in III CTZ. The 
five sapper battalions N10, N13, N14, N15, and N16 were originated in 
1967 but had been redesignated and reorganized countless times and bore 
no resemblance to their original state. The N18 Artillery Battalion was 
newly formed in February 1969 to provide artillery support for the sapper 
battalions in the capital. The special action elements were located 
between Da Nang, their base area, and Saigon, their objective.

3. The 18B Regiment remained out of contact following a Hoi Chanh 
identification on 26 June south of Bo Tu, and wasn't again identified 
until 21 August in a contact in IV CTZ, Chau Duc Province, which resulted 
in three enemy killed. Documents captured in this contact identified a
battalion commanding officer of the regiment. Since this identification, the regiment was identified a number of times as operating in the IV CTZ area, thus explaining the lack of contact with the regiment since 26 June and confirming the regiment's relocation to IV CTZ.

5. The 16th Armor Office, CSFV, was confirmed as an enemy maneuver unit in III CTZ on 27 September as a result of a study compiled through the use of prisoner interrogations, document readouts, and contacts which identified elements of this unit. The regimental size unit had an approximate strength of 1,600 men and had six battalions enumerated 3 through 8. The battalions operate throughout northern III CTZ and conducted sapper/reconnaissance operations assigned by the Armor Office. Size of the battalions varied from 100 to 300 men. The Armor Office also had three subordinate companies of fifty men each. Supporting the Armor Office were headquarters, combat operations, signal, security, and training elements. The 3d Battalion was last identified by documents found on a body following an 8 August 1969 contact southeast of Phuoc Vinh. Two prisoners captured on 12 August during an attack on L5 Andy identified elements of the 4th Battalion, 16th Armor Office. The 5th Battalion was identified in the Katum area in September 69 and at Dau Tieng on 23 February 1969. It had since been identified in the area of Phuoc Vinh by a prisoner captured on 14 September 1969. On 12 August and 5 September 1969 prisoners identified a 6th Sapper Battalion subordinate to the 16th Armor Office; however, documents found prior to their capture indicated that the 6th Battalion may be subordinate to NR-7. The 7th Battalion was last identified by prisoners captured following an attack on Chen Thanh. They also stated that the 6th Sapper Battalion was subordinate to the 16th Armor Office. The 16th Armor Office was believed to be operating out of base areas 352 and 353.

(e) Recapitulation.

1. The VC regions, provinces, and special zones in III CTZ controlled 44 local force companies and 19 local force platoons (Note: local companies and platoons with a strength of 40 or less are considered platoons).

2. The battalions and regimental sized units located within III CTZ were as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>SUBORDINATION</th>
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<tr>
<td>74th NVA Artillery Regiment</td>
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<td>95C NVA Regiment</td>
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AVVRC-RE-H

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, ROE GSR-65(22) (U)

UNIT

Dong Hai VC Regiment

Special Action Element

N-10 Sapper Battalion
N-13 Sapper Battalion
N-14 Sapper Battalion
N-15 Sapper Battalion
N-16 Sapper Battalion
N-18 Artillery Battalion

D14 VC LF Battalion
33d NVA Regiment

274th VC MF Regiment
2d VC MF Battalion
4th VC MF Battalion
6th Heavy Weapons Battalion
6th Water Sapper Battalion
Doan 10 VC MF Sapper Battalion

D1 VC LF Sapper Battalion
D2 VC LF Sapper Battalion
D6 VC LF Sapper Battalion
D440 VC LF Battalion

SUB-ORDINATION

Sub Region 5
Sub Region 6

Tay Ninh Province
Probably COSVN, cooperating with Military Region 7

Military Region 7
Sub Region 4
Sub Region 7
Sub Region 4
Sub Region 4
Sub Region 4
Sub Region 4
U-1 Province
U-1 Province
U-1 Province
Ba Bia Province

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AVCG-32-11
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters, II Field
Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65(22) (U)

UNIT

D445 VC LF Battalion
Don Son NVA Battalion
13th NVA Artillery Battalion
14th NVA AA Battalion
21st Sapper Battalion
22d NVA Artillery Battalion
26th NVA Anti-Aircraft Battalion
Gia Dinh 4 VC Sapper Battalion
65 Water Sapper Battalion
9th VC Artillery Battalion
12th VC MF Sapper Reconnaissance Battalion
3d Artillery Battalion
D1 VC LF Battalion
67th NVA Engineer Battalion
D168 VC LF Battalion
D368 VC LF Battalion

SUBORDINATION

Ba Bien Province
Military Region 10
1st NVA Division
1st NVA Division
5th VC Division
7th NVA Division
7th NVA Division
Sub Region 1
Sub Region 1
Sub Region 1
Sub Region 2
Sub Region 3
Tay Hinh Province
Military Region 7
Phuoc Long Province
Binh Long Province

(d) Summary of Recent Activity.

1 Enemy level of activity during the quarter was somewhat lower than the previous quarter. The quarter witnessed the start of the Fall Campaign on 11-12 August, with a high point of enemy action that appeared to be less intense, but more sustained effort than the highpoints of the Summer Campaign. The September effort was quite similar to that of August, featuring ground probes and standoff attacks. The attacks by fire during these actions were generally of light intensity and were
scattered throughout the corps zone. Enemy efforts were continued in outlying areas, as during the Summer Campaign, but several indicators revealed emphasis on strengthening his infrastructure and the continued use of military actions to further his political goals. The close of the quarter saw the enemy continuing his prolonged period of relative inactivity. The bulk of his divisional forces remained in base areas engaged in resupply and training activities. Intelligence indicated that the provisions of COVNI Resolution Nine were being studied and would serve as a basis for the Winter-Spring Campaign. The resolution indicated that the Winter-Spring Campaign was intended to be a decisive effort to force a US withdrawal, thwart the Vietnamization of the war, and disrupt the pacification program.

1st NVA Division. At the beginning of the quarter, the divisional headquarters had a probable location in Base Area 353 west of the Fishhook while the 18B and 95C Regiments were believed located northeast of Nui Ba Den in central War Zone C. The 101D Regiment was located by prisoners and documents north of Mau Thanh. The estimated strength of the division at that time was 4,425. Toward the end of July, following resupply operations in rear base areas, the division moved into forward positions to begin offensive operations. The 101D Regiment was first identified in several light contacts southwest of An Loc during the first month of the quarter. Although the 18B and 95C Regiments were not identified during the first month of the quarter, numerous attacks by fire on aircraft in central War Zone C indicated their presence in traditional AO's. Agent reports and a Hoi Chanh report that the mission of the 101D Regiment was the interdiction of convoys along Highway 13 south of An Loc. This mission was confirmed on 12 August when the 101D Regiment initiated an attack on a convoy 11 kilometers south of An Loc. The contact resulted in 54 enemy dead and 2 prisoners. A prisoner captured while penetrating a night defensive position in central War Zone C identified the 95C Regiment. This, along with increased activity in War Zone C suggested that the 95C Regiment had completed refitting in preparation for renewed operations. The 18B Regiment was not identified and agents indicated that the regiment had relocated. Toward the end of August, the regiment was identified in Chau Duc Province in IV CTZ following a light contact, thus explaining the lack of contact with the 18B Regiment since 26 June. This was the first indication of a NVA element in IV CTZ and reduced the strength of the 1st NVA Division to 3,200. At the same time, agents indicated that the 101D Regiment was starting to conduct a move into War Zone C. On 25 August a forward element of the 101D Regiment was identified by documents captured in a bunker complex nine kilometers southeast of Bo Tuo. In what was probably
the regiment's last operation prior to moving to War Zone C, the 101D was identified in an ambush on a convoy four kilometers north of Chon Thanh on 6 September. Security elements of the convoy returned fire resulting in 51 enemy killed and 4 prisoners. Through the months of September and into October the division conducted no significant operations and only minor contacts were established with the unit. During October, the 95C Regiment was again located in Cambodian border base areas conducting reorientation and refitting and remained there until late in the month. At that time agents reported that elements of the regiment had moved into the traditional 95C base area north of the Crescent. The 101D Regiment also remained out of contact; however, Hoi Chanh and agent reports indicated that the unit had moved into Base Area 354, north of the Angel's Wing. Indications were that the regiment might follow the 183 Regiment to IV CTZ to establish the three regiment division as reported by prisoners; but by the end of October the regiment was probably still located west of Nui Ba Den along the Cambodian border. The headquarters and support element was unlocated and might have moved from the base area north of Katum which it had occupied during the first of this quarter. By the end of October the divisional strength was estimated at 3,200.

5th VC Division. At the start of the quarter the 5th VC Division was dispersed in north War Zone D and south MR-10 with an estimated strength of 4,300 men. The division was believed to have moved here to conduct training, resupply activities, and operations in Phuoc Long Province. The first identification of the quarter occurred on 8 August at YU185031 when elements of the 5th Special Forces Group Airborne received a Hoi Chanh who was identified as a member of the Heavy Weapons Company 3-275 Regiment. The Hoi Chanh stated that the regiment suffered approximately 50 killed, 25 wounded, and 20 missing due to a 5 August B-52 strike. The source stated the mission of the 275th Regiment was to attack Song Be, while other elements of the 5th VC Division attacked Bunard and Dac Phong. On 12 August the 275th Regiment was again identified in a contact which resulted in 31 enemy killed. The 275th Regiment was identified twice more during the month by a document and a Hoi Chanh. On 5 September, at YU934088 the 174th Regiment was identified in a contact which resulted in 21 enemy killed. On 11 September at YU259-035 the 3-275 Regiment was identified by a prisoner who stated the 2-275 Regiment suffered 30 killed and many wounded in 28 August B-52 strikes. On 1 October the documents found on an enemy identified the 2-174 Regiment. On 17 October the 21st Reconnaissance Company, 95th Regiment was identified by a Hoi Chanh. The 5th VC Division was believed to have
relocated to northern MR-10 to retrain and resupply. The 174th Regiment was left in contact while the 95th and 275th Regiments conducted refitting operations.

4 7th NVA Division. At the beginning of the quarter the 165th and 209th Regiments believed to be located northwest of An Loo and west of An Loo respectively, with the 141st Regiment positioned east of An Loo. Prisoners and documents captured during the first part of the quarter indicated that the division was planning future offensive operations in the northern Binh Long Province area. These indications were partially substantiated by a contact on 13 August four kilometers southwest of Loc Minh in which the 209th Regiment suffered 79 killed in a contact with the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Three 14 August contacts northeast of Loc Minh, which accounted for 40 enemy killed, might possibly have been attributed to the 141st Regiment. Documents taken from an enemy killed following a contact on 15 August east of Bu Dop, identified a platoon leader of a reconnaissance element and included orders from a divisional level element to conduct reconnaissance of the Bu Dop Special Force camp for a forthcoming attack. Although the unit was unidentified it was feasible that it was an element of the 165th Regiment. The 141st and 209th Regiments continued to be identified in interdiction of lines of communications during the remainder of August. Two contacts on 5 and 6 September with elements of the 209th Regiment cost the enemy 75 killed and 6 prisoners. Both of these contacts took place northwest of An Loo. No other significant contacts were made with the division's elements for the remainder of the month. The 209th Regiment suffered 14 killed and 3 prisoners following a contact southwest of Loc Minh on 5 October, while the 141st Regiment was identified by a 14 October rallier as being located north of Loc Minh. No other significant contacts were made with elements of the division throughout the remainder of the quarter. At the end of October the division had an estimated strength of 4,750. The 165th Regiment was believed to be located southwest of Bu Dop, along the Binh Long - Cambodian border area, the 209th Regiment in base areas in the Flat Iron, and the 141st Regiment in Base Area 350, north of Loc Minh.

2 9th VC Division. The 9th VC Division was most active during August. On 9 August the 271st Regiment was identified in a contact in Binh Long Province, west of An Loo where they suffered 41 killed and 6 prisoners. During the 12 August highpoint, the 271st and 272d Regiments were identified. The 271st Regiment suffered 78 killed and 2 prisoners southwest of An Loo while the 272d lost 50 killed, 7 prisoners, and 10 Boi Chanh near Quan Loi. On 14 August the 3-68 Regiment was identified southwest of Tay Minh as they suffered 63 killed and 2 prisoners in a
contact with the 1st ARVN Airborne Battalion. On 21 August, an element of the 88th Regiment was engaged in the vicinity of Nui Ba Den. The contact resulted in 32 killed and 2 enemy captured. Since late August, the 88th Regiment has avoided contact and remained in base areas along the Tay Ninh Province-Cambodian border. The 271st and 272d Regiments, operating in Binh Long Province withdrew to prepare for the fall offensive. The 271st Regiment is currently believed to be in base areas in the Fishhook area. The 272d Regiment, which began to move through War Zone C in late September, was identified in only a few small contacts. The 9th VC Division activity over the past three months was characterized by increased offensive activity in August and the avoidance of contact in September and October.

6 1st NVA Regiment. The 1st NVA Regiment continued to avoid contact as much as possible during the reporting period. On 18 August, the K4 Battalion, 1st NVA Regiment was contacted in western Binh Kien District. The ensuing contact resulted in 23 killed, 1 prisoner, and 1 Ho Chanh. The 1st NVA Regiment was not involved in another contact until 16 September when the K6 Battalion was contacted in Binh Phuoc District and suffered 15 killed and 5 prisoners. On the following day, the K4 Battalion was engaged by elements of the 9th US Infantry Division in west Binh Kien District. The contact resulted in 12 enemy killed and 4 captured. The mission of the regiment continues to include control of land areas and opposition of the GVN Pacification Program.

7 33d NVA Infantry Regiment. In early August 1969, the 33d Regiment was moving to a new base area along the La Nga River with an approximate strength of 1,075 men. During the beginning of August, the regiment remained out of significant contact although there were small identifiable contacts in VC Ba Binh Province. The regiment moved to the La Nga Base Area along with MR-7 headquarters and had the probable mission of reorganizing and refitting. On 25 August at YU544490 11 kilometers north of Dinh Quan, 30 enemy of the 33d Regiment were engaged resulting in 7 enemy killed and 2 prisoners. Also in this approximate area (YU5449), there were significant engagements resulting in a total of approximately 35 enemy killed plus large caches. In the beginning of September, it was believed that the 33d Regiment was north of Dinh Quan with some elements possibly remaining in the La Nga Base Area. Captured documents revealed that the 3-33d Regiment had the mission of transporting wounded and moving supplies consisting of food and ammunition from north of Dong Nai River, south across Route 20, to the La Nga River Base. The 3d Battalion also was to conduct ambushes on Route 20 between La Nga River bridge, YT462340, and Dinh Quan. During the months of September and October the 33d Regiment
remained out of significant identifiable contact and moved into war Zone D north of Dinh Quan. Captured documents indicated that the regiment was probably directly subordinate to COSVN and operating in a coordinating role with KR-7.

