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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

15 December 1969

AGDA (M) (3 Dec 69) FOR OT UT 693233

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 173d Airborne Brigade, Period Ending 31 July 1969 (U)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE
APO San Francisco 96250

TO: Deputy Commanding General
USARV
ATTN: AVHGC-DH
APO 96375

The inclosed Operational Report Lessons Learned is forwarded in compliance with AR 525-15, USARPAC Regulation 525-15 and USARV Regulation 525-15.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
L. J. PETRIE
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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AVBE SC/MID
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

I. Significant Organizational and Unit Activities

1. Introduction:

This Operational Report Lessons Learned covers the period 1 May 1969 through 31 July 1969. During this reporting period the 173rd Airborne Brigade continued Operation Washington Green in support of accelerated pacification in the northern four districts of Binh Dinh Province. These operations were designed to safeguard the village areas and gradually turn over full responsibility to the Vietnamese themselves. In addition, a concerted effort is being made to enhance the combat effectiveness of RF/PF and other district forces in the Brigade area of responsibility. In conjunction with Operation Washington Green the Brigade assumed responsibility for lines of communication security within the Brigade area of responsibility.

To accomplish its mission the Brigade undertook to conduct extensive combined operations with RF/PF and district forces located within the Brigade area of operations and implemented measures to provide for mutual support and coordinations among U.S. Forces, ARVN, RF/PF, and district forces. Tactical Operation Centers were collocated at the various district headquarters; liaison teams were established among forces; and constant coordination was affected at command levels. The Brigade, in conjunction with district MACV personnel, provided military training and assistance to RF/PF and district forces.

2. Organization

Organized on 25 June 1963, from the 2d Airborne Battle Group, 503d Infantry, the 173d Airborne Brigade inherited the proud tradition of the 503d Parachute Regiment that jumped into combat on Corregidor in 1944. The Brigade was originally designed as a "quick reaction" strike force for troubled areas in the Far East. And, for two years before coming to Vietnam, the Brigade trained extensively in airborne, guerrilla, and jungle warfare. Countless training jumps on Taiwan earned the paratroopers the name of Sky Soldiers.

General William C. Westmoreland, in late 1967, saluted the 173d Airborne Brigade as "one of the finest units in the history of the American Fighting Man".

Indeed, the first army combat unit in Vietnam, the first to make a helicopter assault, the first to engage the enemy, and the only unit to make a combat jump, the 173d has attained a stunning battle record from cracking the infamous I. On Triangle to reaching the summit of Hill 875 at Dak To for which the Presidential Unit Citation was awarded.
Presently under the control of First Field Force Vietnam, the Brigade is conducting operations in the northern four districts of Binh Dinh Province.

Diversity in structure provides the Brigade with the capability of conducting numerous types of operations at the same time. The fighting force of the Brigade is composed of four airborne infantry battalions of the 503d Infantry; the 3d Battalion, 319th Field Artillery; E Troop, 17th Cavalry; the 1st Battalion (Mech), 50th Infantry; 173d Provisional Tank Company; and the 173d Engineer Company.

A minor change not affecting the structure or organization of the Brigade occurred on 15 July 1969 when the 173d Provisional Tank Company moved from Tuy Hoa to join the main body of the Brigade. The 173d Provisional Tank Company was placed OPCON to the 1st Battalion (Mech) 50th Infantry.
3. Intelligence:

a. General

During the past three months the 173d Airborne Brigade conducted numerous activities throughout its area of responsibility. This area includes the northern four districts of Binh Dinh Province. Four districts are the direct responsibility of the 173d Airborne Brigade, and two districts are the responsibility of 40th and 41st Regiments, 22d ARVN Division. All districts are included within the Binh Dinh Province Pacification Program.

b. Enemy Order of Battle:

The enemy order of battle is given below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>EST STRENGTH</th>
<th>PROBABLE LOCATION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NT 3</td>
<td>5500</td>
<td>BS3147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d VC Regt/T 3</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>BS7830</td>
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<tr>
<td>2d VC Regt/HQs</td>
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</tr>
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<td>93d BN/2d VC Regt</td>
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<tr>
<td>95th BN/2d VC Regt</td>
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<tr>
<td>97th BN/2d VC Regt</td>
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<td>BS7336</td>
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<td>18th NVA Regt/NT 3</td>
<td>1700</td>
<td>BR763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th NVA Regt/HQs</td>
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<td>BR763</td>
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<tr>
<td>7th BN/18th NVA Regt</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>22d NVA Regt/HQs</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th BN/22d NVA Regt</td>
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<td>8th BN/22d NVA Regt</td>
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<td>9th BN/22d NVA Regt</td>
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<td>BS5661</td>
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<tr>
<td>D-40 Sapper Co</td>
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<tr>
<td>X5034 LF BN</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Phu Ly DP BN</td>
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<tr>
<td>D-23 LF Co</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>CR0166</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
c. Nature of Terrain:

(1) In the northern portion of Binh Dinh province the principal urban area is Bong Son (Q8796). In the flat, seasonally inundated coastal plains, there are three low mountain spurs with numerous adjacent hills. The lowland plains grade westward into rolling plains foot hills and then into steep heavily dissected mountains. The terrain becomes increasingly rugged from east to west. The predominant vegetation is rice cultivation in the lowlands, light to dense undergrowth in the hills and mountains. There are numerous valleys which facilitate movement, however, all expedient movement is restricted to existing trails, roads and waterways.

(2) The coastal lowlands consist of poorly drained, flat to undulating plains. Most of the lowlands have an average elevation of 10 meters. There are some extensive lowland areas which have an elevation of 20 meters or greater, such as My Hoi (Q8465). The lowlands are 10 kilometers wide in the north and gradually broader to 29 kilometers in the south.

d. Nature of the Weather:

(1) General

The transition from the prevailing dry northeast flow to the moist southeast flow began in March, continued through April and was completed over all the Republic of Vietnam by the end of May. Frequent thunderstorms and rainshowers became the predominant features over all the country except for the east coast north of Nha Trang where precipitation amounts remain small and relatively infrequent.

(2) May

With the coast of the southwest monsoon, May is a wet season month throughout the Republic of Vietnam except for the east coast. The principal factor influencing precipitation, other things equal, is exposure to the moist wind flow. Coastal regions exposed to onshore flow, especially those backed by mountain ranges, received the majority of rain days and the greater precipitation. Most rainfall was produced by afternoon and evening showers or thundershowers. The mean number of days with measurable precipitation varies from about 5 days along the east coast to a little over 20 days in the southwest and highlands. The mean number of days with measurable precipitation for May was an average of 9 days with a maximum monthly precipitation of 71.4 inches. During the month the maximum 24 hour precipitation was 3-6 inches over most of the country, the highest one day maximum was 12 inches in Dalat.

As the moist southwest monsoon became established, cloudiness increased over the Republic of Vietnam, except for the northeast coast where
it reaches an annual minimum. Convective clouds form over most regions during late morning hours. The mean cloudiness ranged from 40% at Qui Nhon to 80% at Can Tho and Dalat. AO Lee had a mean cloudiness of 43%. Afternoon ceilings, 3000 to 4000 feet were common throughout the country except along the sheltered east coast.

Visibility continued to improve in May, but morning visibilities remained relatively poor. Slant range visibility was at its best during May. In general, surface visibility is best during the afternoon and slant range visibility is best between 0800 and 1100 hours. Showers and thunderstorms reduced the visibility to less than 5 miles for brief periods, and in more intense storms, to less than 1 mile.

Temperatures decreased slightly during the month except for the northeast coast where they are expected to increase. Mean daily maximum temperatures were 90 degrees in the AO with a mean minimum of 78 degrees.

In early June the mean low-level flow shifts from southeasterly to southwesterly, and by late June, when the southwest monsoon becomes firmly established, winds are southwesterly over all of the Republic of Vietnam. Wind speed was generally light, allowing land and sea breezes to affect wind directions along coastlines.

(3) June

Visibility continued to improve in June, but morning visibilities remained relatively poor. Slant range visibility was at its best during June. In general, surface visibility is best during the afternoon and slant range visibility is best between 0800 and 1100 hours. Showers and thunderstorms reduced the visibility to less than 5 miles for brief periods, and in more intense storms, to less than 1 mile.

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(4) July

The southwest monsoon continued to dominate II Corps weather during July. Strong southwesterly flows between 3000 and 5000 feet brought
coast unstable air into southeast Asia which had passed over warm equatorial
water. The ascending terrain of the highlands and mountains of western II
Corps had extensive regions of low ceilings with rain or heavy rainshowers
and scattered thunderstorms. Cloudiness reached midsummer maximum over II
Corps during July. The general north-south orientation of the Chaine Annamite
sheltered the eastern slopes and coast from the southwest monsoon. As
a result the coastal area normally had only partly cloudy skies with good visi-
bility and little rain. At times during July the southwest monsoon weakened
as the low-level wind flow shifted, becoming west northwest to nor-
westerly. This resulted in short periods of scattered to broken clouds with
little or no periods of precipitation over all of II Corps.

The Chaine Annamitique sheltered the coast and eastern slopes of
II Corps from the southwest monsoon resulting in generally fair weather for the
AO. Low clouds were normally scattered with bases 2500 to 3000 feet above the
ground. Visibility was unrestricted except for occasional brief showers. Rain
generally occurred on 6 to 9 days averaging 2 to 4 inches. Prevailing winds
were westerly at 5 to 12 knots though afternoon sea breezes resulted in south-
easterly winds at some coastal stations during the afternoon. Temperatures
ranged from lows in the mid to high seventies to highs in the low to mid
nineties. The mean relative humidity decreased to a midsummer minimum of 70
to 80 percent.

e. Enemy Strengths and Weaknesses:

(1) Strengths:

(a) Estimate of course of future enemy actions: AO Lee: The
primary mission of VC forces in AO Lee is the disruption of the Allied pac-
ification program and gaining ultimate political control of selected hamlets
and villages under the direction of the Binh Phu (VC) province chief. The
VC district chiefs in the AO will continue activities, assassinations, burnings,
and abductions. The VC district chiefs in the AO will continue activities, assassinations, burnings,
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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

to Binh Dinh (P) in the An Lao Valley which could affect the pacification program in Tam Quan (D) and Hoai Ahon (P).

(b) Reserve and Logistical Strength: AO Lao: Captured documents and reports from PWNs and Hoi Chanhs have indicated the enemy is experiencing a tremendous problem in securing food and medical supplies from the coastal plains area as a result of the Allied pacification program which commenced on 15 April 69. Reports have also indicated that the enemy has not been able to secure replacements as rapidly as he has sustained losses due to combat casualties and sickness.

(c) Leadership and Morale: Many enemy units have been known to be experiencing morale problems due to a lack of foodstuffs and medical supplies. This problem has been compounded because of lack of any significant victories, lack of apparent progress at the Paris peace talks and the continuous threat of Allied firepower. These problems have become even more severe in AO Lao since the beginning of the Pacification Program.

(2) Weaknesses:

(a) The enemy is generally short of medicine and proper medical treatment facilities. This lack of medicine, particularly for treatment of malaria cases, deeply erodes the combat effectiveness of the enemy.

(b) Recruited and impressed VC personnel are relatively untrained, unexperienced and lack motivation. NVA units are short experienced leaders and NVA replacements have received minimal training. This lack of training lowers morale and makes the enemy extremely vulnerable to Allied psychological operations.

(c) The enemy's limited capability to engage in conventional warfare for extended periods makes him vulnerable to Allied airpower and superior Allied firepower.

(d) Extensive use of visual reconnaissance, IRPs, handheld photography and detection techniques combined with the use of artillery, air-strikes and mobile reaction forces severely limits enemy mobility and activity.

(e) The recently initiated pacification program has denied the enemy freedom of movement in the fertile coastal plains area and has reduced his control of the indigenous personnel in the villages.

f. Courses of Action Based on Enemy Situation:

(1) During the reporting period all available intelligence assets were employed to assist in identifying and neutralising individuals who were
AVEE-SC/HD

S U J E C T: Operational Report Lessons Learned

members of the Viet Cong Infrastructure.

(a) 1/503d continued operations in Hoai An District. Operations were directed from a collocated TOC which facilitated immediate exchange of information. Maneuver elements engaged in pacification activities while concurrently attempting to secure VCI information from the villagers.

(b) 2/503d continued operations in Hoai Nhon District. Operations were directed from a collocated TOC which facilitated immediate exchange of information. Maneuver elements engaged in pacification activities while concurrently attempting to secure VCI information from the villagers.

(c) 4/503d continued operations in Tam Quan District. Operations were directed from a collocated TOC which facilitated immediate exchange of information. Maneuver elements engaged in pacification activities while concurrently attempting to secure VCI information from the villagers.

(d) 1/50th continued operations in Phu My District. Operations were directed from a collocated TOC which facilitated immediate exchange of information. Maneuver elements engaged in pacification activities while concurrently attempting to secure VCI information from the villagers.

(e) Ranger Teams were inserted in the An Do Valley, An Lao Valley/"Fish Hook" area and the "Crow's Foot" area to monitor enemy activity and to conduct reconnaissance patrols in areas where Red Haze and AP readouts were received or where agent reports indicated the presence of enemy personnel.

(2) Artillery and airstrikes were directed against small enemy formations, base areas, infiltration routes, Infrared and AP readouts and lucrative targets as identified by photograph readouts and agent reports.

6. Enemy Personnel and Equipment Losses:

(1) Personnel Losses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>53</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA (poss)</td>
<td>38</td>
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<td>33</td>
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CONFIDENTIAL

(8)
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBE-SC/ID
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

15 August 1969

(2) Equipment Losses

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- Cornmeal (lbs): 25
- Potatoes (lbs): 0
- Wheat (lbs): 0
- Sugar (lbs): 0
- Bananas (lbs): 0
- Rock Salt (lbs): 0
- Salt (lbs): 200

**Miscellaneous Equipment:**

- Uniforms (INA): 12
- Uniforms (Misc): 16
- Poncho: 1
### Operational Report Lessons Learned

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AVEE-SC/MD

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(12)
4. Combat Operations

a. Introduction

During the months of May, June, and July, the 173rd Airborne Brigade continued operations in the areas of responsibility assigned to the Commanding General. The Brigade continued to use extensive, combined operations, assistance, and staff visits as a means of improving operations with the 22d ARVN Division, upgrading RF/FF capabilities, and intensifying support of GVN, RD, and pacification programs. The Brigade continued Operation Washington Green in support of the accelerated pacification in the four northern districts of Binh Dinh Province. Brigade elements are operating within general district boundaries as follows: 1st-503d in Hoai An, 2d-503d in Hoai Nhon, 4th-503d in Tam Quan, and 1st-50th in Phu My. Throughout this quarter, the 3d-319th Field Artillery continued in direct support of the 173rd Airborne Brigade. The 3d battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry, continued to remain OPCON to Task Force South, conducting combat operations in southern II Corps. The activities of the 3d-503d are reported by Task Force South. During the period 3-27 July, the 4th Mobile Strike Force Battalion was placed under the operational control of the Brigade, and conducted Operation Darby Maul I. "Darby Maul I" consisted of a series of search and clear operations in the An Nam Valley region of northern Binh Dinh Province.

b. Operation Washington Green

(1) General

The 173d Airborne Brigade commenced Operation Washington Green, effective 151200H April 1969, and continued in this operation throughout this reporting period. In cooperation and coordination with ARVN, FMAF, and GVN authorities, the 173d Airborne Brigade continued its mission to conduct operations in its assigned AO, consisting of the four northernmost districts of Binh Dinh Province, in order to accelerate pacification progress and maintain security of lines of communication.

(2) Concept of Operation

The operation was conceived as a long term effort with Brigade forces participating with ARVN, FMAF, and GVN authorities in a concerted effort to achieve the goals of the pacification program. Military efforts were planned to support district pacification programs. To facilitate joint planning and combined operations among forces, a battalion task force was assigned to each of the four districts in which the Brigade has operational responsibilities. Task Forces operated within the following districts: TF 1-503 (Hoai An); 2-503 (Hoai Nhon); TF 4-503 (Tam Quan); and TF 150 (Phu My). Territorial forces for the most part concentrated their efforts to restoring GVN control to target hamlets while operating behind a security shield provided by Brigade units.
Concurrent with these pacification efforts was an intensive U.S. effort to enhance the combat effectiveness of RF/PF and district forces within the Brigade AO. U.S. forces and RF/PF conducted extensive combined small unit operations under a "Pairing Concept" which aligned U.S. units with a counterpart RF/PF element. Considerable military assistance and training was provided by the U.S. forces to supplement the efforts directed at increasing the combat effectiveness of the local forces. The primary target of these combined efforts was the destruction of the VC infrastructure, guerrilla, and the sapper/terrorist elements operating within and against the hamlets designated for pacification. Reaction to VC/NVA efforts to disrupt the pacification was an essential factor in contingency planning. The operation was directed to be accomplished in two phases; Phase I and Phase II.

Phase I of Operation Washington Green was initiated on 15 April 1969. Initially, sixteen hamlets located in the four northern districts of Tam Quan, Hoai Nhon, Hoai An and Phu My, were targeted for pacification. The number of target hamlets was increased to twenty-four during phase I due to the progress achieved in its initial stages. The primary mission of U.S. forces in Phase I was to provide security in the vicinity of target hamlets. Upon termination of Phase I, GVN pacification programs were being readily implemented in the target hamlets which were being subjected to only isolated and infrequent enemy incidents. Phase I ended on 30 June 1969.

Phase II of Operation Washington Green was begun on 1 July 1969. In this second phase, a total of 34 hamlets were targeted for pacification. The primary mission of U.S. forces remained one of security within the areas of concern. Increased emphasis was placed on assisting and increasing the combat effectiveness of RF/PF and district forces during Phase II. A concerted effort was made on the part of U.S., GVN, ARVN, and local force personnel to develop better mutual support and cooperation among their forces in accomplishing the goals of the pacification program.

(3) Organization

The four maneuver Battalions were organized to best support the Binh Dinh Province Pacification Program. The tactical organizations as of 31 July follow:

Task Force 1st Battalion (Airborne), 503d Infantry, continues hawk team and security operations in support of Hoai An District Pacification efforts. A Company and B Company remain OPON to 1st Battalion (mech), 17th Infantry. C Company 17th Cavalry (-) remains OPON to 1st Battalion (Airborne), 503d Infantry. The battalion tactical OP remains collocated with the Hoai An District Headquarters at LZ Orange. Pacification activities are centered around the hamlets of: Dai Dinh, An Bao, Linh Chien, Thach Leng, Vinh Tuong, Loc Tuong, Phu Khuong, Phu Huu, Nang An, and Thanh Huong.
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2d Battalion (Airborne) 503d Infantry, continues Hawk/Security operations in support of Hoai Nhon District Pacification. The Battalion CP remains collocated with Hoai Nhon District Headquarters. Pacification efforts are centered around the hamlets of: My Tho, An Tghiep, Knanh Trach, Cong Luong, Phu Xuan, Xuan Vihn, My Khanh, Kim Giao, and Dinh Binh.

Task Force 4th Battalion (Airborne) 503d Infantry with C Company, 1st Battalion (Mech), 50th Infantry continues Hawk/Security operations in support of Tam Quan Districts' Pacification efforts. The Battalion tactical CP remains collocated with Tam Quan District Headquarters at LZ Tom. Pacification efforts remain centered around the hamlets of: Binh De, Hy The, Chuong Hoa, Lieu An, and Hoi An.

Task Force 1st Battalion (mech) 50th Infantry (-), continues Hawk/Security operations in support of Phu My District's pacification efforts. The 173d Provisional Tank Company remains OPCON and continues road and bridge security missions along QL 1. A provisional reinforced squad continues security of the "Hawk's Nest". The Battalion Tactical CP remains collocated at Phu My District Headquarters. Pacification efforts are centered around the hamlets of: Phu Nhieu, Phu Quang, Duong Lieu, My Phu, Tan Loc, Tan Oc, An Tinh, Phu Loc, An Loc, and Xuan Thahn.
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(4) Significant Contacts:

During Operation Washington Green the following significant contacts were made as of the period ending 31 July 1969.

a. Hx

(1) 010823 HR 915985 Hk 22, 2/503 Inf, loc 5 km S of LZ English, detonated a booby trapped HG resulting in 1 US WIA who was extracted.

(2) 012040 BS 869127 Hk 425, 4/503 Inf, loc 11 km W of LZ English, detonated an unk type booby trap which resulted in 2 US WIA who were extracted.

(3) 011124 BS 893161 Team H, Co N (Ranger) 75th Inf, loc 24 km N of LZ English, engaged 2 VC/NVA Ww SA fire at a range of 25 m. The VC/NVA returned fire resulting in 2 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 2 carb CIA and 1 US WIA.

(4) 011720 HR 739974 Tm 16 loc 14 km SW of LZ English, received SA fire from a woodline 20 m to their N. The tm returned fire resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (poss). There was 1 US WIA. At 1800 hrs the tm was extracted and the acft received fire. Gunships expended in the area with unk results.

(5) 012215 HR 822875 Hk 13 of 1/503 Inf, loc 13 km SSW of LZ English, initiated contact on 7 VC/NVA with WnS at a range of 100 m to their N. The VC/NVA fled N at 2230 Hk 13G sighted the enemy and initiated contact resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC).

(6) 011245 HR 972308 N Co (Ranger) 75th Inf, Teams K, G, F and M, loc 25 km NW of LZ English, engaged 5 VC/NVA at a range of 10 m. The VC/NVA had weapons but did not return fire and fled N. Results of the contact were 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 1 VC/NVA VIA, CIA, 1 SJS were CIA.

(7) 020507 HR 792885 Hk 110, 1/503d Inf, loc 12 km SW of LZ English,obs an enemy ambush 100 m to their S. They eng enemy with arty ww neg res.

(8) 021-14 BS 869116 Hk 416, 4/503d Inf, loc 11 km N of LZ English, det 1 indiv who was later identified as a VC by district officials, and were interrogating him when he died, apparently of natural causes. He had a list of VC names in his possession - results 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC).

(9) 020725 HR 997621 Co B, 1/503d Inf, loc 7 km N of LZ Uplift, received approx 100 rcs of SA fire fr 200 m to their S. Fire was returned w w SA/AW. The enemy broke contact and fled S. While checking area of contact 1 VC (Female) KIA (BC) and 1 SJS rifle were fd. At 0920 hrs at GR 010813, 1 VC WIA with 1 SJS rifle was CIA and 2 VCS who were helping the VC escape were detained. The 2 SJSs, 1 VC PI and 2 VCS detainees were extracted.
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(10) 021400 R570912 C/7/17 Air Cav 25 km NW of LZ English, a LOH acft rec'd AN fire fr an unk size enemy force and crashed resulting in 2 US KIA and 1 US WIA. The Aero-Rifle Platoon was inserted and rec'd SA/AW fire resulting in 1 US WIA and 1 LOH damged. The Aero-Rifle Platoon reached the downed acft and recovered the 2 KIA and 1 WIA who were extracted. Gunships expended in the area w/ unk results. The 2d platoon of D/2/50C was also inserted and rec'd sporadic SA fire while sweeping the area but suffered no cas. Results of the action were 2 US YUA, 2 US 9U, 1 LOH destroyed, 1 LOH moderately damged. Enemy cas were unk.

(11) 021840 RQ817567 tm initiated contact on 2 VC/INA at a range of 150 meters resulting in 1 VC/INA KIA (BC) and 1 VC/INA KIA (poss). (Ta 41, Co C Ranger, 75th Inf).

(12) 031100 R5784886 Rk 11B7, 1/503 Inf loc 12 km SW of LZ English, detonated a booby trapped 11-26 HG resulting in 2 US WIA who were extracted.

(13) 030953 FR924979 Rk 22, 2/503 Inf, loc 6 km ESE of LZ English, detonated a booby trapped 105mm rd which resulted in 2 US KIA and 1 US WIA. The WIA was extracted.

(14) 031530 FR915985 Rk 22, 2/503 Inf, loc 3 km SE of LZ English, eng 1 VC at a range of 100 m resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 KIA-16 and 2 M-26 HES CIA. The VC was wearing blue clothing.

(15) 031409 R5901210 Co C, 1/50 Inf, loc 12 km NW of LZ English, detonated a booby trapped 11-26 HG resulting in 3 US WIA who were extracted at 1428.

(16) 031507 R5907141 Co C, 1/50 Inf, loc 12 km NW of LZ English, detonated an unk type mine resulting in 1 US WIA who was extracted.

(17) 031905 R5873103 Rk tm 41A, 4/503 Inf, loc 9 km N of LZ English, rec'd 30 rds of SA fire fr 100 m to their E, W and S. There was an est 1 VC/INA in each loc. Fire was ret and the enemy fled. Results of the contacts were 1 US WIA (slight).

(18) 031048 R5925120 Rk 445, 4/503 Inf, loc 11 km NE of LZ English, rec'd 1 HG which resulted in 1 US WIA who did not require dustoff. Illum was fired but no enemy were obs.

(19) 032110 R5909101 Co D, 4/503 Inf, loc 9 km NE of LZ English, rec'd heavy SA/AW fire fr an est 6-7 VC/INA to their N and W. Fire was ret with AN with unk results. Results were 1 US WIA who did not require dustoff.

(20) 031750 CR0148010 Co B, 1/503 Inf, loc 12 km ENE of LZ Uplift, obs 12 VC/INA w/ rucksacks and wpns move into Thanh-Thuy (2) Hamlet. 1st Plt
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was inserted into the area. A LOH killed 1 VC (FC) and the ele detained 4 VCS and captured one 7.62 carbine. The Ht and the detainees VB extracted on 4 May 1969.

(21) 031230 RS700098 Elements of the C/7/17 Air Cav loc 18 km NW of LZ English, eng 3 indivs who were in front of a cave. The fire was returned and 1 LOH was hit and moderately damaged. There was 1 US WIA. Artillery eng the area with vm results.

(22) 040700 RS904123 An APC of Co C, 1/50th Inf, loc 11 km NE of LZ English, rec'd 3-5 rds of SA fire and 1 HE which resulted in 1 US WIA.

(23) 041830 RS842-15 TMs A and J, Co N (Ranger) 75th Inf, loc 20 km NW of LZ English, eng 3 VC/NVA at 40 m N of their pos resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). The VC was wearing green khakis. Two blood trails were fd leading X. The tms were extracted at 2001 hrs.

(24) 050820 RS787882 HK 11c, 1/503 Inf, loc 16 km SW of LZ English, detonated a booby trapped M-26 HE resulting in 3 US WIA, 2 of which were ext.

(25) 050915 RS965844 Co B, 1/503 Inf, loc 11 km NE of LZ Uplift, obs 2 VCS in boats, 1 of which attempted to evade. A warning shot was fired and the VC/NVA returned fire. The ele then eng him resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC).

(26) 051820 RS945857 3d plt, Co B, 1/503d Inf, loc 11 km N of LZ English, while moving into an ambush site, 3 VC were sighted 350 m NE of their pos and 1 had a vpm and the other 2 had oars. The plt initiated contact resulting in 1 VM WIA and det. The 2 other VC fled NE. At 1905 hrs, 7-8 rds of sniper fire were rec'd fr an est 1000 m to the NE. The suspected enemy loc was eng with fire w/o results.

(27) 051300 RS898945 Tm C, Co N (Ranger) 75th Inf, loc 6 km S of LZ English, detonated an unk type of booby trap which resulted in 1 US WIA who was extracted. The tm then rec'd SA fire from an unk size enemy force. Fire was returned w/o results. The tm was extracted at 1315 hrs w/o incident.

(28) 051045 RS841021 RS841045 Tm 21, Co C (Ranger) 75th Inf, loc 18 km S of LZ English, fd 1 "u" shaped trench, (150+ long and 3' wide) w/ 5 tunnels (7' deep and 5' wide). While they were checking the area they eng 1 VC/NVA at a range of 50 m. The VC/NVA did not return fire but fled S. The tm was extracted at 1125 hrs w/o incident.

(29) 051615 RS720489 Ranger Tm 41, Co C, 75th Inf, loc 48 km W of Tuy Hoa, rec'd 5 rds of carbine fire and sporadic sniper fire fr an est 10-15 VC/NVA, 4 of which had vps. The fire came fr an est 200 m fr their pos.
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At 1730, gunships expended in the area resulting in 2 VC/KIA (BC) and 2 VC KIA (poss). The extraction ship accounted for 1 VC KIA (BC) and tm 41 accounted for 1 VC KIA (BC) and 2 VC KIA (poss) during extraction. Arty was expended in the area after extraction was completed.

(30) 060610 ER932867 3d plt, Co B, 1/503d Inf, loc 11 km N of LZ Uplift, detonated an unk type of booby trap resulting in 3 US WIA who were ext.

(31) 071500 ER815977 23B, 2/503 Inf, loc 54 km SE of LZ English, eng 6 VC/NVA at a range of 150 m. The VC/NVA did not return fire and fled S. The tm fd 1 .45 cal pistol, 80 rds of 5.56mm ammo, 1 mag of .45 cal ammo and 30 rds of .30 cal carbine ammo which were extracted.

(32) 071230 ER937035 TM B, Co N (Ranger) 75th Inf, loc 13 km WNW of LZ English, was eng by an enemy force of unk size. The enemy immediately broke contact and fled N w/ unk cas. The tm fd a Co size base camp at ER937037 which had been recently used.

(33) 070920 ER673843 TM 16, Co C (Ranger) 75th Inf, loc 22 km SW of LZ English, eng 1 VC/NVA at a range of 5 m. The VC/NVA returned fire and fled S. The tm followed the VC/NVA and began moving to high ground. At 0935 hrs the tm eng 2 VC/NVA at 20 m resulting in 2 VC/NVA KIA (BC). The enemy were wearing brown khakis. At 0940 hrs the tm eng 1 VC/NVA at 100 m and rec'd AW fire in return. The tm was extracted at 1010 hrs at ER673850.

(34) 061900 ER928993 22E and 22I, 2/503d Inf, loc 5 km ESE of LZ English, rec'd 50 rds of SA/AW fire fr 10-15 VC/NVA fr 400 m N of their pen. Fire was returned and the enemy fled N at 1915 hrs. 1 US was WIA with neg enemy cas.

(35) 082030 ER875125 124, 4/503d Inf, loc 11 km N of LZ English, rec'd 50 rds of SA/AW fire fr 3 VC/NVA 300 m N of their pen. The tm returned fire w/ SA/AW and M-79 and 90mm rifles. 81mm illumination was also fired. There was 1 US slightly WIA. Enemy cas were unk.

(36) 082030 ER97118 417, 4/503d Inf, loc 11 km N of LZ English, rec'd 50 rds of AW fire fr an est 6-8 VC/NVA fr 300 m W of their pen. The tm returned fire w/ SA and M-79s. The enemy broke contact at 2035 and fled in unk dir. Enemy cas were unk.

(37) 080700 ER928252 2d plt, Co B, 1/503d Inf, loc 7 km N of LZ English, eng 2 VC/NVA at 100 m. Results were 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC). 1 female VC was det during a sweep of the area. She said she knew the VC KIA. She was extr for interrogation.
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(38) 080755 CR028788 Co B, 1/503 Inf, loc 13 km NW of LZ Uplift, obs 1 VC/NVA w/ a rucksack and ordered him to halt and fired a warning shot. The VC/NVA threw a HG and the ele eng and wounded him. He was extracted but died enroute resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC). At 0835 at the same loc 1 male VC (19 yrs old) was det and extracted for interrogation. The detainee also had a rucksack and documents and 1 had a medical kit. 1 pistol belt w/ an M-26 HG was CIA fr the VC KIA.

(39) 083010 HR662822 Tm 11, Co C (Ranger) 75th Inf, loc 30 km SW of LZ English, ambushed 10 VC/NVA at 10 m using claymore mines, HGs, CS and SA fire resulting in 3 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 3 VC/NVA KIA (poss). Heavy blood trails were fd leading east. The tm was extracted at 1120 hrs.

(40) 090845 HR772880 Hk 11, 1/50th Inf, loc 18 km SW of LZ English, eng an est VC/NVA plt at 50 m. SA/AW fire was exchanged, gunships and arty were expended. At 0900 the enemy broke contact and fled SW. The area was checked and 2 VC/NVA KIA (BC) were fd. Also fd and CIA were 3 M-1 carbines, 1 M-16, 2 bottles of penicillin, 5 lbs of bandages, 6 NVA rucksacks, 2 chicom HGs, 1 homemade HG, 12 NVA green uniforms, 6 pistol belts, 6 M-26 HGs, 8 sets ash/gray uniforms, 1 M-60 cleaning kit, 1 set of LBE, 1 B-40 rkt fuse, 4 NVA plastic helmets, 12 rds .45 cal ammo, 2 lbs docus, 28 lbs of rice, 350 rds of AK-47 ammo, and 10 hammocks. Also fd were 8 bunkers (w/ 3), 1 set of LEE, 1 M-16 cleaning kit, 1 set of LBE, 1 B-40 rkt fuse, 4 NVA plastic helmets, 12 rds .45 cal ammo, 2 lbs docus, 28 lbs of rice, 350 rds of AK-47 ammo, and 10 hammocks. Also fd were 8 bunkers (w/ 3) which were 3' deep. The items were extracted.

(41) 090920 HR794920 Hk 14B, 1/503d Inf, loc 13 km ESE of LZ English, obsd 2 VC/NVA 200 m to their NE. The 2 VC/NVA spotted the ele and fled SW. The ele checked the area and fd a cooking fire. The area showed heavy use. At 1010 hrs, at ES802027 a booby trapped HG was detonated resulting in 2 US WIA who were extracted. 2 more booby traps were fd in the area and blown in place.

(42) 091700 HR925998 1st Plt, Co B, 2/503d Inf, loc 6 km ESE of LZ English recd SA fire fr an est 4 VC/NVA 250 m to the S of their pln. The enemy was armed with 2 BARS and 2 M-16s. The enemy broke contact and fled S. While checking the area sniper fire was recd fr a hut and fire was returned w/ SA and M-79 rds. 1 VN civ and 2 children were WIA and extracted. There was 1 US WIA fr his own HG. He was extracted.

(43) 090712 CR042790 Co B, 1/50th Inf, loc 14 km NW of LZ English, fd a rucksack and detonated a booby trap in the immediate area. The ele then began receiving SA fire and HGs fr an est 8-10 VC/NVA 30 m to their N. Fire was returned and gunships expended. The area was checked resulting in 2 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 1 detainee. There were 7 US WIA, 4 of which were extracted.
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(44) 090930 BR990834 Co R, 1/503d Inf, loc 12 km NE of LZ Uplift, was engaged with a claymore which resulted in 3 US WIA who were extracted. The enemy were pursued NW. Co B, 1/50th Inf, took over pursuit and engaged with .50 cal fire and killed 1 VC/NA at 600 m resulting in 1 VC/NA KIA (BC).

(45) 091800 BR932863 Co B, 1/503d Inf, loc 11 km NE of LZ Uplift, engaged 3 VC/NA 50 m fr their psn w/ SA fire resulting in 2 VC/NA KIA (BC) and 1 WIA detainee, 1 M1 carbine, 2 M-26 HGs and 2 flashlights CIA. The WIA detainee was extracted at 1835 hrs.

(46) 100700 BR841860 Hk 13B, 1/503d Inf, loc 12 km W of LZ Uplift, dug up graves fd on 9 May and fd 2 VC/NA KIA dressed in green fatigues. Thought to have been killed by Hk 13B at BR842863 on 5 May.

(47) 101137 BS661111 Tms D, J and F, Co N (Ranger) 75th Inf, loc 25 km NW of LZ English, engaged movement of unk size enemy force 30 m fr their psn. No fire was received. The area was checked and a bolt action rifle was fd. The tm was extracted and cdt at 1300 hrs.

(48) 101445 BS703085 Tm M, Co N (Ranger) 75th Inf, loc 16 km NW of LZ English, initiated contact on 1 VC/NA at 10 m when he jumped up and ran away, resulting in 1 VC/NA KIA (BC).

(49) 101925 BS719089 Tm K, loc 18 km NW of LZ English, initiated contact with 3 VC/NA who were filling 5 gallon water cans. Results were 2 VC KIA, 1 SKS rifle and small amt of docus CIA. The tm was extracted at 2000 hrs.

(50) 111035 BR990907 Co C, 1/50th Inf, loc 9 km S of LZ English, detonated a booby trapped M-26 HG resulting in 1 US WIA who was extracted.

(51) 111875 ER929668 Hk 25E, 2/503d Inf, loc 5 km SE of LZ English, engaged 2 VC/NA at a range of 300 m to their SE (at ER924964). The VC/NA were armed w/ AK-47s and fled S after returning fire. The suspected enemy route was eng by arty with unk results.

(52) 111610 BS878113 3d Plt, Co A, 4/503d Inf, loc 11 km N of LZ English, detonated a booby trapped HG resulting in 2 US WIA who were extracted.

(53) 121800 ER916957 Hk 25E, loc 6 km ESE of LZ English, were fired on by 1 BAR. Checking further an enemy base area was fd and more SA fire
was rec'd. Fire was returned, possibly wounding 1 VC/NVA. 2 pistol belts, 1 M-26 HG, medical supplies, clothing, a transistor radio and docus were extracted. (2/503d Inf)

(55) 121015 BS894141 Co C, 4/503d Inf, loc 14 km NE of LZ English, tripped a booby trapped M-26 HG resulting in 2 US WIA, 1 of which was extracted. A radio was also destroyed.

(56) 120050 BR924753 LZ Uplift rec'd 17 rds of 82mm mtr fire fr 350 m to their E which caused no cas or damage. SA fire was rec'd fr S about 1 min prior to mtr fire. A counter-battery program was fired by mtrs and arty w unk results.

(57) 120055 BR900674 1/50th CP, loc 8 km S of LZ Uplift, rec'd 25 rds of 60mm mtr fire fr 500 m to their N and 6 rds of M-79 fire fr 100 m to their E. Fire was returned w unk results. There were no cas or damage.

(58) 121755 BS823109 Tm E, loc 11 km NW of LZ English, initiated contact on a VC/NVA force of unkn size wearing blk pjs and carrying SA. Contact was at a range of 30 m to the N, resulting in 1 US KIA, 1 US WIA and 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC). After the tm was extracted arty and gunships expended in the area and Hawkeye 2E obs 2 VC/NVA bodies. Final results were 1 US KIA, 1 US WIA and 3 VC/NVA KIA (BC). (Co N (Ranger) 75th Inf)

(59) 121500 EQ887942 Tm 44, Co C (Ranger) 75th Inf, loc 67 km W of Tuy Hoa, insertion acft rec'd fire and insertion was aborted. Gunships obs 5 VC/NVA on the LZ and expended resulting in 2 VC/NVA KIA. The VC wore blk pjs and 1 had an SKS.

(60) 120012 BS873017 LZ English rec'd 12 rds of 82mm mtr fire fr an unkn size enemy force at BS862006 which destroyed 1 UH-1H acft, moderately damaged 2 UH-1H and lightly damaged 2 UH-1H acft. A counter-mortar program was fired by arty w unk results. There were no cas. At 0115 hrs Bnkers 12 and 14 rec'd 3 rds of SA fire which was not returned as enemy loc was unk.

(61) 131820 BS872103 Hk 414, 4/503d Inf, loc 9 km N of LZ English, rec'd 60 rds of SA fire fr 100 m to their N. The ele returned fire and the enemy fled SW. The area was checked and 2 bmkrs were fd & destroyed.

