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SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: BG Carleton Preer, Jr.,
Deputy Senior Advisor, III Corps and III Corps Tactical Zone,
Period 1 May 1969 to 30 November 1969 (U)

1. Reference: AR 1-26, subject, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U)
dated 4 November 1966.

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of BG Carleton Preer, Jr., subject
as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized
from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in
accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be
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2

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SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report

BG Carleton Freer, Jr.
Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Attached are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report prepared by BG Carleton Freer, Jr., Deputy Senior Advisor, III Corps and III Corps Tactical Zone for the period 1 May 1969 to 30 November 1969.

2. BG Preer is recommended as a candidate guest speaker at joint colleges and appropriate service schools.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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HEADQUARTERS
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US MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96227

3 December 1969

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report

Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam

JTN: AVHGC-DST
APO 96375


2. This report is submitted in accordance with cited references. It covers the period 1 May 1969 to 30 November 1969, during which period I was assigned as Deputy Senior Advisor, III Corps and III Corps Tactical Zone. In the appendices that follow the report sets forth in detail the accomplishments, the residual problems, and recommended actions for each of the functional areas in which the III Corps Advisory Group has responsibilities. In addition, supporting reports from the Senior Advisors of the three divisions of III Corps are attached as inclosures. The following paragraphs highlight those areas which I consider to be the most critical to ARVN at this time—critical to the extent that they bear a high relevance to the ability of ARVN to take over the ground combat role in Vietnam on a time schedule acceptable to the United States.

3. Leadership:

a. The Corps Commander, Lieutenant General Do Cao Tri, continues to perform in an outstanding manner. By any acceptable criterion he measures up as a top flight Corps Commander. He is highly receptive to suggestions from Lieutenant General Julian J. Ewell, his US counterpart, but at the same time tactfully maintains the strength of his convictions. He is energetic, dynamic, and a broad gauge thinker. His attitude and outlook regarding ARVN taking over heavier responsibilities for their defense is positive and optimistic, tempered by a realistic approach to the critical timing inherent in the Vietnamese takeover. In the final analysis, the impressive progress made by III Corps during this period must be attributed primarily to the outstanding leadership qualities of the Corps Commander and to the splendid rapport which has existed between the Corps Commander and the Senior Advisor, III Corps.
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MACCZ-III

4 December 1969

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report

b. Since mid-summer the most pressing problems of leadership facing III Corps at the higher levels of command has largely been resolved. The new division commanders in the 5th Division and 18th Division have brought new expertise, new energy, and a new sense of direction to these divisions. Based on their performances thus far, it is expected that these commanders will continue to grow with the job and will mature into highly effective division commanders.

c. On the other hand, leadership problems at the middle and lower levels will continue to plague the ARVN for sometime to come. This is due simply to the lack of depth in leadership resources. There are glaring exceptions to this generality: the commanding officer of the 8th ARVN Regiment is one of the most outstanding regimental/brigade commanders I have known in any army; on the other hand another regimental commander in the same division is one of the weakest. Under the US Army, this weakness would be resolved simply by replacing the ineffective commander with a new one from the comparatively large pool of highly qualified potential commanders. But the realities of the leadership situation in ARVN is such that under present circumstances, ARVN in most instances simply does not have a better regimental commander to put into the slot. Until an effective resource of leadership has been developed, the ARVN Army must expect to remain behind the power curve in battlefield leadership. Nonetheless if we view the situation from what might be considered the "acid test" in the Vietnam situation, there appears to be growing evidence that the quality of leadership in the Vietnamese Army may be equal to or may even surpass that found presently in VC and NVA units.

4. Personnel:

a. A major problem still unresolved in III Corps concerns the personnel strength or manning of the divisions. Many of the weaknesses observed on the battlefield flow either directly or indirectly from the shortage of personnel. The low strength in combat units undermines morale, reduces combat effectiveness, and saps staying power.

b. Several factors bear on personnel shortages: the highly centralised, unresponsive personnel replacement system of JGS; the prevailing high desertion rates; poor recruiting results; and in some divisions a high malaria rate. Each of these factors have been recognised and assessed within III Corps, and positive programs have been initiated at both the corps and division levels to get them in hand and to produce meaningful results in terms of improving the strength of tactical units. Results thus far have not been spectacular, although the trend in each of these areas is moving in the right direction. As a result of these programs, I expect that by mid-spring 1970 this fundamental strength problem in III Corps will be largely under control.
5. Combat Operations:

a. ARVN combat operations have progressed satisfactorily during the period covered by this report. Presently the three ARVN divisions are achieving approximately 50% utilization of available companies on offensive operations; this is about the maximum level which can be sustained on a continuing basis with their three-company battalions. The percentage of companies conducting night combat operations doubled, going from 24% in June to 47% in October. The ARVN to VC/NVA kill ratio has increased from 4.3:1 in May to almost 8:1 in October. The kill ratio for the divisions in night operations has increased to 16:1.

b. All indications point to the fact that ARVN units are becoming progressively more effective on the battlefield. Nevertheless, there remains an urgent need to develop within ARVN units a level of technical proficiency nearer to that of US units. With this in mind, the Commanding General, III Corps and the Senior Advisor, III Corps initiated the Dong Tien (Progress Together) Program. This program, designed to improve the combat effectiveness of ARVN units by US/ARVN combined planning and operations, commenced in July and by October 50% of all ARVN divisional operations were of this type. This program has produced good results both in terms of enemy forces eliminated and in terms of increasing the professionalism of ARVN units. The ability of ARVN to take over successfully from American troops may be determined largely by their ability to master within the next few months the battlefield techniques and the facility in employment of supporting weapons at a level comparable to that of US forces in Vietnam.


a. There is a real need for a fourth organic-rifle company in the ARVN battalion. The addition of this company would substantially increase the combat and staying power of the battalion, it would improve the tactical flexibility of the battalion, and it could readily be accommodated within the present span of control of the battalion. In my judgement the overall benefits to be gained from such a change would warrant a conversion of spaces from territorial forces if a force structure increase is not feasible.

b. As the ARVN divisions move out into more active operations and over wider areas the need for increasing the mobility and the command and control capability of the regimental commander becomes more critical. Eventually organizational changes—and in the interim dedicated support—should provide command and control helicopter support for the regimental
commander which would meet these minimum needs: some (approximately three hours) blade time every day; a command and control ship available immediately upon contact with the enemy by elements of his regiment; and during heliborne operations by elements of his regiment. This support roughly parallels that which is provided the US battalion commander. It is doubtful if the ARVN regimental commander can do his job acceptably with any less support than this.

7. Logistics: ARVN command organizations have to make their supply and maintenance systems work. In many cases, advisors must coax their counterparts into placing requisitions and follow-up on items not received. Equipment, supplies, and repair parts are often available through ARVN channels, but commanders and staff personnel have not yet learned to place demands on their own system. The equipment modernization program has rapidly replaced obsolete equipment, but it also has created problems in the lack of personnel with the expertise to maintain it. Emphasis must be placed on training qualified technicians and mechanics as quickly as possible.

8. Advisory Personnel: The advisory effort will perhaps be with us for some time to come, and the effectiveness of the advisory effort is determined by the quality of people assigned to this effort. Therefore, only top-flight personnel should be used. This is especially important during the period when the US is reducing its forces and ARVN progressively is shouldering a greater share of the responsibility for the war effort. Realistically, the same criteria used to select commanders of US brigades should be applied in the selection of division senior advisors, and the same criteria used to select commanders of US battalions should be used in selecting regimental senior advisors. All other positions within the advisory effort should be filled by individuals possessing the highest qualifications.

9. Conclusion: III Corps and the divisions of III Corps have made genuine progress in the last seven months. They still have problems—big problems—but these are recognized by the people who can do something about them and they are becoming manageable. If the overall trends of III Corps over the past half year vis-à-vis the VC/NVA trends in III CTZ for the same period can be maintained, I am confident that III Corps will be able to take over the ground combat role on a time schedule acceptable to the United States.

CARLTON PREER, JR.
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy Senior Advisor
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APPENDIX I

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

1. (C) General. Substantial improvement in the personnel and administrative field has been made in III CTZ during the past seven months. The GI's of the 5th and 25th Division are no longer being advised on a full time basis because of their ability to perform their duties in an outstanding manner. Desertions continue to be excessive, but progress is being made in reducing the overall rate during CY 69. The Commanding General, III CTZ has taken positive steps to reduce the desertion rate. His policies and guidance to the field concerning desertions promise further reduction. A grade imbalance exists in field and company officer grades resulting in more than 88% of tactical units being commanded by individuals of a lower grade than authorized. Of the 36 infantry battalions, 23 are commanded by Captains. III Corps tactical units also suffer from a lack of rank and experience in middle enlisted grades. The III Corps prisoner of war camp has continued to show improvement in the areas of administration, PW training and security. Although established to be a youth rehabilitation center, it has been necessary to process and intern considerably more prisoners than the present facilities can accommodate adequately.

2. (C) Accomplishments:

a. Considerable progress has been made in the recruiting of personnel into RVNAF. 80 RF Companies and 167 PF Platoons have been activated in III CTZ during CY 69. Personnel to fill these platoons and companies were recruited early during the activation phase and were present to commence training as scheduled. Recruiting was accomplished successfully for 9 force structure increase units during the period of 1 May to 30 November. Fill of personnel was accomplished in a very timely manner. Recruiting in the three divisions of III Corps has progressed satisfactorily, with the 18th Division making the most improvement. (See Tab A)

b. During May 69 the test phase of Division Combat Assistance Advisory (DCAAT) concept was completed in the 25th Infantry Division. During the test, emphasis was placed on continuous TOC operations, coordination of all US furnished combat and combat service support, monitorship of combined planning, and responsiveness to US requirements for analysis, reports and evaluation. The advisory effort was concurrently reduced in areas where ARVN is considered self-sufficient. The DCAAT concept is being tested in the 5th Division at the present time and will culminate on 30 November 1969.
c. The III Corps Commander has given much personal attention to the
desertion problem. In March 1969, he directed that Divisions, sub regions,
sector and special zones activate a desertion prevention committee not
later than 1 April 1969. These committees are required to study the
desertion problems in their respective units and report to a committee
at Corps. The committees were directed to study transportation for
soldiers going on leave, family housing, financial problems, leave
policies, and indoctrination and orientation of soldiers, particularly
recruits. The combined efforts of ARVN Commanders, supervisory personnel
and unit advisors have resulted in a favorable downward trend in ARVN
during CY 69 as compared to CY 68. ARVN Commanders are beginning to
recognize the serious ramifications of desertions and are displaying an
interest in desertion control directives and policies. (See Tab B and C)

d. The III CTZ prisoner of war camp made significant improvements
in all areas of administration and operations. A third compound was
completed which increased the rated capacity to 3000 PWs. Since the camp
was designated as the central facility to maintain custody over amputees,
youths and pregnant women, the PW population rose from 3000 to approximately
4000. Custody of this large number of PWs is being maintained without
an increase of custodial personnel, by improvements in personnel manage-
ment, physical barriers, political indoctrination, vocational training,
education, useful labor projects, health and sanitation. Within the last
three months, effective education, labor, farming and vocational
programs have finally been established; dental treatment initiated and
camp sanitation immensely improved. PW files have been updated and general
administration improved. The overall improvement in the operation of the
camp has been so extensive that large numbers of PWs have requested
repatriation to the "Chieu Hoi" program and have demonstrated their
sincerity by voluntarily tattooing their arms with the words "Kill Communists".

e. Military Police operations have been widely expanded within
III CTZ. The 12th QC Battalion was activated, trained, equipped and is
presently operational in Saigon and Gia Dinh Province. The equipment of
the three QC battalions assigned or attached to III Corps was modernized
and brought to acceptable operational readiness levels. Training of QC
personnel reached levels approaching US MP standards. Since the receipt
of sufficient communications and transport equipment operational techniques
of the ARVN military police have begun to revolve away from the stationary
checkpoint system to the more flexible patrol method. Combined police
operations were expanded and immediate ARVN QC support is presently
available to US military police operations throughout III Corps.

3. (C) Residual Problems:

a. Notwithstanding the effort and progress noted above, the desertion
rate continues to be a major problem area. Desertions continue to cause
extreme personnel turbulences within the unit with a high rate and are a
heavy burden for the military and law enforcement agencies. Desertions limit the maintenance of force levels, and cause an excessive expenditure of resources in procurement and training recruits.

b. The shortage of middle grade leaders and grade imbalances which exist in the ARVN command structure constitute another major problem area. (See Tab D) The number of ARVN Commanders who have achieved the required intermediate and advanced levels of schooling at the command and staff school is very limited.

4. (C) Recommendations:

a. That emphasis on the programs to reduce desertions be continued and constantly re-examined to take advantage of new approaches on methods to improve command leadership.

b. That the expansion of facilities at officer and NCO schools be accelerated to increase the number of school trained leaders and more rapidly improve the qualifications of the ARVN officer and NCO Corps.
1. (C) **Accomplishments:**

   a. There has been a steady increase in the exchange of intelligence information at all levels between ARVN and US/FW forces, resulting in improved joint operations, and a more timely exploitation of perishable information.

   b. The ARVN Order of Battle files at Corps level reflect a marked improvement, and several comprehensive studies of enemy units in III Corps have been published based on these files.

   c. Continuing and significant progress has been made in agent systems throughout the Corps, to include more timely reporting of agent information, better control of finances, and an increased awareness of strategic and tactical targeting.

   d. A program has been initiated, in conjunction with II FFORCEV, for the training and implementation of a ground sensor system (TIGHTJAW) for the ARVNs in III Corps.

   e. A recently implemented program has all aerial photography requests initiated by the ARVN Divisions, passing through ARVN channels to MACV, with only advisor supervision. This program replaces one in which the requests were passed from the Division to Corps via ARVN channels, and from Corps to MACV, through II FFORCEV, via advisor channels.

   f. The III Corps Interrogation Center, since becoming fully operational in June/July 1969, is well established as a vital coordinating center for the exploitation of human sources. Important sources are interrogated at the center, using essential elements of information (EEI) from tactical units in III Corps Tactical Zone. The ARVN staff has achieved the expertise to become fully responsible for operation of the facility, with only minor assistance from the advisory staff. The advisory element has changed from extract translations to translation summaries of ARVN reports, to insure timely dissemination of interrogation reports. A complete ARVN report is forwarded with each summary.

2. (C) **Residual Problems:**

   a. Although progress has been noted, the dissemination of ARVN produced hard copy intelligence information to subordinate and lateral units in a timely manner continues to be a problem. Directly contributing to this...
problem is a situation frequently encountered within many of the G2 staff
sections, wherein reports may not be dispatched, and information which has
been analyzed, may not be disseminated to subscribers without the personal
authorization of the G2.

b. One of the main problems which precludes the ARVN's from achieving
and maintaining a complete and viable information gathering and intelligence
producing capability, is their primary use of contact information (PW/Hoi
Chanh interrogations) and Agent Reports, without collating it with other
information mediums or intelligence systems and methods. The lack of training
for ARVN personnel in Infra-red imagery, Side-looking-airborne-radar
(SLAR) and airborne personnel detection system (SNIFFER) products contributes
to this problem. II FFORCEV is presently establishing an on-the-job train-
ing program whereby limited numbers of ARVN Imagery Interpreters can receive
some training in both infra-red and SLAR imagery; however, this limited pro-
gram will not allow the ARVN's to integrate information gained from these
systems into their overall intelligence information gathering program.

c. A shortage of sophisticated photo interpretation equipment leaves
ARVN technicians with the capability to develop intelligence information
from hard copy contact photo prints only. They cannot proceed to the more
efficient and accurate methods of interpretation from film negatives and
positives without light tables and more sophisticated equipment.

d. Specific Information Collection Requirements (SICR) validated by
MACV continue, with rare exception, to be received only by the US Advisor
at the Corps Interrogation Center. These requirements are answered as
quickly as possible only because of the rapport developed between the ARVN
OIC and the US Advisor. A system of paralleling these SICR's through ARVN
channels is necessary to insure continuity in rapid responses.

3. (C) Recommendations:

a. There is little doubt that small progress can be made in the area
of reducing the basic one-man concept found in many of the G2 sections;
however, continued advisor emphasis should be placed in this area.

b. Programs for training ARVN's in the interpretation of infra-red,
SLAR and SNIFFER products need to be established, so information from these
systems can be fully integrated into the ARVN intelligence collection system.

c. Sophisticated aerial photography interpretation equipment, coupled
with necessary training programs, need to be added to ARVN equipment lists
to allow more efficient and accurate film interpretation.

d. That steps be taken to insure SICR's for collection by interrogation
are disseminated through both ARVN and US Advisory channels.
1. (C) GENERAL: Combat operations by III Corps units have increasingly become more aggressive and offensive in nature over the past seven months. While the enemy has increased his efforts to avoid contact, ARVN units have sought him out in his sanctuaries and have made every effort to force him to fight. Improvement in ARVN combat effectiveness is evidenced by the improved kill ratio of almost 3:1 in October as contrasted to 4.3:1 in May (See Tab A). A major contribution to this increase was an impressive 10.5:1 kill ratio by the 10th Division for the 3rd quarter of 1969. The number of maneuver battalions available to the commander for combat operations increased considerably. At present, eight battalions remain under the operational control of Province Chiefs leaving 20 out of 36 maneuver battalions available to the commander in May only 21 battalions were available. The Nong Tien (progress together) program initiated jointly by CO, II CTZ and CO, III CTZ has had far reaching effects upon RVNAF units of III Corps. Nong Tien has influenced their motivation from commanders down to the privates, greatly improved their intelligence capability, increased their air mobility and fire support, and upgraded the quality of combat operations to include results. The activation of two artillery battalions and two armored cavalry regiments increased the firepower of III Corps units considerably.