8. 101st Regiment. The second quarter showed significant changes in the 101st Regiment's area of operation, missions, and frequency of contact. By the end of August it was pretty well established that COSVN headquarters had extended the western boundary of SR-1 to include the Boi Loi Woods. Documents captured during the previous quarter (19 May 69) indicated the presence of 101st Regiment in the area just south of the Boi Loi Woods. Since the first quarter the main body of 101st Regiment has been engaged in resupply missions to other SR-1 main force units. One Battalion appeared to be continuing the regiment's combat mission of providing security for SR-1 headquarters. Increased enemy activity at the Ben Chua River crossing (vicinity XT5535) during the latter part of September resulted in increased contacts with the 101st Regiment. The most significant contacts occurred on 22 and 23 September when US Navy river patrol boats engaged an undetermined number of personnel attempting to cross the Saigon River. A total of 30 enemy were killed in the two contacts. These personnel were later identified by captured documents as members of the 101st Regiment. During the first two weeks of October small contacts continued to be made with elements of the 101st Regiment in the Boi Loi Woods, northern Trapezoid area, and northern Michelin-Razor Back areas. Contacts during the past quarter involving the regiment have resulted in 119 killed. The 101st Regiment's strength was carried at 1,075 men. The most significant change in the unit's tactics was its operating in squad and platoon size elements due to the extensive allied operations in its AO and lack of adequate cover since the beginning of these plow operations.

9. 268th Regiment. During the present quarter the 268th Regiment sustained the heaviest losses among SR-1 main force units, losing 135 killed. Since the beginning of the second quarter the 268th Regiment has been undergoing sapper training in conjunction with SH-1 changes in tactics. The decision to revert to small unit sapper-type operations was perhaps due to the critical resupply problems and decreased combat capability of SR-1 main force units. The 268th Regiment reportedly has two sapper battalions and one infantry battalion, with elements operating in the Boi Loi Woods, Bo Bo Woods and Citadel area. During the month of August, two significant contacts were reported involving the 268th Regiment in the Bo Bo Woods and Citadel area. The first occurred on 5
August resulting in 14 enemy killed and the second on 7 August in which
17 enemy were killed. Both contacts were with the K3 Battalion. On 17
September the K3 Battalion lost 32 killed in a contact with elements of
25th US Infantry Division in eastern Phu Ho village. On 2 October the K3
Battalion was again identified south of the Boi Loi Woods in the only
significant contact with 268th Regiment for the month of October. The
K3 Battalion lost 10 men killed in that engagement. The 268th Regiment
continues to suffer acute morale problems as a result of supply shortages,
intensive allied activities, and numerous casualties. The strength of
the 268th Regiment was held at 910 men.

10 274th VC NP Infantry Regiment. In early August 1969, elements
of the 274th Regiment were believed to be in the Hat Lich area with an
approximate strength of 700 men. Throughout the month of August, the
regiment remained out of significant contact. Although identifiable
contacts were made, they were no larger than platoon size. During the
month of August it was believed that the regiment's main concern was
resupply. In the first part of September, the regiment still remained
out of significant identifiable contact. It was believed that the
regiment was having a difficult time obtaining provisions. Because
of friendly artillery fire and air strikes, its base camps were moved
constantly. On 25 September at YT279354, 23 kilometers northeast of Trang
Binh, an 18th ARVN convoy with the 1-2-48th ARVN as escort, received
fire from an unknown number of enemy resulting in 62 enemy killed and
a prisoner who was identified as a member of the 3-274th Regiment. In
the beginning of October, the regiment was identified in various contacts
with a significant contact on 4 October at YT279354, 23 kilometers
northeast of Trang Binh, where a company was engaged resulting in 15
enemy killed identifying the 2-274th Regiment. This contact was in
War Zone D where the 274th Regiment acquired munitions and weapons.
Due to concentrated allied operations the regiment was continually on
the move, attempting to avoid decisive contact. Also, allied operations
north of Highway 1 are believed to have caused continuing resupply
problems for the regiment.

11 Dong Nai Regiment. At the beginning of the quarter the Dong
Nai Regiment was dispersed throughout SR-5 with an estimated strength
of 1,150 men. The regiment's mission was to conduct harassing attacks
and attacks by fire with some of the battalions' companies supporting
local force units. Elements of the K2 and K4 Battalions along with the
K3 Battalion were situated in the An Son area. The remaining elements
of the K2 and K4 Battalions were southwest of Phuoc Vinh. The K1
Battalion continued to operate north of Tam Uyen. On 14 October at XT-765623 Tran Thanh Danh rallied to Chon Thanh headquarters. Danh stated that the regiment was experiencing difficulty in obtaining rice and other food supplies. He stated the only reliable source of supply for the regiment was Cambodia. The Hoi Chanh stated the Dong Nai Regiment is 95% NVA and there is dissonance between the VC and NVA. Danh stated the Dong Nai Regiment headquarters moved north of the Song Be River. Source also stated that the K1 Battalion is located in the vicinity of XT9636, the K2 Battalion in the vicinity of XT8746 and the K3 Battalion is located in the An Son area. The location of the K4 Battalion was unknown to the Hoi Chanh. The estimated strength of the Dong Nai Regiment is 870 men. Although the Dong Nai Regiment was not involved in any major contacts, the losses suffered in numerous small contacts and desertions are believed to have hampered the regiment’s operational capability.

(8) VC/NVA Battle Losses.

(a) Overall personnel and materiel losses:

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<th>WO</th>
<th>RALLIERS</th>
<th>VCI</th>
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<td>89.2</td>
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*VCI figures for October are from military units only. Final update figure from CORDS not available until 10 November.

(b) Losses in Caches. One of the major factors which continue to blunt enemy offensives is the continued discovery of enemy caches by allied forces.

MATERIEL CAPTURED FROM ENEMY CACHES
August - October 1969

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23
CONFIDENTIAL

AVPDC-RE-11
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of Headquarters, II Field
Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RG8 CSF0R-65(62) (U)

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(9) Enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities and relative probability of adoption at the end of the quarter.

(a) Capabilities.

1. The enemy is capable of launching sapper and multi-battalion size ground attacks throughout the corps zone. Attacks may be supported by rocket and mortar fire.

2. The enemy is capable of attacks against province and district capitals and fire support bases.

3. The enemy is capable of increasing the intensity and frequency of attacks by rockets, mortar, and direct fire by heavy weapons against selected targets throughout III CTZ and military targets in the CMD.

4. The enemy is capable of conducting ground attacks against the periphery of the CMD, utilizing SR battalions and sappers.

5. The enemy is capable of harassing installations and intensifying LOC interdiction throughout III CTZ, for limited periods of time.

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The enemy is capable of increasing terrorist, sabotage, and assassination activities in the CMD and throughout the CTZ.

The enemy is capable of conducting propaganda, subversion, sabotage, espionage, and political efforts throughout III CTZ.

The enemy is capable of avoiding contact for limited periods of time, contingent on the extent of allied efforts and operations.

The enemy is capable of withdrawing to out-of-country sanctuaries for the purpose of avoiding allied operations.

The enemy is capable of positioning forces in forward base areas throughout III CTZ in order to support his efforts to subvert the population of such areas.

(b) Vulnerabilities.

Concentrations of enemy forces are vulnerable to detection by various modes of reconnaissance activity and to destruction by air, artillery, or ground actions.

Enemy movement is vulnerable to interdiction by allied ground, artillery, and air attacks.

The enemy's supply system, particularly his caches, is vulnerable to discovery by allied operations.

The infrastructure is vulnerable to aggressive allied action.

(e) Relative probability of adoption at the end of the quarter.

Little change is expected in the pattern of enemy activity during the next three months. He will continue to attempt to achieve the goals of withdrawal of US forces, recognition of the NLF/PRG, and the acceptance of a coalition government. The enemy's "Winter Campaign" will probably consist of a series of planned highpoints separated by periods of low activity. Emphasis will continue on attacks by fire, sapper, and small scale ground actions as he attempts to produce maximum casualties while holding his losses to a minimum.

The enemy's divisional forces are likely to operate from relatively secure base areas from which they can maintain a threat to outlying areas.
and conduct limited attacks during cyclic highpoints. These forces will continue to maintain pressure on III CTZ northern tier of provinces.

3. In the populated areas, sub regional forces will continue to conduct attacks by fire and sapper actions, with further emphasis on guerilla tactics. The pattern will continue to be one of periodic highpoints followed by lulls in activity. Particular emphasis will be placed on attacking the allied pacification program which is a major threat to his attempts to control the population.


(1) General.

(a) During the reporting period II FFORC completed Phase III of Campaign Toan Thang. Operations throughout the III CTZ to locate and destroy enemy forces and to interdict infiltration routes continued and the enemy failed to achieve any significant tactical success. Generally, operations during the quarter continued at a lower level than the preceding quarter; however, emphasis was maintained on the pacification program and on combined operations. The period was characterized by the enemy continuing to avoid major contact with some exceptions. The enemy's "Fall Offensive" was conducted during August and September, with three high points. These high points were limited primarily to attacks by fire and were conducted by sub region forces for the most part. During October, a definite lull in enemy activity occurred. The second withdrawal movement resulted in the reduction of approximately 5,700 troops in II FFORC with the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne the only major unit in this reduction. As of the close of the reporting period, about one third of the designated troops had been withdrawn, with a completion date of 15 December scheduled. The 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division remained OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division. The 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry was released from its security mission at Dong Tam in late August and joined the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division bringing its strength to three infantry and one mechanized infantry battalions. It continued to operate in Long An Province, conducting primarily a war of attrition against main and local force enemy elements in the area. Two regiments of the 25th ARVN Division continued under OPCON of the Long An Province Chief, conducting extensive pacification operations and combined operations with the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. The 25th Infantry Division area of responsibility was Hau Nghia and Tay Ninh Provinces. Operations against the 9th VC Division were conducted in Tay Ninh Province and neutralization of SR-1 forces and base areas along the Saigon River Corridor continued. The 1st
Cavalry Division, with the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment OPCON manned the northern tier, with operations conducted in War Zone C, Binh Long, and Phuoc Long Provinces. The 2d ARVN Airborne Brigade deployed from the Tay Ninh City area into War Zone C, and conducted combined operations with the 1st Cavalry Division. The 1st Infantry Division, with elements of the 5th ARVN Division continued to grind down SR-1 and SR-5 elements. The remainder of the 1st Infantry Division concentrated on pacification operations. The 199th Light Infantry Brigade's area of operation was Long Khanh Province, where it continued its efforts to upgrade the 18th ARVN Division. In early September, a coordinated operation with the 1st ATF, RTAVF, 18th ARVN Division and 199th Light Infantry Brigade was initiated in the Hat Dich. This multi-battalion effort, directed against SR-4 and the 274th VC Regiment, was scheduled to continue until early January. The RTAVF also concentrated on Doan 10 forces in the lower Nhon Tract-Rung Sat. Two operations, in coordination with Rung Sat Secret Zone, Capital Military District and 1st ATF forces were conducted. The 1st ATF, in addition to Phuoc Tuy Province, extended its area of responsibility into southeastern Bien Hua Province. The 3d Mobile Strike Force Camp operated in War Zone D and in Phuoc Long Province. In October the 5th Mobile Strike Force Camp, with two battalions, deployed from II CTZ and initiated operations in War Zone C. Operations "Giant Slingshot", an effort by US and VN Navy elements to interdict enemy movement on inland waterways continued on the Van Co Dong, Van Co Tay, and Saigon Rivers. "Long Tien", a concept designed to "marry up" II FFORCEN and RVNAF units on an extended basis to conduct combined operations, proved highly successful and continued. At the close of the reporting period, II FFORCEN combat operations and quick reaction to intelligence continued to hurt the ability of the enemy to wage large scale offensive actions.

(b) Results of operations in III CTZ.

1 Significant results of United States and Free World Military Assistance Forces (US/FWMAF) participation in Campaign Toan Than, Phase III, during August, September, and October were 494 US/FWMAF killed (451 US, 9 Australians, and 34 Thais); 4,334 wounded or missing (4,095 US, 77 Australians, and 162 Thais); 13,240 enemy killed; and 1,107 prisoners. In addition, enemy losses included 2,911 small arms; 407 crew served weapons; 363,541 rounds of small arms ammunition; 10,074 high explosive rounds; 214 rockets; 887 mines; 5,880 grenades; and 199.42 tons of rice either captured or destroyed.

2 Cumulative results of Campaign Toan Than, Phase III, which was terminated effective 2400 hours on 31 October 1969, were 2,037 US/FWMAF
killed (1,926 US, 35 Australians and New Zealanders, and 76 Thai); 14,880 wounded or missing (13,874 US, 291 Australians and New Zealanders, and 715 Thai); 34,630 enemy killed; and 1,955 prisoners. Enemy losses included 7,935 small arms; 1,717 crew served weapons; 1,281,663 rounds of small arms ammunition; 36,528 high explosive rounds; 254 rockets; 3,218 mines; 16,754 grenades; and 977 tons of rice either captured or destroyed.

(2) Summary of Combat Operations.

