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IN REPLY REFER TO
AGDA (M) (12 Jan 70) FOR OT UT 69B053 19 January 1970

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: BG George W. Dickerson, CG, 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, Period 11 December 1968 through 11 December 1969 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

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1. Reference: AR 1-26, subject, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U) dated 4 November 1966.

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of BG George W. Dickerson, subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 1-26, as a result of subject report, should be provided ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96375

1 DFC 1969

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report
BG George W. Dickerson

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Attached are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report prepared by BG George W. Dickerson. The report covers the period 11 December 1968 through 11 December 1969 during which time BG Dickerson served as Commanding General, 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division.

2. BG Dickerson is recommended as a candidate guest speaker at appropriate service schools.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L. D. MURRAY
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 3D BRIGADE 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96228

AVBK-CG

6 December 1969

SUBJECT: Senior Officers' Debriefing Report (RCS-CSFOR-74)

Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-DST
APO 96375

1. This report with inclosures is submitted in accordance with USARV Regulation Number 1-3, dated 1 June 1968.

2. The suggested format has been changed to better present operations as conducted by this separate Light Infantry Brigade.

George W. Dickerson
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

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FOR OT UT
69B053
Inclosure

GROUP - 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification
GENERAL BACKGROUND:

The communist forces operating in South Vietnam are engaged in a classic attempt to overthrow a government by violence; it is an effort directed by Hanoi and assisted by other communist governments, particularly that of Red China and the USSR.

The roots of this phase of the conflict go back to the end of WWII when France attempted to reassert itself as the colonial power over Indochina. From WWII to 1954, communist-led local forces known as the Viet Minh fought to expel the French from Vietnam and other parts of Indochina. After suffering a political defeat, France conceded independence to Indochina at the Geneva Conference of 1954.

The Geneva agreement divided the Vietnamese portion of Indochina at the 17th parallel. An avowed communist government, led by Ho Chi Minh, assumed control in Hanoi. To the south, below the 17th parallel, non-communist groups worked to build an effective government. Much of the southern countryside, however, remained under local Viet Minh control and the government never really reached the people. Once entrenched in the north, Ho Chi Minh sought to expand his power by taking over the south. His chief political instruments were the communist parties and front organizations in both North and South Vietnam.

So much for the broad, general political background which is fairly common knowledge. This paper will devote itself to actions as observed at a separate brigade level involved in fighting local and regular guerrilla forces; neutralizing the Viet Cong infrastructure; and occasionally moving out of its normal area of operations to engage regular NVA units.

POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE 3D BRIGADE'S AREA OF OPERATIONS:

When the 3d Brigade, 82 Airborne Division deployed to Western Gia Dinh Province in late October of 1968, the political as well as the military situation in the province was grim. The GVH and Free World Forces had suffered considerable loss of prestige as a result of the TET Offensive of 1968.

The Brigade tactical area of operations consisted initially of two political districts, Hoc Mon and Tan Binh. Both of these districts figured prominently in the 1968 Tet Offensive.

The district of Hoc Mon lies to the northwest of Saigon along National Route 1. It is densely populated and prosperous with a population in January of 1968 of 135,000. Its affluence is partially attributable to its proximity to Saigon’s markets and employment opportunities.

Inclosure
The district of Tan Binh lies directly to the south of Hoc Mon. Some of its villages encompass urban areas to the north and west of Saigon proper. It is also densely populated and prosperous; in January 1968 its population was 345,000.

Prior to the Tet of 1968, Hoc Mon was generally considered to be the more secure district. In fact Hoc Mon was considered to be significantly more secure than other districts in Gia Dinh, excepting Go Vap. Roads were open and safe for travel day and night by ARVN and US vehicles. Each village had a village office and functioning village chief. Forty-one of Hoc Mon's fifty-nine hamlets containing 80% of the people had received an overall HES rating of "B" as late as January of 1968. 97% of the population were in "B" or "C" hamlets. Only the villages of Dong Thanh and Nhi Binh contained "D" or contested hamlets.

In an area described as 97% under GVN control, it is remarkable that the VC were able to build up, undetected, for the 1968 Tet Offensive. Neither the population nor friendly intelligence agents came forward to warn GVN authorities of the presence of large VC units in their villages.

The VC were able to launch sizeable attacks on Saigon and Tan Son Nhut Airbase from bivouac areas in Hoc Mon. US Troops of the 25th Infantry Division were called upon to drive the VC out. The post Tet battles were bloody and destructive. US units lost 217 KIA in Gia Dinh north and west of Saigon during the month of February 1968. As a result, intense artillery preparations were launched against the villages harboring VC units. This vicious fighting resulted in from two to five thousand houses being seriously damaged or destroyed. There were approximately 6,000 registered refugees, with perhaps 30,000 more who were unregistered. Eight hamlets, having a total population of 15,000 had been almost completely destroyed and six other hamlets with a population of 14,000 had suffered severe damage. Of the eight destroyed hamlets, seven had "B" HES ratings, one had a "C" rating.

After the mainforce VC units had been driven out of the district, public opinion assessed only two villages as relatively secure. After Tet, 34 of Hoc Mon's 59 hamlets had an overall "D" HES rating or below.

Vinh Loc Village in Tan Binh District to the south had also served as a main staging area during the Tet Offensive. The post Tet security situation was much the same as in Hoc Mon.

The most significant political fact about these two districts is that Tet had happened. There was very little confidence in GVN authority and capability.

It was in response to studies recommending the stabilizing of one or more battalion-size units in this area that the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division was deployed to the area, with the mission of permanently restoring security and preventing rocket attacks from the west against Tan Son Nhut and Saigon.
VC TACTICS:

In December 1968 my estimate of the enemy’s tactics in Gic Dinh Province revealed that the Viet Cong were using systematic and unrelenting terrorism as a principal tactic for gaining and holding political power and consequently degrading the efforts of the GVN.

The local VC in the area of the Brigade’s operations were targeted basically against the GVN pacification projects and personnel, RD cadre, and the local population. Efforts against US forces were limited to attack by indirect fire, booby traps, and an occasional stand-off attack. Total overt VC activity consisted of hit and run, assassinations, and small probes against pacification installations and projects. This was partially explained by the enemy’s rear service and commo-liason mission. Indications were that guidance from higher echelons had placed limits on their initiation of overt attacks against stability forces.

Enemy forces encountered in the Brigade AO usually were not heavily armed. Many individuals carried only one or two magazines of ammunition for their weapons. There was also a general lack of crew served weapons.

BRIGADE OPERATIONS TO NEUTRALIZE AND PACIFY THE AREA NORTH AND WEST OF SAIGON:

During the period 17 December 1968 to 30 September 1969, the 3d Brigade, Airborne Division operated on the periphery of Saigon. From 1 October 1969 until stand down on 15 November 1969, the Brigade moved further to the north and became responsible for an area of operations which included the Iron Triangle and southern Phu Hoa District located about 27 kilometers northwest of Saigon.

While operating in the Saigon area, the mission of the Brigade had been to conduct pacification operations within its assigned areas of operations, interdict VC/ITVA infiltration into Saigon, and continue surveillance and security operations to prevent enemy rocket and mortar attacks on the capital city. The Brigade also was responsible for executing contingency plans to defend eighteen critical installations in case of an attack on Saigon.

To accomplish its pacification mission, elements of the Brigade directed efforts toward establishing a secure environment in which the sovereign government of South Vietnam could develop. High priority was placed on the security of district, village, and hamlet government institutions. Elimination of the VCI was equally stressed. Inclosed is a detailed appraisal of brigade pacification efforts in Vinh Loc Village (incl 2).
Saturation patrolling, cordon and search operations, and reconnaissance and sweep operations eliminated enemy forces and contributed to village and hamlet security. With these operations, the Brigade sought to dominate the entire area of operations with military and civic action programs for a period sufficient to disrupt enemy operations and to neutralize the enemy political and military infrastructures. While providing this shield of security, each battalion assisted mobile advisory teams and RE/PP elements in the development of the Popular Self Defense Force. Special assistance was provided to Revolutionary Development cadres in their efforts to improve hamlet security.

C Company, 307th Engineers improved the roads between the hamlets and markets. Troopers with college degrees in agriculture assisted Vietnamese farmers in the development of a diversified agriculture program. The 58th Signal Company, working with the ARVN, installed a village telephone system between the hamlets of Vinh Loc Village. This type of support played an important role in the revival of the rural economy.

The Brigade's mission of interdicting VC/NVA infiltration into Saigon was accomplished by physically covering most of the likely avenues of infiltration with night ambush patrols and firing interdicting artillery and mortar fires on assembly areas and trails used by the enemy. To further assist in the prevention of enemy movement and infiltration into the area toward Saigon, the Brigade pooled its surveillance devices, i.e., radars, ground sensor devices, and the large night observation devices (MOC's) into a centralized, integrated Surveillance Task Force which was given the mission of establishing a surveillance screen around the periphery of the area of operations. Rapid means of responding to sightings and readings with artillery and air strikes were integrated into the Surveillance Operations Center. For more specific details, see Inclosure 1, "Lessons Learned -- Surveillance Task Force".

Extensive night operations conducted by the Brigade also discouraged the enemy from firing rockets and mortars on Saigon or the Tan Son Nhut Airbase from the Brigade's area of operations. The Brigade 3-2 was directed to make an intensive study to identify all possible rocket and cache sites in the AO. As a result of this study, a detailed enemy anti-rocket plan was instituted which identified all possible enemy 122mm and 107mm rocket firing sites. These suspected sites were searched out on a routine basis. During hours of darkness, these locations were ambushed whenever possible or were covered routinely by H6I fires. This extensive program paid handsome dividends in locating enemy rockets and rocket caches while preventing the enemy opportunities to fire on the Capital City. No rockets were fired from the Brigade's area of operations into the city limits of Saigon during the one year period in which the Brigade was OPCON to the Civilian Military Assistance Command. See Inclosure 3 for details of the Brigade Anti-Rocket Program.
To consolidate the gains made by the Brigade in pacification and counter-
infiltration and counter-rocket operations, it was apparent that the Vietnamese
forces in the area would have to improve. To this end an intensive Dong Tien,
"work together", program was conducted with Vietnamese forces in and adjacent
to the Brigade AO. Following the command guidelines below, 3d Brigade, 82d
Airborne Division commanders achieved outstanding results in combined operations.

-- Deal directly with the Vietnamese chain of command; not through advisors
except in emergencies. Deal with commanders.

-- Vietnamese commanders accompany US commanders on all command and control
flights involving combined operations. Develop familiarity with tools of
war.

-- Establish combined tactical operations centers where appropriate.

-- Have Vietnamese make all searches of villages and hamlets. Keep US forces
out of population centers except in critical situations and only when
assistance is needed.