(62) 132120 BS924128 Hk 441, 4/503d Inf, loc 12 km NNE of LZ English, rec'd heavy SA, AW and M-79 fire fr an est 15-20 VC/NVA fr 200-400 m to their NW and NE. Fire was returned and arty illum was used. The enemy broke contact at 2150 hrs and fled with unk cas.
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(63) 132250 BS909109 Co D CP, 4/503d Inf, loc 11 km WSW of LZ English, obs 3 VC/NVA 100 m to their N through a starlight scope. The enemy was engaged with .50 cal fire unk results.

(64) 132005 BS891128 Co C, 4/503d Inf, 12 km E of LZ English, heard bells, bamboo thumping and chanting 150m to their N. They fired 1 M-79 rd and the noise stopped. At 2025 hrs movement was heard 50 m to the N and engaged with M-79 unk results.

(65) 140930 BS797945 Hk tm 14c, 1/503d Inf, loc 10 km SW of LZ English, detonated a booby trapped M-26 HG which resulted in 1 US KIA who was extracted.

(66) 141710 BS794444 Hk 14c, 1/503d Inf, loc 11 km WSW of LZ English, rec'd 1 rd of sniper fire from an unk distance to the S resulting in 1 US WIA who was extracted.

(67) 141935 BS862123 The Recon Plt, 4/503d Inf, loc 11 km N of LZ English, rec'd M-79 and SA fire 200 m to their W. Fire was returned and the enemy broke contact at 1945 hrs and fled W. At 1945 hrs the ele rec'd 30-40 rds of SA fire from an enemy ele of unk size. Fire was returned and the ele broke contact at 1947 hrs and fled W unk cas.

(68) 151230 BS776883 Hk 11q, 1/503d Inf, loc 18 km NNW of LZ Uplift, fd 2 graves which were 2-3 weeks old, 1 was male and the other was female killed by SA or Arty. Appear to be same indiv KIA by Hk 11 on 9 May at BS772880.

(69) 151845 BR944973 Hk 25d, 2/503d Inf, loc 7 km SE of LZ English, obs 3 VC/NVA moving SE 1200 m to their SE. One had a BAR and 2 others had AK-47s, all wore black Pjs. They were engaged with 4.2" mtr fire unk results. It is believed 1 rd fell short resulting in 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA who were extracted. The tm was extracted at 2030 hrs.

(70) 150830 BS886108 Co A, 4/503d Inf, loc 9 km N of LZ English, detonated a booby trapped M-26 HG resulting in 1 US WIA.

(71) 152130 BS885142 Hk 432, 4/503d Inf, loc 13 km N of LZ English, rec'd SA sniper fire 200 m to the SW of their pos resulting in 1 US WIA who was not extracted. Artillery engaged the suspected enemy loc with unk results.

(72) 152150 BS888156 Hk 438 and Hk 439, 4/503d Inf, loc 15 km N of LZ English, rec'd 35-50 rds of SA fire 150 m SE and E. Fire was returned with unk results and contact broke at 2200 hrs. Results were 1 US WIA. At 2230 hrs the dustoff acft rec'd fire and contact was resumed. At 2240 hrs an ele moved to HY the hamlet where the fire came from and swept the area. At 2305
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20 rds of SA fire were rec'd fr 100 m to the S resulting in 1 US WIA. Fire was again returned and contact was broke at 2310 hrs. A dustoff arrived at 2325 hrs and rec'd 20 rds of fire but took no hits. This contact broke at 2330 hrs. The sweep of the hamlet was complete at 2400 hrs and the ele returned to their night laager. Results were 2 US WIA.

(73) 150945 BR957863 Co B, 1/50th Inf, loc 12 km NE of LZ Uplift, rec'd SA fire fr 150 m to the W. The VC fled N. The VC pursued and det 1 female VCS who was extracted for interrogation.

(74) 151510 BR930789 The Scout Section, 1/50th Inf, loc 4 km N of LZ Uplift had 1 US KIA fr a booby trap while he was trying to blow it in place.

(75) 151755 BR933864 3d Plt, Co B, 1/503d Inf, loc 10 km NNE of LZ Uplift, eng 3 VC/NVA 100 m to their NW resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 1 WIA detainee. One VC/NVA escaped NW. The WIA detainee was extracted for medical treatment and interrogation.

(76) 161215 BR746927 Hk 15A, 1/503d Inf, loc 14 km SSW of LZ English, ambushed 3 VC/NVA at a range of 20 m who were moving NW on a well used trl. The enemy returned fire and fled W. Results were 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 1 VC/NVA WIA but escaped and 1 AK-47 and a pistol belt w/ 2 mmg CIA. The other 2 VC/NVA had wpns and rucksacks. The VC/NVA KIA was identified as Dan Nguyen Van (age 20-30), from Hoi An (H), Hoai Chau (V), Hoai Chon (D). He joined the NLF on 1 Mar 64 and the Communist Party on 20 May 68. The serial no. on the AK-47 was #9472082.

(77) 161525 BR756951 Hk 15B, 1/503d Inf, loc 12 km SSW of LZ English, eng 2 VC/NVA at 25 m range, resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC). The enemy returned fire and fled. The enemy were pursed with neg results. A wallet, a bag of rice, 1 M-26 HG and a notebook were CIA. The fleeing VC/NVA was followed and f'd KIA at 1719 hrs.

(78) 160900 BR924987 Hk 24E, 2/503d Inf, loc 4 km ESE of LZ English, eng 2 VC/NVA moving W at 200 m, resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC). The other VC/NVA fled E. 1 M-26 HG, 1 poncho, 1 hammock and 1 civ radio and some propaganda docus were CIA. The fleeing VC/NVA was followed and f'd KIA at BR923987. At BR923982 a blood soaked shirt and pieces of flesh were f'd resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC). Final results were 2 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 1 VC/NVA KIA (poss).

(79) 161825 BR775024 Hk 25E, 2/503d Inf, loc 10 km W of LZ English, obs 7 indiv w rucksacks and wpns 2200 m W of their pen and 5 VC/NVA 2000 m W of their pen. The area was eng w arty adjusted by Hawkeye and 3 bodies were obs. The area will be checked on 17 May.
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(80) 162000 BS891138 Co C CP, 4/503d Inf, loc 13 km N of LZ English, rec'd SA and AW fire fr an unk size enemy force, 100 m to their N, S, SW and W. 10 rds of M-79 fire were also rec'd. Fire was returned w/ unk results and there was 1 RF KIA.

(81) 160935 ER976785 Co B, 1/50th Tnf, loc 13 km NNE of LZ Uplift, detonated a booby trapped M-26 HG resulting in 2 US WIA who were extracted.

(82) 171245 BR762955 Hk 15B, 1/503d Inf, loc 11 km SSW of LZ English, detonated a booby trapped M-26 HG which resulted in 2 US WIA who were ext.

(83) 171115 BR899952 Co D, 2/503d Inf, loc 5 km SE of LZ English, rec'd 1 HG fr an est 3-4 VC/NVA. Fire was returned possibly wounding 1 VC/NVA. Blood was fd on bushes in the area.

(84) 171930 BS751029 An ele of Hk 25E, 2/503d Inf, loc 11½ km W of LZ English obs 5 VC/NVA w/ vpns and rucksacks dressed in blk PJs moving S. They also obs 5 VC/NVA 50 m fr the other group standing at the mouth of a cave. These VC/NVA obs the ele and eng them. The ele returned fire and withdrew to the main body. The main body at BS757024, began to receive fire fr an est 40 VC/NVA. Gunships arrived and expended against the enemy loc and the Hk tm withdrew to an LZ at BS758024. They were extracted at 2000 hrs. Arty eng the area after the extraction. Results were 5 VC KIA (posa).

(85) 170720 BS855111 The Recon Plt, loc 10 km N of LZ English, rec'd 10 rds of SA fire fr 100 m to their N. They searched the area and detained 1 male VC (18 yrs old) who was extracted for interrogation.

(86) 171950 BS93150 Hk 436, 4/503d Inf, loc 14 km N of LZ English, rec'd 25-30 rds of SA fire fr a village 100 m to their W. Fire was returned and the area was checked. 1 civ female was WIA and extracted for treatment.

(87) 171300 BS760097 Tms L and N, Co N (Ranger) 75th Inf, loc 14 km NW of LZ English, initiated contact w/ 1 VC at 25 m who was wearing violet PJs, who may have had a weapon. The VC/NVA fled S. 8 rucksacks full of equipment, hammocks, 5 HG, 200 lbs of salt and 75 lbs of rice were also fd. The equipment was extracted, the food destroyed. The tm was ext at 1415 hrs.

(88) 172100 BR489818 Hk 15A, 1/503d Inf, loc 12 km SW of LZ English, heard movement on all sides of their pm fr an est 15-20 VC/NVA. At 1250 m flare illuminated 1 VC/NVA 101 fr their pm. At 2210-2230 hrs arty was fired all around the tms loc and at 2233 hrs the tm moved out of the area to the E.

(89) 180715 BR922868 1st Plt, Co B, 1/503d Inf, loc 10 km N of LZ Uplift, obs 4 VC setting up a claymore and booby traps. They eng the enemy at 290 m and the enemy frd W. 2 VC wore green, 1 wore blk PJs, and 1 wore...
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blue. The claymore and the 155mm rd were CIA and WB destroyed.

(90) 181140 RS748014 Tm K, Co N (Ranger) 75th Inf, loc 11 km NE of LZ English, eng 1 VC/NVA emerging from a tunnel at 30 meters, resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (pos). 1 AK-47 and 1 M-1 carbine. CIA. Blanks and medical supplies were fd in the cave. There were 1 US WIA.

(91) 181335 BR813995 Tm 21, Co C, (Ranger) 75th Inf, loc 6 km SSW of LZ English, initiated contact w/ 6-10 VC/NVA who were moving toward the tin. Contact was at 10 m. Results were 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 1 VC/NVA KIA (pos). The tin moved toward an LZ at BR814993 and eng and killed another 1 VC/NVA. During extraction at BR814993, the doorgunners of the extraction acft got 3 VC/NVA KIA (BC). SA fire was heard during extraction. Arty eng the area after extraction. Final results were 5 VC/NVA KIA (BC), and 1 VC/NVA KIA (pos).

(92) 180100 RS880012 Bunker 33, LZ English Perimeter Defense, obs 1 indiv attempting to crawl through the wire between Bunkers 33 and 34. They eng the indiv and AW and M-79 fire was recid in return. Another indiv was obs trying to crawl through the wire near Bunker 32. He was also eng w/ neg res.

(93) 191815 BR793920 Hk 14A, 1/503d Inf, loc 12 km SW of LZ English, obs 6 VC/NVA w/ wpns 700 m N of their pan. They pursued the enemy up a hill and at 1832 hrs made contact w/ 1 VC/NVA at 150 m resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 1 M-2 carbine and 3 M-26 HGS, a US pistol belt w/ a canteen and 2 mg CIA. There were also several docus CIA.

(94) 191250 BR794980 Hk 23B, 2/503d Inf, loc 7 km SW of LZ English, initiated contact at 200 m w/ 5 VC/NVA who were wearing khakis and carrying wpns. The enemy returned fire and fled E. Results were 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 1 VC/NVA WIA and detained. Also 1 M-16, 1 M-2 carbine and 3 HGS CIA. Arty eng the suspected enemy route of withdrawal w/ unk res. The VC WIA told us that 9 VC/NVA were at BR810975 and the area was checked with neg res.

(95) 191415 RS855120 Co A and B, 2/503d Inf, loc 11 km N of LZ English, conducting a search and seal of Thanh Son (1) (H), det and extracted 38 VCS (22 females and 16 males). 1 VC was KIA by Mine-Cav at 0615 hrs while attempting to escape the cordon.

(96) 191830 RS746108 The Aero-Rifle Plt, C/7/17 Air Cav, loc 15 km SW of LZ English, was inserted on a sighting of 7 VC/NVA and eng them w/ SA fire. The area was checked and numerous blood trails and 7 rucksacks were fd. Results were 7 VC/NVA KIA (pos).

(97) 201945 RS828903 1st Plt, E/17th Cav, loc 15 km SSW of LZ English, observed 30 m to their S and fired 3 M-79 rds which resulted in 1 secondary explosion. The area was checked on 21 May.
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(98) 201500 ER937839 CO B, 1/503d Inf, loc 10 km N of LZ Uplift, heard firing and checked the area. They obs 2 indivs fleeing 400 m fr their pen. They engaged the enemy resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 1 detainee. 6 other indivs were det in the vic. Results were 1 VC KIA (BC) and 7 VCs detained.

(99) 192055 ER905936 HK 24D, 2/503d Inf, loc 5 km SE of LZ English, had 1 VC/NVA KIA (poss) fr the contact reported on 19 May. Heavy blood trails were fd.

(100) 211015 ER778882 HK 11C2, 1/503d Inf, loc 15 km SSW of LZ English, eng 3 VC/NVA moving NE at 20 m resulting in 1 female VC KIA (BC) (24 yrs old) and 1 M-1 carbine and 1 M-2 carbine CIA. 1 VC/NVA was wearing green fatigues. Also CIA were 4 hammocks, 10 lbs of rice, 2 canteen cups, 3 jungle hats, 3 homemade rucksacks and 1 NVA rucksack containing 2 lbs of docus which were extracted. The other VC/NVA fled SW.

(101) 211855 ER905950 HK 24A, 2/503d Inf, loc 5 km SE of LZ English, rec'd SA and M-79 fire fr 200 m to their S, E and SE fr an est 6-8 VC/NVA. Fire was returned and the enemy withdrew in an unk dir w/ unk cas. Results were 3 US WIA who were extracted.

(102) 210630 ER969855 CO B, 1/503d Inf, loc 10 km NE of LZ Uplift, eng 1 VC/NVA at 10 m resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 1 SKS rifle CIA.

(103) 210940 ER967853 CO B, 1/503d Inf, loc 11 km NE of LZ Uplift, eng 1 VC/NVA was fd hiding in a cave. 1 Thompson SMG was CIA and 3 other indivs were det in the area and extracted for interrogation. The VC was WIA and CIA and extracted. Final results were 1 SMG CIA and 4 detainees extracted.

(104) 210930 ER918778 CO B, 1/503d Inf, loc 12 km N of LZ Uplift, eng 3 VC/NVA at 150 m. 1 indiv was det and extracted. Blood trails were fd.

(105) 201015 ER833862 HK 13, 1/503d Inf, loc 14 km SW of LZ English, obs 6 VC w/ wpns. The mini-cav was called in and eng resulting in 4 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 15-20 structures burned. Frly 81mm mtr fire hit near the acft resulting in damage to the acft and 1 US WIA.

(106) 221320 ER826964 HK 13, 1/503d Inf, loc 14 km SW of LZ English, eng 1 VC/NVA w/ wpns at 20 m who was dressed in khakis resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 1 SKS CIA. He was later identified as the plt ldr of the B3 plt of the D22 CO by a HoI chinh.

(107) 221945 ER807992 HK 11C, 2/503d Inf, loc 6 km SW of LZ English, eng 3 VC/NVA at 30 m resulting in 1 WIA and detainted who was extracted for medical treatment and interrogation. The VC/NVA did not have wpns but wore green fatigues. The other VC fled N leaving blood trls. Followed with neg res.
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(108) 221701 PS397004 3d plt, Co D, 2/503d Inf, loc 5 km E of LZ English, on a helicopter inbound to an LZ rec'd 75 rds of SA fire fr 150 m to the SE and fr 200 m to the N resulting in 1 US WIA. The fire was returned and the area was swept w/ neg findings.

(109) 221825 PS399128 the Co B CP, 4/503d Inf, loc 12 km N of LZ English detonated a booby trap resulting in 1 US WIA who was extracted.

(110) 231445 BR838858 Hk 13C, 1/503d Inf, loc 16 km WSW-LZ English, fd 4 VC KIA dressed in mixed clothing who had been killed by SA and fragments. They were fd in the area where the Mini-Cav reported 4 possible KIA on 22 May.

(111) 231540 BS838860 Hk 13, 1/503d Inf, loc 13 km SE of LZ English, fd 3 fresh graves w/ 3 VC/NVA dressed in green fatigues killed by mortar frags. Appeared to have been killed on 22 May.

(112) 231610 BR766952 Hk 14B1, 1/503d Inf, loc 11 km WSW of LZ English, eng 1 VC/NVA (25-27 yrs old) resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and a small amt of docus CIA. He was dressed in a blue-green unif and the docus were ext.

(113) 231525 BS466008 2d plt, Co C, 2/503d Inf, loc 11 km W of LZ English, obs 3-4 VC/NVA 300 m fr their psn, 1 w/ a wpn. The VC/NVA were eng by a LOR fr C/7/17 Cav. At 1532 hrs the area was checked and 2x5 gallon cans of rice and 50 lbs of bananas were fd. The plt then moved down the hill and eng 2 VC/NVA in a cave resulting in 2 VC/NVA KIA (BC).

(114) 232055 BS907104 the Hk 449, 4/503d Inf, loc 9 km NNW of LZ English, rec'd sporadic SA fire fr enemy loc 50-200 m to their W. Movement was obs near the perimeter and the tm withdrew SE toward the CP, loc 300 m to the SE. At 2120 hrs they eng the enemy and 2 APCs moved fr the CP to reinforce. Contact broke at 2130 hrs and the tm moved to the CP.

(115) 232125 BS909101 the D Co CP, 1/50th Inf, loc 9 km NNE of LZ English, rec'd 25-30 rds of AW fire and 1 rrd of M-79 fire fr 100 m to their W. Fire was returned w/ unk results. There was 1 US WIA who was extracted.

(116) 232345 BS749031 the C&C Acft, loc 13 km W of LZ English, while lowering water to the Co B, 4/503d Inf CP, rec'd 10 rds of SA fire. The door-gunners returned fire w/ unk results. Altitude was 201.

(117) 241120 BR861885 Hk 15, 1/503d Inf, loc 15 km NW of LZ Uplift, eng 5 VC/NVA, wearing green fatigues and carrying AK-47s, who were moving SE along a trl. Contact was initiated at 30 m. Results were 1 AK-47 CIA and 4 VC/NVA KIA (poss). Numerous blood trls were fd running SE. The suspected enemy withdrawal route was eng w/ 81mm mtr w/ unk results.
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(118) 241439 ER769889 Hk 11c2, 1/503d Inf, loc 20 km NW of LZ Uplift, obs smoke at ER762862 and thinking it might be an enemy base camp, checked the area. At 1508 hrs they eng 1 VC/NVA. The enemy fled in an unk dir. They checked the area and fd 1x .45 cal pistol, a rucksack and some docus which were extracted. The area was checked further and 2 more NVA rucksacks, 6 homemade booby traps, 60 rds of .45 ammo, 400 rds of AK-47 ammo, 3 chicom NIs and more docus were CIA.

(119) 241930 ER767964 Hk 1AB, 1/503d Inf, loc 11 km SW of LZ English, obs 1 indy moving toward their perimeter and eng resulting in 1 female VC (35 yrs old) KIA (BC).

(120) 241720 ER942968 Hk 25g, 2/503d Inf, loc 7 km SSE of LZ English, eng 2 VC/NVA at 50 m possibly wounded one. One VC/NVA was blk PJs and carried an AK-47. The other wore gray khakis and carried an M-14 carbine. The enemy fled N and was thought to be leading the tm into a booby trapped area. The area was checked again on 25 May.

(121) 240220 ER872126 Hk 426, 4/503d Inf, loc 11½ km N of LZ English, rec'd SA fire and 12 rds of H-79 fire fr 200 m to their NW and SW fr an est 6-8 VC/NVA who were engaged by the enemy. Fire was ret w/ unk res.

(122) 240550 ER887120 Hk 412, 4/503d Inf, loc 9 km N of LZ English, rec'd 2 US/WI fr a booby trapped 105mm rd which was detonated when trap flare wires were being retrieved. The WI were extracted.

(123) 241150 ER846809 Tm 35, Co C (Ranger) 75th Inf, loc 10 km NW of LZ Uplift, eng 1 VC/NVA who was fleeing resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC). 1 NVA flag, 1 Sony AM-FM radio, a khaki unif, a bottle of drugs and some docus were CIA.

(124) 250630 ER971861 Tm 3d Plt, 1/503d Inf, loc 12 km NE of LZ Uplift, eng 4 VC/NVA at 50 m resulting in 3 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 1 M-1 rifle, 2 pistol belts and 5 M-26 NIs CIA. The other VC fled N and had a carbine, 2 female VICs were also det and extracted for interrogation.

(125) 250805 ER905853 A short range ambush patrol, 1/50 Inf, loc 10 km NW of LZ Uplift, rec'd SA/WI fire fr 200 m to their W and obs 5 VC in RF unifs and armed w/ carbines and Thompson SMGs. Gunships eng the enemy w/ unk res. There was 1 US WIA.

(126) 251725 ER755025 Red Raider OP #10 and Ranger Tm G, loc 12 km W of LZ English, obs 1 VC/NVA in blk PJs moving S, 1100 m SSE of their pen. Artillery the enemy pen resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (poss).
(127) 260855 ER842862 HK 13B, 1/503d Inf, loc 13 km NW of LZ Uplift, fd 3 graves and dug them up finding 3 VC/NVA bodies in green fatigues which had been dead for approx 4 days.

(128) 260855 ER915986 HK 24A, 2/503d Inf, loc 3½ km SE LZ English, was eng by an est 20 VC/NVA fr 50-200 m to their N, SW and S, w/ SA, AW and M-79s, resulting in 1 US KIA and 9 US WIA. The fire was returned w/ SA and arty w/o unk results. The D Co reinforced the HK. Dustoff was completed at 0455 hrs and gunships expended with unk results. At 0507 hrs D CO CP group recvd several rds of M-79 fire fr a woodline 50-200 m to their E. Fire was returned w/o results. At 0556 hrs at ER917983 the D Co CP group spotted 6 VC/NVA moving SE toward the hills, 400 m fr their pen. They eng w/ SA and the enemy fled w/o returning fire.

(129) 261550 ER986788 An APC fr Co A, 1/50th Inf, loc 6 km NE of LZ Uplift, hit a mine (command detonated) and was totally destroyed. There were 8 US WIA. 15-20 huts in the area were burned as a result of the explosion. The area was checked and wires were fd leading to a hut. A sandbag full of arty charges was fd 100 m to the S.

(130) 261945 ER934760 The Scout Section, 1/50th Inf, loc 1½ km N of LZ Uplift, spotted an est 70 VC/NVA move into Van Thuong (1). At 0500 hrs the villagers were tearing down their huts in the village. 1/50 swept the area and eng several groups of 5-8 VC who were fleeing. Results were unk. Ele will remain in the area overnight.

(131) 261220 BR865857 TM 21, Co C, Ranger 75th Inf, loc 21 km SE of LZ English, heard 4-5 VC/NVA moving N on a trl. At 1230 they eng the enemy who withdrew N. The enemy tried to outflank the ta and fire was recd fr 20-25 m to the S and W. Fire was returned resulting in 2 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 2 VC/NVA WIA (pos). The KIA were dressed in blk pjs and 5 wpns were obs. The contact broke at 1520 hrs when the ta was extracted. Gunships expended with unk results.

(132) 271025 ER833864 HK 15A, loc 14 km SW of LZ English, detonated a booby trapped N-26 HE which resulted in 3 US WIA, 2 of which were extracted. (1/503d Inf)

(133) 270225 ER966809 3d Plt, Co A, 1/50th Inf, loc 5 km NE of LZ Uplift, in a joint ambush pen w/ the 736th RF Co initiated contact on 1 VC/NVA at 50 m resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC). One RF was accidentally WIA by another RF and was extracted at 20:55 hrs.

(134) 271240 BS864155 A Medivac helicopter, loc 14 km N of LZ English, recd M-79 fire fr a village to their NW. Fire was returned and the area checked w/ unk results. Villagers said there were 2 VC in the area but fled. (Co A, 1/50th Inf).
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(135) 281005 RN990702 CO A, 1/50th Inf, loc 10 km NE of LZ English, was hit by a command detonated claymore resulting in 2 KIA and 4 WIA who were extracted.

(136) 282240 RN933816 HK 52C, loc 6 km NE of LZ Uplift, rec'd 1 rd of M-79 fire fr Chanh Khoan (1) resulting in 1 US WIA. Fire was returned w/ unk results. No extraction was required.

(137) 292135 RN909101 The D Co CP, 4/503d Inf, loc 9 km NW of LZ English, rec'd SA, AW and M-79 fire fr an est 20-25 VC/NVA around a hut. Fire was returned and the hut was caught on fire. 2 secondary explosions were obs. The area WB checked on 30 May.

(138) 291845 RN94786C CO B, 1/503d Inf, loc 11 km NNE of LZ Uplift, eng 1 VC/NVA w/ rucksack who was moving N, 100 m N of their pen. Results were 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 1 rucksack and some docs CIA. The items WB extracted.

(139) 291040 RN842207 Tm I, Co N (Ranger) 75th Inf, loc 20 km NW of LZ English, obs 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC) while dir arty, and obs 5 VC/NVA w/ rucksacks at RN847204.

(140) 291840 RN844047 Tm L and N, Co N (Ranger) 75th Inf, loc 14 km WNW of LZ English, eng 4 VC/NVA moving S on a trl 150 m to their E. They wore blk yrs but had no wpns. The tm initiated contact wounding 2 VC but did not capture them. The tm was extracted at 1909 hrs.

(141) 290355 RN924878 Raider OP #2, 3/319th Arty, loc 12 km SE of LZ English, eng 1 VC/NVA w/ arty at this loc and shifted fire on another VC at RN920878 resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (poss).

(142) 301240 RN897146 HK 434, loc 8½ km N of LZ English, detonated a booby trapped M-26 HC but no cas resulted. (4/503d Inf)

(143) 301215 RN884165 HK 437, 4/503d Inf, loc 14 km N of LZ English, was eng by 3 VC/NVA who were moving N.Contact was initiated at 150 m and the tm returned w/ unk results. There was 1 civ boy WIA by enemy fire and the medivac was fired on when it came to extract him at 1255 hrs. Gunships expended on the suspected enemy location w/ unk results.

(144) 302030 RN908118 HK tm 449, 4/503d Inf, loc 9 km NNE of LZ English, while moving to a night laager, rec'd SA fire fr an est 4-6 VC/NVA 300 m to their SW. Fire was returned and the enemy broke contact at 2037 hrs and fled S and SW. Results were 1 US KIA.

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(145) 302100 BS909101 Hk 447, 4/503d Inf, loc 9 km NNE of LZ English, rec'd 40 rds of SA fire fr 100 m to their N. Fire was returned w/o unk results. At 2104 hrs Hk 449 closed on Hk 447's psn. At 2106 hrs a heavy volume of SA fire and Au fire was rec'd fr all sides. Illum was fired and 4 VC/NVA were obs 30 m to the SE. The VC were eng and 2 fell and 2 fled SE. Contact was broken at 2120. Arty 1 enemy firing psn w/o unk results. Results were 2 VC/NVA KIA (poss).

(146) 300940 BR970865 1st Plt, Co B, 1/503d Inf, loc 12 km NE of LZ Uplift, rec'd fire fr 2 VC/NVA and returned fire resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC). The contact occurred at 150m.

(147) 310800 ER788887 Hk 13B, 1/503d Inf, loc 11 km S of LZ English, detonated a booby trapped M-26 HG resulting in 1 US WIA.

(148) 311450 ER775942 Hk 14C, 1/503d Inf, loc 11 km SW of LZ English, eng 2 VC/NVA in green fatiques, resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 1 VC w/ wpn fled NW without returning fire. 1 set of US web gear was CIA.

(149) 310645 BS909120 Co B, 4/503d Inf, loc 10 km N of LZ English, grenaded a bunker causing a secondary explosion which resulted in 1 US WIA who was extracted.

(150) 310910 BS915117 3d Plt, 4/503d Inf, loc 10 km N of LZ English, eng 1 VC/NVA who was fleeing W, 200 m fr their psn. The enemy dropped one M-26 HG and continued to flee. A fresh punji pit was fd and destroyed, also 2 amo cans of docus, 1 VC pistol belt, 3 VC canteens bedding and 1 bag of propaganda were CIA.

(151) 312110 BS988141 Hk 439, 4/503d Inf, loc 13 km N of LZ English, rec'd 3-4 rds of SA fire and 1 HG fr 2 VC. There was 1 US WIA who WB extracted on 1 June.

(152) 310220 BS975865 3d Plt, Co B, 1/503d Inf, loc 16 km SE LZ English, rec'd Au fire fr an est 7 VC fr 75 m to their NW, resulting in 2 US WIA who were extracted. 2 detaines were killed by enemy fire. The other two detainees attempted to take some wpns fr the US and then tried to flee and were eng resulting in 2 VC/NVA KIA (BC). Final results were 2 US WIA and 4 VC KIA (BC).

(153) 311811 BS931667 1st Plt, Co B, 1/503 Inf, loc 12 km NNE of LZ uplift, eng 1 VC/NVA at 150 m resulting in 1 VC/NVA WIA and CIA and 1 ruck-sack of rice CIA. The other VC/NVA had an M-1 rifle and a sack and fled in an unk dir. The enemy was moving N toward the hills.

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(154) 311400 BS72180 Tm B, Co N (Ranger) 75th Inf, loc 19 km NW of LZ English, initiated contact w/ 3 VC/NVA. The enemy fled S and 3 rucksacks and a heavy blood trail were fd.

(155) 311645 BR734930 Tm 21, Co C (Ranger) 75th Inf, loc 14 km SW of LZ English, obs 2 VC/NVA moving SE, 20 m to their SW. Voices were heard all around the tm. At 1715 VC were obs trying to steal the tm's claymores, 30 m to their S. The tm initiated contact w/ claymores, SA and AW and withdrew N. 3 VC/NVA bodies were obs. The enemy pursued and 2 HGs were recd. The tm was extracted fr an LZ at BR736925 at 1830 hrs and the acft recd 20 rds of AW fire. Arty eng the enemy after extraction. Results: 3 VC/NVA KIA (BC).

b. June

(1) 011030 BS940003 Co A 2/503 Inf, loc 6 km E of LZ English, rec'd SA fire fr 100-200m to their W resulting in 1 US WIA. Fire was returned w/ unk results. The C&C Acft went in to pick up the WIA and rec'd 7 hits resulting in heavy damage. The area was checked by the ground element w/ neg findings.

(2) 010633 BR935850 Co B 1/50 Inf, loc 8 km NE of Phu My, detonated a booby trapped M26 HE resulting in 2 US WIA.

(3) 011130 BS836104 The C&C Acft, C/717, observed 1 VC and the Aero-Rifle Plat was inserted, approx 11 km NNW of LZ English, and det 1 VCS. At 1415 hours a cave was observed and as the element approached, MG fire was rec'd resulting in 1 US KIA and 1 Kit Carson Scout WIA. The cave was engaged w/ HIs which suppressed the fire and the cave was closed w/ demolitions resulting in 5 VC KIA (poss). The WIA were extracted.

(4) 021926 BS943001 Hk 21J, loc 6 km E of LZ English, rec'd fire fr 100-150m to their NE fr 2-3 VC. Fire was returned and the element maneuvered and detonated a booby trapped M26 HE, resulting in 1 US slightly WIA and WB extracted on 3 June. VC propaganda leaflets were fd in the area. (2/503 Inf)

(5) 020010 BS877118 Hk 417, 4/503 Inf, loc 11 km N of LZ English, rec'd
2x rds of M79 fire and SA fire fr 100-150m to their S, W, NW, AND NE. Fire was returned and contact broke 0015. Results were 1 US slightly WIA who wasn't extracted.

(6) 022155 BS 877129 Hk 425, 4/503 Inf, loc 11 km N of LZ English, observed a flashlight for 15 minutes to the N of their position. Then 6-7 flashlights were observed. They engaged M79 fire and used arty illumination w negative sightings. The element relocated.

(7) 021600 BS731199 Team A and D, 1/50 Inf, loc 24 km NW of LZ English, in night laager, rec'd SA and AW and HE's fr an est 7 VC, 40m fr their pos. Fire was returned and then the en fled NW. Results were 6 US WIA. The Tm was extracted and gunships and arty expended in the area w unk results after extraction.

(8) 012130 ER 965920 Teams 34, 11 and 44, Co C (Ranger), 75th Inf, loc 8 km SE of LZ English, observed 2 VC, 50m to their W and movement was heard 80-100m to the N. At 2140 hours movement was observed on all sides and the en appeared to be probing the teams pos. At 2230 hours 5-7 VC were observed around the teams pos and the element engaged HE's and the en fled SE. At 2340 hours 1 VC was sighted and engaged M79 fire w unk results.

(9) 031800 BS882213 Team N, Co N (Ranger), 75th Inf, loc 20 km N of LZ English, was engaged by an en force of unk size fr 100m to the S and N. The fire was returned resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and heavy blood trails were found. 3 VC were found in blk P's w rucksacks and 1 weapon.

(10) 031700 BR969520 Teams 34, 11 and 44, Co C (Ranger), 75th Inf, loc 14 km S of LZ English, observed 2 VC dressed in khakis w AK-47's sitting on a trail resulting in 2 VC/NVA KIA. Movement was heard and the team moved to an LZ and was extracted. Arty and gunships expended in the area w unk results.

(11) 031440 BS845140 C/7/17, loc 13 km NW of LZ English, observed 3-5 indiv hiding in rocks and caves resulting in 3 VC/NVA KIA (BC) by gunships.

(12) 030657 BS914183 A Hawkeye Aft, loc 34 km NW of LZ English, adjusted arty on 1 VC/NVA resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC).

(13) 040900 BS874101 Hk 411, 4/503 Inf, loc 9 km N of LZ English, watering party was hit by a claymore detonated with a PRO-25 battery, resulting in 2 US KIA.

(14) 042020 BR 980794 Co A 1/50 Inf, loc 7 km NE of LZ Uplift, rec'd 1 satchel charge which exploded 50m from their perimeter which was believed to have been propelled by a smaller charge. Fire was returned w unk results.
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(15) 041910 BS 897243 Team N, Co N (Ranger), 75 Inf, loc 24 km N of LZ English, initiated contact on voices and checked the area, finding 1 rucksack. The en fled in an unk dir and the team was extracted at 1940 hrs fr BS897212.

(16) 041245 BR742844 Team 14, loc 22 km SW of LZ English, observed 3 VC following them and ambushed them at 20m resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA. The team moved to the contact area and saw 9-10 VC/NVA dragging the body away. The en fired on the team and the team returned fire *w unk results. Numerous blood trails were found leading N. The team moved to an LZ at BR742845. Results were one VC/NVA KIA (posa). (Co C (Ranger), 75 Inf).

(17) 040620 BR754939 FSB Frost, loc 13 km SE of LZ English, rec'd 1 HI or M79 rd which resulted in 1 US slightly WIA who was not extracted.

(18) 050430 BS948002 3d platoon, Co A, 2/503 Inf, loc 8 km E of LZ English, engaged 2 VC/NVA at 200m to their W resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 1 detainee and docus CIA. 2 VCS (1 male and 1 female) were caught running away and detained.

(19) 050555 BS958003 3d platoon, Co A, 2/503 Inf, loc 7½ km E of LZ English, reached a village and all the villagers began to run. A warning shot was fired and all except 1 stopped. 1 VC/NVA was engaged and killed.

(20) 051415 BS 962006 Hk 21 2/503 Inf, loc 7½ km B of LZ English, det 1 VC hamlet chief who had a pistol belt and 2x M26 Hs and 2 female VCS who were extracted. The male VCS told the element where a tunnel could be found. At 1600 hrs he took them to a tunnel at BS962009. As they were probing for the entrance a female appeared at the entrance and threw a Hg but no cas resulted. They engaged and killed the VC female. 3 more VC appeared at the tunnel entrance and 2 were wounded and all were captured. A trap door was fd and when it was opened an explosion occurred which resulted in 1 US KIA, 2 National Police KIA, 12 US WIA, and 1x US *w combat fatigue who were extracted. Enemy losses were 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 4 VC PONs and 2 detainees.

(21) 051740 BR991791 1st platoon, Co A, 1/50 Inf, loc 8 km NE of LZ Uplift, engaged 1 VC/NVA at 100m *w unk results. The en fled. The en were a green fatigue shirt and black shorts and carried a wpn. Several caves were fd in the area and the area was checked *w neg findings.

(22) 051845 BS834036 Team J, Co N (Ranger), 75 Inf, loc 2½ km NW of LZ English, engaged 4 VC/NVA who were moving down a trail 150m to their NW resulting in 4 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 1 M1 Carbine, 2 sets of web gear, 2 rucksacks and 5 lbs of docus CIA. The en returned fire wounding one US slightly. The team was extracted at 1910 hrs and a zone sweep was conducted by a1.y expending
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170 rds HE.

(23) 061350 BS765954 Hk 14A, loc 11 km SW of LZ English, fd 3 huts (3' x 20') which could hold 20 indiv near a trail and heard 3 indiv in a hut and engaged resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 1x M2 HE CIA, 1 magazine *w 20 rds CIA, 3 lbs of Docus CIA and extracted. (1/503 Inf)

(24) 060745 BS962009 Co A, 2/503 Inf, loc 8 km E of LZ English, observed a sampan *w 2 VC's. The VC's fled and the boat was checked finding 1 VC/NVA body.

(25) 060200 BS990101 The D Co CP, loc 9 km NNE of LZ English, heard propaganda broadcasting to the people of Tan Thanh (1) (H) to meet at the school house at BS990103. A patrol checked the area but fd no people and rec'd 30 rds of SA fire and 3 Hgs fr 40-50m to their N. Fire was returned and the en fled in an unk dir. Hk 448 was left at BS990103 and continued to observe. (4/503d Inf)

(26) 061220 BS705234 Team K, Co N, (Ranger), 75 Inf, loc 27 km NW of LZ English, observed 2x VC/NVA in blk PJs at BS715230. Arty engaged and the team observed a secondary explosion. Results were unk.

(27) 061600 BS5...4 Team D, Co N (Ranger), 75 Inf, loc 10 km NW of LZ English, observed 15x VC/NVA *w 2x wpns and rucksacks and engaged *w arty resulting in 2 KIA (poss). 1x secondary explosion was observed.

(28) 061625 BS743012 LOH Acft, loc 13 km W of LZ English, observed 5 VC/NVA *w 2 wpns. Guns expended *w unk results. 20 VC/NVA were observed fleeing into a cave area and gunships expended and 4 sorties of TAC AIR were conducted against BS742018 *w unk results.

(29) 060730 BS 710172 Red Raider 16, loc 25 km NW of LZ English, engaged 2 VC/NVA at 8m *w SA's resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC). The OP was extracted at 0750 hours.

