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AGO ltr 11 Jun 1980 ; AGO ltr 11 Jun 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGDA (M) (26 Jan 70)
OT-UT-708003

2 February 1970

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: COL William B. Roop, Senior Advisor, Vietnamese Airborne Division, Period 26 January 1969 to 4 January 1970 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

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1. Reference: AR 1-26, subject, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U) dated 4 November 1966.

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of COL William B. Roop, subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 1-26, as a result of subject report, should be provided ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
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1 Incl as

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MACAD-AB

5 January 1970

Country: Republic of South Vietnam

Debrief Report By: COL William B. Hoop, Infantry

Duty Assignment: Senior Advisor, Vietnamese Airborne Division


Date of Report:

1. (U) REFERENCE: Army Regulation 1-26, 4 November 1969, Subject: Senior Officer Debriefing Program.

2. (C) BACKGROUND:
   a. A brief history of the Airborne Division is at Inclosure 1.
   b. The current organization of the Airborne Division is at Inclosure 2.
   c. Advisory Detachment Organization:
      (1) The authorized organization of the Advisory Detachment is at Inclosure 3.
      (2) The current organization of the Advisory Detachment under the Combat Assistance Team Test concept is at Inclosure 4.

3. (U) MISSION: The mission of the Airborne Division as established by the Joint General Staff is as follows: The Airborne Division, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, will constitute the General Reserve of the Joint General Staff and will maintain a continuous capability of conducting parachute assault, airlanea, or airborne operations throughout the Republic of Vietnam in support of combat operations in each Corps Tactical Zone.

4. (C) OPERATIONAL EMPLOYMENT:
   a. General: For the purpose of this report the tactical employment of the Airborne Division during the twelve months from January through December 1969, may be divided into three areas: brigade operations in Saigon and the Capital Military District surrounding Saigon, brigade operations in Tay Ninh Province and Division (-) operations in Tay Ninh and Phuoc Long Provinces. The Airborne Division frequently operated in the aforementioned areas simultaneously.
b. Saigon/Capital Military District: Throughout the past twelve months the Airborne Division had the mission of securing four key installations in the capital city. One airborne battalion secures the Presidential Palace, Newport Bridge, radio station and prison. The battalion command post is located on the Palace grounds while subordinate elements of the battalion man 40 to 50 static guard posts within the city. The battalion performing the security mission is under direct control of Capital Military District. For the first eight months of 1969, airborne battalions, usually under control of an airborne brigade headquarters, conducted small unit combat operations within the Capital Military District to prevent rocket and mortar attacks against the Saigon/Tan Son Nhut Area and to interdict infiltration routes into the capital city. The Airborne Division replaced the 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division and the 199th Light Infantry Brigade in the Capital Military District north and west of Tan Son Nhut Air Force Base and conducted brigade size operations with regimental and popular force units from Gia Dinh province. In addition to conducting extensive squad size day and night ambushes, frequent company size air mobile operations and waterborne reconnaissance missions, units of the division manned the radar sites in their section of the Capital Military assistance Command Surveillance Line.

c. Separate Brigade Operations in Tay Ninh: Earlier this year one brigade of the Airborne Division was under operational control of the 25th Infantry Division for operations in western Tay Ninh Province. Operations were typified by extensive company size reconnaissance in force missions and helicopter assaults. During the period 10 October 1969 through 30 November 1969 the 2d Airborne Brigade, with three battalions, was under the operational control of the First Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and operated in northern War Zone C. During this period, the brigade accounted for 74 enemy killed and 57 individual and crew served weapons captured.