The fact that the major village of Vinh Loc progressed from an "E" rating
(VC contested) under the hamlet evaluation system to a "B" rating is indicative
of the success achieved. In addition, large enemy military caches had been un-
covered, neutralizing the western Saigon battlefield. The enemy traditionally
prepares his battlefield before he starts an offensive, placing supplies, equip-
ment, and military material into hiding places or caches in the area which he
can use once he assembles to start the attack. In this instance his logistics
and administrative framework were neutralized in the Brigade's area of operations
through extensive use of cachefinder and denial operations. See Inclosure 4 for
details of the Brigade's "Cachefinder and Denial Operations".

On 1 October 1969, the Brigade shifted operations to a new area of operations
which encompassed the Iron Triangle and southern Phu Hoa District. The mission
of the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division was to conduct operations against local
and main force units within its assigned AO; assist in pacification of the AO;
and coordinate Dong Tien, work together, operations with Vietnamese units in the AO.

The concept of operations in the new AO was based on the area domination
concept which had proven successful in the areas on the outer periphery of Saigon.
The character of the heavily populated southern Phu Hoa District enabled elements
of the Brigade to apply lessons learned from operations in Tan Binh, Hoc Hon,
and Go Vap Districts. In the population-free Iron Triangle however, the Brigade
used somewhat different tactics. There, the area was physically covered by thor-
ough searches and cachefinder operations coupled with saturation patrolling and
extensive night ambushing. It became apparent that it was necessary to once again
stabilize a force in the area to achieve a thorough familiarity with the terrain,
domination of its communication net work, and continuous harassment and disrup-
tion of enemy operations and movements. Short duration operations and temporary
harassment was not sufficient to neutralize the extensive logistics and commun-
ications net work.
The relationship of elements of the Brigade with government forces solidified during "Dong Tien" operations during the latter half of 1969. Battalion commanders, staff officers, and company commanders became informal advisors to the Vietnamese units. This same type of relationship continued during operations in the new AO in the southern Phu Hoa District. There, the US District Advisors reported that they had noted a marked improvement in the Vietnamese staff procedures at district level. The advisors attributed this improvement to the fact that Vietnamese staff members had been invited to observe and participate in the staff planning for operations with the staff of the Brigade's 1-505th Infantry Battalion.

Also at Brigade level, advice was often offered and accepted by comparable Vietnamese commanders and staff. The Brigade, to foster combined operations, conducted training with ARVN units on mines and boobytraps, VC/NAV tactics, and operation and maintenance of waterborne craft. Combined operations were usually planned and coordinated at battalion or lower level. However, on numerous occasions an ARVN company operated OPCON to a US battalion in combined operations. In all combined operations, emphasis was placed upon giving ARVN commanders and staff the greater responsibility for planning and command and control.

The effectiveness of the support provided the GVN by the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division can best be seen in the Brigade's old CHO AO. In the old Brigade AO, outside of Saigon, GVN forces have taken over the responsibilities previously held by the 3d/82d. These forces have successfully continued the pacification, counter-infiltration and counter-rocket programs. Agriculture is prospering. The farmers can move their produce to market over secure roads. The image of the GVN and Vietnamese forces has improved. The people have confidence that the government and their army can win the war against communism. Subsequent operations in the Iron Triangle and southern Phu Hoa District had immediate significant military results, but the long term effectiveness of the Brigade's operations there will be difficult to measure since the duration of operations was so short.

In summarizing, we have provided the essential ingredient for successful development - security. We have accomplished this by first stabilizing regular military forces in the area and then carefully and concurrently building local security forces while neutralizing enemy units and his supporting infrastructure. We have demonstrated also, the advisability of stabilizing maneuver elements in population-free areas to achieve domination and disrupt enemy logistic, communication, and training complexes. We have determined that strong leadership and effective planning will permit extended operations except in inundated areas where it is advisable to ensure a "drying out" period after 48 hours of continuous operations.

SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS:

In Vietnam, once the enemy is found and fixed, the superior mobility and fire power enjoyed by Free World Forces usually insure his destruction. But before he can be fixed and destroyed the elusive enemy must first be found. The central problem in defeating the enemy is finding him; this military action has achieved
paramount importance in Vietnam - it is an intelligence war, a war to determine where to apply your considerable resources. It is necessary to place your best people on this task.

The 3d Brigade's war was more an intelligence war than that fought by most other units and, in many ways, was closely allied to police operations. The Brigade faced no conventional land mass formations or regular units that fought and operated in familiar or conventional ways. Instead, we found ourselves usually opposing small bands of guerrillas whose logistics were often provided by an occasional box of small arms ammunition left by US and Vietnamese ambush positions, and donations of food provided by their families in the fields. Another part of the enemy threat came from the secret VC and VO sympathizers who were living with full legal cover within our Area of Operations. They ranged from those who merely paid VC taxes, fed and sheltered the VC, the guerrillas who farmed by day and fought by night, to the infrastructure cadre who ran the shadow government of the National Liberation Front. We were confronted by a problem more akin to that faced by security police than troops in a conventional war. We were obliged to make adjustments accordingly.

The extensive US in-country intelligence organization provided support at all levels of command. Within the Brigade, the internal intelligence organization was the same as that authorized other Light Infantry Brigades and routine intelligence operations were conducted. Some unique techniques were tried which resulted in increased efficiency and output, however. The Infantry Battalion and Brigade S-2 positions were filled by trained Military Intelligence Officers. This had two immediately beneficial effects, especially at battalion level. The MI officer brought experience and interest to his assignment; this resulted in improved performance. Second, stability in the job was insured because the MI officer was less likely to be moved to fill other TOE vacancies. The net result was improved intelligence at the using level.

Another technique was locating an Order of Battle specialist and an IPW team at each battalion to work directly for the S-2. Again, this resulted in a better intelligence product, but more importantly it was immediately responsive to the battalion commander and the developing tactical situation. Reaction time improved. This is an essential consideration, the elusive enemy presents only a fleeting target; he must be engaged immediately, or he disappears and the long painstaking and difficult process of finding him must begin again.

In order to enhance the Brigade's Surveillance capability all ground surveillance radar and ground sensor assets in the Brigade were centralized under the control of the Brigade S-2. In this manner, continuous surveillance of the Brigade area of operations was maintained no matter what the tactical disposition of the individual maneuver battalions happened to be. Inclusion #1, "Brigade Surveillance Task Force", provides details of this organization and its effectiveness.

COMBAT READINESS:

The 3d Brigade experienced no significant inadequacies in the logistics area. The Brigade was able to obtain and maintain its equipment, either through its own assets or through direct support assets, without disruption of tactical operations. Supporting units were responsive to requests for support or assistance, and there
were no long term delays in repair or replacement of equipment. This should not imply that this fine record was the result of routine adherence to the logistics system. It was not. It required constant concern, attention, supervision, and emphasis on supply economy and individual responsibility for government equipment.

During the course of the past year, maintenance of equipment and deadline rates have been a problem. Periodic maintenance performed by combat and support units by well trained, supervised personnel was the backbone of our maintenance system. Within the 3d Brigade, this system was supplemented and improved significantly with the addition of weekly combat readiness inspections and frequent and continuous roadside spot checks. We formed a Combat Readiness Inspection Team which included members from all staff sections (S-1 to S-5) and technical representatives from the 82d Support Battalion. This team was formed under the Brigade IG and was capable of inspecting a company sized unit. Combat conditions permitting, one company was inspected each Saturday and contact teams from the Brigade Staff or 82d Support Battalion were dispatched to help units make corrections as necessary.

Roadside spot checks also proved to be beneficial. A system was set up whereby each unit within the Brigade had vehicles inspected every week, and no vehicle within a unit was reinspected until every other vehicle was inspected. Units were furnished inspection results and required to indicate corrective action taken on vehicles which received scores of less than 70%. During an eight-month period, vehicle passing scores doubled and deadline rates dropped significantly as a result of these inspections.

In order to maintain continuous radar coverage for our Surveillance Task Force a special helicopter supported maintenance system was implemented. Through the use of a brigade controlled radar float and helicopter transport, an inoperative radar set could be replaced in minutes and transported to repair facilities shortly thereafter.

During the Brigade's processing for redeployment, the opening of the equipment turn in point prior to actual stand down was of particular value. This enabled units to establish turn in procedures prior to stand down which eliminated confusion and accelerated turn in of equipment and property during the actual stand down. This action also allowed units to begin turn in of non-mission essential equipment prior to their actual stand down and enabled them to reach zero balance to their property books ahead of schedule.
The purpose of this paper is to assist commanders and staff officers when deciding on the employment of currently available surveillance radars and ground sensor devices in a combat posture such as characterized by operations in an area of operations (AO) concept, particularly at brigade level.

To assist in the interdiction and prevention of enemy movements or infiltrations into the areas toward Saigon, I pooled all the surveillance devices, i.e. radars, ground sensor devices, and the large Night Observation Devices (NOD) into a centralized, integrated Surveillance Task Force with the mission of establishing a surveillance screen around the periphery of the Brigade's AO. Rapid means of responding to sightings and readings through artillery and air strikes were integrated into a Surveillance Operations Center.

This system worked well for the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division during its employment in the defense of the Western Sector of Saigon. This paper summarizes the lessons we learned during those operations with the Surveillance Task Force.

GEORGE W. DICKERSON
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding
The requirement for effective battlefield surveillance in Vietnam is one that can be met when maximum use is made of the advanced technology available to U.S. Forces. To efficiently and economically meet this requirement the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division formed a Brigade Surveillance Task Force (STF) which centralized the control of all ground surveillance radars, Duffle Bag Sensors,1 and large night observation devices (NODS). This Surveillance Task Force, in turn, was integrated with the Artillery FDC to provide rapid response to targets detected by the Surveillance Task Force. The Task Force essentially augmented the tactical employment and disposition of ground units which emphasize continuous, day and night saturation patrolling; ambushes; police operations and related pacification operations.

In February 1969, intelligence reports indicated the possibility of major infiltration across the Hoc Mon Canal which formed the Brigade's northern boundary. The canal provided a natural barrier to foot movement which, though passable by fording or the use of sampans, also lent itself to the detection of targets. To meet the infiltration threat the Surveillance Task Force was formed and positioned along the canal. PPS-5 radars assigned to the battalions were attached to the Task Force and placed under the staff supervision of the Brigade S-2. Sensors were added to the line and placed to cover radar dead space and known infiltration routes to the canal. NODS were positioned selectively to reinforce both radars and the Duffle Bag Sensors.

A Surveillance Operations Center (SOC) was established to monitor target detection, control emplacement and positioning of the radars, insure maximum utilization of assets, and to insure immediate engagement of the targets with artillery or other means (such as the Firefly)2 available to the Brigade.

Over the next several months the surveillance line was expanded to cover the entire Brigade area west of Saigon. The Brigade S-2, based on readouts from the Surveillance Operations Center, was able to provide tactical information to the ground commanders in the event of large scale enemy infiltration.

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1 Terminology applied to an in-country sensor employment project.