2. (C) ACCOMPLISHMENTS:

a. Tactical Operations: Since May 1969 there has been a steady trend of overall improvement in the combat effectiveness in RVNAF units in III Corps. Presently the three ARVN infantry divisions are achieving approximately 50 percent utilization of their available companies on offensive operations. The percentage of companies conducting night offensive operations doubled by going from 24 percent in June to 47 percent in October (See Tab B). The results on offensive night operations have also improved. The kill ratio for the three divisions on night offensive operations in October was 16:1.

b. Armored Cavalry Regiments: The three divisional Armored Cavalry Regiments (ACR) which historically have functioned as a local security force are also being used much more effectively. Only one cavalry regiment fell short of the goal of 15 mission days on combat operations during October. LTG Tri, III Corps Commanding General, has now taken strong command action to improve utilization of III CTZ armored cavalry regiments and has recognized the need for education of his subordinates in the capabilities and offensive employment of these units. He has arranged and scheduled courses for all senior commanders and staff officers in preventive maintenance and armor employment. The classes are scheduled to begin on 5 January 1970 and will be presented by combat experienced US Armor officers. This, it is believed, will focus their attention on the inherent responsibilities and requirements incident to JGS making armor organic to the divisions.
c. Fire Support: In September, the number of forward observers per 105mm howitzer battalions was increased from 9 to 15 and the number in the 155mm howitzer battalion increased from 9 to 12 enhancing the maneuver battalions capabilities to obtain responsive fire support. III Corps utilization of artillery, tactical air and helicopter gunship fire support was well above average for the 3rd quarter of 1969 when compared with the other three ARVN Corps, but ARVN still needs to gain experience in the proper use of this fire support. When this occurs ARVN kill ratios should improve.

d. Training: III Corps takes full advantage of both national specialist and division training facilities and has more than filled their monthly school quotas. Each month additional specialist quotas are requested and filled. The 18th Division Training Center has recently moved to Black Horse to make use of the improved facilities vacated by the US 11th ACR.

Since August, 4 battalions of the 5th Division and 3 battalions of the 10th Division have completed battalion refresher training and one more battalion in each of the three divisions is presently in training. Supervised individual marksmanship programs in each of the divisions have been established and each month there has been steady improvement in the percentage of personnel receiving this training.

c. Plans: Each of the divisions have shown improvement in their staff procedures and planning. Advanced planning of resupply convoys has minimized the necessity for emergency rotary wing resupply missions. Additionally, through the Dong Tien program, commanders at battalion and regimental level are learning the value of prior planning through jointly planned operations with the US units.

2. Vietnamization of the Saigon Defense: In October, the last US maneuver unit was withdrawn from CID. The Saigon area is now completely defended by RVNAF forces with the exception of one US 155mm howitzer battery which will be replaced when an ARVN artillery battery becomes available.

a. Airmobile Operations: The Dong Tien program has had considerable impact upon ARVN airmobile operations. RVNAF ground forces have become increasingly aware of the mobility and flexibility of airmobile operations. There has been a sharp increase in the number of company size and smaller unit air assaults (See Tab C). Eagle Flight operations have been stressed, and are being employed extensively in the 31st BTA.

3. Residual Problems: The specific problems themselves have remained unchanged during the last seven months, but efforts to overcome and solve them were significant.

a. Leadership: The most pressing problem continues to be leadership. The C's of the 5th and 10th Divisions were replaced recently with two aggressive, and offensive minded generals and they have begun to weed out the ineffective commanders and key staff officers. The junior officers are beginning to take the initiative and are being given more freedom to take action on their own; however, much improvement is still needed in this area.
b. Night Operations: Earlier this year night operations were generally ineffective and the results compared to the effort spent were negligible. Since May 1969 there has been a significant upward trend in the number of available companies utilized on night offensive operations, the most significant increase being in the months of August - October as depicted by the chart at Tab 3. There was a 33 percent increase of available companies utilized on night operations from May to October 1969. Presently, approximately 50 percent of the available companies in the three divisions are being utilized on night offensive operations. Results of night operations are improving satisfactorily in specific units such as the 9th Regiment of the 5th Division and 50th Regiment of the 25th Division, but continued emphasis must be placed on the other regiments of the three divisions to improve their night offensive tactics to bring them up to a satisfactory level of proficiency.

c. Employment of Armored Cavalry Regiments: The armored cavalry regiments of III Corps are presently being utilized more effectively than in the past as a result of command emphasis by LTC Tri. His training program for his senior commanders and key staff officers on maintenance and employment of armor should bring forth considerable improvement.

4. CONCLUSIONS.

a. Considerable emphasis is being placed on training in III Corps and the effort to upgrade all training facilities continues. Emphasis in training at the present time needs to be placed on the instructors and instruction. Unit training should be in brief increments of two to four days rather than long periods of from four to six weeks.

b. The Dong Tien program is proving to be a valuable means of assisting ARVN forces to upgrade their combat effectiveness. However, close monitoring at all levels of command must be effected to insure that the Vietnamese are included in all phases of the planning and execution of operations. It is often easier and faster for US personnel to do the job themselves, but this defeats the purpose of the program. Timing will be an important factor in breaking away an ARVN unit from Dong Tien operations to put them on their own.

c. The trend in tactical operations has been toward the employment of small units. It is therefore essential that increased emphasis be placed in basic squad and platoon tactics, and night ambush techniques. This also creates increased demands for having effective small unit leaders, who will take the initiative and can employ their units effectively.

d. Emphasis needs to be placed on conducting training during periods that units are on stand down. Presently, this valuable time is not being utilized fully.
e. Emphasis needs to be placed on training FO's, and company commanders to request the appropriate fire support for the specific target. ARVN too often requests helicopter gunship support when the nature of the target is fortified bunkers in which heavy artillery or tactical air should be used. Training is needed at the unit level to acquaint the unit leaders with the characteristics and effects of different ordnance and their most efficient use. The effective timing of the delivery of all fire support and the complete coverage and saturation of the target area by artillery and tactical air support are techniques which ARVN still needs to learn.

f. While there has been an increase in airmobile operations, their results belies their capability. More emphasis must be placed on faster reaction to intelligence and improvement in coordination and planning so that the enemy is caught before he can disperse.
ARVN NIGHT OFFENSIVE UTILIZATION

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<td>SEP</td>
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NUMBER OF AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS

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JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV
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APPENDIX IV

LOGISTICS

1. GENERAL.

a. The RVNAF logistics system was established and continues to operate similar to the system that US Forces employed prior to functionalization and MIVSTRIP. Although Corps units are supported by technical service companies for direct support, this system for divisional units has undergone modernization. Most significant of these changes has been the organization of a Direct Support Battalion in each division which integrates all technical service and maintenance functions into one organization. Regional and Popular Force units are supported by Province Administration and Direct Support Logistics (ADSL) Companies. Field maintenance and supply support to Division Support Battalions and the Province ADSL Companies is provided by an Area Logistics Command (ALC) which is not an organic Corps organization. III ALC, which supports III Corps and III Corps Tactical Zone, is centrally located in the metropolitan Saigon area.

b. A large percentage of equipment used by RVNAF is US manufactured and procured. The RVNAF Modernization Program has resulted in the replacement of old and deteriorated vehicles and equipment in addition to introduction of more sophisticated weapons. Programming and procurement of MAF equipment has in most cases kept pace with requirements; however, there are still shortfalls in water trailers and some heavy engineer equipment. Training in the use of the equipment and concurrent spare parts packages have not always kept pace with the incoming modernization equipment.

2. ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

a. Logistics Support Planning: Continuing improvement has been noted in the including of logistics in planning for III CTZ combat operations. This planning coordination has become highly critical with implementation of the Dong Tien program and because of increased deployment of RVNAF units OPCONT to US Forces situations. The forward deployment of the ARVN Airborne Division has been a gratifying example of the advancing capability for combined US/ARVN and III CTZ logistics planning.

b. The last three months have seen great improvements in recognition by ARVN commanders of the need for responsive maintenance and command interest in operational readiness of Armored Cavalry units. Causative factors to this improvement are: extensive US Advisor interest; recognition of the problem and cooperation of all echelons of the advisory system; detailed analysis of faulty or non-existent systems and the problem in general; and the US insistence that RVNAF do something.
Non-operational track equipment has reached an acceptably low percentage and the deadline, principally, is in motion, i.e., there are now no "hanger queens". This accomplishment particularly merits comment since during this same period the ARVN Cavalry units have been committed to an ever-increasing combat role and have been actively engaged in operations.

c. Improved ARVN transportation procedures in III CTZ have increased the use of land convoys and reduced the requirement for airlift support. Better coordination between staff sections and more emphasis on pre-planning have been instrumental in satisfying the majority of ARVN transportation requirements by use of routine, programmed airlift in lieu of priority 1 and combat essential movements. Increased training and skill has resulted in efficient utilization of rotary-wing aircraft and sling-load operations, expanding ARVN's self-support capabilities. Improved transportation request procedures, to include greater accuracy and completeness of essential information, have decreased the operational role of US Advisors, and in turn, have made ARVN more responsive to their transportation requirements.

d. The Logistics Support Battalions, organic to ARVN Divisions, were organized and have now been deployed. These battalions have greatly improved combat service support to the divisions; provided the capability of deploying forward support elements; and have allowed streamlining the support channel to and from III Area Logistics Command. The commanders and logistics staff officers are gradually learning to use this organic and flexible support capability to the advantage of tactical operations.

e. Greater emphasis on production of trained medical personnel has resulted in an increased capability of ARVN field medical service. ARVN hospitals have graduated approximately 800 students from their 16-week Medical Aidman Course. These graduates have been assigned to both RF/PF and III Corps Divisional units. Each of the Division's Medical Battalions has at least one physician currently enrolled in surgical training at either a US Military Hospital or Cong Hoa General Hospital. When this training program is completed in early 1970, ARVN Medical battalions will realize a surgical capability heretofore virtually non-existent.

3. RESIDUAL PROBLEMS.

a. Failure of logistics and operations planners to coordinate at the staff level continues to be a shortfall. As previously mentioned, there are examples of excellent staff coordination; however, this is not the standard. Further, this problem rests not only with ARVN but it applies also to US advisors and US forces. The Dong Tien program of pairing ARVN/US units as a team is proving to be a leader in training for
b. Lack of an organized, publicized and functioning material readiness system in ARVN hampers both knowledge of asset and operational posture and commanders' knowledge of the overall status of their forces. It also has deleterious effects on allocation of resources and materiel from the higher levels, since accurate relative combat power, materiel-wise, is not available.

c. Concurrent with development of a Material Readiness System, a means to correct the weakness of organizational second echelon maintenance is needed. The present maintenance procedures guide, OCD Manual MT-60-001-999-111, was published in the early '60s. It is not now available to newly formed units or advisors. At the time of its publication none of the current '60's-series modernization vehicles were in ARVN hands. This manual has been updated and/or augmented, piecemeal, by various messages, memos and letters, most of which are not found in units and of which there does not appear to be an index.

d. The Corps staff does not have a material readiness/maintenance management staff officer, although there is an Ordnance Staff Officer who is not elemental to the CTZ C1. Paradoxically, the supply and maintenance element - the III Area Logistics Command - is directly subordinate to the CIA/J3S and its advisors are directly subordinate to IACJ4. Although the CTZ Commander establishes priorities for issue of materiel and equipment, he often finds material readiness policies following technical channels and eluding command cognizance.

e. Along with strengthening and improving maintenance procedures, facilities are needed at organizational level in which maintenance can be performed. Some improvements are in progress, but every unit with second echelon capability and responsibility should be provided maintenance shops.

f. Tool sets and kits, manuals, concurrent spare parts (CSF), follow on Spares (FOS) and PLL supporting repair parts are not becoming available in a timely manner to RVNAF together with new equipment. Frequently adequate repair parts packages do not arrive, and a high percentage of that which does arrive has been held in stock at Base Depot and ALC Ordnance Support Group level. In this situation the CSF and FOS intended to be available to using units while PLL are established and filled are therefore not available. This same situation applies to the Province Administration and Direct Support Logistics Companies.

g. There is inadequate POL handling and storage equipment in the Divisional Support Battalions, the Cavalry units and the ACBSEL Companies.
h. There is a critical shortage of water trailers in most units, primarily because of lack of availability of the FASF programmed quantities.

i. The III CTZ Medical Group's ability to effectively perform its mission is severely hampered by lack of personnel, equipment and facilities. The Corps does not have medevac capability, having only two daytime HU-1D type helicopters.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS. It is recommended that:

a. Staff coordination and concurrent planning be strongly emphasized at all advisory levels.

b. A maintenance management procedures guide and material readiness recording and reporting system be developed and published as a matter of priority. The maintenance management procedures must be keyed to operator and organizational maintenance and relate these levels to third echelon direct support so that the maintenance chain will be understood and exercised.

c. Material readiness staff officers be designated at Corps and Division level. The organization of ARVN for support is not unlike the US FASCOM organization but the correlating/协调 staff positions have not been established.

d. Maintenance facilities be programmed for organizations with second echelon capability and responsibility.

e. MACV take action necessary to secure tool sets kits, manuals and repair parts in quantities adequate to fill ARVN needs.

f. A review of POL be undertaken to determine and authorize POL handling equipment commensurate with ARVN needs.
APPENDIX V

POLITICAL WARFARE (POLWAR)

1. GENERAL. Since POLWAR is a major concept of RVNAP, its implementation within III Corps has received intense command emphasis. POLWAR training for all key ARVN staff members has resulted in an efficient and aggressive program of political warfare. During this reporting period increased emphasis has been placed on the primary mission of the POLWAR program: fostering the ARVN soldier’s loyalty. This is reflected in the New Horizons Campaign, explained in detail below. Within the Social Welfare Division there were no significant accomplishments, as it is dependent upon a large budget to effectively accomplish its goals. Due to a shortage of funds, dependent welfare is minimal, and requests for monetary assistance from the advisor element are frequent.

2. ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

a. PSYWAR:

(1) Since April 1969, there has been an increase in III CTZ PSYWAR activities. Monthly accomplishments in each area are given in Tabs A and B. Tab C shows the increasing number of Hoi Chanh culminating in the record high of 1208 Hoi Chanh during October. The 1969 goal of 5500 Hoi Chanh was exceeded during the first week of October. Three special PSYWAR/PSYOPS campaigns have been conducted within III CTZ. The Accelerated Chieu Hoi Campaign was conducted within Long An Province during the period 15 June through 15 July. A total of 268 of the enemy rallied. During the period 15 June through 15 October, the nation-wide Nguyen Trai II campaign was conducted. During the campaign 388 of the enemy rallied to the GVN within III CTZ. The Tinh Thuong campaign began on 15 November and will continue through 31 December. This campaign is designed to increase the number of ralliers from within the ranks of the NVA.

(2) During the period of this report, the newly established Combined PSYWAR/PSYOPS Coordination Center (CPOC) has developed into a highly effective managerial tool for the successful utilization of PSYWAR assets within III CTZ. Its main focus has been on developing a unified point of coordination for all Allied aerial PSYWAR operations requests. It is through the center that all aerial broadcasting and leaflet drop missions are prepared and passed to the 9th Special Operations Squadron (USAF) and the 112th Squadron (VAF). In early October the Center’s responsibilities were increased by the addition of a Propaganda Development Section. This section is staffed by members of III Corps POLWAR Section, 30th POLWAR Battalion (ARVN), and 6th PSYOPS Battalion (US). While presently serving as a means to coordinate Allied PSYWAR efforts, the CPOC also is preparing the ARVN to assume more responsibility for PSYWAR operations, and eventual Vietnamization of these operations.
b. Political Indoctrination: Paramount in the field of political indoctrination was the implementation of a major Vietnamese effort designed to improve the effectiveness of ARVN. The New Horizons Campaign, although a POLWAR effort, encompassed all aspects of command and staff. Pilot units were selected from the main force divisions, Regional Forces and Popular Forces to receive this concentrated effort. Units were filled to full strength, with POLWAR cadre and all available authorized logistic support and equipment provided. The evaluation period will be concluded on 31 December, after which it is planned to apply the lessons learned to other ARVN units. The major accomplishment was the formulation of a well-qualified committee composed of representatives of all staff sections to visit and inspect all sector headquarters. Actions generated by this committee were a singular success and contributed significantly to ARVN improvement.

c. 30th POLWAR Battalion: A new TOE for the battalion became effective on 1 Sep 69 which increased the number of POLWAR teams from 20 to 32. The battalion's increased activity is reflected in Tab B. Units of the battalion OPCON to the 18th Division were quite successfully employed in the division's recruitment program. The program has netted an average of 400 recruits a month.

3. RESIDUAL PROBLEMS.

a. Tab A, figure 2, shows a steady decrease in aerial loudspeaker broadcasting. The majority of this type of mission has been flown with USAF C-47 aircraft at night. VNAF lacks this capability, and the reduction of USAF participation as a result of redeployments is being felt heavily. They are using the small U-17 aircraft for the purpose of aerial broadcasting. However, the U-17 does not have a night-time capability.

b. Although the new TOE of the 30th POLWAR Battalion was effective on 1 Sep 69, there has been no action on battalion requisitions for additional equipment authorized under the new TOE. This supply problem is also manifested in the shortage of replacement parts in the RVNAF supply system for the mission-peculiar equipment organic to the battalion. The dead-line rate for the outdated audio-visual vehicles is over fifty percent.

c. The Social Welfare Division, which is concerned with dependent health, education, and welfare, is severely hampered in its mission by a lack of sufficient funds. Funds average approximately one dollar per soldier per year. There are numerous requests made to the advisor for assistance, but there is a lack of any advisor assistance fund for this purpose.

d. Although improvement has been noted, there is a reluctance on the part of staff members to coordinate activities with other interested staff sections. This same tendency exists among the divisions within a staff section.
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b. RECOMMENDATIONS.

c. That efforts be continued toward securing a VHAF Ch7 Aircraft dedicated to PSYOPS on a permanent basis.

d. That command attention be given to the logistical problems of the 10th PSYOPS Battalion. To date, efforts within the PSYOPS community have been unsuccessful.

c. That GMU increase the budget for the Social Welfare Service.

d. That staff advisors emphasize proper staff procedures and encourage staff coordination by their counterparts.
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**fig. 1** AIR DROPPED LEAFLETS

**fig. 2** AIR LOUDSPEAKER BROADCASTS

Tab A

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APPENDIX VI

ARTILLERY

1. (c) General.

a. ARVN artillery assets in III CTZ consist of fourteen artillery battalions.

