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<td>31 Jul 1981, DoDD 5200.10; OACSFOR ltr, 23 Jan 1982</td>
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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (N) (8 Dec 69) FOR OT UT 693332 17 December 1969


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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl

as

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US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
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1. (C) Section I, Operations: Significant Activities.

   a. Command.

   (1) During the reporting period there were two major changes in the command group:

   (a) On 16 July, Major General Karl D. McGown became Deputy Commanding General.

   (b) On 7 June, Colonel Berkley S. Gillespie, Jr. replaced Colonel Paul S. Hunt as Deputy Chief of Staff.

   (2) During the reporting period there were 12 major changes in the staff of II FORCEN:

   (a) On 13 May, Colonel Harold D. Pernsky became the Inspector General, replacing Colonel Bernard Big.

   (b) On 17 May, Colonel Jack Mittelstadt became Chief, Special Liaison Section (ETAVF), replacing Lieutenant Colonel James A. Graham, Jr.

   (c) On 25 May, Lieutenant Colonel Abbott R. Morgan became Information Officer, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Jon G. Bissette.

   (d) On 20 June, Colonel John Perkins III became Engineer, replacing Colonel Richard L. West.

   (e) On 21 June, Colonel Saige Okazaki became Provost Marshal, replacing Colonel Leonard Becicka.

   (f) On 28 June, Colonel Alvin Ungarleider became Commanding Officer of Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command, replacing Colonel John L. Kennedy, Jr.

   (g) On 1 July, Colonel Eldridge Thomas became Adjutant General, replacing Colonel Herman J. Miller, Jr.

   (h) On 1 July, Lieutenant Colonel (F) Walworth F. Williams became Assistant Chief of Staff G1, replacing Colonel John L. Kennedy, Jr.

   (i) On 2 July, Colonel William H. Bunge became Surgeon, replacing Colonel Wallace Capel.

   (j) On 11 July, Colonel Maurice S. Weaver became Assistant Chief of Staff G2, replacing Colonel Darrell G. Reed.

   (k) On 4 July, Lieutenant Colonel (F) Albert J. Geraci became Signal Officer, replacing Colonel Walter G. Rufe.
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ATFDC-RE-H

(1) On 6 July, Colonel Robert W. Selton became Assistant Chief of Staff G4, replacing Colonel Vaughn G. Evans.

(3) The overall assigned and attached strength of II FFORC.V increased slightly during the quarter. A comparison at the end of the last four reporting periods follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>OFFICERS</th>
<th>WARRANT OFFICERS</th>
<th>ENLISTED MEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31 Oct 1968</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Jan 1969</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Apr 1969</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Jul 1969</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Personnel, Health, Morale, Safety, Discipline, and Base Development.

(1) The personnel situation within units assigned, attached, and under operational control of II FFORC.V remained satisfactory.

(2) The morale of the command remained at a satisfactory level.

(3) The awards and decorations processed, approved, and issued are listed below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Feb 69 - Apr 69</th>
<th>May 69 - Jul 69</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SILVER STAR</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOLDIER'S MEDAL</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRONZE STAR MEDAL</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIR MEDAL</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMY CONSPRUATION MEDAL</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PURPLE HEART</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| TOTAL         | 1698            | 1783            |

(4) On 24 Jul 69 the Commanding, 1st Infantry Division, and the Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division, were authorized to give on the spot valor awards in the name of the Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, to members of II Field Force Vietnam units under OPCON. The Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division (AM) and the Commanding General, CHAC had previously been granted this authority on 27 April 1969.

(5) Effective 26 July 1969 the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division was OPCON to the Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division. Awards authority of the Commanding Officer, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, extends only to the Purple Heart per USARV Regulation 572-1.

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OPERATIONAL REPORT OF HEADQUARTERS, II FIELD FORCE, VIETNAM FOR PERIOD ENDING 31 JULY 1969, CCS GPOR - (R1) (W-254-76-A) (U)

(6) Postal activities, 44th Army postal unit. During the quarter the 14th AFU sold $722,400 in postal money orders; processed 71.5 tons of incoming mail and 29.4 tons of outgoing mail. On 21 July 1969, USARV, in response to the AG, II FFORCEN inquiry, provided a copy of the currency control listing developed by MACV. The listing is developed from the results of an analysis of money order transactions as reported on MACV Form 385. Individuals listed on the roster have purchased money orders in excess of what would normally be expected, some purchases being made using false identities. Listings are to be provided by AG, USARV on a periodic basis for the use of Army postal units in identifying illegal purchasers.

(7) The military personnel injury rate decreased slightly during the fourth quarter FY 69 as shown on the chart below. The military motor vehicle accident rate increased during the fourth quarter as shown. The increase in motor vehicle accidents is attributed to wet and slippery roads which accompany the monsoon season.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>1st QTR</th>
<th>2nd QTR</th>
<th>3rd QTR</th>
<th>4th QTR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Personnel Injury Rate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(No. Injuries per One Million Man-Days)</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>46.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Motor Vehicle Rate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(No. Accidents per One Million Miles)</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(8) Accidents from weapons (small arms) was the highest accident producing source during FY 69 resulting in 397 military wounded and 52 fatalities. Army motor vehicle was the second largest accident producing source resulting in 172 military injured and 28 fatalities. There were 80 Vietnamese injured and 108 killed involving Army motor vehicles.

(9) The status of discipline, law, and order within the command remained relatively stable. Quarterly statistics for the 4th quarter FY 69 indicate that offense rates for II FFORCEN assigned, attached, and GICOR units remained relatively stable when compared with the three previous quarters. Crimes against persons and property and military offenses continued to decline while increases were experienced in miscellaneous and traffic offenses. Decreases can be attributed to command emphasis on crime prevention and the effectiveness of educational programs stressing discipline, law, and order. The increase in miscellaneous offenses indicates additional awareness by commanders for the importance of timely and improved reporting, especially in marihuana offenses. Miscellaneous offense rates can be expected to increase slightly during the 1st quarter, FY 70 as more emphasis is placed on narcotics suppression. It is also anticipated that the enforcement emphasis placed on traffic control during the 4th quarter FY 69 will continue in an effort to reduce injury, loss of life, and property damage. This should cause an increase in traffic offense rates. Ultimately, however, traffic accident rates should reflect an overall reduction. The FY 69 comparative rates computed on the basis of 1000 troops are listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>1st QTR</th>
<th>2nd QTR</th>
<th>3rd QTR</th>
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</table>
II FFORCEV ASSIGNED, ATTACHED, AND UCCON UNITS, FY 69

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFFENSE CATEGORY</th>
<th>1st QTR</th>
<th>2nd QTR</th>
<th>3rd QTR</th>
<th>4th QTR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crimes Against Persons</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>1.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Property</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>5.06</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>6.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Offenses</td>
<td>21.30</td>
<td>22.18</td>
<td>20.09</td>
<td>19.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic Offenses</td>
<td>16.90</td>
<td>13.31</td>
<td>16.89</td>
<td>21.29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(10) Development of the II FFORCEV base camp continued satisfactorily. The status of significant projects as of 31 July was as follows:

(a) Completed revetments around MOGAS point.
(b) BOQ revetments 95 percent completed.
(c) Finished Special Services game room.
(d) Constructed covered walkway to new conference room.
(e) Constructed three bunkers in BOQ area.
(f) Completed extension of General's Mess.
(g) Stained exterior of General Officers' quarters.