(a) 1st Infantry Division. 1st Infantry Division operations during the quarter were characterized by the use of small unit ambush, ground reconnaissance, and airmobile techniques supported by the integration of all available target acquisition, mobile, artillery, and air assets. Riverine, land clearing, and air cavalry operations supported by ground maneuver forces succeeded in further attriting enemy main and local force elements. The division continued to participate in Campaign Toan Thang during the reporting period. Operation Strangle, which began on 21 July, continued into the period and terminated 21 September. This operation was conducted in western Binh Duong Province with the objective of neutralizing Sub Region 1 forces in the Iron Triangle and the Trap-esoid by interdicting supply routes, cutting the flow of replacements, and destroying base camps. The operation was conducted using the 2-16th Infantry, the 1-26th Infantry, the 2-28th Infantry, the 1-4th Cavalry, the 2-2d Infantry (Mechanized), B/2-34th Armor, elements of the 8th ARVN Regiment, and US and Vietnamese naval forces. The operation resulted in 414 enemy eliminated, consisting of 365 killed, 35 prisoners, and 14 ralliers. Operation Thunder Run, a 3d Brigade operation, was initiated on 12 August to counter an increased enemy threat in northern Binh Long Province. This threat necessitated the division assuming an additional 17 kilometer section of the QL 13 road security as 1st Cavalry Division (AM) forces countered the enemy threat in the north. On 21 September Operation Danger Forward (Phase I) commenced. It involved all 1st Division elements and the OPCON units of the 1-505th Airborne Infantry and of the 2-11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. The objectives of this operation were to destroy NVA/VC forces within the area of interest, to assist in upgrading of ARVN/GVN forces, and to establish an overwatch responsibility for the pacification program throughout the area of interest. The operation included the 1st and 3d Brigades in Dong Tien (Progress Together) operations with the 8th ARVN Regiment in northern Binh Duong Province against SR-1 and to the east of QL 13 against the Dong Dai Regiment. The 2d Brigade, in Dong Tien operations with the 7th Regiment in southern and eastern Binh Duong Province, was targeted against the 8th ARVN Regiment.
against the K-1 Battalion, the Dong Nai Regiment, the 2d Quyet Thang Battalion. Land clearing operations continued during the quarter as did riverine operations along the Saigon and Thi Tinh Rivers. In September the division established a Target Destruction Section (TDS) within its operations center in order to analyze all available intelligence in an effort to eliminate lucrative enemy targets. The section was organized to analyze contact, agent, radar, and reconnaissance reports and to analyze patterns of sensor activities which developed. Collocated with the 02 and G3 Air, the fire support element, and the Army aviation element, the TDS recommended employment and coordinated the use of assets to include artillery, tactical air, and ground and naval forces. Some of the significant contacts during the quarter follow. On 12 August at 1530 hours approximately 5 kilometers south of Ap Duc (XT768761), a contact by the 2-24 Infantry (M) resulted in 54 enemy killed and 2 prisoners. Friendly losses were 2 US killed and 2 wounded. On 24 August at 1556 hours approximately 5 kilometers southeast of Ap So Bau No (XT575364), the 2-28th Infantry attacked an enemy force resulting in 28 enemy killed with 6 US wounded. At 1100 hours on 6 September approximately 5 kilometers north of Chom Thanh (XT763680), elements of the 5d Brigade made contact with an enemy force of unknown size. Results were 55 enemy killed and 4 prisoners, 3 crew served weapons, 1,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 49 grenades, 11 HE rounds, and 8 small arms captured. Friendly casualties were 1 US killed and 7 wounded. The seal of Phu Hoa Dong from 15 to 26 September was one of the most significant operations conducted during the period. This combined seal by elements of the 2d Brigade, the 7th ARVN Regiment, and GVN forces of Phu Hoa District included elements of four infantry battalions. Payops throughout the seal was used extensively. The seal resulted in 23 enemy killed, 16 Hoi Chanh and 17 prisoners, 32 individual weapons, 6 crew served weapons, and significant quantities of war materiel captured. At 0015 hours on 22 September in the vicinity of X. Bung Binh (XT559350), a contact by the 2-28th Infantry resulted in 25 enemy killed with no friendly casualties.

(b) 1st Cavalry Division (AM). Operations during the quarter were interdictory in nature, characterized by the exploitation of B-52 strikes and the increased employment of small unit day and night ambushes. Combat assaults followed by extensive ground reconnaissance operations proved effective in disrupting enemy infiltration routes, discovering and eliminating enemy caches, and inflicting casualties on the enemy. The division was organized with the 1st and 2d Brigades in War Zone C, the 11th ACR (minus one squadron) in Binh Long Province, and the 3d Brigade in Phuoc Long Province. The 1st Brigade operations were targeted against units...
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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of Headquarters, II Field

Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65(B2) (U)

of the 1st NVA Division and the 82d and 50th Rear Service Groups with
priority of effort directed toward the reduction of base areas, cache
sites, and the interdiction of enemy lines of communication. The 11th
ACR continued combined operations with the 9th ARVN Regiment and the 5th
ARVN Division. Priority of effort was directed against cache sites,
against enemy local forces in the An Loc, Loc Ninh, and Quan Loi area,
and toward the interdiction of enemy units moving from base areas 350 and
352 in northern and western Binh Long Province. The 2d Brigade operated
against elements of the 5th VC Division in the eastern portion of Phuoc
Long Province with priority of effort directed toward the interdiction
of the An-Dam road complex and toward the elimination of the D/168th VC
local force and the Song Be battalions. Emphasis was placed on combined
operations with RE/FP units stressing increased night ambush positions
in the vicinity of villages and hamlets to enhance security of these
areas. The 3d Brigade was targeted against elements of the 7th NVA
Division, local and main force VC units and rear service elements op-
errating in Binh Long Province and along Sargus Jungle Highway.

Psychological operations supported three major campaigns during the
reporting period. These were Family Tree, Exploiter, and Accelerated
Chieu Hoi. These campaigns resulted in 128 returnees to GVN and 11
returnees rallying to US forces in the division area of operations. On
4 August at 0842 hours approximately 7 kilometers north of Katum
(XT332978), a contact by the 1-9th Cavalry resulted in 23 enemy killed
and 5 small arms destroyed. There were no friendly casualties. On
9 August at 1145 hours in the vicinity of Lo Thanh (XT595065), a contact
by the 1-9th Cavalry resulted in 21 enemy killed with no friendly
casualties. On 10 August at 1310 hours in the vicinity of Ap Ta Thie
Krom (XT622972), a contact by elements of the 11th Armored Cavalry
Regiment resulted in 23 enemy killed and 8 prisoners. There were 5
US wounded. On 11 August at 0300 hours in the vicinity of LZ Becky,
a 2-8th Cavalry contact resulted in 17 enemy killed and 5 crew served
weapons, 26 HE rounds, 10 rounds of small arms ammunition, and 190
grenades captured. Friendly losses were 4 US killed and 14 wounded.

Between 0100 and 0200 hours on 12 August the enemy initiated attacks
against FSB's Becky, Sidewinder, Aspen, and Quan Loi base camp.
Sporadic contact continued at FSB Becky until 0450 hours. The enemy
was engaged with organic weapons, artillery, Shadow, and Night Hawk,
resulting in 54 enemy killed and 3 prisoners. Friendly losses were 8
US killed and 39 wounded. During the attack on FSB Sidewinder friendly
forces were supported by artillery and light fire teams. C/1-11th
Cavalry moved from FSB Aspen during the attack to support the 2-11th
Cavalry at FSB Sidewinder. The enemy withdrew at 0400 hours leaving
78 killed, 3 prisoners, and 4 Ho Chi Chanh. There was one US wounded.
The attack at Quan Loi base camp began at 0107 hours with enemy mortar and rocket propelled grenade fire, followed at 0140 hours by a ground probe on the southeast side of the perimeter, and at 0358 hours by 107mm rocket fire. The enemy broke contact and withdrew to the south at 0430 hours. Results of the contact were 50 enemy killed and 9 prisoners.

Friendly losses were 7 US killed and 45 wounded. On 12 August at 1300 hours, E/2-11th Cavalry and H/2-11th Cavalry made contact with the retreating enemy in the vicinity of Ap Duc Thin (XU720824). The enemy was engaged with organic weapons supported by a light fire team and tactical air. Results of the contact were 85 enemy killed with friendly losses of 5 US killed and 42 wounded. On 12 August at 0215 hours in the vicinity of Ap Soc Xiem (XU699087), a contact by elements of the 3d Brigade resulted in 23 enemy killed and 3 small arms and 2 crew served weapons captured. Friendly losses were 1 US killed and 14 wounded. On 12 August at 0140 hours in the vicinity of PFB Aspen, a contact by the 2-11th Cavalry resulted in 32 enemy killed and 1 prisoner, 5 small arms weapons, 4 crew served weapons, 73 HE rounds, and 1 rocket captured. Friendly losses were 1 US killed and 19 wounded. On 12 August at 0910 hours approximately 10 kilometers southeast of Prek Klok (XU328779), a 2-8th Cavalry contact resulted in 25 enemy killed and 1 prisoner, 2 small arms weapons, 4 crew served weapons, 73 HE rounds, and 1 rocket captured. Friendly losses were 2 US killed and 6 wounded. On 13 August the 1st Cavalry Division accounted for 148 enemy killed. During the period of 12-14 August the enemy suffered 761 killed while friendly losses were 36 US killed. Enemy activity decreased after 14 August and consisted generally of indirect fire attacks. On 16 August at 0845 hours approximately 10 kilometers southeast of Prek Klok (XU328779), a 2-8th Cavalry contact resulted in 25 enemy killed with 1 US killed and 3 wounded. On 23 August in the vicinity of Phum Tate (XU678082), the 1-11th Cavalry located 40 enemy killed. On 5 September the 2-8th Cavalry at 0900 hours received an indirect fire attack followed by a ground probe from a estimated reinforced enemy company. The enemy was engaged with organic weapons, artillery, and tactical air. Results of the contact were 46 enemy killed with 1 prisoner, 24 AK-47's, and assorted ammunition captured. Friendly losses were 1 US killed and 33 wounded. At 1615 hours on 5 September in the vicinity of An Loc (XU732899), a contact by the 1-16th Infantry (M) resulted in 40 enemy killed. Friendly casualties were 2 US killed and 25 wounded. At 0905 hours on 6 September in the vicinity of Loc Thin (XU699081), a contact by 1-11th Cavalry resulted in 55 enemy killed and 5 prisoners and 2 small arms captured.
Friendly losses were 1 US killed and 14 wounded. At 1515 hours on 7 September in the vicinity of Xa Minh Duc (XY706820), a contact by the 3-11th Cavalry resulted in 32 enemy killed and 2 crew served weapons and 1 small arms weapon captured. Friendly casualties were 1 US killed and 5 wounded. On 10 September in the vicinity of Lang Nam (XY713836), the 3-11th Cavalry located 28 enemy killed and captured 1 prisoner, 16 HE rounds, 1 small arms weapon, and 1 crew served weapon. At 0005 hours on 14 September in the vicinity of LZ Ike, a 2-8th Cavalry contact resulted in 34 enemy killed and 1 prisoner, 7 small arms, 3 crew served weapons, 5 rockets, 40 HE rounds, and 450 rounds of small arms ammunition captured. Friendly casualties were 14 US wounded. On 28 October at 0955 hours approximately 16 kilometers east of Katum (XT-485896), a contact by 1-9th Air Cavalry resulted in 17 enemy killed. There were no friendly casualties.

The division continued operations in Toan Thang Phase III during the reporting period. At the beginning of the reporting period the deployment of forces remained the same as at the end of the previous period. On 8 August the 1st Infantry Division assumed responsibility for the majority of Phu Bai District and the Phu Cuong and Ba Bep bridges. Within the division a minor boundary change affecting the 2d Brigade took place. The 1st Brigade continued combined operations with ARVN airborne, RF/PF, and CIDG units with the Vietnamese undertaking more diversified operations throughout the areas of operations. During the quarter the 2d Brigade intensified its efforts against the Cu Chi and Trang Bang District local force and the Viet Cong infrastructure and greatly limited the enemy's use of his base camps, staging areas, and resupply areas in the lower Boi Loi Woods, the Citadel, and the Mihol. The 3d Brigade emphasized the pacification role during the quarter. Mixed stationing of one US platoon with one or more RF platoons was attempted during the quarter. The relatively heavy concentration of government forces coupled with the relatively secure hamlet evaluation status for all hamlets and villages permitted the brigade to operate in smaller size units. Mobile patrol bases consisting of a rifle company were positioned in rural development target areas and operated well with minimum guidance. Operations during the quarter were directed to finding and engaging small enemy groups. During the reporting period operations were conducted to deny the enemy the use of Nui Ba Den as a sanctuary. Elements of the 4-25th Infantry (mechanized), the 2-34th Armor, and an ARVN airborne battalion applied constant pressure on enemy forces on the mountain. The ground forces were supported by heavy artillery, air bombardments, and the use of CS gas. Psychological operations were conducted in support of tactical
operations and the pacification program. Special emphasis was placed on rapid response to intelligence targets and coordination of psychological warfare activities with tactical operations. Government operations were supported by dissemination of information developed by psyops operations in conjunction with Medical Civic Action Programs (MEDCAP). MEDCAP was the most effective civic action activity. It raised health standards and also provided a means through which intelligence gathering and psyops could be conducted. On 12 August at 0710 hours in the vicinity of Ap Giong Gong (X365147), a contact by the 2-27th Infantry resulted in 57 enemy killed and 13 crew served weapons, 14 small arms, 105 HE rounds, and 2,000 rounds of small arms ammunition captured. Friendly losses were 7 US killed and 18 wounded. On 16 August at 1325 hours in the vicinity of Phum Xoai (XT354533), a contact by the 3-22d Infantry resulted in 19 enemy killed and 500 rounds of small arms ammunition destroyed. There were no friendly casualties. On 17 August at 0825 hours in the vicinity of FSB St Barbara (XT272682), a contact by 3-22d Infantry resulted in 21 enemy killed and 3 US killed and 6 wounded. On 20 August at 1145 hours in the vicinity of Ap Bo Loi (XT320337), a contact by the 2-22d Infantry (N) resulted in 25 enemy killed and 1 prisoner. Friendly losses were 5 US killed and 6 wounded. On 21 August at 0445 hours in the vicinity of Ap Phuc Hoa (X3716066), a contact by elements of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division resulted in 35 enemy killed with 1 US killed and 2 wounded. On 21 August at 0450 hours in the vicinity of Sm Bo Lon (XT296551), a contact by the 4-23d Infantry resulted in 41 enemy killed and 3 prisoners, 4 small arms weapons, 3 crew served weapons, 4 HE rounds, and 4 grenades captured. Friendly losses were 6 US wounded and 2 armored personnel carriers damaged. On 24 August at 1204 hours in the vicinity of Ap Tral (XT360247), elements of the 2d Brigade contacted an enemy force of unknown size. Results of the contact were 48 enemy killed with 1 prisoner, 23 small arms, 4 grenades, and 1 crew served weapon captured. Friendly casualties were 2 US killed and 4 wounded with 2 helicopters damaged. At 0745 hours on 3 September approximately 4 kilometers southeast of Nui Ba Den (XT292563), a 4-23d Infantry (N) contact resulted in 30 enemy killed with 1 US killed. At 1415 hours on 6 September in the vicinity of Nui Ba Den (XT305575), in a 4-23d Infantry
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AVBRC-RE-H
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65(R2) (U)

(M) contact, 27 enemy were killed. At 0950 hours on 11 September in the vicinity of Nui Ba Den (XT299569), a contact by the 4-23d Infantry (M) resulted in 49 enemy killed with friendly casualties of 2 US killed and 5 wounded. On 12 September in the vicinity of Ap An Thoi (XT515205), a contact by D/2-12th Infantry resulted in 33 enemy killed with friendly casualties of 1 US wounded. At 1530 hours on 15 September in the vicinity of X. Go Noi (XT597227), a contact by the 2-14th Infantry resulted in 36 enemy killed and 2 H-IV rounds and 15 small arms destroyed. There were no friendly casualties. On 26 September, A/B/2-12th Infantry conducted a combat assault in the vicinity of the Boi Loi Woods and encountered an estimated enemy company. Results were 30 enemy killed and 10 small arms weapons destroyed. Friendly casualties were 1 US killed and 4 wounded.