(30) 071625 BR914375 The Scout Section, loc 12 km N of LZ Uplift, detonated a booby trapped M26 HI resulting in 1 US WIA who was extracted. (1/50 Inf)

(31) 071640 BR897863 The Recon Plat, loc 13 km S of LZ English, checked the area where a 2½ ton truck was ambushed on 6 June and fd expended AK-47, M79, M16, and .30 cal etgs. Sniper fire was rec'd fr the S at BR900855 and returned *w unk results. (1/50 Inf)

(32) 071705 BR905818 2d plat, Co B, 1/503 Inf, loc 5 km N of LZ Uplift, engaged 6 VC/NVA at 100m who were armed *w 2x AK-47s, 1x M16, and 2 carbines, wore civilian clothes. Results were 1 RF KIA and 1 US WIA. The en fled *w unk cas.
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(33) 071746 BR911811 The Scout Section, loc 20 km S of LZ English, engaged an est 12-15 VC/NVA resulting in 2 VC/NVA KIA (BC) fd at BR912794, 1 male VC (40 years old) was d/c and extracted who had frag wounds and no ID card. (1/50 Inf)

(34) 080110 BS87005 LZ English rec'd 4 rds of 82mm mort fire which impacted on the helicopter pad and 4 rds which landed outside the perimeter fr 100-300m. The mort fire came fr BS865014 and the area was engaged *w arty *w unk results. 3 rds of SA fire were rec'd at bunker #9 *w neg results.

(35) 080020 BS886113 The A Co CP, loc 10 km N of LZ English, rec'd 3 MG's and SA fire from 100m to their NW, resulting in 1 US WIA who was extracted. Fire was returned *w unk results. (4/503d Inf)

(36) 080052 BR924753 LZ Uplift, rec'd 8-10 rds of 82mm mort fire which resulted in 1 US slightly WIA and no damage. Counter-mort engaged suspected en firing pos *w unk results.

(37) 080105 BR936803 LZ Salem, loc 12½ km NNE of Phu My, rec'd 3 rds of 82mm mort fire which exploded on the SW portion of the perimeter. A counter-mort program was fired on *w unk results.

(38) 081620 BR895865 2 veh fr 1/50 Inf and 37 Fr Co C 75 Inf at Bridge #8, loc 13 km S of LZ English, rec'd en fire fr 100m fr both sides of the road including SA, AW, and B-40 rockets. The Scout Section reacted and aty engaged the en *w unk results.

(39) 080855 BS813109 Teams D and L, Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 13 km NW of LZ English, observed 5-7 VC/NVA dressed in blk PJs *w wpns. The en initiated contact and fire was returned resulting in 1 US WIA and 2 VC/NVA KIA (poss).

(40) 072220 BR995656 LZ Crystal, loc 9 km SW of LZ Uplift, rec'd 4 catapulted satchel charges fr an unk dir resulting in 1 ARVN WIA who was extracted. Arty engaged suspected en loc *w unk results.

(41) 091745 BS975002 Team 21 Co C (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 11 km W of LZ English, observed 5 VC/NVA wearing blk PJ's, 1200m to their NNW. Arty engaged the en resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (poss).

(42) 091430 BS332860 LOH Acft, 2/7/17 Air Cav, loc 4 km NW of Uplift, observed 1 indiv hiding something and the VC fled, and was engaged and resulted in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC).

(43) 091550 BR982908 A Hawkeye Acft, 17 km NE of LZ Uplift, adjusting Naval gunfire fr the USS Rogers, observed an individual throw something fr a
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cave. A small secondary explosion occurred resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (poss).

(44) 100530 BS953006 Hk 21k, 2/503 Inf, loc 7 km E of LZ English, spotted 1 VC female moving 350m from their pos. She was ordered to halt but continued to flee and was engaged resulting in 1 VC female KIA. The indiv had no ID card.

(45) 101405 BS865018 Hk 22A, lon ½ km NW of LZ English, rec'd SA fire from 2 VC/NVA 250m to their SW. Fire was returned with unk results. There was 1 US WIA from injuries sustained trying to avoid the en fire. (2/503 Inf)

(46) 105525 BS867016 Co B, loc 1 km W of LZ English, had 1 indiv from 1st Plat 173 Engr Co WIA fr a booby trapped SA ctg who was extracted. (2/503 Inf)

(47) 101530 BR830983 Hk 25F, loc 4 km W of LZ English, had engaged 1 VC/NVA who fled after being told to stop. He was WIA and continued to flee and was engaged again resulting in 1 VC/NVA (BC). 3 rds of AK-47 ammo were found on the body.

(48) 100115 BR933759 Elements at Bridge #8, 1/50 Inf, loc 1 km NW of LZ Uplift, rec'd a HE from an en force of unk resulting in 1 US WIA who was extracted.

(49) 101155 BS781192 Team N Cm (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 22 km N of LZ English, had 2 US WIA from punji stakes at infiltration and the team was extracted.

(50) 101725 BS818114 Team 21, Co C (Ranger), 75 Inf, loc 11 km NW of LZ English, initiated contact with 7 VC/NVA from 150m range, resulting in 1 VC KIA and 1 VC WIA who escaped. The VC were blk PJs with rucksacks and 5 vpns. 3 VC fled N and 2 fled S after returning fire. Gunships and arty expended in the area with unk results. The team was extracted at 1808 hours fr BS806117.

(51) 101445 BR758997 Team 21, Co C (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 11 km W of LZ English, observed 2 VC/NVA with AK-47s and blk PJs following the team. They ambushed the VC at 400m with unk results and the VC returned fire and fled NW. C/7/17 was inserted. Results were 1 VC/NVA KIA (poss).

(52) 100645 CO722413 2nd Plat of the Prov Co, loc 10 km SW of Tuy Hoa, detonated a mine which blew off the road wheels on the left side of 1 APC.

(53) 092100 BR8569149 B Btry, 3/319 Arty, at LZ Two Bits, loc 5½ km SW of LZ English, rec'd 1 HE from an en force of unk size which exploded 20m N of their perimeter. Hand flares were used to illum with neg results. At 2145 hours another HE was rec'd at the same loc and the area was again illum with neg results.
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(54) 100215 BS915145 LZ Lowboy, loc 13km NNE of LZ English, rec'd 4 rds of M79 fire fr the S and E which resulted in 1 US WIA and 1 US KIA.

(55) 102300 BS909101 Hk 446, 4/503Inf, loc 2 km E of LZ English, heard movement to their NW and NE and rec'd 1 rd of SA fire fr 10m to their NE. They initiated an ambush and withdrew to the CP at 2235 hours. The area WB checked on 11 June. En cas were unkn.

(56) 112230 BS909101 The D Co CP, 4/503Inf, loc 10 km NE of LZ English, rec'd 1 M26 HG fr their N which knocked out their telephone line. Fire was returned with unk results.

(57) 111345 BR 613835 Team 41, Co C (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 31 km SW of LZ English, was being inserted and the UH-1H insertion acft rec'd SA fire fr 75m to their N fr an est VC/NVA *w unk results. Fire was returned by gunships and doorgunners, *w unk results.

(58) 110155 CQ 065435 1st plat, Provincial Tank Co, loc 10 km WSW of Tuy Hoa, collocated *w 1 plat of 2d Co 1/47 ARVN rec'd a heavy volume of fire, consisting of SA, AW, B-40 rocket and 57mm RR fire, fr an en force of unk size fr 400m to the NE. The heavy volume of fire decreased at 0210 but sporadic fire continued. The 2d Co 1/47 ARVN arrived at 0215 hours and 2d Plat Prov Tank Co arrived at 0230 hours and 3d Plat Prov Tank Co arrived at 0250 hours. Arty and gunships engaged with unk results. Results were 2 US KIA, 3 US WIA who were extracted at 0330 hours, 9 ARVN WIA, extracted at 0410 and 1 APC destroyed and 1 damaged.

(59) 121630 BS944002 Hk 21I, 2/503Inf, loc 6 km E of LZ English, rec'd 4 rds of SA fire fr an est VC/NVA fr 200m range The Hk team maneuvered and engaged the en at 150m resulting in 1 female VC KIA and 1 US WIA who was extracted. The en fled NE. The area was checked and a bunker was fd and a HG thrown inside which caused a small secondary explosion.

(60) 122030 BS938998 Hk 21C, loc 6 km WSW of LZ English, engaged 2 VC/NVA at 25m *w resulting in 2 VC/NVA KIA, 1 rucksack, 2 hammocks, 2 civ radios, rice, notebooks, CIA. The en wore green fatigues and shorts.

(61) 12093 BS91310G C patrol fr Hk 449, 4/503Inf, loc 9 km NNE of LZ English, was moving E and rec'd 20-30 rds of SA fire and returned fire *w unk results. The en fled S and the tm followed ... spotted 3 VC/NVA in a boat and engaged *w unk results and the en returned fire resulting in 1 US WIA who was extracted. The MINI-CAV expended on suspected en loc *w unk results. The en left the boat and 1 VC/NVA.
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(62) 121100 BS886105 Co A, loc 10 km N of LZ English, observed 1 VC/NVA and engaged w 1x HG resulting in 1 VC/NVA WIA and extracted.

(63) 121950 BS885158 Hk 438, 4/503Inf, loc 15 km N of LZ English, rec'd SA fire fr 5 VC/NVA fr 100- 150m to their NW resulting in 1 US WIA who was extracted. Hk 437, 439, 435, and 436 swept the area w neg findings.

(64) 121130 BR958799 An APC from Co A, 1/50 Inf, loc 5 km NE of LZ Uplift, hit a mine which destroyed the APC and resulted in 1 US KIA, 5 US WIA and 1 RF WIA. The WIA were extracted.

(65) 121630 BS809105 Team D, Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 10 km NW of LZ English, engaged 10 VC/NVA w 5 wpns and rucksacks at 300m resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA.

(66) 122216 BS909101 Hk449, 4/503 Inf, 1 km NNE of LZ English, rec'd M79 and 20 rds of SA fire fr 200m to their E. Fire was returned w unk results. At 2222 hours 2 rds of M79 fire were received which resulted in 4 RFs WIA which were extracted at 2255 hours.

(67) 131925 BR853882 Hk 13G2, loc 12 km SSW of LZ English, observed 3 VCS and ordered them to halt. The VC began to run and warning shots were fired. 2 VC halted and were detained and were extracted on 14 Jun. 1 VCS escaped NE.

(68) 130747 BS946003 Hk 21L, 2/503 Inf, loc 6 km E of LZ English, engaged 3 VC/NVA w 5 carbines dressed in blk PJs at 200m. The en returned fire and broke contact at 0757 hours and fled E.

(69) 131500 BS914968 Hk 25B, 2/503 Inf, loc 6 km SE of LZ English, engaged one indiv who was fleeing S at 150 m resulting in 1 detainee. The VC had green fatigues, rucksack and flashlight. He was extracted for medical treatment and interrogation.

(70) 131017 BS908117 Hk 54, 4/503 Inf, loc 12 km NNE of LZ English, detonated a booby trapped M26 HE resulting in 2 US WIA who were extracted.

(71) 131725 BS915118 Co D, 4/503 Inf, loc 11 km N of LZ English, had 3 US WIA fr a command detonated claymore. The WIA were extracted.

(72) 131105 BS886113 3d plat Co D, 4/503 Inf, loc 12 km NE of LZ English, engaged 1 VC who was attempting to flee resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC).

(73) 131035 BS888852 Tm 34, Co C (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 30 km SSE of LZ English, engaged 1 VC female w rucksack who was moving S on a trail, resulting

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in 1 VC female KIA. The range was 100m. The rucksack contained rice. The ton was extracted.

(74) 141052 BS367147 3d plat Co E, 4/503 Inf, loc 13 km NW of LZ English, engaged an est VC sqd 150m fr their pos, resulting in 1 VC WIA who escaped. The en flled E at 1110 hours.

(75) 142055 BS924119 RX2466, 4/503 Inf, loc 11 km NE of LZ English, hod command controlled claymore detonated which resulted in 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA who were extracted. 3 female VCS were det and W3 extracted.

(76) 141120 BS968874 2d plat Co B, 1/50 Inf, loc 11 km NW of English, detonated an unk type of mine which resulted in 4 US WIA who were extracted.

(77) 132110 BS978215 Rx 52B, 4/503 Inf, loc 7 km NE of LZ Uplift, engaged 3 indiv who were approaching their laager site and wounded them. They were fd to be a female (28), a man (50), and a 3 year old child. They were extracted for medical treatment and ... adults w3 questioned.

(78) 132315 BS979999 Correction to report in INSTUM 164, reference 1/50 Inf fire was returned and the area was checked finding 1 VC KIA and 3 Chicom HIs CIA.

(79) 151005 BS952007 Co A CP and 2d plat, 2/503 Inf, loc 6 km E of LZ English, had just completed search of An Nghiep (E) and moved E and rec'd fire fr an est 9 VC/NVA fr 125m to their N, 150m to their E and 75m to their S. The fire was returned and during maneuever there was 1 US WIA who was extracted 1826 hours. Gunships expended *w unk results & the area was checked w neg res.

(80) 160130 BS904974 The D Co CP and 24th and 112 PF plats, loc 4 km SE of LZ English, rec'd SA fire fr 2-3 VC/NVA 200m to their NE and the 24th and 112th PF plats returned fire. The en broke contact and fled at 0145 hours. (2/503 inf)

(81) 160645 BS995001 Co A, 2/503 Inf, loc 7 km E of LZ English, rec'd SA fire fr 2-3 VC/NVA 200m to their S which resulted in 1 US WIA whr. was extracted.

(82) 161840 BS995001 Rk 21A, 2/503 Inf, loc 6½ km W of LZ English, engaged 2 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA. The 2 VC were observed 200m to their W wearing blue clothing. 1 VCS was det trying to flee area.
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AVNRC/SC/MD

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(83) 161211 BR658683 1st plat Co B, loc 11 km NE of LZ English, engaged 1 VC who was attempting to flee resulting in 1 VC KIA. 3 other VCs (1 male and 2 females) in the same area were dat and extracted for interrogation. (1/50 Inf)

(84) 161710 BR754954 Team 26, Co C (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 13 km W of LZ English, engaged 10 VC 70m to their SW. 2 VC were observed w rucksacks and 2 w 1x AK-47 and 1x carbine. SA fire was rec'd fr 1000 to the S at 1805 hours. Results were 1 VC KIA and 2 bags of food, 1x wallet, and some docs CIA which were extracted.

(85) 162115 BS965101 Hk48, 4/503 Inf, loc 9 km NE of LZ English, observed 1 VC carrying a claymore walking toward them. 75m fr their pos the sn hid behind a tree and was engaged w unk results. The area was checked w unk results.

(86) 170005 BS73011 At LZ English, 2/503 Inf, there were 5 explosions on the helicopter pad fr homemade bombs and Chicon HIs which destroyed 1 heli-copter, heavily damaged 1 and lightly damaged 1. At 0007 a satchel charge destroyed 70C 500 resulting in 4 US WIA. At 0001 hours C and N Co (Ranger) 75 Inf rec'd 40 rds rocket fire res in 6 US WIA. At 0008 bunker 15 rec'd M79 fire fr the garbage dump and returned fire w unk results. At 0010 hours continuous illus and reaction forces were in place. At 0018 bunker 16A, 17, and 18 rec'd M79 fire fr the garbage dump and 0023 hours bunker 14 rec'd several grenades fr their rear, afew of which were duds. At 0026 bunker12 saw movement near the wire and rec'd explosion near the bunker. Final casualty report was 16 US WIA.

(87) 170245 BS796101 Hk 21F, 2/503 Inf, loc 4 km SE of LZ English, detonated a booby trapped 81mm mortar resulting in 2 US WIA who were extracted.

(88) 170830 BS933001 Hk 21H, 2/503 Inf, loc 6 km E of LZ English, was maneuvering around Dinh Cong (H) when the RD tm and PSIF from the hamlet fired on them resulting in 3 US WIA who were extracted. No fire was returned.

(89) 171620 BR772791 Team 16, Co C (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 23 km SW of LZ English, engaged 6-8 VC at 25m resulting in 3 VC KIA. The en fled N. The en had blk FJ's on and carried AR's.

(90) 162335 BS968335 Hk 51, 1/50 Inf, loc 9½ km NE of LZ Uplift, engaged a suspected en loc and 1 ricochet rd resulted in 1 US WIA who was extracted.

(91) 181037 BR845831 Hk 15A, 1/503 Inf, loc 11 NW of LZ Uplift, observed 3 VC/NVA moving SE, dressed in blk FJ's and khakis w 1x AK-47. Contact was initiated at 200m resulting in 1 VC KIA (poss). The en fled S carrying the KIA and did not return fire.
AVHE-SC/46D

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(93) 181500 BS906106 Hk 446, 1/503 Inf, loc 9 km N of LZ English, rec'd 50 rds of SA fire fr their NW returned fire resulting in 1 VC KIA and 2 WIA detainees. 3 other VCS were det resulting in 5 det extracted.

(94) 181910 BS364105 Hk 461, 1/503 Inf, loc 9+ N of LZ English, rec'd SA/AW fire fr 5-6 VC/NVA fr 300m to their E and SE. Fire was returned resulting in 1 US WIA who was extracted. Gunships expended *w unk results.

(95) 181705 BR903857 A jeep fr Bde HHC, loc 18 km N of Phu My, was ambushed by 4-5 VC *w SA and AW fire fr both sides of QL-1 resulting in one US KIA and 2 US WIA. Fire was returned and the Scout Section swept the area *w neg findings.

(96) 181040 BR766793 Team 16, Co C (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 15 km W of LZ Uplift, observed 2 VC/NVA *w wpns and initiated contact at 40 m resulting in 2 VC KIA. There were no friendly cas. Arty engaged the area after extraction.

(97) 181350 BR704846 Tm 21, CoG (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 24 km SW of LZ English, observed 1 VC who fled SW. 2 VC were heard talking 85m fr their pos. 2 VC were observed 50m S of their pos and engaged *w unk results. An est en plat surrounded the tm. The contact lasted 1½ hours *w sporadic fire being exchanged. Gunships expended *w 1 VC KIA and the tm killed 1 VC enroute to an LZ. Arty engaged the area after extraction *w unk results.

(98) 191140 BR763875 The C&C Acft, 1/503 Inf, loc 18 km SW of LZ English, rec'd 2 rds of SA fire fr their W while trying to extract WIA fr Ranger Tm 12.

(99) 190600 BR965827 Hk51, 1/50 Inf, loc 8 km NE of LZ Uplift, rec'd sniper fire fr their E and returned fire. 4 VC were seen running E and pursued 700m *w neg results.

(100) 191045 BR756677 Tm 12, Co C (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 18 km SW of LZ English, was moving up hill to have a sick man extracted when 1 man was WIA by an M26 booby trap and rec'd 3 rds of SA fire for 150m. There was 1 US WIA. The team was extracted at 1340 hours. Gunships expended *w unk results after the C&C Acft of 1/503 Inf rec'd SA fire while trying to extract the WIA.

(101) 191130 BR691881 Team 34, Co C (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 21 km SW of LZ English, observed 2 VC/NVA *w HIs in a hut under some rocks resulting in 1 VC KIA (3C) and 1 VC KIA (poss). The area was searched and a 100 man basecamp was fd. Tunnels, huts inside caves and firing pos under rocks were fd. Air-strikes and arty engaged the area and food, medical supplies, 3 HIs, docus and baskets were fd and extracted.
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AV8R_SC/MWD

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(102) 200820 BS871153 3d plat Co C, 4/503 Inf, loc 13 km N of LZ English, initiated contact with an enemy force of unk size 200 m to their NW. The VC returned fire w M79s and AW fire. Results were 2 US WIA. The en fled N and the area was searched w unk results.

(103) 200957 BS871399 3d plat Co C, 4/503 Inf, 12 km N of LZ English, observed 2 male VCS flee W. The area was searched and 2 female VCS fled resulting in 1 VC KIA and 1 det WIA and extracted.

(104) 201400 BS761115 Gunships, C/7/17 Air Cav, loc 13 km NW of English, rec'd SA fire and expended resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC).

(105) 201535 BR94509 A Hawkeye Acft, loc 10½ km NW of LZ Uplift, observed 3 VC flee into a bunker and engaged w arty resulting in 3 VC/NVA KIA.

(106) 2:0042 BS890190 Hk 449, 4/503 Inf, loc 10 km NE of LZ English, heard movement 75 m NE of their pos. The element threw a tripflare for illum. There was neg sightings and the trip flare started a fire causing 3x explosions. The elem is not sure what caused them.

(107) 211030 BS938122 Hk 122, 4/503 Inf, loc 14 km NE of LZ English, observed 1x VN male at 50 m and fired shots to halt. Indiv ran into cave and elem stayed at entrance. 1x VN escaped by other exit. Elem engaged indiv w SA fire at 300 m. En believed to have fallen in deep water hole. Elem requested CS and gas masks for cave and divers to check hole. Indiv body was fd without wpn. Res 1x VC/NVA KIA (BC).

(108) 214640 BS893144 B/4/503, loc 10 km N of LZ English, had 1x US trip a 155mm boobytrapped rd resulting in 1x US KIA. Crater 6' x 4' deep.

(109) 212220 BS924126 Hk 441, 4/503 Inf, loc 11½ m NE of LZ English, rec'd 30 rds of AW fire and 2 rds of M79 Fire fr 3 est VC 200 m W of their pos. Elem returned fire w SA and M79s. At 2225 contact ceased. At 2226 en reinstated contact w en and 40 rds of sniper fire were received fr 300 m W of their pos. Contact ceased at 2232 hours. the WIA were extracted.

(110) 211200 BR892840 Scopes, 1/50 Inf, 17 km S of LZ English, fd 1x VC KIA (BC) by US arty while reacting to a 320 HF Co in contact w an est VC plat. The H/F's CIA 400-600 lb rice.

(111) 212000 BR952820 Hk 52B (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 20 km N of LZ English, engaged 3 VC at a distance of 20 m. Res VC WIA (poss). VC wearing blk PJ's. Tm observed 1x AK-47. Gunships supported and VC fled in unk dir.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

(112) 211125 BS887196 Tm N, Co M (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 20 km N of LZ English, initiated contact w 3-5 VC w wpns, HGs and blk F's at 20m. VC fled in an unk dir. Tm pursued and made contact'3 times. Contact broke and tm was extracted. Gunships supported.

(113) 211745 BS822327 Tm M, Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 21½ km NNW of LZ English, observed 6x moving SE at BS 824226. All 16 indiv had wpns and rucksacks. At 1755 hrs tm observed 16x VC moving SE into woodline at same loc the previous sighting was made. Arty fired 93 HE rds on suspected en loc.

(114) 211137 BS766932 Hk 14C 1/503 Inf, loc 12 km S of LZ English, observed 4 VC sitting on a hooch. The indx fled N and the elem engaged w SA resulting in one 1x VC female KIA. 1 homemade print press, 1x .45 cal pistol, 1x M1 carbine, 12 lb of docus, 2x canteens, 1x cup and cover,10x lb of rifle, 2x NVA rucksacks CIA. Hooch and tunnel were destroyed. The body and equipment were extracted.

(115) 220400 BS922003 B Co OP, 2/503 Inf, loc 4 km SE of LZ English, observed 3 VC/NVA moving between the CP and OP 75m outside of perimeter. The en engaged the CP w SA fire. Results were 1x RF slightly WIA.

(116) 220900 BS859112 Hk 417, 4/503 Inf, loc 10 km NW of LZ English, searched area and had rec'd and returned fire on the night of 21 Jun and fd 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 2 VC/NVA slightly WIA . The 2 VC/NVA WIA were extracted.

(117) 221015 BR957873 2d plat B Co, 1/50 Inf, loc 12 km N of LZ Uplift, rec'd SA fire and M79 rds fr unk size VC force. Contact broke and en fled in an unk dir. Results were 2x US WIA and 1x RF WIA.

(118) 221845 BS826225 Tm N, Co M (Ranger) 74 Inf, loc 21 km N of LZ English, observed 3 VC moving SE carrying rucksacks. Arty fired on target w unk results. At 1900 Tm observed 10 VC moving SE on a trail at BS831226. The en wore blk F's. 9 indiv carried rucksacks and 6 indiv had wpns. Arty fired on target resulting in 3 VC/NVA KIA and 1x VC/NVA KIA (poss) whose body was seen thrown by blast but neg observation could be made on body.

(119) 222035 BS861008 Tm 21, Co C (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 1 km W of LZ English, observed 2 VC moving W to E carrying rucksacks 74m S of their pos. At 2045 hours the Tm heard noises and movements NE of their pos which sounded like mortar tubes and wpns clearing shrubs. At 2047 the Tm rec'd M79 rds and SA fire fr NE and returned fire w SA and M79. Tm believed that 60mm mort rd was rec'd by them fr SW. Contact was sporadic for 40 min resulting in 1 US WIA fr SA. Tm was extracted at 2145 hours. Gunships and arty fired on suspected en loc w unk results.
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(120) 221115 BR958885 Hawkeye, loc 15 km N of LZ Uplift, adjusted arty on 2 VC/NVA resulting in 1x VC/NVA (kia) and 1x spiderhole uncovered.

(121) 231000 BS878159 Hk 431, 4/503 Inf, loc 18 km N of LZ English, tripped 1x M26 HE resulted in 3 US slightly WIA. No dustoff was requested.

(122) 231730 BS860116 3d plat Co A, 4/503 Inf, loc 10 km N of LZ English, while on patrol moving N fr CP, rec'd 5-8 Chicom HIs and SA fire fr 200m E and W fr an unk size VC force. Force was never sighted by elem but SA fire was returned in both directions resulting in 4 US WIA. Dustoff completed at 1820 hours.

(123) 231020 BR891847 B/1/503 Inf, loc 16 km S of LZ English, engaged 2x VC/NVA *w SA as they were fleeing, resulting in 1x VC WIA CIA *w a NVA helmet and rucksack, but no wpns.

(124) 231300 BS821995 1m K Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 20 km N of LZ English, while moving down a trail, observed a VC observing them fr a tree. Elem went into anearby village to apprehend detainees. Elem searched huts and detained 3 VCS (males) of military ages. People began to flee and warning shots were fired. Elem rec'd SA fire fr vic BS849193 and returned fire resulting in 1 VC KIA. Elem rec'd more SA fire and 2x VCS detainees attempted to escape resulting in 2 more VC/NVA KIA. The contact resulted in 3 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 1 VCS WIA, 11 detainees, 5x NVA webgear and 6x M26 HEs CIA.

(125) 241152 BS857793 Hk 154 1/503 Inf, loc 11 km WW of LZ Uplift, made contact *w an on force of unk size resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA and 1 M1 rifle CIA. The en fired E. Arty fired *w unk results and gunships expended *w unk results. Hawkeye checked the bunker and fd 6 bunkers *w light OHC, 1x hut (15'x20') which was camouflaged and 5 foxholes. The Aero-Rifle Plat was inserted at 1244 hours to check the area. At BR839796 patches of marijuana were fd.

(126) 240420 BR963005 Hk216, 2/503 Inf, loc 7 km E of LZ English made contact *w 3 VC/NVA at 35m which resulted in 1 VC/ KIA (BC). The group was lead by a female.

(127) 241605 BS811152 Hk 437, loc 14 km N of LZ English, fd 2x M26 HIs boobytrapped which were destroyed in place. Also fd was a punji stake pit approx 3' in diameter which resulted in 1 US slightly WIA. Indiv was not extracted.

(128) 242007 BR90794 A Co CP, 1/50 Inf, loc 13 km NE o. LZ English, rec'd 1x satchel charge thrown at them fr their SE. Elem reacted *w organic wpns resulting in neg cas or damage.

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(129) Tm 25, Co C (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 25 km SW of LZ English, engaged 1x VC/NVA moving S on a trail. 3-6 more VC/NVA reinforced the en fr the S and then fled N. The contact resulted in 1 VC/NVA WIA CIA, 1x M1 carbine CIA, 1x rucksack and documents CIA. The Tm was extracted at 0943 hrs and arty gunships expended. An airstrike was conducted at 1150 hrs in vic grid BR674853. The eng resulted in 2 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 1x VC/NVA KIA (poss).

(130) 241445 BR665782 Tm 34, Co C (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 31 km SW of LZ English, heard movement and observed 8-10 indiv in a stream bed. The en initiated contact w SA fire w what was believed to be SKS wpns and the elem returned fire w SA fire, MG and claymores. The en fled NW resulting in 1x VC/NVA CIA.

(131) 231320 BR645908 A Hawkeye Acft, loc 24 km SW of LZ English, observed 4 VC/NVA and engaged w arty resulting in 4 VC/NVA KIA. (poss). 3/319th

(132) 250715 BS918093 D Co, 4/503 Inf, loc 11 NNE of LZ English, observed an unk size VC/NVA force fleeing to the SE. The elem engaged w SA fire resulting in 4x VC/NVA KIA (BC), 2x VC WIA CIA, 1x M16, 1x M1 carbine, 2x SKSs, 4 M26 HEs, 1x Chicon HE, 100 rds .30 cal ammo, 6x M16 magazines w 108 rds, 1x flashlight, 5x US pistols, 2x Hammocks, ARVN uniforms, assorted clothing and medicine CIA.

(133) 251030 BS910097 D Co, 4/503 Inf, loc 9 km NE of LZ English, engaged 3 VC at 150m w SA fire resulting in 1 VC female KIA. The other two fled the area and were pursed w neg results.

(134) 251245 BS910091 D Co, 4/503 Inf, loc 8 km N of LZ English, ambushed 3 VC carrying carbines and wearing blk PJs resulting in 1 VC WIA but escaped. Two en fled N and 1 fled S and pursued w neg results.

(135) 252145 BR989832 Rk 52A, 1/50 Inf, loc 15 km SE of LZ English, rec'd SA fire fr an unk size force at 150m S and SW and heard 2 explosions believed to be satchel charges or B-40 rockets. Fire was returned and contact broke at 2150 hrs resulting in neg cas or damage.

(136) 251715 BS813108 Tm B Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 13 km SW of LZ English, initiated contact w 1 VC/NVA carrying a rucksack and dressed in brown khakis at 200m resulting in 1 VC/NVA WIA but escaped to the NW. The Tm was extracted at 1807 fr grid BS806805.

(137) 251900 BS826225 Tm J Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 21 km NW of LZ English, engaged 4 VC w at 350m W of Tm's loc moving fr N to S, resulting in 2 VC KIA and 2 VC WIA but escaped. The en was carrying 2 wpns and each had a rucksack. The elem was unable to move to site and recover because of heavy
ground fog which prevented extraction until morning. Arty was fired in the area throughout the night.

(138) 26:035 BS934005 Hk 21A, 2/503 Inf, loc 5km E of LZ English, initiated contact: w 2x VC/NVA at 25m. The en was moving N w no wpns and wearing blue shirts and pants, carrying pistol belts, web gear and medical supplies. The contact resulted in 1x VC KIA and 1x VC and equipment CIA, who was extracted at 1930 hrs for interrogation. During initial questioning the indiv stated that the 1x VC KIA was a guerrilla leader and medic of A-2 unit of An Nhiep (H). He also stated that there were two VC units working in the hamlet, one consisting of 23x VC. Indiv is to be further interrogated.

(139) 262030 BS909101 Hk449, 4/503 Inf, loc 10 km NE of LZ English, observed movement in old torn down houses. The elem threw frag grenades which resulted in a secondary explosion believed to be a 105mm boobytrap resulting in neg cas.

(140) 261830 BR978782 Hk12C, loc 6 km NE of LZ English, initiated contact w 11 VC (1x male and 10x female) at 250m to their E. The en fled SE and as they moved they dropped 3x M79 rds, 2x rucksacks, 1x NVA pistol belt, medical supplies, salt tablets and personal items. The elem pursued the en at 500m into a village where they lost contact at 1845 hours.

(141) 261830 BS826223 Tm K, Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 21 km NW of LZ English, observed 11x VC/NVA moving fr N to S. (7x wearing brown khaki unis, and 4x wearing blk PJs). The en were carrying 8x wpns and 8x rucksacks. Arty was fired and at 1840 hrs the Tm heard screams and moans fr the area. The area was checked at first light on Jun. 27.

(142) 270857 BR769948 Hk 14C, 1/503 Inf, loc 13 km SW of LZ English, engaged 1x VC/NVA at a stream at 75m resulting in 1x VC/NVA WIA CIA. After being wounded the indiv screamed "Chieu Hoi". The indiv was wearing gray PJs and Ho Chi Minh sandals and carrying no wpn or equipment.

(143) 271828 BR835773 Hk 14A, 1/503 Inf, loc 23 km SW of LZ English, observed 4 VC moving NE. No wpns were observed but 1 VC was carrying equipment. At 1852 hrs 4 VC were observed moving SE, and joined the first elem. Arty engaged and rds were observed falling w/10m of target loc w/ink results.

(144) 276620 BS665114 Co A, 4/503 Inf, loc 11 km N of LZ English, while enroute to the condon and sweep area observed 1x VC fleeing to the S. Warning shots were fired but the suspect continued to flee resulting in 1x VCS WIA. Individual was dusted off and detained.

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(145) 27/30 BS875105 2 plat Co B, 4/503 Inf, acting on information received for a VN civilian that the area was boobytrapped & destroyed in place by the VC. At 1340 hours the elem destroyed 500 en placed mines & took BS 875105. Element had a boobytrapped 105mm rd grid BS 874099 but did not destroy because of lack of sureness. The area was marked for the EOD to destroy at a later time. At 1600 hrs a booby trapped M79 ra was tripped which resulted in 1x US WIA who was extracted by a C&C Act. The area was marked and the element withdrew.

(146) 27/550 BS859148 2 plat Co B, 4/503 Inf, loc 13 km N of LZ English, observed 4x VCS fleeing N at 100m. Warning shots were fired but the indiv did not stop resulting in 1x VCS WIA who was extracted but later died. The area was further checked and the elem destroyed 9 VC who were held and screened but released.

(147) 27/815 BR988796 Co B, 1/503 Inf, loc 8 km N of LZ Uplift, engaged 3 VC w SA fire at 200m resulting in 1x VC KIA. 1 rucksack w rice, 1 US jungle hat and indiv clothes were captured.

(148) 27/620 BR987773 Co B, 1/503 Inf, loc 6 km N of LZ Uplift, observed 2 VC w wpns at 800m fr CP. An elem moved out and engaged the en at 200m resulting in 1 VC KIA and 1 SSK CIA. 2 VC fled as the elem pursued w neg results.

(149) 27/1040 BR765855 Tk 44, loc 20 km SW of LZ English, rec'd 4 rds of SA fire fr their SE and arty engaged the area w unk results. 10 min later Tk 44 rec'd more SA fire as 6 VC w SSK wpns dressed in khakis w rucksacks were observed at 50-100m S. The Tk initiated contact resulting in 1x VC KIA (poss). The en returned fire and fled S. Gunships expended in the area as the Tk was extracted. Artillery engaged the area w unk results.

(150) 28/15 BR8645800 Hk 13B, 1/503 Inf, loc 15 km S of LZ English, fd 4x fresh graves which contained 4x VC KIA (BC). Also fd was a small amt of rice, 1x M79 bandoleer, 2x M16 magazines and 2x well cultivated fields containing vegetables and pineapples.

(151) 28/22 BR875041 Bunker #21, loc at LZ English, observed 2x indiv at 50-100m moving outside of the perimeter at 2305 rec'd 1x M79 rd which landed between Bunker #19 and Bunker #20 w neg cas or dam. Bunker #21 returned SA fire as illum was fired w neg results.

(152) 29/14 BR854793 Hk 150, 1/503 Inf, loc 22 km S of LZ English, observed 1x VC wearing green PJs and carrying a rucksack and moving W and engaged w SA fire at 50m resulting in 1x VC KIA. The rucksack contained 1 pr of PJs, a small amt of rice, marijuana and 3 VN books. At 1527 hrs the elem observed 2x VC at a distance of 50-75m and engaged w SA fire. The en fled without returning fire. The elem was extracted at 1609 as arty and gunships expended in the area w unk results.
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(153) 290545 BS928013 Hx 2I1, 2/503 Inf, loc 4km N of LZ English, engaged 2x VC w SA fire at 400m result in 1x VC KIA and 1x VC CIA. Also 1x rucksack was captured containing pen and paper, 1x hammock and 1x M26 HE. The en were wearing green fatigues.

(154) 290620 BS990813 Hx 2/503 Inf, loc 4 km E of LZ English, engaged 1x VC/NVA fleeing wearing green fatigues and a jungle hat with fire at 400m, resulting in 1x VC/NVA KIA.

(155) 290700 BS992815 Hx 2/503 Inf, loc 4 km E of LZ English, engaged 2x VC/NVA with SA fire, at 75m resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA and the capture of one pistol belt, and 2x frag HEs. The en were wearing blue and tan unis as 1x VC fled NE and escaped with neg results.

(156) 291540 BR924995 B Co, 2/503 Inf, loc 5 km E of LZ English, observed 3x explosions vic BR927995. During the time the MINI-BASE reported hearing the rds pass overhead and impact at the same time. Both elem believed the explosions to be B-40 rds. Coordination was made with ARVN sources and confirmed to be en fire. An elem moved to the loc where the rds were expended and the area was searched with neg results.

(157) 300333 BR923910 Hx 1303, 1/503 Inf, loc 10 km SW of LZ English, observed 1x sampan moving S down river and engaged with SA fire resulting in 1x VC KIA. The victim was carrying no vpn, equipment, or ID card.

(158) 301450 BS868105 Hx 415, 4/503 Inf, loc 10 km N of LZ English, rec'd fire from unk size en force to their S and returned with SA fire as contact broke at 1455. A helicopter was on statior and rec'd SA fire and observed 1x airburst fr vic BS869104. MINI-CAV expended in area with neg results.

(159) 302145 BS868105 Hx 412, 4/503 Inf, loc 10 km N of LZ English, observed movement at 10Om W of their pos and engaged with SA fire. Elem checked the area and found 1x VCS male (age 50) with frag wounds in right shoulder and without ID card. Suspect willbe extracted to Tam Quan Dist Hqs on 1 Jul.

(160) 300725 BR964866 1/50 Inf, loc 11 km NE of LZ Uplift rec'd 15-20 rds of AK-47 fire fr NW of their pos which resulted in 1x US WIA who was dusted off. At 0745 a C&C ship and B Co checked the area and observed 1x VCS fleeing who was det. Also observed were 3-4 indiv who ran into a hut. They were questioned but released as innocent civilians.

(161) 301025 BR964840 Hx 51, 1/50 Inf, loc 10 km NE of LZ Uplift, had a command detonated claymore blast on elem resulted in 1x US slightly WIA who was dusted off. The elem made a sweep of the area and detained 3 VCS (2x females and 1 male) who were extracted for interrogation.

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(162) 301030 BR002806 3 plat B/1/503 Inf, loc 9 km NE of LZ Uplift, observed 1x VCS wearing gray pants and blk shirt. The elem commanded the indiv to halt and fired warning shots, but the suspect continued to flee resulting in 1x VC KIA. 1x civ transistor radio, 1x hammock, and a deck of cards captured.

(163)301055 BR99823 3d plat B/1/503, loc 10 km NE of Uplift, observed 3x VC with 2x AK-47e and 1x M16 rifle at 150m and engaged them. The en did not return fire but fled SE and escaped. Area was checked and a blood trail was fd w neg results.

(164) 301155 BR985843 Hk 51, 1/503 Inf, loc 11m NE of LZ Uplift, rec'd SA fire and returned fire. The elem later observed 5x VCS fleeing and pursued, resulting in the apprehension of 1x VCS. The suspect was extracted to LZ Uplift for interrogation.

(165) 301215 CR017804 B/1/503, bc 10 km NE of LZ Uplift, while on patrol fd 1x VCS male (25-30) hiding from a passing C&C ship. The suspect attempted to flee and was wounded in the shoulder resulting in 1x VCS WIA who was extracted to LZ Uplift.

(166) 301300 CR006792 B/1/503, loc 10 km NE of LZ Uplift, observed 1x VC to the SW and engaged at .50m resulting in 1x VC KIA. Captured were 1x rucksack containing 1x hammock 2x documents and 2 pairs of green fatigues.