d. Division operations in Tay Ninh and Phuc Long Provinces: On 1 December 1969 the Airborne Division commenced a two brigade, division controlled operation with the 1st Cavalry Division in northern III Corps Tactical Zone adjacent to the Cambodian border. The Division's mission was to interdict enemy supplies moving from north to south near the Cambodian border and to locate and destroy major enemy units infiltrating south. The airborne Division headquarters was located in Phuc Vinh adjacent to the 1st Cavalry Division command post. The 2d Airborne Brigade established a joint tactical operations center with the 1st brigade, 1st Cavalry Division at Tay Ninh west to direct combined operations in northern War Zone C. The 1st Airborne Brigade located its joint tactical operations center with the 2d brigade, 1st Cavalry Division at Phuc Long (Fire Support Base Buttons). Individual airborne battalions established fire support bases astride known routes of infiltration such as the Stong Jungle Highway and the Mustang and Adams Road trail complex. An Airborne artillery battery was located in each fire base to support the maneuver companies working in the battalions area of operations. Responding to intelligence collected by the sophisticated techniques of the 1st Cavalry
Division the Vietnamese battalions frequently executed airborne combat assaults to gain contact with the enemy. The majority of operations were conducted by separate companies maneuvering independently throughout the battalions' area of operation. During daylight, all four companies conducted extensive reconnaissance in force missions. At night, one rifle company secured the battalion fire support base, while the remaining companies occupied ambush and defensive positions. Once contact was achieved, extensive use was made of the combat support assets of both divisions including tube artillery, aerial rocket artillery and tactical air strikes. After fifteen days of operation under division control, units of the 1st and 2d Airborne Brigades had killed 81 enemy soldiers and captured 30 weapons. Current plans call for the continuation of the combined division operation into 1970.

5. (C) TRAINING:

a. General: Except for basic airborne training, the division has no centralized training program. Only broad guidance is issued by the division to the brigades and battalions and little supervision is exercised over the conduct of the training. The division commander judges training results based on unit performance in battle and relies on the battalion unit refresher training program to train his soldiers rather than a division controlled program active continuously throughout the year.

b. Individual Replacement Training: In addition to the nine week basic training conducted by airborne cadre at Quang Trung National Training Center and the three week airborne training course given at Tan Son Nhut, the individual airborne soldier may receive advanced training qualifying him in a military specialty. Normally this training is accomplished by individual units on a decentralized basis.

c. Unit Training: The unit training objective of the Airborne Division, is to retrain one maneuver battalion each quarter. Until late in 1969, operational commitments prevented the realization of this objective. Three battalions received refresher training in 1969 at Van Kiep and Duc My National Training Centers. Current plans call for the 11th Airborne Battalion to commence unit training early in 1970. The second long range reconnaissance platoon of the division reconnaissance company, completed eight weeks of long range reconnaissance training at Duc My National Training Center during the past year. Artillery refresher training is also conducted at Duc My National Training Center. The division goal is to have each battery undergo refresher training every thirteen months. During 1969 six artillery batteries completed this five week refresher training.

d. Training in Combat Service Support Units:

(1) Medical Battalion: In addition to an extensive on-the-job training program for medical specialists and technicians, the battalion conducted two 12 week courses in basic medicine. One hundred basic medics were graduated from the two courses. Approximately 20 airborne medics completed six months of advanced training at the ARVN military medical school during the past year.
(2) Support Battalion. Training in the various units of the Support Battalion was accomplished primarily outside of the division. Fifteen and eighteen soldiers respectively graduated from the engineer and signal maintenance courses during 1969. Five troopers received training in graves registration procedures this year. More than 100 airborne drivers were trained. The number of allocations for technical service schools was insufficient to meet the battalion's needs; therefore, in-house training was conducted by the Support Battalion for supply clerks, unit supply sergeants and finance clerks.

e. Offshore Training: During the past year the division had no officers trained in the United States for two related reasons. First because of heavy operational commitments and second because the division tends not to nominate their best personnel for the slots. The division currently has a request pending for 2 spaces for offshore schooling in fiscal year 1971 for the Infantry Officers advance Course.

f. Correspondence Courses: During the last year little progress has been made by officers enrolled in US Army correspondence courses.