(11) Captain Norman P. Singer, MC, former surgeon of the 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery, 54th Artillery Group was killed by an incoming enemy mortar round while rendering first aid to personnel who were in a perimeter gun pit. Personnel of the gun pit had been injured due to a preceding incoming round. A medical aidman was available to the firing battery at the fire support base. Captain Singer's assignment and place of duty was with the battalion aid station which was located at the same fire support base but at a location other than the gun pit. Notwithstanding Captain Singer's act of heroism of immediately rendering medical aid to those injured at the gun pit, his untimely death again reaffirms the doctrine that front line first aid is given by battery or company aidman, not by battalion surgeon whose mission is to render a higher level of medical treatment for all battalion personnel in a facility which complements his medical abilities. Had Captain Singer followed this doctrine, his enthusiasm and abilities for rendering expert medical support to all members of the fire support base would not have ended as suddenly. To be learned and emphasized is that medical personnel should limit their duties and responsibilities to their respective assigned missions and not jeopardize their personal safety. Only in this manner can all levels of medical support effectively conserve the fighting strength.

c. Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

(1) Intelligence aspects of tactical operations conducted in the II Field Force Vietnam (II FFORCEV) Tactical Area of Interest (TACI) are dis-
AVFBC-RE-H

Room in the Operational Report - Lessons learned submitted by units under the operational control of this headquarters.

(2) Intelligence collection.

(a) The daily briefing on selected agent reports was continued by the Collection Division. The purpose of this briefing is to better evaluate the intelligence produced by human sources and to determine the reliability of the sources themselves. This, in turn, enables the agency which employs these sources to decide which agents warrant retention and which should be released.

(b) Collection Division is also responsible for ensuring that all necessary Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements (SICR) are published and levied on the appropriate collection agencies. In addition, Collection Division coordinates the collection of intelligence on specific subjects and keeps subordinate units informed as to which SICR's are current by publishing a quarterly II PPORCEV Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements Registry. The Registry indexes all SICR's by number and by collection agencies. During the past quarter 32 MACV SICR's and 3 II PPORCEV SICR's were cancelled, while 17 new MACV and 2 new II PPORCEV SICR's were levied.

(c) During the period 1 May to 31 July 1969 the Collection Division began analyzing agent reports for more complete exploitation of all reported information. Specific areas of interest being examined are: possible psychological vulnerabilities in enemy elements which could be exploited by the 05; all information of enemy rocket artillery elements, and rocket resupply activity that would improve the II PPORCEV Artillery Counter-Rocket fire plans; all information regarding enemy fixed installations; caches that would contribute to the identification and selection of targets by the G2 Targets Division; and all information regarding enemy activities on interior waterways patrolled by the US Navy, which is passed to the Navy LNO, II PPORCEV.

(3) Counterintelligence/PHOENIX.

(a) Operations of the Province Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers (PIOCC) and District Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers (DIIOC) continued to improve, although at a slower rate than during the previous quarter. The improvement was primarily in the nature of refinement, as people learned what was expected of them, and what the capabilities were of the various units which support the PIOCCs and especially the DIIOC's are. Although a few DIIOC's were not felt to be operating efficiently, the causes were local in nature and bore no relation to the overall PIOCC/DIIOC concept. One measure of success of the DIIOC's is the BIG MACK intelligence collection program. This program continues to improve, both in quality and quantity. During this quarter, 42 students from II PPORCEV OPCOM units attended the PHOENIX Advisor Course presented by MACORDS-PHONIX. This compares with 21 attendees during the previous quarter.

(b) Although emphasis continues on the Volunteer Informant Program, tangible results continue to fall short of expectations. One reason for the limited response is the general decline in military activity during this quarter. In addition, VN civilians are still prohibited from entering many of the forested areas in III CTZ. Recent word from MACV indicates that funds for the program during FY 70 have been reduced substantially although definite
(c) An analysis of terrorist incident locations within III CTZ during
the quarter produced interesting, although not conclusive, results. With
the exception of Saigon, the CTZ "hotspot" was the northeastern portion
of Hau Nghia Province northeast of the Van Go Dong River. The terrorist rate
decreased during the latter part of the quarter especially along Highway 1
between Trang Bang and Cu Chi and Highway 8A between Cu Chi and Bao Trai,
allowing the security status of both roads to be rated as "green" during
the daylight hours. In other areas, such as Vo Dat in Binh Tay Province,
An Loc in Binh Long Province, and Tan Uyen in Bien Hoa Province, the terrorism
rate increased towards the end of the quarter, although not to a significant
level. The analysis will continue for at least another quarter, to allow
for a definite assessment of any trends or patterns.

(4) Ground reconnaissance. Company D (Ranger), 151st Infantry, continued
its operations in Southern War Zone D and eastern Sub Region 5 as it completed
its first fully operational quarter. The company's patrols were used primarily
in a screening role to provide early warning of the movement of major enemy
forces which were targeted against Long Binh - Bien Hoa. Utilizing saturation
patrolling techniques, a total of 316 teams were inserted resulting in 50
contacts, 69 sightings and 50 enemy killed.

(5) G2 Air.

(a) Intensive aerial reconnaissance and surveillance was conducted within
the III CTZ throughout the reporting period. Maximum use was made of II
FPORCEV air assets; however, the number of successful missions decreased due
to bad weather prevalent during the monsoon season. In visual reconnaiss-
ance (VR), emphasis was placed on surveillance of the III CTZ/Cambodian
border, the inner and outer defensive rings of Saigon/Bien Hoa, lines of
communications, suspected base camps and infiltration routes. During the
reporting period, a total of 16,903 VR sorties were flown in the III CTZ,
resulting in 705 significant sightings and an average of 34 to 61 of the
VR areas in the III CTZ were covered each day. The low ratio of sightings to
sorties is attributable to generally unsuitable climatic conditions.