(1) Ten 105mm Howitzer battalions.

(2) Four 155mm Howitzer battalions.

b. The 46th Artillery Battalion (155mm) began training on 15 Sep 69 and has a planned operational date of 1 Jan 69. This battalion will be deployed in general support throughout III CTZ. The 133rd Artillery Battalion (105mm) began training 27 Sep 69 and has a planned operational date of 27 Dec 69. This battalion will be deployed in the 33d DTA as part of the 18th ARVN Division Artillery.

c. Upon deployment in Dec 69 of the 46th and 133rd Artillery Battalions, III CTZ will have three 105mm howitzer battalions in direct support, and one 155mm howitzer battalion in general support of each DTA. CID will have one 105mm howitzer battalion in direct support, and one 155mm howitzer battalion will be in general support of III Corps positioned within the Capital Military District and Long Xinh Special Zone.

d. ARVN artillery presently has nine forward observers in each 105mm and 155mm howitzer battalion. However, due to the additional mission of supporting territorial requirements (sector and subsector) it was recognized that additional FO’s were required and justified. A change to the TOE of the 105mm battalions was approved 12 Sep 69 to increase forward observer sections from nine to fifteen. Personnel for these additional FO sections will become available in Dec 69.

e. A TOE for an ARVN field artillery group headquarters and headquarters battery was submitted to JCS for approval. This unit will be designated as Headquarters and Headquarters Battery 30th ARVN F.A. Group, and will deploy in mid 1970 as a headquarters for all III Corps artillery battalions.

2. ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

a. ARVN artillery has made tremendous progress in increasing its mobile capabilities. By 31 Dec 69 they will have obtained their objective of 90% mobility.

b. III Corps artillery has trained an ARVN Jungle Battery to replace the US Jungle Battery in Direct Support of the 3rd Mobile Strike Force.
The first platoon of this unit was deployed with the US Jungle Battery on 17 Nov 69. The transfer of direct support responsibility will take place in two phases and will be accomplished by Jan 1970.

c. III Corps Artillery and II FFV Artillery conceived through a combined effort to develop the artillery Dong Tien (Progress Together) Plan. The concept of this plan is to provide close and continuous coordination of mutual support projects through the association of ARVN and US/FMAF artillery units. The following mutual support projects are outlined:

1. Exchange visits of battery personnel (associate battery program).
2. Combined Fire Support Coordination Centers (CFSCC) one co-located with each sector tactical operation center.
3. Procedures and coordination requirements for planning combined fire support.
4. Standardized operational readiness evaluation.
5. Combined Unit Refresher Training Program.
6. Standardization of tube calibration procedures.
7. Standardization of registration procedures and policy.
8. Combined use of meteorological data.
10. Consolidated monthly and quarterly progress reports will be submitted by all coordinating levels to measure progress and effectiveness. Through this means the artillery Dong Tien program will immeasurably increase the capabilities and effectiveness of the combined ARVN and US/FMAF artillery team in III Combat Tactical Zone.

d. Annual ammunition expenditures (See Tab A).

e. Missions fired, in support of tactical operations and H & I (See Tab B).

f. Effectiveness in terms of enemy eliminated (See Tab C).
3. ADVERSE PROBLEMS.

a. RF/VP and some maneuver battalions fail to utilize all available combined artillery assets in support of operations.

b. There is insufficient coordination of firing units in planning combined fire support, to obtain maximum coverage and effectiveness, for the maneuver elements.

c. ARVN artillery does not have organic heavy artillery and should therefore make maximum use of US heavy and long range artillery assets; this capability is not employed to its fullest extent.

d. Sufficient artillery assets are not available to provide adequate coverage for III ZTZ; III Corps Artillery should have five additional 105mm howitzer battalions, three 155mm howitzer battalion and two 8" howitzer battalions.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. That training be continually provided to adequately and effectively train RF/VP forward observers in the use of available artillery assets and proper fire planning. This is being accomplished through a combined project in the artillery Dong Tien program.

b. That firing units make maximum use of the artillery Dong Tien program through the Combined Fire Support Coordination Centers in order to extend coverage and provide all available fire support to the maneuver elements.
EFFECTIVENESS IN TERMS
OF ENEMY ELIMINATED

AS OF 21 NOV 1969

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APPENDIX VII

ENGINEER

1. (C) ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

a. General: In III CTZ, engineer effort involves support of ARVN military operations; road, bridge and airfield maintenance, rehabilitation, and construction; support of DZs, sectors, and subsectors; and base development. III Corps engineer assets of one combat engineer group and three divisional engineers battalions are inadequate to satisfy all requirements. Considerable US Engineer support is used to take care of a large part of the total requirements. Notwithstanding, ARVN engineer accomplishments have been considerable during this period.

b. Specific Accomplishments (See Tab A for detailed discussion)

(1) Road Construction and Rehabilitation. Approximately 247.4 km of national, provincial, and secondary roads were opened and/or rehabilitated. On these roads 99 meters of Eiffel bridge and 380 meters of Bailey Bridge were installed.

(2) Bridge Construction. Six semi-permanent highway bridges were completed and three others are presently under construction.

(3) Airfield Construction. The Duc Thanh airfield was repaired and extended, and improvements were made to the airfields at Xuan Loc and Duc Hoa.

(4) Combat and Operational Support. The 30th Engineer Group participated in Operation Dong Tam III in May and June to open Routes 111, 112, and 311 between Phuoc Vinh and Song Be. All III Corps Engineer units supported combat operations with demolition work, minefield installation, mine sweeping teams, and floating equipment.

(5) Critical Bridge Contingency Operations. In May, after the Phu Long Bridge at Lai Thieu was destroyed by sappers, the 30th Engineer Group erected a 250 meter AIT floating bridge within 60 hours. The Ben Lao floating bridge, which was installed 30 June 1968, was removed in October 1969.

(6) Base Development. All engineer units in III Corps participated in base development. This included restoration of facilities at Tay Ninh, construction of range facilities at Ben Keo RF/PT Training Center, a TOC at Xuan Loc, RF outposts, and battalion compounds.

(7) ARVN Dependent Housing. Divisional units completed construction of 465 family housing units.
2. (C) RESIDUAL PROBLEMS: III Corps engineers have the leadership, professional competence, and experience to perform military and civil engineering tasks of all types. Their primary problem now is one of quantity. However, there are particular problem areas that significantly affect operations. (See Tab B for detailed discussion).

a. Engineer Requirements and Employment of Troops: Engineer units organic to or attached to III Corps are inadequate to meet total engineer requirements. Divisional and Corps engineer units are employed on construction tasks which detract from their primary missions. This problem will become increasingly critical when US engineer units are withdrawn.

b. Staff Organization and Planning: The current practice of assigning one officer as both CO, 30th Engineer Group, and III Corps Engineer reduces staff effectiveness, planning, control, and supervision. Command and control is over centralized and authority is not delegated to junior leaders. Officers are reluctant to follow-up instructions for fear of invading another officer’s area of responsibility.

c. Equipment and Equipment Maintenance: A considerable portion of the equipment in engineer units is old and requires replacement. The repair parts and support maintenance systems are slow and cumbersome and do not provide adequate support to the units in the field.

d. Issue of Construction Materials: The existing system for issuing construction materials is inadequate and not responsive to Corps engineer needs.

3. (C) RECOMMENDATIONS

a. That the use of III Corps engineer units in a construction role be decreased and that priority of effort for III Corps engineers be given to combat operational support of divisions, DTA’s, and a continuing Revolutionary Development Program.

b. That the ARVN Chief of Engineers reevaluate the current and projected missions of the 5th Construction Group, also located in III CTZ, and direct a part of its effort toward assuming some of the construction presently accomplished by III Corps engineer units.

c. That the ARVN Chief of Engineers assign an additional lieutenant colonel to III Corps to be either the III Corps Engineer or CO, 30th Engineer Group.

d. That issue of new equipment for engineer units be expedited.

e. That maintenance and support activities receive the highest possible command interest and attention for the improvement of present systems and the development of an increased capability.
That the present system of issuing engineer construction materials be reviewed by the ARVN Chief of Engineers to improve its responsiveness to III Corps operational support and construction requirements.
Road Construction and Rehabilitation:

a. The following national, provincial, and secondary roads were opened and/or rehabilitated by units indicated:

(1) 13th Engineer Battalion.

- Blackhorse to Trung Hieu (YS443966 to YS572980) - 7 km
- Routes 333, 334, and 335 (YT630085 to YT34262) - 60 km
- Route 2 (YS550390 to YS65320) - 6 km

(2) 25th Engineer Battalion.

- TL 9A (XT598967 to XT660024) - 11.4 km
- Duc Hoa to Hau Nghia/Cia Binh border (XS598967 to XS659928) - 7 km
- Ap Chanh to Trai Lai (XT553052 to YT649027) - 10 km
- Ap Hau Ho to Ap Dinh Ta (XT567042 to XS667900) - 7 km

(3) 30th Engineer Group.

- Route 7 (XS297676 to X3700600) - 10 km, including 1 Eiffel Bridge of 36 meters
- LTL 1A, QL-11; Route 311 (XT79495 to YT13062) - 90 km, including 4 Bailey Bridges totaling 380 meters
- QL-19 (XT702670 to X5030660) - 6 km, including 1 Eiffel Bridge of 21 meters
- Route 8 (XS580717 to X5610750) - 10 km, including 2 Eiffel Bridges totaling 12 meters
- Ap So Do to Dao Cong (XT512076 to XT548120) - 6 km
- QL-20 (YT653462 to XT755752) - 17 km

b. The two most significant routes restored were Routes QL-20 between Trai Lai Cay and the II Corps border, and Routes LTL 1A, QL-11, and 311 between Phuoc Vinh and Song Be. An estimated 12 company months of effort were expended on these roads. In each case the operation was a tremendous success in terms of increased security and pacification and the agricultural and economic growth along these lines of communication.

c. During this period the equivalent of two battalions, with appropriate support from the separate engineer companies in 30th Engineer Group, have been committed to the Revolutionary Development Program to improve secondary roads in Long An, Hau Nghia, Tay Ninh, and Gia Dinh Provinces. The most effective application of III Corps engineers in regard to pacification, security of hamlets and villages, and rural development is through this program, although personnel and equipment losses due to enemy action are heaviest on these operations. ARVN combat engineers are particularly suited for these tasks and are motivated to open areas that are controlled by the Viet Cong.
### 2. (U) Bridge Construction:

#### a. Three semi-permanent bridges on Route QL 1 in Binh Tuy Province were completed and three others on the same highway are presently under construction. The status of these bridges is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Song Cieng (Y5839591)</td>
<td>72 m</td>
<td>Under construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Song Le (Y5877997)</td>
<td>18 m</td>
<td>Complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Song Dinh (Y5877956)</td>
<td>54 m</td>
<td>Under construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suoi Hoai (Y5897989)</td>
<td>27 m</td>
<td>Complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Song Cat (Y3921981)</td>
<td>30 m</td>
<td>Complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ta Non (23021991)</td>
<td>24 m</td>
<td>Under construction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### b. Three other semi-permanent bridges were also completed during the period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Length</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Song Be (X792191)</td>
<td>129 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Va (X7959479)</td>
<td>33 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giong Ong To (Y5822920)</td>
<td>39 m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### c. ARVN engineer units are highly proficient in the construction of bridges. Their pile driving and steel erection capabilities are especially noteworthy. Their progress on bridge construction projects is hindered only by inadequate forecasting, poor scheduling, and non-availability of construction materials.

### 3. (U) Airfield Construction:
The 18th Engineer Battalion repaired and extended the Duc Thanh airfield in August. A soil binder was applied to the laterite surface and then the field was covered with M8Al matting. The quality of work was excellent and the project accomplished in a reasonable time. This battalion also made minor repairs to the runway and parking area surface of the Xuan Loc airfield during July, August, and September so that OV-10 aircraft could be based there. The 25th Engineer Battalion made additional improvements on the Duc Hoa airfield by constructing parking areas and refuel and rearm points. The airfield control tower was restructured and cartwork problems that arose during the rainy season were also corrected.

### 4. (C) Combat and Operational Support:
The 30th Engineer Group participated in Operation Dong Tam III in May and June. This was a joint US/ARVN operation to open routes L1A, QL-14, and D11 between Phuoc Vinh and Song Be. A follow-on operation is the current road opening between the intersection of routes QL 14 and D11 and Duc Phong. Because of the numerous construction and revolutionary development tasks assigned to the 30th Engineer Group, whose assigned TOE mission is to provide combat and operational support to divisions and DTA's, participation in combat operational support is infrequent. Divisional engineers are continuously engaged in combat support consisting primarily of demolition...
and mine sweep teams accompanying infantry units. Operational support includes use of assault boats in river crossing operations and equipment and mine sweep teams in road opening operations. Minefields are also installed and removed. For example the 25th Engineer Battalion installed 13 minefields containing some 50,000 mines.

5. (C) Critical Bridge Contingency Operations: The III Corps Engineer is responsible for contingency planning for 11 critical bridges in the vicinity of Saigon, and plans are to be executed by the 30th Engineer Group. In May, after the Phu Long Bridge at Lat Thieu was destroyed by enemy sappers, 30th Engineer Group erected a 250 meter MT6T float bridge within 60 hours. The operation was supported by 100th US Engineer Company (Float Bridge). Due to limited working space at the bridge site, pontons were assembled 1 kilometer away and airlifted to the river by CH-54 helicopter. It is expected that other contingencies will be met in the same outstanding manner. The Ben Luc floating bridge, which was installed 30 June 1968, was removed in October 1969.

6. (U) Base Development: Since May a platoon from the 30th Engineer Group has restored 15 buildings and facilities in the Tay Ninh Sector and ADSL Company areas. This same unit constructed a rifle range with concrete target pits at the Ben Keo RF/PF Training Center. The 18th Engineer Battalion completed a division tactical operations center at Xuan Loc in August. The 5th Engineer Bn constructed an RF outpost 9 km north of Chon Thanh and a battalion size compound at Bong Bong. The 25th Engineer Bn completed an encampment for the 253rd Arty Bn. Divisional battalions normally have a considerable portion of their effort committed to base development tasks, including Class "B" construction, for their divisions.

7. (U) ARVN Dependent Housing: Divisional units completed construction of 468 family housing units at Chon Thanh, Xuan Loc, Ba Ria, Duc Hoa, Gia Rey, and Phu Loi. 210 units remain to be completed as part of the $2.5 billion Dependent Housing Program in III CIZ. Additional housing for ARVN dependents will be constructed by contractors.
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PROBLEM AREAS

1. (U) **Engineer Requirements and Employment of Engineer Troops.**

   a. There is a tremendous requirement in III CTZ for engineer effort. For example the road net alone consists of nearly 4000 km of national, provincial, and village roads of which only a fraction is paved and an estimated 50% abandoned awaiting proper security conditions and availability of engineer resources before repair. Engineer units available to III Corps are inadequate to meet total engineer requirements. At present US engineers are available to clear roads of enemy interdictions, make hasty repairs, replace blown culverts and bridges, restore roads to MACV standards and accomplish a multitude of other engineer tasks. When US engineer units are withdrawn, the lack of engineer effort will become a serious problem.

   b. Divisional engineer battalions have the mission of providing their divisions with combat and operational support. In addition they are responsible for maintenance of those roads in their DTA which exceed the maintenance capability of the Ministry of Public Works. The divisional engineer battalions are usually so deeply involved in construction projects, specifically Class "D" defensive systems and base development, that they do not adequately fulfill their primary mission of supplying combat and operational support to divisional units.

   c. The primary mission of the 30th Engineer Group is to provide general engineer support for the Corps, attached units, and division tactical areas. However, the 30th Engineer Group has been assigned construction projects, such as LOC bridge construction, by JGS. Thus engineer support for the Corps, attached units, and DTAs is siphoned off since priority is given to higher headquarters directed projects. Thus III Corps is effectively deprived of much of its direct support effort.

2. (C) **Staff Organization and Planning:** The current practice of assigning one officer as both CO, 30th Engineer Group, and III Corps Engineer reduces staff effectiveness, planning, and control. He spends approximately 25% of his time at Corps Headquarters, 25% at Group Headquarters, 25% in the field supervising Group projects, and 25% traveling the 401km separating Corps and Group Headquarters. The Corps Engineer is not supported in the Group by an executive officer strong enough to exert the same command influence in his absence. At Corps, he does not delegate authority to the deputy, and the staff rarely takes action on important matters. The total engineer effort in the field has been adversely affected since the Group CO is unable to spend adequate time supervising projects. Divisional engineers do not receive adequate direction or technical assistance from III Corps. Planning at Corps, Group, and division level is similarly limited. This problem could be eliminated by the assignment of another engineer lieutenant colonel to be either the Corps Engineer or the 30th Group Commander. Other problems are fundamental and must be overcome by all units to achieve real operational efficiency. Command and control is overcentralized and authority is not delegated to junior leaders. As a result, very little is accomplished when the commander is not present.
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Commanders and staff officers are reluctant to follow-up and check on things for fear of invading another officer's area of responsibility and causing a loss of face. Therefore, many essential elements of an operation are performed in a haphazard manner. Plans for operations are not made in enough detail and depth, and do not allow for adequate, flexible response to unforeseen changes.