g. Miscellaneous Training: Various units of the Airborne Division received technical training on radar set and airboat operation from the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division during August, 1969. Infantry battalions conducted training at their fire support bases when operational commitments permitted. In late November and early December of this year, the Airborne Division received assistance from the 1st Cavalry Division in training divisional units in the combat tactics and airmobile techniques used by the 1st Air Cavalry Division. Specific practical "hands-on" training was presented by the 1st Air Cavalry Division on employment of aerial rocket artillery, medevac procedures, construction and defense of fire support bases, helicopter terminal guidance and resupply procedures, displacement of artillery batteries by helicopter and various other subjects required to meet the immediate needs of the airborne units. In a broad sense, the day to day relationship between the staffs and units of the Airborne Division and the 1st Air Cavalry Division serves to improve and polish the performance of the division in the airmobile environment.

h. Advisor Training: The advisor training program within the detachment consists primarily of initial processing instruction given by the various staff sections. A two hour period of instruction covering the history, organization, mission and employment of the division is presented to all newly assigned personnel. An aggressive physical training program is pursued by the advisors throughout the year. Additional training is conducted based on requirements when ever a battalion deploys into a new area of operation. For example, prior to the division operation with the 1st Cavalry Division, all advisors received a three hour class, presented by officers of the 1st Cavalry Division, covering the methods of operation of 1st Cavalry units related to conduct of airmobile assaults, employment of aerial rocket artillery and intelligence collection methods. Subsequent instruction, including practical exercise, has been given to each battalion advisor on techniques of aerial rocket artillery adjustment.
6. (C) UNIT AND STAFF ACTIVITIES:

a. Personnel:

(1) General: Following the extremely turbulent year of 1968, the past year has been relatively stable in the area of personnel. Despite the usual heavy losses due to casualties and some deserters, the division has maintained its personnel strength by a successful recruiting program which averaged 450 recruits per month. Since no new units were authorized, there was little turbulence among division units. Current authorized division strength is 12,024. The division currently has 10,855 assigned, approximately 90% of its authorization.

(2) Desertions: There has been a great improvement in lowering the desertion rate, due primarily to a vigorous prevention program initiated in October 1968. The rate for January-March 1969 was ten deserters per month per thousand men assigned. This was the lowest rate in ARVN at that time. Since that quarter, the rate has increased to eighteen per thousand. The difference is primarily due to the large numbers of recruits that the division began receiving in March. Research has shown that the great majority of deserters are newly assigned personnel. Through a program of more thorough indoctrination and orientation, the division hopes to decrease the number of recruits that desert.

b. Intelligence: The intelligence staff function is weak at all echelons throughout the Airborne Division. The division G2 and brigade G2 sections have served mainly as an office of record for enemy information disseminated to their headquarters by higher, adjacent and subordinate units. Little effort has been directed toward intelligence planning, collection, processing and timely dissemination. There are two primary reasons for this deficiency. First, a general failure on the part of tactical commanders to appreciate the value of good intelligence and second, the decentralized nature of most combat operations conducted during the past year.

Since the beginning of the operation with the 1st Cavalry Division, the division G2 has demonstrated a marked improvement in intelligence processing and dissemination. Utilizing all of the collection means of the 1st Cavalry Division, the Airborne G2 has stepped up the output of useful intelligence to the brigades. Both the brigades and the division are making progress in the corroboration and integration of intelligence into operational planning. The division reconnaissance company is now being used in an intelligence gathering role in each brigade area of operations.

c. Logistics:

(1) General: During the past year, the Airborne Division has made great progress toward achieving logistical self sufficiency. The equipment modernization program has proceeded rapidly and most of the equipment authorized by current Division TOEs has been received. There are no critical shortages of weapons and ground mobility equipment. The attitude
of most support personnel is positive, characterized by an eagerness to accomplish the mission.

The steady improvement in the Division's logistics has been paralleled and can be attributed, in part, to improvements in the Direct Support Battalion, which was activated in November 1968. The DS Battalion consists of Headquarters, Finance, Supply, Maintenance, Transportation, and Technical (aerial delivery) Companies. The battalion has reached 95% of its authorized strength. Most of the equipment authorized by its TOE has been received.