2 A night surveillance/reconnaissance tactic which employs two gunships (UH-1 or Cobra) and a light ship (UH-1) equipped with a bank of high intensity lights.
The mission of the STF is to detect, report and adjust fire on enemy movement. The basic concept was to place radars in a line along the periphery of the area of operations and then to cover the gaps and dead space with other appropriate sensors (See Appendix 2). The STF operates from one central location; designated the Surveillance Operation Center. The monitoring systems for the sensors and the NCS for the various radar sites are located at the SOC. Night observation devices were placed at selected locations along the surveillance line. Communications from the radar site to the units was used to warn ambush patrols of movement and to confirm enemy presence detected by night observation devices. The communications from the SOC were also established with the Brigade S-2, the Brigade TOC, and the supporting artillery. When movement was detected by the Duffle Bag Sensors, the radar site in the vicinity was alerted to check and/or confirm movement. This confirmation method proved most effective. Once movement was confirmed a forward observer at the SOC called for artillery fire. Experience indicated that within three to four minutes after the target had been acquired artillery was delivered on the location of enemy movement.

Radar towers were used to increase the range and eliminate as much dead space as possible. Patrol bases were colocated at the radar sites to provide security for the radar crews. Radar sites were moved periodically to obtain varying coverage and dummy radars and towers were erected as a deception tactic.

Enemy movement decreased significantly after February 1969 and PW's and Hoi Chanhs indicated that movement shifted east and south around the Brigade AO. The VC have shown a peculiar respect for and avoidance of the radar towers; none have been attacked.

The terrain in which the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division STF placed their sensors was generally swampy with a high background noise level. This condition precluded the use of seismic (Handsids and Minisids)3 sensors on the Alpha mode of detection. This problem was solved by using a

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3 Handsid: Hand Emplaced Seismic Intrusion Detector. This has been replaced by the Minisid (Miniature Seismic Intrusion Detector). Both devices can be used as master transmitters for "slave" sensor devices such as the Magrid (Magnetic Intrusion Detector) and Pirid (Passive Infrared Intrusion Detector). The "slave" sensors are connected to the "master" sensor by wire.
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combination of magnetic and seismic sensors on the Bravo or Delta mode. In this way ground noise problems and false activations decreased to an acceptable minimum. Due to unsuitable terrain in the Brigade AO, the use of Pirids was limited since the soil generally would not support its mounting stake. A few successful plants were made by mounting the Pirid on bushes and brush using the fastening screw.

It has been found that the FFS-5 radar is vulnerable to moisture and vibrations. The power cable connecting the receiver transmitter to the console indicator is short circuited when water seeps into the connection. This problem was overcome expediently by wrapping plastic around the cable connections. In addition, corrugated tin roofs were placed on the towers to keep rain off the receiver/transmitter.

Vibration damage occurred during vehicular transport of radar sets. Whenever possible the radar sets were moved by helicopter to minimize damage.

(c) LESSONS LEARNED

The centralized control of the Brigade STF provides integrated coverage of the Brigade AO and immediate tactical information of large scale enemy movements. Centralized control of the Brigade STF also:

1. Provides for the most economical and practical use of limited technical expertise and resources.
2. Allows for flexibility in employing radars and sensors.
3. Provides for rapid response to maintenance problems.
4. Provides for immediate artillery response.
5. Provides information on enemy movement patterns.

Duffelbag Sensors operate in four modes: Alpha - Seismic activations only are transmitted to the monitor device. Bravo - Slave device activations only are transmitted. Charley - Both master and slave device activations are transmitted. Delta - Both master and slave device must be activated within 20 seconds of each other to be transmitted to the monitor device.
Sensors, by themselves, are not substitutes for ground units. They can be employed most effectively to augment the tactical employment and disposition of ground elements.

While the use of sensors permits a tactical economy of force, the introduction of these devices established additional personnel and logistic requirements within the Brigade. Experience to date, does not suggest a sensor - man trade off.

There are inherent technical limitations to existing sensors which degrade their overall capability and value.

Appendixes
1 - Organization
2 - Schematic of Surv Line
3 - Photos of STF
Note 1: STF HQs assigned to HHC, 3d Bde 82d Abn Div, under staff supervision of Bde S2

Note 2: Sensor Technicians assigned to HHC, 3d Bde 82d Abn Div

Note 3: Two (2) radar teams from each Inf Bn attached to Bde STF

Staff Supervision
Coordination
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NODS

X - SENSOR STRINGS

--- SURVEILLANCE LINE

→ AVENUE OF APPROACH

→ RADAR SCANS

APPENDIX 2 to Inc1 1

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15°
FORWARD

This monograph covers combined pacification techniques and procedures used under the auspices of the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division in its efforts to up-grade hamlet security and regain the willing support and loyalty of the people within its area of operations with special emphasis on Vinh Loc Village. As late as November 1968, this six hamlet village was evaluated as being VC contested. Except for the village headquarters, all its hamlets were rated in the "E" category under the Hamlet Evaluation System.

While the 3d Brigade used numerous tried and proven pacification procedures, it also pioneered in new concepts which paid off quite handsomely.

This paper is presented with the hope that other tactical units might benefit from these experiences while developing their own pacification programs.

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I. THE GEOGRAPHIC IMPORTANCE OF VINH LOC VILLAGE

LOCATION AND ECONOMIC FACTORS: Vinh Loc is a village in Tan Binh District, nine kilometers west of Saigon. Its population of 9,000 is divided into six small hamlets with the village headquarters located at Vinh Thanh. The economy of Vinh Loc is almost completely agrarian; the primary income from rice, vegetables, and the raising of water buffalo. In the fall of 1968, there were 3230 hectares under cultivation, with the average annual income for each employed worker at $30,000 VN. The terrain in and around Vinh Loc is flat, crossed by numerous rice paddy dikes with visibility virtually unlimited, broken occasionally by bamboo hedgerows and nipa palm growing along the streams' banks. The area two kilometers west of Vinh Loc is inundated, uncultivated, and marshy.

POLITICAL AND MILITARY BACKGROUND: Vinh Loc was established in 1962 as part of the "Strategic Hamlet Program". This program was abandoned by the GVN in 1964. With the termination of this program, the six hamlets in Vinh Loc received little attention from the Central Government and the Viet Cong (VC) were quick to enter the resultant vacuum. A strong VC shadow government was established, taxes collected and the people intimidated at will. Although no North Vietnamese Army (NVA) or major Main Force (MF) units were in the area, the 6th Local Force Battalion, with a strength of 300 men, was within a few hours travel of Vinh Loc. In addition, the Vinh Loc Guerrilla Company numbered between 80 and 100 men. Facing these significant military forces and a politically active infrastructure, GVN effectiveness was marginal at best.

1. By grouping people into fortified hamlets, the Strategic Hamlet Program was designed to provide the government of Vietnam a means of protecting the civilian population from VC terrorism, while at the same time affording the government an opportunity to exercise control over the population.
In November of 1968, five of the six hamlets were rated "E" under the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES). Recognizing that the HES rating is a composite evaluation based on several indicators, it is significant to note that the GVN appointed hamlet chiefs would not stay in their hamlets overnight. In one hamlet, Vinh Tin, it was estimated that 50% of the families were VC sympathizers or had relatives in the VC. The only hamlet where a significant degree of GVN influence existed was the village headquarters hamlet at Vinh Thanh; this hamlet had a HES rating of "C".

During both the TET and May Offensives of 1968, the 9th NVA Division was able to use the area in and around Vinh Loc as a staging base for their assaults on Saigon and Tan Son Nhut. In the typical VC pattern, Local Force and Guerrilla units were able to pre-position large caches of ammunition, weapons and other military supplies months ahead of the attacks. In addition, Vinh Loc provided numerous sites for rocket attacks against Saigon. These offensives clearly demonstrated the vulnerability of Saigon and Tan Son Nhut air field to rocket and ground attacks from the Vinh Loc area.

II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PACIFICATION - STRATEGY

DEFINITION: Pacification, as it applies at brigade level in the Republic of Vietnam, is a complex process of converting the population of an area from support of the Viet Cong to support of the government of the Republic of Vietnam. The Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) ranks hamlets in accordance with the degree of GVN control. The ranking is determined from a composite of indicators designed to reflect the presence or absence of GVN control. An "E" hamlet is one where major VC political and military institutions exist and operate effectively. A rating of "D" indicates some degradation in the capabilities of these VC institutions, but that irregular military activities and taxation continue. A "C" hamlet implies major degradation in the capability of VC institutions; the VC military control of the village has been continued -- broken, and GVN presence is becoming more effective. A "B" hamlet indicates virtual elimination of the capabilities of VC institutions, with a significant decrease in their activity. The GVN can provide effective security, the beginnings of population control, and economic progress. An "A" rating indicates that the remnants of VC institutions have been removed and that effective GVN authority can be exercised, day and night.
Vietnam, is the military, political, economic, and social process of establishing or re-establishing the local government. It includes the provision of sustained, credible territorial security, the destruction of the enemy's underground government, the assertion or re-assertion of political control and involvement of the people in government, and the initiation of economic and social activity capable of self-sustenance and expansion. The economic element of pacification includes the opening of roads and waterways and the maintenance of lines of communication important to economic and military activity. The key to pacification is the provision of sustained territorial security. Territorial security is security from VC local forces and guerrilla units and VC/NVA main force units, if any are in or threatening the area. It also includes the protection of the people within a hamlet from the VC infrastructure and bullies.

The military plays an indispensable role in pacification. Without initial military security operations to establish the essential secure environment, the civil aspects of pacification cannot progress. Only under relatively secure conditions can progress be made in the rectification of the political, economic, and sociological imbalances which are the root causes of, and support the continuation of insurgency.

WORK BEGINS: By November 1968, the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division had completed its redeployment from the Hue-Phu Bai area to an AO north and west of Saigon with three infantry battalions operating in the Districts of Hoc Mon, Go Vap and Tan Binh. The Brigade mission in its new AO was three-fold: (1) Prevent rocket and ground attacks from the west on the Saigon-Tan
Son Nhut complex; (2) eliminate all main force VC units; and (3) support the GVN Pacification Program.

After the Brigade occupied its new sector around Saigon, it was early recognized that in order to achieve a permanent alteration in the balance of forces at least two things would be required: (1) dismantling of the VC system; and (2) the creation of permanent GVN security forces to insure that the VC system did not return.

To achieve these objectives the Brigade Commander in January, developed what became known as a strategy of Area Domination. (See Inclusion #1) The purpose of this strategy was to dominate the entire area, including Vinh Loc Village, with military and civic action programs, for a period long enough to disrupt enemy operations and damage or destroy the enemy economic and political infrastructure throughout the area.

The 3d Brigade accomplished this area domination by placing its three infantry battalions in areas critical to the enemy, thus disrupting his use of communications routes, base camps, and recruiting and logistical bases. The battalions were assigned tactical areas of operations (AO's) and established patrol bases from which they conducted extensive night ambushing, daytime patrolling, eagle flights, and cordon and searches of the hamlets. Intensive aerial observation and surveillance was maintained over the area, and known and suspected rocket launching sites and enemy base camps were hit with air strikes and artillery fires, followed up with infantry combat reconnaissance.
To help prevent the enemy from moving into or infiltrating into the areas toward Saigon and to complement the numerous nightly ambushes, the Brigade pooled its surveillance devices, i.e. radars, ground sensor devices, and the larger Night Observation Devices (NID) into a centralized, integrated Surveillance Task Force which was given the mission of establishing a surveillance screen around the periphery of the area of operations. Rapid means of responding to sightings and readings by artillery and air strikes were integrated into the Surveillance Operations Center.