On 15 October in the vicinity of X. Ben Dong (XT576304), a contact by elements of the 2d Brigade located 25 enemy killed. On 24 October at 1240 hours in the vicinity of X. Bung Binh (XT543347), a contact by elements of the 2d Brigade resulted in 43 enemy killed and 15 small arms captured. Friendly casualties were 9 US killed and 12 wounded.

(d) 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. The brigade continued OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division during the reporting period. The brigade continued operations in Long An Province, with responsibility for the security of highways 4, 18, and 23 and for the local pacification program. Emphasis during the quarter was placed on payops, particularly quick reaction operations. The Family Tree Payop Campaign was conducted whenever the parent enemy unit could be identified. In this campaign, accurate enemy casualty figures were publicized to the SR-3 command by means of loudspeakers or leaflet drops. As enemy units in most instances do not report heavy casualties, this operation was designed to produce conflict within the enemy command. Payops operations were also integrated with civic action operations during the conduct of MEDCAPS, ICAPS, and NITECAPS. During the month of August the brigade killed 453 enemy and captured 29 prisoners, 8 crew served weapons, 101 small arms, and 13 rockets. The most significant contact took place on 3 August. At 1155 hours, the 190th Assault Helicopter Company engaged the enemy in the vicinity of Giong Mat Cat (X5355945). Companies A/B/5-60th Infantry, supported by B/5-17 Cavalry were inserted into the contact area.

Contact continued until 1830 hours. The results were 26 enemy killed and 4 prisoners, 2 crew served weapons, and 6 small arms captured. Friendly casualties were 5 US wounded. On 31 August the 6th Battalion 31st Infantry came from the IV Corps Tactical Zone and became OPCON to the brigade. On 26 September at 1540 hours in the vicinity of Kham Ba Cay (XT46639), A/6-31st Infantry engaged an estimated two platoons of enemy. Artillery and the 240th Assault Helicopter Company supported the contact.
AVPFC-RE-H

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65(R2) (U)

which lasted until 1750 hours. Results of the contact were 24 enemy killed and 3 individual weapons captured. There were two US wounded. October was characterized by small, scattered contacts.

(e) 199th Infantry Brigade (Sep) (L). During the reporting period the brigade conducted daily reconnaissance/training operations with RF/PF units defending populated areas. As a result of this effort, a steady improvement was noted in the aggressiveness, tactical proficiency, and willingness of territorial forces to assume a greater role in hamlet and village security. Operations against enemy command and control elements, Operation Yellow Jacket, were successful in keeping enemy headquarters elements on the move and denying them uninterrupted operations in forward base areas. The brigade placed emphasis on psychological operations integrated with combat operations, oriented toward pacification objectives. All activities were designed to be adaptable to combined execution by RVNAF/FWAF and provincial agencies. Four major plans were developed to support the brigade's mission. First, target the 274th Regiment and U-1 Province headquarters; second, target the local populace to break accommodation with the VC and create support for the GVN; third, target the 33rd Regiment, M-7 regional headquarters, and the 81st and 84th Rear Service Groups; and fourth, target local force units, primarily to induce Hoi Chanh. Tactical operations were supported by preplanned targeting and quick reaction psyops. The psyop program and combat operations resulted in a significant increase in Hoi Chanh. The brigade encouraged provincial officials to conduct indoctrination sessions for VC relatives. This program was conducted through visits of three days duration at the province Chieu Hoi center and by house-to-house visits by combined teams. The program was directed toward using VC relatives to encourage members of the local force and infrastructure to rally. The civic action program during the quarter was directed toward enhancement of pacification, improvement of public welfare, and improvement of the psychological attitude of the populace. All civic action projects were closely coordinated with GVN officials and advisory personnel. The most significant contact of the quarter occurred on 8 August at 1425 hours approximately 14 kilometers south of Dinh Quan (YT570219) in which the 4-12th Infantry killed 20 enemy. There were 2 US killed and 6 wounded. On 11 September the 2-34 Infantry began participation in Operation Friendship III. This operation included units of the 18th ARVN Division, the 1st Australian Task Force, and the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force in an extensive reconnaissance and land clearing effort in and north of the Hat Dich base area. At 1600 hours on 14 September approximately 3 kilometers southeast of Ap Tran Tao (XT742091), a contact by C/3-17th Cavalry resulted in 14 enemy killed.
(f) Capital Military Assistance Command (CMAC). CMAC began the reporting period by continuing participation in Campaign Toan Thang III. The activity during the period was characterized by small unit actions supported by Army aviation with an increase in offensive operations adjacent to the area of operations boundaries. Daylight operations most frequently were platoon and company size reconnaissance actions with contacts frequently initiated by supporting aircraft. Booby traps accounted for a large number of friendly casualties; consequently, refresher training and troop discipline received added command emphasis. Several significant caches were uncovered thus depriving the enemy of much needed food and medical and ordnance supplies. A considerable amount of tactical effort was directed toward defense against rocket and mortar attack. This effort included daylight searches, night ambushes, aerial surveillance, ground radar surveillance, and harassing and interdictory fires. Daylight searches were oriented toward discovery of munition caches and the denial to the enemy of reconnaissance and preparation of launch sites. Preplanned aerial surveillance was integrated with ground radar to insure continuous coverage of the rocket belt. Preplanned artillery fires were integrated with the daily patrol and ambush plans to insure interdiction of all known and suspected launch sites. Enemy rocket attacks against Saigon and outlying areas increased in intensity during the period with the enemy launching simultaneous attacks from previously used launch sites. On 1 October effective 0800 hours the 3d Brigade 82d Airborne (-), consisting of the 1-505th Infantry (Airborne), the 1-508th Infantry (Airborne), and B/1-17th Cavalry, became OPCON to II FFORCEV, with the 1-508th Infantry(Airborne) moving to Phu Loi and B/1-17th Cavalry moving to the Iron Triangle. A/3-17th Air Cavalry remained in direct support of CMAC. On 15 October effective 1800 hours the 2-505th Infantry (Airborne) was released OPCON to the 3d Brigade 82d Airborne with A/3-17th Air Cavalry remaining in direct support of CMAC.

(g) Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command (BHTAC). During the reporting period BHTAC conducted extensive search and clear operations in its area of responsibility. The 501st Land Clearing Company conducted Rome Plow operations in A0 Green Extension during the period of 21-27 August and cleared 1,208 acres. Enemy contact during the reporting period was light. Four ground surveillance radars were employed by BHTAC during this period; these were one AN/TPS-25 and three AN/PPS-5's. The AN/TPS-25 was employed alternately at FSB Concord and Duster Compound. Many of the targets acquired were engaged by artillery. The AN/TPS-5 ground surveillance radars were deployed to monitor possible avenues of approach to the Bien Hoa Army Base/Air Force Base area. These radars were moved periodically to increase their effectiveness. The majority of sightings acquired...
were passed to ground units concerned for action and information. The Duffel Bag program continued in effect to monitor the access routes to the Bien Hoa - Long Binh rocket belt. There were 6 strings of 47 sensors deployed along the northern and northeastern approaches to the area. Sensor targets were cleared on a nightly basis by the FSCE. An aero-rifle platoon from A/3-17th Cavalry was used for security during sensor emplacement missions, with US and ARVN ground cavalry units sometimes used. Airborne personnel detector (APD) support was provided BHTAC by the 29th Chemical Detachment with significant results. Patterns of enemy movement were noted which frequently correlated with agent reports and reports from other sources. Results of the APD were passed to appropriate ground commanders for action and to the artillery for targets, with a high percentage of the readouts engaged by artillery.

(h) 1st Australian Task Force. The 1st Australian Task Force continued participation in Campaign Toan Thang III. Throughout the quarter with operations designed to destroy the enemy and assist in pacification and civil affairs in Phuoc Tuy Province. During Operation Gary Owen, B Squadron 3d Cavalry Regiment on 5 August at 2110 hours in the vicinity of Nui Gai Ma (YS770639) contacted an estimated 20-25 enemy. The results were 14 enemy killed and 1 prisoner and 6 individual weapons captured with no friendly losses. On 6 August at 0545 hours, during Operation Camden, approximately 12 kilometers southeast of Op Binh Son (YS315882), a Company D, 5th RAR contact resulted in 7 enemy killed and 5 individual weapons captured. The remainder of the period was characterized by light contacts and the discoveries of small caches.

(i) Company D (Ranger), 151st Infantry. Company D continued operations in Toan Thang III. The company continued its patrol operations during the quarter. Artillery support was rendered by batteries of the 7/9th Artillery, Bien Hoa and Xuan Loc; 2/35th Artillery, Bien Hoa; 5/42d Artillery, Bien Hoa; 6/27th Artillery, Phuoc Vinh; 3A/38th Artillery, 18/186th Artillery, ARVN; and 2/40th Artillery, 199th Light Infantry Brigade Artillery. Spooky and Shadow also supported during the quarter, as did B-52 bombers. Five to ten teams were deployed daily and provided a continuous flow of information on enemy locations and activities. The company continued to gather large quantities of intelligence. On 5 September at 1200 hours the company was placed OPCON to the Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command. The company was released from OPCON effective 1400 hours 26 October.

(j) Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF). During the quarter the RTAVF conducted combat operations in Long Thanh, Nhon Trac and the
southern portion of the Duc Tu District of Bien Hoa Province. On 12 August, the rear party of the 3d Increment of the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force closed into RVN following the last of the three serials of the main body which arrived during the 3-5 August period. This completed the replacement of the 1st Increment by the 3d Increment. The 3d Increment, upon arrival, assumed all the missions and functions of the 1st Increment, to include the assumption of the designation as the 1st Brigade. During the period of 2-4 August the 1st Brigade conducted a combined operation in conjunction with US Navy elements from the Rung Sat Special Zone and the Vietnamese Marine Corps in the vicinity of Tan Go Ong Cua (YS166869). During the operation several bunkers were found which were determined to be a hospital complex. From 9 to 15 August a combined operation was conducted by the 1st Brigade with the Vietnamese Marine Corps approximately 5 kilometers southeast of Ap Binh Son (YS260930) with limited results. During the period of 12 to 20 August the 2d Brigade conducted a cordon and search operation at Phu Hoi using patrol boats along the Thi Vai River. On 11 September RTAVF began combined operations with elements of the 139th Infantry Brigade, the 1st Australian Task Force, and the 18th ARVN Division in and north of the Hat Dich area against elements of the 274th NVA Regiment.

3) Air Operations.

(a) Resources. The following non-divisional resources of the 12th Combat Aviation Group were under the control of II FFORCEV during the reporting period.

1 Helicopters

10 Assault Helicopter Companies

1 Aerial Weapons Company

3 Assault Support Helicopter Companies (Med)

1 Assault Support Helicopter Company and 1 Platoon (Heavy)

1 Avn Company (Corps)

1 Air Cav Squadron
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFEC-RE-H

2 Airplanes
1 Utility Airplane Company
1 Surveillance Airplane Company
2 Reconnaissance Airplane Companies

(b) Assault Helicopter Company Commitment. The 10 assault helicopter companies each provide 2,700 hours of flying time per month to supported tactical units. Each absorbs all flying time from its home station to the first LZ, from the last LZ back to home station plus all unit administrative flying. All UH-1 helicopters are provided on the basis of 6 hours of blade time in a 9 hour period. The companies are allocated daily as follows:

2 companies of 12 Slicks, 4 gunships each. Special Classified Missions requiring 24 hour a day support plus general support missions.

1 company of 11 Slicks, 4 gunships. General Support.

7 companies of 1 C&C, 9 Slicks, 4 gunships. Combat assaults + 1 slick general support.

(c) Limitations. A continuing problem has been the limited number of assault helicopter companies available to fully support combat assault operations and at the same time provide sufficient aircraft for general support. The majority of general support requirements are from organisations that have little or no organic aviation assets and consist primarily of command, personnel movement, and unit resupply. Units and commands supported are the Navy, Headquarters III CTZ, III CTZ CORDS, three ARVN Divisions, Capital Military District, Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force, and II FFV Artillery. To provide consistent high rate of airborne operations in the II FFORCIV, III CTZ assets provided for air assault (seven AHC 1-9-4 packages) are not used at any time for general support by a supported tactical command. In addition strict adherence to the maximum continuous commitment capability of the 12th Combat Aviation Group is enforced. Exceptions require general officer approval.

(d) Area Coordinator Concept. Allocation of aviation resources under the area coordinator concept was instituted during the period. Under this concept the seven (7) assault helicopter companies' packages allocated for combat assaults are provided to area coordinators. The areas generally follow province boundaries with the area coordinator being the senior US
tactical commander. As area coordinator he is responsible to suballocate the aviation assets for airmobile operations to all US, ARVN, and RF/FF forces in the area. Command emphasis is placed upon combined US/ARVN operations with the objective of improving ARVN airmobile proficiency. The seven AHC's provide all combat assault assets for the following major tactical units and commands: two US divisions, three separate infantry brigades, Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force, three ARVN divisions, and the Capital Military District.

