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1. Reference: AR 1-26, subject, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U) dated 4 November 1966.

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of LTC Karl T. Rettstatt, subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 1-26, as a result of subject report, should be provided ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES SOUTHERN COMMAND

APO NEW YORK 96354

SCARGB-PT 6 JAN 1970

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Program (RCS-CSFOR-74) (U)

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) References:

   a. Army Regulation No. 1-26, 4 Nov 66.
   b. Report by LTC Karl T. Rettstatt (Incl 1).

2. (U) LTC Rettstatt's report covers a period of 2 1/2 years during which time he was closely associated with a military force faced with serious urban unrest. In view of LTC Rettstatt's exposure to incipient insurgency it is recommended that he be considered as a potential speaker at Service Schools.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

CHARLES B. MACDALENA
Capt, AGG
Assistant Adjutant General

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SCUR-P

9 December 1969

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report (RCS: -CSFOR-74)

COMUSARSO
ATTN: G-2
Ft Amador, CZ

1. References:
   a. USARSO Regulation 600-101
   b. Army Regulation 1-26

2. Attached debriefing report was prepared by LTC Karl T. Rettstatt, 573-30-8547, who served as Chief, US Army Section, USMILGP Uruguay during the period 8 June 1967 through 9 December 1969.

Lorenzo Callendo
Colonel USAF
Commander

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INCL

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1. (C) General

The undersigned assumed command of the ARSEC on 8 June 1967. The subsequent period of more than 2½ years has been a time of economic crisis aggravated by the manifestations of social disorder in the forms of demonstrations, strikes and work stoppages, arson, sabotage, political kidnapping, attacks on police, bombings and other acts of terrorism. During most of this period the country has been under a Presidential declared "State of Siege". Prices and wages were frozen and other measures were decreed to halt the run-away inflation and the chaos caused by strikes and demonstrations. Many public employees have been federalized and given military training.

The Army of Uruguay (UA) performed admirably during this period of crisis and though hard pressed manpower-wise our evaluation is that they had sufficient resources to effectively control a higher level of violence than they actually experienced. This was particularly true after the arrival of expedited and additional equipment provided through MAP and purchased by the UA in coordination and conjunction with special training provided by MAP. From a military point of view the experience gained in the past 2½ years has been good for the UA. Many of the points that we have been trying to drive home have been realized. There has been an overall improvement in the UA's capability to perform its internal security mission; however, from the ARSEC point of view progress had to be measured by the old, undesirable rule of one step backward for each two steps forward.

2. (U) Mission & Emphasis

The ARSEC mission is clearly spelled out in existing directives and is understood by all concerned. Our primary emphasis has been on improving the UA's maintenance and supply system. Our MAP material program and, more particular, our MAP training program have been oriented towards accomplishing this objective.

3. (C) Composition of ARSEC

a. The following two wiring diagrams illustrate the composition of the ARSEC at the beginning of my tenure and its present structure.
The current organization (FIG 2 above) reflects the BALPA and other reductions as well as the consolidation of administrative functions at MILGP. The reduction of the Signal Advisor space was the most important loss; however, the UA Signal Service is working effectively and the current Director of this Service, after a slow start, has been doing a good job. The US Signal Advisors performed their duties in such a manner that at present the requirement for a full time advisor is questionable. The Training Advisor and the Ordnance Advisor will absorb the duties of the Signal Advisor and the CHRSEC will make more frequent visits to the Signal Service. All personnel of the ARSEC have established and maintained excellent rapport with their counterparts in particular and the US in general.

The unilateral reductions of MILGP personnel (i.e., BALPA) have been looked upon by some members of the UA as further evidence of a lessening of US interest in Uruguay. The UA has been told, and more or less accepts, that MAP grant aid for material ends in FY 70; however, at the same time the Minister of Defense and the Inspector General of the Army have indicated that Mr. Rockefeller promised continued support of the Uruguayan Armed Forces at a level well above the planning figures that we now have. Needless to say there is some
confusion and uncertainty in the minds of key UA personnel as to what the future holds.

4. (C) The Army Of Uruguay

a. The UA basically stays out of politics. It is the type of Army that we would like to see in all of Latin America: that is, the type of Army that stands behind the elected government rather than overthrows it. Until the last 2 to 3 years the politicians have generally disregarded the Armed Forces; however, during the past two troubled years the government has paid more attention to the military with the result that funds for the Army and other services have been easier to obtain. Even with these increases the Army's budget is barely adequate to provide for basic essentials and very little is left to accomplish standardization and force improvement.

b. The UA's current strength is approximately 1,388 officers and 12,000 enlisted men.

It is a professional Army with an officer corps derived primarily from a four (4) year military academy. Many of the cadets studied at and graduated from the Liceo Militar (Military High School) prior to entrance into the academy. The NCO Corps is likewise professional in nature. The UA is an all volunteer force and the annual turnover rate is very small consisting mainly of men retiring after 30 or more years of service. The Army has an adequate military school system in both tactical and low level technical fields. Promotions in both enlisted and officer ranks requires completion of resident courses and for officers competitive examinations. There are, however, provisions for promotions by selection as well as limited use of promotion by seniority. The promotion system is basically sound but needs to be modernized particularly in the competitive examination system.

c. The strength of the UA is about right for the size of the country, the population and the Army's mission. It is deployed throughout the country in population centers with the major concentration in the 1st Military Region in and around Montevideo. Enclosure 1 illustrates the disposition of the major elements of the UA. Those units shown in red are MAP supported. The UA recognizes now more than ever before that its primary mission is internal security. It is capable of performing its mission. Rural guerrilla warfare is remote; the major threats for the foreseeable future are civil strife, student disorders, labor disorders and terrorism. Given the level of violence experienced during the past two years the Army could perform its mission almost indefinitely; however, this would have considerable impact on the GOU's budget and an additional drain on the already weak economy.
To its credit, the UA fully recognizes the unstable economic situation existing in the country and has not placed unreasonable demands on the government for large expenditures for new, so-called sophisticated equipment. As mentioned earlier the UA's budget is nearly too small to make ends meet. This is due in part to a lack of professional management and a system of priorities.

e. The major weaknesses of the UA, without discussing materiel, are:

(1) Because of tradition, a needed reorganization of the Army cannot be realized.