(167) 301420 BS848207 Tm K, Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 20 km NNW of LZ English, tripped an unk type booby trap resulting in 2x US WIA who were dusted off as the tm was extracted.

c. July

(1) 010435 BS833014 Hk 21D, 2/503 Inf, loc 6 km E of LZ English, engaged w SA fire at 10' 1x VC/NVA who was wearing dark green fatigues and who appeared to be guarding a bridge. The en escaped SE leaving a heavy blood trail. The area was checked and the elem fd 1x SKS rifle, 1x carbine, 2x rucksacks, and some documents CIA. The elem followed the blood trail w neg results.

(2) 011129 BR903951 D Co, 2/503 Inf, loc 5 km N of LZ English, fd 1x bunker for 1 or 2 men and some documents which were extracted. At vic BR903951 the elem fd 6x 1man bunkers. All bunkers were destroyed.

(3) 011525 BS853100 Co A, 4/503 Inf, loc 9 km N of LZ English, acting on an Intel Rpt fr Tam Quan that 3x VC were loc at grid BS855104, sent a patrol to check the area. The MINL-CAV was on station and observed 1x VC run into a bunker. The patrol elem moved to the loc and fired warning shots and commanded
for the VC to come out. The en did not come out and the elem engaged 1x M26
resulting in 1x VC KIA (female). The area was searched neg results.

(4) 011845 BS585202 Raider 1, 4/503 Inf, loc 20 km NW of LZ English,
fd 1 green shirt with blood stains and 1x bullet hole believed to be that of an
escaped en wounded during the engagement which took place earlier on 30 Jun at
2340 hours.

(5) 011600 BR963774 3d plat, B/1/503, 1/50, loc 5 km N of LZ Uplift,
engaged 2x VC at 150m with wpns resulting in 1x VC KIA (BC), and 1x rucksack, 1x
mosquito net, parachute cover, 1x hammock, 1x US poncho and personal clothing
CIA.

(6) 011850 BR960861 3d plat B Co, 1/50 loc 13 SE of LZ English, tripped
1x boobytrapped M26 H resulting in 1x US WIA and 1x RF WIA who were dusted off.

(7) 010810 BS75205 Tm F, Co N Ranger, loc 20 km NW of LZ English,
initiated contact with 7 VC/NVA with wpns and rucksacks at 4' resulting in 1x
VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 3 rucksacks CIA, as the MINI-CAV expended in the area. The
en was armed with AK-47s and carbines and wearing blk PJ. There were no US cas.

(8) 02930 BR827899 15 Engr (LE) Co, 1/503, loc 9 km SW of LZ English,
had 1x road scraper hit and detonate a 105mm mine resulting in neg cas but light
damage to the equipment. Equipment taken to LZ Pony.

(9) 020805 BR962871 1st plat B Co, 1/50, loc 11 km NE of LZ Uplift,
rec'd 45x rds of M79 fire and 30-40 rds of SA fie fr 400m NE fr an unk size en
force resulting in 1x US WIA who was dusted off.Elem returned fire as contact
broke. The area was searched and numerous shells of M79 and M16 rds were fd.

(10) 020850 BR998793 39th Sct Dog Plat, loc 9 km NE of LZ English,
1/50, Sct Dos tripped a boobytrapped M26 H resulting in 1x US KIA and 1x Sct
Dog KIA who were extracted.

(11) 021700 BR958778 3d plat, B 1/503, loc 6 km NE of LZ Uplift engaged
4x VC with wpns resulting in 2x VC KIA and the capture of 1x .45 cal pistol,
3x rucksacks, 1x claymore mine, 2x pistol belts, and 1x hammock. The en were
wearing blue shirts and blk pants. The elem swept the area and fd the bodies
of 2 VN boys, age 10, and 1x VN boy wounded by en fire. The wounded were evac-
uated.

(12) 021720 BR958788 3d plat 1/503, loc 6 km N of LZ Uplift, engaged 1x
VC female with SA fire at 100m resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC).
FUNCTIONAL

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(13) 021430 BS786201 Tm B Co M Ranger, loc 22 km NW of LZ English, engaged 10-12 VC at 75m W resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). 1x rucksack, medical supplies, and 1x canteen and a cup was CIA.

(14) 021230 BS81174 Tm 44, Co C Ranger, loc 12 km W of LZ Uplift, delivery acft rec'd AW fire fr an unk type AW as the tm was about to be inserted. Gunships expended in the area resulting in the 2x VC KIA. The en wore blk FJs and green fatigue.

(15) 021610 BS598653 Tm 21 Co C Ranger, loc 36 km SW of LZ English, observed 4x VC with carbines and wearing blk FJs at 20m W and engaged with SA resulting in 1x VC KIA. Gunships and the MINI-CAV expended in the area with unk results. 1 US wpn was lost in the action and the tm was extracted.

(16) 03001 BS700000 LZ English, 2/503, loc 4 km N of Bong Son, rec'd 5x rds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in neg cas or damage. Artillery fire counter mort with unk results. At 0002 hrs SA fire was rec'd resulting in 1 US WIA slightly. AW fire was returned with unk results, as contact and incoming ceased at 0006. At 0100 hrs 1x gunship while reacting to the attack crashed on take off due to power failure resulting in neg cas and heavy damage to the acft.

(17) 03200 BS701115 Ek 412, 4/503, loc 10½ km N of LZ English, rec'd an unk amt of SA fire and 3x Chicom grenades fr an unk en fr 20-25m W resulting in 2x US KIA, 1x US slightly WIA, and 3x VVI civ WIA. Elem returned fire with 4W and as en fled in unk dir. The 3x wounded civ were dusted off.

(18) 032340 BS923752 LZ Uplift, 1/50 loc 8 km N of Phu My, rec'd 5-8 rds of 82mm fire fr SW resulting in 1x US WIA and neg damage. Elem returned fire with 4W as arty fired counter mortar on suspected locations with unk results.

(19) 030730 CR000784 3d plat B/1/503, loc 8 km NE of LZ Uplift, detained 1x VCS who attempted to hide fr the elem. After moving a short distance the suspect began to yell and flee at which time the elem was ambushed by 3-4 en at 0000-0500. The elem returned fire resulting in 1x VC KIA. The en fled as the elem pursued with unk results.

(20) 031030 BS71765 3/81/505, loc 4 km E of LZ English, engaged 2x VC with SA fire at 50m resulting in 1 VC KIA. The other VC fled the area as the MINI-CAV was on station and expended resulting in 1 VC KIA. Captured were 1x M1 carbine and 2x rucksacks. The en wore blue and gray unif.

(21) 031000 BS99728 41, Co C Ranger, loc 40 km SW of LZ English, engaged 2x VC with SA resulting in 1 VC KIA. Captured was 1x set of web gear and 23 rds of mauser ammo. 1x VC fled and escaped to the N as arty engaged with unk results. Also captured was 1x SA which fell into a river and was not recoverable.
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(22) 031830 BR919538 Hawkeye 27 G/7/17, loc 4 1/2 SE of LZ English, observed 2 VC flee into a bunker and observed 30-35 bunkers in the area which were uncovered by arty fire in the area. 5x bunkers were destroyed creating a secondary explosion. There were 8-9 other secondary explosions observed within a 50m rad. 1x VC was observed dragging another out of a bunker into another. Arty was adjusted on to target resulting in 2 VC KIA (poss). At 1935 hrs an airstrike was conducted in area with unk results.

(23) 040715 BR96878 Hk 25C, 2/503, loc 7 km ESE of LZ English, tripped a boobytrapped HE which resulted in 4x US WIA. All were dusted off.

(24) 041430 BR974831 Tm 44, Co C Ranger, loc 36 km SE of LZ English, ambushed 3-4 VC with claymores resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 VC KIA (poss). The en wore blk PJs and carried unk type wpns. The en engaged were pt men for a 10-15 en force. Arty and gunships expended in the area as the tm was extracted with unk results.

(25) 052210 BR901115 1st plat, G/1/50 Inf, loc 10 km NNE of LZ English rec'd SA fire and an unk no. of W79 rds fr 150-200m on 4 sides fr unk size en force resulting in 2 US WIA and 1x RF WIA which required no dust off as wound was slight.

(26) 050530 BR996783 3d plat B/1/503 Inf, loc 10 km NNE of LZ English, engaged 2x VC who were eating in a hut with HGs and 2x VC with SA fire who fled from the same hut. Results were 4x VC KIA. CIA were 1x SKS rifle, 2x AK-47 rifles, 1x Chicon HK, 1x US claymore mine and assorted clothing.

(27) 050740 BR996732 3d plat D/1/503 Inf, loc 10 km NNE of LZ English, observed some p.m leaves moving at 50m fr their pan and initiated SA fire resulting in 1x VC KIA (BC). CIA were 1x AK-47, 1x pistol belt, 2x air mattresses with ground cover. All items were extracted.

(28) 061615 BR058988 3d plat B Co and the 212th RF Co, 2/503 Inf, loc 7 km E of LZ English were sweeping the area as a joint tm when the 3 plat elem observed 2x VC at a distance of 300m moving up a hill and engaged with SA fire resulting in 1x VC KIA. At the same time the 212th RF Co observed 3x VC fleeing the area and engaged with SA fire resulting in 3x VC KIA. The elem made a further search of the area and fd 1x VC who was hiding in a tunnel. Both elements continued to search the area and fd 1x VCS female who attempted to evade the elements. Both det were extracted for interrogation.
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(29) 061145 BS909114, Elemen Bridge #5, loc. 10 km N of LZ English, tripped a booby trapped 105mm HE rd which resulted in 1 US WIA who was dusted.

(30) 061235 BS958:45, lk 432, loc. 15 km N of LZ English, observed 1x VC attempt to set up a claymore while 1x VC female stood lookout. The elem engaged with SA fire at 100-150m resulting in 1x VC WIA (female). The VC male returned fire and fled in an unk dir and escaped. There were no friendly cas and the wounded was dusted off.

(31) 074455 BS927127, Hk 448, 4/503 Inf, loc. 12 km NNE of English, rec'd 1x M26 HE thrown fr the N resulting in 1x US WIA (slightly), requiring no dustoff. The elem searched the area with neg results.

(32) 07555 BS927127, An elem of 2d plat, B/1/503, loc. 10 km N of LZ Uplift, while going for water 1500 fr CF rec'd 1x and 4-6 rds of SA fire fr an unk size en force fr an unk dir resulting in 1x US KIA and 2x US WIA who were evacuated. The elem searched the area with neg results.

(33) 081130 GR01A07, Hk 12B, 1/50 Inf, loc. 9 km N of LZ Uplift, heard an explosion and sent a patrol out to check the area. Upon arriving in the area the patrol engaged 6x VC with SA fire resulting in 4x VC WIA who were carried off by the other four fleeing to the NW. The patrol elem pursued the en to the hamlet of Thanh Thy and observed 6x other VC who fled and escaped. As the elem began to pursue the fleeing en they were engaged with SA fire and AW fire fr 100-200m by an est 20 man en force resulting in neg cas. The elem returned fire with unk results. Arty was not employed due to the close proximity of a vllge. 2x LOH's were called, came on station, and while patrolling the area, det 1x VC who was observed fleeing the area of contact, and later was placed under the security of the patrol elem, broke loose and fled E attempting to escape and was engaged with 1x M79 rd resulting in 1x VC KIA.

(34) 081005 BS941210. Tm B, Co N Ranger, loc. 20 km N of LZ English, observed 2 VC/NVA with wpns and engaged resulting in 1 VC CIA. The captured VC broke loose and attempted to escape resulting in 1x VC KIA (BC). The elem also det 1x VC female who was without an ID card and was fd in the area of engagement. The suspect was extracted to LZ English.

(35) 081130 BR757874, Tm 41, Co C Ranger, loc. 18 km N of LZ English, was engaged by 3x VC/NVA with SA fire resulting in neg cas. The elem returned SA fire resulting in 1x VC/NVA KIA as the en broke contact and fled NW. The en were observed wearing gray and blk PJ's, bush hats and web gear.

(36) 091440 BR967784, 1 plat B Co, */503 Inf, loc. 9 km E of LZ English, was observing 15-17 armed indiv which were taken to be RF. The elem checked
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and later fd the group to be en who had disappeared to the N. MINI-CAV was called to check the area, and observed 7x more armed VC in a rice paddy and expended resulting in 1x VC KIA (BC) and 1x VC WIA and 2x VCS detained.

(37) 091130 BS903097 Hk 445, 4/503 Inf, loc 9 km NE of LZ English, det 1x VCS male who attempted to evade the elem. The suspect was extracted.

(38) 091535 BS863183 1st plat, C Co 4/503 Inf, loc 18 km N of LZ English, was securing a supply when it observed and engaged 2x VC at 200m W. The en returned SA fire resulting in 2x US WIA who were dusted off.

(39) 092000 BS874130 Hk 423, 4/503 Inf, loc 13 km N of LZ English, had 1x indiv trip a boobytrapped M79 rd which resulted in 1x US WIA who was dusted off at 2030 hours.

(40) 092130 BS899130 Hk 425, 4/503 Inf, loc 12 km N of LZ English, rec'd 50-100 rds of SA and AW fire fr an unk size en force and 1x M60 HG thrown fr an unk en loc resulting in 1x RF WIA. The elem returned SA fire and M79 fire with unk results as contact ceased at 2200 hrs. The RF was dusted off.

(41) 101000 BS863177 Hk 174, 4/503 Inf, Guard Outpost, loc 17 km N of LZ English, was attacked by an unk size en force with SA fire resulting in 1x US KIA and 1x PR-25 radio, 1x M6, 1x claymore, and 1x rucksack with LBE LIA.

(42) 101400 BS694165 7k K, Co N Ranger, loc 25 km N of LZ English, engaged 15x VC with SA fire at 50-100m resulting in 1x VC KIA. The en were observed carrying Sks and AK-47s and wearing blk PJs and khakis as they returned SA fire, broke fire, and fled E. Captured was 1x basket with clothing and food. Arty and gunships engaged the area with unk results.

(43) 101745 BS830225 Tm A Co N Ranger, loc 22 NW of LZ English, observed 4x VC/NVA sitting down taking a smoke break at 700m S and engaged with sniper fire resulting in 1x VC WIA & 1x SA WIA (poss). The en were observed carrying wpns and wearing green khakis as they fled the area. Arty fired on the area with unk results.

(44) 111830 BS903113 Hk 547, 4/503 Inf, loc 14 km NE of LZ English, observed 4x VC attempting to set up a booby trap and engaged with SA fire. The booby trap detonated resulting in 1x VC WIA who was carried off by the others as they fled NW. The elem pursued the en finding 1x VC KIA at 1850 hours. The MINI-CAV came on station, and expended in the area with unk results.

(45) 110830 CRO23787 Hk 12B1, 1/50 Inf, loc 10 km NE of LZ Uplift, engaged 2x VC at 150m E with SA fire resulting in 2x VC KIA (BC). CIA were 1x SKS, 1x M1 carbine, 1x hammock and 1x flashlight. (1/50 Inf).
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(46) 111620 CR01980 Hk 12B, 1/50 Inf, loc 4 km SW of LZ English, initiated contact with 4 VC at 75-100m with neg res as the en fled NE into a woodland. The elem pursued and was ambushed with claymore mines fr 3x sides resulting in 1x RF WIA who was dusted off. There were no US cas.

(47) 120005 BR998852 Hk 23D, 2/503 Inf, loc 3 km S of LZ English, had an elem trip a booby trapped M26 MG which resulted in 2 US WIA, who were dusted.

(48) 121335 BS859109 Hk 47, 4/503 Inf, loc 10 km N of LZ English, while moving to their NL had 1x indiv trip a boobytrapped M26 resulting in 1x US WIA. Dust off was completed at 1849 hours.

(49) 121935 BS862125 1st plat A Co and 1st and 3d plat of B Co, 4/503 Inf, loc 12 km N of LZ English, acting on information obtained by interrogation earlier of 3x VCS by conducting a cordon and search where a meeting of VC cadre was to be held between 1900-2100 hours 12 July. Enroute to the area the 3d plat elem observed 1x VC at 400m and did not engage but informed 1st plat B Co elem who fired warning shots as the indiv approached their pos. The indiv did not stop resulting in 1x VC KIA. At 2045 hrs, 3d plat engaged 1x VC seen exiting a spiderhole, resulting in 1x VC KIA. The search ended at 2115 hrs.

(50) 130200 BS866176 Hk 431, 4/503 Inf, loc 16½ N of LZ English, rec'd 15-20 rds of SA fire fr 150m W resulting in 1x US WIA slightly. The elem returned with SA fire and M79 fire with unk results.

(51) 130900 BR968878 2 plat B Co, 1/50 Inf, loc 15 SE of LZ English, rec'd 2x M79 rds fr N resulting in 1x US WIA and 1x NP WIA who were dusted off. The elem pursued the en with neg results.

(52) 130155 BS760211 Tm H Co N Ranger, loc 2 km W of LZ English, observed 5x indiv approaching pos fr the E and engaged with SA fire with unk results. The en reacted with SA fire and HE resulting in 4x US WIA.

(53) 131150 BS760211 Tm G Co N Ranger, loc 23 km NW of LZ English, initiated contact with 2x VC at 20m resulting in 1x VC KIA and the capture of 1x AK-47. While moving to the LZ, the elem discovered a VC basecamp and engaged 1x VC resulting in 1 VC KIA and 1x US WIA. Arty engaged the area with unk results. The tm was extracted at 1630 hours.

(54) 141530 BR987976 Recon Hk 15A and C, 1/503 Inf, loc 3 km N of LZ Uplift, initiated contact with 5x VC at 10m NE resulting in 1x VC KIA. CIA was 1x M26 MG and some documents. The en fled NE, gunships were called in and expended in the area as the elem was extracted. Arty engaged the area with unk results.
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142141 BS868716 Hk 431, 4/503 Inf, loc 16½ km N of LZ English, rec'd 2x M79 rds and approx 300 rds SA fire fr an est 6-7 en NW of their pos resulting in 1x US WIA slightly with neg dust off. The elem returned SA fire with unk results.

142155 BS921128 Hk 449, 4/503 Inf, loc 13 km NE of LZ English, rec'd 1x HE thrown fr an unk en loc N of their pos resulting in 2x US WIA who were dusted off. The elem returned SA fire with unk results.

141645 BS962774 3d plat B 1st/503 Inf, loc 4 km N of LZ Uplift, initiated contact with 3 VC resulting in 1x KIA. GIA was 1x M26 HE and some documents. The en broke contact and fled.

150910 BS969973 1st plat B Co 2/503 Inf, loc 8 km S of LZ English, had an elem trip a booby trapped 60mm HE rd resulting in 1x US WIA who was dusted off.

151100 BS900956 2d plat C Co 2/503 Inf, loc 3 km S of LZ English, rec'd SA fire fr 400m E of and sent an elem out to check the area and the point man tripped an unk type booby trap resulting in 6x US WIA. All were dusted off.

150625 BS856182 Bn Recon plat, 4/503 Inf, loc 17 N of LZ English, obvs'd 2x VC fleeing W and engaged with SA fire at 100m resulting in 1x VC KIA.

150850 BS917091 1st plat D Co 4/503 Inf, loc 10 km SSW of LZ English, during a sweep of an island rec'd SA, AW, and M79 fire fr an nest 6-man en tm fr the NW resulting in 1x US KIA. The elem returned fire and the en broke contact and fled S. The elem pursued the en and made contact again with neg results as the en continued S. At 1915 hrs a G&O soft came on station and rec'd SA fr ground fire with neg hits. Fire was returned resulting in 3x VC KIA (BC). At 1310 hrs the Aero Rifle Plt of C/7/17 Cav was inserted and det 3VCs. The suspects were extracted for interrogation. At 1200 1st plat D Co, rec'd M79 fire resulting in 1x US WIA slightly. Neg dust off was required. At 1340 hrs the 3d plat fired 1x en body, 1x SKS rifle, and 2x Chicon bolt action rifles. The elem also det 1x VC male who was fd in the area. The suspect was extracted for interrogation.

152025 BS948842 Hk's 53A 11A, 1/50 Inf, loc 16 km SE of LZ English rec'd 1x frag HE thrown fr an unk en loc S of pos and sent a patrol elem out to check the area. The patrol rec'd SA fire and frag HE fr an unk en loc S resulting in 1x US KIA and 3x US WIA. All were dusted off.
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(63) 151200 BS013090 1st plat D Co, 4/503 Inf, loc 10 km NE of LZ English, during a sweep of the area, fd 2x VC/NVA KIA in a contact earlier.

(64) 161015 BR966859 2d plat, A Co 1/50 Inf, loc 11 km N of LZ English, had an elem trip an M26 HE, resulting in 3x US WIA. All were dusted off.

(65) 162417 BS963018 Tm B Co N Ranger, loc 1x km W of LZ English, observed 4x VC 2x carrying wpns and dressed in blk PJs enter a sampan and begin moving W and engaged with SA fire, resulting in 1x VC KIA and 3x VC WIA. CIA was 1x M1 cartins and 1x set of web gear. Gunships engaged the area and the tm was extracted.

(66) 164330 BR736338 Hawkens 25, 3/319 Arty, loc 11 km S of LZ English, observed 4x VC 2x carrying wpns and dressed in blk PJs while 2x were dressed in civ clothes and carried packages. As the cot flew over the en dispersed. Arty was adjusted in the area resulting in 2x VC KIA poss.

(67) 170955 BS967113 Ht 4/7, 4/503 Inf, loc 11 km W of LZ English, engaged a VC/NVA plat with SA and M79 fire, resulting in 2x VC/NVA WIA who were seen carried off by the en as he returned fire and fled S. The elem pursued with neg results as contact ceased at 2000.

(68) 171350 BR963767 R/1/503 Inf, loc 3 km N of LZ Uplift, engaged 3x VC at 100m resulting in 1x VC KIA and 1x VC CIA. Also CIA was toilet articles, medical supplies, and 1x hammock. The elem pursued 1x VC who fled with neg results. The VC CIA was extracted to LZ Uplift for interrogation.

(69) 18030 BS878178 Hk431, 4/503 Inf, loc 17 km N of LZ English, heard an explosion near their pos and investigated finding 1 VC body in green fatigues and a red scarf lying next to a crater. The indiv appeared to have been killed trying to set up a booby trap which detonated.

(70) 181825 BS90901 D Co CP, 4/503 Inf, loc 9 km NE of LZ English, had 1x indiv moving on the outside of their perimeter and detonated an unk type anti-personnel mine resulting in 2x US WIA (1x serious, loss of both legs and 1x minor). Dust off was completed at 1830 hours.

(71) 182210 BS884153 Hk 438, 4/503 Inf, loc 14 km N of LZ English, observed 1x VC at 300m and engaged with SA and M79 fire. The en fled N up a stream bed and the elem recd M79 fire resulting in 1x US WIA slightly. The elem continued to pursue the fleeing VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (poss).
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(72) 181505 BR977843 2d plat A Co, 10 km NE of LZ Uplift, while conducting a sweep recorded SA fire and an unk no. of HSs fr a nearby bunker, resulting in 1x US WIA who was dusted off. The elem returned SA fire as the en attempted to throw a satchel charge which landed short blowing up the bunker resulting in 2x VC. The area was searched and CIA were some documents, 1x poncho, medical supplies, some claymore wire and a firing device.

(73) 190525 BR975984 22L, 2/503 Inf, 10 km SE of LZ English, while conducting a cordon and search engaged 1x VC running in and out of huts at 50m resulting in 1x VC KIA (BC). CIA was 1x M1 rifle and 1x rucksack. At 0555 the elem engaged VC VC running in and out of huts with neg results.

(74) 191840 BR972988 22B, 8 km N of LZ English, observed 1x VC at 200m fleeing S and engaged with M79 fire and engaged resulting in 1x VC WIA CIA who was extracted. (2/503 Inf)

(75) 192215 BR903128 439, 4/503 Inf, 12km N of LZ English, engaged 5x VC/NVA with SA fire at 25m with unk results. The en returned with SA/AW fire and HSs resulting in 1x US KIA and 2x US WIA, as contact ceased at 2355. Dust off was completed at 2355.

(76) 200635 BR961989 22K, 2/503 Inf, 8 km E of LZ English, checked the area of a contact which took place at 2000 hrs 19 Jul and fd 1x VC KIA who was killed by M79 fire. CIA was 1x M1 carbine.

(77) 202115 BR987716 B Co, 1/503 CP, 7 km N of LZ English, using a starlight scope observed 7x VC moving S and sent a patrol elem out who engaged with SA/AW fire at 400m resulting in 1x VC KIA as the en fled S.

(78) 210635 BR852106 Hk 411, 4/503 Inf, 10 km N of LZ English, observed 2x VC/NVA at 500m and engaged with sniper wpns resulting in 2x VC/NVA KIA.

(79) 212300 BR99114 Hk 541, 4/503 Inf, 10 km NNE of LZ English, rec'd SA/AW fire and 15-20 rounds of M79 fired at 20-30 VC 150-200m N resulting in 4x US WIA slightly requiring neg dust off. The elem returned fire with unk results as contact ceased at 2310 hours.

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(81) 21:35 BS 849108 Tm A Co N Ranger, loc 12 km NW of LZ English, initiated contact with 3x VC/NVA at 50m resulting in 2x VC/NVA KIA and CIA 1x AK-47 and 1x M2 carbine. 1x VC/NVA fled E and escaped. The tm was extracted ab arty and gunships expended in the area with unk results.

(82) 22:100 BR908950 Ex 23I, 2/503 Inf, loc 4 km SSW of LZ English, initiated contact with an unk size er force with SA fire at 50m resulting in 1x VC/KIA (poss). The en fled S as the elem pursued with neg results. During pursuit 1x US fell and some panji stakes resulting in 1x US WIA who was dusted off.

(83) 22:625 BS87143 1st plt A Co, 4/503 Inf, loc 12 km NW of LZ English observed and engaged 2x VC/NVA with SA fire at 25m resulting in 1x VC/NVA KIA. CIA was 1x .45 cal pistol and some documents. There was 1x US WIA slightly requiring neg dust off. 1x VC/NVA fled NW and escaped and the elem pursued with neg results.

(84) 21:625 BS80190 1st plt C Co, 4/503 Inf, loc 18 km N of LZ English received 9x rcds of SA fire and 5x rcds of M79 fire fr 100m SSW and NW resulting in 3x WIA who were dusted off. The elem returned fire and arty engaged the area with unk results. At 1825 dust off 29 rec'd SA/WM ground fire fr the S with neg hits during extraction.

(85) 21:06 BR99670 2a plt B 1/503 Inf, loc 9 km NE of LZ English, had an elem tri a booby trapped M26 HG resulting in 2 US WIA who were dusted off.

(86) 21:547 BS794007 Tm K Co N Ranger, loc 18 km N of LZ English, engaged 1x VC/NVA at 25m resulting in 1x VC/NVA KIA. The en was observed wearing a red unif and carrying a pistol but the tm was unable to capture the items due to heavy en movement in the area. The tm also observed an en basecamp at 50m E. The tm was extracted and arty engaged the area with unk results.

(87) 22:720 BS70189 Tm D Co N Ranger, loc 18 km E of LZ English, observed 22x VC/NVA at 500m NE moving S. The en were observed wearing mixed unif, carrying 10 wps and 15 rucksacks. Artillery was requested and later engaged the area. Later coordination was made with C Co 4/503 at 1840 hrs vic grid BS 87196 checked the area and nd 1x VC/NVA KIA KIA of Btry D 3/319. The area will be checked further on 23 July.

(88) 23:142 BR908072 Ex 23I, 2/503 loc 4 km SW of LZ English, rec'd 1x HE thrown fr an unk dir resulting in 1x US WIA slightly requiring no dust off.

(89) 23:105 BS70101 Tm N Co N Ranger, loc 20 km NW of LZ English, initiated contact with 2x VC/NVA at 25m resulting in 1x VC/NVA KIA (BC). The en were wearing mixed unif and without wps. The tm observed a nearby basecamp with
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several huts and heard heavy movement and was extracted as arty engaged the area with unk results.

(90) 231800 BS759105 Hawkeys ZF, 3/319 Inf, loc 9 km W of LZ English, observed 10 VC in bushes and directed arty fire in the area resulting in 8x VC KIA (BC) and 97/15 and A Btry 3/319 Arty. The area was checked on the 24th.

(91) 240000 BS802942 Hk14C, 1/503, loc10 SW of English, engaged 2x VC at 15m with SA fire resulting in 1x VC MIA who fled SW and escaped, 1x VC fled SW and also escaped. CIA was 1x M16 rifle, 1x M1 rifle, 5x rucksacks, 3x web gear (US) and some documents.

(92) 241930 BS823925 Tm J Co N Ranger, loc 2½ km SW of LZ English, engaged 6x VC/NVA carrying 2x wpns and rucksacks wearing khakis at 40-50m resulting in 1x VC KIA (BC). CIA was 1x rucksack. The en fled N and gunfire expended in the area with 1x secondary explosion as arty supported with illumination. At 1940 hrs the ta rec'd 1 M26 thrown fr an unk dir resulting in neg cas.

(93) 243340 BS780927 Guard Bunker # 32, loc at LZ English, observed movement to the front and initiated fire with unk results, and rec'd 12-13 rds of M79 fire resulting in 1x US WIA slightly requiring neg dust off. The elem returned SA fire as the area was illuminated with neg sightings.

(94) 250400 BR779925 Rk 15A, 1/503, loc 12 km SW of LZ English, engaged 1x VC with SA fire at 10m NW resulting in 1x VC MIA. CIA were 2 Brrs, 5x kilos of rice, and some documents. The en was wearing green fatigues.

(95) 251055 BR769944 Rk 15A 1/503, loc 12 km SW of LZ English, observed 4x VC with wpns at 800m and arty engaged the area. The elem checked the area and fd 1x VC/NVA KIA (BC). CIA was 1x M1 and 1x rucksack.

(96) 251447 BR797928 Rk 15A, 1/503, loc 11 km SW of LZ English, engaged 3x VC with SA fire resulting in 1x VC KIA and 2x VC CIA. 7x en fled the area and escaped. The elem also fd a small basecamp consisting of 1x small tunnel, a cooking area with utensils, 30 lbs of rice, 1x pr of fatigues and some documents the det and the docus were extracted and the base camp was destroyed.

(97) 251531 BR769944 Rk15A, 1/503, loc 11 km SW of LZ English, initiated contact with 5x VC/NVA at 50m resulting in 1x VC KIA (BC) and 1x US WIA slightly requiring neg dust off. The other en broke contact, fled N and escaped.
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(98) 250240 B9891969 Recon 25D, 2/503, loc 11 km SE of LZ English, initiated contact with 5x VC/NVA at 50-75m with SA fire resulting in 2x VC/NVA KIA (pos). The en returned fire, broke contact, and fled west as swiftboat engaged with 6xms mort and AW fire with unk results. 1x US was WIA slightly with neg dustoff.

(99) 250950 B9895138 B Co CF, 4/503, loc 13 km N of LZ English, had an indiv trip a booby trapped M79 rd resulting in 1x US WIA who was dusted off.

(100) 251825 C9054873 Hk 1231, 1/50 Inf, loc 9 km NE of LZ Uplift, engaged 8x VC moving SW with SA fire at 100m SE resulting in 2x VC KIA (BC). CIA were 2x rucksacks containing 6x batteries, 1x flashlight, 1x contain, 2x pistol belts, 7x lbs of rice and 1x lb of sugar.

(101) 260810 B963179 Hk 437, 4/503, loc 16 km N of LZ English, rec'd 5-10 rds of SA fire fr 200m N resulting in 2x US WIA who were dusted off. The elem returned SA fire and gunships expended in the area resulting in unk results. The elem later checked the area finding fresh blood spots and 1x en transfusion bottle (German).

(102) 260303 B990499 Hk 445, 4/503, loc 9 km NE of LZ English, observed 5-6 VC crossing a rice paddy and engaged with SA fire at 150m N resulting in 1x VC KIA. The en returned SA fire and at 2105 the elem rec'd 50 rds of SA fire fr 100-150m NW resulting in neg cas as fire was returned with unk results. At 2130 the elem rec'd approx 200 rds of SA and 300 rds of AW fire fr 150-200m N and the elem returned fire with unk results as the en was seen dragging the body of the VC KIA. The en broke contact and fled west. There were neg cas as contact ceased.

(103) 261815 B990300 Hk 120, 1/50 Inf, loc 8½ km NE of LZ Uplift, tripped a boobytrapped HG resulting in 3x US WIA, 1x was dusted off.

(104) 260730 Tm P, Co N Ranger, loc 2 km W of LZ English, tripped a boobytrapped a 105HE rd resulting in 2x US KIA and 2x US WIA who were dusted off.

(105) 262116 B978945 Hk 14A, 1/503, loc 12 SW of LZ English, ambushed 3x VC moving down a trail at 50m N with SA fire resulting in 1x VC KIA (BC). CIA were 1x rucksack, cooking utensils and 3 lb of rice.

(106) 270308 B9828876 Hk 1381, 1/503, loc 13 km SW of LZ English, engaged an est 5 VC/NVA with claymores, HGs, and SA fire at 50' resulting in 2x VC/NVA KIA and 1x US KIA, the en returned fire and fled in an unk dir. CIA were 1x M16 rifle and 1x M1 carbine.
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(107) 270900 BR865977 Hk 13A, 1/503, loc 11 km S of LZ English, engaged 1x VC/AV with SA fire at 30m S resulting in 1x VC/WIA but escaped. The elem followed the blood trail with neg results.

(108) 272033 BR853171 Hk 437, loc 17 km N of LZ English, had an indiv trip a boobytrapped M26 HG resulting in 3x US WIA. Dust off was completed.

(109) 272310 BR807113 Hk 542, 4/503 Inf, loc 10½ km NNW of LZ English, engaged 2x VC with AM fire 10-15m W resulting in 1x VC WIA but escaped. The elem checked the area and fd a heavy blood trail and 1x waterproof bag containing some documents, letters and 1x pr of Ho Chi Minh sandals. The area will be checked further on 28 July.

(110) 27925 BR56829 Hk 11B, 1/50 Inf, loc 10½ km N of LZ English, while in their ML site rec'd 1x rd of M79 fire fr 250m SE resulting in 2x US WIA. The area was illum with neg sightings and WIA were dusted off.

(111) 280322 BR854887 Hk 13C, 1/503 Inf, loc 11 km S of LZ English, fd sleeping pans for at least 20x personnel and observed 1x VC and engaged with SA fire at 15m resulting in 1x VC KIA (BC). The en was dressed in green fatigues carrying some documents in his wallet which were extracted. Also fd were a small cave containing 6x 82mm sort empty casings. All were destroyed.

(112) 281000 BR874890 1x 2½ ton vehicle, 1/503 Inf, loc 12 km SSW of LZ English, rec'd SA sniper fire resulting in 2x US WIA who were dusted off.

(113) 200825 BR871972 1st plat, D Co 2/503 Inf, loc 9 km ESE of LZ English, had an elem trip an M26 booby trapped HG resulting in 2x US WIA who were dusted off.

(114) 280938 BR868974 1st plat D Co, 2/503 Inf, loc 9 km ESE of LZ English, had an elem trip a boobytrapped 81mm mort rd resulting in 6x US WIA who were dusted off.

(115) 282100 BR973984 Hk 22B, 2/503 Inf, loc 10 km SE of LZ English, observed 2x VC and engaged with SA fire at 50m NE resulting in 1x VC KIA (BC). The victim was wearing a blk shirt and blk shorts. The other VC escaped S.

(116) 280905 BS951018 1st plat C Co 1/50 Inf, loc 9 km N of LZ English, had an APC hit a boobytrapped 155mm rd resulting in 5x US WIA, 1 US KIA and total damage to the vehicle.

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(117) 281605 BS83142 C Co CP, 4/503, loc 13 km N of LZ English, rec'd an intal that a meeting was being held in vic grid BS896142. At 1630 hrs, 1st plat swept the area and observed 1x VC wearing green fatigues who fled NW with neg results. 2d plat set up a blocking pan and engaged 1x VC with SA fire and resulted in 1x VC KIA. The elem checked the area and fd 1x VN who was wounded by SA fire and dusted off.

(118) 281200 BR858558 Hk 11B, 1/50, loc 104 km N of LZ English, observed 1x VC with wpn wearing blk PJs at approx 200m N fleeing N and pursed. Another VC without a wpn jumped up at 150m N and began to flee. The elem engaged with SA fire resulting in 1x VC KIA (BC). The elem checked the area and fd 1x VN who was wounded

(119) 291215 BS868162 Hk 437, 4/503, loc 15 km N of LZ English, observed 3x VCS fleeing fr a hut and fired warning shots to halt. The suspects did not stop and additional shots were fired. The suspects continued to flee and were engaged with SA fire resulting in 1x VC WIA. Dustoff came on station to pick up and rec'd SA ground fire with neg hits but was held up until gunships arrived on station. The WIA died before pick up resulting in 1x VC KIA (BC). The elem continued to search the area and det 2x VCS females who were hiding in the hut that the males fled fr. The suspects were extracted to Tam Quan.

(120) 290800 BR975785 1/b/1/503 Inf, loc 6 km NE of LZ Uplift, tripped a boobytrapped M26 BG resulting in 3x US WIA who were dusted off.

(121) 291800 BR991199 2d plat B/1/503, loc 7 km NE of LZ Uplift, observed 2x VC at 50m E who handed a female some documents and fled the area. The elem pursued and engaged with SA fire resulting in 1x VC KIA (BC). The other VC fled SE and escaped. The elem det 2x VCS who were fd in the area. The suspects along with the documents were extracted for interrogation.

(122) 291435 BS685058 Tm Co N Ranger, loc 20 km NW of LZ English, rec'd an unk no. of frag Hs fr an unk en pos. 3 resulting in 5x US WIA and 1x radio destroyed. The elem evaded the en and escaped to a new loc 350-400m W. While attempting to establish radio contact with the elem on the ground, a C&C acft was signalled by hand flares fr the tm on the ground. At 1815 hrs the tm was extracted by C&C acft.

(123) 302025 BS693976 Hk 22F, 2/503 Inf, loc 10 km E of LZ English, engaged 2x VC with SA fire at 25m with neg results. The en threw 2x HGs resulting in 1x US WIA, fled N and escaped. Dust off was completed at 2035 hours.

(124) 301425 BS865196 Hk 437, 4/503 Inf, loc 15 km N of LZ English, rec'd 30-35 rds of SA fire fr 100m W fr a hut resulting in 2x US WIA who were dusted off. The elem returned fire on the hut and observed 1x secondary ex-
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Explosion resulting in 1x VCS female WIA who was inside the hut. The suspect was dusted off and the area was further checked with neg findings.

(125) 300855 CRO05802 2d plat B/1/503 Inf loc 9 km NE of LZ Uplift, had an elem trip a booby trapped M26 HE resulting in 3x US WIA who were dusted off.

(126) 302135 BS865017 Tm 0 Co N Ranger, loc 1 km WNW of LZ English, rec'd SA fire and an unk no. of M26s fr an unk size en force 50m N resulting in 1x RF WIA slightly. The elem returned SA and M79 fire with unk results and moved to a new location.