(2) Problem areas: In some instances, the equipment modernization program has moved too quickly. For example, the Division was equipped with the 105mm Howitzer, M102, before the ARVN supply system was initially provided with required repair parts and before the accompanying FDL package was available. The Division has had maintenance difficulties with that equipment ever since. One artillery piece, deadlined since June, has been cannibalized to provide parts for the other howitzers. Attempts to eliminate problems of this sort have been made.

Although the Division TOE's are adequate from the standpoint of firepower and ground mobility equipment, the current operation has revealed shortages in the equipment and the personnel authorized the Signal Company and the Engineer Company. The authorized signal equipment has been inadequate to provide flexible and responsive communications throughout an extensive AO. The recurring necessity to move Fire Support Bases rapidly, is beyond the Engineer Company's capabilities. These inadequacies have necessitated that III Corps and the 1st Air Cavalry Division furnish the Airborne Division with radios, bulldozers, scooploaders, and other equipment in excess of the Airborne Division TOE's. These equipment loans have been stop-gap measures. Despite the willingness of the Airborne soldiers to accomplish their mission, the strain of sustained operations, using equipment in excess of TOE, has begun to take its toll.

During the last week in December, one officer and eleven enlisted men were evacuated from Fire Support Bases for recuperation. The medical prognosis was exhaustion. Continuing problems can be expected as the duration of this operation increases. It is now apparent that if the Division is to undertake missions like the current one, both the Signal and Maintenance Companies should be increased to battalion strength.

Concurrent with the essential changes to TOE, other changes in the Division's support structure should also be carefully considered. With the increase in Engineer and Communications equipment, it is likely that the Maintenance Company will also require an increase to battalion strength. A Support Command Headquarters for the command and control of the expanded support units would then be necessary, and must also be considered.

d. Medical Service: During the past year there has been no change in the organizational structure of the Medical Battalion. A great effort has been made to improve the medical service provided the men of the Airborne Division. Emphasis was placed on the acquisition of new equipment and
facilities to complement the medical battalion's well trained staff. The most notable improvement has been made in the operating room. Within the past year the operating room has been air conditioned, new lights installed and a new general anesthesia machine placed into service. Patient evacuation has been enhanced through the acquisition of 16 new M-718, front-line-ambulances. On 26 October a new NCO Mess Facility was dedicated and placed into service. This facility was completed on a self-help basis by the enlisted men of the Medical Battalion.

A continuing effort is being made to insure that the casualties sustained during an operation are admitted to the airborne hospital either directly or through transfer as soon as possible. The high quality of medical care and the personalized attention given at the airborne hospital is a definite boost in the airborne soldier's morale.

e. Base Development:

(1) General: Progress has been made in the base development program during the past year. Troop billets for three battalions and 200 dependent housing units have been completed at Red Hat Hill (near Long Binh). The Supply Company's cantonment area and 30 dependent housing units have been completed at Tan Son Nhut, where work is now in progress on 100 additional dependent housing units. In that area, contracts have been let for the construction of Reconnaissance and Transportation Company cantonment areas. Construction is already under way on the 2d Artillery Battalion cantonment area at Tan Hiep near Bien Hoa.

(2) Problem Area: Though progress has been made, expansion of the Division during the past year and the probable expansion in the coming year has rendered the past base development program obsolete. One hundred and fifty dependent housing units, constructed from scrap material long before the initiation of a base development program, are substandard and should be replaced. The Division G4 has submitted a plan for two additional battalion cantonment areas at Tan Son Nhut and has also furnished JCS with a list of dependent housing requirements and a request for major rehabilitation of existing facilities. The additional cantonment areas have been approved, but the status of the dependent housing and rehabilitation requests is still undetermined. Careful monitoring of all programs and close coordination with US base development advisors at JCS are necessary during the coming year.