(e) Night Hawk System. The Night Hawk system was introduced into II FFORCEV OPCON units during the period. The mounts are locally manufactured and currently under evaluation. The system consists of an AN/VSS-3 Xenon Search Light coaxially mounted with an AN/TVS-4 Night Observation Device and an independent pintle mounted minigun. The system, mounted in a US-D/H, is employed singly or in conjunction with other Night Hawk equipped helicopters, slicks, or gunships. The system has the capability of covert night surveillance and, upon detecting a target of switching to white light for engagement with the minigun or following gunships. This improved night capability has increased the pressure against the VC/NVA during the hours of darkness, which is the primary time for troop movement, resupply and offensive operations.

(4) Close Air Support.

(a) Total Close Air Support sorties made available by 7th USAF were reduced approximately 20 per cent for the month of October. The primary impact of the reduction was a more than 30 per cent cut in sorties allocated on a preplanned basis. As a result there was a sharp drop in the number of preplanned sorties committed against suspected enemy locations. Preplanned Combat Sky Spot sorties committed against suspected enemy locations were halted on 5 October.

(b) All valid immediate requests for close air support continued to be filled throughout the quarter. In general, preplanned sorties at the reduced level fully supported planned maneuver unit operations and gave each brigade size unit an air strike a day to be committed against a suspected enemy location.

(c) Close air support of II FFORCEV OPCON units during the quarter was fully adequate.

(5) Force structure:
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFBC-RE-H
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65(R2) (U)

(a) Gains:

1. 2d Battalion, 12th Artillery (155 Towed) on 3 September 1969.
2. 17th Construction Squadron, Royal Australian Engineers.
3. The following units were changed from OPOON status to assigned status on 17 October in preparation for Phase II Redeployment requirements:
   a. 6th Battalion, 15th Artillery (105 Towed)
   b. 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery (8"/175 SP)
   c. 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery (8"/175 SP)
   d. 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery (8"/175 SP)

(b) Losses: 3d Battalion, 197th Artillery (155 Towed) on 3 September 1969.

(c) Training:

(a) Seven ARVN battalions completed ARVN Infantry/Ranger Battalion Refresher Training during the period 1 August - 31 October 1969. Four of the seven battalions were retrained, two by US units and two by the 5th Infantry Division (ARVN). The current concept is for all ARVN divisions to establish a refresher training capability with US assistance, directed primarily toward accomplishing training through combined operations. Two battalions of the 25th ARVN Division are currently scheduled to undergo refresher training at the Van Kiep National Training Center (ARVN).

(b) Operational commitments continue to hamper coordination of refresher training for the ARVN Cavalry Squadrons. The 25th ARVN Division's Cavalry Squadron received training from 25th Infantry Division (US) elements during the reporting period. The last troop had not completed training at the end of the period. Of the three ARVN engineer battalions scheduled to receive refresher training, one was trained prior to the reporting period, one was in training at the end of the period, and final coordination had not yet been completed for the training of the third.

(c) Reciprocal Mobile Training Teams (RMTT) were exchanged between the 18th ARVN Division and 199th Infantry Brigade, and between the 5th ARVN
Ranger Group and 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division. Operational requirements precluded teams being furnished by the 5th ARVN Division and the 25th ARVN Division. The program continued to be well received and beneficial.

e. Logistics and Transportation.

(1) Programs and projects.

(a) The G4 Section provided assistance to units assigned and attached to II FFORCEV in identifying and requesting turn-in of unneeded TOE/MOTE equipment no longer required as mission essential. Results of the programs were that units reduced their maintenance and storage required for non-mission essential items.

(b) Due to intensive management by the G4 Section, the number of CONEX containers on hand in units assigned and attached to Headquarters II FFORCEV was reduced by 30. These CONEX containers were returned to transportation channels and resulted in a significant decrease in non-essential storage facilities.

(c) Logistic Readiness Program.

1 The first quarter FY 70 Logistic Readiness Meeting for II Field Force Vietnam assigned and attached units was held on 4 October 1969. Topics discussed included Organizational Maintenance and Supply Inspection (OMSI) results, analysis of the first quarter Materiel Readiness Reports, and Weekly Command Deadline Reports.

2 As of 3 October 1969, 49 Organization Maintenance and Supply Inspections had been conducted for II Field Force Vietnam assigned and attached units for the calendar year 1969. Forty-three units received a rating of satisfactory and six were rated unsatisfactory. The major cause of inspection failures is attributed to maintenance management.

3 The 15th Transportation Company was reorganized to provide the 1st Cavalry Division with decentralized direct support aircraft maintenance. The significant increase in operational ready rates for the 1st Cavalry Division aircraft is considered to be, to a high degree, a direct result of that decentralization. Each aviation company now has collocated its own direct support maintenance detachment. Downtime is reduced by the elimination of distance between the unit and its direct support, by the increased technical supply stockage authorized, and by
the increased maintenance personnel strength available to the unit commander.

(2) Ammunition.

(a) Ammunition items in short supply continue to be managed through the use of available supply rate (ASR) allocations to insure equitable distribution of available ammunition to all II Field Force Vietnam units. Expenditures of certain high cost, high tonnage items also continued to be controlled through the available supply rate system.

(b) During the quarter, the number of conventional munitions under available supply rate control were:

- August 1969: 17
- September 1969: 16
- October 1969: 13

(c) The Quarterly Ammunition Conference was held at II Field Force Vietnam Headquarters on 11 September 1969. Topics discussed included supervision of the Class V supply system, current and future status of ASR items, COLED-V systems, preparation of the World Wide Ammunition Report, and ammunition storage safety.

(3) Transportation.

(a) United States Air Force C123/C130 sorties flown from the Common Service Airlift System in support of II Field Force Vietnam units are summarized in Inclosure 3.

(b) The MACV allocation of C7A aircraft dedicated to II Field Force Vietnam consolidated the previous allocation of the 1st Cavalry Division (Air Mobile) with the allocation to II Field Force Vietnam on 1 October 1969. This new allocation provides 14 C7A Aircraft to be assigned on a dedicated mission basis to II Field Force Vietnam.

(4) Engineer Support.

(a) General. Both divisional and supporting non-divisional engineers continued to provide engineer support throughout the II Field Force AO. Heavy monsoon rains created a situation which required maximum efforts to keep main supply routes passable and fire support bases accessible.
(b) Secondary road program. At the direction of the Commanding General, a plan for opening and upgrading secondary roads in the western portion of III CTZ was developed. The plan, which was finalized and approved during the quarter, envisions opening about 360 kilometers of road and upgrading an additional 160 kilometers of road. Construction will be accomplished by US, ARVN, and Thai engineers. The program was designed to open areas for military operations, pacification, and revolutionary development. Construction standards are class 12 (one way) bridges, 12 foot wide roadways, and an all weather capability for light traffic. Construction was to start in November 1969, with a target date for completion of May 1970.

(c) Land clearing program. The land clearing program continued despite the adverse effects of the rainy season. A total of 25,053 acres of jungle was cleared in the Hat Dich, Trapesoid, Boi Loi Woods, Sherwood Forest, FSB Crook, Gang Toi, and Crescent areas. The rainy season, with the accompanying mud and poor trafficability made frequent moves of night defensive positions essential. On two occasions in the Hat Dich, a 60 foot dry span bridge was successfully airlifted into the jungle to permit stream crossings.

(d) Bridge security program.  

1 At the close of the reporting period, thirty of the thirty-two critical bridges had fully operational permanent lighting systems. The system on the Phu Long Bridge was programmed for completion early in the next quarter. The permanent system on the Tam Luong Bridge was installed but was not in use. This system was designed to be operated by a 10 KW generator to be furnished by Capital Military District. The generator had not yet been provided. Both bridges were lighted by a temporary system. Installation of commercial power on eight of the critical bridges was completed during the period. This program eliminated the need for engine generator sets where commercial power is available. The bridges affected were: Chu Y. Binh Loi, Phan Tan Gian, Tan Thuan, Nhi Thin Duong, Kinh Tau Hu, Kieu, Phu Lam, and Quay Bridges. An inspection and limited maintenance program was initiated by USAFRV for the security lighting system. This program, tasked to the 507th Engineer Detachment (Utilities), was established to maintain the system until GVN can develop the capability and assume the responsibility.

2 Pier protection systems were completed on the Binh Loi (less fenders), Ong Thin, Ben Luc, Newport, and Rach Cat Bridges during the quarter.
MACV was requested to contract for installation of pier protection on the recently repaired Phu Long Bridge. Lack of engineer effort prompted the action.

(e) Status of primary land lines of communication.

1. For the purpose of this report, the following terms are defined:

a. Condition I: Class 50 and above. Road can carry all division loads.

b. Condition II: Class 30 to class 50. Road can carry the majority of logistical traffic.

c. Condition III: Class 12 to class 30. Road can carry light military traffic, e.g., armored personnel carriers and 2 1/2 ton trucks.

d. Condition IV. Road can carry military utility vehicles, e.g., 3/4 ton and 3/4 ton trucks.

e. Condition V. Road is closed to all traffic.

2. Route QL-1:

a. Cambodian border (XT284244) to Saigon (X8793942), Condition I.

b. Saigon (X8793942) to Xuan Loc (YT456080), Condition I.

c. Xuan Loc (XT456080) to II/III CTZ Border (ZT174011), Condition II, except for class 25 bridges at ZS073995 and ZS075999.

3. Route QL-4:

a. JCT QL-1 (X8845914) to Ben Luc (X8618759), Condition I.

b. Ben Luc (X8618758) to IV CTZ Boundary (X8599600), Condition II.

4. Route QL-13:

a. JCT QL-1 (X8879071) to Phu Cuong (XT810148), Condition II.

b. Phu Cuong (XT810148) to Loc Ninh, Condition I.
AVFBC-RE-H

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65(R2) (U)

1. Loc Ninh (XU759142) to JCT QL-14A (XU759142), Condition I.
2. JCT QL-14A (XU759142) to Cambodian Border, Condition V.
3. Route QL-14:
   a. Dong Xoai (XT079759) to JCT 311 (YT289977), Condition I.
   b. JCT 311 (YT289977) to YU303011, Condition I. Bridge is out at YU303011.
4. YU303011 to II/III CTZ Boundary (YU881175), Condition IV.
5. Route QL-15:
   a. Bien Hoa (YT002114) to Baria (YS380607), Condition I.
   b. Baria (YS380607) to Vung Tau (YS274444), Condition II.
6. Route QL-20: JCT QL-1 (YT343101) to II/III CTZ boundary, Condition II. (La Nga Bridge, YT482341 is class 20).
7. Route QL-22: Go Dau Ha (XT384251) to Tay Ninh (XT199500), Condition I.
8. Route LTL-16: Bien Hoa (YT002114) to JCT LTL-1A (XT886375), Condition I.
9. Route LTL-1A:
   a. Dong Xoai (YT079759) to Phuoc Vinh (XT975491), Condition I.
   b. Phuoc Vinh (XT975491) to JCT TL-2A (XT888366), Condition I.
   c. JCT TL-2A (XT888366) to XT862262, Condition IV. Bridges out at XT862262 and XT875313.
10. XT862262 to JCT QL-13 (XT812140), Condition II.
11. Route LTL-2: JCT QL-1 (YT437045) to Baria (YS380607), Condition II.
12. Route TL-2A: JCT LTL-1A (XT888366) to JCT TL-7B (XT831340), Condition I.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RSC CSFOR-65(R2) (U)

Route TL-7B: JCT TL-2A (XT631340) to JCT QL-13 (XT755318), Condition I.

Route LTL-5A:
- a. Saigon (XS816890) to Ong Thin Bridge (XS815775), Condition I.
- b. Ong Thin Bridge (XS815775) to XS784665, Condition III. (Includes the Ong Thin Bridge, Class 18).
- c. XS784665 to Cau Noi Ferry (XS783569), Condition IV.

Route LTL-23:
- a. Baria (YS380607) to Xuyen Moc (XS673672), Condition II.
- b. Xuyen Moc (XS673672) to Ham Tan (XS021809), Condition V.

Route TL-9A: JCT QL-1 (XS739003) to Duc Hoa (XS598966), Condition II.

Routes LTL-26 and 239, Tay Ninh (XT259500) to Dau Tieng (XT490460), Condition I.

Route LTL-19 Trang Bang (XT488194) to JCT LTL-26 (XT437354), Condition I.

Route 316: Newport (XS874942) to JCT QL-1 (YT072130), Condition I.

f. Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs.

(1) Psychological Operations.

(a) During the reporting period, II FFORCEV psychological operations were conducted in support of tactical operations, pacification, and special campaigns. Emphasis was placed on more effective methods of conducting psyops, including quick response to enemy activity and face to face psyops. In particular, OPCON units have stressed conduct on psychological operations at the small unit levels. This system resulted in a sharp increase of face to face and ground broadcast operations and the distribution of a greater variety of printed media to small, selected target audiences. As a consequence of this effort, the number of psychological operations conducted in II FFORCEV increased from 1,727 to 5,216 during the reporting period. Personal leaflet and tape messages made by ralliers were again found to be
one of the most effective inducements to soldiers in the enemy ranks to rally to the GVN. Psyops support for OPCON units consisted in part of the aerial dissemination of over 600,000,000 leaflets by Army and USAF psyops aircraft, and over 3,200 hours of aerial broadcasts. Psyops in conjunction with tactical operations resulted in a total of 2,955 ralliers during the three month period.

(b) Psychological Operation Family Tree was continued during this reporting period. The objective of this campaign was to generate friction and distrust in the VC/NVA command structure so that the enemy's ability to conduct coherent operations would be degraded. Special campaigns were also initiated against the VC local force structure, and against the 274th VC Main Force Regiment. Psychological operations against the 274th Regiment are in support of a four nation military operation to reduce the effectiveness of this regiment and eliminate its base areas.

(c) The potential redeployment of US/FWMAF troops was incorporated into psyops planning. General type redeployment media were prepared and stocked to support any future troop withdrawal announcements. Greater emphasis was placed on combined US/FWMAF and RVNAF psychological operations during this reporting period. The III Corps Combined Psychological Operations Center (CPOC) was increased in effectiveness by the addition of the Propaganda Development Center of the 6th Psyop Battalion and by the CPOC Air Operations' assumption of control of both USAF and VNAF Psyop aircraft.