(b) Side-looking airborne radar (SLAR) aircraft covered the entire
III CTZ on a nightly basis. All missions flown in the III CTZ were flown by
the 73d SAC and its attached ASTA Platoons. Surveillance patterns placed a
heavy emphasis along the Cambodian Border, Tay Ninh Province, the Flashback
and the northern and southeastern portions of the III CTZ. Daylight SLAR
missions are still being flown along the corps boundaries and patterns are
being analyzed. However, due to the small number of returns, a detailed
analysis has not been accomplished.

(e) Infrared imagery (Red Base) surveillance was flown to detect enemy
activity, base camps, staging areas, and assembly areas within III CTZ.
During this period, emphasis was placed on surveillance of the Cambodian
border, Tay Ninh, Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces, and War Zones C and D.
Coverage was also provided, almost nightly, over the Song Be Corridor,
Michelin Plantation, Ho Bo and Boi Loi Woods, Filhol Plantation, the Phuoc
Vinh/Funnel Area, the Catcher's Mitt, and the Hat Binh Secret Zone. Also,
possible rocket launch sites around the Long Binh/Bien Hoa area and around
Saigon were given high priorities. The monsoon season drastically reduced
the quantity of Red Haze emissions as bad weather aborted many missions. In addition, the high content of moisture in the jungle canopy tended to shield enemy campfires.

(d) The evaluation of the OV-1 Mohawk Direct Support Concept Test was completed and the following recommendations were approved by the Commanding General, II FPCORVN, on 21 June 1969:

1. That the direct support concept, as tested, be adopted for employment in the III CTZ.
2. That the Mohawk system assets, both personnel and equipment, of the 1st Cavalry Division (in) and the 1st Infantry Division, be fully attached to the 73d SAC.
3. That ground sensor terminals continue to be employed at division level.
4. That command emphasis be placed on the replacement of MDS shortages in the OV-1 Mohawk system.

It was concluded that direct support was able to give approximately twice as much coverage to those divisions which had their organic OV-1 aircraft. The primary reasons for the increase in coverage, especially Red Haze, is attributed to better maintenance and sufficient aviators. The aircraft availability rate for the 1st Cavalry Division's Mohawks increased 17 percent and the 1st Infantry Division's increased 11 percent. The direct support concept was proved to be both feasible and suitable, resulting in a much more efficient utilization of the available assets. While this would seem to be the best method of employment for this section of Southeast Asia, it is not suggested the same would hold true in other areas of the world.

(e) Air Force tactical reconnaissance missions flown in the III CTZ accounted for half of the missions completed in Vietnam. The monsoon season prevented the use of high altitude, large format, split vertical cameras. However, low and medium altitude camera systems used the Texas Printer to enlarge the format to 5x9 prints. Extensive use of high acuity Item I and Item II cameras is being requested. These cameras have been improved and are now designated the EA-62 and 83. The EA-62 has a 4.5 inch by 29 inch format with a 140 degree panoramic sweep, providing stereo vertical and low oblique pictures of the requested target area. The grain size of the photographic emulsion of the film provides excellent resolving power, resulting in more lines per millimeter. Fine detail can be discerned on the surfaces of the positive print, the positive film base, and the negative. Small areas can be enlarged 120 times without loss of detail. Large areas can be covered with less cloud obstruction with the panoramic rotary lens, and optical bar at lower altitudes. This allows the aircraft to obtain the required percentage of coverage with a minimum of flight lines. Camouflage detection film (CD), although vertically a misnomer here in Vietnam due to the enemy's use of natural vegetation for concealment, has been found to be excellent for general interpretation when used to supplement black and white photography. III CTZ units have used the film to detect infrared-absorbing enemy fortifications such as mud bunkers where foliage has been cut in dense jungle and along water ways to determine water depth. CD film is an excellent sensor to determine damage caused by air strikes, artillery, defoliation, and Rome Plow operations. The VNAF Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron has made tremendous
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AVIUS-EN-H

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RG3 CSFOR - (H3) (M-163-70-4) (D)

progress in development of an operational system in the RC 47. The K-17 and K-38 split vertical cameras provide the formats desired (9x9 and 9x18) on 95 percent of ARVN unit requests. ARVN units and Free World Force units are now specifically requesting that these VAF products be provided because of the excellent quality, easier readout, and proper packaging of the photograph. The RS-10-A and AAS-18 Infrared Systems were used to supplement Army Mohawk night surveillance and target acquisition aircraft. The MP4 was used primarily along the northern borders of the corps. Both the KA and NS-57 flew night photo cartridge strips for both the psychological impact on enemy units and to monitor infiltration routes along known lines of communication.

(6) G2 Targets Division.

(a) The G2 Targets Division's primary function continues to be the development and evaluation of targets for B-52 strikes. There has been an increase in the development of targets for Combat Sky Spots (Radar Directed Tactical Air Strikes) and, in coordination with other staff sections, in the use of the data based on hard installations and enemy activity indicators in determining areas for placement of CBU munitions and land clearing operations.

(b) A total of 484 targets in III CTZ were struck by B-52's during this quarter, maintaining approximately the same intensity as the previous quarter. Again in this quarter the majority of the targets were in Tay Ninh Province (54 percent) targeted against the 1st NVA and 9th VC Divisions. Binh Long Province received 14 percent of this quarter's strikes which were targeted primarily against the 1st NVA and 7th VC Divisions. Long Khanh Province was again one of the areas receiving a substantial percentage of the strikes during the quarter (12 percent) where the 5th VC Division and elements of KQ-7 were the targets. The remainder of the strikes were in Phuoc Long, Binh Duong, Binh Dao and Phuoc Tay Provinces.

(c) The 29th Chemical Detachment, under the operational control of the G2 Targets Division, remains one of the principal surveillance means available to the division. This quarter, 154 hours were flown on airborne personnel detector (Sniffer) missions, compared to only 87 hours during the previous quarter. This tremendous increase in APD missions was due to greatly increased support to OPCON units and the 18th ARVN Division. Although the number of hours flown on defoliation missions decreased from 69 during the previous quarter to 36 for this quarter, the overall flight time of the detachment increased over 40 percent.

(7) Description and recapitulation of enemy order of battle.

(a) Description. The Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN) remains the supreme political military headquarters controlling all Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) activities in the Republic of Vietnam. Military units in III CTZ are subordinated either directly to COSVN or to one of eight secondary level headquarters in III CTZ. (See Enclosure 9). There were no significant changes in the enemy's military-political boundaries during the quarter and the area of III CTZ continues to be divided into 13 major sub-divisions. Sub regional battalions assumed the primary role in enemy operations during the period in marked contrast with divisional employment during the quarter, and by the end of the quarter, most main force units had withdrawn to base areas probably to retrain and resupply.
b) Significant order of battle developments.