3. (U) Equipment and Equipment Maintenance:

a. The most significant problem involving equipment is that much of it requires replacement due to age. This is particularly true of the dump trucks in the combat battalions. The condition of this old equipment hinders the units in the accomplishment of their missions and greatly increases their maintenance load.

b. Maintenance of vehicles and engineer equipment at company and battalion level is generally good. Operators take good care of their equipment, and the ARVN mechanic is very knowledgeable in his field. Given the necessary parts and tools he is more than able to accomplish his tasks. Commanders, however, give little or no command attention to maintenance management. Reporting of declined equipment is inaccurate and there is a total lack of follow-up by commanders on requests for parts and repair of items at direct support units.

c. Direct support units do not provide adequate support to units in the field. Direct support units do not have an aggressive "support attitude". Their capabilities are limited by poor physical plants and facilities and cumbersome stock record control procedures. The procedure for requisitioning and supplying repair parts is particularly weak. Excessive time is required and frequently the requesting unit is told the part is not in stock, even though the part is on the depot shelves. The time period for getting a piece of equipment repaired usually exceeds three months. Turn-in procedures for combat and accident losses are a continuing problem which is worsened by there being no float items for immediate issue.

d. With the activation of new ARVN engineer units and the receipt of modern vehicles and equipment, maintenance and direct support activities will become increasingly vital. The supply of repair parts and the performance of support units must receive additional emphasis by the ARVN engineers, the direct support units, ALC and advisors if the effectiveness of engineer units in the field is to be sustained or improved.

4. (U) Issue of Construction Materials: The existing system for issuing construction materials is inadequate and not responsive to Corps engineer needs; hence the effectiveness of ARVN engineer units is greatly reduced. Almost all project delay can be attributed to non-availability of materials. This is especially true for materials needed for combat and operational support tasks. It is this situation more than any other factor which limits the effectiveness of ARVN Combat Engineers in an operational support role. Planning is habitually not conducted far enough in advance to program sufficient materials for even approved projects.
Frequently III Corps engineers are directed to begin projects for which all of the necessary materials are neither on hand nor in stock. This results in materials being traded from one project to another, and subsequent shortages affecting many operations. Although the issue of construction materials is presently sluggish, in the past 6 months advisors have caused ARVN engineers to become more dependent on their own support channels. Hopefully this will force the present system to be improved.
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APPENDIX VIII

COMMUNICATIONS

1. (U) GENERAL.

a. The Vietnamese Armed Forces are providing reliable communications systems which are highly responsive to the increasing needs of military commanders and civilian authorities throughout the III Corps Tactical Zone. Improved communications are contributing substantially to increased security of remote areas and more efficient self-government, military operations and civic actions.

b. The professional competence and technical proficiency of ARVN Signal Corps personnel are continually improving. The ARVN communicator is characterized by pride and enthusiasm, reflected by the superior condition in which he maintains his equipment.

2. (C) ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

a. During the past seven months ARVN radio, telephone, and teletype communications systems have improved in quality, reliability and speed of service. Significant progress has been made in expansion of existing facilities as well as construction of new, modern area communications center buildings at province capitals.

b. Much new US signal equipment has been introduced into the Republic of Vietnam but this has posed no problem for ARVN communicators who have shown great intelligence, adaptability and eagerness to learn. Operators have become highly proficient with this equipment which includes the latest multi-channel VHF and microwave systems, FM and single sideband tactical radio sets, circuit control and patching equipment.

c. An enormous effort is now being made in the area of signal training. The signal school at Vung Tau is working to capacity in developing highly proficient communicators for all branches of the service. Signal schools at corps and division level are training organic personnel as well as RF/PF troops. Many ARVN signal corps personnel are being sent to the 1st Signal Brigade Training Facility at Long Binh where they are schooled in operation and maintenance of AN/TRC-24 multi-channel radio systems, AN/GRC-106 single sideband radio sets and a variety of circuit control systems. Cable splicing is also taught to ARVN personnel at this facility. The Regional Communications Group, 1st Signal Brigade, is training ARVN signal corps personnel in the operation and maintenance of the US Integrated Communications System. In the near future the ARVN will have a professional communications-electronics cadre second only to those of the highly industrialized countries of the world.
d. Old and obsolete equipment is gradually being replaced in the Corps Signal Battalion. In the past few months two outdated AN/TRC-3 four channel VHF systems were replaced by 12 channel AN/TRC-24 systems. An obsolete TC-10 switchboard was replaced by the modern AN/TJC-7 which now serves III Corps Headquarters. TOE's have been approved converting the Division Signal Company to a Signal Battalion and authorizing modern AN radios to replace obsolete sets now in use. The new equipment will give ARVN a radioteletype capability between corps and division.

3. (C) PROBLEM AREA: The principal problem continues to be in the area of supply and maintenance of the new equipment. Excessive "down time" is experienced due principally to non-availability of repair parts and sometimes due to lack of trained repairmen. ARVN logistics have not been able to keep pace with the tremendous influx of new and modern communications equipment.

4. (C) CONCLUSIONS: ARVN signal units within the III Corps Tactical Zone display great professional competence and technical proficiency. Operating flexible and reliable communications systems, ARVN signal corps personnel have been responsive to the needs of commanders and the tactical situation. Expansion of facilities and modernization of equipment continues and a great effort is now underway to meet the requirements for trained communications equipment operators. Increased stress in the future will have to be placed on logistically supporting the large quantities of new signal equipment arriving in country.
APPENDIX IX

CHEMICAL

1. (C) GENERAL: During the past seven months, the level of deforestation and defoliation activities has remained stable, despite an in-country herbicide shortage and the rainy season’s restriction of some land clearing operations. There has been an increase in the employment of riot control agents.

2. (C) ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

   a. Approximately 3,755 hectares have been defoliated by helicopter, ground and water based spray in III Corps Tactical Zone. In addition there were 1,073 defoliation sorties flown by C-123 aircraft in III Corps Tactical Zone covering an area of approximately 129,633 hectares.

   b. There were 78,521 acres of land cleared by land clearing teams in the III Corps Tactical Zone during the past seven months.

   c. Riot control agents were used to block enemy infiltration routes. Approximately 480,000 pounds of CS were employed, much of this on joint US/ARVN operations.

3. (C) RESIDUAL PROBLEMS.

   a. The principal problem area is still the time required to process defoliation requests through ARVN channels. In many cases the province defoliation plan is sent forward without consulting the province senior advisor. When these plans reach III Corps, they then have to be carried to the province senior advisor, who then has his staff investigate the plan, causing needless delay.

   b. Although most ARVN units now have been issued protective masks, they seldom carry them during tactical operations, and this precludes the use of riot control agents, should they be needed. This is particularly true of joint US/ARVN operations.

   c. ARVN units do not have the necessary organic equipment to conduct missions of defoliation, deforestation, and riot control.

   d. There has been an increasing number of herbicide damage reports in the corps area. The claims have been investigated, and, in most cases, it was found that the crop damage was caused not by herbicide, but by insects and plant disease. This indicates a need for an increased educational effort at province level by agriculture advisors.
h. (c) RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. That command emphasis be placed on processing requests for defoliation in a more expeditious manner.

b. That ARVN units be provided with the necessary organic equipment to conduct missions of defoliation, deforestation and riot control.

c. That ARVN units be encouraged to carry the protective mask on all tactical operations.

d. That an agricultural education program be conducted at province level to enable the local farmer to identify and control harmful insects and plant diseases.
SRAO-III-5-3A

20 November 1969

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U)

Deputy Senior Advisor
III Corps Tactical Zone
ATM: G-3 Advisor
SFO 96314

1. (C) References: Regulation 1-3, HQ USARV, subject as above, dated 1 June 1963; letter AVIAG-PO, HQ USARV, subject as above, dated 5 July 1963; and MACV-III-03 message confidential cite #929963, subject as above, dated 24 October 1969.

2. (U) This debriefing input is submitted in accordance with cited references and covers the period 1 May 1969 to date. A generalized summary follows with detailed information provided in attached appendixes.

3. (C) Overall Assessment:

a. General: Combat effectiveness of the 5th Infantry Division (ARM) is improving. Since Major General Nguyen Van Hau took command the Division has initiated a program of carrying the war to the enemy. This initiative is a vital element which the Division has lacked. The employment of the Cavalry Regiment in an offensive role was a dramatic departure from their "Palace Guard" mission. Sustained operations have become a reality through a combination of Dong Tien operations and the assignment of RD missions to the RF/FP. Six months ago one half of the Division's Infantry Battalions were tied to RD support, there as now there are none.

b. US Influence: MG Hau has evidenced that he is receptive and will react to meaningful suggestions. It can not be overemphasized that he is a strong commander, and will only implement ideas which will definitely improve the combat effectiveness of the Division.

c. Progress: Definite progress is being made in all areas within the Division. Basically improvements can be attributed to positive leadership which has forced the maneuver units to seek and destroy the enemy. The necessary supporting elements have reacted and are keeping pace with the progress of the Infantry Battalions. Dong Tien operations have contributed to increased Combat Effectiveness by providing the stimulus necessary for the conduct of Platoon and Company size operations.

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d. Problem areas within the 5th Division remain constant with those in the past. The new CG definitely removes the leadership problem formerly faced with the Division Commander. Overall, the problems do not present as black a picture as has been the case, as progress is being made. Effective company grade leadership constitutes a serious problem as no battalions are commanded by the authorized Lieutenant Colonel rather 11 of the 12 are commanded by Captains. Through Dong Tien and implementation of the CG’s offensive tactics, Regimental Commanders are pressed to field good unit leaders.

4. (U) Quality of Advisor Personnel.

The advisory system can be only as effective as the officers and enlisted men who comprise it. It is considered imperative that only those possessing the highest qualities be assigned to advisory duty whether in a unit or staff position. Professional competence is the single most important factor in determining whether an advisor will succeed or fail.

Appendices:
I - Personnel and Administration
II - Intelligence
III - Plans, Operations, and Training
IV - Logistics
V - Political Warfare
VI - Engineer
VII - Communications
APPENDIX I
PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

1. (c) GENERAL

Considerable improvement in personnel and administration has been made in the past seven months. The greatest obstacle has been realizing and accepting problem areas. This situation now is being approached in a more positive manner. Personnel management is now accepted as being necessary. Desertion continues to be excessive, positive steps have reduced the overall rate by approximately 30 per month during CY 69 compared to CY 68. The lack of qualified officers has prevented the Division Commander and Regimental Commanders from replacing ineffective commanders also the Division tactical units are short experienced middle grade enlisted men. These problems impact on all aspects of unit operations.

2. (c) ACCOMPLISHMENTS

a. The G1 has initiated a program whereby he maintains data on all of the recruiting teams for the purpose of identification of weak and inefficient teams. Through this increased interest the recruiting program has established an increasing trend. Recruitinng by this Division has been accomplished only for the 5th Division. Studies are being made at this time to determine the feasibility of expanding the recruiting program to include recruiting for the Army of the Republic of Vietnam.

b. Awards and decorations are being given emphasis especially for the field units. This is one of the points being emphasized by the Commanding General as part of his program to reduce desertion. Combined US and ARVN awards ceremonies are being conducted much more frequently.

c. After a comprehensive study was conducted, this Advisory Team was reorganized under the Division Combat Assistance Team (DCAT) concept on 1 October 1969. The test period is not yet complete, but all indications are that objectives and requirements will be met under this organization.

3. (c) PROBLEM AREAS

a. Desertion: Although progress is being made through command interest and emphasis, desertion remains the most critical personnel problem. Many factors contribute to this problem ranging from Class D recruits to poor living conditions. A new approach is being undertaken by the Commanding General to reduce this waste of resources and manpower. His plan will involve assigning new recruits to units which have better living conditions and are not isolated. This will provide sufficient time for the recruits to adjust to military life. These personnel will then be transferred to other units after having become transitioned from civilian life to military life.

b. Interpreters: Although sufficient interpreters are available many are only marginal in performance. Reassignment of interpreters continues to take excessive amounts of time to be accomplished. Some Commanders insist on operational control of interpreters against JCS Regulations which state that the interpreters will be under the Operational control of the Senior Advisor of the unit to which they are assigned.
a. That emphasis on programs to reduce desertions be continuously monitored.

b. That expansion of facilities at officer and NCO schools be accelerated so that more well trained leaders are available.
1. (C) **GENERAL**

The 5th Division program of intelligence, collection, production, and distribution has been greatly improved especially in maneuver elements subordinate to the Division. An intelligence community has been set up in the 3rd DTA to provide a timely flow of information between sector, subsector, battalion, regiment and division. The overall effectiveness of the division G-2 staff is good, however officers taken individually and compared with American staff officers still have much work to be done. The main problem has been top heaviness of organization. Junior officers are reluctant to make decisions resulting in a slowdown when providing intelligence to the using unit.

2. (C) **ACCOMPLISHMENTS**

a. The 5th Division S-2's at regiment and battalion level have made tremendous strides in their professional competency and have become quite well respected by their American counterparts especially under the Dong Tien program.

b. The regimental reconnaissance companies are being used in an ever increasing role for information gathering and confirmation instead of a rifle company role.

c. The popularity of aerial photography with the ARVN continues to overshadow other aerial surveillance systems. However, G-2 Air has shown an increased appreciation and use of infra-red photography, side-looking airborne radar, and airborne personnel detection systems. The implementation of the DCAT system at 5th. ARVN Division eliminated the G-2 Air Advisor however the ARVN have proved quite capable of continuing the air intelligence program on their own.

d. As a result of increased knowledge and appreciation of the sensor systems, the ARVN use of aerial surveillance as an integral part of operational planning has increased.

3. (C) **PROBLEM AREAS**

a. The coordination between the ARVN G-2 and G-3 in the development of operational plans is almost non-existent and is accomplished only when pushed by the advisors. A similar problem is the lack of coordination with the G-3 staff for operational reaction to finished intelligence.

b. The present structure of the ARVN G-2 staff has resulted in a minimum of cross information among the internal divisions of the G-2 staff. Information is compartmentalized until it reaches the upper echelons, again slowing the processing and dissemination of finished intelligence.

c. Lack of secure communication assets for coordination with higher and adjacent units continues to plague the effectiveness of the G-2 Air staff. Dissemination of intelligence through ARVN Channels is possible and is improving at a steady rate.

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d. There is a shortage of sophisticated photo interpretation equipment and ARVN technicians lack depth in training. This is being gradually overcome by ARVN OP programs.

4. (C) CONCLUSIONS

The ARVN photo interpreters have the basic skills and knowledge and do a good job with respect to photographic readouts. Their main shortcomings lies in shortage of equipment and lack of training and experience in interpreting the products of other sensors. More training and exposure to the capabilities and limitations of these systems should go far toward eliminating these difficulties. The ARVN intelligence community is knowledgeable and experienced. The effectiveness of its intelligence effort can be enhanced by closer coordination between regiments, internal G-2 staff sections, and elements of the G-3 staff. Emphasis still must be placed on broader dissemination channels and the habit of closer coordination between intelligence and operational staffs.
APPENDIX III

PLANS, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

1. (c) GENERAL

Combat operations of 5th Infantry Division units have varied widely during the past eight (8) months. The periods of more intense enemy activity were May, August, and September. The interis periods were marked by the enemy's reluctance to establish contact. With the assumption of command by MG Huyn Van Hieu on 14 August 1968, 5th Division units are changing from a defensive to an offensive posture. The support of RO by Division forces has been eliminated as there are no battalions with this mission. Division level staff officers are well qualified and technically proficient. Their initiative and willingness to delegate authority are areas in need of stimulation. Planning in depth as well as in detail is not accomplished to a sufficient degree and results in many last minute changes. These changes breed confusion and frequently compromise the original plan. The initiation of the Dong Tien program has made possible a number of improvements necessary to develop a combat effective Division. Through the use of combined command posts many of the leadership traits have developed and are becoming identifiable. Battalion and company commanders have long feared reprisal from superior officers if they demonstrate initiative, decisiveness or aggressiveness. There are indications that this obstacle may soon be overcome by competition developed through working closely and continuously with US units. A positive, progressive acceptance of Dong Tien by the 8th Regiment has allowed this regiment to improve its combat effectiveness. The 7th and 9th Regiments have profited from Dong Tien although not to the level achieved by the 8th Regiment. Through the progress made possible by Dong Tien there are indications that the Division has generated the necessary momentum to overcome many traditional problems.

2. (c) ACCOMPLISHMENTS

a. Tactical Operations

(1) The 7th Regiment continues to progress at an extremely slow rate. Lack of leadership plagues and delays any real progress. Locating the enemy is a great problem for this Regiment as the Battalions are often deployed in areas which have a low enemy strength. One battalion is participating in the Dong Tien program on a continuous basis. This Regiment is the least effective unit within the Division.

(2) The 8th Regiment has been the mainstay of this Division for the past eight months. Effective leadership by the Regimental Commander has been the key factor for this unit's successes. Two battalions continuously participate in the Dong Tien program. Targeted against SR-1 forces this Regiment has been particularly successful at taking the war into what previously were enemy sanctuaries. Ambushes are employed by this Regiment in a highly effective manner. During the month of October there were 36 company size ambushes, which results in 3/4 enemy being eliminated.

(3) 9th Regiment operates in Phu Loc Province which has a low local force population, consequently the total enemy eliminated is dependent upon the presence of main force units. This Regiment utilizes all available fire support to a greater degree than other units of the Division.
The Armored Cavalry Regiment traditionally has functioned as a local security force. Through the use of combined operations it was deployed during June and was highly successful. The leadership within this unit is strong and has developed greatly with this newly acquired offensive role.

Airmobile operations are not conducted effectively as is illustrated by the number of enemy eliminated as a direct result of these operations. Divisional units conducted 31 Airmobile operations during the month of October, but only 7 of the enemy were eliminated. The availability of air assets has increased since the development of area coordinators (1st Infantry Division in Binh Duong Province and the 1st Air Cavalry Division in Phuoc Long and Phuoc Long), however the assets have not been utilized to react to "hot intelligence". Planning and coordination are the two missing factors necessary to conduct effective airmobile operations.