A detailed enemy anti-rocket plan was also instituted which identified all possible enemy 122mm and 107mm rocket firing sites. These suspected sites were searched out on a routine basis. During hours of darkness, these locations were ambushed whenever possible or were covered routinely by H&I fires. This extensive program paid handsome dividends in locating enemy rockets and rocket caches while preventing the enemy opportunities to fire on the Capital City. No rockets were fired from the Brigade's area of operations into the city limits of Saigon during the one year period in which the Brigade was OPCON to the Capital Military Assistance Command. The emphasis in all these operations was on the use of combined U.S. - Vietnamese forces.

While the daily results of our area domination operations rarely captured headlines, the cumulative damage to the enemy, particularly to the infrastructure and to the local guerrilla units, often exceeded that of pitched battles and will probably have more lasting results.

Such domination of the area surrounding the western half of Saigon provided the GVN a shield behind which to move into and gain control and give the
GVN an opportunity to develop professional police forces and organize and deploy RF/FP units and to develop and train PSD's (Popular Self Defense Forces) within the hamlets on the outskirts of the Capital.

The strengthening of GVN forces, was approached from the standpoint of the Brigade "wearing itself out of a job". The Regional and Popular Forces (RF/FP) as well as the Popular Self-Defense Forces (PSDF) had to be trained, first individually, then as units, to the point where they would assume the major portion of the Defense of Vinh Loc.

Once the balance of force had been altered sufficiently, the Brigade would begin its assault on the political and military fronts. The economic war implied a vigorous civic action program coordinated through GVN agencies; the political war involved support to the psychological operations conducted at Province level.

In keeping with the "One War" concept of General Abrams, the Brigade's pacification strategy evolved on the multiple fronts of military, civic, and psychological warfare. (See Inclosure #2)

III. VILLAGE SECURITY OPERATIONS

The Brigade's attention was initially drawn to Vinh Loc with the inclusion of several of its hamlets in the GVN "1000 Hamlet" accelerated pacification program. With its history of communist domination, Vinh Loc appeared to be the key to operations in Tan Binh District.

THE PLAN: Initially, U.S. Forces would concentrate in and around the village
The earthis would be their conduct in conjunction with Vietnamese forces. These joint operations would strengthen security and serve as training vehicles for the Vietnamese units, and as GVN forces improved, U.S. units would move further away from the village with the Vietnamese assuming responsibility for all local security.

STABILIZING THE 1ST BATTALION, 506TH INFANTRY: Prior to December, it had been the practice of the Brigade to rotate battalions throughout the 40. In December it was decided to stabilize one battalion in the Vinh Loc area. The continuing presence of the same U.S. battalion would insure better rapport with the GVN units and the population. The stability and continuity gained would increase effectiveness in combat as well as pacification operations, since U.S. troops would become more familiar with the area and its people.

At the same time coordination began with Tan Binh District to form a Combined Reconnaissance and Intelligence Platoon (CRIP). The CRIP consisted of a combined US and Vietnamese platoon which operated under the direction of the District Intelligence Operations Coordination Center and the battalion S2. The primary target of the CRIP was the VC Infrastructure, but it also was instrumental in eliminating numerous VC guerrillas. The CRIP proved quite effective in the fight to secure Vinh Loc from VC influence.

THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE 53d RF BATTALION: When the 3d Brigade moved into Vinh Loc in October, there were no other Allied military units present. The 53d RF Bn was occupying static defensive positions around Tan Son Nhut Airfield, 9 kilometers to the east. As the 1st Bn, 508th Inf was
being stabilized in Tan Binh, the 53d was ordered to Vinh Loc; its arrival marked the beginning of a close partnership with the 1st Bn, 508th Inf. The combined operations conducted by the 1/508th and the 53d were quite successful. The experience proved that U.S. and local forces have complimentary assets; the local forces know the terrain and population; the U.S. troops have more fire power and mobility. The RF's were particularly successful in finding caches and booby traps, while the U.S. Troops were more effective in interdicting lines of communications, establishing ambushes and coordinating tactical operations.

THE FORMATION OF THE POPULAR SELF-DEFENSE FORCE: By January of 1969, the 53d RF Bn had improved in its military capability to the degree that they were able to assume responsibility for the immediate security of all hamlets and the 1st Bn, 508th Inf could be moved to cover the western approaches to the area. In that same month, the District Chief of Tan Binh District authorized the creation of a village militia, the Popular Self-Defense Force (PSDF). The creation of these forces involved the selection and training of village members for the PSDF, to include conex containers for arms storage, flak jackets, uniforms, and assistance in weapons training.

In March, Hamlet and Village elections were held throughout Vietnam. In keeping with the desire to minimize the influence of military units on these elections, the PSDF were given Hamlet security responsibility, the 53d RF moved out into the area surrounding the village, and U.S. forces moved even further west concentrating on likely avenues of approach into the area. In
particular, it was decided that no U.S. unit would operate within one kilometer of any hamlet unless its assistance was requested.

On the night of 9 March, the PSDF were tested. Taking advantage of the absence of U.S. forces, a VC platoon attacked the hamlet of Vinh Tin, breaking through the outer defenses, killing the PSDF guards and firing up the FF billets. Overcoming the initial confusion, experienced by any unit in its first fire-fight, the PSDF rallied and drove the VC from the hamlet, killing the platoon leader and several VC in the process. The defense of the hamlet had been successfully conducted by the local PSDF, with no assistance required from either RF or U.S. forces. Local pride was further enhanced the next morning with impact awards for valor presented by the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division Commander, BG George W. Dickerson. The success at Vinh Tin Hamlet convinced the people of Vinh Loc Village that they could defend themselves and that no middle ground existed between the VC and the GVN.

THE VIMH TIN STUDY: Although by March 1969 large scale VC movement in the Vinh Loc area had been eliminated, isolated guerrillas still existed in the swamps and marshes west of the village. These individuals still managed some contact with relatives and friends in the various hamlets. In particular, the hamlet of Vinh Tin was known to have many families with members in the VC. It was almost certain that food, clothing and information was being provided to the VC by the families in Vinh Tin. For this reason Vinh Tin was selected as a target hamlet by the Brigade for detailed study in an attempt to develop techniques of identifying and isolating the guerrillas.
from their families and sympathizers.

The initial requirement was the development of a data base which would identify VC families and pin-point common behavioral patterns that might in turn identify lines of communication used by the VC and assist in the control of the population. Two methods were used in developing this data. As a beginning, a joint cordon and search operation was conducted which included some unique techniques. US troops sealed the hamlet perimeter while RF troops provided an internal cordon within the hamlet to limit internal movement. All families were kept together in their homes and not allowed to leave. National Police Field Forces (NPFF) and uniformed police actually conducted the search of each house and the questioning of the family members. A team from the 518th MID, 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div accompanied each search team and took pictures and fingerprints of each family group while the home was being searched. A Black List was also carried by the search teams. However it soon became apparent that while names had been added to the list, none had ever been deleted as VC were eliminated. Consequently the Black List was of limited value. In later operations all Black Lists in the hamlet were updated and were of considerable value, however.

As the search and interrogation of the families continued, suspects were arrested and taken to another unique feature of this operation - the Combined Holding and Interrogation Center (CHIC). The CHIC is a joint US/Vietnamese operation which is designed for detailed screening and interrogation of suspects. The first stage is a screening and initial classification point. Here basic information is taken about the individual. His
identification card is checked for alteration or forgery. He is again checked against the Black List and "Mug Book". Then he is fingerprinted and photographed. Normally the individual is given his initial classification at this station. The classification will normally be one of the following: Viet Cong Infrastructure, VC PW, VC Support, Draft Dodger, Army Deserter, Illegal Resident, Civil Defendant or Innocent Civilian. After initial classification the individual is interrogated and if necessary reclassified. If he provides useful information it is exploited immediately. All detainees are placed in the custody of the National Police for final disposition. (See Enclosure #3)

As a result of the Cordon and Search/HIIC operation, an up to date data base was collected in Vinh Tin. Family photograph albums were compared with old family books and the revised Black List. In this manner a list of VC suspect families was developed. Weeks later a member of the 516th MLD posing as an agricultural expert interviewed all families with known or suspected VC affiliations plus a representative sample of the other families in the hamlet. Key questions included the following: Where do you work? Where do you fish? What routes do you take to work? Patterns of activity were sought in areas bordering the swamps and marshes.

Once the families with members in the VC were identified, their houses were marked and indicated on a vertical aerial photograph of the hamlet. Additionally, as the brigade learned these individuals farmed and fished, this information was also marked on the aerial photographs. This information along with the family photographs and finger prints was turned over to the District Intelligence Operations Center (DIOC) providing them basic data necessary
if VC sympathizers were to be denied contact with the local VC guerrillas and the VC Infrastructure.

This information proved valuable and the District Chief carried out extensions of this project through the other five hamlets of Vinh Loc Village, thus establishing the basis for meaningful population control measures throughout the village.

THE GRANTING OF A 53d RF AO: In June, in recognition of their fine work and to strengthen their planning and coordination function, the 53d RF Bn was granted an Area of Operations within the Brigade's area of responsibility which included the village of Vinh Loc. U.S. forces respected the boundaries and entered only after the same coordination that would be affected with a regular unit. Daily liaison was conducted both in and outside the 53d's AO. The 53d, in effect, controlled all military operations in their area.

THE STATUS OF SECURITY IN VINH LOC TODAY: By September, 1969, all VC forces in Vinh Loc had been virtually eliminated. The 6th Local Force Battalion, having suffered heavy casualties, had been forced to flee the area and could no longer influence events in Tan Binh District. The Vinh Loc Guerrilla unit had been reduced to two men. Local guerrilla units in adjacent villages had been similarly eliminated, the VC party apparatus had been rendered ineffective, and little coordinated VC political activity remained in the village.

The number of enemy contacts had steadily diminished from a high of 28 in February to none in September. Of particular significance, by October all
Hamlets in Vinh Loc had received a HES rating of "B".

IV. EFFORTS TO ENHANCE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL WELFARE

As pointed out earlier, the critical factor in pacification is security. The desire to govern implies an obligation to protect, and this protection is of primary concern to the villagers. Once security is assured, the Government can turn to improvements in general welfare. As the standard of living is improved, the population shifts from indifference to active cooperation and the task of maintaining security is simplified. The active support of the people is absolutely essential to the elimination of the VC infrastructure. Security and civic action are thus seen to be mutually supporting.

The efforts of the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division to improve the general welfare of Vinh Loc were directed at economic and social objectives. Although already a relatively prosperous farming community, there were several distinct handicaps to further economic growth. These consisted primarily of limitations in travel due to poor or non-existent roads and lack of communications. General welfare could also be improved through better drainage, potable water and improved medical facilities.