f. Civic Action/Psychological Warfare:

(1) Civic Action: The Division has continued to conduct regular Civic Action activities wherever it operates. MEDCAP missions have been emphasized and have been conducted on a weekly basis. Earlier this year, while operating in the Capital Military District, the Division repaired several bridges and rehabilitated three schoolhouses.
The Division takes care of its own personnel as best they can. USAID relief food, administered through the Catholic Relief Service, has been distributed monthly to more than 5,000 Division widows and dependent children. Under this program, 192 tons of rolled wheat and corn meal, and 9,000 gallons of cooking oil have been distributed. 358 orphans each receive a school subsidy of 620 piastres per month.

Dependent children also profit from the Division's active civic action programs. Early this year, a four room addition to the dependent school at Tan Son Nhat was constructed on a self-help basis, under the supervision of the Political Warfare Section. Nearly 2,000 dependent children are enrolled in several regularly conducted youth activities, the most popular of which are the Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, and Taekwondo Do school.

(2) Psychological Warfare: Psywar activities increased during the past year. Leaflet drops have been conducted in each Division AO monthly. Loudspeaker broadcasts, both aerial and vehicular, and poster programs have been used in propaganda campaigns directed toward several target villages in the various Division AOs. These campaigns have been reinforced by personal contacts, with the distribution of pamphlets, and clothing and food, being favored techniques. These campaigns have been directed not only toward winning the people to the government in disputed areas, but also to consolidation and retention of the people's loyalty in areas considered under government control.

7. (C) COMBAT ASSISTANCE TEAM: The Combat Assistance Team concept was implemented within the Airborne Advisory Detachment as a test during the period 1 June 1969 through 30 September 1969. This concept envisages a shift from the traditional role of advising to one of providing assistance in obtaining combat support and combat service support. The advisors concentrated their efforts towards decreasing the Vietnamese reliance on advisor personnel by encouraging the Vietnamese, wherever possible, to effect their own direct coordination with Allied units. During the test period one airborne brigade was under operational control of the 25th ARVN Infantry Division in Tay Ninh Province, while the remaining two brigades were operating in Capital Military District. At the beginning of the test 32 advisor spaces at brigade and division level were eliminated for a net reduction in the detachment strength of 24 per cent. The test results obtained at the end of September were gratifying and indicated the feasibility of the brigade and division CAT as tested. Results of the test at battalion level were less conclusive. Since the end of the original test period, the Airborne Division embarked on operations in a continuous airmobile environment with the 1st Cavalry Division. Because this was a significant change in the division's mode of operation and because of the requirement imposed by the 1st Cavalry Division that each maneuver element be accompanied by a US advisor to coordinate 1st Cavalry Division combat support, the battalion Combat Assistance Team was augmented and the test extended through January 1970. The Vietnamese completely support the test concept and their self-reliance has noticeably increased. Data gained from the test will assist in determining the optimum Combat Assistance Team organization and functions in an airmobile environment. The current Combat Assistance Team organization is reflected on the diagram at Inclosure 4.
8. (C) **EVALUATION OF THE AIRBORNE DIVISION:**

a. **General:** The Airborne Division is one of the elite units in the Vietnamese Army. Because of its reserve mission the division is not given a division tactical area of responsibility and is not continuously deployed as a division in an operational area. In spite of periods of relative inactivity, the Airborne Division maintains its professional competence and has continued success when committed to battle. The officers are experienced and display a deep commitment to the struggle against Communism. The Airborne Division is the only Vietnamese division whose battalion commanders are lieutenant colonels and company commanders are captains. This rank structure increases the amount of combat experience leadership within infantry battalions. The individual airborne soldier is courageous and aggressive. He is proud of being part of the Airborne Division and personally associates with the division's enviable reputation.