1 Few significant changes in the number and effectiveness of enemy units were noted in the II FFORC TAOL. One infantry regiment was withdrawn and probably subordinated to Military Region 2, while one artillery and two sapper battalions were identified. The table below portrays the combat effectiveness of regiments and separate battalions at the beginning and end of the quarter. Units which are believed to be present, but not confirmed are shown in parentheses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>30 Apr 69</th>
<th>31 Jul 69</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FCE</td>
<td>CE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inf Regt</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arty Regt</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inf Bn</td>
<td>5(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arty Bn</td>
<td>8(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sapper Bn</td>
<td>6(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recon Bn</td>
<td>1</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PCE</th>
<th>MCE</th>
<th>NCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FCE - Fully Combat Effective</td>
<td>MCE - Marginally Combat Effective</td>
<td>NCE - Not Combat Effective</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 The 1st NVA Regiment was found to have been re-subordinated from COSI to Sub Region 3 probably by the end of the previous quarter. The re-subordination resulted from the formation of combined command groups in Sub Region 3. The combined command groups were apparently designed to solve command and control problems for the summer or future offensives. Under the current concept, the command group in VC Chau Thanh District exercises control over both the 1st NVA Regiment and local force units. While the regiment's integrity has been maintained, the new command structure indicates the 1st NVA Regiment's continued presence in central and southern Long An Province and the performance of Sub Region 3 missions by the regimental elements.

3 Two additional units, the 9th Artillery Battalion and the H5 Water Sapper Battalion were confirmed in Sub Region 1. Documents and a prisoner confirmed the 9th Artillery Battalion as probably located northeast of Ben Su at the end of the quarter while its area of operations encompassed the entire Sub Region. The battalion has a strength of 146 men and has three companies, the C7, C8, and C9. The H5 Water Sapper Battalion was initially identified as being separate and distinct from the Gi3 Dinh 4 Sapper Battalion. The battalion is divided into a bridge destruction section and an underwater demolition section with a total strength of 50 men. A prisoner stated that the battalion primarily operates along the Saigon River from Dau Tieng to Saigon.

(c) Recapitulation.
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1. The VC regions, provinces and special zones in II CTZ controlled 51 Local Force companies and 12 Local Force Platoons. (Note: Local companies and Platoons with a strength of 40 or under are considered Platoons).

2. The battalions and regimental sized units located within II CTZ are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>SUBORDINATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>74th NVA Artillery Regiment</td>
<td>69th VC Artillery Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96th NVA Artillery Regiment</td>
<td>69th VC Artillery Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>208th NVA Artillery Regiment</td>
<td>69th VC Artillery Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56th VC Anti-Aircraft Battalion</td>
<td>69th VC Artillery Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58th VC Artillery Battalion</td>
<td>69th VC Artillery Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66th VC MP Base Security Regiment</td>
<td>COSVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46th VC MP Reconnaissance Battalion</td>
<td>COSVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 VC MP Guard Battalion</td>
<td>COSVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16B NVA Regiment</td>
<td>1st NVA Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95C NVA Regiment</td>
<td>1st NVA Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101D NVA Regiment</td>
<td>1st NVA Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95th NVA Regiment</td>
<td>5th VC Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>174th NVA Regiment</td>
<td>5th VC Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>275th VC Regiment</td>
<td>5th VC Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22d VC Artillery Battalion</td>
<td>5th VC Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th NVA Anti-Aircraft Battalion</td>
<td>5th VC Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141st NVA Regiment</td>
<td>7th NVA Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165th NVA Regiment</td>
<td>7th NVA Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>209th NVA Regiment</td>
<td>7th NVA Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>271st VC Regiment</td>
<td>9th VC Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>272d VC Regiment</td>
<td>9th VC Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th NVA Regiment</td>
<td>9th VC Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22d VC Artillery Battalion</td>
<td>9th VC Division</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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AVFRC-RE-II
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, NGOs CSFOR - (U) (W-DRK-VC-A) (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>SUBORDINATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24th VC Anti-Aircraft Battalion</td>
<td>9th VC Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101st NVA Regiment</td>
<td>Sub Region 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>268th VC MF Regiment</td>
<td>Sub Region 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st VC MF Battalion</td>
<td>Sub Region 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 VC LF Battalion</td>
<td>Sub Region 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th VC Artillery Battalion</td>
<td>Sub Region 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th VC Artillery Battalion</td>
<td>Sub Region 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th VC MF Battalion</td>
<td>Sub Region 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th NVA Battalion</td>
<td>Sub Region 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>242d NVA Battalion</td>
<td>Sub Region 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>267th VC MF Battalion</td>
<td>Sub Region 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>269th VC MF Battalion</td>
<td>Sub Region 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>308th VC AF Battalion</td>
<td>Sub Region 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>264th NVA Battalion</td>
<td>Sub Region 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128th Artillery Battalion</td>
<td>Sub Region 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 NVA Regiment</td>
<td>Sub Region 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>211th NVA Sapper Battalion</td>
<td>Sub Region 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>265th VC MF Battalion</td>
<td>Sub Region 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>506th VC MF Battalion</td>
<td>Sub Region 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>508th VC MF Battalion</td>
<td>Sub Region 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>520th VC MF Battalion</td>
<td>Sub Region 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dong Tho NVA Battalion</td>
<td>Sub Region 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dong Hai VC Regiment</td>
<td>Sub Region 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Action Element</td>
<td>Sub Region 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>214 VC LF Battalion</td>
<td>Tay Ninh Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>354 NVA Regiment</td>
<td>Probably Military Region 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>274th VC MF Regiment</td>
<td>Military Region 7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AVFOO-RO-1

UNIT
24 VC HF Battalion
4th VC HF Battalion
6th Heavy Weapons Battalion
6th Water Sapper Battalion
27th 10th VC HF Sapper Battalion
11th VC LF Sapper Battalion
12th VC LF Sapper Battalion
16th VC LF Sapper Battalion
1440 VC LF Battalion
1445 VC LF Battalion
Deosong Bo NVA Battalion
13th NVA Artillery Battalion
21st Independent VC HF Battalion
22d NVA Artillery Battalion
24th NVA Anti-Aircraft Battalion
Gia Dinh 4 VC Sapper Battalion
H5 Water Sapper Battalion
9th VC Artillery Battalion
12th VC HF Sapper Reconnaissance Battalion
34 Artillery Battalion
68th NVA Engineer Battalion
1460 VC LF Battalion
1568 VC LF Battalion

SUBORDINATION
Sub Region 4
Sub Region 4
Sub Region 4
Sub Region 4
Sub Region 4
Sub Region 4
Sub Region 4
Sub Region 4
1-1 Province
1-1 Province
Ba Ria Province
Ba Ria Province
Military Region 10
1st NVA Division
5th VC Division
7th NVA Division
7th NVA Division
Sub Region 1
Sub Region 1
Sub Region 2
Sub Region 3
Tay Ninh Province
Military Region 7
Phuoc Long Province
Binh Long Province

(4) Summary of recent activities.