(127) 312220 BS919130 Hk44, 4/503 Inf, loc 12 km NNE of LZ English, rec'd 50-70 rds of AW fire fr an est 6-8 VC 100m E resulting in 1x US KIA. The elem returned SA and M79 fire with unk results.
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(5) Operation Washington Green was still being conducted at the close of
this reporting period 31 July 1969. Cumulative results for the operation to
that time are broken down according to battalion/district, and are as follows:

(a) 1st Battalion (ABN) 503d Infantry
US losses: 2 US KIA; 81 US WIA; 1 Sgt Dog KIA,
US inflicted en losses: 44 VC/NVA KIA (BC); 2 VC/NVA WIA/CIA;
75 det; 34 SA, 15.5 tons of rice, 1100 lb of potatoes, misc documents and
equipment CIA.

(b) 2d Battalion (ABN) 503d Infantry
Friendly losses: 2 NP KIA; 1 VN Civ KIA; 1 VN Civ WIA,
US inflicted en losses: 32 VC/NVA KIA (BC); 7 VC/NVA CIA (5 WIA);
156 det; 6 Hoi Chanh’s; 12 SA, 6600 lb of rice & misc docu & equip CIA.

(c) 4th Battalion (ABN) 503d Infantry
US losses: 20 US KIA; 98 US WIA; 2 M16s, 1 M79 & 1 PRC 25 lost; 1 PRC 25 and
1 APC dest.
Friendly losses: 2 interpreters WIA; 2 RF WIA; 1 VN Civ WIA,
US inflicted en losses: 44 VC/NVA KIA (BC); 8 VC/NVA CIA (3 WIA);
1022 det; 19 SA, 34775 piastres, 4500 lb of rice, misc docu & equip CIA.

(d) 1st Battalion (Msch) 50th Infantry
US losses: 4 US KIA; 100 US WIA; 2 APCs dest; 1 Sgt Dog KIA.
Friendly losses: 1 NP WIA; 2 VN Civ KIA; 3 VN Civ WIA,
US inflicted en losses: 36 VC/NVA KIA (BC); 5 VC/NVA CIA (4 WIA);
767 det; 4 Hoi Chanh’s; 19 SA, 4 tons of rice, misc docu & equip CIA.

(e) Troop E, 127th Cavalry
US losses: 3 US KIA; 4 US WIA; 1 LOH dest.
Friendly losses: 1 Kt: Cursed Scout KIA,
US inflicted en losses: 6 VC/NVA KIA (BC); 85 det; 2 SA, 45 bicycles, 2200 lb
of rice CIA.

(f) 173d Aviation Plat
US inflicted en losses: 2 VC/ NVA KIA (BC); 1 VC/NVA WIA/CIA;
3 det; 1 SA, misc docu & equip.

(g) 61st Aviation Company
US inflicted en losses: 6 VC/NVA KIA (BC); 2 det.
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(a) 20th Recon Aircraft Company
US inflicted en losses: 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC).

(i) 3d Battalion (ABN) 319th Infantry

(j) Cumulative results of all units
US losses: 35 US KIA; 377 US WIA; 2 SA, 1 M79 lost; 1 PRC 25, 3 APCs, 1 LOH, and 1 UH-1H dest.
US inflicted en losses: 208 VC/NVA KIA (BC); 23 VC/NVA KIA (18 WIA);
2110 det; 10 Ho Chi Minh's; 87 SA, 5240 lb of rice, 34775 piastres, 1100 lb
of potatoes, 45 bicycles, and misc docu and equip CIA.

d HAWK Team Operations:
During the past quarter, the 173d Airborne Brigade continued to
utilize Hunter Killer (HAWK) teams in their efforts to locate and destroy
enemy forces. HAWK teams could safely be utilized due to the absence of
large VC/NVA main force elements in the Brigade's area of operation. Their
purpose has been to place small (fire team and larger) size ambushes along the
jungle and lowland trails used by small enemy squads, couriers, liaison teams,
and logistical carrying parties. By placing ambushes along these routes of
enemy activity, the HAWK teams have provided a constant source of harrassment
to enemy units and have been able to cover an especially large land area.
The utilization of HAWK teams by the 173d Airborne Brigade has proven to be
particularly effective realizing an exceptionally high kill ratio.

e. Ranger Activities:

1) General

During the past quarter, extensive use was made of Company N
(Ranger) 75th Infantry, 173d Airborne Brigade. Due to the program of Pacification
that the Brigade is committed to, Company N has provided the Brigade with
much needed intelligence information regarding enemy activity during Operation
Washington Green. A resumé of activities and significant contacts are given:

2) May

Company N (Ranger), 75th Infantry conducted a total of 65 missions
during the month of May 1969. The LRP teams were generally assigned surveil-
ance missions, however, they were also assigned hunter-killer (HAWK), net
relay transmission, and prisoner of war capture missions. These patrols
accounted for 8 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 5 VC/NVA KIA (posse) and 2 VCS detained.
During May contacts resulted in 1 friendly Ranger KIA, 5 Rangers WIA and no
MIA's. The patrols observed VC/NVA personnel on 12 occasions with a reaction
force inserted one time to exploit Ranger sightings.
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(3) June

Company N (Ranger), 75th Infantry conducted a total of 52 LRP missions during the month of June 1969. The LRP teams were assigned surveillance and hunter-killer (HAWK) missions. During this month the Rangers were instructed in the adjustment of artillery. In conjunction with these missions, the LRP teams on 11 occasions adjusted artillery fire onto observed enemy personnel. The Ranger patrols accounted for 17 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 12 VC/NVA KIA (Poss), 16 VCS detained and 6 enemy weapons captured. There were 9 Rangers WIA and 29 separate enemy sightings.

(4) July

Company N (Ranger), 75th Infantry conducted a total of 87 missions during the month of July 1969. The LRP teams were generally assigned surveillance and hunter-killer (Hawk) missions. These patrols accounted for 20 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 10 VC/NVA (Poss). During July contacts resulted in 3 Rangers KIA, 15 WIA and no MIA's. The patrols observed VC/NVA on 89 occasions. In conjunction with these missions, the LRP teams pm 27 occasions called and directed artillery fire onto observed enemy positions.

(5) Significant Contacts:

May

(1) 011425 BS693161 Tm M Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 24 km N of LZ English, engaged 2x VC/NVA with SA fire at 25m. The VC/NVA returned fire resulting in 2x VC/NVA KIA (BC), 2x carb CIA and 1x US WIA.

(2) 011225 BS723208 Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 25 km NW of LZ English, engaged 5 VC/NVA at 10m. The VC/NVA had ppns but did not return fire and fled N. Results were 1x VC/NVA KIA (BC), 1x VC/NVA WIA, CIA were 1 SKS.

(3) 021505 BQ707561 Tm 41 Co C (Ranger) 75 Inf, engaged 2x VC near a campfire with arty with unk results.

(4) 022420 BQ777567 Tm initiated contact on 2 VC at a range of 150m resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC), and 1 VC KIA (Poss). (Tm 41 Co C (Ranger) 75 Inf)

(5) 021945 BQ757564 Tm 44 Co C (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 41 km NW of Tuy Hoa, heard 2 or 3 .30 cal MG and possibly a .50 cal MG firing 300m NW of their pos. Arty engaged the suspected en location with unk results.
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(6) 041830 BS342215 Tms A and J Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 20 km NNW of LZ English, engaged 3 VC at 40m N of their pos resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). The VC was wearing green khakis. Two blood trails were fd leading N. The teams were extracted at 2001 hours.

(7) 051300 BR898945 Tm C Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 6 km S of LZ English, detonated an unk type of booby trap which resulted in 1 US WIA who was extracted. The tm then rec'd SA fire fr an unk size en force. Fire was returned with unk results. The tm was extracted at 1315 hrs without further incident.

(8) 051915 BR965925 Tm M, loc 10 km SE of LZ English, observed movement and flashlights 30-40m to their N, W, and S. The tm fired claymore mines, and SA and moved to an LZ at BR960921. The tm was extracted at 2130 and gunships expended in the area with unk results.

(9) 051045 BR841045 Tm 21 Co C (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 18 km S of LZ English, fd 1 "U" shaped trench with 5 tunnels. While they were checking the area they engaged 1 VC at 50m. The VC did not return fire but fled S. The tm was extracted at 1125 hours without incident.

(10) 051615 BG729489 Tm 41 Co C (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 48 km W of Tuy Hoa, rec'd 5 rds of carbine fire and sporadic sniper fire fr an est 10-15 VC, 4 of which had wpns. The fire came fr an est 200m SE of their pos. At 1730, gunships expended in the area resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 2 VC KIA (poss). The extraction ship accounted for 1 VC KIA and tm 41 accounted for 1 VC KIA. Arty was expended in the area after with unk results.

(11) 061540 BS750030 Tms B and E Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 12 km WNW of LZ English, observed 2 VC searching the area where the tms were inserted. The tms engaged the VC at 400m and the VC fled S. Arty fired on the suspected en route with unk results.

(12) 071230 BS747035 Tm B Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 13 km WNW of LZ English, was engaged by an en force of unk size approx 50m to their N. The en immed broke contact and fled N with unk cas. The Tm fd a co size base area at BS747037 which had been recently used.

(13) 071930 BS759041 Tm B Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 12 km NW of LZ English, rec'd sniper fire fr an unk size en force 400m to their SW. Arty engaged the en location with unk results and the team relocated.
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(14) 070920 BR673843 Tm 16 Co C (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 22 km SW of LZ English, engaged 1 VC/NVA at a range of 5m. The VC/NVA returned fire and fled S. The tm followed him and at 0925 rec'd 3 HGs fr 2 VC/NVA to their rear. The tm engaged the 2 VC/NVA and began moving to high ground. At 0935 hrs the tm engaged 2 VC/NVA at 20m resulting in 2 VC/NVA KIA (pos). The en were wearing brown khakis. The tm was extracted at 1010 hrs at BR673850.

(15) 08101C BR662824 Tm 17 Co C (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 30 km SW of LZ English, engaged 10 VC/NVA at 10m using claymores, HAs, CS and SA fire resulting in 3 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 3 VC/NVA KIA (pos). Heavy blood trails were fd leading E. The tm was extracted at 1120 hrs fr BR664327.

(16) 101137 BS661111 Tms D, J, and F Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 25 km NW of LZ English, engaged movement of unk size en force 30m fr their pos. No fire was rec'd. The area was checked and a bolt action rifle was fd and several blood trails were also fd leading N. The tm was extracted and relocated at 1300.

(17) 101155 BS103050 Tm N Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 17 km NW of LZ English, obs 12 VC with wpns at the bottom of a stream bed. An air strike was put into the area with unk results.

(18) 101445 BS703085 Tm M Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 16 km NW of LZ English, initiated contact on 1 VC at 10m when he jumped up and ran away resulting in 1 VC KIA.

(19) 101915 BS719089 Tm K, loc 18 km NW of LZ English, initiated contact with 3 VC who were filing 5 gallon water cans. Results were 2 VC KIA, 1 SKS and a small amt of docus CIA. The tm was extracted at 2000 hrs.

(20) 090830 BQ828586 Tm L Co C (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 34 km NW of Tuy Hoa, sighted 4 VC 300m N of their pos. 3 wore blk PJs and 1 wore khakis, all had wpns and rucksacks. Between 0840 hrs and 0910 hrs, 3 more groups of VC, all wearing blk PJs and 1 carrying an RPD, linked up at BQ823042. At 0925 hrs, the group moved to 150m E of the tm's loc. The 1 VC dressed in khakis seemed to be in command. At 0930 the group moved NE. The tm moved to an LZ at BQ828583 and was extracted at 1020 hrs. Gunships and arty were expended on suspected en loc in the area. At 1040 hrs a Hawkeye Acft obs an est VC Co or Bn and engaged them with gunships, arty and airstrikes with unk results (could not be observed due to heavy foliage).

(21) 121755 BS821190 Tm E, loc 11 km NW of LZ English, initiated contact on a VC force of unk size wearing blk PJs and carrying SA. Tm engaged resulting in 1 US KIA, 1 US WIA and 1 VC KIA (BC). After the tm was extracted, arty and
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Gunships expended in the area and Hawkeye 2E obs 2 VC/NVA bodies. Final results were 1 US KIA, 1 US WIA, and 3 VC/NVA KIA (BC). (Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf)

(22) 121500 B9877942 Tm 44 Co C (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 67 km W of Tuy Hoa, insertion act rec'd fire and insertion was aborted. Gunships obs 5 VC/NVA on the LZ and expended resulting in 2 VC KIA. The VC wore blk PJs and 1 had an SKS.

(23) 171300 BS760097 Tm L & N Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 14 km WNW of LZ English, initiated contact with 1 VC at 25m who was wearing violet PJs. The VC fled S. 8 rucksacks full of equipment, hammocks, 200 lb of salt, and 75 lb of rice were also fd. The equipment was extracted, the food destroyed. The team was extracted at 1145 hours.

(24) 181500 BS748014 Tm K Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 11 km NE of LZ English, engaged 1 VC/NVA emerging from a tunnel at 30 m range, resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (Poss) and 1 AK-47 and 1x M-1 carbine CIA. Blankets and medical supplies were fd in the cave. There was 1 US WIA.

(25) 181135 (BS 748014) Team 21, Co C (Ranger) 75th Inf, loc 6 km SSW of LZ English, initiated contact with 6-10 VC/NVA who were moving toward the Tm. Contact was at 100 m. Results were 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 1 VC/NVA (Poss). The Tm moved toward an LZ at BR 814993 and engaged and killed another 1 VC/NVA. During extraction at BR 814993, the door gunners of the extraction acft got 3 VC/NVA KIA (BC). SA fire was heard during extraction. Arty engaged the area after extraction. Final results were 5 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 1 VC/NVA (Poss).

(26) 240000 BR846809 Tm 35 Co C (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 10 km NW of LZ Uplift, engaged 1 VC/NVA who was fleeing resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC). 1 NVA flag, 1 Sony AM-FM, a khaki uniform, a bottle of drugs and some docus were CIA.

(27) 251735 BS755025 Red Raider OP #10 and Ranger Tm G, loc 12 km W of LZ English, observed 1 VC KIA while mir a ty, and obs 5 VC with rucksacks at BS847207. C F I

(28) 261220 BB865857 Tm 21 Co C (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 21 km E of LZ English, heard 4-5 VC moving N on a trail. At 1230 they engaged the en who withdrew N. The en tried to outflank the Tm and fire was rec'd fr 20-25m to the S and W. Fire was returned resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 2 VC KIA (Poss). The KIA were dressed in blk PJs and 5 wpns were observed. The contact broke at 1520 hrs when the Tm was extracted. Gunships expended with unk results.

(29) 291040 BS847207 Tm J Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 20 km NNW of LZ English, obs 1 VC KIA while dir arty, and obs 5 VC with rucksacks at BS847204.
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(30) 291840 BS744047 3ms I and N Co 3 (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 14 km NE of LZ English, observed 4 VC moving S on a trail 150m to their N. They were 12-15 y.o. and had no weapons. The team initiated contact wounding 2 VC but did not capture them. The team was extracted and reinfiltrated at 1905 hrs.

(31) 311420 BS772180 Tm B Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 19 km NW of LZ English, initiated contact with 3 VC/NVA. The en fled S and 3 rucksacks and a heavy blood trail was fd.

(32) 311645 BR734930 Tm 21 Co C (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 14 km SW of LZ English, observed 2 VC/NVA moving SE, 200m to their SW. Voices were heard all around the team. At 1715 VC were observed trying to steal the team's claymores, 300m to their S. The team initiated contact with claymores, SA, and AW and withdrew N. 3 VC bodies were observed. The en pursued and 3 HIs were rec'd. The team was extracted at an LZ at BR736925 at 1830 hrs and the aircraft rec'd 20 rds of AW fire. Artillery engaged the en after extraction. Results were 3 VC/NVA KIA (EC).

June

(1) 012130 BS965120 Tm 34, 11, and 44 Co C (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 8 km SE of LZ English, observed 2 VC 50m to their W and movement was heard 80-100m to their N. At 2140 hrs movement was observed on all sides and the en appeared to be probing their pos. At 2230 hrs 5-7 VC were observed around the teams pos. The en engaged with 2 HIs and the en fled SE. At 2340 hrs 1 VC was sighted and engaged with M79 fire with unk results.

(2) 031800 BS882213 Tm N Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 20 km N of LZ English, was engaged by an en force of unk size firing 100m to their S and N. The fire was returned resulting in 1 VC KIA (EC) and heavy blood trails were fd.

(3) 031700 BR85037 Tm 13 Co C (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 14 km S of LZ English, engaged 2 VC dressed in khakis with AK-47s sitting on a trail resulting in 2 VC KIA. Movement was heard and the team moved to an LZ and was extracted. Artillery and gunships expended 1 in the area with unk results.

(4) 041910 BS897243 Tm N Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 24 km N of LZ English, initiated contact on voices and checked the area finding 1 rucksack. The en fled in unk dir and the team was extracted.

(5) 042456 BR743844 Tm 14, loc 22 km SW of LZ English, observed 3 VC following them and ambushed them at 20m resulting in 1 VC KIA. The team moved to the contact area and saw 9-10 VC dragging the body away. The en fired on the elem and the elem returned fire with unk results. Numerous blood trails were fd.
leading. The team moved to an LZ and gunships expended in the area. A reaction force was inserted in the area at 1330. 1 member of the team remained with the force and the area was checked with neg findings and the reaction force was extracted at 1404 hrs. Results were 1 VC KIA (BC) and 6 VC KIA (poss).

(6) 051845 BS334036 Tm J Co K (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 2½ km NW of LZ English, engaged 4 VC/NVA who were moving down a trail 150m to their NW resulting in 4 VC/NVA KIA, 1 M1 carbine, 2 sets of web gear, 2 rucksacks, and 5 lb of docus CIA. The en returned fire wounding 1 US slightly. The tm was extracted at 1910 hrs and a zone sweep was conducted by arty expending 170 rds HE.

(7) 061220 BS706234 Tm K Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 27 km NW of LZ English, observed 2 VC in blk PJs. Arty engaged and the tm observed a secondary explosion. The results were unk.

(8) 061600 BS128114 Tm D Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 10 km NW of LZ English, observed 15 VC with 2 wpns and rucksacks and engaged image fire resulting in 2 VC KIA. 1 secondary explosion was observed.

(9) 070630 BS181114 Tm D Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 12 km NW of LZ English, observed 10 VC moving SE with heavy rucksacks and 4 wpns. The VC were dressed in blk PJs. Arty engaged the en with unk results.

(10) 081620 BB895865 2 vehicles fr 1/50 Inf and 1 fr Co C 75 Inf, at bridge #8, loc 13 km S of LZ English, rec'd en fire fr 100m on both sides of the road including SA, MW, and B-40 rockets. The scout section reacted and arty engaged the area with unk results. There were 2 US WIA fr Co C (Ranger) 75 Inf.

(11) 080600 BS848110 Tm D Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 12½ km NW of LZ English, engaged 5 VC at 100m who were moving NE with rucksacks and 1 wpn. The en fled with unk cas.

(12) 080855 BS813109 Tm D & L Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 13 km NW of LZ English, observed 5-7 VC/NVA dressed in blk PJs w wpns. The en initiated contact and fire was returned resulting in 1 US WIA and 2 VC KIA (poss).

(13) 081630 BB895852 Tm 13 Co C (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 11 km NW of LZ Uplift, engaged 2 VC with unk results. 1 WIA was inserted as a reaction force and linked up with the Ranger tm with unk results.

(14) 091435 BS741189 Tm C Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 19 km N of LZ English, rec'd SA fire fr 200m. No fire was returned.
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(25) 141000 BR36743 Tm 42 Co C (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 9 km W of LZ Uplift, observed 9 VC dressed in blk PJs and engaged them with arty with unk results.

(26) 161710 BR754954 Tm 26 Co C (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 13 km W of LZ English, engaged 10 VC/NVA 7km to their SW. 2 VC/NVA were observed with rucksacks and 2 with AK-47s and 1 carbine. SA fire was rec'd fr 100m to their S at 1805 hrs. Results were 1 VC/NVA KIA (poss) and 2 bags of food, 1 wallet and some docs CIA which were extracted.

(27) 171620 BR772791 Tm 16 Co C (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 23 km SW of LZ English, engaged 6-8 VC at 25m resulting in 3 VC KIA. The en fled N wearing blk PJs, ARs.

(28) 181040 BR766793 Tm 16 Co C (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 15 km W of LZ Uplift, observed 2 VC with wpns and initiated contact at 40m resulting in 2 VC KIA. There were no friendly cas. Arty engaged the area after extraction at 1100 hrs.

(29) 181350 BR7C4846 Tm 21 Co C (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 25 km SW of LZ English, observed 1 VC who fled SW. 2 VC were heard talking 85m fr their pos. 2 VC were observed 50m S of their pos and engaged with unk results. An est en plat surrounded the tm. The contact lasted 1½ hr with sporadic fire being exchanged. Gunships expended resulting in 1 VC KIA and the tm killed 1 VC enroute to an LZ.

(30) 191045 BR756877 Tm 12 Co C (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 18 km SE of LZ English, was moving up a hill to have a sick man extracted when 1 man was WIA by an M36 ooby trap and rec'd 3 rds of SA fire fr 150m. The tm was extracted as gunships expended in the area with unk results after the G2O acft of 1/503 Inf rec'd SA fire while trying to extract the WIA.

(31) 191120 BR691181 Tm 34 Co C (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 21 km SW of LZ English, observed 2 VC/NVA with HED in a hut under some rocks resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 VC KIA (poss). The area was searched and a 100 man basecamp was fd. Tunnels, huts inside caves and firing pos under rocks were fd. Airstrikes and arty engaged the area, and food, medical supplies, 3 HEDs, and docs were fd.

(32) 211020 BS883217 Tm E Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 20 km N of LZ English, engaged 3 VC at 20m. Res 1 VC WIA. VC wearing blk PJs. Gunships supported and VC fled in unk dir.

(33) 211125 BS887196 Tm H Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 20 km N of LZ English, initiated contact with 3-5 VC with wpns, HEDs, and blk PJs at 20m. VC broke contact and fled in an unk dir. Tm pursued and made contact 3 times. Contact broke and tm was extracted. Gunships supported. Results were 2 US WIA by punji stakes.
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(34) 211745 BS823227 Tm M Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 21¼ km NW of LZ English, observed 16 VC moving SE at BS831226. All indiv had wpns and rucksacks. At 1755 hrs tm observed 14 VC moving SE into Woodline at same loc the previous sighting was made. Arty fire 93 HE rds on suspected en loc with unk results.

(35) 221845 BS826225 Tm M Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 21 km N of LZ English, observed 3 VC moving SE carrying rucksacks. At 1900 tm observed 10 VC moving SE. The en wore blk PJ's, 9 indiv had rucksacks and 6 had wpns. Arty fired on target resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC) and 1 VC KIA (poss) whose body was seen thrown by blast but neg observation could be made on the body.

(36) 222035 BS861008 Tm 21 Co C (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 1 km W of LZ English, observed 2 VC carrying rucksacks moving W to E 75m S of their pos. At 2045 hrs the tm heard noises and movement NE of their pos of which sounded like mortar tubes and wpns clearing shrubs. At 2047 the tm rec'd M79 rds and SA fire fr NE and returned fire with SA and M79. Contact was sporadic for 40 min resulting in 1 US WIA fr SA. Tm was extracted at 2145 hours. Gunships and arty expended on sus en loc with unk results.

(37) 231300 BS842195 Tm K Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, while moving down a trail was observed by 1 VC viewing fr a tree. Elem went into a nearby village to apprehend detainees at grid BS849192. Elem searched huts and detained 3 VCS of military ages. People began to flee and warning shots were fired. Elem rec'd SA fire and returned fire resulting in 1 VC KIA. Elem rec'd more SA fire and 2 VCS detainees attempted to escape resulting in 2 more VCS KIA. The contact resulted in 3 VC KIA (BC), 1 VCS WIA, 11 detainees, 13 NVA rucksacks CIA, 5 NVA web gear, and 6 M26 HIs CIA. All personnel and equipment were extracted.

(38) 230750 BS861008 Tm 21 Co G (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 1½ km W of LZ English, fd 1 LAW (blown in place) and 1 timing device. Tm rec'd 3 rds of sniper fire fr 500-1000m to their NE resulting in neg cas.

(39) 240845 BR674853 Tm 25 Co G (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 25 km SW of LZ English, engaged 1 VC/NVA moving S on a trail. 3-6 more VC/NVA reinforced the en fr the S and then fled W. The contact resulted in 1 VC/NVA WIA CIA, 1 M1 carbine CIA, 1 rucksack and do-us CIA. The tm was extracted at 0943 hrs and arty and gunships expended in the area. An airstrike was conducted at 1150 hrs in vic grid BR674853. The erg resulted in 2 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 1 VC/NVA KIA (poss).

(40) 241445 BR665782 Tm 34 Co G (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 31 km SW of LZ English, heard movement and observed 8-10 indiv in a steam bed. The en initiated contact with SA fire with what was believed to be SKS wpns and the elem returned fire with SA, MG, and claymores. The en fled NW resulting in 1 VC KIA (poss).
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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

15 August 1969

(41) 251715 BS813108 Tm B Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 13 km NW of LZ English, initiated contact with 1 VC/NVA carrying a rucksack and dressed in brown khakis at 200m resulting in 1 VC/NVA WIA but escaped to the NW.

(42) 251900 BS826225 Tm J Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 21½ NW of LZ English, engaged 4 VC with SA at 350m W of tm's loc moving fr N to S, resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 2 VC WIA but escaped. The en was carrying 2 wpns and each had a rucksack. The elem was unable to return to site and recover equipment because of heavy ground fog which prevented extraction until morning.

(43) 261830 BS836223 Tm K Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 21 km NW of LZ English, observed 11 VC moving fr N to S. The en were carrying 8 wpns and 8 rucksacks. Arty was fired and at 1840 hrs the tm heard screams and moans fr the area. The area will be checked at first light on 27 June.

(44) 271300 BS836222 Tm K Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 21 N of LZ English, engaged 2 VC/NVA at 200m S. The en fled carrying 1 wpn, 1 rucksack and wearing brown khakis and blk PJs. The en escaped with neg results.

(45) 271040 BS765845 Tm 44 Co C (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 20 km SW of LZ English, rec'd 4 rds of SA fire fr their SE and arty engaged the area with unk results 10 min later tm 44 rec'd more SA fire as 6 VC with SKS wpns dressed in khakis with rucksacks were observed at 50-100m S. The tm initiated contact resulting in 1 VC KIA (poss). The en returned fire and fled S. Gunships and arty expended in the area as the tm was extracted with unk results.

(46) 301420 BS84207 Tm K Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 20 km NW of LZ English, tripped an unk type booby trap resulting in 2 US WIA who were dusted off as the team was extracted.

July

(1) 010810-0830 BS775205 Tm F Co N (Ranger), loc 20 km NW of LZ English, initiated contact with 7 VC/NVA with wpns and rucksacks at 4 ft resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 3 rucksacks CIA, as the MINI-CAV expended in the area. The en was armed with AK-47s and carbines and wearing blk PJs. There were no US cas.

(2) 021430 BS786201 Tm B Co N (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 22 km NW of LZ English, engaged 10-12 VC at 75m W resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC). Captured were 3 AK-47s, 6 web gear, 10 rucksacks, 7 hammocks, and 12 Chicom RIs. The en broke contact at 1450 hrs and fled in unk dir. There were no friendly cas.

(3) 021230 BS811744 Tm 44 Co C (Ranger) 75 Inf, loc 12 km W of LZ Uplift,
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

delivery acct rec'd AW fire and fire fr unk type AW as the tm was about to be inserted. Gunships expended in the area resulting in 2 VC KIA as the tm was returned to LZ English. The en wore blk PJs and green fatigues.

(4) 021610 BR594853 Tm 21 Co C Ranger, loc 36 km SW of LZ English, observed 4 VC with carbines and wearing blk PJs at 20m W and engaged with SA resulting in 1 VC KIA. Gunships and the MINI-CAV expended in the area with unk results. 1 US wpn was lost in the action as the tm was extracted.

(5) 031000 BR999728 Tm 41 Co C Ranger, loc 40 km SW of LZ English, engaged 2 VC with SA fire at 5m resulting in 1 VC KIA. Captured was 1 set of web gear and 23 rds of mauser armo. 1 VC fled and escaped to the N as arty engaged with unk results. Also captured was 1 SA which fell into a river and was not recoverable.

(6) 041430 BR574831 Tm 44 Co C Ranger, loc 36 km SW of LZ English, ambushed 3-4 VC/NVA with claymores at 10m resulting in 1 VC NVA KIA (EC) and 1 VC KIA (poss). The en wore blk PJs and were carrying unk type wpns. The en engaged were point men for a 10-15 man force. Arty and gunships expended in the area as the tm was extracted with unk results.

(7) 061000 BS844120 Tm B Co N Ranger, loc 20 km W of LZ English, observed 2 VC with wpns and engaged resulting in 1 VC CIA. The captured VC broke loose and attempted to escape resulting in 1 VC KIA (EC). The elem also det 1 VCS female who was without an ID card and was fd in the area of engagement. The suspect was extracted to LZ English.

(8) 081130 BS757874 Tm A Co N Ranger, loc 18 km SW of LZ English, was engaged by 3 VC/NVA with SA fire in neg cas. The en were observed wearing gray and blk PJs, bush hats and web gear. Arty engaged the area with unk results as the tm was extracted.

(9) 101400 BS694165 Tm K Co N Ranger, loc 25 km NW of LZ English, engaged 15 VC with SA fire at 50-100m resulting in 1 VC KIA. The en were observed carrying SKSs and AK-47s and wearing blk PJs and khakis as they returned SA fire, broke contact, and fled E. Captured was 1 basket with clothing and food. Arty and gunships engaged the area with unk results, as the tm was extracted.

(10) 101745 BS330225 Tm A Co N Ranger, loc 22 km NW of LZ English, observed 4 VC sitting down, taking a smoke break at 700m S and engaged with sniper fire resulting in 1 VC KIA. The en were observed carrying wpns and wearing green khakis as they fled the area. Arty fired on the area with unk results.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

(11) 130155 BS852018 Tm H Co N Ranger, loc 2 km W of LZ English, observed 5 indiv approaching pos fr the E and engaged with SA fire with unk results. The en reacted with SA fire and HE resulting in 4 US WIA. Dust off was completed at 0230 hrs.

(12) 131450 BS760211 Tm G Co N Ranger, loc 23 km NW of LZ English, initiated contact with 2 VC at 20m resulting in 1 VC KIA and the capture of 1 AK-47. While moving to the PZ (LZ) the elem discovered a VC basecamp vic grid BS756215 and engaged 1 VC at 10m resulting in 1 VC KIA and 1 VC WIA. The tm observed 9 rucksacks, bunkers, lean-tos, and shovels in the camp. Arty engaged the area with unk results. The tm was extracted at 1630 hrs.

(13) 162147 BS36018 Tm B Co N Ranger, loc 1 km W of LZ English, while moving into a night laager pos observed 4 VC/NVA enter a sampan and began moving W and engaged with SA fire at 25m resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 3 VC KIA (poss). CIA was 1 set of web gear and 1 M1 carbine. Gunships engaged the area as the tm was extracted at 2245 hrs.

(14) 201040 BS819108 Tm A Co N Ranger, loc 12 km NW of LZ English, observed 2 VC/NVA at 500m and engaged with sniper wpns resulting in 2 VC/NVA KIA.

(15) 211735 BS819108 Tm A Co N Ranger, loc 12 km NW of LZ English, initiated contact with 3 VC/NVA at 50m resulting in 2 VC/NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 and 1 M2 carbine. The tm was extracted at 1815 hrs as arty and gunships expended in the area with unk results.

(16) 221006 BR996799 Tm K Co N Ranger, loc 7 km W of LZ English, engaged 1 VC at 25m E resulting in 1 VC KIA. The en was observed wearing a red unif and carrying a pistol but the tm was unable to capture the items due to heavy en movement in the area. The tm was extracted and arty engaged the area with unk results.

(17) 221720 BS870189 Tm D Co N Ranger, loc 18 km N of LZ English, observed 22 VC/NVA at 500m NE moving S. The en were observed wearing mixed unifs, carrying 10 wpns and 15 rucksacks. Arty was requested and later engaged the area. Later coordination was made with Co C 4/503 and at 1840 hrs vic grid BS777196 checked the area and fd 1 VC/NVA KIA KBA of Btry D 3/319. The area will be checked further on 23 July.

(18) 231015 BS709101 Tm M Co N Ranger, loc 20 km NW of LZ English, initiated contact with 2 VC at 25m resulting in 1 VC KIA. The en were wearing mixed unif and without wpns. The tm observed a nearby basecamp with several huts and heard heavy movement and was extracted as arty engaged the area with unk results.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

(19) 241930 BS833225 Tm J Co N Ranger, loc 21 1/2 km NNW of LZ English, engaged 6 VC carrying 2 wpns and rucksacks wearing khakis at 40-50m resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). CIA was 1 rucksack. The en fled N and gunships expended in the area observing 1 secondary explosion as arty supported with illum. The tm was extracted at 2010 hrs and arty expended in the area with unk results.

(20) 260730 BS843005 Tm F Co N Ranger, loc 2 km W of LZ English, tripped a booby trapped 105 HE rd resulting in 2 US KIA and 2 US WIA who were dusted off.

(21) 291435 BS868162 Tm M Co N Ranger, loc 20 km NW of LZ English, rec'd an unk no. of frag HGs fr an unk en pos S resulting in 5 US WIA and 1 radio destroyed. The elem evaded the en and escaped to a new loc 350-400m W. While trying to establish radio contact with the elem on the ground a C&C acft was signaled by hand flares fr the tm on the ground. At 1815 hrs the tm was extracted by C&C acft. During the extraction the acft rec'd SA fire with 1 hit in the pilot's door resulting in neg cas.

(22) 302135 BS864017 Tm O Co N Ranger, loc and elems of the 229 RF Co, loc 1 km WNW of LZ English, rec'd SA fire and an unk no. of M26 HGs fr an unk size en force 50m N resulting in 1 RF WIA slightly. The elem returned SA fire and M79 fire with unk results and moved to a new location.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

Operation Darby Mul I was conducted by the 4th Mobile Strike Force battalion during the period 3 to 27 July 1969. This battalion, which was OPCON to the Brigade, conducted reconnaissance-in-force operations against a series of designated objectives in the An Lao valley portion of the Brigade AO. This operation was designed to determine the enemy's activities in this area and to thwart any preparations for hostile actions against the populated centers in the Brigade AO. Results of the 4th Mobile Strike Force battalion's engagements with the enemy were: 8 KIA; 1 CIA; 6 SA; 925 lbs of rice; and 31 lbs of documents CIA.

Significant contacts for Darby Mul I are:

1. 050900 BS720015 242d MSF Co, loc 15 km W of LZ English, obs 3 VC/NVA fleeing from near bunkers. The ele attempted to capture the enemy but failed as they fled W and escaped. Captured were 3 pair blk JPs and 25 lbs of rice. All items were destroyed.

2. 051440 BS758036 242d MSF Co, loc 11 km NW of LZ English, obs 3-4 VC/NVA at 800 m wearing blk PJs. No wpns were obs and no other action was taken. The ele also fd 1 abandoned sampan vic BS750022.

3. 081245 BS709065 214th 1SF Co, loc 16 km NW of LZ English, while on a search and clear msn eng 8 VC/NVA w/ SA fire at 50 m NM resulting in 5 VC/NVA KIA. Captured were 10 lbs of docus, 20 M-26 HG's and 500 lbs of rice. There were no frdlly cas. The ele also detained 2 VCS who were fd in the area of contact. The suspects were extracted to LZ English for interrogation.

4. 090945 BS70594 243d MSF Co, loc 15 km NW of LZ English, rec'd light MG fire fr 500 m and eng w/ arty w/ unk results.

5. 091532 BS709082 C & C Aft for MSF Co, loc 20 km NW of LZ English, rec'd SA ground fire fr an est sqd of VC/NVA taking 2 hits but neg cas. Gunships expended in the area w/ unk results.

6. 100822 BS723082 243d MSF Co, loc 18 km NW of LZ English, edg 1 VC/NVA at 15 m S resulting in 1 VC/NVA WIA who escaped. The ele checked the area and followed the blood trail w/ neg results.

7. 100900 BS705069 243d MSF Co, loc 17 km NW of LZ English, fd a hut large enough to accommodate a plt size force. The hut contained 400 lbs of rice, 1 wallet, a small ant of waser ammo, and some docus. The docus were extracted while all other items were destroyed. The hut was burned also.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

(8) 101040 BS715127 242d MSF Co, loc 18 km NW of LZ English, fd 1 small hut which contained 2 anti-tank grenades (Type D/AT-K-44; LOT #326-54) and 2 crimped cartridges of unk caliber.

(9) 140805 BS667235 FO of 241st MSF Co, loc 31 km NW of LZ English, adjusted arty on 3 VC/NVA obs in a stream wearing blk PJs and carrying rucksacks w/ neg results. The enemy fled in an unk dir and escaped.

(10) 180940 BS663239 243d MSF Co, loc 30 km NW of LZ English, engaged w/ SA fire by a sqd sized enemy force resulting in 4 CIDG WIA. The ele returned fire and pursued w/ neg results. The WIA were extracted.

(11) 191300 BS652256 243d MSF Co, loc 36 km NW of LZ English, engaged a sqd size enemy force at 50 m resulting in 1 VC/NVA WIA CIA who was DOA after dustoff. CIA was 1 hauser rifle. The enemy returned SA fire resulting in 2 CIDG WIA who were dusted off.

(12) 201045 BS714214 242d MSF Co, loc 27 km NW of LZ English, received AW fire from an unk size enemy force resulting in neg cas. The ele returned fire as arty fired into the area w/ unk results.

(13) 211320 BS773213 242d MSF Co, loc 25 km NW of LZ English, initiated contact w/ a sqd size VC/NVA force w/ neg results as the en broke contact and fled W. Arty engaged the area w/ unk results and C/7/17 Cav was inserted as a reaction force w/ neg findings.

(14) 220930 BS753189 243d MSF Co, loc 27 km NW of LZ English, attacked an NVA basecamp-training area consisting of 40-50 NVA wearing green fatigues resulting in 3 NVA KIA. CIA w/s 5 AK-47s, 1000 rds 7.62 ammo, 200 rds RPD ammo, 21 lbs of docus, 13x 60mm wrs rds, 1 (TS) Claymore mine, 50 lbs clothing, 1 US poncho, several sheets and medical supplies, and chicom HG. There was 1x CIDG KIA. The camp consisted of several bunkers 7' x 10' x 4' w/ OCR, and several mockups of wooden mortars and HGs. The enemy fled in unk dir.

(15) 230845 BS711209 242d MSF Co, loc 27 km NW of LZ English, received SA sniper fire fr 2-3 enemy fr an unk loc resulting in 2 CIDG WIA. Arty fired on suspected enemy pan with unk results.

(16) 241400 BS794007 241st MSF Co, loc 7 km W of LZ English, fd and destroyed 3 (10' x 10') huts and 2 foxholes.
AVCE-SG/MED
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

5. Artillery, Air, and Naval Support:

a. Artillery Support:

(1) May

(a) The 3d battalion, 319th FA Headquarters remained at LZ English throughout May and continued its mission of direct support to the 173d Airborne Brigade. Battery A was positioned at FSB Frost throughout the reporting period and provided direct support to the 1st BN, 503d Inf. Battery B provided mutually supporting fires to Battery A from LZ Two Bitts and also continued its direct support mission to the 2nd BN, 503d Inf. Battery C closed at YU 375337 (vicinity Bu Gia Map in III CTZ) at 301730 hrs April and began the month at the new FSB. As the month opened, Battery D had 4 howitzers at LZ Lowboy, and 2 howitzers at FSB Projo (BS68188) on Operation Red Thrust V; a combined artillery-ranger raid into the northern end of the An Lao Valley.