b. During the past twelve months, the Airborne Division officers have displayed an increasing degree of self-reliance and confidence in their ability to conduct combat operations. This attitude stems from the experience the division has received in its diverse and extended operations. In all areas, the Vietnamese are becoming more independent and are performing many of the functions previously performed by advisor personnel. As this report is being prepared, the Airborne Division is fighting side by side with the 1st Cavalry Division on an equal status. At this time, the division seems to have adjusted to the complexities of airmobile warfare and once again has proved its ability to operate under varying concepts and varying terrain conditions.

c. The obvious weakness in the Airborne Division is its neglect in establishing an adequate division controlled training program. The causes of this neglect are threefold: First, operational commitments which scatter divisional units throughout Vietnam; second, the prevailing attitude that fighting the enemy is the division's sole function and that training should be accomplished outside the division; and lastly a lack of experience in how to organize and conduct the training. Task organizing battalions under changing brigade headquarters further complicates training management. The advisory detachment is attempting to convince the division of the requirement for a centralized training program suited to the division's needs and method of deployment.

d. The division is incapable of independently providing constant service support for a division size operation. Frequently US units were required to provide assistance in the Signal and Engineer areas. The present Signal and Engineer companies lack the equipment and personnel to support even two committed brigades. Data is being maintained for future use in recommending table of organization and equipment changes; possibly expanding to Signal and Engineer battalions, and creating a Division Support Command.
e. The Airborne staffs, at all levels, are insufficient in size to enable the Vietnamese to plan with the depth and thoroughness characteristic of US units and necessary in the current conflict. As the Airborne Division continues its participation in more sophisticated and complex combat operations, the problems caused by shortage of sufficient staff personnel and the resultant lack of planning become more acute. This deficiency extends outside the division's ability to correct since the authorization for extra personnel must come from the Vietnamese Joint General Staff. Although principle staff officers are selected with care, their assistants are usually personnel who did not succeed at battalion level or were wounded and could not return to the infantry battalion. As a result, the principle staff officers are required to do much of the work themselves. The division commander has little feeling for the necessity of having qualified personnel to occupy staff positions.

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WILLIAM B. ROOP
Colonel, Infantry
Senior Advisor
The Airborne Division is commanded by Major General Du Quoc Dong, who joined the Airborne in 1954 as a second lieutenant. In August of the previous year the French Army had organized the 1st Airborne Battalion composed of Vietnamese volunteers. By April 1954 there were five airborne battalions (1st, 3rd, 5th, 6th, and 7th battalions) and one artillery battery. These six units, which predate the formation of the Republic, received their training under French tutelage at Tan Son Nhut. The combat experience of the Airborne Group encompasses the major airborne operations of the Indochina War, including Dien Bien Phu. In December 1955, the Airborne Group was redesignated the Airborne Brigade. On 1 December 1965 the Airborne Brigade was redesignated the Airborne Division with the addition of two infantry battalions and one artillery battalion. Since that time the 9th and 11th Airborne Battalions, the 2nd and 3rd Artillery Battalions, and the Reconnaissance Company have been activated. In addition, other support units have been created, enhancing the Airborne Division's capability to perform its mission.

The Division has some of the most decorated units in the Republic. The 1st Battalion, oldest and most highly decorated, was first to be presented the highest unit award in Vietnam, the tri-color Fourragere. The 3rd and 5th also have been awarded this coveted decoration. Eight of the nine maneuver battalions and all three brigade headquarters have been awarded the US Presidential Unit Citation, the 8th Battalion having been so decorated twice. In addition, the 1st and 2nd Artillery Battalions, the Medical Battalion and the Engineer Company have each received Armed Forces level unit citations.