Enemy activity during this quarter declined somewhat in comparison to the last quarter in trends and levels of activity. During April, the main force divisions were receiving replacements, refitting, and resupplying.
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in preparation for the expected increase of activity in conjunction with the "Simulation of Ho Chi Minh" Campaign. A highpoint, which was almost as great as the first phase of the last quarter offensive of last quarter, was touched off in mid-May. This high level of activity was preceded by a gradual increase in activity and followed by a moderate level of activity, which included a lesser highpoint on 22-23 May. All four divisions participated in the May phase of the Summer Campaign. During the first highpoint, elements of the 1st NVA Division lost 200 killed or captured in ground actions in Tay Ninh and Binh Long provinces, while elements of the 9th VC Division lost 173 killed and 4 prisoners in three contacts with ARVN elements southeast of Ben Soi. During the second highpoint, 7th NVA Division elements were engaged in two large contacts in the An Loc area, which resulted in 146 killed. Activity in the June phase of the Summer Campaign was characterised by attacks by fire and a number of ground assaults against allied positions. Although the number of enemy initiated incidents did not reach the May high, the intensity of the activity was greater. During the week ending 7 June, 2,334 enemy were killed or captured. This was the highest weekly total for the quarter and just short of being equal to the year's high reached during the first phase of the Post-Tet offensive. Activity fell off at the end of June as the enemy regrouped for the July phase of the Summer Campaign. The final month of the quarter saw limited action with only a suggested highpoint on 5 July. The quarter ended with the main enemy units avoiding significant contacts, with training and resupply as the main emphasis.

2 1st NVA Division: By the midpoint of the first month of the quarter the 95C Regiment and elements of the 18B Regiment, the Z-28 Sapper Battalion, and the 101D Regiment were involved in offensive operations against Landing Zones Carolyn, Grant, and Jamie, respectively. The 6 May attack on Landing Zone Carolyn consisted of two separate ground attacks preceded by four separate indirect fire attacks. The action resulted in 9 US killed, 62 US wounded, plus 101 enemy killed and 29 captured. During May the headquarters of the division was located for the first time since its identification in III CTZ; the location was in the vicinity of XT1095. During the month of June the X-28 Sapper Battalion and the 18B Regiment were operating in the same general area and inititated attacks on Landing Zone Ike. On 9 and 11 June the 95C Regiment lost 113 killed in two contacts west of Dan Tieng. A prisoner from a 1 July contact northeast of Landing Zone Ike identified his unit as the G16 Mortar Company, 101D Regiment, which suggested that the regiment could be moving to rear base areas. It was believed, however, that the bulk of the 101D Regiment was still in the vicinity of Minh Thanh and that the remainder of the division was still in western War Zone C preparing for operations against allied installations in the area. Only two more contacts were made during the last half of the quarter, both with the 101D Regiment northeast of Minh Thanh. The 95C and 18B Regiments are believed to be located in central War Zone C, possibly for training and resupply, the former northeast of Nui Ba Den and the latter southwest of Bo Tac. The strength of the division is estimated at 4,525.

3 5th VC Division: The 5th VC Division avoided contact during the first month of the quarter until the 18 May attack on Xuan Loc in which elements of the 174th Regiment, 275th Regiment, 21st Independent Sapper Battalion, and 33d Regiment were identified. After the 95th Regiment lost 41 killed in a 7 June contact southwest of Gia Ray, and Landing Zone Joy
was attacked by the 275th Regiment on 12 June, there were no significant contacts with elements of the 5th Division during the remainder of the month. A captured document identified the 275th Regiment east of Hang Rang. A report by a raileer stated that on 11 and 20 June the 275th and 174th Regiments respectively began to move back into War Zone D, suggesting that the 5th VC Division was shifting its area of operation into southern War Zone D. At the beginning of July agent reports indicated that the 5th VC Division was located in southern War Zone D. On 8 July a Boi Chan from the 21st Sapper Battalion who rallied at X3648 indicated that part of his unit was north of the Dong Nai River. Reports indicated that the 174th Regiment had conducted reconnaissance of Forward Operating Base Ann during the middle of June, suggesting that this regiment was planning operations north of the Dong Nai River. By mid-July the continued lack of identifiable contact with elements of the 5th Division south of the Dong Nai River and a series of light contacts north of the river led to the conclusion that at least part of the 5th Division had relocated in southern War Zone D, while the 55th Regiment was still in Ba Bien Province. Throughout the remainder of the quarter elements of the division avoided identifiable contact, suggesting the possibility that the entire division has withdrawn into base areas in War Zone D. The estimated strength at the end of the quarter is 4,450.

7th NVA Division: At the beginning of the quarter the 141st Regiment was believed to be functioning as security for the 7th NVA headquarters in the Fishhook. The 209th Regiment was identified southwest of the Fishhook in an attack on Landing Zone Phyllis and in attacks on convoys in the area, while the 165th Regiment remained in the vicinity of Minh Thanh. During May the 209th Regiment moved eastward from northeastern War Zone C to a position southeast of An Loc. From its assumed sanctuary in the Fishhook, the 141st Regiment began offensive operations with an attack on the village of Minh Doc southwest of An Loc on 23 May resulting in 650 men. The 141st Regiment was identified again on 24 May in a contact with the 1st US Infantry Division southwest of An Loc costing the enemy 96 killed. Significant contacts with the 7th NVA Division during June included one with the 165th Regiment on 6 June southwest of An Loc and one with the 209th Regiment on the same day northeast of An Loc. The enemy lost a total of 210 men during the two contacts. In a light contact on 21 June, southeast of An Loc, the 141st Regiment was identified by captured documents. The beginning of July was marked by a lack of contacts with elements of the 7th NVA Division. Toward the middle of the month there were indications that the 165th and 141st Regiments may be moving north with the 1st NVA Division for the purpose of securing supplies and reinforcements. The lack of contact during the month suggests that the division is still preparing for operations, probably in the An Loc area. The 209th Regiment is believed located northwest of An Loc, the 141st Regiment east of An Loc, and the 165th Regiment just northeast of An Loc. Estimated strength of the division is 4,800.