Definite progress has been made in the training of the Battalions. The most effective training has been OJT with the US units. Two battalions have completed the newly created Battalion Refresher Training Course. The Division Training Center has made a great amount of progress in its training facilities. The greatest deficiency lies in the instructors as they are not sufficiently trained and are required to present more classes than they can adequately prepare. Command interest must be generated and maintained so that additional training improvements can be made.

3. (C) PROBLEM AREAS

a. Leadership: This is developing under the Pong Tien program, but is still hampered by highly centralized authority. Failure to delegate authority has resulted in the staff sections at Division, Regiment, and Battalion responding only to Command directives rather than developing an idea into a plan for the Commander's evaluation.

b. Column Formations: Combat formations are not utilized which employ point, flank, and rear security. Too often RIF operations are conducted with the file formation being utilized which restricts the unit's reaction capability.

c. Conduct of Airmobile Operations: These need to be planned in greater detail and utilized for reaction to intelligence. The southern Binh Duong area is ideal for the conduct of airmobile operations, but very few are conducted in this area.

4. (C) CONCLUSIONS

a. The combat effectiveness of the Division's units leaves much to be desired, however, there have been substantial improvements made in many areas. MG Hieu's emphasis upon offensive operations, training programs, and combined operations are expected to greatly effect this Division's performance.

b. The principal deficiencies in the operational field can be eliminated through effective leadership.
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APPENDIX IV

LOGISTICS

1. (C) GENERAL

a. The logistics support of the 5th Infantry Division (ANV) has undergone several significant changes during the past few months. Most significant is the operation of a Direct Support Battalion which is organized similar to a US support command and integrates all technical service, supply, and maintenance functions into one organization. The unit also has the capability of providing three forward support teams which support the three regiments of the Division. These teams provide third echelon maintenance and supply point facilities.

2. (C) ACCOUNTABILITY

a. Logistical planning: With the increased offensive effort of the Division it has become apparent that the level and degree of logistical planning has increased. Transportation planning for unit moves and resupply convoys has taken on significant importance. The G4 now habitually calls meetings of unit logistics personnel to disseminate information prior to movement and thus increasing the effectiveness of these operations. A traffic control system has been developed for the 32nd DTA by the Division G4, and has achieved moderate success in coordinating convoys. A US Army Highway Traffic Control Center is currently operating at Long Binh and assists in coordinating convoy activities with US units. Mutual US/ANV traffic control points are employed at Chan Thanh, Ben Cat, and Lai Ke to control convoy traffic on Route 13. Development of intra-staff planning and coordination has improved significantly and has noticeably increased the effectiveness of the overall ANV Logistics/Support of Operations.

b. Equipment

Significant upgrading of ANV equipment has been accomplished with replacement of move, shoot and communicate type equipment. The Division has received many new items of equipment which has increased transportation support capabilities, communications, and firepower. Problem areas have developed in repair parts for operation of the convoy control system at times. Organizations not organic to the Division have moved convoys without knowledge of the Convoy Control Center on several occasions. Divisional units have also moved convoys at improper times when they were in receipt of instructions that specified when the convoy was to move. On other occasions convoy commanders have failed to acknowledge the joint ANV/US military police traffic control point personnel, and proceeded on after being signaled to stop, causing traffic congestion and providing an attractive target to the enemy.

c. There is not adequate operational staff planning between staff sections. Numerous operational plans have been ordered without proper staff action resulting in failure to establish priorities, insufficient reaction time for logistical requirements, and a waste of materials. The lack of coordination with higher headquarters, has caused resupply problems to develop when units have been attached to the division. Support orders for attached units do not always arrive in time for adequate reaction which causes confusion and delay in logistical support. Units have also unexpectedly been extended on an operation which is outside the support capability of the division rear elements, necessitating air resupply without consideration for lead time requirements on aircraft. Deployment of the forward support platoon of the direct support battalion has not been adequate. More extensive use is required to obtain the maximum support available from these teams.
d. **Equipment and Facilities**

(1) Several items of critical importance continue to be in short supply. In many cases equipment is received through the RVNAF Modernization Program with insufficient repair parts and tools available to adequately perform required maintenance. Billings manuals for new pieces of US equipment are not on hand and hamper maintenance performance.

(2) Medical facilities are currently marginally adequate, and no patients are "cared for" by VNAF. All ref/evac is handled by US Air Force.

(3) Current TO&E's are not available at unit level causing great inconsistency in that divisional units consider to be authorized. Submissions for changes to TO&E, upgrading the combat effectiveness of units, are seriously hampered by this situation.

(4) Inadequate POL storage capability causes many problems in resupply. The storage capacity of the Direct Support Battalion is only 26,300 gallons at present, utilizing M49C tank trucks, rubber 500 gallon bladders, 55 gallon drums, and a 5000 gallon underground storage tank. The underground storage tank has never been operable and a greater amount of underground storage is needed to adequately support the Division. Current POL storage methods hamper adequate resupply, and cause excessive convoy activity, precluding use of transportation assets for other requirements.

5. **CONCLUSIONS**

The present ARVNAF logistical system is functional and capable of accomplishing its mission. ARVNAF has demonstrated the capability to manage the system with the limited assets available. There is a need for continuing command emphasis in connection with logistics. There is a definite requirement to each maintenance and supply technicians correct methods and procedures for the new sophisticated equipment that is being issued to ARVNAF.

5. **RECOMMENDATIONS**

a. Continued emphasis on staff liaison, coordination and complete staff action to include follow-up at all staff levels.

b. Continued emphasis on generating command interest to develop supply impetus down to supported units.

c. Emphasize release of barrier material with more realistic level of reserve, therefore enabling field units to maintain an improved defensive posture.

d. Fill present TO&E shortage and expedite adequate repair parts and tool stockage.

e. Continue to develop a training program to technically prepare maintenance and supply personnel, in conjunction with the Equipment Modernization Program.

f. Establish a functioning VNAF medevac capability.
APPENDIX V

POLWAR

1. GENERAL

The Polwar effort is fairly efficient and aggressive in nature because the key section officers are well trained and have great experience in Political Warfare. The RF/PF and Rn level Polwar cadre generally lack any formal Polwar schooling which reduces the effectiveness of the political indoctrination of the ARVN soldier. There is seldom any direct coordination between the Division Polwar personnel, the Regimental 35's, and Corps. The III Corps 05 does hold monthly meetings but these are primarily directive in nature and lack personal contact or interest.

2. PSYWAR

   a. Accomplishments: The Psywar Section's program revolves primarily around planned leaflet drops, aerial loudspeaker missions, and the use of psywar teams on the ground attached to the Regiments and/or Sectors. In this context the section performs very well. There is a printing capability at the Division which has been used to rapidly produce a new type of leaflet when needed.

   b. Problem Areas: There is a definite lack of quick reaction to enemy contacts and/or Chieu Hoi's. Staff coordination between G2, G3 and G5 in planning psywar missions for reaction to hot intelligence or exploitable events is not conducted. There is an acute shortage of tape recorders to make recordings of Chieu Hoi's. One tape recorder, which has been retained at Division, is the only one within the Division. This lack of recorders greatly hinders rapid exploitation of Chieu Hoi's.

3. POLITICAL INDUCRINATION

   a. Accomplishments: Division Polwar has an indoctrination team which is continuously used in the Regiments. Each Company has an indoctrination officer whom carries out the Polwar program. Approximately 50% of these officers have had some kind of formal indoctrination training within the past year. The Division Training Center gives indoctrination training and classes when each Battalion comes in for its refresher training. This program as well as the roving team are making the ARVN soldier more aware of his nation's government.

   b. Problem Areas: An insufficient number of the company indoctrination officers are school trained and experienced.

4. CIVIC ACTION

   a. Accomplishments: The Division has started working on Civic Action with a consistency that it never had before. There are no large projects at present but many simple, efficient and high impact type projects are being completed on a daily basis. Examples of this area digging wells, repairing roads, and repairing and painting houses. The Social Welfare Section is presently trying to renovate the Dependents' Maternity Clinic and trying to obtain a laundry contract for the Division's Widows Association.
b. Problem Areas: There is an insufficient amount of money available for many good projects that might be started. Also the ARM in general are reluctant to attempt to requisition materials through their supply system.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Progress is being made in the upgrading of ARM in the Polwar field but it is not as rapid as possible. The Polwar people are complacent and not prone to accept or attempt new ideas or plans. Too often opportunities are lost because of a lack of initiative and the policy that innovations must be directed from higher headquarters.
Requirements for the 5th Engineer Battalion within the 32nd Division Tactical Area are numerous. The division engineers have two basic requirements: to support all division units, and to support sectors and sub-sectors within the DTA. Missions range from combat support to permanent Class B construction. There are also road networks and airfields which the division engineers have the task of maintaining. Due to the size of the Battalion and lack of equipment, the DTA must rely on US Engineers and III Corps Engineers for upgrading and maintenance of road networks. The 5th Engineer Battalion has demonstrated that it can provide needed support. Additional equipment and better utilization planning of the engineers will enable the Battalion to assume a larger role in supporting the 32nd DTA.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

a. Road Repair: Approximately 12 kms of road have been improved or are under the process of being improved, 3 kilometers were in Chau Thanh district and 9 kilometers are in Phu Giao district. Road repair in Chau Thanh district was accomplished solely with organic resources while work in Phu Giao district is being accomplished jointly with III Corps Engineers.

b. Airfields: Lam Son Airfield has had minor maintenance performed and current plans are to rebuild the airfield. Surveying of the field has been accomplished by division engineers with design criteria being furnished by III Corps.

c. Combat and Operational Support: Combat support for division units has been accomplished entirely by the 5th Engineer Battalion. Combat support primarily consists of demolition and minesweep teams. Operational support primarily consists of the use of assault boats in river crossing operations, and deployment of equipment and minesweep teams in road opening operations.

d. Base Development: The 5th Engineer Battalion has constructed two new bases and is currently constructing another. One RF outpost was constructed approximately 9 kms north of Chon Thanh on OL 13. All work was accomplished with organic resources with materials provided by the 1st Infantry Division (US). A battalion size compound was constructed at Pong Bong with materials coming through ARVN supply channels. Through improper planning it was found that this compound was not required and 1½ months after completion of the project the battalion was ordered to destroy the compound. A third compound is being constructed at Phu Loi. This is a Force Structure Increase (FSI) project and materials are ordered by the Bien Hoa Area Construction Office.

e. Civic Actions: A new school consisting of 12 class rooms is currently being constructed with materials being provided by PhuPNG Sector.

f. Class "B" Construction: Class "B", reinforced concrete bunkers, POL and ammo dumps, are being constructed, or will be constructed throughout the DTA. This Class "B" construction is currently within the FSI program.
3. (C) PROBLEM AREAS

a. Combat Support: There are two areas which have seriously hampered the 5th Engineer Battalion in accomplishing its primary mission of combat and operational support to the divisional units. These have been the use of the battalion in a construction role and improper planning by the division staff in utilizing the engineers. There is also a lack of engineer support requests coming from field commanders.

b. Equipment and Equipment Maintenance: The most significant problem involving equipment is that the equipment is old and outdated. Although the battalion has recently received two new front loaders and a new crane, much of the remaining engineer items have been in use from 4 to 7 years. 85% of the wheeled vehicles, excluding 1½ ton trucks, were built in the 50's. The ARVN repair parts system, especially for engineer items, is extremely slow in reacting. Due to the problem in the parts area cannibalization is becoming more prevalent. The maintenance section lacks sufficient tools and special sets to provide adequate maintenance. The ARVN mechanic has shown to be very knowledgeable in his field, and if given the parts and tools to do his job will be more than able to accomplish his tasks. Another problem that arises in the maintenance field is in the ARVN DSU area. Since the division does not have sufficient capabilities to provide 3rd echelon support for engineer equipment, the engineer battalion must depend on an EDSU. Since the EDSU supports many other ARVN engineer units the time period for getting a piece of equipment repaired usually exceeds 3 months. Although the ARVN modernization program will help to alleviate the equipment problem greatly by providing new equipment, there will be little or no change in the maintenance area unless the repair parts system is made to work more efficiently.

4. (C) CONCLUSIONS

a. The engineers have the leadership, experience, and professional competence to accomplish the various engineer tasks.

b. The 5th Engineer Battalion is not being properly utilized in fulfilling its primary mission of supplying combat and operational support to division units.

c. Present equipment has reached the age that it hinders the battalion in meeting its requirements because of excessive down time.

d. Proper planning and a priority system are not presently in use for programming utilization of the battalion.
1. (U) ACCOMPLISHMENTS

The 5th Division Signal Officer installed a communication monitoring system which enables them to monitor AM, FM, CW, and wire circuits. This enables the Signal Officer to control their communications and to make on the spot corrections when improper procedures are used or a security violation is observed. A WEP system was installed at Dong Xoai. The division HQ area has had new cables installed and all field wire has been deleted in a "clean up" campaign. A new switchboard capable of providing service to 200 customers has been installed in an underground bunker. Formerly, the division switchboard was operated and maintained by the 306th Signal, a non-divisional unit.

2. (U) PROBLEM AREAS

The 5th Division has been receiving much US type equipment under the "Vietnamization" program. This operates a problem as the parts are not readily available in their supply system, personnel are not trained to operate and maintain the equipment, and publications are not available for the operator or maintenance personnel. The "down time" of equipment is quite lengthy and will remain that way until these problems can be resolved.

3. (C) CONCLUSIONS

The ARVN communicators are considered professionals. They understand and utilize good communication procedures. The established lines of communications are very reliable and the operators and maintenance personnel possess both skill and technical proficiency. ARVN communications at this time are considered very good and are getting better all the time. They certainly can carry their load in the field of Signal.
SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Program

Commanding General
III CTZ, Bien Hoa
APO 96227

1. (U) Reference message number 92903, dated 24 Oct 69, subj: Senior Officer Debriefing.

2. The following report is submitted in accordance with cited reference and covers the period 1 May 1969 to date. Functional areas in which the 18th ARVN Division Senior Advisor has responsibility or a major interest are covered in appendices hereto.

3. (C) OVERALL ASSESSMENT:
   a. General: There has been a steady improvement in the combat effectiveness of the division during the period covered by the report. The mechanical phase of upgrading the division is complete with the issue of new weapons, communication equipment and additional vehicles. All the battalions have completed unit refresher training programs conducted by the 11 ATTF and the 199th LIB. The Commanding General is now emphasising refresher training be conducted at battalion and company level. The frequent zeroing of individual weapons and training in ambush and patrolling techniques is being stressed. The ARVN commanders are confident that they can defeat the enemy. The ARVN have clearly demonstrated that they are now capable of efficiently and effectively employing fire power. There has been a significant increase in the use of VNAF air strikes within the DTA.

   b. Progress: There has been significant improvement in several areas during the reporting period. In particular, the division has become more offensive minded, is conducting more company size operations and extended operations are the norm. Reaction to contacts has been excellent in nearly every case. There has been a vast improvement in the timely requesting and efficient employment of artillery and TAC air support. Airmobile
SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Program

operations are conducted as proficiently as most US units.

c. Principal Problem Areas: There has been a significant improvement in leadership at battalion level and up; the leadership at company level and below is still weak. Staffs at division and regimental level are improving. Training of maintenance personnel has not been programmed far enough ahead of the issue of some new signal equipment. The logistical system is well organized but still too centralized. The general non-availability of material continues to hamper engineer efforts. Although the division is doing everything within its resources, the ARVN program for administering to the needs of the soldier and his family is inadequate. There continued to be an excessive desertion rate although the high achievements in recruiting give cause for optimism in this area.

4. ADVISOR PERSONNEL: There still exists the need for well qualified individuals to work with the ARVN commanders and their staffs. During the reporting period the 18th Division has experienced a sharp reduction in the number of qualified advisor replacements. This shortage of personnel has become more and more apparent as operations become more decentralized, and the number of Dong Tien operations increased. The correlation between good units and good advisors is great.

Appendices: I - Personnel and Administration  
II - Intelligence  
III - Plans, Operations and Training  
IV - Logistics  
V - Political Warfare  
VI - Engineer  
VII - Communications
APPENDIX I

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

1. (C) GENERAL. The Division assigned strength decreased during the first half of this year, however, beginning in July the situation reversed itself and a steady increase has been noted since that time. The authorized strength increased in August with the activation of the 183rd Artillery Battalion and again in September when the 5th Cavalry Regiment became organic to the Division. The largest single category of replacements received this year have been conscripts and from this group come most of the desertions. Confronted with these facts the Division has been conducting an intense recruiting program aimed at increasing the volunteer strength and thus decreasing the need to accept conscripts. Based on the large number of volunteers recruited JGS recently assured the Division Commander that the flow of conscripts would halt at the end of November. Overall the officer strength appears good but a closer examination discloses an excess of aspirants and a shortage of the grades of lieutenant colonel and captain. Twelve of the 36 rifle companies are commanded by 2nd lieutenants or aspirants; 7 are commanded by captains. Although some improvements have been made in personnel services and personnel management the lack of rank and experience in command positions contributes to the slow progress.

2. (C) ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

a. The most significant personnel accomplishment for this Division has been the increase in recruiting. In July the Division began a very vigorous program to increase recruiting which led to more control by the Division Headquarters, and the addition of recruiting teams from the 5th Cavalry Regiment and the Division Headquarters. From July through October the results total nearly 2200 volunteers which is four times the number recruited during the first six months of this year.

b. The prompt and correct payment of all soldiers is receiving more attention by all commanders. During September and October all units were paid during the specified pay periods.

c. Commanders are becoming increasingly aware of the importance of granting soldiers annual and special leave. Directives have been issued that leave rosters will be maintained and soldiers will be informed of the approximate date that they can go on leave.

d. Individual record checks are now being conducted by the receiving units prior to the trainees leaving the Division Training Center. This action has greatly reduced the number of soldiers sent to units without records.

e. The Division G1 and AG visit the Regimental Personnel Sections monthly to seek problems and offer assistance.
f. Accuracy of periodic reports has improved, particularly the desertion reports.