(b) Operation Red Thrust V terminated on 2 May. The combined operation with N Co (Ranger), 75th Inf and a platoon from the 40th ARVN Regt lasted 5 days, expending a total of 1803 rounds of artillery ammunition. The operation confirmed the increased enemy presence in the upper An Lao Valley and denied the enemy free use of his "sanctuaries" that were outside the range of artillery as emplaced at that time. For further information see CAAR: Red Thrust V.

(c) FSB Frost, established on 25 April, continued to report sightings of campfires and lights in the An Lao Valley and the valley southwest of FSB Frost. On 3 May the CO, 3/319th FA, and the CO, A/3/319th FA, emplaced trip flares in the valleys southwest of FSB Frost (vicinity BS7392) in order to set an artillery ambush. Data was precomputed to the targets and kept available for placing immediate fire on any of the trip flares that were activated.

(d) On 5 May the CO, 3/319th FA, placed Battery B on 30 minutes standby to execute a Red Strike operation. The concept of a Red Strike was an immediate reaction raid of very short (approximately 2 hrs) duration to hit lucrative APP and Infrared Readouts. The Red Strike concept required timely aircraft availability with concurrent intelligence target acquisition. The two conditions were never simultaneously fulfilled, and the Red Strike operation could not be executed.

(e) LZ English was mortared at 0015 hrs on 12 May. Again the countermortar radar at LZ North English detected the 1st round on the ascending portion of its trajectory and alerted the FDC before the first round impacted. Five helicopters were damaged, but no personnel were injured.
(f) Enemy activity was stepped up in other areas on 12 May. RF/FF elements southeast of the Long Son bridge reported enemy movement. D/3/319th FA fired in support and a sweep of the area at first light revealed numerous blood trails, pieces of skull, a pistol belt, and AK-47 ammunition.

(g) Battery 0, recently returned from their assignment at Bu Gia Map, were mortared at Bu Loc on 15 May. One slight WIA was sustained from 12 rounds of 60mm mortar fire, with no equipment damage reported.

(h) In conjunction with the Associate Battery Program, Major Tan, CO of the 221st ARVN Field Artillery Battalion, visited the CO, 3/319th Field Artillery, on 15 May. Discussions centered about the establishment of a fully operational WSCC at 40th ARVN Regiment Headquarters and the eventual move of the 221st Battalion Headquarters to LZ English.

(i) On 17 May a reconnaissance team operating vicinity 55666C21 sighted 12 VC/WA in the open. Hawk-eye aircraft adjusted 6 30mm-18 FC from A/3/319th Artillery onto the target. Surveillance: undetermined number of bodies sighted in the target area.

(j) Throughout the month the 3/319th FA supported the engineer minesweep of QL-1 from LZ Lowboy to the north. Numerous contacts were reported and on 25 May the minesweep teams were hit from both sides of QL-1 approximately 1 kilometer north of LZ Lowboy. CO, D/3/319th FA functioned as fire support coordinator for the gunships and other fire support agencies that fired in support of the engineer minesweep team.

(k) As the month ended a cease fire was in effect from 3000 hrs to 0600 hrs in honor of a Vietnamese national holiday. Activity during the cease fire was generally light and the battalion did not fire during the period.

(2) June

(a) The 3d Br, 319th FA Headquarters remained at LZ English throughout the reporting period and continued to provide fire support to the maneuver elements of the 173d Airborne Brigade. In AC Lee Operation Washington Green, the plan for accelerated pacification, continued in effect. In AC Sheridan the 3/503d INF and C/3/319th FA are involved in a similar pacification effort. Because of the relatively static positions of the Infantry battalions involved in pacification there were no battery size moves made during this month. However, the battalion conducted 5 one-day raids to attack areas that are normally outside the range of artillery fires and to maintain proficiency in battery displacements.
From its position at FSB Frost Battery A provided fire support to the 1/503d Inf operating in Hoai An District and to ranger teams operating in the An Lao Valley. Battery B, at LZ Two Bits, supported the 2/503d Inf in Hoai Anh district and provided mutually supporting fires with FSB Frost. Battery C remained at Camp Rock (vic Eab Ulc) under the operational control of the Provisional Artillery Group formed by IFPV Arty. From LZ Lowboy Battery D supported the 4/503d Inf in Tam Quan District and the 19th Engineer Battalion minesweeps north along highway QN-1 into I CTZ.

On 2 June a B-2 intelligence target was acquired vic R950943. The 3/319th FAC attacked the target with a 4 battery TOT involving B/3/319, A/6/84th, C/221st (ARVN 105mm), and 2/B/37th (ARVN 155mm). Total expenditures were 156 HE and 9 FC.

Operation Red Thrust VII, an artillery raid by a platoon of Battery B and 2 Red Raider teams from FSB Battery, took place on 6 June. At the beginning of the operation one of the Red Raider teams made contact and had to be extracted. During the raid 543 rounds were expended, triggering 6 secondary explosions and destroying numerous bunker complexes and possible base camp sites.

At 1100 hrs on 8 June LZ English was hit by 8-12 incoming 82mm mortar rounds. The countermortar radar at LZ North English identified the firing positions while the initial round was on the ascending portion of the trajectory and alerted the FAC before the round impacted.

Battery C conducted a one day artillery raid to WT118695 on 11 June. The platoon moved by road to attack intelligence targets outside the range of all artillery units. Total expenditures were 386 HE rounds, with the platoon closing back to FSB Rock by 1600 hrs.

On 14 June Battery C again conducted a one day artillery raid by road. The firing position used was at WT528987, with intelligence targets again being hit. An aerial observer reported 3 secondary explosions from the total of 517 rounds expended on confirmed and acquired targets.

Operation Red Thrust VIII, a combined artillery-ranger raid by a platoon of Battery A and C/75th Inf, was conducted on 23 June. The raid was targeted against the extreme northern portion of the Kron River Valley and expended a total of 508 rounds on confirmed and acquired targets. For further information see GAAR: Red Thrust VIII.

Throughout the month the 3/319th FA was very active in the RF/PP artillery assistance program. The assistant S-3 conducted over 30 reaction tests in Tam Quan and Hoai Anh Districts. These reaction tests have proven to be an invaluable tool in training the RF/PP units how to properly call for and use artillery fire support.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

15 August 1969

(3) July

(a) The 3/319th FA Headquarters remained at LZ English throughout the reporting period. On 1 July, Battery A was at FSB Frost supporting 1/503d Inf, Battery B was at LZ Two Bits supporting 2/503d Inf, Battery C was at Baoloc supporting 3/503d Inf, and Battery D was at LZ Lowboy supporting 4/503d Inf.

(b) On 020045 July 1969 LZ English received 6 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. HSB/3/319th FA countermortar radar positioned at LZ North English, observed 4 rounds and plotted the enemy mortar west of LZ English. B/3/319th FA and C/221st AVN FA fired countermortar and silenced the enemy weapon.

(c) On 3 July 1969 one platoon from B/3/319th FA occupied LZ Challenge (32822) to begin Operation Red Thrust IX an artillery raid combined with Ranger-type elements organized from Headquarters Battery personnel. The platoon attacked confirmed and acquired targets in the Kron River Valley. On 5 July 1969 the platoon returned to LZ Two Bits. For further information on Operation Red Thrust IX see CAAR: Red Thrust IX.

(d) On 6 July 1969 A/3/319th FA closed FSB Frost and moved to FSB Stinger (BS769087) to support the 4th MSF Battalion on a search and clear operation in the An Lao Valley.

(e) On 12 July 1969, A/3/319th FA closed FSB Stinger and moved to FSB Lisa (BS693779). One platoon of D/3/319th FA moved from LZ Lowboy to FSB Hawkeye (BS799175) to shoot an LZ preparation on FSB Lisa as A/3/319th FA conducted its combat assault. The platoon was returned to LZ Lowboy after the preparation was fired.

(f) On 22 July 1969 a TOT was fired on a confirmed VC/NVA base camp at BS959797. Firing units were an 8-inch howitzer platoon from A/7/5th FA at LZ North English and the destroyer HMAS Brisbane. A platoon from B/2/503d Inf swept the area and reported that extensive base camp facilities were completely destroyed.

(g) On 23 July 1969 an aerial observer conducted a fire mission against 10 VC/NVA in the open at BS759105. The mission was fired by A/3/319th FA and A/7/15th FA. Eight VC/NVA were killed by artillery.


(i) On 28 July 1969 D/3/319th fired an LZ preparation at BS808142; then an ele from HSB/3/319th conducted a CA. The firing battery was inserted and FSB Hunky was established. Concurrently, A/3/319th moved by convoy to LZ Lowboy and occupied the firing position vacated by Battery D.

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(87)
b. Air Support:

(1) The 173d Aviation Platoon (Casper), continued to support all combat operations during the months of May, June, and July. Due to the relocation of "D" Maintenance's Aviation Section to LZ English during this period, aircraft availability has been greatly increased. Productive time has been gained due to the fact of nonrelocation of aircraft to LZ Jane for maintenance.

The statistical report of the Aviation Platoon's activities for these months is reported below. May's report is unavailable due to lack of records in platoon operation files.

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<th>July Sorties/Missions</th>
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GRAND TOTAL SORTIES: UH-1H 376 2,548
GRAND TOTAL SORTIES: OH-6A 166 479
GRAND TOTAL MISSIONS: UH-1H 112 137
GRAND TOTAL MISSIONS: OH-6A 79 60

TOTAL 7.62 AMM EXPENDED: 23,000 2,100

(2) The USAF continued to provide tactical air support during the past reporting period. Their TACP and ALO remained at LZ English.
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Bde FACs flew a total of 745.5 hours in support of brigade operations during May, June, and July. The hours as utilized follow:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF MISSION</th>
<th>NUMBER OF MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Troops in Contact</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquired Enemy Locations</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspected Enemy Locations</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed Enemy Locations</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Target Destruction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing Zone Construction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop Assault Preparation</td>
<td>4</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE MISSION</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preplanned FAC Airstrike</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate FAC Airstrike</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preplanned Combat Sky Spot</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate Combat Sky Spot</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spooky or Shadow</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESULTS OBTAINED</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Explosions</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Fires</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers Destroyed</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures Destroyed</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA (POSS)</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foxholes and Caves Destroyed</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

C. Naval Support:

Naval gunfire liaison was provided by Subunit \( \text{\textsuperscript{1969}} \text{\textsuperscript{1969}} \), composed of Navy and Marine personnel.

Naval Gunship Support: Additional support was provided from United States Navy destroyers on station with either two or three twin-mounted 5-inch guns. The destroyers and their on-station sequence for the period May - July 1969 are reported as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SHIP</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>RS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 9</td>
<td>USS Rogers</td>
<td>Tigers</td>
<td>Call</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Tigers</td>
<td>Call</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Nui Mieu</td>
<td>H&amp;I</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 10</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Nui Mieu</td>
<td>Call</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Tigers</td>
<td>H&amp;I</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 11</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>An Iao</td>
<td>H&amp;I</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Tigers</td>
<td>Call</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 13</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Nui Mieu</td>
<td>H&amp;I</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 29</td>
<td>USS Buchanan</td>
<td>Tigers</td>
<td>Call</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>An Iao</td>
<td>H&amp;I</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>An Iao</td>
<td>H&amp;I</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 30</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>An Do</td>
<td>Call</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Tigers</td>
<td>Call</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>An Do</td>
<td>H&amp;I</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>An Do</td>
<td>H&amp;I</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1</td>
<td>USS Buchanan</td>
<td>An Do</td>
<td>H&amp;I</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Tigers</td>
<td>H&amp;I</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Tigers</td>
<td>H&amp;I</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Tigers</td>
<td>Call</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 3</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>An Ioa</td>
<td>H&amp;I</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 20</td>
<td>RMA Brisbane</td>
<td>An Do</td>
<td>H&amp;I</td>
<td>60</td>
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<td>July 21</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>An Do</td>
<td>H&amp;I</td>
<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Tigers</td>
<td>Call</td>
<td>85</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 22</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>An Ia</td>
<td>H&amp;I</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Tigers</td>
<td>Call</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AVBE-SC/MD

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

6. Combined US - ARVN Operations and Training:

The 173d Airborne Brigade continued with ARVN, GVN, and district forces in a mutual effort as a basic means of accomplishing tactical and pacification missions. The purpose is to better defeat VC/NVA forces and to assist the Republic of Vietnam forces in attaining its pacification goals in Operation Washington Green. These operations contribute to the revolutionary development program and make more available the FWMF logistical support, particularly in the areas of aviation and heavy equipment assets.

Liaison visits between US Forces and ARVN Forces are a normal daily occurrence. Constant radio communications between headquarters are maintained at all times, and daily SITREP's are exchanged.

National Police Field Force (NPFF) operate with US Forces constantly on a daily basis. Excellent rapport is maintained between small unit US Forces and the NPFF. Constant success is recorded in cooperative ventures in cordon and search operations, with US Forces securing the hamlets, and NPFF and RF/PF providing the search element. The people being searched are more receptive and cooperative when people they know are searching, and valuable information is often volunteered for this reason.

US Forces operate daily with RF/PF forces placed OPCON to the different battalions. Not only do the RF/PF provide a successful search element, but the RF/PF forces provide a detailed knowledge of the local area. A benefit to the RF/PF's is the "pairing concept". RF/PF forces, through association, gain valuable training in US tactics and in operation of US equipment with which they are gradually being equipped.
Iri
I AL
AVBESC/M 15 August 1969
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

7. Chemical Operations: The 51st Chemical Detachment of the 173d Airborne Brigade provided chemical support on a standby basis whenever requested by elements of the Brigade. The following missions were accomplished:

a. Herbicide Missions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>METHOD</th>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>TARGET</th>
<th>SORTIES/AMOUNT</th>
<th>HECTARES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14 May</td>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>BS750015 Broad leaf crops</td>
<td>1/55 gal Blue</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BS750025 incl corn, peppers</td>
<td>55 gal Orange</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BS754025 &amp; other misc crops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 May</td>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>BS750004 Rice, manioc, corn</td>
<td>1/55 gal Blue</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BS755004 and misc broadleaf</td>
<td>55 gal Orange</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BS755994 crops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 May</td>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>BS755048 Corn, manioc, misc</td>
<td>1/55 gal Blue</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BS760041 broadleaf crops and</td>
<td>55 gal Orange</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BS760042 bananas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 May</td>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>BS750093 Rice paddies</td>
<td>1/55 gal Orange</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BS755098 and pepper</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BS754092 plants</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BS736051 Pepper plants</td>
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<td>0.14</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BS729050 and corn</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>BS727051 Pepper plants</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BS729055 and rice paddies</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BS736058 Corn, pepper, and</td>
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<td>0.08</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BS740060 raddishes</td>
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<tr>
<td>22 May</td>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>BS742210 Pepper plants</td>
<td>1/55 gal Blue</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BS744215 and corn</td>
<td>55 gal Orange</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BS745205 Pepper plants</td>
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<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BS745200 and corn</td>
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<td>BS750200</td>
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<td>BS750215</td>
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<td></td>
<td>BS735179 Corn, rice and</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>BS735185 pepper plants</td>
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<td>BS739189</td>
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<td>BS739178</td>
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**AVOID SC/06D**

**SUBJECT:** Operational Report Lessons Learned

**15 August 1969**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>METHOD</th>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>TARGET</th>
<th>SORTIES/AMOUNT</th>
<th>HECTARES</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>2 June</td>
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<td>BS760023</td>
<td>Manioc</td>
<td>1/55 gal Blue</td>
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<td>55 gal Orange</td>
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<td>Mixed broadleaf vegetables, Manioc</td>
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<td>6 June</td>
<td>CH-47</td>
<td>BR960230</td>
<td>Elephant grass &amp; shrubs on perimeter</td>
<td>2/550 gal Blue</td>
<td>315</td>
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<td>550 gal Orange</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>of Lane Army Heliport.</td>
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<td>8 June</td>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>BS715205</td>
<td>Rice, manioc, lettuce</td>
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<td>BS717228</td>
<td>and small leafy vegetables</td>
<td>55 gal Orange</td>
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<td>15 June</td>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>BS618184</td>
<td>Rice, corn, manioc watercress</td>
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<td>23</td>
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<td>BS618192</td>
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<tr>
<td>21 June UH1-H</td>
<td></td>
<td>BR754937</td>
<td>Elephant grass &amp; shrubs around FSB</td>
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<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BR751941</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BR751947</td>
<td>Frost (A/7/319)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10 Jul UH1-H</td>
<td></td>
<td>BR640966</td>
<td>Manioc</td>
<td>1/110 gal Blue</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>BR633763</td>
<td>Manioc, corn and rice</td>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report

b. Riot Control Agents:

(1) On 3 and 4 June this unit provided technical assistance for the removal of 30 drums of bulk CS to the 8-4, 173d Abn Bde, and decontamination of the CS which had been spilled from 55 gal drums on the Helipad outside the perimeter of LZ English. The PDDA, M3A3, was used in this operation.

(2) On 11 June a gas chamber exercise was conducted by this unit for D Battery, 3/319th Artillery. A total of 50 personnel took part in the exercise of the familiarization with CS and the proper testing and fitting of the M17/M17A1 protective mask.

c. Personnel Detector Program:

(1) A total of 25 missions for 28 hours and 10 minutes were flown in support of TF 173d Abn Bde during May.

(2) The 51st Chemical Detachment supported TF 173d Abn Bde with a total of 22 APD missions for 21 hours and 55 minutes during the month of June. A mission on 25 June revealed many high readouts via BS7108 - BS7209. This area was later engaged with artillery fire and air strikes resulting in secondary explosions. Two (2) E-158 CS cannisters were dropped in an area via BS704148 where a high readout was received on 30 June.

(3) The 51st Chemical Detachment supported TF 173d Abn Bde with a total of 20 APD missions for 20 hours and 10 minutes during the month of June. Seven (7) E-158 CS cannisters were expended as a result of heavy readouts received during APD missions:

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<th>DATE</th>
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<th>NR. EXPENDED</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
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<td>4 July</td>
<td>BS724037</td>
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<td>BS586783</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>BS7113</td>
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<td>Cannisters failed to function.</td>
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(4) On 220930, June 1969, the 243 MSF Company was CA in response to numerous heavy APD readings. The force encountered an NVA Basecamp training area consisting of 40-50 NVA wearing green fatigues resulting in 3 NVA KIA. Captured in action were 5 AK-47s, 1000 rounds of 7.62 ammo, 200 rounds of RPD ammo, 21 lbs of documents, 13 60mm mortar rounds, 1 (US) claymore mine, 50 lbs of clothing, 1 US poncho, several sheets and medical supplies, and a hand grenade. The camp consisted of several bunkers, 7' x 10' x 4', with overhead cover and several mockups: of wooden mortars and hand grenades.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

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s. Flame Thrower Operations:

(1) On 4 May 1969 members of the 51st Chemical Detachment supported C/7/13 Artillery using portable flamethrowers to burn the perimeter of LZ Salem. 110 gallons of thickened fuel were expended. It was learned during this operation that such activities must be conducted with utmost caution to firing personnel in that many small arms rounds and several grenades and ARVN placed boobytraps were exploded by the excessive heat.

(2) On 17 and 18 June, flame thrower support was provided in the burning of thick brush from the perimeter at LZ English. 80 gallons of thickened fuel was expended in this operation.

(3) Members of this unit provided portable flame thrower support to 3/319th Artillery in burning heavy brush outside the perimeter of LZ English on 5 July 1969. Thirty-five (35) gallons of thickened fuel was expended.

(4) On 21 July 1969, portable flame thrower support was provided to E Battery, 3/319th Artillery in burning brush on the perimeter of Fire Base Two Bits. 120 gallons of thickened fuel were expended in this operation. The can-type fire extinguishers were used to apply much of the thickened fuel in the latter operation and proved efficient and time saving.

e. Training:

(1) All personnel of the 51st Chemical Detachment received a two-day block of instruction and training on the new Detector, Airborne Personnel, XD by a team of 5 from Edgewood Arsenal, Limited War Laboratory and Ft McCllellan on 2-3 May 1969. All but 2 missions during May were flown by two operators in order that all individuals received adequate operational training with the new equipment.

(2) On 9, 10, 27, and 28 June, training on the operation of the Detector, Manpack personnel, XD2, was provided to personnel of the 22d ARVN Div.

(3) On 24 July 1969, the 51st Chemical Detachment presented 8 hours of instruction to Capitol ROK Tiger Division Chemical personnel on operation and maintenance of XD2 Manpack Personnel Detector.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

8. Engineer Support:

a. General

(1) During the reporting period, the 173d Engineer Company was primarily concerned with civic action projects. Though continuing its basic mission of providing engineer support to four organic maneuver battalions and one attached maneuver battalion, it has also been concerned with base improvement and in aiding various units' self-help programs.

(2) Mineweep operations continue to be an important responsibility of the 173d Engineer Company, which provides daily and special mineweep teams. Teams are allocated with various maneuver elements of the brigade; in addition to mineweep responsibilities they provide engineer assistance on call. A team departs LZ English daily and sweeps north along QL-1 to LZ Lowboy, and a team located in the vicinity of the Long Son railroad bridge sweeps along TL 514.

(3) A squad from the second platoon is located at LZ Uplift and provides engineer support to units in that area.

(4) A squad from the third platoon continues to be located with Task Force South in support of the 3d BN, 503d Infantry.

(5) A squad from the fourth platoon continues to be located at LZ North English in support of the 4th BN, 503d Infantry.

b. Significant Activities

(1) Projects that the 173d Engineer Company was concerned with during the month of May were: constructed a bridge on TL 514, a TSC for 75th Inf (Ranger), supported FSB Frost with engineer equipment, installing light poles at FSB, built a webtoc for Special Troops Battalion, repaired the an Long road, repaired the an Long bridge, built a bunker on hill 641, constructed a bridge in Long Son, grader worked on roads at LZ Uplift, helped 54th second battalion, 503d Inf, to move into a new area, built two bunkers for FSB Frost, repaired wire between bunkers # 25 and 36, built a webtoc near the airfield, provided engineer equipment for various unit projects on LZ English, provided supervision and advice to various units' self-help projects, grader and pumper/chopper worked on roads in LZ English.

(2) Projects the 173d Engineer Company was concerned with during the month of June were: constructed billets for Hawkeyes, cleared a minefield in the vicinity of F Troop, 17th Cavalry, built a TSC for 534th Signal Company, built a bridge at LZ UPLF, supplied two (2) dump trucks for seven (7) days to
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

S5, built showers for HHC, supplied a D5 dozer for two (2) days to D Maintenance, a D5 dozer worked at LZ Salem for three (3) days, a chainsaw operator and saw worked for 172D MT for three (3) days, put roofs on two (2) BCs, built a mess hall, for 1st BN, 503d INF, built a webtoc for the 61st AVN, erected a lighting system for the defensive perimeter of LZ English, one (1) dump truck hauled gravel for the ARVH for one (1) day, two (2) dump trucks hauled gravel for 3d BN, 319th Arty, a front loader worked for the 3d BN, 319th Arty for three (3) days.

(3) During the month of July the company finished a timber trestle bridge at LZ LOC; this bridge will be primarily used by Vietnamese civilians. The company continues construction of an extension to TL3A, a limited access road for local populace and light military traffic. On this route the company constructed a class 15 timber trestle bridge, a double single 130 feet class 15 Bailey bridge, dis-assembled a single 60' foot Bailey bridge and in its place constructed two 60' inch by 30' feet wide culverts. Also constructed on this route was a market place, consisting of four buildings and a levelled area.

(4) On the 10th of July, a tropical storm caused damage to the bridge in Pong Son, necessitating in its closing to traffic. A platoon jacked up a Bailey bridge, hauled eight loads of fill and other repair work, had the bridge open on the 13th of July.

(5) Other projects that the 173d Engineer Company worked on during the month of July were: all lighting system for the perimeter of LZ English, (the engineer phase of this project is completed, making final electrical connections is another unit's responsibility), constructed a fence around the Brigade TOC, billets for Red Cross personnel, built a grease rack for HHC, built a bunker in the vicinity of the chapel, worked on and filled revetments, supervised construction of a water tower for 2d Troop, 17th Cavalry, helped construct a 16 foot by 30 foot shower for the 2d BN, 503d INF, hauled 963 loads of gravel and fill for the TL3A extension and for various units on LZ English, constructed fire support base-stinger, and aided in the construction of another fire support base, constructed eight 24 foot, 18 inch culverts on TL3A extension, started to regrade and pneumprime the brigade road network.

(6) The water point located at LZ Uplift, operated by this company, had an output of 620,220 gallons.

c. Problems Confronting the Commander

(1) Operating a class II and IV yard (construction material) has created a problem for this unit. While not a part of the TMC, thus not authorized loading equipment, it is nevertheless an integral part of the unit.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

(1) Loading of materials necessitates using manpower, thus depriving construction projects of all available manpower.

(2) The company is authorized two D7E dozers, and the ones assigned to this unit are presently at 160th Maintenance in Qui Nhon. The age of these dozers precludes using them on any heavy continuous job.

(3) The company is authorized two dozers of the airmobile type, normally utilized in Fire Support Base construction. Due to combat loss and parts shortage the Brigade is denied use of this type dozer.
9. Training:

a. During the reporting period the 173rd Airborne Brigade continued to conduct jungle warfare training of newly arrived personnel. The following are the US totals graduated:

(1) May:
- Officers: 43
- Enlisted: 834
- Total: 877

(2) June:
- Officers: 43
- Enlisted: 952
- Total: 995

(3) July:
- Officers: 57
- Enlisted: 1042
- Total: 1099

b. The 173rd Airborne Brigade also continued to sponsor the RF/PF and RD/PSDF Leadership Schools. A breakdown by month follows:

(1) May:

(a) The 173rd Support Battalion continued to conduct the Brigade Regional Forces/Popular Forces Leadership School. RF/PF Class 6-69 began on 5 May 1969 with 44 'TOOs', and graduated on 15 May 1969. Trung Si Nguyen Duy Nghiem of Phinh Dinh Province was the Honor Graduate of Class 6-69. RF/PF Class 7-69 began on 23 May 1969. Each graduate of the RF/PF Leadership School receives a certificate of completion, a "Sky Warrior" shoulder tab and a class picture. The Honor Graduate of the RF/PF class also receives a plague and a Honor Graduate Certificate of Completion.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

(b) The RF/PF Leadership School continued its training course for Revolutionary Development Team personnel. RD Class 6-69 began on 12 May 1969 with 31 students and was graduated on 15 May 1969. All graduates received a certificate of training at a graduation exercise at the completion of the class.

(2) June:

(a) Two classes of RF/PF NCO's graduated from the RF/PF Leadership School during June. The two classes graduated forty-five and forty-three NCO's respectively, all of whom came from Binh Dinh Province. The honor graduates were Sgt Vu Dinh Ty, and Sgt Le Ci.

(b) One RD/PSDF class graduated from the RD/PSDF Leadership School which began in June. There were thirty members in this class, all of whom came from Binh Dinh Province. Honor graduate was Team Leader Nguyen Van Cang.

(3) July:

(a) Forty-six RF/PF's graduated from the RF/PF Leadership School in July. The class was comprised of NCO's from Binh Dinh and Phu Bong Provinces. The honor graduate was Mr. Hai Ba Yong, a member from Binh Dinh Province.

(b) No RD/PSDF course was conducted in July.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

10. Psychological Operations and Civic Action:

   a. Total number of man-days (10 hour days) personnel of units engaged in civic action activities.

        (1) May - 2,176
        (2) June - 2,301
        (3) July - 2,434

   b. Cost of civic action projects.

        (1) Cost of supplies contributed from military resources for civic action projects (do not include cost of commodities obtained from USAID, CARE, CRS, and like organizations).

           (a) May - 1,414,000 $VN
           (b) June - 806,600 $VN
           (c) July - 908,340 $VN

        (2) Expenditures from the US/NAV Civic Action FUND.

           (a) May - 59,210 $VN
           (b) June - 0
           (c) July - 0

   c. Voluntary contributions.

        (1) Collections

           (a) May - 1,000 $VN
           (b) June - 0
           (c) July - 10,760 $VN

        (2) Expenditures

           (a) May - 1,000 $VN
           (b) June - 0
           (c) July - 2,500 $VN
d. Percent of US military civic action activities conducted jointly with:

1. Other FWMAF
   a. May - 10%
   b. June - 10%
   c. July - 10%

2. RVNAF
   a. May - 90%
   b. June - 90%
   c. July - 90%

3. US Civilian voluntary agencies
   a. May - 0%
   b. June - 0%
   c. July - 0%

e. Self-help. Estimated average percent of each project that was completed by:

1. Self-help labor
   a. May - 80%
   b. June - 80%
   c. July - 86%

2. Material furnished by the people.
   a. May - 10%
   b. June - 10%
   c. July - 20%
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g. Number of institutions assisted during the reporting period.

(1) Schools
   (a) May - 16
   (b) June - 19
   (c) July - 13

(2) Hospitals/Dispenseries
   (a) May - 14
   (b) June - 12
   (c) July - 7

(3) Orphanages
   (a) May - 7
   (b) June - 5
   (c) July - 6

(4) Others
   (a) May - 7
   (b) June - 3
   (c) July - 3

h. Local officials and people of Northwestern Binh Dinh Province continue to actively support GVN and US/FMAF, as is evidenced by constant review of existing Civic Action Projects. As increased emphasis is placed on pacification, the people increasingly volunteer their efforts and labor for Hamlet self-help projects.

A. Hoi Chanhs continue to rally to the GVN cause. 34 VC/INVA rallied in May, followed by a slight drop in June to 30 rallies. Late July and early August rallies indicated that increased GVN and US/FMAF pressures and increased emphasis on the Hoi-Chanh leaflet drop and the speaker program are the cause of increased Hoi Chanh activity. Greater increases in Hoi Chanh ralliers to the GVN cause can be expected. 38 Hoi Chanhs rallied in July.
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j. The May, June, and July responses to the Volunteer Information Program were 928, 413, and 350 responses respectively. Total output in $VN were May - 421,825 $VN, June - 250,900 $VN, and July - 144,000 $VN. The reduction in responses and VIP $VN output is a result of a de-emphasis on VIP and is also caused by a large decrease of available ordnance in the field for the people to find.

k. ARVN Dependent Housing continues to receive maximum technical and commodity support from the 173d Airborne Brigade. The 40th ARVN Regiment, which is currently constructing units at LZ Deg, reports as of 31 July 1969 that 3 houses (30 units) are completed, and 1 house (10 units) is under construction. As of the same reporting date, the 41st ARVN Regiment at LZ Crystal has 10 units (1 house) completed and 50 units (5 houses) under construction. The 47th Regiment at Tuy Hoa reports 10 units completed and 50 units under construction. The 22d Ordnance Company at Phu Tai reports no completions and 70 units under construction.

l. The 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry, 173d Airborne Brigade, continues unilateral sponsorship of the Ngoc Son Buddhist Orphanage in Bong Son. The 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery, 173d Airborne Brigade, continues lateral sponsorship of the Catholic Refugee Camp at Bong Son.

m. Class Number Ten of the LZ English Dispensary graduated with ceremonies on 4 August 1969, bringing the total number of graduates to 135. Class Number Eleven will begin instruction on 11 August 1969, with the students coming from the District of Tam Quan. During the past month the Dispensary treated over 800 people from the local villages.

n. Significant Pacification Items

(1) KD Cadre opened schools in 9 target hamlets during May and June. The cadre supplied teachers, and school supplies were made available through 8-5 sources and were presented to GVN officials to present to the schools, thus enhancing the GVN image.

(2) On 15 April the Hamlet of My Duc was deserted. Today 165 families, totaling approximately 450 persons have moved back to the hamlet to rebuild homes and farm their fields. Additionally, several hundred persons come daily to the hamlet to rebuild homes and to farm. It is believed that these families will eventually become permanent residents also.

(3) The hamlet of Thien Chanh in Tam Quan District had 42 persons residing there in 15 April 1969. Today there are over 1500 persons residing in the hamlet and the number continues to increase. A school is in operation using KD cadre as teachers. Fishing, the hamlets primary industry, which was nonexistent on 15 April, has resumed. A fishing fleet is escorted from the hamlet each
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The operations of National Police and US Forces and are returned each evening. On June 30 an average of 300 persons manned the fishing fleet. As of July 31, a count of 100 fishing vessels and 500 fishermen were reported making the daily trip without incident. Because of the favorable increase in number, the fishing restrictions which existed along the coastline in Thieu Chan will be lifted on 10 August 1969, allowing unrestricted fishing in offshore waters. Continued emphasis from GVN/FWI sources will insure success in this area.

(4) The 40th ARVN Regiment has been conducting Civic Action Projects in support of Pacification which include such projects as building and repairing schools and rebuilding market places. About 2 weeks ago one such project, the rebuilding of a school, was destroyed by fire. It was a VC initiated incident. The 40th ARVN Regiment took advantage of this atrocity by using extensive PSYOPS to expose the action to the people. Today the school is being rebuilt, and a tent is being used until repair is completed. LT HIEP, the 40th ARVN Regiment S-5, is doing an outstanding job in the field of Civic Action.

(5) The Parish Priest of Qui Thuan Hamlet in Tam Quan asked the District Chief for assistance in repairing the Catholic Church in the hamlet. He has moved approximately 30 individuals into the hamlet to begin repairs. Upon completion of the project, the priest will join the District Chief in appealing to former residents in various refugee camps to return. There are estimated to be several thousand refugees presently residing in refugee camps in Tam Quan, Bong Son, and Qui Phan. Additionally, assistance is being given in the repair of a small Buddhist temple at the same location. This unique project tempt refugees back to their hamlet in high expectations of success.

(6) The month of July showed significant evidence of progress toward Phase II Pacification goals. Every attempt is being made to initiate and sponsor high impact pacification projects in each of the 34 Phase II Hamlets within the Brigade Area of Operations. The Pacification effort is being scaled according to established standards of the Hamlet Evaluation System.

(7) A great stride has been made in the Northernmost District of Binh Dinh to keep the people informed of current events. The District Officials of Tam Quan District, in conjunction with the Vietnamese Information Service, are currently publishing a 4 page newspaper which is distributed throughout the district. The paper is published weekly from funds furnished by the Vietnamese Information Service, and is being received with a great deal of enthusiasm by all inhabitants of Tam Quan.

(8) Preplanned and Quick Reaction psyops support continues to produce noticeable results within the Brigade. At approximately 1110 hrs. on 31 July 1969, in the vicinity of Phu Xuan Hamlet in Hoai Phong District, 18 VC/VCI, 10 males and 8 females rallied to the GVN. They rallied to the Phu Xuan Ham-
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let Chief, who in turn delivered them to U.S. troops operating within the hamlet. Indications such as these add credence to the necessity for a wide-ranging PSYOPS Program throughout the Brigade.

(9) All levels of command in the 173d Airborne Brigade continue to give maximum support to the pacification Program. Again it should be noted that the battalion CP's are collocated within each district headquarters. This close liaison allows maximum communication, and alleviates many problems inherent to separate command posts. This type of program has increased operational efficiency, while at the same time allowing better understanding and rapport between US, ARVN, and GVN Officials. The Brigade Commander and his staff, as well as the battalion Commanders and their staffs, make every effort to personally visit and coordinate with their counterparts as well as local GVN Officials throughout the Brigade AO.
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11. personnel and Administration:

   a. General:

    (1) The Brigade personnel posture was good during the reporting period. Overall, the Brigade was overstrength 223 personnel. There were, however, certain MOS skills that were short. The shortages at the end of the reporting period were as follows:

    | MOS | Title                          | Assigned Strength | Authorized Strength |
    |-----|--------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
    | 03Z | Recreation Supervisor          | 0                 | 1                  |
    | 11D | Arm Recon Spec                 | 92                | 152                |
    | 11F | Df Op & Intel Spec            | 68                | 176                |
    | 12C | Bridge Spec                    | 1                 | 13                 |
    | 26C | Cmbt Area Srvl Radar           | 2                 | 3                  |
    | 31G | Comm Chief                     | 29                | 38                 |
    | 35L | AV Com Eqt Rpm                 | 1                 | 2                  |
    | 35W | AV Flt Cntl Eqt Rpm            | 1                 | 2                  |
    | 43K | Canvas Rpm                     | 0                 | 1                  |
    | 45G | Turrent Art Rpm                | 0                 | 1                  |
    | 45J | Acft Armament                  | 1                 | 3                  |
    | 54D | Cal Eqt Rpm                    | 3                 | 5                  |
    | 54E | Ctl Staff Spec                 | 3                 | 10                 |
    | 62F | Crane Operator                 | 0                 | 1                  |
    | 63P | Recovery Spec                  | 1                 | 13                 |
    | 68H | Acft Turbine Engine Rpm        | 0                 | 1                  |
    | 71E | Court Rptr                     | 0                 | 1                  |
    | 71G | M& Records Spec                | 0                 | 1                  |
    | 71M | Chaplain Asst                  | 4                 | 6                  |
    | 71N | Movement Spec                  | 2                 | 3                  |
    | 71P | Flgt Oper Coordinator          | 0                 | 1                  |
    | 71T | Maint Data Spec                | 2                 | 42                 |
    | 76J | M& Sup & Parts Spec            | 0                 | 1                  |
    | 81A | General Draftsman              | 1                 | 2                  |
    | 84G | Photo Lab Spec                 | 1                 | 2                  |
    | 91C | Clinical Spec                  | 11                | 16                 |

   b. Personnel:

    (1) The strength of the Brigade as of the last day of each month was as follows:

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SUJBJFCT Operational Report Lessons Learned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>ACC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>6600</td>
<td>7091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>6482</td>
<td>6963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present for duty</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) May:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present for duty</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) June:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>June</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present for duty</td>
<td>398</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Losses and gains by month were as follows:

(a) May:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Losses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>1 0 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>0 3 97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLA</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DELEG  &amp; ETS</td>
<td>44 10 20 674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRANSFERS</td>
<td>6 0 62 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NONHOSTILE HOSP</td>
<td>- - 190 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>54 10 995 869</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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2. Gains:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>RN</th>
<th>AGC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reassignment</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>634</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NONHOSTILE HOSP

| Hosp Returnees | 213 | 214 |
| Total | 66 | 10 | 847 | 923 |

(b) June:

1. Losses:

| KIA | 0 | 13 | 15 |
| WIA | 10 | 0 | 68 | 78 |
| MIA | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| DECS & ETS | 33 | 4 | 747 | 754 |
| TRANSFERS | 7 | 1 | 38 | 46 |
| 0 | 0 | 62 | 62 |
| TOTAL | 52 | 5 | 929 | 989 |

2. Gains:

| Reassignment | 43 | 5 | 966 | 1014 |

Hosp Returnees

| 2 | 0 | 173 | 175 |
| Total | 45 | 5 | 1139 | 1189 |

(c) July:

1. Losses:

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1. OFF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>DEROS &amp; ETS</th>
<th>TRANSFERS</th>
<th>NON-HOSTILE HOSP</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Gains:

Reassignment 53 4 1042 1099
Hosp Returnees 5 0 142 147
Total 58 4 1184 1246

(3) Key personnel losses and gains: Key personnel losses and gains, to include principal heads of staff sections, special staff sections, and battalion commanders were:

(a) LOSSES

Maj William P. Deveaue - HHC/BDE
Maj Tommy M. Partin - Co A (Admin)
Maj Peter P. McKenzie - HHC/2/503d
Maj Chris Peg - Co A (Admin)
Maj Dean F. Schnoor - HHC/2/503d
Maj William Hudson - HHC/BDE
Maj James E. Crouch - Co A (Admin)
Maj Paul H. Ray - Co A (Admin)
Maj Walter J. Werner - HHC/BDE

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(b) JUNE:

GAINS

Col Donald F. Blets - HHC/BDE
LTC Paul D. Fisher - HHC/1/503d
LTC James F. McCluskey - HHD
MAJ William A. Mitchell - HHD
MAJ Albert H. Wilson III - HHC/BDE

LOSES

Col Joseph R. Franklin - HHC/BDE
LTC Frank A. Henning III - HHC/1/503d
MAJ Gordon R. Cooley - HHD
MAJ Karl F. Schmid - HHC/BDE
MAJ Ronald A. Lawrence - HHC/BDE

(c) JULY:

GAINS

LTC Patrick J. Hessian - Bde Chaplain
LTC John R. Martin Jr. - CO, 3/319th
LTC John N. Gilbert - CO, 1/50th
MAJ John J. Treanor - Bde Surgeon
MAJ Robert G. Rohland - CO, Spec Trps Bn
MAJ Thomas E. Noel III - Bn 3, 3/319
MAJ Donald J. Soland - Bn 3, 3/503
MAJ Lilburn L. Myers - En XO, 2/503
MAJ Booty G. Ballew - En XO, 2/503
MAJ Craig A. Hegan - Bde S3 Plans
MAJ Darrell C. Houston - En 3, 4/503
MAJ William C. Chase - Asst Bde S3
MAJ Tedd M. Lewis - En XO, 4/503

LOSES

LTC James R. Woodall Jr. - CO, 1/503
LTC Joseph J. Lessczynski - CO, 3/319
LTC Robert A. Puts - XO, 1/503
LTC William P. Winkler - Bde Surgeon
MAJ Henry Boyer Jr. - XO, 2/503
MAJ John O. Bihler - XO, 3/503
MAJ Palmer McGraw II - S3, 3/503
MAJ James D. Stanton - CO, Sp Trps Bn
MAJ Richard A. Schmidt - Ch, HHD

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(4) Awards and Decorations: There were a total of 1709 awards for valor and meritorious service during the reporting period. A breakdown follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY 0</th>
<th>JUNE 0</th>
<th>JULY 0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Cross</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver Star</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legion of Merit</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldier's Medal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star (Valor)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star (Merit/Achievement)</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal (Valor)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal (Service)</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal (Valor)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal (Merit/Achievement)</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple Heart</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>652</strong></td>
<td><strong>713</strong></td>
<td><strong>744</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Discipline, Law and Order:

(1) The 173d Military Police Platoon is based on a six squad structure. For the entire month of July, the platoon headquarters and four squads (4) were supporting the Commanding General, 173d Airborne Brigade and his staff at LZ English. One squad (-) remained in support of the 3d battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry at Bao Loc. A two man liaison team remained in Phu Bai in support of the CO, 173d (Abn), Support Battalion. One squad (-) remained in support of the 4th battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry at LZ North English. One MP NCO remained attached to the Provost Marshal, Qui Nhon ASC for liaison purposes.