9th VC Division: The quarter began with the identification of the 271st Regiment in an attack on a 6th ARVN night defensive position southeast of Ben Soi, resulting in 54 enemy killed and 2 prisoners. Heavy losses continued to be sustained by the 271st Regiment in early May when on 11 and 12 May the 3d and 6th ARVN Battalions were attacked southeast of Ben Soi resulting in 273 enemy killed and 4 prisoners. No contacts were made with the 271st Regiment during the remainder of May. At the beginning of the quarter the 9th Division was composed of the 271st, 272d, and 273d Regiments.
On 23 May a captured document revealed that the 273d Regiment had infiltrated into IV Corps and that the 68th Regiment was now subordinate to the 9th VC Division. The 273d Regiment was identified on 6 June in an attack on Fire Support Base Crook; another attack followed the next day by the 88th Regiment. Total casualties for the two attacks were 399 killed and 11 prisoners. At the same time an attack was made on Tay Ninh City by the 271st Regiment and elements of the 88th Regiment with total enemy losses amounting to 125 killed. The next identification was on 27 June when the 88th Regiment lost 94 killed in a contact east of Nui Ba Den with the 25th US Infantry Division. The 88th Regiment was again identified on 20 July southeast of Ben Suc and on 23 July northwest of Go Dau Hiep. No further contact was made during the quarter with other elements of the division. At the end of the quarter the 271st and 273d Regiments were believed to be located east of Tay Ninh City along the Cambodian border and the 88th Regiment in the northern Straight Edge Woods. Strength of the division is estimated to be at 4,190.

6 1st NVA Regiment: There were no major contacts involving the 1st NVA Regiment during the quarter. Small contacts, prisoner and Boi Chanh reports confirmed the presence of the regiment in southern Long An Province in the vicinity of the last significant contact on 18 April southeast of Ben Luc. Elements of the regiment were able to avoid contact until 27 June when elements of the 50th ARVN Regiment engaged an unknown size enemy force just north of Binh Phuoc in southwestern Long An Province, killing 5 and capturing 6. Prisoners identified the 012/35-1st NVA Regiment. The K2 Battalion was again identified on 10 July by a prisoner captured in the vicinity of XD4186. On 13 July the 50th ARVN Regiment killed 21 and captured 5 prisoners who identified the K4 Battalion. On 21 July 12 enemy were killed in a contact from which documents identified the K4 Battalion. In late June the creation of a Combined Command Group changed the subordination of the regiment from COSVN to SR-3. The purpose of the group was apparently to solve command and control problems which arose when the 1st NVA Regiment, subordinate to COSVN, conducted operations with local Force units which were subordinate to SR-3. As the Combined Command Group will be responsible to SR-3, elements of the 1st NVA Regiment will presumably fulfill missions of SR-3. However, the retention of the old reporting chain for the regimental elements indicates that some control over the use of its elements will be maintained by the regiment. Total strength of the regiment at the end of the quarter is estimated to be 1,490.

7 101st NVA Regiment: During the first month of the quarter two notable contacts in the South Michelin - North Trapezoid area resulted in 142 killed. On 19 May captured documents indicated the presence of the regiment in the area just south of the Boi Loi Woods, and on 24 May three wounded and 1 dead NVA from the 101st Regiment were found in the Boi Loi Woods. No significant contact was made until 16 June when the 25th Infantry Division engaged an unknown number of enemy which resulted in 40 killed. Captured documents revealed that the unit in contact was the 3-101st NVA Regiment. Throughout July small contacts continued to be made with the regiment in the South Michelin - North Trapezoid area. Strength at the end of the quarter is estimated to be 1,200.

8 Dong Nai Regiment: Scattered contacts early in the first month of the quarter indicate that the regiment remains dispersed. A prisoner, captured on 11 May, indicated that the E2, Dong Nai Regiment, had suffered
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Heavy casualties and had moved to Phu Jao and that the K4, Dong Hai Regiment, may relocate there also. On 10 May a prisoner was taken who identified his unit as 338/K1, Dong Hai Regiment. According to him, the K1 Battalion was composed of four companies of 60 men each with the following designations: 338, 339, 340, and 341. The headquarters section of the regiment was located in the vicinity of X06530 by a prisoner captured on 26 May. A Ho Chi Minh who rallied on 3 June, identified his unit as the K5, Dong Hai Regiment. On 6 June the Political Officer of the K3 Battalion was captured. He stated that the battalion was located in the Bau Ca Lake area, just north of An Son. Elements of the battalion were located as follows: (1) C1/K3 in the vicinity of La Thieu, (2) C2/K3 in the vicinity of Di An, and (3) C3/K3 in the vicinity of Lai Thieu. Throughout the remainder of June prisoners and Ho Chi Minh continued to identify elements of the regiment in areas previously located. On 12 June a prisoner captured in the vicinity of X06515 from C4/K1, Dong Hai Regiment, stated that C1, C2, and C3 companies moved south on 10 June. A prisoner captured on 27 June identified the following specialized companies subordinate to the regiment: 14th Mortar, 16th RE, 18th AS, 20th Communications, 21st Medical, 22d Reconnaissance, 24th Transportation, and 19th Engineer. Strength of the regiment at the end of the quarter is estimated to be 1,200.

2. Sub Regions: Activity in Sub Region 1 was moderate in May. During the month the 101st EVA Regiment lost 114 killed and 1 prisoner in a contact east of Dau Tieng. On 13 and 14 May, in the same area, and on 16 May northeast of Trung Lap, the enemy lost a total of 134 killed in three contacts involving unidentified elements. Activity continued to be moderate throughout June, and a steady decline was noted in July. Activity was light in Sub Region 2 except for a few significant contacts. One was a contact southwest of Thu Thua in mid-May with the 267th Battalion, in which 83 enemy were killed. A significant ammunition cache was found in the same area in mid-July. A contact on 29 July involving elements of the 5th Special Forces and 25th US Infantry Division in the vicinity of X05689 cost unidentified enemy elements a total of 96 killed. Only a few light contacts and attacks by fire interrupted the lull which prevailed in Sub Region 3. Light activity predominated in Sub Region 4 with only a few major incidents occurring. On 13 May, 87 enemy were killed in an attack by an estimated battalion southeast of Minh Son. The heaviest enemy losses were suffered on 16 June in an attack south of Beacat by the 274th Regiment which resulted in 216 enemy killed. At the beginning of May there was a sharp increase in terrorist activities in Saigon followed by a relative lull during the remainder of the quarter.

(a) VC/VPA battle losses.