3. (c) PROBLEM AREAS.

   a. Desertion continues to be the major personnel problem for this Division.

   b. Two problems that influence personnel management, but that are beyond the control of Division are: 1) an inadequate Advanced Individual Training program; and 2) assignment/reassignment policies are inefficient.

4. (c) RECOMMENDATIONS.

   a. That the desertion problem receive continuous command attention and primary emphasis be given to ensuring that all commanders and leaders make maximum use of appropriate countermeasures.

   b. That JCS establish an Advanced Individual Training program which will provide an adequate output of trained specialists.

   c. That assignments/reassignments be accomplished by MOS when possible, rather than by bulk.
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APPENDIX II

INTELLIGENCE

1. (G) GENERAL: The 18th Division intelligence collection, production and distribution is efficient and effective. The Vietnamese intelligence community is making an increased effort in making maximum use of current intelligence in the planning of operations. The utilization of aerial surveillance systems has continued to improve, but as yet they are not being employed to their maximum capacity. The Division 0-2, LTC Minh, is an extremely capable intelligence officer, he is well trained, and he is receptive to suggestions and assistance from the 0-2 Advisers.

2. (G) 02 OPERATIONS:

   a. Accomplishments:

      (1) The production and dissemination of ARVN generated intelligence has continued to improve. The close relation between the 0-2 of the 18th Division and the 199 CID has supplemented both units collection efforts.

      (2) The 18th Division has continued to increase the efficiency of its MID interrogation efforts and has routinely produced outstanding results.

      (3) Staff relations between the 0-2 and 0-3 are improving due to recent co-location.

   b. Problem Areas:

      (1) Dissemination of ARVN produced intelligence needs improvement especially in lateral intelligence transfer procedures.

      (2) 0-2/0-3 staff coordination continues to be a difficulty in spite of recent improvements. Continued adviser emphasis will be needed to correct this situation.

3. (G) 02 AIR OPERATIONS:

   a. Accomplishments:

      (1) Aerial photography continues to provide most of the information for the ARVN 0-2 Air; however, he is now using side looking airborne radar and camouflage detection films to a greater extent.

      (2) The 18th Division now has a cooperative effort with the 0-2 Air Adviser to improve target selection within the Division.

      (3) There has been a definite increase in the use of VNAF Forward Air Controllers for Visual Reconnaissance.
b. Problem Areas:

(1) The use of US Air Assets for Visual Reconnaissance is complicated by the language barrier. It has been necessary to have advisor personnel brief the US pilots after the briefing by the O-2 Air. Continued briefing practice by the O-2 Air will minimize this problem.

(2) The 18th Division O-2 Air lacks sophisticated photo interpretation equipment. ARVN personnel are able to develop target intelligence from hard copy contact photo prints only. Light tables and magnification devices are needed to increase their efficiency.

c. (U) CONCLUSION: The O-2 Section of the 18th Division is staffed with well qualified personnel. They are constantly improving their operations and are willing to accept constructive advice. The problems now facing the section can all be overcome with combined efforts of advisors and counterparts.
1. (C) GENERAL:

a. The intensity of enemy activity in the 18th Division TAOR has varied significantly since May 1969. During May and early June the 5th NVA Division was operating in Long Khanh Province and contact was frequent and heavy.

b. During the last week of June the 5th NVA Division withdrew north into War Zone D and the frequency and severity of contacts diminished. From July through November the enemy avoided contact and the Division began conducting small unit operations in an attempt to find enemy forces and then pile on. Contact remained sporadic and generally light throughout this period. On 20 August Brigadier General Lam Quan Tho assumed command of the Division. General Tho has encouraged small unit operations and quick reaction to intelligence information.

c. Available combat strength has increased in the Division. The 183rd Artillery Battalion was activated on 1 August 1969 and began training on 27 September 1969. Three additional maneuver Battalions became available to the Division when static security missions under sector control ended during the first week of August.

2. (C) ACCOMPLISHMENTS:

a. Tactical Operations: The 18th Division has conducted many combined operations with the 199th LB. One battalion and one cavalry troop has remained OPCON to Long Binh Special Zone and one or two battalions OPCON to the 1st Australian Task Force. One or two battalions have been on Engineer Security missions. Since August no battalions have been OPCON to any of the Provinces for more than a two week period. The Division Commander has therefore had from 7 to 9 battalions and 1 Cav Regiment (-) available for offensive operations throughout most of the period. The number of small operations has increased significantly within the Division. In response to the enemy tactics of avoiding contact, company size elements have been operating throughout the TAOR in an attempt to find and fix the enemy. The majority of the units have been very aggressive once contact has been made and have used air and artillery supporting fires effectively. A few battalions have been reluctant to move back immediately into areas of contact once supporting fires have been completed. The basic cause for this lack of aggressiveness is poor leadership at the battalion and company level. However steps have been taken by the Division Commander to replace ineffective leaders and currently only one battalion commander is considered ineffective.

b. The use of combat assault assets has improved considerably both in the number of operations conducted and tactical planning for these operations. Too much reliance is still placed on the US Advisors in planning airmobile
operations but the ARVN are developing a greater understanding and interest in taking advantage of the quick reaction capability afforded by combat assault assets.

c. Cavalry Requirements: The 5th Cavalry Regiment has not been utilized enough on offensive operations. On 3 November a combined Task Force was formed consisting of 1 Inf Bn, 1 Inf Bn (-) and 1 Cavalry Troop under the command and control of the 5th Cavalry Regiment. Since that date utilization of the 5th Cavalry Regiment on offensive operations has doubled.

d. VNAF Air Support: VNAF Tactical Air Support has been extremely effective and has provided excellent support to units on the ground. BDA reports by VNAF FAC's have not been furnished to the Division until almost 48 hours after the strikes go in. The delay is a result of reporting procedures. In some cases VNAF FAC's have not conducted BDAs and as a result the Division has no idea of the effectiveness of the strike.

e. Training: Emphasis has been placed on upgrading ARVN Bns through refresher training programs. Four battalions have completed a 6 week training program with the 1st AIF and four battalions with the 199th Mobile Training Team. One troop of the 5th Cavalry has been trained for two weeks by the 11th Cavalry Regiment; the remaining two troops have received one week of training. The Division Training Center moved its base camp from Nui Dat to Blackhorse on 24 Oct. The existing facilities at Blackhorse were an improvement over what the center had in Nui Dat. In addition new ranges and training areas are being constructed which will considerably upgrade the training facilities available to the center. Six experienced US NCOs have been assigned TDU to the Training Center and are assisting the ARVN in upgrading their quality of instruction. The 18th Division has augmented the Training Center staff with 5 additional officers and 10 NCOs.

3. (C) PROBLEM AREAS:

a. Leadership: In general there has been a significant improvement in leadership within the Division. Only 1 battalion commander is considered ineffective and the Division Commander has indicated he will be replaced. There is still some weakness at the Regimental and Division Staff level however recent personnel changes, particularly at Division level give cause for optimism.

b. Planning: Planning has improved but is still not up to US standards. The Division G-3 and his staff have been increasingly reliant on US advisors.

4. (U) FAILURE TO REPORT SITUATION PROMPTLY: Progress has been made in this area but ARVN spot reports are still not complete in many cases. When reporting bunker complexes, data as to number of bunkers, size, type or lack
of overhead cover is often omitted. When reporting enemy sightings or contacts there is still in some instances a failure to report accurately, tyre uniform, weapons and equipment, size of enemy force and direction of withdrawal.

5. (U) CONCLUSION: There has been a significant improvement in the 19th Division and this is reflected in the favorable kill ratio attained since August 1969. Many more company size operations have been conducted by the Division since August and night offensive operations have increased sharply. However more effective night ambush techniques must be employed if contacts and enemy kills are to increase along with the increase in night offensive utilization.
LOGISTICS

1. (C) GENERAL: The RVNAF logistics system is established and operates similarly to the system US forces employed prior to MILSTRIP. The Division Logistical Battalion supports the Division with direct support maintenance and supply. The III Corps Area Logistical Command located in Saigon supports the Division Logistical Battalion.

2. (C) ACCOMPLISHMENTS:

   a. The formation of the 18th Logistical Support Battalion providing direct support and supply and maintenance has greatly improved combat service support. The formation of this unit has improved coordination with III ALC field depot and expedited distribution plans and the issue of equipment.

   b. The issue of external aerial delivery equipment to the Division Headquarters Company and artillery units has alleviated ARVN dependency upon US advisors to obtain this equipment.

   c. Equipment Modernization Program:

      (1) There has been significant progress in upgrading ARVN equipment. The Division is now approaching 100% fill on all items and the Division's equipment compares favorably with that of an American Division. The Division has been issued 100% of the TOE authorization of the M-16 rifles and AN/PRC 25 radios.

      (2) Less aircraft have been used by the Division for resupply as a result of the issue of more 2½ ton trucks.

3. (C) PROBLEM AREAS:

   a. There is a lack of command and staff interest shown in the area of logistics and maintenance. Command and staff visits are rarely made to subordinate units. Logistics personnel do not know the supply equipment and maintenance status of supported units. A combat loss reporting system is not in effect. It is approximately 30 to 60 days after a loss before units submit reports to the G-4.

   b. There is a shortage of repair parts, tools and technical manuals for new type equipment. Parts manuals for new equipment are often not issued making correct requisitioning and PLL stockage difficult.

   c. Shortage of TM's is made more critical by the fact that TM's are a property book item. They are often locked in a secure place and not readily available.
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d. There is a need for subordinate commanders and their S-4s to place emphasis on logistical support planning and coordination with the Division G-4 and Logistic Support Battalion.

4. (U) CONCLUSIONS: The Division's logistical system is capable of supporting the Division. The logistics battalion has made possible many improvements in logistics. Active Division command and staff interest in the field of logistics will improve the present system.

5. (U) RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. More command and staff interest in the logistics and the maintenance areas.

b. Initiation of an ARVN material readiness report so proper planning can be made to correct maintenance problems and to inform the Division Commander and Staff of the equipment status of the Division.

c. All technical manuals should be removed from the unit property book and made readily available to using units.

d. Reports of critically needed repair parts should be submitted to ensure that III Corps ALC is aware of the problem areas.
POLITICAL WARFARE

1. GENERAL.

a. The 18th Division Polwar Bloc is effectively pursuing its mission, however, there is a lack of School trained Polwar cadre. All section chiefs are receptive to advice, and rapport of U.S. advisors and counterparts has been excellent. However, this same degree of effectiveness is not evident in subordinate units of the Division. This has been generally due to an insufficient number of Polwar trained officers and NCO’s at unit level. Another major problem area is lack of support on the part of some ARVN unit commanders. The Vietnamese Polwar System is entirely dependent upon command emphasis at each level. Some commanders either do not understand their Polwar system or are perhaps mistrustful of it. The Division Polwar Bloc has attempted to overcome this by a continuous flow of guidance and directives to subordinate units. In effect it has often performed the work that should have been done at unit level. The 52nd Regiment is probably the poorest Polwar oriented unit in the Division. It is believed that this unit will soon become a III CTZ "New Horizons Program" target unit.

b. Psywar is fairly effective and showing signs of improvement. However, the Psywar Section is not using all the available Psywar sources of intelligence to improve Psywar impact on VC/NVA.

c. The Social Welfare Section is effective but hampered by a lack of funds and supplies to meet the Division needs. There is also a shortage of social workers at division as well as regimental level.

2. PSYWAR.

a. Accomplishments:

(1) Activities: Since May 1969 there has been a slow but steady increase in 18th Division Psywar effectiveness and the number of air leaflets dropped has shown a slight but steady increase. The Division Psywar Chief believes that his present monthly air leaflet drop average (14.7 million) is sufficient considering the amount of enemy present in the 33rd DTA.

(a) Air loudspeaker hours average 45.5 hours per month. This also shows a good increase over the first five months of 1969 which averaged 37.0 hours per month.

(b) In conjunction with this activity the Hoi Chanh rate has increased significantly since May 1969. There were a total of 366 Hoi Chanhs for January through May 1969. Since May and through October the Hoi Chanhs total is 404. This averages 67 Hoi Chanhs per month for the first 5 months of 1969 compared to 81 Hoi Chanhs per month for the period June through October 1969.
b. Problem Areas:

(1) There seems to be a problem of obtaining offset printing paper (negative, slow, copyrapid). Inquiries into the supply of this paper reveal that the 3rd Area Logistical Command never seems to have any on hand. The Division Polwar Printing Section uses a Type 85 press and this type of paper is needed to produce leaflets, newspapers, posters and magazines for Psywar/Indoctrination efforts.

(2) Preplanned Air Leaflet requests take from 7 to 10 days before the III CTZ Combined Psychological Operations Center can drop the leaflets. However since enemy units move continually, by the time the leaflets are dropped the targets have often moved.

c. Conclusions: The Psywar Section has pointed its efforts toward better intelligence techniques and liaison with the Division G-2 Section. This has resulted in far more accurate leaflet targeting. The Psywar Section attempts to avoid "wild swath" leaflet drops and concentrates on leaflets and loudspeaker operations on point targets addressed to specific enemy units whenever possible.

d. Recommendation: That the ARVN system of issuing printing supplies to division level units be reviewed and a more responsive system of issuing printing supplies be implemented.

3. POLITICAL INDOC7RINATION.

a. Accomplishments:

(1) The Military Sports program is well run and the quality of the instruction has been much improved particularly in the Tae Kwon Do course with the assignment of a new Chief Instructor.

(2) The Indoctrination/Education programs have been fairly well pursued and the Indoctrination Section is promoting its mission. However only limited success has been attained at regimental and battalion level due to the lack of personnel trained in indoctrination techniques.

b. Problem Areas. There is a serious lack of trained indoctrination personnel at division as well as at subordinate unit level.

c. Conclusions: The Political Indoctrination Section seems to be well organized and functional. Little demand is placed on the US Advisor for support. There presently are plans to conduct a division sponsored squad leader Polwar course. This program's objectives are to teach unit NCO's their function in the Polwar System and how they can best accomplish their Polwar responsibilities.

4. PX/COMMISSARY.

a. Situation. The PX/Commissary System is presently hampered seriously by lack of funds and the shortage of the most popular items.
Despite sound plans to extend and develop this very important morale and welfare service, the present situation of Vietnamese governmental support has been disappointing. The PX/Commissary is one really tangible thing that the GVN can offer its Armed Forces. This service could do much more to assist morale and troop/dependent welfare. Unfortunately the contributions of the program has been marginal.

b. Problem Areas:

(1) There is never sufficient quantities of staple goods to satisfy the demand, such as canned milk, meat, pork and fish.

(2) The present great variety of items probably defeats the possibility of stocking greater quantities of basic staple foods.

c. Conclusions: The ARVN PX/Commissary System can be a tremendous asset to the Armed Services if it receives the funds and administrative attention it deserves. At present, the system is not very effective to the serviceman, and at best the benefits derived are only marginal.

d. Recommendations: The RVNAF PX/Commissary System should be reviewed in depth and necessary actions taken to establish a truly beneficial system which will better meet the needs of the troops and their dependents.

5. SOCIAL WELFARE SERVICE:

a. Accomplishments.

(1) Within the availability of funds and welfare supplies the 18th Division Social Service has been very efficient and effective. The quality of work performed by the RVNAF WAC's has been very commendable. The present Division Chief Social Worker is conscientious, honest and uses her funds and supplies to provide the greatest benefit to the needy members of the division.

(2) The Social Service has opened a dependent nursery in Xuan Loc and it is staffed by one Social Worker. The nursery handles approximately 60 children of various ages and conducts two classes per day.

b. Problem Areas: The major problem areas are insufficient funds and welfare supply items to meet division needs.

(2) The Division is short of social workers at all staffing levels from division to regiment. The Division is presently short 6 social workers.

c. Conclusions: The overall objectives of the Social Service Section are met by the present staff. Within the limits imposed by funds and supplies, the social service assists in bringing soldiers and dependents closer to a healthier, happier life.
d. Recommendations: That efforts be made to increase funds and supplies to this division's Social Service to meet the needs of ARVN dependents.

6. Civic Action/Civil Affairs: This is not a primary responsibility of the Polwar Bloc but a mission that all ARVN units should be performing.

   a. Accomplishments:

      (1) All Regimental units conduct Medcaps through their surgeons. The Division has averaged between 3700 to 4000 patients treated per month for the past year. This is in addition to the Medcaps performed by the 301st Polwar Company attached to the division.

      (2) There have been a few small scale projects accomplished by regiment and battalion units, such as building school furniture. Most of these have been short range high impact type projects.

   b. Problem Areas:

      (1) There are few ARVN trained Civic Action personnel. Thus a prime objective of improving ARVN civilian relationship often goes lacking. This is due to the shortage of personnel who have the knowledge and skills to conduct effective Civic Action projects at unit level.

      (2) There is not much emphasis given to Civic Action projects by ARVN Commanders and the projects that are undertaken are largely dependent on US provided funds or supplies.

   c. Conclusions: While the field of ARVN Civic Action has much potential, it is believed that a basic attitude hampering this activity is that many officers and soldiers feel that they and their dependents are far more neglected than the civilians. Therefore they probably feel that Civic Action begins with their own dependents first.

   d. Recommendations: Although not a primary Polwar responsibility, efforts should be made to provide for more funds and supplies for Civic Action by ARVN units through channels.

7. The 301st Polwar Company:

   a. Accomplishments:

      (1) The attached Polwar Company has been only fairly effective in accomplishing its mission.

      (2) Entertainment activity has been stressed to assist in enhancing morale.

      (3) The Five CA/Paywar teams have been heavily used to support units in the field.
(4) At present one CA/Psywar team is attached to each Regiment to perform combined Psywar/Recruiting services. Results in division recruiting has shown that the teams have been beneficial to this mission and recruiting has increased significantly.

b. Problem Areas:

(1) There are not enough CA/Psywar Teams in the present Company TO&E. The proposed expansion to 8 teams will help if the equipment is provided and trained personnel assigned.