The objective of the Brigade was not to enhance the image of the American soldier as much as that of the GVN representatives. For this reason, all projects were closely coordinated with District and Village officials, all material support being funneled through Vietnamese channels. The attempt
was to associate the people with their government.

One of the initial requirements was for an improved road network. The demand was so great that many villagers were willing to sacrifice strips of cultivated land to form shoulders for these roads. During the period of its operations in Vinh Loc the Brigade repaired over 30 kilometers of road.

A beginning was made on the problem of supplying potable water. Three wells were capped and numerous drainage ditches dug. Extensive work remains to be done in this area, however.

Another problem introduced by village officials was the lack of communications between the hamlets. Telephone service would enhance not only security, but could considerably increase the overall economic and political growth of the area. This village had never had a telephone system. In conjunction with other U.S. and Vietnamese units, the Brigade developed a telephone system that came to be known as Vinh Loc Bell. The Hamlet Chiefs, the Village Chiefs and the 53d RF Bn were interconnected through the use of a manual switchboard, sound-powered telephones, 15 miles of field wire and over 250 telephone poles. A secondary benefit of the system will be the eventual use of the pole line to distribute electrical power throughout the area.

In addition to contributions to economic welfare, a considerable effort was made to improve social conditions. Medical care in Vinh Loc was nonexistent. Hamlet aid stations and numerous medcaps and dentcaps served
to alleviate if not eliminate this problem. Over 75 Medcaps and 25 Dentcaps were held in Vinh Loc, centered around the hamlet aid stations. At best, Medcaps were no more than an interim measure, however, the critical need being to properly staff and supply the aid stations. The Brigade provided assistance to the district medical advisor in improving the facilities and providing stocks of medical supplies.

In the fall of 1968, only one school operated in Vinh Loc, and this school, located in Vinh Thanh, was considerably over-crowded with an enrollment of 554. Schools located in four other hamlets had been almost totally destroyed by the VC during the TET. A priority task for the Brigade was to assist district officials in repairing and reopening these schools. With the Brigade providing materials and with labor supplied by the Hamlets, the damaged schools were repaired and facilities at Vinh Thanh improved. In addition, measures were taken to protect the schools from attack. PSDF units were located near the schools and chain link fence was erected for protection from B-40 rocket attacks. By September of 1969, five schools were operating in Vinh Loc with a total enrollment of 1336.

During 1969, there was considerable improvement in the economic and social welfare of the villagers, with increased commerce on an improved road network, a doubling of school enrollment, and regular, if limited, medical care available. The total area under cultivation increased from 3230 to 4430 hectares, and the average income per worker rose from $30,000 VN to $36,000 VN.
How much of the progress was due to civic action, how much to increased security is an open question. However, the combination of security and civic action produced a considerably fuller, richer life for the people of Vinh Loc.

V. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF PACIFICATION

Success in pacification requires that villagers recognize that the Government can protect them and is truly interested in their welfare. A well-directed psychological operations campaign can hasten this recognition. (See Inclosure #4)

The Brigade conducted an intensive campaign in support of its pacification objectives. As the 1st Bn, 508th Inf began to make progress toward its security objective, it became necessary to convince the villagers that their village was in fact secure, and that with the help of the people that security would be permanent.

Various programs were used to drive this message home. The Brigade PSYOPS Team worked in conjunction with MEDCAPS. On the 28th of October, the PSYOPS Team began staying overnight in the hamlets, showing movies and playing recordings. The intent was to show that U.S. and GVN forces now controlled both day and night in Vinh Loc. On the 5th of November, the Brigade began conducting MEDCAPS at night on a regular basis. Nurses were brought on later MEDCAPS to demonstrate U.S. confidence in the improved security.
The PSXOP effort against the VCI attempted to attract informants and induce active cooperation from the villagers. The themes emphasized that the NLF was not genuinely interested in the welfare of the people and could neither help nor harm them. The GVN, on the other hand, did protect and help them. The Armed Propaganda Team was developed for daily face to face contact with the villagers and became an additional intelligence gathering agency for the Brigade. In particular, this team served as a means through which information could be passed. Intelligence and PSXOP activities were closely coordinated and often targeted specific individuals.

In an effort to strengthen the local government, the hamlet chiefs were used to announce MEDCAPS, cultural programs, and to distribute special gifts within the hamlets. Their participation in the various civic action programs served to enhance their local image. Quite often relatively small acts served to greatly increase prestige. A ride between hamlets in a U.S. jeep was an example of a small act that provided large returns in prestige. U.S. presence for local ceremonies was another.

An active psychological warfare program tends to increase the effectiveness of both Civic Action and security operations. Used to add emphasis to existing programs it can greatly speed the entire pacification effort.

**VI. AN EVALUATION AND SUMMARY**

Experiences of this Brigade substantiate the fact that tactical units can contribute significantly to pacification and strengthening the popular support of GVN in developing a self-sufficient, sovereign nation.
Pacification follows the establishment of sustained area security. Sustained area security is enhanced by the stabilizing of regular military forces, U.S. or Vietnamese, in a given area. The benefits gained from stabilizing forces more than compensate for the tedium and boredom experienced by troops who must make daily sweeps and nightly ambushes for long periods without significant contact. This psychological strain can be diminished by strong small unit leadership.

U.S. units must devote considerable time and resources toward improving hamlet and village security by assisting the RF/PF and PSNF in training, development of security plans, coordinating daily operations, and in conducting combined operations. Local forces properly trained will constitute a presence that is permanent as well as visible and immediate. The contested areas must be dominated so as to deny the VC and VCI freedom of action.

U.S. forces can further assist in strengthening local governments by improving communications between hamlets and villages, encouraging contacts between the officials and the people, improving public health through sanitation projects, medcaps, and dentcaps.

Attempts should be made to get the government officials to the forefront in all publicity and work associated with pacification projects. This will assist in developing a "social consciousness" among the leaders and help the people understand how their government supports them and their hamlets.

Major tactical units within their area of responsibility should maintain close daily coordination and permanent liaison with districts in their areas.
The maintenance of a GVN organization in the early stages of accelerated pacification is extremely helpful in neutralizing the VCL and local VC guerrillas.

Activities in the economic and social field contribute significantly to the establishment of recognized GVN presence. This Brigade profited by assisting in the improvement of the hamlet and village roadnets, the installation of culverts, the construction of a telephone system connecting the hamlets within Vinh Loc Village and in providing materials and assistance in the reconstruction of local schools and Dinh. When the VC attacked these pacification projects, it adversely affected them in the eyes of the people - the VC openly became the "bad guys". The brigade always gave high priority to repairing such VC damage to emphasize this difference.

The development of an intelligence data base proved helpful in developing techniques to control the population and keeping certain individuals under surveillance. Photos, up-dated family books, fingerprints, identifying individual work-areas and homes proved helpful to the DIOS as well as to the local US and RP/EP security forces.

Surveys conducted in Vinh Loc in October 1969 indicated a significant degree of confidence in GVN forces, as well as a significant degree of willing participation, through the PSDP, in village security.

It is impossible to attribute the success in pacifying this village to any single factor. Events happening throughout Vietnam may have influenced the
willingness of the VC to contest the presence of U.S. and GVN forces here.

To be sure, the balance of forces in the area was altered significantly.

Whether the area is to remain pacified remains to be seen. Future developments may induce the VC to challenge GVN control again. The pacification program in this village is not completed; the real test is just beginning.

4 Inclosures
1 - Pacification Policy
2 - Commander's Concept
3 - Combined Holding and Interrogation Center
4 - Simple PSYOPS Leaflets
SUBJECT: Pacification Policy

1. References:
   g. Letter, Hqs., CORDS, Gia Dinh Accelerated Pacification Campaign, dated 26 December 1968.

2. General:
   a. In Vietnam we are confronting an enemy who seeks to dominate the land. His vicious attacks are aimed at soldiers and civilians alike. Our mission is two-fold; to defeat the enemy militarily and to help build a self-sufficient, sovereign nation. These goals are coequal and must be accomplished if we are to succeed.
   b. This letter will address the difficult task of assisting pacification endeavors or helping is the building of the nation of South Vietnam. Not only must we help in the reconstruction of such physical facilities as schools, communications, roads, and hospitals, but we must also build the peoples confidence in themselves and in their legitimate government. We must help them to help themselves. Our actions must be aimed in this direction.

Incl 1 to Incl 3
SUBJECT: Pacification Policy

a. In conducting Brigade activities, emphasis must be on blending military operations, pacification, and RVNAF assistance (to include RP/PF and PSDF) into a total effort or "one war", aimed at not only defeating the enemy militarily, but also in assisting the establishment of a sovereign government in Vietnam to the hamlet level.

3. Military Support of Pacification:

a. Pacification, as it applies in the Republic of Vietnam is the military, political, economic, and social process of establishing or re-establishing local government responsive to and involving the participation of the people. It includes the provision of sustained, credible territorial security, the destruction of the enemy's underground government, the assertion or reassertion of political control and involvement of the people in government, and the initiation of economic and social activity capable of self-sustenance and expansion. The economic element of pacification includes the opening of roads and waterways and the maintenance of lines of communication important to economic and military activity. The key to pacification is the provision of sustained territorial security. Territorial security is security from VC local forces and guerrilla units and VC/NVA main force units, if any are in or threatening the area. It also includes the protection of the people within a hamlet from the VC infrastructure and bullies.

b. The military plays an indispensable role in pacification. Without initial military security operations to establish the essential secure environment, the civil aspects of pacification cannot progress. Only under relatively secure conditions can progress be made in the rectification of the political, economic, and sociological imbalances which are the root causes of, and support the continuation of insurgency.

4. Objectives:

a. Within the broad perimeters of pacification, as described above, the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division will continually support the following objectives:

(1) Upgrade Security - The essential first step towards pacification is to create a secure environment in which activities designed to elicit the participation of the people in the elimination of injustice, fear, and misery can begin with some promise of success.

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SUBJECT: Pacification Policy

(3) Assist in Development of Stronger Local Governments - Work with and support Revolutionary Developments Cadres or other groups in their efforts toward developing local governments and gaining the participation of the people.

(4) Strengthen Self-Defense - Ultimately the people themselves must participate in their own defense.

(5) Emphasis on Revolutionary Development (RD) and Self-Help - RD attempts to bring the people under GVN control and to provide them with a new life. In their communications between the people and their governments and through productive work, gains the support and loyalty of the people.

(6) Revive the Rural Economy - By providing assistance and working with other agencies, carry out coordinated/combined projects aimed at assisting the villagers to help themselves.

(7) Stress Chieu Hoi Program - Attempt to get the VC to rally (Chieu Hoi) to the GVN. Urge people to encourage their VC relatives and friends to Chieu Hoi.

5. Concepts and Techniques:

a. Objective: Upgrade Security - A number of techniques have evolved as the Brigade and ARVN Forces have worked together in coordinated military operations. The concepts and techniques listed here in no way describe the limits of this type operation. Imagination and adaptability to local circumstances are the only limits to the development of other and better techniques.