(b) Overall personnel and material losses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kill</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Missing</th>
<th>VOA</th>
<th>MA</th>
<th>CA</th>
<th>MWK</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>5933</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>1699</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>349</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>6533</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>1776</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>149</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>3439</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>1093</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* VOA figures for July are from military units only. Final update figure from COREM not available until 10 Aug.
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(b) Losses in Caches. One of the major factors which continue to blunt enemy offensives is the continued discovery of enemy caches by allied forces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MATERIAL CAPTURED FROM ENEMY CACHES</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>122mm rockets</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>54</td>
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<tr>
<td>107mm rockets</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>502</td>
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<tr>
<td>BFG rounds</td>
<td>2715</td>
<td>2200</td>
<td>2645</td>
<td>7560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar rounds</td>
<td>3791</td>
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<td>1735</td>
<td>7566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recoilless Rifle rds</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>1019</td>
<td>1811</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA ammo</td>
<td>211,876</td>
<td>188,596</td>
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<td>Grenades</td>
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<td>4471</td>
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<td>Mines/Booby traps</td>
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<td>1141</td>
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<tr>
<td>Individual weapons</td>
<td>1699</td>
<td>1776</td>
<td>1093</td>
<td>4568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew served weapons</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice (tons)</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>602</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The impact of these losses played an important role in keeping the enemy from providing the massive fire support needed in mounting any large scale offensives. This could be a contributing factor for the predicted July highpoint not materializing.

(9) Enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and relative probability of adoption at the end of the quarter.

(a) Capabilities.

1 The enemy is capable of launching sapper and multi-battalion size ground attacks throughout the corps zone. Attacks can be supported by rocket and mortar fire.

2 The enemy is capable of attacks against province and district capitals and fire support bases.

3 The enemy is capable of conducting battalion size ground attacks against the periphery of the CMZ, utilizing sub region battalions.

4 The enemy is capable of increasing the intensity and frequency of attacks by rocket, mortar, and direct fire heavy weapons against selected targets throughout III CTZ and military targets in the CMZ.
The enemy is capable of harassing installations and intensifying LOC interdiction throughout III CTZ, for limited periods of time.

The enemy is capable of increasing terrorist, sabotage and assassination activities in the CMZ and throughout the CTZ.

The enemy is capable of conducting propaganda, subversion, sabotage, espionage, and political efforts throughout III CTZ.

The enemy is capable of avoiding contact for limited periods of time, contingent on the extent of allied efforts and operations.

The enemy is capable of withdrawing to out-of-country sanctuaries for the purpose of avoiding allied operations.

The enemy is capable of positioning forces in forward base areas throughout III CTZ in order to support his efforts to subvert the population of such areas.

(b) Vulnerabilities.

Concentrations of enemy forces are vulnerable to detection by various modes of reconnaissance activity and to destruction by air, artillery, or ground action.

Enemy movement is vulnerable to interdiction by allied ground, artillery, and air attacks.

The enemy's supply system, particularly his caches, is vulnerable to discovery by allied operations.

The infrastructure is vulnerable to aggressive allied action.

(c) Relative probability of adoption at the end of the quarter.

Little change is expected in the pattern of enemy activity during the next three months. He will continue to attempt to achieve the goals he failed to attain during the Summer Campaign, that is, the withdrawal of US forces, the recognition of the RVN/GOV, and the acceptance of a coalition government. The enemy's "Fall Campaign" will probably consist of a series of planned highpoints separated by periods of low activity. Emphasis will be on attacks by fire, and sapper and small-scale ground actions as he attempts to produce maximum casualties while holding his losses to a minimum. Movement of supplies and personnel south into III Corps during the August - October period will probably be reduced by wet weather, making it less likely that the enemy will commit his main force units in large-scale, corps wide attacks which would result in losses that could not be soon replaced. Selected targets, however, will likely be subjected to assault from main force units. These targets will have been carefully chosen so that advantage accrued from such action would outweigh the loss of manpower.

The enemy's divisional forces are likely to operate from relatively secure base areas from which they can maintain a threat to outlying areas and conduct limited attacks during cyclic high points. These forces will attempt to maintain pressure on the three northern provinces: Tay Sinh, Sinh Long, and Phuoc Long.
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3. In the populated areas, 3d Regional forces will conduct attacks by fire and sapper action, with an increased emphasis on guerrilla tactics. The pattern will continue to be one of periodic high points followed by lulls in activity. Particular emphasis will be placed on attacking the Allied Pacification Program, which the enemy sees as a major threat to his attempts to control the population. Activity in the CND will consist of terrorist and sapper activity coordinated with high points outside the capital. A ground assault against the city is considered unlikely.


(1) General.

(a) During the reporting period II FFV continued phase III of Campaign Team Thang. Operations throughout the III Corps Tactical Zone to locate and destroy enemy forces and to interdict infiltration routes continued and the enemy failed to achieve any significant tactical success. A Summer Offensive was launched by the enemy on 5 May with highpoints, consisting primarily of attacks by fire, occurring twice during the months of May and June and once during July. Losses inflicted on the enemy during June 1969 were the highest since May 1968. The withdrawal of 25,000 troops from Vietnam had little impact on II FFV as the 9th Infantry Division, less its 3d Brigade, was designated to be redeployed. These elements had been OPCON to the Commanding General, Delta Military Assistance Command and had conducted operations in northern IV Corps Tactical Zone. The redeployment of the 2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division was completed during the reporting period. The 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division was designated a separate brigade on 20 July, placed OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division on 26 July, and continued to operate in Dong An Province, conducting primarily a war of attrition against main and local force enemy elements in the area. Two regiments of the 25th ARVN Division were placed OPCON to the Long An Province Chief and conducted extensive pacification operations and combined operations with the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. During the quarter there was a major adjustment of II FFV units in response to the enemy threat, particularly in the Long Binh - Bien Hoa area. A reorientation of the operations of the 1st Infantry and 25th Infantry Divisions in the Saigon River Corridor (Citadel, Bo Loi Woods, Ha Bo Woods, Trapesoid, Michelin, and Long Anuyen Secret Zone) was affected to order to put maximum pressure on the SR-1 main force units operating on either side of the Saigon River. The 25th Infantry Division area of responsibility was Bien Hoa and Tay Ninh Provinces, where operations against the 5th VC Division were conducted north and west of Tay Ninh City, and neutralization of SR-1 forces and enemy base areas along the Saigon River Corridor continued. The 1st Infantry Division, relieved of responsibility for the upper tier, concentrated on grinding down sub regional forces in Binh Duong and Bien Hoa Provinces and on pacification operations in the area. The 1st Cavalry Division assumed responsibility for Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces, as well as War Zone C, with the mission of advancing pacification, improving the effectiveness of US, ARVN, and RE/FP units, and conducting military operations. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment conducted several extended operations in the jungles north of the Michelin Plantation and in War Zone C. At the close of the quarter, the regiment, less one squadron, was OPCON to the 1st Cavalry Division and operated in Binh Long Province. On 16 June the 19th Light Infantry Brigade completed its move from the Command Military District to Long Khanh Province. It had a threefold mission: to upgrade the 18th ARVN Division by means of combined operations with US units and close association
with US forces, to assist ARVN and province forces in their pacification efforts, and to put additional forces into the area in which the 5th VC Division was operating. The 1st Australian Task Force continued to operate in Phuoc Tuy Province. A combined operation was conducted by the Australians and Government of Vietnam Marine Task Force "B" in the Hat Dinh. The R4AVF began the exchange of its 1st Brigade with like element in Thailand. This rotation is due to be completed on 12 August. The 3d Mobile Strike Force Company conducted several extended reconnaissance operations in War Zone D. Capital Military Assistance Command employed its one brigade, the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, in western Command Military District. Operation "Giant Slingshot", an effort by US and VN Navy elements to interdict enemy movement on inland waterways, was extended to the Saigon River and also included the Vam Co Dong and Vam Co Tay Rivers. The Phuoc Vinh - Dong Be Road operation, initiated 21 April, was completed on 14 June; this project consisted of upgrading 67 kilometers of road, repairing and replacing bridges and culverts, and clearing a 200 meter wide strip on either side of the road. This work was performed by 1st Infantry Division, 5th ARVN Division, and 162d Land Clearing Battalion elements. Two large convoys were run from Phu Cuong to Song Be and back without incident. Operation "Dong Tien", meaning "progress together", was initiated on 1 July. This concept was designed to "marry up" II FFORCEN and ARVN commands participating in the effort to upgrade Government of Vietnam forces. At the close of the reporting period, II FFORCEN combat operations and quick reaction to intelligence continued to hurt the ability of the enemy to wage large scale offensive actions.