To earn these decorations, the Airborne units participated in many of the most critical battles of the Vietnam War. The more notable battles were Hue and Phu Cat in 1968; Dak To in 1967; Khe Sanh, A Shau Valley, and the Tet offensive in 1968; and the defense of Tay Ninh City in 1969. During Tet 1968 the Airborne Division was given its most difficult assignment of the war. While repelling a fierce attack at the Airborne Base Camp at Tan Son Nhut, the division was called upon to fight major battles simultaneously at Cuong Tri, Hue Citadel, Van Kiep, and Saigon. The 6th Battalion hit an enemy regiment head on to halt the enemy surge across the runway of Tan Son Nhut and drive them off the air base. Meanwhile, two companies of the 6th Battalion were sent to assist the remnants of the 6th Battalion, which had been reduced to less than 400 men, when they defeated two enemy regiments in a battle at Dak To just three days earlier and stopped two enemy battalions penetrating the Joint General Staff Compound. In Saigon, the 1st battalion held off a threat upon the Presidential Palace and cleared out the Cho Lon area, while regaining control of the Radio Station and key bridges and intersections around Saigon. When the 5th Battalion completed liberation of the town of Ham O, north of Ha Nang, it returned.
to Saigon to assist the 1st Battalion in the mop up of enemy elements in Saigon. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion cleaned out the enemy positions at Go Vap and Zum Moi just north of Saigon. At Hue Citadel the 2d and 7th Battalions combined, and were joined by the 9th Battalion, to break the enemy siege nearly two days prior to the US Marines entering Hue. Previously the 9th Battalion had defeated two NVA regiments in Quang Tri City. Still undergoing initial, basic unit training, the newly activated 11th Battalion repelled a reinforced Viet Cong Battalion attack upon Van Kiep Training Center. By the end of Tet 1968, Airborne units had fought and won some of the most important and difficult engagements of the enemy offensive, resulting in 2050 enemy killed, 140 enemy captured and 533 individual and 228 crew served weapons captured. The heroic events of Tet 1968 represent some of the proudest moments of the Airborne Division.

Using the skills for which they are noted, Airborne units have made combat jumps at Binh Long in 1965 at Chuong Thien in 1966, and again at Chuong Thien in 1967.

This year the Division units have been engaged in the defense of Tay Ninh City and Saigon and are adding another colorful page to the proud heritage of the Airborne Division. During 1969, Division elements have killed 1772 enemy soldiers and captured 138 enemy soldiers, 606 individual weapons, and 183 crew served weapons.

Although tasked with a unique and difficult mission, the Airborne Division has continued to stand out as a close family of tough, proud, and dedicated soldiers, with the oldest and proudest history in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. As the reputation of the "Angels in Red Hats" grows nationwide, the unit continues to be a main stabilizing force in the Republic of Vietnam.
Airborne Division Advisory Detachment Organization

**AIRBORNE DIVISION ADVISORY DETACHMENT**

1 COL SA
1 LTC RSA

**S-1 Sect.**
1 CPT S-1
1 E-7 MSG
1 E-6 Mess Steward
1 E-4 Pers Spec

**G-3 Adv Sec**
1 MAJ G-3 Adv
1 CPT Asst G-3 Adv
1 CPT G-3 Adv
1 E-7 Div Sply Adv

**G-4 Adv Sec**
1 MAJ G-4 Adv
1 E-7 Div Sply Adv

**DS Bn Adv Tm**
1 MAJ DS Bn Adv
1 CPT Maint Co Adv
1 CPT Supply Co Adv
1 CPT Trans Co Adv
1 E-7 MFR Trans Adv
1 E-7 Sply/Svs Adv
1 E-6 Radiom Repair Adv
1 E-6 Fire Ctrl Instn Adv
1 E-6 Small Arms Rpmn Adv
1 E-6 Engine/Power Train Adv