(d) Overall psyop capability of II FFORCEV continues to be severely limited by the nonavailability of operative psyop equipment. Major problem areas are:

1 Request for major items of equipment, particularly aerial loudspeakers and hand-held loudspeakers initiated by II FFORCEV in May 1969, are still pending at DA and USAECOM level.

2 Continued lack of spare parts and maintenance facilities for all types of psyop equipment, to include printing presses and paper cutters, has resulted in excessive down time of available assets.

3 Redeployment of Flight B, 5th SOS (USAF) to CONUS and assumption of this mission by Flight B, 9th SOS (USAF) for both III and IV CTZ has reduced air psyop support for II FFORCEV units by approximately 50 per cent, since 9th SOS now covered both corps areas.

(2) Civil Affairs and Military Civic Action.
AVFBC-RE-H
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-L earned of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65(R2) (U)

(a) During this quarter, continuing emphasis was placed on a closer working relationship with CORDS representatives at all echelons, local GVN officials, and RVNAF personnel. The effectiveness of the province-oriented civil affairs platoons as a coordination link between US/RVNAF units and the III CTZ advisory staff continued to improve. A liaison officer from the 2d Civil Affairs Company was attached to the 1st Infantry Division on a trial basis to improve coordination of the division civic action program with the local province-oriented CA platoon.

(b) There was some decline in the number and extent of civic action projects undertaken by US units. This can be partially attributed to the guideline of limiting projects to a short-term, high-impact type to facilitate the redeployment of units selected for withdrawal. The decline can also be attributed to the policy of supporting the newly-implemented Village Self-Development Program. The success of this program could be seriously jeopardized by undertaking civic action projects that have not been requested and approved by GVN officials. Therefore, units are generally refraining from undertaking projects unless properly coordinated.

(c) During this reporting period elements of the 9th Infantry Division deployed to CONUS. Prior to their departure, the redeploying units insured that all civic action projects were either completed or turned over to a responsible unit for disposition.

(d) A representative from II FFORCEV and subordinate units attended a Personal Response Orientation Course conducted at III MAF. Implementation of a similar program is under consideration.

g. Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support.

(1) Revolutionary Development. At the conclusion of the Second Semester of the 1969 Pacification Campaign (31 October 1969), there was an unprecedented extension of government control into the countryside. Pacification was little hampered by the enemy, although available intelligence suggest it was targeted. October HES figures indicate that an estimated 3,233,500 people in the III CTZ area (97.3 per cent of the total population excluding Saigon) were living under GVN security (security rating of C or higher), an increase of 66,100 people or 1.2 per cent over September. Security improvements were complemented by improvements in local government. The latter showed significant upgrading in the past three months as the National Training Center at Vung Tau continued to produce promising graduates from the village/hamlet officials training course.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFBC-RE-H

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65(R2) (U)

(2) Territorial Security.

(a) With the exception of the heavy attacks in August against the population centers and US units in Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces, the level of enemy activity for the reporting period was low. RF/PF activity has continued at the same level as for the previous reporting period. Although the number of contacts was off slightly, most were friendly initiated.

(b) With the current emphasis on Vietnamization of the war, more emphasis was placed on upgrading the RF/PF to fulfill their territorial security mission.

(3) Refugees. During the third quarter of 1969, 42,509 in-camp refugees received final payments from the Ministry of Social Welfare and were removed from the active refugee rolls. Also, 31,491 out-of-camp refugees were registered, paid, and dropped from active rolls, and about 8,000 former refugees were returned to their former hamlets under the return-to-village program. It was probable that there would continue to be refugees generated, but only in small numbers. During calendar year 1969, more than 100,000 refugees were resettled in III CTZ.

(4) Chieu Hoi.

(a) During this reporting quarter the Chieu Hoi Program produced 2,962 Hoi Chanh as compared with 1,821 during the previous period. In August there were 787 ralliers, in September 967, and in October there were 1,208. The month of October 1969 is the record month for Hoi Chanh since the inception of the program in 1963. Previously the record was for February 1967 when 1,124 Hoi Chanh were registered.

(b) The Hoi Chanh continue to state their reasons for rallying to the side of the GVN as fear and hardship caused by military pressure.

(5) New Life Development.

(a) Although the forest industry continued to operate at a fraction of its potential as a result of war-related problems, there were a few encouraging developments. In Tay Ninh Province, an important forest area where the industry has been virtually stagnant during the past year, logging activities were resumed during September. An area of 80 square kilometers opened to logging and was expected to yield about 1,000 cubic meters of wood per month. Forestry activities also picked up in Binh Long...
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of Headquarters, II Field Forces Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65(R2) (U)

and Phuoc Long Provinces, although the advance of logging in Phuoc Long was hampered by poor security.

(b) Interest in the Village Self Development (VSD) Program continued at a high level. Participants believed that the government's VSD Program was beneficial. Popular hopes for a continuation of the program in 1970 appeared to be high. To create more interest and participation there will be increased emphasis on advertising the VSD Program through information and psychological operations.

(c) One of the first Rural Development Banks to be established in Vietnam was opened in Bien Hoa on 30 October. It was capitalized at 31 million piasters divided equally between private investors and the GVN, through the Bien Hoa Agricultural Development Bank. The bank, chartered to service the small farmer and businessman, was expected to make a substantial impact on the availability of agriculture credit for small operators.

(d) The year's enrollment figures in public elementary schools in III CTZ showed a total of 431,523 which was 31,891 or nearly an eight percent increase over last year's enrollment. This increase of eight percent brought the enrollment to approximately 82 percent of the total potential, and within three percent of the MOE goal for the 1970-71 school year. To support the increased enrollment, 640 new elementary school teachers were assigned in III CTZ for the current school term bringing the total number of elementary school teachers to 7,736.

h. Communications. Significant changes in communications in support of II Field Force Vietnam operations during the reporting period are outlined below.

(1) Radio.

(a) The II FFORCEV Command Net AM Single Sideband (voice) was deactivated on 31 July 1969. A review of II FFORCEV communications requirements indicated there was no further need for this net. The net served as a non-secure, on-call, back-up means of communications but because of the availability of FM secure, FM non-secure, radio teletype and teletype circuits through tactical and Corps Area System, the SSB net was used only for test purposes.

(b) A decision was made to deactivate the MACV SSB net because other communication facilities were available. The II FFORCEV station in
AVFRC-R3-H
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of Headquarters, II Field
Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65(R2) (U)

this net was deactivated on 2 August 1969.

(c) The II FFORCEV tropospheric scatter system from Headquarters, II
FFORCEV to the 9th Infantry Division at Dong Tam was deactivated on 1
August 1969. This AN/TRC-97 system was deactivated because of decreased
communication requirements at Dong Tam after the 9th Infantry Division
moved from that location.

(d) An automatic retransmission station (PM) was established on Hill
837 by the 53d Signal Battalion in support of the 23d Artillery Group. The
retransmission station was needed by the 23d Artillery Group in order to
relay tactical FM communications to the various operating battalions. The
relay was deactivated on 2 September 1969.

(e) An automatic retransmission station (PM) was established on Hill
837 by the 53d Signal Battalion in support of the 69th Engineer Battalion.
The retransmission station was used to relay FM tactical communications
from the battalion headquarters to the companies in north Long Khanh
Province.

(f) The AN/TRC-24 system from Headquarters, II FFORCEV to Blackhorse
in support of the 199th Infantry Brigade was deactivated on 20 August 1969
when the 199th moved to Xuan Loc, an AN/TRC-24 system was installed from
Headquarters, II FFORCEV to Xuan Loc, relayed through Hill 837.

(g) On 3 September 1969 an AN/TRC-97 system was installed from
Headquarters, II FFORCEV to Phuoc Vinh. The purpose of the system is to
improve existing communications to the lst Cavalry Division as well as
provide an alternate system to that location.

(h) To support the move of the 3d Brigade 82d Airborne Division to
Phu Loi, an AN/TRC-24 system was installed between Phu Loi and Headquarters,
II FFORCEV on 24 September 1969. A RATT station in the II FFORCEV Command
Net (RATT) was also installed at that location to support the 3/82d Airborne
Division.

(i) The AN/MRC-112 system from Song Be to Song Be Airfield was
deactivated on 1 August 1969. The system was operated by the 53d
Signal Battalion and was giving communications support to artillery
units in that area.

(j) On 12 September 1969 construction was completed on the 53 Signal
Battalion new VHF building. The new facilities provide a stable source of
commercial power, better ventilation to reduce equipment losses due to heat and consolidation of equipment for better control.

(k) A radio officers' conference was conducted at Headquarters, II FFORCEV on 23 October 1969. The purpose of the conference was to discuss radio and frequency problems encountered by the OPCON units.

(1) On 11 October 1969, an AN/TRC-24 system was established between Headquarters, II FFORCEV (Plantation) and the 1st Cavalry Division rear at Bien Hoa. Additional circuits were required from 1st Cavalry Division at Phuoc Vinh to its rear at Bien Hoa. These 8 additional circuits are routed from Phuoc Vinh to Plantation over the 53d Signal Battalion's AN/TRC-97 tropospheric scatter system and are patched to the AN/TRC-24 system at Plantation where they are routed to Bien Hoa.

(2) Commcenter.

(a) On 13 August 1969 the circuit between II FFORCEV Commcenter and the commcenters of the 1st Infantry, 1st Cavalry and 25th Infantry Divisions were upgraded to enable transmission of top secret messages on an on-call basis. Establishment of this on-call capability precludes delays of top secret messages normally sent via courier.

(b) The II FFORCEV courier service was streamlined by publication of change 1 to II FFORCEV Regulation 66-1, on 14 September 1969. Schedules were consolidated or placed on an as-required basis consistent with the present unit requirements; to provide maximum service consistent with manpower/vehicular commitments.

(c) A NESTOR Conference was held on 29 September 1969 at II FFORCEV. Representatives of all OPCON units received information on the enemy's capability to intercept, analyze and react to intelligence gained from in-the-clear FM transmissions; the amount of TRANSEC violations committed and how the enemy can be denied this information.

(3) Wire Communications.

(a) An emergency action console telephone was installed on 2 August 1969 for the Deputy Commanding General Headquarters II FFORCEV to provide him with access to the rapid response system.

(b) On 27 August a 12 channel VHF system was provided to the 199th Light Infantry Brigade when they relocated from Long Giao to Xuan Loc.
Circuits were provided for command and control communications from 199th forward to 199th rear and 199th forward to Plantation dial telephone exchange.

(c) The III Corps Advisor Tactical Operations Center (TOC) Manual Switchboard was consolidated with the BHTAC switchboard on 29 August 1969. The consolidation resulted in better communications for III Corps subscribers and was an extension of communications economy by consolidating colocated switchboards.

(d) In the beginning of September the AN/MTC-10 manual switchboards utilized by the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) were replaced by an AN/MTC-1. The AN/MTC-1 has provided more rapid and reliable telephone communications for the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) headquarters.

(e) This headquarters received input from all OPCON units on their dedicated circuit networks. The information will provide a basis for better evaluation of future communication requirements plus help in elimination of present excessive and redundant circuits.

(4) 1st Australian Task Force Switchboard. As an interim measure until the arrival of the 1st Australian Task Force's newly procured AN/RTC-7, Central Office, Telephone, Manual, the 1st Signal Brigade furnished the 1st Australian Task Force with AN/MTC-1, Central Office, Telephone, Manual. The installation of the MTC-1 began on 20 October 1969 and was completed on 23 October 1969. The new switchboard will provide more rapid and better quality telephone service for the 1st Australian Task Force.

(5) Control of Overseas Telephone Calls. Effective 1 September 1969 controls were placed on all overseas telephone calls within the US Military Communications System IAW USARV Regulation 105-7. The II FFORCEV Signal Office has been designated as the releasing authority for Headquarters, II FFORCEV, assigned and attached units. Control numbers, which are required for placing an overseas call, are issued by the signal office and appropriate administrative records are being kept. The use of overseas telephone control numbers insures the proper use of long haul communications circuits by authorized personnel.

(1) Information.

(1) During the reporting period, "The Hurricane" continued to feature stories on Vietnam, its culture, its people, and its armed forces. In the August, September, and October issues there were 32 feature articles; 13
emphasized Vietnam subjects ranging from pacification and CORDS activities to the cities of Vietnam. Four stories were centered around Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. In other areas, 10 featured American and Free World Forces in III CTZ. Five other articles were presented on miscellaneous subjects including a story on Air America.

(2) Production in the Radio/TV Section rose sharply. There was a total of 1,488 radio hometown tapes, 15 radio feature stories, and 10 spot announcements for AFVN. Additionally, during the reporting period this office initiated a weekly 15 minute radio show for AFVN titled "Dateline: III Corps". Five of these shows have been aired.

(3) In public information there were 63 press releases and 5% hometown news releases.

(4) Relations with the civilian news media continue to be excellent. There were six up-date press briefings conducted during this period. These were attended by a total of 94 correspondents. Also, during the same period 20 reporters interviewed the Commanding General on subjects ranging from the current tactical situation to Vietnamization and pacification programs. One of the interviews was filmed for television. Additionally two other reporters had interviews with G2 and G3.

j. Inspector General. During the reporting period the Inspector General completed 6 inspections.

k. Staff Judge Advocate.

(1) During the reporting period, personnel of the Staff Judge Advocate section continued to visit units in the field to provide legal assistance and guidance in the handling of military justice matters. Due to the effective date and implementation of the Military Justice Act of 1968, which was effective 1 August 1969, the work load in military justice matters increased tremendously during the period. However, due to an addition of four JAGC officers and three enlisted personnel, two of whom are qualified lawyers, the quality and quantity of legal services rendered continued to show substantial improvement.

(2) The Staff Judge Advocate verified the classification by the 219th Military Intelligence Detachment of a number of detainees as to their status as civil defendants or prisoners of war.
AVFBC-RE-H

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65(R2) (U)

(3) One general court-martial was conducted for the offense of absence without proper authority and ten specifications of violating MACV postal regulations.

(4) The Office of the Staff Judge Advocate continued to provide legal support for post, camp and station functions.

(5) During the third quarter of 1969, claims processing has remained at a rather high level. Claims incident to service (AR 27-20) increased both in the number of claims paid and the total amount paid. Claims on hand and claims being forwarded through channels to this office showed a slight decline. Foreign claims (AR 27-26) increased slightly over the preceding quarter. The foreign claims are being investigated by unit claims officers and returned to this office well within the USARV Foreign Claims Division's suspense date. This reflects better organization at the unit level and a closer liaison between the units and the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate.