(2) General failure to delegate authority and a stifling of initiative.

(3) A general disregard of the technician.

(4) A lack of an effective command inspection system.

(5) A general lack of managerial talent and a system of priorities for the meager funds available to effect overall force improvement.

(6) A failure to modernize the promotion examination system to include a larger percentage of supply, maintenance and logistical requirements.

(7) No system for weeding out marginal officers.

(8) A general lack of a sense of urgency on the part of a large percentage of the officer corps.

5. (C) Accomplishments

a. Reorganization of the Ordnance Service which will eventually lead to the consolidation in one area of shops and storage areas and the elimination of overlapping and duplicate functions. The reorganization also places the Regional 3rd Echelon Shops under the direct control of the Ordnance Service. The reorganization plans were moving ahead until the recent replacement of the Director of the Ordnance Service. I expect the plan to continue to move ahead, albeit with some modifications, as the new Director becomes familiar with the situation.

b. TO&E's. The General Staff is conducting a general review of its TO&E's to bring them more in line with the existing situation.
and to eliminate items not on hand and not likely to be procured in the foreseeable future.

c. Expansion of Riot Control Training. The UA is undertaking an extensive program of riot control training. Since January 1969, the Army has trained one company in each Infantry Battalion and is continuing to expand this training. Thus far the Army has trained approximately 1500 troops in the 1st Military Region. A US provided MTT was utilized to train UA instructor personnel from all units of the Army plus representatives from the AF, Navy and Police Department.

d. Communications. A marked improvement in communications has been realized as the result of increased maintenance effort, receipt of previously programmed equipment on an expedited basis and a redistribution of vehicular mounted radios throughout the Army.

e. Replacement of entire M-38 1-ton truck fleet with M506A2 and M506A3 vehicles. This was accomplished by donating the entire M-38 fleet (with DOD approval) to the UA which, in turn, is repairing these vehicles and selling them at auction to settle the loan used to purchase 126 M506A2 1-ton vehicles. The US provided through MAP 92 M506A3 1-ton vehicles. These vehicles are in country and have been distributed. As a part of this program the UA picked up all future support of the 1-ton fleet.

f. Standardization of non-MAP administrative vehicle fleet with a series of Chevrolet vehicles and Bedford diesel trucks.

g. Approval of the so-called inducement package of (15) M-113 APC’s and (20) 6-ton commercial trucks. The first 5 M113’s have arrived and the UA has retired from service 10 M3A1 tanks. The remaining 30 M3A1 tanks will be withdrawn from service upon arrival of the remaining 10 M113’s. The 20 6T trucks will be used to expand the transportation unit.

h. Noticeable improvement in UA General Staff coordination since appointment of GEN Toniolo as Chief of Staff. GEN Toniolo would be a good choice for IG when GEN Borba steps down in about one year.

6. (c) ARSEC Problem Areas

a. Inability to get the General Staff moving on an effective command inspection system.

b. Non-completion of inventory of UA MAP and non-MAP equipment. A complete inventory is badly needed by the General Staff for planning and developing new TO&E’s. When these are developed and
placed in operation, some redistribution of equipment will be required.

c. Maintenance problems with M-34 2½-ton trucks are increasing and it appears that we may be reaching the point where they are no longer supportable. The M-34's in-country are approaching the stage where major component replacement or rebuild is required. We waited for 1 year for ATAC to provide supportability information only to receive a CSP listing which is of no value. OMA is aware of this problem and is attempting to acquire the needed information.

7. (C) The Future

a. The ARSEC as now constituted can perform its mission; however, further unilateral reductions would almost eliminate any need for an ARSEC as such. The time has come for a new look at our military advisory organizations in Latin America and for conferences at governmental levels to determine host country's desires in the way of advisory support.

b. The UA is, at this time, in reasonably good shape except for its artillery units which have not received MAP support except for a small quantity of ammunition. The UA desires to continue its force improvement: through the standardization of its weapons by replacing all foreign arms with US WW II arms; by upgrading their artillery units; through the acquisition of 15 additional APC's for their other mechanized cavalry unit; and by continued standardization of their tactical and administrative vehicle fleets. The hope that at least part of this can be accomplished through grant aid and the remainder by loans. In general the UA is realistic in its future plans and should be supported to the maximum extent possible.

c. Our prior year MAP training is beginning to pay more and more dividends as many of the officers moving into key command and staff positions have received US training. These officers generally show more initiative, have a better grasp of the problems facing their Army and are working to eliminate these problems. At the same time these officers are realistic, dedicated and will not hesitate to go to a third country if necessary to improve their Army. These officers are particularly concerned with the unilateral cuts in personnel and reductions in MAP support at a time they consider to be the most critical in their history. They like the US and hope to continue their association but not to the detriment of their Army.
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Senior Officer Debriefing Report, 8 June 1967 through 9 December 1969.

#### AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)

LTC Karl T. Rettstatt

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