(2) The Polwar Company could be a major contributor to the Polwar Bloc's success, however, the present unit commander lacks initiative.

c. Recommendation: That the creation of eight CA/Psywar teams per company be strongly emphasized, and that perhaps a better motivated officer could be placed in charge of the 301st Company.
1. (C) GENERAL: The mission of the 18th ARVN Engineer Battalion is to provide direct support for the 18th Division and support the 33rd DTA as directed. With the meager equipment assets of the unit it is hard pressed to support DTA requirements. Operational support, is frequently required from US or III CTZ engineer assets to assist the 18th Engineers.

2. (C) ACCOMPLISHMENTS:

   a. Road Construction and Rehabilitation: Approximately 73 kms of road were opened or rehabilitated within the 33rd DTA as follows:

   (1) Long Khanh Province: Route 333 from YT 630085 to YT 678198 approximately 12 kms; approximately 7 kms of road from Blackhorse to Trung Hieu village (YS 443966 to YS 572980).

   (2) Binh Tuy Province: Routes 333, 334, and 335 from YT 678198 to YT 934262 approximately 48 kms.

   (3) Phuoc Tuy Province: Route 2 from YS 458838 to YS 463782 approximately 6 kms.

   b. Airfield Construction: The airfield at Duc Thanh was repaired and extended approximately 600m. A soil binder was applied and the surface covered with matting.

   c. Combat and Operational Support: Combat support consisted primarily of demolition which accompanies infantry units on operations.

   d. Base Development: Major projects were the construction of the 18th Division Headquarters Tactical Operations Center and support of the dependent housing program.

3. (C) PROBLEM AREAS: The system, through which engineer constructional materials are obtained, does not respond to the needs of the engineer unit. Almost all project delays can be attributed to the nonavailability of material. The problem of acquiring material to respond quickly will increase as the profile of US units decrease.

4. (C) CONCLUSION:

   a. The 18th Engineer Battalion has the professional competence and experience to accomplish all combat engineer tasks.

   b. The 18th Engineer Battalion is inadequate to support the regiments of the Division and the DTA.
c. The system for supplying construction materials is inadequate.

5. **RECOMMENDATION:**

   a. That the feasibility of non divisional engineer companies be organised and assigned to each sector to provide operational support and increase the public works capability, be studied.

   b. That the construction material support for engineers be improved. Arrangements should be considered to permit the ARVN system access to USARV assets if materials are not available in the ARVN System.
APPENDIX VII

COMMUNICATIONS

1. (U) GENERAL:

a. All communications within the 16th Division are provided from organic signal assets. Communications from the Division to Headquarters, III Corps and 33rd DTA Provinces are provided by the 301st Area Signal Company. There is a close correlation between the quantity and quality of these systems and the effectiveness of the command and control of all civil and military operations conducted in the 33rd DTA. As "Vietnamization" continues, there will be an even greater demand for versatile and reliable communications.

b. Signal personnel assigned to this Division are fully qualified to meet this challenge. Their overall professional competence and technical proficiency would rival most US signal units.

2. (C) ACCOMPLISHMENTS:

a. The major improvement in ARVN communication during the past 7 months resulted from a growing sense of pride in doing an outstanding job. ARVN signal personnel will not accept lengthy outages as the norm, on their own initiative, they immediately take steps to rectify the cause(s) of an outage. There has been a marked increase in the use of radioteletype as a means of passing secure traffic.

b. Communications in the 18th Division has continued to demonstrate remarkable responsiveness in satisfying the requirements of changing tactical situations. The speed with which communications can be established once a major unit has relocated is commensurate with most US units.

c. The Division has continued to receive new signal equipment. At this time the Division has its full authorized quantity of AN/PRC-25 radios. Only minor shortages exist for all other signal equipment. Most shortages of VHF equipment will be eliminated as Corps level units receive TRC-24 equipment and their TRC-3 equipment is reissued to division units.

3. (C) PROBLEM AREAS: The principal problem is in the area of new equipment introduction. Some new communication equipment is issued to the Division prior to their receipt of sufficient maintenance parts or repairmen being trained. An example is the TTC-7 switchboard. This switchboard was received at the Division prior to signal repairmen being trained, adequate spare parts received, or maintenance manuals being translated. Thus, the Division was incapable of installing or maintaining this equipment without US assistance.

4. (U) CONCLUSIONS: The Division's signal units display a professional competence and technical proficiency indicative of good communicators.
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They are responsive to the needs of commanders and the tactical situation. With the exception of a delay in obtaining adequate repair parts stockage and timely maintenance training on new equipment, the ARVN supply and maintenance system is capable of carrying their own load.

5. (U) RECOMMENDATION: There continues to be a need for training of operators and maintenance personnel. Enough "lead time" should be planned in order for thorough training to be accomplished prior to the issue of new equipment.
SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing (U)

Deputy Senior Advisor
USAAG, III CTZ
APO 96227

1. (U) Reference, message, DSA III CTZ, MACCZ-III-03 929903, subject as above. DTG 240500Z Oct 69.

2. (C) The following input information for the DSA's Senior Officer Debriefing report is submitted in compliance with referenced message:

PART I
OVERALL ASSESSMENT

During the period May through November 1969, the overall efficiency of the 25th ARVN Division continued to improve at a consistent rate. The areas in which the most significant progress was made were operational planning, the tactical employment of small units, combined (Dong Tien) operations, the level of combat unit utilization, support of the Revolutionary Development Program, and personnel management. A number of achievements were also made in the field of logistical support; however, improvements in supply procedures, maintenance and logistical planning did not keep pace with the excellent progress made in other areas. The following statistics relative to improved performance are considered worthy of special note:

a. Small unit operations increased from 238 in May to 1295 in October; a 541% increase.

b. Combined operations (Dong Tien) increased from 49 in May to 490 in October; a 1000% increase.

c. Night operations increased from 67 in May to 546 in October; a 815% increase.

d. The number of heliborne operations increased from 46 in May to 142 in October with no significant increase in available assets; a 300% increase.

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The standards of leadership and the professional ability of commanders and key staff officers at Division, Regiment, and Battalion level were elevated to a point well above the national Vietnamese average. At the present, there are only three of four key officers who are not considered to possess the potential for future advancement to positions of greater responsibility. The Division Commander, Major General Nguyen Xuan Thinh, has demonstrated repeatedly that he is an exceptionally capable tactician, leader and administrator. Leadership at Company, Platoon and Squad level has improved slightly over the period, but remains below desired standards.

During most of the period, nine of the twelve infantry battalions of the division were employed under the operational control of the Province Chiefs of Long An and Hau Nghia in support of the Revolutionary Development Program. Then the Province Chiefs initially gained control of the ARVN battalions, there appeared to be a marked regression in unity of effort and a less effective utilization of the combat units involved. The decline in efficiency was quickly recognized however, and positive action was taken to clarify command relationships and define perimeters of responsibility. In his capacity as the Division Commander, General Thinh currently maintains direct control of his "RD" units on administrative, logistical and training matters; and, in his role as the DTA Commander, he exercises positive supervision over tactical activities through the Province Chiefs. At the present time, the general policy is to employ ARVN RD units in offensive type operations which "indirectly" support the pacification program, and to delegate the more static type roles to Regional and Popular Force units. In some cases, however, ARVN units are still tied to area RD missions which restrict them from being employed more profitably in mobile combat operations. It is not anticipated that this problem will be solved completely until such time as all units are reverted to Division Control.

Although the combat efficiency of the 25th ARVN Division has been elevated to a relatively high level, there are a number of fixed organizational and equipment shortfalls that preclude the achievement of optimum proficiency. Specific areas where structural weaknesses exist, include the following:

a. Organization and Equipment of Infantry Companies and Battalions. Consideration should be given to adding a fourth rifle company to each battalion and increasing equipment (radios, starlite scopes, crew served weapons) to the levels found in U.S. units.
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b. Command and Control Helicopters. As a minimum, each regiment should be provided one Command and Control helicopter to facilitate the control of combat operations and to permit closer supervision of widely dispersed units.

c. Ground Surveillance Equipment. ARVN units should be provided radar equipment and night observation devices to enhance battlefield surveillance during the hours of restricted visibility.

d. Organic Engineer Support. The TO&E of the Division Engineer Battalion should be amended to add sufficient earth-moving and construction equipment and personnel to enable the unit to more efficiently perform the multitude of priority combat support tasks assigned.

PART II
PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

Personnel management and administration within the Division continued to improve during the period. A highly successful recruiting program resulted in an average monthly acquisition of 528 personnel. At the same time, the division desertion rate continued to be one of the lowest in ARVN. The average monthly rate was 2.4%, with a low of 1.4% in May and a high of 2.6% in September. An average of 2199 personnel were on leave each month (26.7% of assigned strength) and a liberal pass policy has attributed to high morale and esprit. Personnel were paid on time, with minor exceptions such as at the Division Training Center where transportation difficulties caused delays. The use of U.S. helicopter assets to assist the pay teams was a major factor in eliminating late payments. Mobile post exchanges and additional commissaries were employed to provide service to the troops; however, the relatively low stockage of supplies available to the Division limited the overall effectiveness of the system. Only approximately 30% of the authorized dependent housing was completed during the period.

Progress in this field has been slow because of a national shortage of material and the failure of civilian contractors to accept construction projects at some sites. All units of the Division were subjected to IG inspections during the period and received ratings of satisfactory or better. The majority of units were cited for their excellent mission performance, personnel management and high morale. A total of 6156 awards and decorations were presented to members of the Division during the 6 month period. Two officers were promoted to the grade of Colonel and four were elevated from Major to Lieutenant Colonel. The following key personnel were replaced: CO, 4th Regiment; CO, 5th Regiment; Division Intelligence Officer, O-2; Inspector General; Training Center Commandant.

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PART III
INTELLIGENCE

A. Major Enemy Activity During the Period. Enemy activity during May consisted of preparing for the Summer Campaign. Action, though remaining moderate through most of May, was interrupted by a country-wide highpoint on 11-12 May in which 159 cities were shelled in RVN. Preparation for the Summer Campaign was characterized by the enemy's avoiding contact and stressing efforts to upgrade his infrastructure and local force units. The Summer Campaign's two significant highpoints occurred 5-9 June and 19-20 June, both of which had been generally anticipated by allied intelligence. Principal areas of enemy activity in the 31st DTA in June were Tay Ninh City and its suburbs, FSB Crook (X0055992) and FSB Washington (X0046568), areas Southwest of Tay Ninh City between the Cambodian border and Southeast of Nui Ba Den, the Citadel, and areas between Trang Bang and the lower Loi Loi Woods. After sustaining heavy casualties in both high points, enemy forces generally avoided heavy contact and withdrew to base areas for refitting and preparation for the July action period. Captured documents indicated the enemy recognized he could not expect to annihilate US and SVN forces in the Summer Campaign, but expected to gain limited successes towards a later decisive victory. The enemy had planned to seize Tay Ninh City on or about 15 July, and proclaim it the Capital of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, but friendly actions again disrupted the enemy's staging for the mid-July highpoint. Enemy activity continued to be subdued throughout July and into early August as the enemy prepared his Fall-Winter campaign. This campaign, like the Summer Campaign, was conceived as an intermediate stage with limited objectives rather than the final decisive effort. Binh Long Province was singled out as the final pressure point with a secondary effort to be mounted in Tay Ninh Province. On 11 August, the enemy initiated a coordinated country-wide series of attacks by fire and ground actions. Action in the 31st DTA consisted of widespread attacks by fire and several limited ground confrontations with the exception of a heavy engagement between the ARVN Airborne and the 88th NVA Regiment Southwest of Tay Ninh City. The remainder of the activity centered principally in the vicinity of Nui Ba Den, Southwest of Tay Ninh City between the Van Co Dong and the Cambodian border, the central and lower Loi Loi Woods, the Citadel, Tan Tru and Binh Phuoc Districts of Long An Province. After the mid-August highpoint, the OSVN forces withdrew into secure bases near or across the Tay Ninh-Cambodian border, while Sub-Regional forces and the VCI began a campaign of political indoctrination, improving their security and reconnaissance, building up their logistics, and maintaining light contact with allied forces. By early August in SR-1, elements of the 268 Regiment

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and the 1st and 2d Quyet Thang Battalions had begun retraining and reorganizing as sappers. At the same time, it was apparent that SB-I was having chronic and worsening logistic and replacement problems as the flow of rice, men and munitions continued to be interdicted by allied operations. The enemy attempted to complete the Fall-Winter Campaign throughout September and October by initiating a series of incidents throughout the DTA. Except for the August highpoint, the Fall-Winter Campaign has been characterized by low activity, with the burden of contact being borne mainly by guerrilla and local forces, while main force units generally remained in base areas out of contact. The enemy may, in fact, maintain this posture indefinitely in anticipation of a political settlement to the war and/or an early US withdrawal.

B. Changes in order of battle.

1. 273 VC Regiment/9th VC Division moved to IV Corps. On 8 May, two Hoi Chanhs who rallied separately indicated that the 273 Regiment which had been out of contact since mid-April had moved to Ba Thu, Cambodia. On 11 and 12 May, documents captured from KIA in Chau Doc Province, IV Corps, identified the 273 Regiment. It was later learned that the regiment commenced moving south in March and completed the move in May.

2. 88th NVA Regiment/SB-I transferred to the 9th VC Division in Tay Ninh Province. On 23 May, captured documents indicated that the 88th NVA Regiment which had been out of contact in SB-I since 21 April, may have transferred to the 9th VC Division to fill the void left by the 273 Regiment which moved to IV Corps in March. Subsequent PW’s, documents, and Hoi Chanhs confirmed the transfer took place in early May.

3. 18B NVA Regiment/1st NVA Division moved to IV Corps. On 21 August, documents captured after an engagement in An Giang Province, IV Corps, identified the 18B NVA Regiment. The regiment, whose last contact was 20 June at LZ Ike in Tay Ninh Province, began deploying south in early July and arrived in An Giang Province in early August where it still remains.

4. 7th NVA Division left Eastern War Zone C and Michelin area. The regiments of the 7th NVA Division slowly gravitated north-easterly during May to the vicinity of the Fishhook and An Loe, Binh Long Province, where the division is currently located.

5. The 10th Artillery Battalion activated in SB-I. On 26 August, captured documents indicated SB-I had possibly formed an artillery regiment, consisting of the D-8, D-9, and D-10 artillery battalions, the D-10 being
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Previously unidentified. High ranking PW's of SR-1 confirmed there was a new artillery battalion in SR-1, while in October a Hoi Chanh said that a D-10 Artillery Battalion was activated recently. Documents, PW's and Hoi Chanhs captured during September and October confirmed the presence of the D-10 Artillery Battalion, and in late October, it was officially accepted by G2, IIPFV.

6. Quyet Thang Regiment De-activated. Documents captured on 3 August revealed that the Quyet Thang Regiment had been de-activated. A few days later, a rallier confirmed that the regiment's two battalions were now directly subordinate to SA-1. Intelligence sources since that time have confirmed the de-activation.

7. Appearance of SB-6 Sapper Battalions in SR-2 and SR-3. Commencing in May, the sapper battalions of SB-6 have attempted to infiltrate from Cambodia to Saigon through SR-2 and SR-3.

8. Use of NVA in Local Forces. On 3 July, a Hoi Chanh from the Ben Thu District (VC) local forces in SR-3, indicated his unit had received NVA replacements. There have been other indications that some SR-3 battalions were broken down and working very closely with local forces and guerrillas. A Duc Hoa local forces PW stated that he and 11 other NVA had been transferred from the 2542 Battalion to the Duc Hoa District local forces.

C. Changes In Enemy Strength And Capability. From 1 May through 31 October 1969, the enemy threat to the 31st DTA in terms of numbers of troops has remained roughly constant at slightly less than 20,000 troops, a figure which includes the VC/NVA Main Force divisional units in and adjacent to Tay Ninh Province, all Sub-Region units, and all local force and guerrilla units, including those straddling or operating near the DTA border. There have, however, been significant changes of strengths within the divisional and sub-region commands. The 9th VC/NVA lost its 273 Regiment in May 1969, and gained the 88th Regiment from SA-1. The 1st NVA Division lost its 168 Regiment in August 1969. Both the 272 Regiments and the 168 moved to IV CTZ. In May 1969, the 7th NVA Division moved out of its Eastern Zone C AO's into new AO's in Binh Long Province. The 7th Division was supported in its Binh Long operations by the 1st Division's 101D Regiment which operated from June to August 1969, astride J. 13 in southern Binh Long Province. After the August highpoint, the 101D returned to the DTA and moved across War Zone C to border base areas northwest of Tay Ninh City. Throughout the period, SR-1 and SR-3 units continued to sustain heavy losses at a rate greater than that of replacements and by 31 October 1969, the manpower and supply shortages in SR-1 had become critical. The divisional units, seeking refuge in Cambodian base areas, had less difficulty in...
maintaining troop levels. The Local Force and guerrilla units' strengths have almost halved in populated areas, and many Local Force and guerrilla units have been completely eliminated. There is some evidence of Local Force units in SR-2 and SR-3 receiving Main Force NVA replacements, but for the most part, the Local Forces are dependent upon local sources for replacements.

Throughout the period 1 May to 31 October 1969, the enemy has been capable of launching periodic coordinated sapper and multi-battalion size ground attacks, supported by rocket and mortar fire, throughout the 31st DTA, though this capability has been steadily eroded by the effects of friendly operations. This enemy capability to launch large scale attacks decreases from North to South.

SR-1 has suffered the greatest decline in overall offensive capability, due mainly to friendly disruption of its logistic and replacement system. The enemy has been able to maintain the capability to conduct the following type actions throughout the DTA: indirect fire attacks, limited harassment and/or interdiction of LOCs, limited scale ground and sapper attacks against friendly installations, withdrawal to Cambodian base areas, and limited operations of all types in support of his political and anti-pacification effort.