2. (c) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commanders' Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel.

(1) Activation of New Territorial Forces.

(a) OBSERVATION: New Territorial Forces can quickly be activated, trained and deployed in III CTZ provinces.

(b) EVALUATION: In the wake of the Guam Conference, the Vietnamese Joint General Staff (JGS) authorized 167 new Popular Force platoons to be activated and deployed in III Corps provinces by the end of 1969. Previous estimates of personnel resources indicated that some provinces would experience difficulty recruiting troops to fill authorized platoons, forming them into units, and training and deploying them by the end of 1969. Recruiting was initiated on 11 July, and by 2 August 127 platoons were recruited and ready to commence training. The remaining platoons were recruited by 6 September and all platoons were in training by 15 September. Training is proceeding ahead of schedule and all of the new platoons will be trained and deployed by 31 December 1969. Hau Nghia Province was not authorized to form new platoons because it was believed that their recruiting base had been exhausted. However, the province believed it would be able to recruit personnel for PF platoons and requested authority to form new platoons. A subsequent authorization
for 12 additional PF platoons was given to Hau Nghia and the platoons are currently being formed and trained.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the above be used to illustrate Vietnamese ability to expand their forces.

(2) Community Development Advisory Personnel.

(a) OBSERVATION: Four Community Development Officers (CDO) terminated employment within III CTZ during the months of September and October due to resignation, transfers, or non-renewal of contracts.

(b) EVALUATION: With increased emphasis being placed at the village level, it is virtually impossible to adequately advise and monitor the Village Self Development Program with personnel losses reducing the capability of already inadequate staffing.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That expedited personnel action be taken for the replacement of CDO losses in current staffing, and that follow-up action be pursued on recommendations previously submitted for an increase in Community Development Assistants' (CDA) authorized strength.

(3) Public Works Operating Personnel.

(a) OBSERVATIONS: Serious personnel shortages continue to exist within the GVN Province Public Works Services.

(b) EVALUATION: There exists a shortage of equipment operators as well as maintenance shop personnel throughout III CTZ. Due to the non-availability of skilled personnel, the general practice has been to hire inexperienced personnel rather than totally close down operations. The result has been a gradual deterioration of Public Works Services equipment throughout the region.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the appropriate action be taken by US and GVN officials to have trained personnel exempt from the draft for employment in this critical area and to review the present low wage scale with a view toward revisions which would attract qualified personnel.

(4) Province Logistics Advisors.

(a) OBSERVATION: Progress in the implementation of the Ministry of Revolutionary Development (MOED) Basic Supply Regulations (BSR), has reflected deterioration in most areas since the departure of qualified personnel.
Province Logistics Advisors (PLA) in III CTZ provinces. These regulations are directed toward the ultimate goal for establishment of a fully integrated GVN supply system for common commodities, and the establishment and maintenance of accurate audit trails and accountability records for AID-provided commodities.

(b) EVALUATION: US Public Laws and AID regulations governing programming, procuring, distributing and utilizing US provided commodities, and requirements for advising the GVN in the operation of integrated logistics systems, makes continued supervision of GVN logistics operations mandatory. In the field, the requests from Province Senior Advisors (PSA) and Province Chiefs, reflecting their critical need for continuous assignment of trained logistics personnel, further verifies the urgent requirement for PLA's. Efforts to have PLA positions re-established and filled by qualified AID civilian personnel have been successful. PSA efforts to utilize members of the province team staff to fill the PLA job on a part-time basis have produced inadequate results.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a qualified company grade officer be detailed to the staff of each of the eleven III CTZ province advisory teams and the autonomous city of Vung Tau as the full-time Province Logistics Advisors to ARVN Officer counterparts (Provincial Accountable Officers).

b. Intelligence. None.

c. Operations.

(1) Counter - Sapper Defense.

(a) OBSERVATION: The sapper is trained to identify and exploit weaknesses found in the defense of an installation. The sapper's greatest enemies are an alert, aggressive defending force, a well-prepared defense, and illumination.

(b) EVALUATION: Standard position defense principles and techniques are valid against sapper operations; however, a stereotyped defense relying on fixed routines, simplifies the sapper's task. Originality, initiative, flexibility, and an avoidance of set patterns will provide the installation with a defense which will thwart the sapper. The following points should be considered.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65(R2) (U)

1 Intelligence. Identify the sapper units and deny them and their support weapons access to the area. Prevent sappers from obtaining detailed intelligence of the defense.

2 Perimeter defense. Detect and destroy the sapper as he attempts to penetrate the perimeter. The sapper is well trained in the techniques of penetrating obstacles and barriers. The good perimeter defense is designed to slow down the sapper and to increase the probability of his detection by the alert defending force. Once detected, the defending force should make use of its defenses to direct maximum firepower on the enemy.

3 Internal defense. Canalize, fix, and destroy the sapper who has penetrated the perimeter. Once the penetration has occurred, the sapper moves very rapidly to his objective. He is very vulnerable to small arms fire.

4 Fire support plan. Direct maximum fires on the sapper and his support weapons. The well planned installation defensive fire support plan should include all supporting fires, those located on the installation and those of supporting units, and should include artillery and aerial delivery systems.

5 Command and control. The single most important aspect of defense against sapper attacks is effective command and control. Command and control of the installation should be centralized and a dual communication capability should be established.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the above points be considered in all planning for defense against sapper attacks.

(2) Barbed Wire Entanglements.

(a) OBSERVATION: The enemy is breaching defensive perimeters quite easily, mostly under the wire but also by cutting.

(b) EVALUATION: Several commanders have indicated that the enemy is easily breaching defensive perimeters. The enemy will often spend eight hours travelling the last hundred meters to a perimeter and is well trained in wire cutting and in the detection of anti-intrusion devices, mines, booby traps, and trip flares. Following are some considerations on the employment of barbed wire entanglements.
1. Tactical wire entanglements should be equivalent to three belts of 4- and 2- pace double apron fence.

2. Protective wire should be equivalent to one belt of 4- and 2- pace double apron fence.

3. Bands using various types of wire are desirable since this makes it hard for the enemy to develop a standard breach technique.

4. Triple standard concertina is usually more effective than double apron. It is difficult to cut, cross, or crawl through.

5. Improvised staples, approximately 18 inches long and usually made of 3/4 inch drift pins, should be driven over each pair of end hoops, over the bottom of the coil at each long picket and at the 1/4 and 5/4 points between the pickets to secure the first concertina to the ground. This is essential and must be done before installing more concertina to the rear.

6. Concertina is much harder to cut than standard barbed wire.

7. The 4- and 2- pace fence is a substantially better obstacle than the 6- and 3- pace fences.

8. The lower notch or bottom eye of the long pickets in the double apron fence, or the medium pickets in the low wire entanglement, should be approximately four inches off the ground to make passage over or under the bottom wires difficult.

9. The number 2, 5, and 12 wires of the standard double apron fence must be tight enough and close enough to the ground to make passage over or under them very difficult.

10. The effectiveness of the double apron fence against crawling can be substantially enhanced by placing an extra diagonal wire near ground level and directly beneath the number 9 wire. The extra wire should be attached to the lower notches or eyes and should be placed just before the number 9 wire is placed.

11. The double apron fence constructed with barbed tape is more difficult to breach by crawling through and harder to cut using wire cutters than standard wire.
12 The low wire entanglement makes passage underneath very rigorous, is almost invisible in tall grass or shallow water, and is very effective when combined with other types of belts.

13 Tanglefoot, extensively used between the external and internal perimeter, is extremely efficient for keeping the enemy in the kill zone.

14 Trip flares, noise devices, mines, and booby traps should be used extensively and where least expected.

15 C-ration cans with pebbles, affixed to bushes and w.rea, make adequate noise devices.

16 Internal wire systems should be used to delay and canalize enemy penetration.

17 All entanglements should be under constant observation, covered by fire, and patrolled and illuminated at frequent but irregular intervals.

18 Periodically change the configuration of the perimeter wire to thwart enemy reconnaissance efforts. This is accomplished by using portable barbed wire obstacles or belts of single or double concertina arranged in irregular patterns to supplement the basic perimeter wire which does not change. By shifting the patterns of these temporary wire obstacles the exact configuration of the perimeter wire is confusing to the enemy and breaching the wire is more difficult.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the above points be considered when erecting a barbed wire defensive perimeter.

3) Conduct of Village Seal Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: The conduct of a successful seal operations requires detailed and imaginative prior planning, vigorous execution, and the use and coordination of appropriate and adequate forces.

(b) EVALUATION:

1 A seal operation of Phu Hoa Village was conducted during the period 15-26 September.

2 The seal was conducted by US, ARVN, district, and provincial forces.
Planning for the operation was a joint effort which began on 8 September and included the use of not only ground combat troops but also US and ARVN artillery, engineer, Army Aviation, Air Force, a river assault group, river patrol boats, scout dogs and tracker teams, and a tunnel rat team.

The village was divided into five primary search areas which were further divided into four search team areas, with each search team composed of ten RF soldiers, five national policemen, five members of the armed propaganda team, and two US soldiers.

The search teams were changed daily so as to have "different eyes" look at the same area and to avoid individual boredom and overfamiliarity with a particular area.

Bands and medical teams were used to present allied presence in a favorable light.

A lottery, utilizing numbered safe conduct passes, capitalized on the villagers' love of gambling and facilitated the collection of villagers for intelligence screening at a joint US-VN interrogation center.

Psynops was conducted daily throughout the operation and employed broadcasts, leaflet drops, US ground speaker teams and face-to-face communication.

A typed Chieu Hoi message prepared by the commander of the VC C-10 Company was also utilized.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That use of the above points which are appropriate be considered when planning seal operations.

Night Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: Regional and Popular Force (RF/PF) units are reluctant to conduct night operations.

(b) EVALUATION: Throughout the III Corps area RF/PF Advisors and Mobile Advisory Team Leaders report that RF/PF units are reluctant to conduct mobile operations during the hours of darkness, and that they will not remain in ambush positions throughout the night as prescribed. The resulting void in territorial security has permitted enemy units to operate freely in areas removed from RF/PF base camps and outposts.
Opportunities to engage the enemy while he is at a disadvantage as a result of hostile terrain and reduced visibility are forfeited by units that will not remain outside their compounds beyond 2400 hours. Comparisons of operational performance between RF/PF in I and III Corps indicate that in the former the RF/PF are much more successful in eliminating the enemy and in providing village/hamlet security. The noticeable difference in tactics employed in the two corps areas is that I Corps RF/PF units operate extensively at night and remain throughout the night in ambush positions. The number of contacts with the enemy at night is much higher in I Corps than in III Corps.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That more explicit direction from corps and above be issued to increase the number and effectiveness of night operations.

(5) Control of Village Activities by Province and District Officials.

(a) OBSERVATION: The tendency of some Province and District Officials to control village activities, and to impose ill-conceived requirements has been observed to be limiting factors to the progress of the Village Self Development Program (VSDP).

(b) EVALUATION: NORD directives regulating the VSDP are generally considered to be sufficiently broad in spectrum to cover most aspects of the program. However, inflexible interpretations of some provisions originally intended as broad guidelines have often stifled the resourcefulness of villagers and suppressed their initiative.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Efforts should be exerted to develop an awareness on the part of province and intermediate level officials, that the strengthening of village governments, and the consequent polarization of mass support of village leadership has as its corollary the strengthening of their positions instead of weakening them.

(6) Protein Production.

(a) OBSERVATION: The lack of feed grain during September and October forced many farmers to slaughter livestock before attaining market weights, and in some instances animals intended for breeding programs.

(b) EVALUATION: The need for more comprehensive planning is evidenced by the demand created by swine and poultry production programs on a limited source and supply of feeds.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVPK-H-RE-H
OPERATIONAL REPORT LESSONS-LEARNED OF HEADQUARTERS, II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM, PERIOD ENDING 31 OCTOBER 1969, BCS CHF-68(12) (1)

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It should be stressed with Agriculture Service Chiefs that the first consideration in any production enterprise is the source, quantity, and quality of the inputs. Production of an economic unit of feed to sustain livestock involved should be considered by the SVN as an integral part of any livestock or poultry project, and should be an established prerequisite for government support.

(7) Defoliation.

(a) OBSERVATION: Three observation trips by the regional staff have been made into provinces requesting assistance in determining defoliation damage to crops.

(b) EVALUATION: Conclusions based upon these three field trips tend to eliminate the Ranch Hand (Air Force) applications from causing damage outside intended target areas. In these particular cases, most damage that has been identified has been traced to mishandling of defoliants and equipment by personnel on the ground, usually VN personnel.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That increased emphasis be placed in the correct handling of defoliant agents, to include calculating drift, neutralizing residual chemical left in containers, and more thorough cleaning of equipment before changing from insecticides to herbicides, and vice versa.


(a) OBSERVATION: The repair of PSDF weapons is unsatisfactory in most provinces.

(b) EVALUATION: There are over 84,000 weapons in the hands of PSDF in III CTZ excluding those in the Saigon area. The responsibility for maintaining these weapons has been assigned to the Province Administrative and Direct Support Logistics Company. However, the manpower and physical facilities of the AADSL companies were determined prior to the increase in RF/FF forces and the additional mission to support PSDF and RF cadre. As a result, the personnel and equipment authorized for AADSL companies are inadequate.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Administrative and Direct Support Logistics Companies be authorized additional personnel and equipment.
2 That weapons training be more specific and thorough in operator care and maintenance of individual weapons.

e. Training. Village/Hamlet Officials.

(a) OBSERVATION: Training of village/hamlet officials conducted by the Vung Tau Training Center and by the provinces, is considered to be sufficiently comprehensive in developing general administrative expertise. However, in the light of observations made by CORDS province advisory teams, it has become evident that specialized training programs, designed to meet particular needs and solve specific problem areas, should be continuously evolved within the province to make the VSDP an effective part of pacification.

(b) EVALUATION: GVN training budgets for specified purposes are fixed at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, GVN officials concerned understand the reluctance to reallocate programmed funds. The reluctance to do so has limited provincial capability to adjust training programs as unprogrammed requirements develop.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The GVN should be encouraged to provide Provincial Training Directors with sufficient authority to make appropriate adjustments in training activities calculated to cope with constantly developing requirements of Village/Hamlet administration.

f. Logistics.