**G-5 Adv Sec**
1 CPT G-5 Adv
1 LT Asst G-5 Adv
1 MAJ Gen Med Off Adv
1 CPT HSC
4 E-7 Med Adv

**MEd Adv**
1 MAJ Gen Med Off Adv
1 CPT HSC
4 E-7 Med Adv

**IG Adv**
1 MAJ IG Adv
1 CPT IO Adv

**IO Adv Sec**
1 MAJ IO Adv
1 CPT IO Adv

**Div Art Adv Tm**
1 LTC Div Art Adv
1 MAJ Staff Adv
1 E-6 Opns Adv
1 E-5 Ck/Typist

**Hsg Adv Tm**
1 LTC Hsc Adv
1 MAJ Staff Adv
1 CPT Intel Adv
1 CPT HSC
1 E-8 Opns NCO
1 E-7 Intel Anal Sp
3 E-4 RTO

**Bn Adv Tm**
1 MAJ Bn Adv
1 LT Asst Bn Adv
1 E-7 Wprns Adv
2 E-7 Firing Uty Adv

**Arty Bn Adv Tm**
1 MAJ Bn Adv
1 LT Asst Bn Adv
2 E-7 Firing Uty Adv

**TOTAL:** Officers 65
Warrant 01
Enlisted 69

**GRAND TOTAL:** 135
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**INCLOSURE 4 (Senior Officer Debriefing Report, January 1970)**

Airborne Division Headquarters Combat Assistance Team

**Airborne Division Combat Assistance Team**

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<tr>
<td>Administration Section</td>
<td>1 CPT Adjutant/Administration Officer</td>
<td>1 MAJ CSS Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 CPT Information Officer</td>
<td>1 CPT Operations Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 E-7 Administration NCO</td>
<td>1 CPT Intelligence Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 E-5 Personnel Specialist</td>
<td>2 CPT Liaison Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 E-5 Cook (Red Hat Hill)</td>
<td>1 E-8 Operations Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Support Section</td>
<td>1 E-7 Communications Sergeant</td>
<td>1 E-5 Clerk/Typist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 E-5 Assistant Communications Sergeant</td>
<td>1 E-4 Radio/Telephone Operator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Service Support Section</td>
<td>3 E-4 Radio/Telephone Operator</td>
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</table>

**Brigade CAT (3)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>O-2</th>
<th>E-3</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 MAJ Team Commander</td>
<td>1 CPT Assistant Team Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 E-8 Operations Sergeant</td>
<td>Liaison Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 E-5 Senior Radio/Telephone Operator</td>
<td>2 E-4 Radio/Telephone Operator</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Battalion CAT (9)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 MAJ Team Commander</td>
<td>1 E-7 Light Weapons Infantry NCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 E-6 Light Weapons Infantry NCO</td>
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</table>

**Division Artillery Combat Assistance Team**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>O-4</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 MAJ Division Artillery CAT Commander</td>
<td>3 CPT Battalion Team Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 E-7 Operations Sergeant</td>
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</table>

**Advisor Positions Retained in Addition to the CAT**

| 1 CPT Reconnaissance Company Advisor | Total: 0 - 4 |
| 1 MAJ Support Battalion Senior Advisor | 1 CPT Supply Company Advisor |
| 1 MAJ Support Battalion Senior Advisor | 1 WO Maintenance Company Advisor |
| 1 CPT Transportation Company Advisor | 1 E-7 Motor Transportation Advisor |
| 1 E-7 Supply/Services Advisor | 1 E-6 Radio Repair Advisor |
| 1 E-6 Fire Control Instrument Advisor | 1 E-6 Engine/Power Train Advisor |
| 1 E-6 Small Arms Repair Advisor |

**Detachment Total:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>O-3</th>
<th>E-1</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 MAJ CSS Chief</td>
<td>1 MAJ Medical Officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 CPT Medical Service Officer</td>
<td>1 WO Property Book Officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 E-7 Supply Sergeant</td>
<td>1 E-7 Motor Sergeant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 E-7 Medic</td>
<td>1 E-6 Aerial Delivery NCO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 E-6 Assistant Supply Sgt</td>
<td>1 E-4 Supply Clerk</td>
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</table>

**TOTAL:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>0-15</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>54</td>
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Incl 4
**Senior Officer Debriefing Report: COL William B. Roop**

**Senior Officer Debriefing Report, 20 January 1969 to 4 January 1970.**

**COL William B. Roop**

**Report Date:** 5 January 1970

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