(1) Saturation Patrolling is used for finding and fixing the enemy. All possible variations should be used. For example, when helicopters are used, the enemy is alerted. To counter this, some units of the Brigade have used a number of "touchdowns" which were all prepped by artillery. In this way the enemy is confused as to the exact location of the patrol.

(2) RECONDO-CHECKERBOARD Operations are a tactical technique used to jump or block small enemy units moving through the AO. The primary mission of this patrol is to find, fix and destroy enemy forces.

(3) Hunter-Killer forces consist of two components carefully tailored to the mission, situation, weather and terrain; a swift, highly mobile, lightly equipped hunter element to seek out the enemy, and a much larger, heavily supported killer force which remains centrally poised and carefully positioned ready to pounce on and destroy the enemy located by the hunters.
SUBJECT: Pacification Policy

(4) The cordon and search has been used alone and has been integrated with the county fair and other variations by units of the Brigade. The most successful employment has been using US elements to set-up the cordon and RVN elements (RF/PF or National Police) to search. The time and situation are most important elements to contribute to the success of this type operation; timing must be varied and the situation requires special tailoring for each cordon, even when conducted in a hamlet previously searched.

(5) Sweep and Recon In Force type operations are used to give an area a visual inspection, apprehend suspected persons, as a show of force and with variation, to conduct some of the type operations mentioned above.


c. Objective: Assist in Development of Stronger Local Governments - Political and sociological programs designed to develop local government and to gain participation of the people are called New Life Development (NLD) programs. Introduced by the RD cadre groups or other means, these programs provide for the stimulation of, and support for, self-sustaining economic and political activity, which is strengthened and continued through community development follow-on programs.

(1) Units of the Brigade must have an up-to-date area study of the AO which is oriented to the local government. The hamlet staff (chief, assistant chief and security chief) should be known by name, where they live in the hamlet, and what they need in the way of support. Additionally, the names of the RD cadre should be known. Thus the Brigade unit at each level should continually coordinate and communicate at hamlet, village, district and province level. This information on area study is a must in order for the various Brigade elements to assist in the development of stronger local government.

(2) Upon the completion of a thorough area study, a plan for the next six months should be developed in coordination with the District Senior Advisor, or his Deputy for CORDS. This plan then should be sent to Brigade for coordination with the Province Senior Advisor. For example, there is a need for a new hamlet chief's office. At province level it can be determined if this facility is programmed in a future plan or budget.
AVBK-CG
SUBJECT: Pacification Policy

(3) Provinces have assigned RD Teams, VIS (Vietnamese Information Service) officials, and PSDF (Popular Self-Defense Forces) personnel to aid the pacification effort. Units of the Brigade can enhance the stature, the morale, and the performance of these officials by close personal relationships and by response to their needs and problems. This can be in such simple things as presence on ceremonial occasions, occasional transportation for an official, medical assistance in special cases, or civic action support for their projects when their own resources and capabilities are inadequate.

d. Objectives: Strengthen Self-Defense - The Peoples' Self Defense Forces, or hamlet self-defense forces, provide active and passive defense for the hamlet to include shelters, gathering of intelligence for military forces in the area, early warning to the population of attack and similar actions. When the forces are armed and trained, they will provide for internal security of the hamlet and may establish guard posts, listening posts, and patrols, depending upon their capability and the situation.

(1) Brigade elements should assist the Mobile Advisory Teams and the RF/PF elements in the development of the PSDF.

(2) Brigade elements could provide an experienced NCO to serve as an advisor to a hamlet PSDF element in coordination with the local MAT.

(3) Special assistance can also be provided to the RD cadre team working in the hamlet. They, with assistance, could teach and activate the PSDF to improve their hamlet security with advice on better guard post locations, better and improved defensive positions, where to locate their reserve, a functional early warning system and how to coordinate with the RF/PF/US elements in the area.

d. Objective: Emphasis on Revolutionary Development and Self-Help-Elements of the Brigade must work through the RVN personnel in their areas. Projects of many and varied magnitude are needed, however, Brigade elements cannot predict how long they will be in the area. Projects of short range, high impact must be selected by Brigade elements. Projects that take over two weeks to complete should be avoided if possible, or the project should be so coordinated that the RD cadre, the RF/PF elements, or the people can complete it on their own. This is the significance of self-help; where the people are interested enough to contribute their time to the completion of a needed project.

(1) Brigade elements at all levels should be aware of population grievances, i.e., the requirement (RVN law) that all people must carry an ID card. It may be that the people do not know this and as US elements stop them, ill feelings can be created. The RD cadre, VIS, or US ground psyops teams should be brought in to publicize this requirement.
SUBJECT: Pacification Policy

(2) All projects must be planned in conjunction with the people and conducted at their pace if the true benefits of self-help concept are to be gained. Brigade elements can go in and complete a project in a half-day that would otherwise take the hamlet people weeks to complete. This aspect must be evaluated very carefully and a joint decision reached on how important the project is and who will do what toward its completion. MEDCAPS are an example of a CA program that can be directed to a self-help concept. The district, village, and hamlet have paid health workers, midwives, and first-aid trained people in the PSDF. They must be involved in the US MEDCAP at every opportunity.

f. Objective: Revive the Rural Economy - Area studies should have a section on the rural economy within the Brigade element's area of operations. Both at district and province levels, agriculture advisors and specialists (USAID) are available to advise on the assistance that Brigade elements may render in this important area.

(1) At the present time there are two Agricultural majors known in the Brigade. Both are willing to spend extra time in assisting the Vietnamese farmers in the development of a diversified agriculture program. This type American soldier, in coordination with USAID experts, could contribute a very important product in the development or revival of rural economy.

(2) The improvement of roads, bridges, opening of waterways would be a positive contribution. Advice on movement of produce, where the best markets are and how to get the produce to market in the best possible condition could be assisted by an improved communication network. With these improvements, all of the other objectives as listed will be augmented.

g. Objective: Stress Chieu Hoi Program - The 1969 program will work at village level. Major units can help by alertness for opportunities for PsyOps and by putting Ho Chi Minh Villagers (those who have rallied) into Chieu Hoi Centers rapidly so that they can be used in inducing further ralliers.

(1) Kit Carson Scouts assigned to Brigade elements should be used on every possible occasion to talk face to face with the local population on his personal experience in the Chieu Hoi program. Hand held loud speakers are now being procured by the Brigade for use at company level. At every possible situation, the assigned ARVN interpreter and/or KCS should be directed to "talk" about the GVN National Reconciliation and Chieu Hoi programs.
(2) Kit Carson Scouts, time and tactical situation permitting, should be taught by Brigade elements useful skills which will assist the RVN in the time that peace returns to the country. Those KCS who have been seriously wounded and will not be fit for combat duty, will be placed in schools or job situations where they can learn to be a useful citizen of this republic. This placement will be done by the Brigade Kit Carson Scout Project Officer.

6. Conclusions:

a. As stated previously, this Brigade plays an indispensable role in pacification. Without initial and continual military operations designed to increase security, the civil aspects of pacification cannot progress.

b. This pacification policy letter is the starting point. The references cited are guides. The detailed execution and administration of this policy or concept is subject to rapid evolution as it adapts to changing situations. Therefore, it will be necessary to use this policy in conjunction with current directives and concepts.

S/3 George W. Dickerson
GEORGE W. DICKERSON
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 3D BRIGADE 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96228

J.BK-OG 15 April 1969

SUBJECT. Commander's Concept: 15 April 1969 to 15 June 1969

TO: All Commanders

Reference - Commander's Concept, Post TET to Mid April 1969, dated 25 February 1969

1. GENERAL:

a. In conducting operations during the period of this guidance, emphasis will be on blending military operations, pacification, and RVNAF assistance into a total effort or "one war" aimed at defeating the enemy militarily and assisting in the establishment of a sovereign government in Vietnam to the hamlet level.

b. Commanders should constantly strive to develop and implement better ways of getting at and destroying the enemy, separating the VC from the populace, denying the VC his logistical support and in developing better techniques for neutralizing and destroying the effectiveness of the VC infrastructure.

2. MILITARY OPERATIONS:

a. In the area of military operations, priority will be given to the following objectives:

(1) Locate, capture, or destroy enemy personnel and equipment.
(2) Interdict and deny enemy movement within or through the AO.
(3) Destroy enemy rocket/mortar threat.
(4) Increase U.S. security and improve defenses of key installations and fire bases within Brigade AO. Continue rainy season preparations.
(5) Conduct combined operations with RVNAF to enhance training and experience.
(6) Work with RF/PF and TFPF to improve training and assist in overall improvement of security to include hamlet security and RF/PF support with the civilian populace.
(7) Each battalion be prepared to move as an infantry battalion (reinf) and conduct combat operations under a II Field Force designated U.S. Division.

Incl 2 to Incl 3
AVBK-CG 15 April 1969

SUBJECT: Commander's Concepts 15 April 1969 to 15 June 1969

(8) Maintain readiness capability to move rapidly as a brigade and to engage the enemy anywhere within the Field Force area within eight hours notice.

(9) Brigade and battalions will continue weekly readiness inspections. (HQ, 3d Bde letter, Readiness Inspection Program, 8 March 1969)

3. PACIFICATION AND SELF HELP:

a. To accelerate pacification while strengthening the popular support of GVN in developing a self-sufficient, sovereign nation, the Brigade will emphasize the following objectives:

(1) Continue to improve hamlet and village security by assisting the RF/FF and PSVN in training, development of security plans, coordinating daily operations, and in conducting combined operations.

(2) Strengthen local governments. Units assist by improving communications between hamlets, encouraging contacts between the officials and the people, improving public health through sanitation projects, medics, and dentists.

(3) Develop battalion pacification programs to include goals, objectives, and time schedules for high impact, low cost projects, based upon Brigade Pacification Program and the MACV Hamlet Evaluation worksheet.

(4) Continue close coordination with districts. Maintain daily contact and permanent liaisons. Continue to maintain GRIP organization.

4. COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE:

a. Commanders, to include separate companies, will be prepared to discuss specific unit tasks at the next Brigade Commander's Conference to be held this month after the AIG is completed. Notes and idea stimulators are in Enclosure 1.