(i) Force structure increases create a strain on the Vietnamese Supply system.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the months of June and July 1969 a critical shortage of barrier materials developed in Hau Nghia and Long An Provinces.

(b) EVALUATION: During the execution of the 1969 force structure increase plan, eighteen RF companies were recruited, trained, and deployed in Long An Province. Fifteen RF companies that had been recruited in Gia Dinh and Tay Ninh were deployed in Hau Nghia. The two provinces were allocated more companies than any others in the corps, and at the time of their deployment, the full effect of the barrier material shortage was felt. The barrier materials for 1969 for both provinces had been programmed in January 1968. However, the force structure analysis which subsequently led to the allocation of the RF companies to Long An and Hau Nghia was made in November 1968. The amount of barrier materials programmed was not adjusted at that time to provide adequate materials to accommodate the new companies.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFRC-RE-II
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65(R2) (U)

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Advisors should stress the importance of correlating logistical support with planned troop strength increases.

(2) Public Works Road Construction Equipment.

(a) OBSERVATION: The equipment potential of the Province Public Works Services continues to represent a low level of capability for the road construction program it is scheduled to support.

(b) EVALUATION: The deadline rate for all public works equipment remains at a constant 25 per cent. This, added to the fact that the overall equipment inventory is inadequate, creates a negative potential for accomplishing provincial roadwork programs.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That funds be budgeted for the Directorate General of Highways to support the medium and long range procurement plans.

2. That medium and long range programs be developed to phase in new equipment to replace the present obsolete public works road construction equipment inventory.

3. That for immediate replacement, consideration be given to procurement of excess US engineer equipment.

4. That the National Public Works Repair and Parts Depot at Sui Lo be improved through direct US military support to provide immediate capability to repair and rebuild deadlined equipment, and to provide adequate repair parts service to provinces.

5. Communications.

(1) Ventilation of the KY-8 Secure Radio Equipment.

(a) OBSERVATION: The KY-8 secure equipment must be protected from the direct heat of the sun and from hot, poorly ventilated bunkers if it is to remain operative.

(b) EVALUATION: Direct FM secure communications from Headquarters, II Force Vietnam to Tan Son Nhut was temporarily out during the recent presidential visit. It was determined that the outage was caused by an overheating of the KY-8 secure equipment at Tan Son Nhut. Communications was
immediately resumed when the KY-8 was cooled. The 199th Infantry Brigade station in the II Field Force Vietnam secure at Xuan Loc experienced long outages after their recent move to that location. It was determined that the KY-8 secure equipment was being operated in a relatively hot bunker complex and as a result was becoming inoperative because of excessive heating. When the equipment was moved to a cooler location it operated with no failures.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Commanders and operators should insure that the KY-8 secure equipment is operated in the coolest possible place consistent with tactical requirements. In any case, it should be protected from the direct rays of the sun and poorly ventilated enclosed areas.

(2) Communications Difficulty of Artillery Warning Control Centers.

(a) OBSERVATION: Several of the Artillery Warning Control Centers (AWCC) have experienced difficulty in communicating with the Control and Reporting Center (CRC).

(b) EVALUATION: Several of the AWCC's do not have sole user telephone circuits to the Control and Reporting Center at Tan Son Nhut (Paris Control) and as a result have difficulty in communicating with them. Also, the AWCC's have no responsive communications between each other. Only the common user telephone is available for AWCC's to communicate with each other and in some cases this can cause a considerable time delay when the centers are attempting to coordinate artillery fires and aircraft clearances.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Communications for the AWCC's has been studied and evaluated by this headquarters. At the present all AWCC's are being provided with sole user telephone circuits to Paris Control and the centers are being equipped with UHF radio equipment in order to allow them to communicate with Air Force type aircraft. It has been recommended that a SSB (voice) net be established between Paris Control and the AWCC's. This type net would provide responsive communications between the AWCC's and Paris Control and also would allow the AWCC's to communicate with each other. Availability of SSB radio equipment has prevented this net from being established as of this date.

(3) Nui Ba Ra Mountain Communication Difficulties.

(a) OBSERVATION: Severe frequency interference and poor radio communications existed when signals were originated from or were relayed through the radio site on Nui Ba Ra Mountain.
SUBJECT: Operational Report, Lessons-Learned of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65(R2) (U)

(b) EVALUATION: The 1st Cavalry Division had been experiencing severe frequency interference problems and poor communications in general when signals were originated from or relayed through the radio site on Nui Ba Ra Mountain. An on site evaluation and study of the problem resulted in the discovery of several possible factors that were contributing to the situation. It was determined that frequency control and mutual interference due to antenna coupling was the primary source of difficulty.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Recommendations were made to the responsible units on the mountain that strict control be exercised over the assignment and use of frequencies on the relay site and that antennas be spaced as far apart as possible so as to prevent mutual interference.

(4) Use of KY-38 Speech Security Equipment.

(a) OBSERVATION: There has been limited usage of KY-38 speech security equipment by OPCON units.

(b) EVALUATION: NESTOR equipment utilization reports and a NESTOR equipment conference revealed that many units OPCON to II FFORCEV were using organic KY-38's much less than what is desired to reduce the number of TRAMSEC violations and thus deny intelligence to the enemy. It was determined that the reason was due to the excessive weight of the PRC-77/KY-38 when used in its intended man-pack configuration. Weight of the two devices is in excess of 70 pounds. All expressed extreme satisfaction in the unit's operation, stating that the KY-38 exceeds the capability of the KY-8 which is used extensively. Many stated that they needed VRC-12/KY-38 interconnect cables so that the smaller device could be used in lieu of the KY-8 which is prone to fail when used in poorly ventilated and especially warm environment. Another major reason they wish to substitute the KY-38 for the KY-8 is because of power limitations at fire support bases or the desire to reduce noise during darkness by non-use of power generators. The battery powered KY-38 is ideally suited for that purpose.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Intended KY-38 usage for patrols and the foot-soldier in man-pack configuration should be reevaluated in recognition of legitimate reasons for non-use. Ample supplies of KY-38/VRC-12 interconnect cables should be fielded so that KY-38's can be used in lieu of KY-8's when situations dictate. This has been discussed with USARV headquarters.

(5) Unsatisfactory Service of NEC Telephone System.

CONFIDENTIAL
AVFRC-RE-H
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of Headquarters II Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, ROS CSFOR-65(R2) (U)

(a) OBSERVATION: The G3 section of II FFORC had a NEC key system installed which was a continual source of trouble and provided unsatisfactory service.

(b) EVALUATION: The key system was a Japanese system designed to operate on a different power source than that being utilized. No repair parts were available for troubleshooting problems. The key system was removed on 17 August and replaced with a satisfactory arrangement of regular telephones which provided much better subscriber service.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That before non-issue communication items are installed, the responsible signal unit ascertain if they have necessary schematic diagrams and repair parts to maintain the equipment.

h. Materiel. None.

i. Other.

(1) RF/PF casualties from mines and booby traps.

(a) OBSERVATION: During recent months the number of RF/PF killed or wounded by mines and booby traps has been increasing.

(b) EVALUATION: From fifteen to twenty per cent of all RF/PF combat deaths are the result of mine and booby trap detonations. Statistics are not available on the number of RF/PF who subsequently die from wounds received from mines and booby traps; however, due to the critical nature of the wounds normally received from such explosive devices, it can be assumed that the percentage of total deaths is in excess of 15-20 per cent of those wounded. In Phuoc Tuy Province, on 8 October, the 576th RF Company was on an operation into the Long Hai Mountains, a well-known enemy sanctuary. It was also well known that the VC had mined and booby trapped the area, but the RF commander, failing to heed the advice of the US advisors, did not use mine detectors to locate the positions of mines. The company unknowingly entered a minefield and an RF soldier detonated an M16 mine, at 1845 hours, killing himself and wounding six other RF and two US advisors. The RF commander's lack of concern proved costly in that incident, but it is typical of an attitude of careless disregard for mines and booby traps prevalent toward areas where the enemy employs mines to defend his sanctuary areas.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That advisory emphasis be placed on increasing RF/PF attention to mine and booby trap detection.
AVFPC-RE-H
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of Headquarters II Field
Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65(R2) (U)

(2) Ministry of Education (MOE) Representation at Corps Pacification
and Development Council Meetings.

(a) OBSERVATION: Representatives from the various ministries are
invited to attend meetings of the III Corps PD Council. MOE has been
represented at the PD meetings by the Primary Education Chief of Bien
Hoa Province.

(b) EVALUATION: Although the Province Education Chief is familiar
with provincial programs, he is at a disadvantage when regional programs
are discussed. Consequently, regional educational matters do not receive
adequate support. This lack of representation has been recognized by both
GVN and US officials as a deterrent to progressive accomplishment of
regional education programs.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That this matter be brought to the attention of
the MOE urging appointment of an official knowledgeable in regional
activities to represent and speak for MOE at regional PD council meetings.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

8 Incl

II FFV Orders of Battle
2. II FFV Area of Operations
3. C130/C123 Sorties
4. Close Air Sorties
5. B-52 Strikes
6. Disposition of Enemy Forces
7. II FFV Troop List
8. Enemy Organisation in the III CTZ

Incl 1 wd HQ, DA

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AVFBC-RE-H

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of Headquarters II Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65(R2) (U)

CO, USAAMS - 1
CO, USAINFHUR - 1
ACofS, G1 II FFV - 1
ACofS, G2 II FFV - 1
ACofS, G3 II FFV - 5
ACofS, G4 II FFV - 1
ACofS, G5 II FFV - 1
DEPCORDS - 1
CDC LNO - 1
7th Mil Hist Det - 5
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (17 Nov 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFGR-65(R2) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 25 DEC 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, GCP-JT, APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (U) Reference item concerning "Psychological Operations", page 46, paragraph 1f(1)(d):

(1) MOE authorizations for hand held loudspeakers has been approved by DA. A bulk requisition for 869 hand held loudspeakers has been submitted by ICCV to USARVCOM. No delivery date has been established. Additional requirements have been submitted by units for 155 hand held loudspeakers with shipment expected in Dec 69. Request for authorization of aerial loudspeakers is pending.

(2) ICCV has established ASL for PSYOP equipment. Bulk requisition for depot storage has been submitted. When depot stocks have been built up, 4th PSYOP Group will cease ASL operation and be supported by Depot. Depot stock of repair parts for PSYOP equipment will not be dedicated solely to 4th PSYOP Group, but will be available to all legitimate requestors.

b. (C) Reference items concerning "Counter-Sapper Defense" and "Barbed Wire Entanglements", pages 58 and 59, paragraph 2c(1) and paragraph 2c(2). The Combat Intelligence Lessons (CIL) to be published 1 Jan 70, will include an article on "Defense Against Sapper Attacks". The item "Barbed Wire Entanglements" will be used to supplement the CIL. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

c. (C) Reference item concerning "Conduct of Village Seal Operations", page 61, paragraph 2c(3); concur. The comprehensive planning exhibited in the example cordon and search operation reflected the detailed planning essential to conducting this type operation successfully. Significantly the planning provided for considerate treatment of the populace and positive efforts to obtain their support, as well as specialized tactical teams and combined search teams.

72

CONFIDENTIAL
AVIIC-DST (17 Nov 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters, II Field
Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, ROG GSPOM-65(R2)(U)

d. (C) Reference item concerning "Ventilation of the KY-8 Secure Radio
Equipment", page 66, paragraph 2g(1); concur. COMSEC equipment should be
operated in as cool an environment as possible. Transistorized communications
equipment is extremely vulnerable to heat and should be provided with ventila-
tion. The ECOM laboratories are presently working toward developing a
reflective paint for use on tactical communications equipment that will lower
the internal operating temperature at least ten degrees when operated in the
direct rays of the sun.

e. (C) Reference item concerning "Communications", page 67, paragraph
2g(2). Personnel and equipment to operate Artillery Warning Control Centers
(ANCC) are not provided by TO & TRA for such an organization. Rather, they
are obtained from assets authorized II FFV subordinate organizations; i.e.,
divisions. As such, the provision of SSB (voice) nets for ANCC's must be
accomplished from within assets available to II FFV, or by MTOE of II FFV
organizations to obtain the assets needed. Approval of MTO change must be
based on essential need. The ANCC's are being provided with sole user tele-
phone circuits to the Control and Reporting Center in Saigon (Paris Control).
They should have no need to coordinate fires between adjacent ANCC areas
because that is the function of Fire Direction Centers (FDC) and Fire Support
Coordination Elements (FSCE). ANCC's are often collocated with FDC's or
FSCE's and thus have immediate access to fire coordination information.
Accordingly, the need to have SSB nets for purposes of communication between
ANCC's remains to be justified and the use of SSB nets for communication
between ANCC's and Paris Control serves as a back-up system and not an essen-
tial requirement. This item will be identified for consideration by HQ MACV.

f. (C) Reference item concerning "Use of KY-38 Speech Security Equip-
ment", page 68, paragraph 2g(4). The KY-38 is designed to be used with AM/FM
portable radio sets. As such it is the latest in the state of the art that
is available. The ECOM laboratories are manufacturing interconnecting cables
for the AN/VCQ-12/KY-38 configuration and at the present time 300 of these
cables are due out. The substitution of the KY-38 for the KY-8 in a vehicular
configuration is agreeable; however, it should not in any case, be done so at
the expense of portable radio transmission security.

3. (U) Many items in the II FFV GRLL pertain to ARVN, RF/PP, and the advisory
effort and as such cannot be addressed by USAV. These items will be forwarded
to MACV J3 for consideration.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
L. D. MURRAY
CPT, AOC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy for:
MACV/II FFV

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, II Field Force Vietnam for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 26 JAN 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as endorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C. E. Short
CPT, AGC
Adj AG
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Incl 3

CONFIDENTIAL
## STATISTICAL SUMMARY
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1 August - 31 October 1969

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Incl 4
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78
### B-52 STRIKES II, III CTZ

1 August - 31 October

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Incl 5

CONFIDENTIAL
# II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM TROOP LIST

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**Incl 7**
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, II Field Force Vietnam

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug 69 to 31 Oct 69.

HQ, II Field Force Vietnam

**11. REPORT TITLE**
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, II Field Force Vietnam

**12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY**
OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310