As the enemy has shifted his strategy from one of seeking decisive encounters with friendly forces to one of antipacification and preparation for a negotiated and to the war or an early US withdrawal, he has placed added emphasis on the following activities: sapper attacks, booby traps and mine warfare, reorganization of artillery units and the formation of new artillery units to better support sapper and other small-unit/small-scale operations, and the repositioning of forces.

During the period, enemy capabilities have been adversely affected by friendly operations in the following significant areas:

1. Coordinated operations against SR-1's base areas have produced a serious and worsening food, ammunition and manpower shortage in SR-1. SR-1 units are now largely incapable of mounting any major coordinated offensive action.

2. Friendly discovery and subsequent destruction of enemy caches have increased in effectiveness throughout the DTA, seriously degrading the enemy's capability to stage an offensive and disrupting his offensive timetable.
3. "Rome Plow" operations have resulted in long-term physical denial of many former base areas, especially in SA-1.

4. Friendly operations, especially in populated areas (notably Long An), have forced the wide dispersal of Main Force battalion elements in and among the Local Force and guerrilla elements and their supporting population.

5. Local Force elements and guerrillas have become increasingly vulnerable in the face of a more effective pacification effort, especially in Long An and Hau Nghia. The population has become increasingly responsive to pacification, greatly reducing the enemy's popular support base in the settled areas.

6. More effective friendly night operations of all types have greatly curtailed the enemy's night movement capability.

D. Improvements in the 25th ARVN Division Intelligence Operations. There have been three significant areas of improvement in intelligence operations within the 25th ARVN Division:

1. Target Information Center. In September, a Division Target Information Center (TIC) was established at Duc Hoa. Within the center, all sources of intelligence such as Red Haze; SLAR; People Sniffer; SPARS; Duffel Bag; GSR; PW, document, and rallier readouts; agent, LRP, photo and visual reconnaissance reports; and contacts with the enemy are posted on a map of the PTA. By keeping the map current, patterns of enemy movement and concentrations can be observed and successfully reacted upon.

2. Duffel Bag. On 25 October 1969, 39 soldiers from the 25th ARVN Division commenced Duffel Bag training at Vung Tau and completed their schooling on 7 November. An initial issue of sensor devices and monitoring equipment has been received, and an OJT period of instruction has been initiated.

E. Combined Intelligence Training and Operations with US Forces. In early August 1969, the LRP platoon, 25th Recon Company, 25th ARVN Division commenced training and combined operations with the 75th Rangers, 25th US Infantry Division. The entire LRP platoon has now been trained and has completed 12 successful combined missions, lasting an average of 4 days using both water and airborne insertion and extraction means. The LRP platoon of the 49th Regimental Recon Company commenced training and operations with the 25th US Division in early September. Training of the LRP platoon of the 50th Regimental Recon Company has also been initiated.
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Overall, LRP operations have been highly successful.

PART IV

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

A. General. During the period May - October 1969, the 25th ARVN Division showed a marked increase in its ability to efficiently conduct mobile combat operations aimed at destroying enemy main and local force units.

B. Employment of forces. In Hau Nghia Province, the 49th Regiment employed one battalion in the Tan My area to conduct operations along the Vam Co Dong River, aimed at the 2642 and 269 NVA Battalions. Additionally, a combined patrol base, with elements of the 2/27th Infantry (US), was established five kilometers from the Cambodian border along a main infiltration route into the Province. Another battalion was employed in the Trung Lap area to conduct operations against well-entrenched local forces and elements of the 268 NVA Regiment. A combined patrol base with US forces was also established in this area.

During the period, the 10th Cavalry conducted two major operations with ARVN and US Infantry units in the "Filhol" Rubber Plantation and the "Hobo" Woods. A significant aspect of these operations was that they provided the 10th Cavalry Squadron an opportunity to be employed as a mobile headquarters, controlling combined combat forces, for the first time. Continued use of the 10th Cavalry Squadron Headquarters in this role is programmed for future operations in Hau Nghia and Tay Ninh Provinces.

In Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces, nine Infantry Battalions (two battalions, 49th Regiment; three battalions, 46th Regiment; and four battalions, 50th Regiment) were committed to "direct" and "indirect" support of the Revolutionary Development program. In general, these battalions were employed in accordance with a three-phase plan, executed as follows:

1. Battalions were deployed into target areas defined as "contested areas". Command posts were established and rifle companies conducted mobile combat operations aimed at eliminating enemy forces and impressing upon the populace the fact that government forces were there to stay.

2. Civic action programs were instituted with emphasis on self-help. Areas of possible enemy concealment were defoliated, temporary schools were opened and work on permanent schools was started, market places were built, medcaps were held, psywar teams were committed, roads were opened, and many other projects aimed at improving the populace's economic and social standards were initiated. At the same time, operations were conducted in outlying areas to provide in-depth security to the populated areas, but more importantly to engage and destroy enemy forces.
3. In most instances, Sector Forces subsequently assumed responsibility for area security and the infantry battalions were displaced to new areas. Emphasis was placed on highly mobile combat operations into enemy controlled areas.

4. Throughout the period, one battalion of the 46th Regiment was committed to operations in Southern Hau Nghia under the operational control of the Duc Hoa Sensitive Area Command.

5. Maneuver battalions of the Division made sixteen semi-permanent moves, ten of which were to areas where ARVN units had not previously conducted continuous operations.

6. Division Artillery units were employed by Platoon and Battery increments throughout the DTA in support of ARVN, RF, PF, and CIDG units.

C. Operational techniques. The institution of "Project Upgrade" in May, aimed at upgrading and expanding the capabilities of the Division's units and increasing their combat efficiency, enhanced the general impetus towards accomplishment of the Division's mission. Emphasis was placed on small unit operations, night operations, combined operations, heliborne operations and operational planning. The progress experienced in these fields is reflected in inclosure 1.

Small unit operations received added emphasis in order to increase the Division's ability to cover a greater area, locate the enemy and apply the combat power needed to destroy him. The move to small unit operations was accomplished in two phases: May - August, units decreased battalion-sized operations and steadily increased company-sized operations; during September and October, a further step was taken as platoon-sized operations became more frequent. This technique resulted in the elimination of many leadership problems at the company and platoon levels and a more effective utilization of available forces.

The eventual goal of conducting fifty percent of all operations at night was instituted. The technique of establishing patrol bases along suspected enemy LOC and saturating the surrounding areas with combat patrols has been effectively adopted. Consequently, night operations are now conducted with more confidence and better results, in addition to being conducted more frequently.

The number of combined operations under the "Dong Tien" Program have increased significantly, and operational techniques have consistently improved. The past practice of ARVN forces being committed under supervision of U.S. units was abolished and replaced by a concept of teamwork that has created greater confidence, understanding and efficiency. Combined operations are currently being conducted on a daily basis at all levels from platoon through battalion.
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Heliborne operations were improved by the application of better techniques. Significant progress was made in the employment of blocking forces, use of multiple LZ's, rapid insertions of friendly forces, "eagle flighting" and rapid reaction to enemy sightings.

1. Results of operations. (See inclosure 2)

2. Staff operations. The efficiency of the Division ATC has increased to a point equal to U.S. standards. Improvements were made in the areas of reporting, requesting assets, and monitoring the progress of operations. The daily morning briefings in the Division ATC have changed from an all US advisor presentation in May to a current ATC function, with US briefers reporting only the activities of adjacent US forces.

In August, a weekly SH-1 meeting was instituted by direction of headquarters II FFRV. The AWN Division input to this meeting has been prepared and provided by the AWN G2, G3 and G5, with minimum advisor assistance. Results have been excellent.

Several improvements in fire support coordination and fire support have also occurred. The AWN CSCC has assumed the responsibility of clearing fires with all other AWN units. Artillery can now be adjusted using a US observer, and vice versa. A combined FSCC was established in Long An Province in July, and has resulted in better control of supporting fires and a much improved capability to mass fires against enemy forces. Construction of a combined FSCC in Tay Ninh was initiated on 19 August, and planning for one in Hau Nghia has been initiated. When all three are completed, fire support throughout the DTA should be greatly improved.

F. Training. During the period, the Division Training Center trained 2200 basic combat trainees including 500 Popular Forces soldiers. Other training conducted by the center included a Rifle Company Commander's Course, a headquarters Company Commander's Course and a Noncommissioned Officer's Course. In all cases, results were excellent. Additionally, three M60 machinegun courses were conducted for selected individuals to facilitate transition to the new weapon.

In May, a marksmanship training program was instituted in the Division with the goal of having each soldier zero his weapon and conduct practice firing at least once each month. When the program was instituted, weapons training within units was almost nonexistent; however, consistent progress has been made. In October, 88% of the personnel in the Division conducted such training.
During October, the 25th ARVN Division initiated an extensive ambush training program. For this program, an ARVN Mobile Training Team has been established within each regiment. The teams are scheduled to spend three days with each rifle company, during which time they present formal instruction, supervise practical work, and monitor actual ambush operations. The established objective is to complete the program once for all units prior to the first of the year, and to repeat the training at least once each quarter thereafter. A sniper training program is currently under study.

During the period, thirty members of each regimental reconnaissance company attended formal LiP training at Duc My Ranger Training Camp. Also, during September and October, two troops of the 10th Cavalry underwent refresher training with the 3/4 Cavalry (US). The remaining troop is scheduled for similar training in November.

PART V

SIGNAL OPERATIONS

During the period May - October, Division signal operations increased in scope and efficiency. The Division Signal Officer made frequent trips to every unit of the Division, seeking out problems and taking necessary corrective action. As a result of the intensified training program, the Division currently has single sidemband and carrier communications to each regiment and each province that provide excellent communications with the Division Headquarters. Additional training which will enhance the Division's communication capability is a Morse code operator course currently being conducted by signal company personnel.

The Division Signal Officer has instituted a program to reduce communication security violations by establishing a radio monitoring team that travels extensively throughout the 31st DTA. The results of their communications monitoring are brought to the attention of unit commanders and the Commanding General for appropriate corrective action when violations are noted.

Although the Division Signal Company has serious shortages of equipment and trained personnel, it has continued to provide excellent signal communications in support of the Division and Province forces.

PART VI

LOGISTICS

A. General. Performance and progress in logistical operations improved significantly during the period. Better utilization of available ground and aircraft haul capabilities was realized as a result of improved management techniques within the Division G4 Section. Also, a marked improvement has
been noted in the planning for acquisition of barrier and construction materials. A major problem which has not been eliminated is the failure of the Division G4 to effect necessary coordination to effectively support the Division's tactical plans. Short-term logistical planning also requires considerable improvement.

E. Progress in Logistics Support Battalion Organization and Operations. The Logistics Support Battalion completed organization on 30 June 1969; however, due to a shortage of personnel, the three (3) Forward Support elements of the Battalion could not be deployed at that time. Personnel shortages continue to exist in the fields of maintenance, technical supply, supply, and signal repair. In August, three understrength maintenance platoons were deployed to each of the three (3) Infantry Regimental Base Campuses. At the present, the Battalion is not operating as originally planned, but is using a combination of old and new logistical support procedures. On 1 Nov 69, JCS authorized a Tracked Vehicle maintenance Platoon and additional technical supply personnel for the Battalion. However, to date, neither the personnel nor the equipment have been received. Despite this shortfall, the CO, 25th Logistics Support Battalion, has organized his unit into an effective organization that meets the basic logistical requirements of the Division.

C. Status of Maintenance. The Division is receiving new modernization equipment at a timely rate; however, shortages of repair parts exist at organizational and direct support maintenance level, and there are not sufficient school quotas available for the training of maintenance and technical supply personnel. ANVAC records reflect that at least 90% of the repair parts stockage has been requisitioned but only 20% of these have been filled from depot stocks. Organization maintenance has improved throughout the Division.

D. Progress in MIL. During the past six months the number of requisitions for MIL parts submitted to the 25th Logistical Support Battalion has increased from 2% to 90% of authorization. However, only 21% of outstanding requisitions have been filled because depot has failed to adequately stock an AE based upon density of items supported.

Z. Status of Division Engineer Battalion. During the period, the 25th Engineer Battalion has demonstrated its capability to effectively perform all of its prescribed TOE missions. The Battalion is well trained and maintains an average of 94% of its authorized personnel strength. A significant portion of the Engineer and Ordnance vehicle equipment on hand is antiquated and should be replaced. Regardless of this fact, however, the Battalion has an effective maintenance program and maintains a low deadline rate of approximately 8%. The age and shortage of dump and
cargo trucks seriously restricts the hauling capability of the unit. Also, a shortage of engineer equipment significantly reduces the Battalion's capability to perform river and light tactical rafting operations. The assignment of construction type missions and shortages of materials also limits the unit's combat support capability and responsiveness. Despite these factors, however, the quality of job performance of the unit is considered to be outstanding.

F. The major Engineer Programs initiated and completed during the period are listed in Inclosure 3.

PART VII

PCL/VAR

A. General. Overall effectiveness of the Polwar effort within the 31st USA was greatly enhanced during the period, and continues to improve. PCL/VAR performance data is reflected in Inclosure 4.

E. Achievements:

1. There has been a marked improvement in gaining the people's cooperation, especially in communicating through families to encourage local VC to become ralliers.

2. The reorganization of the 303d Polwar Company to form a total of eight psyops teams rather than five has permitted greater dispersion, more contact with the people, and a corresponding increase in the number of Ho Chi Chanhs. The formation of Armed Propaganda Teams in each company in the Division has enhanced the Polwar effort in a similar manner.

3. Assistance to the people by Battalions of the Division committed to Pacification support operations has succeeded in returning numerous families to previously uncontrolled areas. This assistance has been particularly effective in Long An Province. The recent increase of Ho Chi Chanhs in Tay Ninh Province is also attributed, in part, to the Polwar effort taking hold in that province. Ho Chi Chanh rates have habitually increased in newly occupied areas where Battalions of the Division operate. Revolutionary Development activity, such as the rebuilding of schools by ARVN soldiers, has influenced many people to further support of GVN projects.

4. Noteworthy improvement was made in the aggressive use and skilful employment of psyops teams, especially in Sub Region 1 in Nui Longa Province. This improvement is reflected by the threefold increase in the Nui Longa Ho Chi Chanh rate in the last six months.
5. The recent reoccupied farmlands in Long An Province have noticeably expanded rice production in areas where land went untilled last year.

3. Problem Areas.

1. The lack of sufficient psyop equipment such as microphones, amplifiers, and tape recorders has hindered the operations of the Armed Propaganda Teams. Each battalion is authorized only two microphones for psyops purposes.

2. Massing the population for psyops appeals has not proven difficult in the relatively controlled areas; however, assembling large numbers of people in contested areas where Divisional units have just arrived has been unsuccessful. In this situation, time-consuming visits to families on a house to house basis has been required.

GEORGE E. ROBBINS, JR.
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

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### Progress of Operations

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### Results of Operations

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Downgraded at 3 year intervals; declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10

Incl 2
1. Roads:
   a. TL9A, Hau Nghia: Rehabilitation and upgrading Division MSR (TL9A) with an asphalt penetration surface. All subbase and base course preparation is complete. Asphalt surfacing is 70% complete. Surfacing operation is halted due to lack of rock. Total length of roadway work is 11.4 km.
   b. TL9A, Jia Dinh: Total roadway maintenance of TL9A in Jia Dinh province is 22.4 km. The roadway maintenance consists of grading, blading and rolling the surface.
   c. Total length of secondary roads upgraded with laterite surface is 26.5 km.

2. Airfield Construction and Maintenance (Duc Hoa).
   Further development of the airfield in accordance with the Master Plan has been undertaken and completed as follows:
   a. Six (6) helicopter rearm pits complete with landing pads have been constructed.
   b. FUL area, including 5 berms around FUL bladders has been relocated and 7 helicopter refueling points, with landing pads, have been constructed.
   c. An airfield control tower to receive a mobile tower unit has been restricted.
   d. Runway, taxiways and other facilities to maintain safe operations on the airfield have undergone periodic maintenance.

3. Minefield and Tactical Wire:
   a. A total of 13 minefields, complete with tactical wire, were installed and recorded. This represents the placement of approximately 50,000 mines.
   b. Two minefields were removed during the period.

4. Construction of Encampments:
   a. An encampment for the 25th Artillery Battalion was completed during the period covered.
   b. Three force structure increase camp's (FSI's) have been started to house the 25th Infantry Division Reconnaissance companies. The project is 40% complete and has been in progress for 4 months.

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10
5. **Fortifications.**

a. The 1968 construction program assigned the 25th ARVN Division Engineer Battalion the construction of 27 squad size, Class B fortifications. Due to materials' delay, the fortifications were not started until early May 69. To date, 11 fortifications are under construction, with 3 of these being complete. The total project is 30% complete. Progress continues to be delayed due to lack of materials, equipment, and available construction effort.

b. In July 69, the Engineer Battalion commenced construction of a Division Tactical Operations Center (TCC) at Duc Hoa. The TCC, being constructed of structural steel and reinforced concrete, is progressing smoothly and is 25% complete.

6. **Bridging and Rafting.**

a. The Battalion's Boat Platoon has installed and maintained one light tactical raft at Ben Soi for the past 11 months.

b. A 20 meter Bailey bridge on TL 10 has been maintained by the Battalion. The decking was replaced and the approaches upgraded during August 69.

7. **Road Clearing.** The Engineer Battalion sweeps 32.2 km of roadway daily to keep the roads free of mines.

8. **River Support.** During the past 12 months, the Divisional Tactical elements in Long An Province have been supported with 19 boats, with motors and operators, from the Engineer Battalion Boat Platoon. These boats are used to increase the tactical unit's river mobility.

9. **Other Divisional Combat Support.** Throughout 1969, the Engineer battalion has directly supported divisional elements in Can Giooc with one operational Engineer Platoon.
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