2 Tabs

A Commander's Notes on Objectives

B Concept of Engirclement

GEORGE W. DICKERSON
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding
I. **Find A Better Way To Get At VC And Destroy Him Militarily**

1. Separate VC from his logistics  
2. Separate VC from the family  
3. Denial of ammo resupply (routes, caches & US ammo)  
4. Increase tactical deception  
5. Stress ambush techniques and increase training on a routine basis  
6. Increase use of safe/fire booby traps  
7. Increase early warning  
8. Sniffer, firefly, SLAR, Red Haze, VR's  
9. Late afternoon snatch flights and RCP's - twilight patrols  
10. Use psywar to point out futility of VC effort  
11. Use encirclement concept - large cordons around farming areas (Incl 2)

II. **Increase Security Within Brigade AO**

1. Improve anti-rocket and missile defense (active and passive)  
2. Improve anti-sapper tactics and training  
3. Increase security and improve facilities at bridge sites  
4. Improve and increase surveillance capability (radar, sensors, trip flares, etc.)  
5. Analyze and identify enemy objectives in AO; develop countermeasures  
6. Develop better night ambush and anti-booby trap techniques  
7. Change routine operations; don't establish patterns  
8. Continue operations for and during rainy season  
9. Continue booby trap seminars

III. **Accelerate And Intensify Search Efforts**

1. Possible rocket firing sites (ref. Brigade S-2 study)
2. Possible rocket cache sites (Brigade and En 3-2 studies) -
3. Develop radio research study to snatch enemy communications and
their equipment -
4. Waterway denial program (develop techniques) -
5. Detailed searches of limited area after detailed study (imagery,
VM, maps, etc.) - avoid large sweeps; concentrate on details -

VI. Stress Neutralization of VCI

1. Increase effectiveness of intelligence net -
2. Increase cooperation/coordination with Districts (Bioco, Phoenix
GRPS, PF and RF Commanders, and local village officials) -
3. Separate people from VC; deny communication and personal contact -
4. Encourage ID's, photos, black lists, and identification of KIA's.
5. Maintain up to date Black List -
6. New ways to corrom and search (develop techniques and records
without undue harassament of people) -
7. Air mobile RCP's and roadside check points - let local officials
and RVNAF make actual search
8. Stay behind and surveillance patrols to watch for VC movement at
dusk

VII. Encourage acceptance of GVN

1. Continue to establish TV viewing facilities within hamlets -
2. Develop better US image (apparance, manners, and conduct) -
3. Get GVN and villages and hamlets officials to forefront in all
pacification projects -
4. Decrease US presence (get in background; put VN in front) -
5. Accelerate p. effication projects (establish pacification program
with objectives and time schedules for the period) -
VI. Develop Psychological Program

1. Work through VC families to encourage sons to Hoi Chan -
2. Keep VC families under surveillance -
3. Encourage and pay for assistance during searches and information gathering (use rewards) -
4. Present better US image - don't nudge program the wrong way
5. During military operations such as encirclements and RIF operations use power megaphone to exploit psychological vulnerability of the VC at the moment. Offer chance to Hoi Chan or be annihilated.

VII. Readiness

Continue Brigade and Battalion Readiness Inspections on a once a week basis to stress readiness areas of particular importance to CG.
**Encirclement** - Concept is to encircle an area containing suspected VC with an air tight cordon with minimum loss to friendly elements. Frontal assaults are avoided. Units must be physically tied in hand-to-hand. Such a tie-in is essential at hedgerows and stream lines, where, from experience, the VC will do their best to swim or slip through the encirclement during the night. Stream and canals should be blocked with concertina wire across the stream suspended by rope, tied in on both sides of the stream by engineer stakes. This also assists in detecting and recovering bodies that may be dumped in the stream. Small arms and weapons fire must be well coordinated to prevent firing into friendly forces. Loud speakers should be used to encourage the VC to Hoi Chan or be annihilated.
ANNEX A (COMBINED HOLDING AND INTERROGATION CENTER — CHIC) TO FRAGO 33 TO OPORD 6-69 (TOAN THANG PHASE III)

REFERENCE: MAP, VIETNAM, 1:50,000, SHEET 6350 IV.

MISSION: To effectively collect, screen, log photograph, and classify (M, G, P, V, VI, SUSP) the male and female residents of Tan Thoi Hamlet, Tan Liop Village, coordinates X749043.

1. EXECUTION:

   a. The Brigade 32 Section and the 518th MID, in conjunction with the Hoa Giong District Intelligence Operations Coordination Center, will establish and run the screening point (CHIC) as outlined in paragraph 3 of FRAGO 33. Organization of the CHIC is outlined below and diagrammed in Appendix 1.

   b. Organization:

   The CHIC will be divided in 5 (5) functional areas, according to the tasks to be accomplished, as follows:

   (1) Area I: Holding Area. This is the initial collection point. All male and female residents of the hamlet in the target age group will be seated to await screening. Order and control will be maintained by US Military Police and VN National Police.

   (2) Area II: Initial Screening Point. All civilians will be logged in and screened against blacklists, ID card registers, photo identification cards and usual intelligence procedures (no ID card, faulty ID card, etc). All suspect personnel will be tagged prior to leaving Area II. A percentage of innocent civilians will be interrogated in Area IV. All personnel will be escorted to the preliminary holding area (Area III). Area I will be a combined effort of US/Vietnamese personnel (518th MID).

   (3) Area III: Preliminary Holding Area and photography tents. All civilians will be processed through the CHIC to Area III prior to final screening and photography. US military and Vietnamese National Police will assist in control. (518th MID will take photos of every civilian processed).

   (4) Area IV: Final Screening and Initial Interrogation Point. All suspect personnel and a percentage of innocent civilians will be escorted to the final screening and interrogation point. (3 US and 2 Vietnamese DIOCC interrogation teams).

   (5) Area V: Detainee Collection Point. Holding area where all suspects and innocent civilians will be held prior to evacuation, released and/or further interrogation in Area IV.
c. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) A convoy consisting of elements of the Brigade 32 Section, 318th MID, 82d Military Police Company and 307th Engineer Company will depart Camp Red Hill at 0700 Hours. The convoy will be under the control of the Brigade. The convoy will arrive at the target hamlet at approximately 0800 Hours.

(2) Upon arrival at the objective area, all personnel as indicated in para (1) above will assist in setting up the CHIC as outlined in Appendix I. The CHIC will be completed no later than 0800 Hours.

(3) National Police will assemble all males and females and will walk them to the Holding Area (Area I). No one will be released from the CHIC area until the search is completed within the hamlet. Control of indigenous civilians within the CHIC area is the responsibility of the Vietnamese National Police and the 82d Military Police unit.

d. Controls: A CP tent will be maintained on the periphery of the CHIC for organization, control, and communication with the cordon and search force.
Appendix I (Schematic of CHIC) to Annex A (Combined Holding Interrogation Center) to PHASE 33 to OPRID 6-69 (Teec Hawg PHASE III)
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
6th PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BATTALION

AVCM-6-PDC

SUBJECT: PSYOP Materials Data

1. Description of Material
   a. Theme: GVN Image
   b. Title: MLF Disregard for the People
   c. Target: Population
   d. Size: 4 x 5
   e. Quantity: 15,000
   f. Leaflet Number: 6-105-69
   g. Source of Requirement: 82nd ABN Div Date Required: 15 Feb 69
   h. III Corps Approval: Van, Date 14 Feb 69
   i. II FforceV Approval: GA; Date 14 Feb 69

2. English Translation: Front: Photo: Caption: This is another example of MLF disregard for the people.
   Back: Dear people of Vinh Hoa, Vinh Binh, Vinh Tin.
   The MLF tells the people that it is their friend. But if the MLF is the friend of the people, why does it destroy what the people need?
   On 8-9 February 1969, the VC attacked the GVN built schools at Vinh Hoa, Vinh Binh, Vinh Tin. Although they were unable to do more then slight damage, their intentions were clear—they wanted to destroy something the people needed and desired.
   The GVN is a government of the people and for the people, building what the people need. Building schools to give your children a better future.
   Support the GVN, it gives your children what they need to build for their future and that of your country.

6th Psyops Dn.
Form 22 (24 Jun 69)
ĐONG BÀO VĨNH- HOA, VĨNH- BÌNH, VĨNH- TÍN THÀNH MÈN.

Bộ Mật Trận Giải Phóng miền Nam thường xuyên hoang mang chứng là bản dân, giúp đỡ dân. Những thể ra chúng chỉ luôn luôn không bạo gây sự hiếu hỷ cho đồng bào.


Ngược lại, Chính phủ Việt Nam Càng Hoa là Chính phủ của dân và với dân, luôn luôn xây dựng những gì dân- chung cần tới, nhất là để dì y hi viên xây dựng trường học để đào tạo, cho con em đồng-bảo một tương lại văn- lôa.

Vậy đồng-bảo hãy nịnh liết ứng hộ Chính phủ bổ nữa hâu tục cứ gop phán vào việc mang lại hòa bình và thịnh vượng cho đất nước.

6-105-49
SUBJECT: PSYOP Materials Data

1. Description of Material
   a. Theme: Report/Reward
   b. Title: Stop and Think
   c. Target: Civilians
   d. Size: 3 x 6
   e. Quantity: 150,000
   f. Leaflet Number 6-136-68
   g. Source of Requirement: 3 Bde 82d ABN Date Required: 11 Mar 69
   h. III Corps Approval: Kinh, 19 Apr 68
   i. II FForceV Approval: VPE 13 Aug 68

2. English Translation: Front: Photos: Captions: There is the destruction caused by the VC....And here is the happy life under the Republic regime. Back: People of South Viet NamII Stop and ThinkII
   Which portrait of your future do you prefer—-one that depicts death and destruction caused by the VC or another than depicts peace and prosperity which the GVN desires for all of SVN. If you follow the deceitful council of the VC and NVA terrorists, they will definitely blacken all you hold dear. Do not let your future be black, the color of death and destruction.
   Help the GVN and your loved ones by reporting all VC activities to your local GVN officials.
   Support your national government for peace and security.

This data sheet supersedes data sheet dated 16 Aug 68.
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
6TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BATTALION

AWM-6-FDC.

SUBJECT: PSTOP Materials Data

1. Description of Material
   a. Theme: US and FMMAF Image
   b. Title: Security
   c. Target: Civilians
   d. Size: 4 x 5
   e. Quantity: 100,000
   f. Leaflet Number: 6-371-68
   g. Source of Requirement: 82nd Arbn. Div. Date Required: 20 Nov 68
   h. III Corps Approval: Hue, Date 15 Nov 68
   i. II Field ForceV Approval:

   Back: The ARVN and Allied soldiers are operating in your area. We are here to provide security for you and your families. We are ready to assist you, our friends. We help you to build for a brighter future. By working together we can help you towards a happier and more peaceful life for yourself, your family and your friends. However, we can do this only with your help. Any information that you can give us about the Viet Cong activity in your area will help us to help you. Your identity will be kept secret. In this way, you will be helping the Army to establish security and happiness for you.

6th PSTOP Bn.
Form 22 (24 Jun 68)
QUẬN GIÚP DÂN

DỌNG-BẢO THÂN-MẾN...


Với sự hợp-tác mật-thiết giữ Quân và Dân, chắc-chắn chúng ta sẽ đem lại một cuộc sống thanh-bình, hạnh-phúc cho chính bản-thân, gia-dình và mọi người chung-quanh.

THE ANTI-ROCKET PROGRAM
OF THE
3D BRIGADE, 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION

The use of the 107mm and 122mm rockets by the Viet Cong to attack key installations by fire has drawn worldwide attention to the communist capabilities in Vietnam. A rocket slamming into the Capital City of Saigon is certain to merit attention in the world press and gives the nonmilitary audience an exaggerated picture of Viet Cong capabilities. Most military observers agree that the rockets now cause little military damage, but in this limited war it is essential that this potential threat be eliminated.