(2) Base Camp Operations (LZ English)

(a) Commitments which were maintained on a daily (24 hour) basis for the reporting period were:

Three Desk Clerks
Three TOC Guards
Two CG Guards
Two Walking Patrols (Bong Son)
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Two Man Defile (Pong Son)
Fourteen Motorized Patrolmen (6 patrols)

(b) Three Desk Sergeants were maintained during the reporting period operating on a shift basis. The three Desk Clerks are also working on this shift basis.

(c) Due to non-availability of personnel, the last five days of May and all of June, there were only three Gate Guards. There were six Gate Guards for the month of July.

(d) A total of nine indigenous personnel (Interpreter) were processed by the Brigade Provost Marshal's Office for issuance of USARV Form 361, Standard passes, during the reporting period.

(e) The number of detainees processed by the 173d Military Police during the reporting period are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prisoners of War:</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Defendants:</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innocent Civilians:</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees:</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chieu Hoi's</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(f) There were thirty-six convoy/VIP escorts performed by the 173d Military Police during the reporting period.

(g) There is no registration of privately owned weapons done at the Brigade level. All registration is done at USARV Provost Marshal Office. All the necessary forms and information are available at the Brigade Provost Marshal's Office. With the exception, in an emergency situation, when an export license has not been received prior to departure of the owner of the weapon, the Brigade Provost Marshal's Office can prepare a certificate for the Vietnamese Customs Export to serve as a temporary export license.

(h) The following is a breakdown of all violations recorded at the Brigade Provost Marshal Office during the reporting period:

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Non-Traffic Violations: 323
CID Cases: 83
Traffic Violations: 89
Traffic Accidents (at fault): 20
Traffic Accidents (Fatalities): 3

(3) Tactical Support:

(a) During the reporting period the 173d Military Police Platoon was in operational support of AO Lee (LZ English) and 3/503d Inf, Task Force South (Boa Loc).

(b) The total number of detainees processed by each area of operation:

AO Lee: 189
Boa Loc: 0 (173d MP's presently does not have capability to operate a detainee collection facility).

(4) Staff Judge Advocate:

(a) The discipline of the Brigade has been good during this reporting period. In addition to the activities listed below, the SJA Section gave 20 commander's briefing, reviewed 11 reports of survey, and 15 board proceedings.

(b) Legal assistance was rendered to 649 personnel. This includes brigade and non-brigade personnel.

(c) Article 15 nonjudicial punishment were 636. The following is a breakdown of personnel punished:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. E-4 &amp; below</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. E-5 &amp; above</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Officers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) The following is a breakdown by month of the type of court-martial cases for the Brigade during this reporting period:

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1. General:
   - May: 1
   - June: 4
   - July: 0

2. Special:
   - May: 37
   - June: 23
   - July: 47

3. Summary:
   - May: 2
   - June: 2
   - July: 

(a) Personnel Property Claims Processed were 7.

(b) Development and Maintenance of Morale:

   (1) Morale within the brigade remained excellent due to increased and improved services and facilities.

   (2) Finance: The Brigade's Finance Section (Company "A" Admin) continued to provide financial support throughout the reporting period. Newly arrived replacements were made aware of the Soldiers Savings Program and the various allotments available to them through orientations and various newsletters. The total payments processed were as follows:

   (a) Regular Monthly Payments: $21,556.00
   (b) Partial Payments: $5,027.00
   (c) Mac Payments: $2,885.00
   (d) Total Payments processed and made: $29,428.00

   (3) Chaplain:

   (a) General: During this reporting period religious activities were widespread. There was good coverage of all units in the brigade. The location in which these activities occurred were base camps, areas of operation, check points, strong points, observation points, and hospitals. They occurred on both group and individual levels.

   (b) Hospital visits continued to be made as often as was possible. BG Barr s, upon his assumption of command, began the policy of visiting each hospital in the brigade area of operations at least once weekly. These visits are much appreciated by wounded and sick personnel.

   (c) Character guidance briefings continued to be made available to commanders during the reporting period.

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(d) Total services conducted and attendance during the quarter were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Protestant</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>11,203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Catholic</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>6,483</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. Administration Services:

(1) Postal Services

(a) General: Postal services were good with incoming mail being received on 92 out of 92 days. The average time in transmission of mail from San Francisco to actual recipient in field locations was 7 days. Outgoing mail was dispatched on 92 out of 92 days. The average time of transmission of the mail from the sender to the APO in San Francisco was 5 days.

(b) Mail processed (pounds)

1. May:
   a. Received: 86,345 lbs
   b. Dispatched: 31,800 lbs

2. June:
   a. Received: 64,600 lbs
   b. Dispatched: 27,416 lbs

3. July:
   a. Received: 71,700 lbs
   b. Dispatched: 19,767 lbs

(c) Total amount of money orders sold:

1. May - $369,459.08 (average purchase $75.00)
2. June - $233,721.65 (average purchase $75.00)
3. July - $290,481.66 (average purchase $50.00)
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(d) Total amount of postage and parcel post fees was as follows:

1. May - $9,564.43
2. June - $2,495.00
3. July - No report

(2) Special Services Activities:

(a) May:

1. General: The Special Services program continued during the month of May with R&R being the main attraction.

2. There were no USO shows during the month of May.

3. Number of R&R's:
   a. In-country: Allocated - 63, Used - 63
   b. Out-of-country: Allocated - 525, Used - 588

4. There were a total of 1212 films shown during the month of May.

5. The Brigade Band played 12 shows during May. The attendance was 3,000.

6. The photo lab was used by 194 personnel during May.

(b) June:

1. General: Special Services activities continued with R&R continuing to be the main attraction.

2. There was 1 USO show during the month of June with an estimated attendance of 400 personnel.

3. Number of R&R's:
   a. In-country: Allocated - 63, Used - 63
   b. Out-of-country: Allocated - 507, Used - 540

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4. There were a total of 466 films shown during the month of June.

5. The Brigade Band played 14 shows and the attendance was 3,000.

6. The photo lab was used by 107 personnel during the month of June.

(c) July:

1. General: R&R remains the main Special Services attraction.

2. There were 3 USO shows during the month of July. The attendance was 1650 personnel.

3. Number of R&R's:

   a. In-country: Allocated - 63, Used - 63
   b. Out-of-country: Allocated - 438, Used - 553

4. There were 466 films shown during the month of July.

5. The photo lab was used by 117 personnel during the month of July.

6. The Brigade Band played 10 shows in July with an attendance of 2850 personnel.

(3) Public Information Office Activities:

   a. General: The mission of the brigade information office is twofold. First is the coordination and conduct of a command information program that serves the needs of the Commanding General. Second, is the preparation and conduct of a public information program that provides a record of newsworthy events and combat action by the Brigade. Numerous public information releases, cleared through the USARV Information Office, supported the second part of the mission. It is often impossible to separate the command information function from the public information function; i.e., besides serving the command information function, the Brigade's yearbook, magazine and newspaper will also serve as public records of the Brigade's activities.
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(b) Significant Coverage: The Brigade Information Office made maximum utilization of personnel to insure adequate coverage in the Brigade's area of operation. Significant coverage for the reporting period was given to civic action programs throughout the Brigade's area of operation. Coverage of enemy activities involving the elements of this Brigade was given maximum support by the staff of the Information Office.

(c) Information Activities:

News Releases: 51
Formal Interviews and Briefings: 65
Hometown News Releases: 1176
Hometown Pictorial Releases: 38

(d) Major projects produced during the period:

Newspaper "Fire Base 173"
Quarterly Magazine, Sky Soldier
Brigade Yearbook
General's Scrapbook
12. Logistics:
   a. General:
      (1) May:

      There were no critical shortages of food or associated products during May. Class I continued to be provided by the FSA's of respective 1st Logistical Support Command. Resupply of barrier material continued on an area basis. Resupply of Class II, IV, VII, and VIII, other than barrier materials, continued to An Khe from Qui Nhon and were hauled using truck convoy. No supply problems were encountered with Class II supplies. No serious problems were encountered in obtaining Class V support. No problems were encountered in obtaining Class VIII supplies.

      Emphasis was placed on relocating the battalion supply operations to Cha Rang Valley in the Qui Nhon area. Nearly all back up supplies were moved to that location during the period 25 thru 31 May. This activity was targeted to be fully operational at the new location on or about 7 June 69.

      (2) June:

      There were no critical shortages of food or associated products during June. Class I continued to be provided by the FSA's of respective 1st Logistical Support Command. Resupply of barrier material continued on an area basis. Resupply of Class II, IV, VII, and VIII, other than barrier materials, continued to be made to Cha Rang Valley. Bao Loc and Tuy Hoa were supported by air, while supplies to Cha Rang from Qui Nhon were hauled by truck. No critical supply problems were encountered with Class II supplies. No serious problems were encountered with Class V support, and no problems were encountered in obtaining Class VIII supplies.

      Relocation of the battalion supply operations to Cha Rang Valley in the Qui Nhon area was completed and is completely operational.

      (3) July:

      There were no critical shortages of food or associated products. Class I continues to be provided by the FSA's of respective 1st Logistical Support Command. Resupply of barrier material continued on an area basis. Resupply of Class II, IV, VII, and VIII, other than barrier materials, continued to be made from Cha Rang Valley. Bao Loc was supported by air, while supplies to Cha Rang from Qui Nhon were transported by truck.
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b. Class I  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of &quot;A&quot; rations</td>
<td>334,179</td>
<td>373,426</td>
<td>320,575</td>
<td>1,028,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of &quot;B&quot; rations</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of &quot;C&quot; rations</td>
<td>167,085</td>
<td>125,708</td>
<td>48,619</td>
<td>341,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of HRZ rations</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>23,040</td>
<td>26,640</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Significant Items Received:

(1) May

- Flame Thrower 1958-7 1 Ea  
- Gen Set 0.3 KW AC 400cy 2 Ea  
- Howitzer 105 3 Ea  
- Mortar 4.2" 1 Ea  
- Rifle 5.56mm 383 Ea  
- Telephone Set TA-312/pt 38 Ea  
- Antenna RC 292 25 Ea  
- Truck Utility 1/4 ton 9 Ea  
- Truck Wrecker 5 ton 1 Ea  
- Generator 15KW 2 Ea  
- Gen Set 1.5KW 2 Ea  
- Gen 3KW 400cy 2 Ea  
- Mortar 81mm 2 Ea  
- Pistol 45 cal 7 Ea  
- Telephone Set TA-1/pt 20 Ea  
- Trailer Tank 1/2 ton 4 Ea  
- Truck Van Shop 1/4 ton 1 Ea  
- Truck Bump 5 ton 2 Ea

(2) June

- Antenna 292 10 Ea  
- Compressor for Din 2 Ea  
- Mask .17 med 1 Ea  
- Mask .28 Sml 160 Ea  
- Mask .28 LG 80 Ea  
- Rec Tran GRA-6 1 Ea  
- APC M-13A1 5 Ea  
- Gen 15 KW 2 Ea  
- Mask .28 Sml 10 Ea  
- Mask .28 LG 885 Ea  
- Mortar 81mm 5 Ea  
- Receiver Tran RT-524 2 Ea

(127)
### SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

**15 August 1969**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revolver 38 Cal, 2&quot; Brl</td>
<td>8 EA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig Assy Switchboard</td>
<td>1 EA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test Set TS-140/PCM</td>
<td>1 EA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck Cgo 3/4 ton</td>
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<tr>
<td>Truck Cgo 2 1/2 ton</td>
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<tr>
<td>Truck Cgo 2 1/2 ton M5A2</td>
<td>3 EA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Truck Tractor 5 ton</td>
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<td>Antenna 299</td>
<td>25 EA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cable, Tele, MK-306</td>
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<td>Carrier, Com Post</td>
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<tr>
<td>Compressor, 5CFM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Compressor</td>
<td>1 EA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Direction Finding Kit</td>
<td>2 EA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flame Thrower</td>
<td>2 EA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mask, Prot, XM-8 Med</td>
<td>1283 EA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mask, Prot, XM-8 LRG</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pistol, Cal .45 Auto</td>
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<td>M106, M64</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shop Equip, (Canvas &amp; Glass)</td>
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<td>Shop Equip, (Fuel)</td>
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<td>Shop Equip, Sal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Starlight Scope, PVS-3</td>
<td>44 EA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Night Vision, TVS-4</td>
<td>4 EA</td>
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#### Inventory of Equipment

- Gen Set, GE FU 619/H: 2 EA
- Launcher, Grenade, M79: 2 EA
- M1, 50 Cal: 7 EA
- M1, 60 Cal: 61 EA
- Mask, Prot, M7, LRG: 150 EA
- Mask, Prot, M7A1 Med: 69 EA
- Mask, Prot, M8, Sm: 80 EA
- Radio Teletype, Grc 142: 1 EA
- Trailer, 1/2 ton, M16: 2 EA
- Truck, Amb, 1/2 ton: 1 EA
- Truck, Crg, 3/4 ton: 9 EA
- Truck, Crg, 2 1/2 ton: 2 EA
- Truck, Crg, 2 1/2 ton: 4 EA
- Truck, Crg, 2 1/2 ton: 6 EA
- Truck, 5 ton Dump: 2 EA
- Truck, Utility, 1/2 ton: 10 EA
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5 August 1969

4. Confidentiel liaison is made with the JFY, DC4, and the support-
   for the DC4 Command. Current status on outstanding claims for critical short-
   ages is obtained by print-out listings furnished by supporting activities.

e. Class III

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMODITY</th>
<th>MAY</th>
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<th>JULY</th>
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<tr>
<td>Diesel (gal)</td>
<td>34,144</td>
<td>37,005</td>
<td>34,553</td>
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<tr>
<td>JP-4 (gal)</td>
<td>23,345</td>
<td>54,978</td>
<td>29,395</td>
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<td>JP-4</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>113,000</td>
<td>119,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lub (qts, 0850)</td>
<td>50 qts</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,344 qts</td>
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<td>Recoil Oil (pails)</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>92</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hyd Fluid (qts)</td>
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<td>-</td>
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f. Class V

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>JULY</th>
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<td>.50 cm</td>
<td>286,360</td>
<td>130,642</td>
<td>323,611</td>
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<td>7.62 cm</td>
<td>299,759</td>
<td>382,740</td>
<td>138,444</td>
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<tr>
<td>50 cal</td>
<td>11,144</td>
<td>14,970</td>
<td>42,221</td>
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<tr>
<td>106mm BHR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>81mm How</td>
<td>792</td>
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<td>1,976</td>
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<tr>
<td>105mm How</td>
<td>19,404</td>
<td>19,313</td>
<td>17,018</td>
</tr>
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</table>

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(129)
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AVBE-SC MTH
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

II Lessons Learned

During the reporting period, various lessons were learned. These lessons learned were drawn from the operations which occurred during the period extending from 1 May 1969 through 31 July 1969.

1. Operations:

   a. Determining Direction of Fire from Unlocated Sources: Often when a friendly position comes under mortar and/or rocket attack only one or two people or units have the launch site under observation. The immediate tendency of all personnel is to open fire in all directions. Almost invariably everyone in the area comes up on the radio making it very difficult to establish communications with the person or persons who have visual contact with the enemy. Fire control is a necessity. Prior instruction should be given to all friendly units that only those positions which can observe enemy locations should open fire. The first act of the commander should be to request that all units which have observed the enemy positions report all pertinent information to him. By following this procedure much confusion and coordination is eliminated, and a quick and accurate fire can be placed on the enemy positions.

   b. Attacking Targets Below Minimum HE QF on Red Thrust Operations: Red Thrust (artillery raid) positions are usually outside of the range fans of US artillery, and sometimes outside of all range fans. Close fire support is especially critical during a raid because of the limited resources available for self-defense. It has been noted by this unit that close support can be performed by infantry mortars, if available. If mortars are not available, targets that are below minimum quadrant elevation for HE ammunition can be effectively attacked by utilizing a short fuze setting on Firecracker ammunition.

   c. False Insertion of Recon Teams: During the insertion of a recon team, a false insertion was made. Gunships prepared the false LZ and the insertion ship touched down momentarily before inserting the team on the actual LZ approximately 1 km away. The team moved a short distance and established an OP. Remaining in the same general area for three days, they had no sightings. They then moved approximately 2 km. Subsequent to relocating they had 3 enemy observations and captured one NVA soldier. Upon interrogation the PW stated that his unit had observed the false insertion and that his unit had avoided the area of the insertion and the surrounding area for a radius of about 2 km. When he was captured he had no idea that Americans were in the area. False insertions are an effective deceptive measure for insertion of small units; however it must be recognized that enemy units will give a wide berth to any area they believe to have been an insertion site. Recon teams must have a considerable distance from any real or false insertion area to obtain maximum results.
d. Accidental discharge of M-60 Machine Guns: When the M-60 Machine gun is carried with ammunition loaded, it is not uncommon for the safety lever to be on the fire position either through neglect or contact with dense jungle. Accidental discharges have been known to occur when the trigger is struck by brush or the gunner's equipment. If the gun is unloaded, the amount of time necessary for even an expert team to put the gun into action causes the gun to be ineffective for the fleeting targets common to guerrilla warfare. The gun can be carried in the 'half cock' position. The bolt is pulled back and the chamber is inspected to ensure the weapon is clear. The feed tray cover is then closed. The bolt is eased forward so that it is no longer in the firing position. The ammunition is then fed into the weapon until it clicks into place. The weapon cannot be fired accidentally, but can be put into action simply by pulling the bolt to the rear and placing the selector on the fire position.

e. VC Mine Detection:

(1) The 4th BN (Abu) 503d Infantry has been successful in detecting and destroying 78% of all mines and booby traps encountered in its AO due to continuing efforts to educate the troops on the enemy's employment of these devices. Two recent occurrences revealed additional information which assisted in this program. In the last week of June two boobytrapped areas, through which elements of the battalion passed, were discovered well marked for easy identification by local inhabitants. In one area three sets of palm fronds were placed to the front and rear of the boobytrapped area in an X pattern. Placed beside the booby trap there was a coconut tape shaped in a figure 8 with knots tied along its length. In the other area signs displaying the words "Mau Bien" (danger) and "Can Yung" (danger area) marked the boobytrapped area.

(2) When using trails, observe the flanks and look for obvious indicators or signs that might be mine or booby trap warnings for local inhabitants. Also, heed warnings by local inhabitants and learn the Vietnamese words for mines, booby traps, danger, danger area, and other words the VC are apt to use for warnings. The interpreter can be utilized to familiarize the American personnel with these words. An awareness of these obvious danger signs is a helpful and expedient manner of reducing booby trap casualties.

f. Security during Pacification Operations: A US squad, during recent pacification operations, was situated for the night within the eastern portion of a hamlet perimeter. The unit was operating with PF elements which were securing the other sectors of the hamlet perimeter. During the night, an estimated VC platoon infiltrated the hamlet perimeter from the south and west without detection. The VC were able to move through the hamlet undetected and bring effective fire on the US position from the south and west, and from
among the hamlet houses. The US squad was able to repel the enemy attack until the reaction force arrived, but sustained casualties during the initial enemy fire because the VC had ignored the RF bunkers and concentrated all of their firepower on the US position. This incident illustrated that US elements should not rely solely on RF units for security and should plan for all around defense even when located within a friendly hamlet's perimeter. Units must stay alert for enemy attacks from unlikely avenues of approach, and keep in mind that the enemy may have detailed information on the layout of these hamlets and may know the location of security force positions.

g. VC Tactics: The 3d Platoon (Amm) 503d Inf has in the past given a wide berth to RF/PP locations to prevent contact between friendly units. However, recent experience has shown that the VC knowingly operate within RF/PP ADs and sometimes very close to RF/PP outposts. Some VC units are obtaining secure base camps or conducting operations close to static RF/PP outposts. Allied operations should not avoid these outposts on the assumption that the surrounding area will be free of VC.

h. Use of Night Observation Devices: On area type night ambushes where night observation devices are mounted on M-16 rifles, riflemen often become fatigued and make unnecessary movement in attempting to support the weapon-mounted night observation device. Recently, a unit commander instructed his area ambush elements to use M-16 bipod legs to support the weapon-mounted NMD, thus making it easier for the rifleman to handle the weapon. This measure reduced unnecessary movement and fatigue on the operator, hence, increasing his effectiveness.

i. Close In Aiming on a Platoon Size Artillery Raid: A suitable position for an artillery platoon raid is usually a very small, prominent hilltop. The restricted size of the proposed site, however, may make it impossible to use aiming posts. A 6400 mil firing capability must be established and maintained throughout the raid. To provide this capability, it is recommended that raiding platoons use two collimators per howitzer. The collimator can be emplaced much closer to the howitzer than stakes, and the irregular shape or abrupt drop off of the hilltop position will not adversely affect the laying and subsequent employment of the piece.

j. Incendiaries in Crop Destruction: A method of destroying enemy crops before they can be harvested is through the use of illuminating projectiles. These rounds can be timed to burst 50 meters above the target and will provide the necessary incendiary effects. This method has proven successful in burning off large rice fields and other enemy-cultivated crops ready for harvest.

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AVPSC/ED

DATE: 15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

k. Fire Support Base Defense: The establishment of a new FSB, especially without an infantry security force, necessitates optimum positioning of the limited security assets available to the Battery Commander. In addition to walking the perimeter, other methods must be used to ensure that all avenues of approach and probable penetration points are adequately identified and defended. It is recommended that aerial photos of the fire support base be taken immediately upon occupation of the position and at two to three week intervals thereafter. This will provide the Battery Commander with a better view of his perimeter and the surrounding area. Comparison of successive photos will disclose changes in the vegetation and other features along the avenues of approach to his position that could indicate enemy reconnaissance of his perimeter and other activity in preparation for an attack.

1. Artillery in Support of Ranger Operations: Ranger operations, because of their widely dispersed nature, create unique artillery support problems. Difficulty in obtaining current and accurate locations of Ranger teams has been experienced when the Ranger TOC was not collocated with the artillery TOC. In order to provide rapid, close support to the Ranger elements, it was determined essential that the artillery commander have a direct Ranger liaison OIC with whom he can directly coordinate fire support. Additionally, when combined raids are executed the Rangers should establish a TAC CP with the artillery element so that the fire support coordination necessary for accurate and responsive fires can be expeditiously accomplished.

m. Firing positions as Observation Posts: On platoon sized artillery raids, the howitzers are usually emplaced on a prominent hilltop to facilitate defense of the position. This type of position also provides an excellent observation post. Proper utilization of the fire base as an OP can provide significant intelligence data and additional artillery targets. Binoculars, FC scopes, and Starlight Scopes should be brought with the raiding unit and employed by as many personnel as practical. Suspected enemy trails and supply routes that can be observed from the firing position should be seeded with trip flares and other warning devices in order to provide some excellent targets. When the devices are activated, precomputed data will permit placing rapid, accurate fire on the individuals who tripped the devices.

n. Rice Extraction: Extraction of a large cache of rice is a difficult and time-consuming process if only UH-1 helicopters are utilized. A more efficient method of extraction is to use a CONEX container lifted to the cache site by CH-47 helicopter. The CONEX container is loaded with rice and hauled out by CH-47. This method reduced sorties and permits more efficient use of other air assets.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report, Lessons Learned

I. Liaison in local hamlets: On 18 April, the 3d Battalion, 503d Infantry, placed squads in 6 hamlets to work with and to assist PF platoons and RD cadre. Having troops working closely with these PF and RD cadre at the grassroots level provided an excellent added intelligence source. Almost immediately the members of both PF and RD teams began reporting reliable information on enemy activity to the US squads in the hamlets. The reports obtained and the activity observed by the troops were passed immediately to the battalion, which in turn was able to react in anticipation of enemy activity. Experience indicates that the same information forwarded through normal channels would have taken considerable longer to reach the battalion and would very likely have precluded effective reaction by the battalion.

II. Miscellaneous:

a. Armored personnel carrier M13A1: Personnel reporting for duty to the 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry have had little or no training on the Armored personnel carrier M13A1. They are ignorant of its capabilities, the maintenance required, and its different methods of employment. Each unit acknowledging these deficiencies, should incorporate a familiarization course for new arrivals into the reception and briefing schedules. Each new arrival should have at the minimum, one week intensive training with the M13A1. This procedure would eliminate many of the operational and tactical errors which occur when newly arrived, untrained personnel work with APC's.

b. Psychological Operations: Recently two VC and two civil defendents turned themselves in under the Chieu Hoi program to RD teams located in the 1-50th AO. The individuals were then turned over to Vietnamese officials. This unit received no opportunity to question the Hoi Chanhs or exploit them in any way. The ability to exploit Hoi Chanhs soon after they rally would greatly increase the possibility of influencing other members of their units to Chieu Hoi. A definite procedure should be set up so as to insure that all units concerned are able to exploit the Hoi Chanhs to the utmost.

c. Exploitation of Hoi Chanhs: Too often the people are led to believe that a Hoi Chanh is mistreated. The best method of convincing the people that this is not true is by demonstrating to them the treatment accorded a recent Hoi Chanh. It is recommended that prior to their departure to the Chieu Hoi center, the Hoi Chanhs be escorted back to their village to say good-bye to their families. Quantities of cigarettes, soap, and candy may be provided for himself and his family so that the villagers can see for themselves that Hoi Chanhs are well treated. By merely seeing the Hoi Chanh after his rallying, the villagers' fears that Hoi Chanhs are shot or mistreated are dispelled.
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AVP55-SC/HD

15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

d. Increasing the Effectiveness of Loudspeaker Missions: Loudspeaker missions are often ignored by the VC. Interrogation of Hoi Chanhs reveals that loudspeaker missions not directed at a certain group are not very effective. It is recommended that when intelligence is able to pinpoint an enemy group within a grid square, a loudspeaker mission be flown, followed by an artillery concentration. The artillery is used to emphasise the precarious position of the enemy, disrupt him, enabling potential Chieu Hois to escape from the unit. The theme used need not threaten the enemy but may stress the despair of an enemy hiding in the hills while at the same time emphasising the opportunities and care given to a Hoi Chanh. A recent Hoi Chanh stated that a mission of this type persuaded him to Chieu Ho.
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AVFA-GC (15 Aug 69) 1st Ind (C)
SUBJECT: 173d Airborne Brigade Operational Report Lessons Learned
1 May 1969 - 31 July 1969 (U)

DA, Headquarters I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350 12 SEPT 69

TO: CG, USARV ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375

1. (C) This headquarters has evaluated subject report and concurs in its
content with the following exceptions:

   a. Reference para lib: Present for duty figures should reflect 390
      officers, 37 warrant officers, 6150 M and an aggregate total of 6577 as
      of 31 May 1969.

   b. Reference para lib(4): This headquarters awarded the following awards
to 173d Abn Bde personnel:

      (1) Silver Star  
           MAY 5  
           JUNE 5  
           JULY 8  

      (2) Soldiers Medal
           MAY 4  
           JUNE 1  
           JULY 5  

   c. Reference para 3b: As of 31 July 1969 this headquarters held the
units listed below at the strengths and locations indicated:

      | UNIT          | ESTIMATED STRENGTH | PROBABLE LOCATION  |
      |---------------|--------------------|--------------------|
      | NT3           | 5725               |                    |
      | 2 VC Regt/NT3 | 990                |                    |
      | 2 VC Regt/HQ  | 370                | BS6733             |
      | 93 Bn/2d VC Regt | 200              | BS6733             |
      | 95 Bn/2d VC Regt | 210              | BS6733             |
      | 97 Bn/2d VC Regt | 210              | BS6733             |
      | 22 NVA Regt/NT 3 | 1000              |                    |
      | 22 NVA Regt/HQ | 175                | BS6337             |
      | 7 Bn/22d NVA Regt | 255              | BS6337             |
      | 8 Bn/22d NVA Regt | 280              | BS6337             |
      | X503d LF Bn     | 265                | BS8506             |
      | E210 LF Bn      | 150                |                    |

2. (C) Following comments are made reference Section II:

   a. Para 1b: Firing Table Addendum B-l, G-3 lists the appropriate
data for firing Firecracker Ammunition at close-in ranges for the 105mm
howitzer. Caution must be exercised when there are low level winds.

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5209.10
b. Para li: Concur with the employment of two collimators if there is not sufficient space for one set of aiming posts and one collimator. Collimators cannot be employed closer than 4 meters to the howitzer or farther than 15 meters from the howitzer.

c. Para lj: A better munition for incendiary effects is the white phosphorous shell with either a point detonating fuse for ground burst, or a time fuse for an air burst. The white phosphorous shell with either fuse will obtain greater area coverage than an illumination shell. In addition, the illumination shell cost $46 per shell compared to $27 for a white phosphorous shell.

d. Para lk: If the unit has a trained photo imagery interpreter, and if the FSB is to be a permanent base this technique has merit. The same information can be obtained at much less expense by allowing the battery commander to fly a visual reconnaissance prior to occupation of the position and bi-weekly thereafter.

e. Para lm: Concur. Any prominent terrain or man-made structure capable of being employed as an OP should be utilized as such.

f. Para 2b: A definite procedure has been setup in the form of Prime Ministers Directive 222, dated 15 Nov 68. English language copies of this directive have been issued to all FWMF.

g. Para 2c: Concur. This procedure does help to dispell rumors of bad treatment. It is felt that a Vietnamese staged function of this nature would have more appeal to the Vietnamese villagers than an operation conducted by "foreign devils".

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

FREDERICK E. HOLLAND
LT AGG
ASS'T AG

CP:
2 - ACSFOR, DA
1 - CG, 173d Abn Bde
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned
(1 May 1969 - 31 July 1969)

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned
for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, 173d
Airborne Brigade and concurs with the report as indorsed.

2. An apparent discrepancy in the number of enclosures exists between
the 173d Airborne Brigade's letter of transmittal and the 1st Indorsement
by I FFV. This difference is reconciled by the table of contents which
lists eight inclosures to the basic report.

3. It is noted that this report varies in format and content from that
prescribed by AR 525-15 and USARV Regulation 525-15. A USARV message
reemphasizing correct reporting procedures will be sent to all major
USARV reporting headquarters prior to 31 October 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cy furn:
173d Abn Bde
I FFV
GPOP-DT (15 Aug 69) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 173d Airborne Brigade for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 12 Nov 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]
C. L. SHORT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
CONFIDENTIAL

ORGANIZATION: 173D Infantry Brigade

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In accordance with Bda Reg No. 335-8, dated 23 February 69, the following report is submitted:

1. (C) General: The plan envisaged insertion of a platoon of artillery and 6 ranger teams into the "fishhook" area of the upper An Leo Valley to attack recent enemy buildups that are outside the range of all artillery as presently emplaced.

2. (U) Name of Operation: Red Thrust V

3. (C) Type of Operation: Combined artillery-ranger raid.

4. (C) Date of Operation: 290810 Apr to 021530 May 1969.

5. (C) Location: FSB Projo (BS681188) and upper An Leo Valley Area.

6. (C) Control Headquarters: 3d Bn, 319th Artillery.

7. (C) Reporting Officer: LTC Joseph T. Leszczynski

8. (C) Task Organization: 1 platoon of Btry D, 3/319th FA, 6 teams from Co N (Ranger) 75th Inf, one reinforced platoon from the 2nd Co, 2nd En, 40th ARVN Regiment.

9. (C) Supporting Forces:
   a. 61st Assault Helicopter Company
   b. 196th Aviation Company
   c. 203d Reconnaissance Airplane Company
   d. 355th Heavy Helicopter Company.

Incl 3
10. **Intelligence:** Order of Battle holdings list the 50th NVA Transportation Battalion as being based in the Upper An Lao Valley region. Recently corroborating intelligence reports have placed the tactical headquarters of the 2d Regiment, 3d NVA Division in the upper An Lao Valley. The Chieu Hoi, 1st, and agent reports of this move have been confirmed by increased APD and Red Haze readouts. Long range intelligence forecasts point to a general offensive toward the end of May, logistically supported from base areas in the An Lao Valley.

11. **Mission:** Battalion inserts a platoon of Battery F, 3/319th FA into FSB Projo to attack recent increases of enemy troop concentrations and provide fire support to Ranger teams conducting reconnaissance operations in the area.

12. **Concept of the Operation:** A platoon of D/3/319th FA, with a platoon of 2d Co, 2d Bu, 49th ARVN Regiment providing security, conducts a combat assault into FSB Projo. Six Ranger teams are inserted under the fan of fire support provided by the raiding platoon to conduct reconnaissance operations. The artillery provides direct support to the ranger teams, attacks targets of opportunity sighted by reconnaissance aircraft, and engages intelligence targets supplied by Brigade targeting section. Extraction is made on order after all elements have completed their mission.

13. **Execution:**

   a. The time sequence of events for Operation Red Thrust V was as follows:

   0500 Advance party departs LZ Lowboy, ARVN security platoon departs LZ English.

   0540 After gunship preparation advance party and security platoon conduct assault into FSB Projo, LZ Green, but ARVN's sustained 3 slight WIA from punji stakes implanted on the LZ.

   0935 First CH-47 sortie arrives at LZ.

   1029 Howitzers laid and ready to fire.

   1340 Hawkeye aircraft adjusted artillery on base camp area: 1 structure destroyed, rice fields burning.

   1440 Hawkeye aircraft adjusted artillery on structures, foxholes and trench complex: 2 structures destroyed, trench line neutralized.

   1810 Hawkeye aircraft adjusted artillery on base camp area: 3 structures destroyed, rice field burning.
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ATT: DDOS
SUB: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation Red Thrust V (U)

30003 Ranger team observed an unoccupied platoon size base camp. Engaged with artillery, neutralizing the base camp.

1110 Hawkeye aircraft adjusted artillery on suspected base camp area neutralized.

1142 Hawkeye aircraft adjusted artillery onto a bunker complex, 5 bunkers destroyed, several damaged.

011300 Observation Post at FSB Projo observed 2-3 VC/NVA in a ravine. Engaged with Firecracker, neg surveillance.

1305 Ranger team in contact vic B724216. Results: 1 VC/NVA KIA (SC), 1 SSS CIA. Team estimated 40 to 45 enemy in area. Ranger team extracted at 1315. Hawkeye aircraft covering extraction received automatic weapons fire (7.62 HMG or 12.7 MG) from the area of the contact. Artillery adjusted into the area resulting in a bunker complex destroyed and automatic weapons position silenced.

2121 Ranger team reported flashlights, movement, and cooking fires vic B772720L Engaged with artillery: lights and fires extinguished, movement ceased.

021030 Hawkeye aircraft adjusted artillery onto trail network and rice fields: trails interdicted, rice fields burning.

1145 Hawkeye aircraft adjusted artillery onto suspected base camp area: base camp neutralized, rice fields burning.

1200 Extraction begun.

1410 FSB Projo received 6-10 rounds of M-47 fire from South. Returned fire with M-60 MG and M79 grenade launchers.

1420 Last Chinook sortied extracted: LZ swept by gunships.

1445 Marked sniper location with smoke from C&C ship. Engaged by gunships, negative results.

1530 All elements closed back to parent unit locations: Operation Red Thrust V terminated.

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b. During Operation Red Thrust V a total of 1803 rounds were expended. This includes:

- 1626 High Explosive
- 33 Smoke
- 44 White Phosphorous
- 60 Illuminating
- 40 Firecracker

The breakdown by types of mission and rounds is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number of Missions</th>
<th>Rounds of All Types</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquired</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>212</td>
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<tr>
<td>Special</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14. (C) Combat Services, Logistics, and Administration: Ammunition should be placed in close proximity to the howitzers by the CH-47 or CH-54 aircraft so that the maximum amount of time can be utilized in preparing the position for defense against enemy attack.

15. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques:

a. Maximum utilization should be made of Army fixed wing aircraft for aerial observer missions. These aircraft should be on station as the combat assault is made so observed targets are immediately available to fire on as soon as the first howitzer is laid and ready to fire. This exploits the effect of the raid and precludes the enemy's rapid evasion of the howitzers' firepower. This rapid attack of what the enemy had formerly considered his haven deals a psychological blow that should be exploited as fully as possible.

b. Because of the necessarily small size of the fire base trash and unused powder increments become a problem. One solution is to store the powder increments in pits until just before extraction. The powder is ignited by the tracer rounds from the gunships or slicks as the sweep of the fire base is completed.

c. Illuminating shells timed to burst within 50 meters of the ground provide excellent incendiary effects on structures and rice fields.

d. High Explosive shells with M39 fuzes can be of great value in defense of the fire base. Data was precomputed to various terrain features which afforded the enemy cover and concealment. By intermittently bursting rounds in the air over those targets effective suppressive fires were delivered.
on suspected enemy sniper locations.

16. (U) Commander's Evaluation and Lessons Learned:

a. Because of the small area of the fire base close-in aiming points are difficult to establish and maintain. The raiding artillery platoon should bring two collimators per howitzer in order to facilitate the establishment and maintenance of a 6400 mil capability.

b. Ranger team emplacement of seismic intrusion devices along well used trails and streams would provide an excellent triggering device for artillery ambushes.

c. Operation Red Thrust V confirmed the increase of enemy activity in the upper An Lao Valley. The sudden exposure of enemy forces in a supposedly "safe" area to the artillery's firepower reduces the enemy's ability to launch offensive operations against allied forces. Preemptive artillery-ranger raids will continue to be made into the very lucrative target areas in the An Lao Valley.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Lawrence C. Miller
CPT, FA
Adjutant
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 3D BATTALION (105 TOWED), 319TH FIELD ARTILLERY
173RD AIRBORNE BRIGADE APO 96250

AVBE-DSOC

14 June 1969

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation Red Thrust VII (U)

In accordance with Bde Reg No. 335-8, dtd 28 Feb 69, the following report is submitted:

1. (C) General: The plan envisaged insertion of a platoon of artillery and 2 reconnaissance teams into the northeast portion of the An Lao Valley to attack a recent build up of enemy strength in the area.

2. (U) Name of Operation: Red Thrust VII.

3. (C) Type of Operation: Artillery raid.

4. (C) Date of Operation: 0630 to 1610, 6 June 69.

5. (C) Location: FSB Hawkeye (BS 799175) and surrounding area.

6. (C) Control Headquarters: 3d Battalion, 319th Field Artillery.

7. (C) Reporting Officer: LTC Joseph J. Lessczynski


9. (C) Supporting Forces:
   a. 61st Assault Helicopter Company
   b. 196th Aviation Company
   c. 203d Reconnaissance Airplane Company

10. (C) Intelligence: Recent heavy contacts in the southern portion of Quang Ngai Province indicated increased enemy activity in that area. The 3/1st Inf, Americal Division, reported repeated contacts with an undetermined size NVA

Incl 5
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation Red Thrust VII (U)

force. Airborne Personnel Detector and Infrared missions returned hot readings in the vicinity of the Quang Ngai-Binh Dinh Province boundary.

11. (C) Mission: Battalion inserts a platoon of B/3/319th FA into FSB Hawkeye to attack recent increases in enemy troop concentrations in the area.

12. (C) Concept of the Operation: A platoon of B/3/319th, with a 15 man security force from H&S Btry, conducts a combat assault into FSB Hawkeye (BS799175). Two Red Raider Teams are also inserted under the fan of fire support provided by the raiding platoon. Confirmed and acquired targets are attacked, and extraction is made in the afternoon.

13. (C) Execution:

a. The time sequence of events for Operation Red Thrust VII was as follows:

06 0630 Red Raider Teams 15 and 16 lifted off from LZ English in preparation for insertion vic FSB Hawkeye.

0650 Red Raider 15 on ground at BS 710172, Red Raider 16 on ground at BS 728219. LZ's were green, no resistance encountered.

0728 Security force lifts off from LZ Two Bits.

0730 Red Raider 16 in contact with 2 VC/NVA at BS 709172. Both individuals carried weapons and wore dirty khaki shirts and trousers. One VC/NVA KIA, the other fled.

0743 Prep of FSB Hawkeye commenced by A/6/84th FA.

0750 OA of FSB Hawkeye by security force. LZ was green.

0801 Red Raider 16 extracted as a result of earlier contact.

0825 First howitzer in position at FSB Hawkeye.

0844 Platoon laid and ready to fire.

0942 Hawkeye adjusted the platoon on a suspected base camp. Red Raider 16 reported a secondary explosion (10x15 ft.), grid BS 716229.

1025 FSB Hawkeye fired on hot APD readings expending 6 FC and 36 HE.

1042 Secondary explosion (white smoke, 20-25M high) observed while FSB
1201 Red Raider 16 observed 2 VC in the open vic BS 706234. Adjusted FSB Hawkeye onto target, observed secondary explosion 20-30m high, with white smoke and a fireball in the center.

Hawkeye fired on hooch/bunker complex vic BS 695133.

1228 Air strike put in vic BS 698148 on suspect enemy location. FAC reported that air strike drew small arms ground fire.

1259 Hawkeye aircraft adjusted FSB Hawkeye on BS 698148, where the air strike took small arms fire. Aircraft observed a secondary explosion 5 to 15 meters high, 5 meters in diameter, with white colored smoke.

1301 Hawkeye aircraft reported 2 more secondary explosions, vic BS 706234, while adjusting FSB Hawkeye on a suspect enemy location. Explosions were approximately 10-15m high, with dark smoke and no fireball observed.

1528 Both howitzers closed back to LZ Two Bits.

1545 Red Raider 15 was extracted.


b. During Operation Red Thrust VII a total of 543 rounds of all types were expended. This included:

487 HE
30 WP
20 HC
6 FC

14. (C) Combat Services, Logistics, and Administration: One CH-47 sortie for the extraction can be eliminated; by rigging the expended brass in the nets or A-22 containers used for the piggyback loads on the insertion. Two nets (crossed) or a net and an ammo tarp must be used; about 300 shell casings can be loaded with each howitzer.

15. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques:

a. Clearing the raid position: If it is possible to make a reconnaissance a day or two prior to the raid, artillery smoke or WP rounds should be fired on the raid site. These rounds do an excellent job of burning off grass and dust that would be a fire hazard to the raiding platoon if it were left there.
b. Establishing direction: On a small raid site it is usually necessary to set up the aiming circle much closer to the guns than is normally recommended. Because of this, the aiming circle must be oriented before the howitzers arrive so that the magnetic azimuth will be valid. In order to prevent an error in direction as a result of the aiming circle’s being blown or knocked over, the following technique was found useful: Place an M-60 round or some similar object in the ground beneath the plumb bob. Once the aiming circle is magnetically oriented, the instrument reading to an easily identifiable point on the skyline is recorded. This field expedient “orienting station” and “end of the orienting line” will provide the battery commander an accurate, easily reproducible azimuth reference throughout the operation.

16. (C) Commander’s Comments

a. Battery Commander

(1) When going into a very small raid site, special attention must be placed on the 6400 mil firing capability (6400 mil) for both guns, low and high angle. If aiming posts and collimators cannot be placed at the preferred deflections, distant aiming points can be utilized to cover any “blind spots” in the 6400 mil traverse.

(2) It is essential that the first howitzer in have a piggyback with smoke and WP in it. In the event that a ranger team gets in contact, the artillery will be able to provide safe and accurate fires with no undue delay.

b. Battalion Commander: The six secondary explosions triggered by artillery fire from FSB Hawkeye and the contact made by Red Raider 15 confirmed the increase of enemy strength in the area. The raid neutralized many hard targets and destroyed valuable enemy supplies. The economy of force coupled with the great destructive power of an artillery raid has again proven to be an invaluable weapon.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

LAWRENCE G. MILLER
CPT, FA
Adjutant
THE PURPOSE OF THIS BRIEFING IS TO DESCRIBE OPERATION WASHINGTON GREEN FROM CONCEPT THROUGH PLANNING TO EXECUTION, AND TO REPORT PROGRESS AS OF 30 JUNE, THE END OF PHASE I.

OPERATION WASHINGTON GREEN WAS DESIGNED TO FOCUS THE MAJOR EFFORT OF THE 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE ON SUPPORT OF PACIFICATION IN AO LEE, COMPRISING THE NORTHERN FOUR DISTRICTS OF BINH DINH PROVINCE (CHART 1). PRIOR TO INITIATING THE OPERATION ON 15 APRIL, ONLY 37% OF THE POPULATION OF APPROXIMATELY 350,000 OF THESE FOUR DISTRICTS WAS UNDER GVN CONTROL, VARYING FROM ONLY 9.9% IN TAM QUAN TO 66.9% IN HOAI AN. GENERALLY SPEAKING, THIS POPULATION WAS WITHIN ONE KILOMETER OF THE TWO MAJOR HIGHWAYS, 1 AND 3A. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE OPERATION WAS TO ASSIST GVN IN BRINGING ALL THE POPULATION UNDER GVN CONTROL BY THE END OF 1969.


ALTHOUGH THERE WERE NO MAIN FORCE ENEMY UNITS OPERATING WITHIN AO LEE, THERE WERE NUMEROUS SMALL LOCAL FORCE UNITS BASED IN THE MOUNTAINOUS AREAS ADJACENT TO THE RICELANDS OF THE FOUR DISTRICTS. THESE UNITS, CONSISTING OF VC DISTRICT LOCAL FORCE COMPANIES, VC VILLAGE GUERILLA PLATOONS AND VC HAMLET SQUADS, PREYED ON THE POPULATION OUTSIDE OF THE GVN SECURED AREAS, EXTORTING FOOD, MONEY AND MANPOWER FROM
THE HAMLETS. WHILE NOT A MAJOR THREAT TO U.S. OR REGULAR ARVN FORCES, THESE ELEMENTS PRIOR TO 15 APRIL HAD EFFECTIVELY CONTROLLED THE CIVILIAN POPULATION—IN SOME AREAS FOR AS FAR BACK AS 1945 DURING THE VIET MINH DAYS.


IN ADDITION TO THE FOREGOING, AND SINCE EXECUTION OF THE GVN PACIFICATION PLAN AT DISTRICT LEVEL WAS TO BE THE PRIMARY MISSION OF THE BRIGADE, I ALSO DIRECTED THAT MY BATTALION COMMANDERS COLLOCATE THEMSELVES, THEIR TACTICAL HEADQUARTERS AND THEIR MAJOR COMMUNICATIONS TERMINAL WITH THE DISTRICT CHIEF AND HIS STAFF AT DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS. SPECIFICALLY, I DIRECTED THAT THE PRIMARY PLACE OF DUTY FOR BATTALIONS S2'S WOULD BE IN THE DIoCC AND THE BATTALIONS S3'S IN THE DISTRICT TOC. Thus, the 1/50 (MECH) IS AT PHU MY TOWN IN PHU MY DISTRICT, SHARING THE UNDERGROUND TOC WITH THE VIETNAMESE DISTRICT AND MACV ADVISORY STAFFS; THE 1/503 IS AT LZ ORANGE IN HOAI NHON DISTRICT; THE 2/503 IS AT BONG SON IN HOAI NHON DISTRICT; AND THE 4/503 IS AT LZ TOM IN
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TAM QUAN DISTRICT. THE COLLOCATION OF BATTALION AND DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS HAS BEEN THE KEY TO OUR SUCCESS IN OPERATION WASHINGTON GREEN.

AS PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED THE OBJECTIVE OF THE OPERATION WAS TO BRING ALL THE POPULATION IN AO LEE UNDER GVN CONTROL. THIS WAS TO BE DONE HAMLET BY HAMLET IN EACH DISTRICT IN TWO PHASES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE OVEP TINH BINH DINH PROVINCE PACIFICATION PLAN. IN PHASE I, TO BE COMPLETED BY 30 JUNE, THERE WERE 24 TARGET HAMLETS IN THE BRIGADE’S PORTION OF THE FOUR DISTRICTS, AS SHOWN BY THE RED DOTS (CHART 1). THE BLUE DOTS REPRESENT THE ADDITIONAL 34 TARGET HAMLETS SCHEDULED TO BE UPGRADED TO A, B OR C SECURITY STATUS IN PHASE II, ORIGINALLY TO BE COMPLETED BY 31 DECEMBER 1969, BUT SUBSEQUENTLY MOVED FORWARD TO 31 OCTOBER. TO ACHIEVE SECURITY STATUS OF C OR BETTER, EACH TARGET HAMLET MUST HAVE A PF PLATOON RECRUITED AND ORGANIZED FROM ITS OWN POPULATION TO PROVIDE AREA SECURITY WITHIN THE HAMLET BOUNDARIES PLUS A PEOPLE’S SELF DEFENSE FORCE, OR PSDF, TO PROVIDE INTERHAMLET SECURITY WITHIN SUBHAMLETS OR GROUPS OF HOMES. INTERHAMLET, OR VILLAGE SECURITY, AND BACK UP REACTION FORCES FOR THE PF PLATOONS ARE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF DISTRICT RF COMPANIES. WHEN THESE PSDF, PF AND RF FORCES ARE ORGANIZED, EQUIPPED AND TRAINED TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR MISSIONS IN ALL THE HAMLETS, THEN AND ONLY THEN CAN ARVN FORCES BE FREED FROM THE POPULATED AREAS TO PREVENT INVASION ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES AND TO SEARCH OUT VC/NVA FORCES IN MOUNTAIN AND JUNGLE BASE AREAS. AT THIS POINT IN TIME U.S. AND OTHER FREE WORLD FORCES WILL NO LONGER BE REQUIRED IN SOUTH VIETNAM. IT IS THE CURRENT MISSION OF THE 173D BRIGADE TO ASSIST GVN IN DEVELOPING THE EFFECTIVE PSDF, PF AND RF FORCES NEEDED BY AND IN SUPPORT OF EACH TARGET HAMLET TO INSURE ITS LASTING SECURITY AGAINST VC ATTACKS AND INTIMIDATION.

IN FURTHER ANALYZING OUR TASK, WE RECOGNIZED THAT ANOTHER MAJOR FACTOR WOULD BE GAINING THE CONFIDENCE AND FAITH OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE, WITHOUT WHICH PROGRESS WOULD BE SLOW. TO FOSTER THIS FAITH AND CONFIDENCE IN LONG TERM GVN SECURITY, WE PLANNED OUR COMBINED RF/PF AND U.S. DISPOSITIONS SO THAT EACH SECURITY ELEMENT, ONCE
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ASSIGNED TO A HAMLET OR GROUP OF HAMLETS, WOULD REMAIN UNTIL AGreed PACIFICATION GOALS HAD BEEN ACHIEVED. THESE GOALS, IN ADDITION TO THE EFFECTIVE PSDF, PF AND RF FORCES DISCUSSED PREVIOUSLY, INCLUDED ELECTED HAMLET CHIEFS LIVING DAY AND NIGHT IN THE HAMLET, EFFECTIVELY FUNCTIONING HAMLET GOVERNMENT, ELIMINATION OF GUERILLAS AND VC FROM THE HAMLET, RESETLEMENT OF REFUGEES, ATTENDANCE IN SCHOOL BY AS MANY CHILDREN AS POSSIBLE, AND INVOLVEMENT OF THE PEOPLE OF THE HAMLET IN SELF-HELP PROJECTS AND PROGRAMS RESPONDING TO THEIR CC: ASPIRATIONS. ANTICIPATED BENEFITS, WHICH HAVE SINCE BEEN PROVED, ACCRUING FROM THIS: CONCEPT OF COMBINED U.S. - RF/PF EMPLOYMENT HAVE INCLUDED COMPLETE FAMILIARITY OF U.S. AND GVN FORCES WITH THE AREA AND THE TERRAIN, AND STRONG IDENTIFICATION OF THESE FORCES WITH THE PROTECTED HAMLETS AND VICE VERSA. THIS CLOSE AND CONTINUOUS ASSOCIATION HAS BEEN A KEY FACTOR IN THE TRANSFER OF ALLEGIANCE OF THE PEOPLE FROM THE VC TO GVN, EVEN IN HAMLETS WHICH HAVE NEVER BEEN UNDER ANY KIND OF GVN AUTHORITY.

AS THE EXECUTION DATE OF 15 APRIL APPROACHED, I INITIATED A CAMPAIGN TO REORIENT MY COMMANDERS AND TROOPS. I EMPHASIZED TO THEM ALL THAT NO LONGER WOULD WE BE CHASING AND KILLING THE VC/VNA IN THE UNPOPULATED JUNGLE AND MOUNTAINOUS AREAS. EVEN MORE IMPORTANT, BODY COUNT WOULD NO LONGER BE THE CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS. INSTEAD, WE HENCEFORTH WOULD BE SECURING THE PEOPLE AND THEIR HOMES AND FARMS. OUR AIM WOULD BE TO DENY THE VC THEIR SUPPORT FROM THEIR HAMLETS, WITHOUT WHICH THEY COULD NOT SURVIVE. TO MY COMMANDERS I EMPHASIZED THESE CHALLENGES: THAT THEIR TROOPS MUST NOT BECOME COMPLACENT OR DEFENSIVE Minded; THAT THEIR UNITS WOULD HAVE TO PATROL ACTIVELY AND AGGRESSIVELY, CONSTANTLY ON THE MOVE TO DENY THEMSELVES AS TARGETS FOR THE ENEMY LOCAL FORCE UNITS AND GUERILLAS AND TO INCREASE THE ENEMY'S RISK OF DETECTION; THAT U.S./GVN SQUADS AND Platoons WOULD HAVE TO OPERATE PRIMARILY AT NIGHT, AS DID THE ENEMY. TO THE TROOPS I EMPHASIZED THE GREAT CONTRIBUTION THEY WERE MAKING TO THE PEOPLE OF VIETNAM, THAT THEY WERE ALLOWING THE PEOPLE FOR THE FIRST TIME IN MANY YEARS TO LIVE IN SECURITY IN THEIR OWN HOMES, TO FARM THEIR FIELDS WITHOUT

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FEAR TO RESTORE THEIR WAY OF LIFE, TO SEND THEIR CHILDREN TO SCHOOL ONCE AGAIN, AND TO LIVE IN PEACE AND DIGNITY UNDER LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF THEIR CHOICE.

AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE WASHINGTON CONCEPT WAS ASSUMPTION OF THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION (LOC) SECURITY MISSION WITHIN THE BRIGADE'S AO ALONG HIGHWAYS 1 AND 3A. IN COORDINATION WITH THE RESPECTIVE DISTRICTS WE HAD, BY 21 APRIL, COMPLETED A TIME-PHASED SCHEDULE OF RELIEVING SIX RF COMPANIES AND 14 PF PLATOONS FROM THEIR BRIDGE BUNKERS AND HIGHWAY OUTPOSTS. ASSUMPTION BY BRIGADE OF THIS LOC SECURITY MISSION HAS HAD TWO IMPORTANT RESULTS. FIRST, THERE HAVE BEEN NO INCIDENTS OF VC INITIATED DAMAGE TO THE HIGHWAYS WITHIN THE BRIGADES AO'S, WHEREAS PREVIOUSLY WE WERE EXPERIENCING ABOUT ONE BLOWN CULVERT PER WEEK. OF EVEN GREATER IMPORTANCE, THOUGH, WAS THE RELEASE OF A SIZEABLE FORCE OF RF/PF BACK TO THEIR PRIMARY ROLE OF PROVIDING SECURITY AND SUPPORTING PACIFICATION IN THE TARGET HAMLETS. IN THIS ROLE THEIR EFFECTIVENESS HAS IMPROVED MUCH MORE THAN IT COULD HAVE HAD THEY REMAINED IN THEIR STATIC POSITIONS ALONG THE HIGHWAYS.

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ALTHOUGH PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PACIFICATION EFFORT FALLS UPON VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES UNDER THE CENTRAL DIRECTION OF PRESIDENT THIEU, WE FELT THAT THERE WAS MUCH THAT OUR U.S. SOLDIERS COULD CONTRIBUTE IF THE ENTIRE EFFORT WERE TRULY INTEGRATED. CONSEQUENTLY, MY GUIDANCE THROUGH BATTALION AND COMPANY TO PLATOON WAS FOR ALL LEADERS TO ASSIST THEIR OPPOSITE VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS, BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN, IN ALL ASPECTS OF PACIFICATION--SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL AS WELL AS MILITARY. INITIAL EMPHASIS, OF COURSE, WAS ON PROVISION OF SECURITY TO TARGET HAMLETS, SINCE WITHOUT SECURITY NONE OF THE GOALS CAN BE REALIZED. EVERY EFFORT THEREFORE HAS BEEN MADE TO UPGRADE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RF/PF FORCES IN THE BRIGADE'S AO. IN EFFECT, SEVERAL THOUSAND SOLDIERS OF THE BRIGADE HAVE BECOME ADVISORS TO THE RF/PF THEREBY MASSIVELY AUGMENTING THE LIMITED EFFORT OF SOME TWELVE MACV 5-MAN ADVISORY TEAMS CHARGED WITH IMPROVING THE 27 RF COMPANIES AND 52 PF PLATOONS IN THE BRIGADE'S PORTION OF AO LEE. BRIGADE ELEMENTS CONDUCT COMPLETELY INTEGRATED OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS WITH THEIR COLLOCATED RF OR PF ELEMENTS, AND CONSTANTLY TRAIN THEIR COUNTERPART RF OR PF SOLDIERS IN MARKSMANSHIP AND SMALL UNIT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND OPERATIONS, AS EXEMPLIFIED BY THIS JOINT PATROL. INITIALLY, U.S. AND RF OR PF CONDUCT OPERATIONS ON AN INTEGRATED BASIS, WITH PERHAPS EACH PROVIDING HALF THE PATROL OR AMBUSH UNIT. OVER A PERIOD OF TIME, THE U.S. MEMBERSHIP IS REDUCED UNTIL HAMLET SECURITY OPERATIONS ARE CONDUCTED ON AN ALTERNATING BASIS BY EITHER THE U.S. OR THE RF OR PF ELEMENT. AT THIS POINT IN TIME THE RF OR PF CAN STAND ON ITS OWN AND U.S. PRESENCE IN THE HAMLET IS NO LONGER NECESSARY. RESULTS OF THIS PROGRAM HAVE BEEN MOST GRATIFYING

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ALREADY IN PHASE II. FOR EXAMPLE, WE HAVE SEEN CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATIONS PLANNED BY AND EXECUTED UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE DISTRICT CHIEF, WITH RF COMPANIES AN PF PLATOONS CONDUCTING COMBAT ASSAULTS BY HELICOPTER, WITH NO U.S. ASSISTANCE OR ADVICE OTHER THAN PROVIDING THE AIRCRAFT.

IN ADDITION TO THE ON-THE-JOB SORT OF TRAINING JUST DESCRIBED, THE BRIGADE HAS HAD IN OPERATION FOR ONE YEAR AN RF/PF LEADERSHIP SCHOOL. THIS SCHOOL CONSISTS 10-DAY COURSES FOR RF/PF NONCOMMISSIONED AND JUNIOR COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, ALMOST A THOUSAND OF WHICH HAVE GRADUATED AND RETURNED TO THEIR RF/PF UNITS IN THE BRIGADE'S AREA OF OPERATIONS.

CONCURRENTLY WITH UPGRADING THE RF/PF, THE BRIGADE HAS ALSO FORMED SECURITY TRAINING ASSISTANCE GROUPS, OR STAG'S, AS WE CALL THEM. IN EACH BATTALION AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY THESE GROUPS TRAIN THE PSDF--THE PEOPLE'S SELF DEFENSE FORCES--IN MARKSMANSHIP, WEAPON CARE AND CLEANING, NIGHT PATROLLING AND AMBUSH TECHNIQUES, AND SENTINEL TYPE DUTIES. UPON GRADUATION AFTER A FIVE-DAY, 40 HOUR COURSE, THE PSDF ARE ASSIGNED THE WEAPON WITH WHICH THEY TRAINED EACH DAY AND RETURN TO THEIR HOMES TO ACT AS THE HOME GUARD IN THEIR SUBHAMELTS, OR NEIGHBORHOODS, THUS AUGMENTING THE SECURITY PROVIDED BY THE HAMLET'S PF PLATOON. BY MID-JULY, THE BRIGADE HAD TRAINED 700 PSDF.

PROVIDING AND ASSURING THIS LONG TERM SECURITY FOR THE HAMLETS HAS CONVINCED THE PEOPLE THAT THE GVN CAN AND WILL PROVIDE A SHIELD FROM VC INTIMIDATION. SUBSEQUENT RESPONSE FROM THE PEOPLE HAS EXCEEDED OUR MOST OPTIMISTIC EXPECTATIONS, AS EVIDENCED BY THE FOLLOWING SEVERAL EXAMPLES.

IN TAM QUAN DISTRICT, THE HAMLET OF QUI THUAN USED TO BE A PREDOMINANTLY CATHOLIC HAMLET. HOWEVER, A FEW YEARS AGO NVA FORCES AIDED BY LOCAL VC OVERRAN THE HAMLET, TERRORIZED THE CATHOLIC CITIZENRY AND ALL BUT DESTROYED THEIR CHURCH. MOST OF THE PEOPLE FLED FROM THE AREA AND HAVE SINCE BEEN LIVING IN REFUGEE CAMPS SCATTERED THROUGHOUT BINH DINH PROVINCE. BY 23 APRIL OF THIS YEAR IT WAS BEGINNING TO BE
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P R O T E C T  T H E  F R U I T S  O F  T H E I R  L A B O R.


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Refugees in other coastal villages or in the secure urban areas along Highway 1. Not only did the restriction impose a hardship on the people of Thiên Chanh and adjacent fishing hamlets, but it also effectively eliminated half of the rice-and-fish economy of Tam Quan. On 20 April when a U.S. airborne platoon and a RF platoon jointly moved into Thiên Chanh along with the hamlet chief and the RD team, there were only 42 inhabitants present. These hardy individuals were making their living by fishing furtively in the restricted zone whenever the U.S. and Vietnamese Navy patrol boats were out of sight. Recognizing that security alone would not be enough to attract the people back, and that their fishing industry had to be reestablished, the district chief requested assistance from the brigade in obtaining relief from the fishing restriction. A procedure was thereupon worked out with the U.S. and Vietnamese Coastal Surveillance Unit by which an exception could be made to allow the people to fish. On a daily basis now, the fishing fleet assembles near the inlet entrance where the hamlet chief checks passenger identification and cargo aboard. The fleet is then escorted by a Boston Whaler through the three kilometer restricted zone to unrestricted waters where the fishermen can fish. In the afternoon at an appointed time and place, the boats rendezvous and are accounted for, are escorted back through the inlet and are inspected and released by the hamlet chief. The number of boats has steadily risen from the original five to over 100 with 500 fishermen by mid-July, and now includes an increasing number of boats and fishermen from the adjacent hamlets of Trương Xuân and ʿIán Thanh. But what is more important, the daily catch of fish has recreated a booming economy in Tam Quan. Old Tam Quan market, deserted last March as it had been for years, is now alive with people every afternoon; and where three months ago there were only 42 people in Thiên Chanh, there are now almost 2,000. This represents a sizeable decrease in the refugee population of Tam Quan.

Turning now to Hoài Nhơn District, on 15 April the hamlet of My Đức at the .
MOUTH OF THE AN LAO VALLEY WAS DESERTED. NOT A PERSON LIVED THERE, NOT A BUILDING
WAS STANDING. ONCE RICH AND FERTILE RICE PADDIES LAY FALLOW. LONG SINCE ABANDONED.
TERRORIZED BY REPEATED VICIOUS ATTACKS BY THE NVA; TAXED, ROBBED AND IMPRESSED FOR
LABOR BY HARD CORE VC, THE PEOPLE OF MY DUC, ALL OF WHOM OWNED THEIR LAND, FINALLY
GAVE UP AND FLED AS REFUGEES TO BONG SON IN 1965, WHERE THEY HAVE SINCE LIVED IN A
TYPICAL TEMPORARY RESETTLEMENT CAMP. PHASE I OF THE DISTRICT PACIFICATION PLAN IN-
CLUDED THE HAMLET OF MY DUC. THE DISTRICT CHIEF WAS ANXIOUS TO HAVE THE HAMLET RE-
POPULATED--IT WOULD REDUCE HIS REFUGEE PROBLEM AND GETTING THE RICE FIELDS TO PRO-
DUCE AGAIN WOULD BOLSTER THE ECONOMY. ON 15 APRIL COMBINED U.S. AND RF SECURITY
ELEMENTS MOVED INTO MY DUC HAMLET. FOR SOME TIME THEY REMAINED BY THEMSELVES.
THEN AS THE PEOPLE BEGAN TO BELIEVE THE FORCES WERE GOING TO STAY, A FEW OF THEM
BEGAN TO MAKE THEIR WAY OUT TO THE AREA DAILY TO GRAZE THEIR CATTLE, IN SPITE OF
A FAIRLY LARGE STREAM THAT HAD TO BE FORDED AND WHICH WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO CROSS
IN THE MONSOON SEASON. AT ONE TIME THERE HAD BEEN A BRIDGE, BUT THE VC HAD LONG
SINCE DESTROYED IT. AS INTEREST PICKED UP THE PEOPLE INDICATED THAT IF THE BRIDGE
WERE REPAIRED AND THE ROAD REOPENED THEY WOULD MOVE BACK TO MY DUC. BRIGADE
ENGINEERS REBUILT THE BRIDGE AND EVERY DAY THE SECURITY ELEMENTS AT MY DUC WERE
RESUPPLIED BY ROAD INSTEAD OF HELICOPTER. WITH THE ROAD OPEN, MORE AND MORE
PEOPLE BEGAN TO COME TO MY DUC TO GRAZE THEIR CATTLE AND TILL THE SOIL, BUT FEW
WERE BUILDING HOMES. THE PROBLEM WAS A MATTER OF ESTABLISHING MUTUAL TRUST--THE
DISTRICT WOULD NOT PROVIDE ASSISTANCE UNTIL THE REFUGEES DEMONSTRATED THEIR INTENT
TO RESETTLE, WHILE THE REFUGEES WOULD NOT BEGIN TO RESETTLE UNTIL DISTRICT PRO-
VIDED THE MONEY AND MATERIALS WITH WHICH TO BUILD THEIR HOMES. AT LENGTH A MUTUAL
UNDERSTANDING WAS REACHED AND THE PEOPLE BEGAN TO BUILD IN MY DUC. BY THE END OF
PHASE 1, ON 30 JUNE, THERE WERE OVER 160 FAMILIES LIVING IN MY DUC NIGHT AND DAY--
ALONG WITH THE HAMLET CHIEF AND HAMLET COUNCIL, AND RICE FIELDS WERE ONCE AGAIN
BEING PREPARED FOR PLANTING.
IN HOAI AN 100% OF THE POPULATION WAS UNDER GVN CONTROL BY THE END OF PHASE I ON 30 JUNE. THE REQUIREMENT FOR PHASE II WAS TO MOVE A FEW OF THE HAMLETS FROM THEIR EXILE LOCATIONS BACK TO THEIR ABANDONED PERMANENT SITES WHERE THEY WERE ALREADY FARMING THEIR HAMLET RICE PADDIES. DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF PHASE I, FROM 15 APRIL TO 30 JUNE, THERE HAD BEEN NOT A SINGLE ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENT IN THE DISTRICT.

WE--AND BY WE, I MEAN THE PROVINCE AND DISTRICT CHIEFS AND THEIR ADVISORS AS WELL AS MY BATTALION COMMANDER AND MYSELF--WE THEREFORE DECIDED TO PHASE OUT ALL U.S. ELEMENTS FROM THE DISTRICT EARLY IN PHASE II, THUS MAKING HOAI AN A TEST CASE OF WHETHER AN ENTIRE DISTRICT COULD BE SECURED ONLY BY ITS TERRITORIAL FORCES AND PSDF. CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS AND VC PROPAGANDA HAD INDICATED THAT THE VC/NVA WERE WAITING FOR U.S. FORCES TO LEAVE AND THAT THEREAFTER THEY WOULD MOVE BACK IN TO TAKE OVER THE POPULATION. BY 1 AUGUST ONLY TWO U.S. COMPANIES WILL STILL BE IN HOAI AN, AND ONE OF THESE IS SCHEDULED TO LEAVE ON 15 AUGUST. THE REMAINING COMPANY WILL BE MOVED OUT AS SOON AS WE FEEL IT POSSIBLE TO DO SO. AS YET, THERE HAS BEEN NO EVIDENCE THAT THE VC/NVA HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO CARRY OUT THEIR THREAT.

ASSUMING OUR PROGRAM OF GRADUAL COMPLETE REMOVAL OF U.S. FORCES FROM HOAI AN IS SUCCESSFUL, THE SAME CONCEPT WILL BE FOLLOWED IN THE OTHER THREE DISTRICTS AS THE PSDF AND RF/PF ACHIEVE THE CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE CONTINUOUS LONG TERM SECURITY TO THE POPULATION.

I WOULD LIKE NOW TO GIVE AN OVERALL PROGRESS REPORT OF THE BRIGADE'S EFFORT IN SUPPORT OF PACIFICATION. ONE OF OUR MOST DIFFICULT TASKS HAS BEEN TO FIND WAYS OF MEASURING OUR PROGRESS OTHER THAN BY COUNTING ENEMY DEAD BODIES.

THIS FIRST CHART (CHART 2) REFLECTS THE SUCCESS OF THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM. NOTICE THE PEAK IN APRIL, WHICH REALLY REPRESENTS ONLY THE TWO WEEKS REMAINING IN APRIL AFTER OPERATION WASHINGTON GREEN KICKED OFF. IN HOAI NHON ONLY THREE VC HAD RALLIED IN THE SIX MONTHS PRECEDING THE COMBINED MOVE INTO THE PHASE I TARGET HAMLETS. DURING THE NEXT TWO WEEKS OVER 40 RALLIERS CAME DOWN FROM THE POPULATION.
IN **"A"** OF PHASE I THERE HAVE BEEN 115 HOI CHANS IN AO LEE.

THIS CHART (CHART3) SHOWS PROGRESS IN THE FOUR DISTRICTS IN ELIMINATING THE VIET CONG INFRASTRUCTURE. AGAIN, THE SAME PEAK IN APRIL, WITH A TOTAL IN PHASE I OF 347 VCI NEUTRALIZED.

IN ADDITION TO THE 115 HOI CHANS AND 347 VCI ELIMINATED, THERE WERE 468 VC/NVA KILLED OR CAPTURED DURING PHASE I. THE GRAND TOTAL OF THESE LOSSES TO THE ENEMY IS 930, A REDUCTION OF 15 PERCENT IN THE ESTIMATED TOTAL ENEMY STRENGTH AT THE BEGINNING OF PHASE I OF 5500 VC MAIN AND LOCAL FORCE, VCI AND VILLAGE AND HAMLET GUERRILLA.

IF THE REPORT OF A GUERRILLA CAPTURED IN HOAI NHON IN MID-JULY IS CORRECT, THE ATTRITION OF ENEMY STRENGTH SINCE THE FIRST OF THIS YEAR IS FAR MORE THAN THE 15 PERCENT JUST MENTIONED. UPON INTERROGATION, THIS GUERRILLA STATED THAT HE WAS THE LAST LEFT ALIVE OF HIS 22-MAN VILLAGE GUERRILLA PLATOON, ALL THE OTHER 21 HAVING RALLIED OR BEEN KILLED.

THIS CHART (CHART 4) SHOWS THE PHENOMENAL RESPONSE OF THE VIP—THE VOLUNTEER INFORMANT PROGRAM. THIS PROGRAM INVOLVES PAYMENT IN PIASTRES ACCORDING TO PRESCRIBED AMOUNTS TO VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS WHO FURNISH INFORMATION OF THE ENEMY OR WHO TURN IN WEAPONS AND MUNITIONS. DURING PHASE I APPROXIMATELY 1500 INDIVIDUALS WERE PAID A TOTAL OF ALMOST ONE MILLION PIASTRES, ROUGHLY 10,000 DOLLARS, FOR INFORMATION AND ITEMS RANGING FROM RIFLES AND ROCKET LAUNCHERS TO CLAYMORE MINES AND 175MM ARTILLERY SHELLS. THESE MUNITIONS AS BOOBY TRAPS BY ENEMY HANDS COULD HAVE INFLECTED HEAVY LOSSES AMONG U.S./GVN TROOPS. MUCH OF THE SUCCESS OF THIS PROGRAM WAS DUE TO ITS DECENTRALIZATION WITHIN THE BRIGADE TO COMPANY AND PLATOON LEVEL, COUPLED WITH FACE TO FACE DISSEMINATION OF LEAFLETS ADVERTISING THE PROGRAM WITHIN HAMLETS.

ANOTHER STATISTICAL MEASURE OF PROGRESS IN THE RF/PF KILL RATIO. BEFORE
OPERATION WASHINGTON GREEN THIS RATIO FOR ALL THE RF/PF UNITS IN THE FOUR DISTRICTS WAS 1.6 TO 1 IN FAVOR OF FRIENDLY UNITS. BY THE END OF PHASE I ON 30 JUNE, THIS RATIO FOR RF/PF UNITS ASSOCIATED WITH BRIGADE ELEMENTS INCREASED TO 4 TO 1. BY MID-JULY IT FURTHER INCREASED TO 3 TO 1.

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As a final overview, (Chart 6) the total effect of our effort and that of the 40th and 41st ARVN regiments in terms of population under GVN control in A, B or C category hamlets is reflected on this chart. The apparent regression in Tam Quan District is due to more objective and accurate evaluation at the end of May than at the end of April. Figures at the bottom are for all of AO Lee, and indicate a doubling of population control in phase I.

These charts and figures are only partial indications of our success, the really meaningful ones are the smiles I see on the peoples faces as I walk through hamlets that two months ago I found dangerous to fly over, and the confidence that is exhibited by RF/PF planning and executing day and night offensive operations. Other meaningful and heart warming indications are children attending school for the first time in several years, if not their lives; roads long in disuse being repaired or new roads being put through to hamlets that have always been isolated; instances where wives have gone into VC-dominated hills to have their husbands surrender and rally to the government; and increasingly frequent occasions where villagers turn in munitions, or point out booby traps to U.S. or GVN troops, and identify VC sympathizers, guerrillas and members of the infrastructure. You have to see the thriving activity of the market place in Tam Quan, or fly over the tin roofs of my Duc, or watch the prideful progress of church renovation in Qui Thuan, or look at the fallow rice paddies of Hoai Nhon turn green with newly planted rice, before the charts and figures become really meaningful.

In summary, I emphasize that Operation Washington Green is producing unanticipated excellent results. Our success is based on many things, the three most important being:

First, the integrated U.S./GVN effort at district, village and hamlet level, in response to a single plan--the District Pacification Plan.
SECOND, INCREASED EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RF/PF--THE BACKBONE OF PACIFICATION SECURITY--THROUGH CONSTANT DAILY ASSOCIATION WITH SIMILAR SIZED U.S. ELEMENTS, TO INCLUDE COMBINED OPERATIONS AND TRAINING AND MUTUAL COMRADESHIP.

THIRD, CONVINCING THE PEOPLE THAT SECURITY FORCES ARE THERE TO STAY FOR AS LONG AS THE JOB TAKES.

I FEEL CONFIDENT THAT WITH CONTINUED EFFORT WE WILL ATTAIN OUR GOAL OF 100% OF THE POPULATION IN THE FOUR NORTHERN DISTRICTS OF BINH DINH UNDER GVN CONTROL BY THE END OF THIS YEAR.
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 173d Airborne Brigade

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May 69 to 31 July 69.