To eliminate the rocket threat to the Saigon - Tan Son Nhut complex, the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division implemented an anti-rocket program in April 1969. Prior to that date the extensive ambush patrols in the area had reduced the enemy's capability to move in at night, but no systematic study had been made to develop an integrated anti-rocket program.

This new program was designed to stop rockets from being fired at the Saigon - Tan Son Nhut area. As a first step in the development of a plan, it was necessary to determine the VC "Modus Operendi" or technique of rocket employment.

From a detailed study of all previous Vietnam rocket firings, it was determined that several criteria were established by the VC in the selection of rocket launching sites. These criteria were:

1. The VC habitually fire their rockets at night.
2. The 122mm rockets are fired at a range of 10,500 meters. The 107mm rockets are fired at a range of 8,000 meters.
3. VC rocket crews selected readily identifiable terrain features as the launching site. Trail junctions, stream junctions, road or canal intersections were all used as launching sites. These terrain features were also readily identifiable on the military maps of the area, indicating that the VC use the maps to select possible launching sites.
4. The rocket launching site is in an open area which affords mask clearance.
5. The rocket launching site has an access route into the area, either by stream or canal or by trail. The rockets probably are transported by sampan or carried by labor parties or carts to the launching sites.
6. Many of the launching sites were near government or military boundaries, an indication that the VC took advantage of the difficulty encountered by allied forces in obtaining fire clearances near boundaries.
7. The VC took advantage of any dead space in the radar coverage of the area. Many of the access routes and launching sites were in the dead space of line-of-site radar scan.

Incl 3
8. VC will reuse a rocket launching site. Several times rockets had been fired at later dates from a previously used site.

Using these established patterns, it became apparent to the brigade that the VC carefully and systematically selected the sites from which to launch their rockets. A detailed anti-rocket plan, exploiting these established patterns, was developed.

All rocket launch sites within the brigade's area of operations were first determined by application of the VC rocket site criteria.

From selected targets, such as the beacon at Tan Son Nhut Airfield, a rocket belt was drawn. This belt for 122mm rockets was extended from 9,500 to 11,000 meters from the target. Within this belt possible launching sites were selected using the criteria established by the Viet Cong. Trail junctions and canal intersections were marked on the maps. Then these points were checked for mask clearance by both map and aerial photos. Access routes were determined. Radar dead space was plotted. Particular attention was devoted to areas near governmental and military boundaries. A list of six or eight digit coordinates of possible launch sites was compiled. A similar list was compiled using an offset fan for the 107mm rocket at ranges between 6,000 to 8,500 meters from likely target areas.

Aerial reconnaissance was then conducted to confirm this list of sites as possible rocket launch sites.

Knowing that the weight of the rocket would preclude carrying it a long distance to the launch sites, possible cache sites along access routes near the launch site were also plotted. This then gave the brigade a list of cache sites and launch sites to neutralize during the anti-rocket program.

The brigade then implemented an aggressive program of detailed daylight searches of cache sites. The results were gratifying. For example, six 122mm rocket launchers with tripods were discovered at a six digit coordinate selected for search. More than fifty 107mm rocket fuses were discovered at a selected 107mm rocket cache site. In another instance 58 rockets were discovered when a search patrol noticed that a patch of land, surrounded by cultivated fields, was not being worked. A search of this patch revealed the buried rockets. (See pictures, Incl 1 thru 4)

To prevent use of rocket launch sites, an integrated infantry and artillery anti-rocket program was developed. Ambush patrols were placed at night on or near selected likely launch sites. Those sites not covered by ambush patrols were covered by artillery interdictory fires. Duffel bag sensors were also placed near possible launch sites.
The results of this anti-rocket program are encouraging. In the eleven months that the brigade has been in the area, only six rockets have been fired from within the brigade's boundaries. None have hit their primary targets as the ambushes and interdictory artillery fires have prevented the VC from launching at the selected sites.

In one instance, an ambush patrol, spotted one of these rocket launchings, and by reporting the location brought artillery fire on the crew. As the rocket crew attempted to escape, radar tracked them and another patrol, directed to move by boats to a ford on the Hoc Mon Canal, intercepted the VC and killed them.

In another instance, a Duffel Bag sensor placed near one launching site was activated, movement was confirmed by radar, and artillery fire was placed on the site resulting in a large secondary explosion.

Through an integrated, coordinated anti-rocket program the VC rocket threat on Saigon - Tan Son Nhut has been neutralized. Close coordination daily between the infantry battalions and the supporting artillery has denied the enemy access to his rocket launch sites and has severely limited his capability to hit key targets in Saigon - Tan Son Nhut from the brigade area of operations.
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 3D BRIGADE, 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96228

AVPK-AC

26 November 1969

SUBJECT: Quick Reaction Lessons Learned

Commanding General
USARV
ATTN: AVBG C-DST
APO 96375

1. (U) References: USARV Conf. Msg 1118, SUBJECT: As above.

2. Operation YORKTOWN VICTOR.


   b. Mission: 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division redeploy to the Iron Triangle and southern Phu Hoa District to conduct combat operations against local and main force units, assist in the pacification of the AO and coordinate Dong Tien operations.

   c. Location: Binh Duong Province.

   d. Brigadier General Dickerson.

   e. Tactics and Techniques.

(1) GENERAL: During operations in the rocket belt around Saigon, the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division developed a technique which proved successful for locating enemy rocket caches. The technique is discussed in detail in Section V, MACV Combat Experiences 4-69. Briefly, the technique involved a detail study of all possible rocket launch sites meeting certain rocket firing criteria and then searching out the vicinity of their possible firing locations and logical cache areas close to these suspected firing sites. Such locations were then carefully searched by ground troops. In early October, when the Brigade shifted operations to the Iron Triangle and southern Phu Hoa District, major efforts were directed toward the neutralization of the 83d Rear Service Force, which had supplied Viet Cong forces that the Brigade had previously encountered in Tan Binh, Hoc Mon, and Go Vap Districts. Using essentially the same cache finder technique, which had proven successful in uncovering rocket caches in the Saigon area, the Brigade developed plans to locate and destroy the underground depots of the 83d Rear Service Group.

Incl 4
(2) Cache Finder Operations: After the Brigade had been operating in the new AO for two weeks, the locations of all enemy contacts were plotted and designated likely places for enemy caches. In these suspect areas, cache finder operations were conducted. The cache finder operation is a thorough and detailed search of a relatively small area. The 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division has found that a platoon sized element is ideal for searching a suspected cache area. The element moves into the area, conducts a quick reconnaissance, and establishes security. The area must be carefully searched for mines and boobytraps, since the enemy often employs defensive rings of boobytraps in and around his cache sites. Mine detectors and scout dogs proved to be helpful in the detection of these boobytraps. Once security has been established and boobytraps cleared, a very careful detailed search of the area is begun. Combat soldiers can perform this search mission effectively if they are not encumbered by normal combat gear. The search party should carry probing rods, entrenching tools and their individual weapons. Air Force forward air controllers and airborne observers can be used effectively to direct ground troops to enemy tunnel entrances and other suspect cache locations. When a cache is found, caution must be exercised in investigating and evacuating it in order to avoid casualties from boobytrapped equipment. Extreme care should be used when troops are conducting cache finder operations along inland waterways to prevent accidents and insure security. (only expert swimmers should be allowed in the water.) Strong security should be provided on both banks, up and down stream from the search area.

(3) Cache Finder Training: A lack of knowledge of cache sites, indicators, and search techniques is the most common cause of failure to find caches. Even the most advanced equipment and most carefully planned cache finder operations are useless if the soldier does not know what he is looking for and how to search. Each soldier should be carefully briefed on cache site indicators and search techniques prior to any cache finder operation. After returning from cache finder operations each soldier should be debriefed and any pertinent information or observations should be disseminated to all other members of his unit and higher headquarters. This is especially important in that the enemy may develop patterns in a certain geographic area that may be unique to that area. Knowledge of these patterns will facilitate further discovery of his cache sites.

(4) Special Equipment: To be effective cache finder units should have some type of probing rod to locate caches which are usually buried several feet underground. Probe rods can be made from inch steel rods. M-16 cleaning rods or bamboo poles can be used as a field expedient. Entrenching tools should be carried to excavate any suspected cache site. In some cases mine detectors may be helpful in the search for caches. The use of mine detectors, however, does not take the place of a careful search with probe rods. Probe rods are used mainly to locate camouflaged tunnel entrance covers. These covers are usually made like wooden trays in which local sod or vegetation is placed and the lid then placed over the entrance hole. Probe sticks are helpful in locating these wooden trap covers or
other foreign objects just under the sod. Rods or sticks can not be pushed deep into the ground, they are mainly for shallow surface probing. These rods also prove helpful in searching haystacks, manure piles and false ceilings and walls in houses. The use of bulldozers to uncover tunnels and underground shelters has proven effective once a suspected site is being searched.

(5) Cache Sites and Cache Site Indicators: The enemy makes elaborate efforts to camouflage his cache. Cache sites normally will be located along transportation routes used by the enemy, i.e., close to rivers, canals, and roadways or trails.

(a) Cache Sites:

1. Along streams or canal banks.
   a. Near stream intersections.
   b. Near sampan docking sites (can be detected by "V" shaped notch in bank).

2. Along trails or paths.

3. Isolated patches of thick vegetation.

4. Uncultivated patches in areas that are being farmed.

5. Graveyards.

6. High, dry areas where houses have once been located.

7. Beneath floors and in walls of old bunkers.

8. Near prominent natural or man made features (for example an unusual tree.)

9. In stream bed. (Drag with hooks)

10. In abandoned and actively used wells. (Use grappling hooks.)

11. Under the roots of trees which have been pushed over.

12. False graves.

(b) Cache Site Indicators:

1. Fresh dirt in an area (enemy will transport dirt a great distance.)

2. Fresh dirt or mud in a rice paddy discoloring the water
while fields are covered with relatively clear water.

3. Depressions in earth (ground will settle around buried objects).

4. Booby trap concentrations which appear to be set in a pattern to protect a particular object.

5. Evidence of transplanted vegetation (for camouflage).

6. Bamboo thickets seem to be a favorite spot for well camouflaged tunnel entrances.

7. Evidence of fresh digging spade marks in an old bunker.

8. Trail markers.

9. Trees which bear unusual man made marks or symbols.

10. Unusual gaps or absence of vegetation.

11. Fresh graves in an unpopulated area.

12. Sticks or unusual objects stuck in stream or canal bottoms.

(6) Results of Operation YORKTOWN VICTOR cache finder operations:
Using the techniques and equipment described above, elements of the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division discovered twelve significant caches during Operation YORKTOWN VICTOR (1 September - 15 November 1969). Included in these caches were the following:

1. Individual weapons 123
2. Crew served weapons 22
3. B-40 rockets 8
4. B-40 launchers 1
5. Mortar rounds 465
6. Small arms and MG ammo 20,000 rounds
7. Radios

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