(b) Results of operations in III CTZ.

1 Significant results of United States and Free World Military Assistance Forces (US/MWAF) participation in Campaign Toan Thang, Phase III, during May, June, and July were: 877 US/MWAF killed (826 US, 21 Australians and New Zealanders, 30 Thais); 6,524 wounded or missing (5,618 US, 142 Australians, 364 Thais); 11,568 enemy killed; and 482 enemy captured. In addition, enemy losses included 2,417 small arms; 598 crew served weapons; 167,052 rounds of small arms ammunition; 6,392 high explosive rounds; 35 rockets; 1,325 mines; 6,668 grenades; and 770,36 tons of rice either captured or destroyed.

2 Cumulative results of Campaign Toan Thang, Phase III, included 1,543 US/MWAF killed (1,475 US, 26 Australians and New Zealanders, 42 Thais); 10,546 wounded or missing (9,779 US, 214 Australians and New Zealanders, 553 Thais); 21,390 enemy killed; and 848 prisoners. Enemy losses included 5,024 small arms; 1,310 crew served weapons; 898,122 rounds of small arms ammunition; 26,454 high explosive rounds; 40 rockets; 2,331 mines; 12,874 grenades; and 777,586 tons of rice either captured or destroyed.

(2) Summary of Combat Operations.

(a) 1st Infantry Division. The 1st Infantry Division continued to participate in Campaign Toan Thang. On 17 April D Troop (Air), 1-4th Cavalry was attached to the 1st Aviation Battalion (Combat). This internal reorganization of air assets provided increased maintenance support to the air cavalry troop and increased the availability of its aircraft. On 16 June the 1st Brigade began relocating from Luan Loi to Dau Tieng Base Camp (XN4947) and assumed responsibility from the 25th Infantry Division for base camp security on 30 June. The division initiated combat operations in the Michelin Rubber Plantation and in the western Trapezoid area and increased...
combined operations with the 5th ARVN Division and the Provincial Forces during the period. Combined forces of infantry, mechanized, armor, and engineers completed the opening of the II Corps line of communication to allow resupply convoys to travel from Phu Quong to Song Be 15 through 17 June. Operation Ta Lo Thang 2-64, begun on 21 April, and terminated on 26 June. It was controlled by the 1st Brigade and consisted of opening and upgrading Highway 14, Highway 16, and Route 319 from Phuoc Vinh to Dong Xoai to Nhieu Binh. A (ARVN) remaining weapons of likely for a Bridge. Route upgrading and bridge repair were conducted by the 301st ARVN Engineer Battalion. From 5 May to 22 June a combined operation was conducted with the 5th ARVN Division in the vicinity of An Loc and Luan Loi to find and destroy elements of the 1st and 7th North Vietnamese Division. Results of this operation were 604 enemy killed and 29 prisoners, with substantial quantities of war material captured. Operation An Son was conducted 4 to 25 June with elements of the 24 Battalion, 18th Infantry; the 7th Battalion, 18th ARVN Regiment; and four Regional Force companies participating. A combined US/ARVN staff was formed under the command of a US field grade officer. A task force was organized to eliminate main force elements which had infiltrated the An Son area, south of Phu Quong. The task force saturated the area and eliminated 83 of the reported 120 VC in the area. Of the total, 15 enemy soldiers rallied as a result of a combination of tactical pressure supported by extensive pay/ Coverage. A special technique was employed whereby loudspeaker broadcasts from aircraft, river patrol boats, and ground vehicles were transmitted in accordance with a coordinated maneuver and broadcast schedule. During previously announced periods of one hour duration, allied troops would cease offensive operations to allow enemy troops to rally. Enemy forces were educated through the loudspeaker missions and through contact made by armed propaganda teams to the best procedures to be used to rally. Operation Boston Pistol, conducted 18 to 30 June, relieved the 1st Infantry Division of responsibility for Binh Long Province, Phuoc Long Province, and the Luan Loi Base Camp, with the 1st Cavalry Division (ARVN) assuming responsibility for the area. The 24 Brigade concentrated its efforts on pacification operations during the period. An expanded area of operations into the northern Lam Song area resulted in additional road security requirements (Ben Cat to Nhieu Binh) and the assumption of "overwatch" responsibility for additional target hamlets. The 3d Brigade retained responsibility for Lai Khe Base defense. School construction, repair, and maintenance continued to enhance the South Vietnamese educational system. On 12 May at 0330 hours in the vicinity of Fire Support Base Buttons (TU1397873), a contact by the 1-2d Infantry resulted in 33 enemy killed with friendly casualties of 2 US wounded. On 24 May at 0200 hours approximately six kilometers west of As Phuoc Binh (X7 693868), a contact by the 2-2d Infantry (K) resulted in 33 enemy killed and 5 crew served weapons, 8 small arms, 32 HE rounds, and 17 grenades captured. Friendly losses were 17 wounded. On 24 May at 1825 hours approximately five kilometers west of As Phuoc Binh (X7 700870), a contact by the 2-2d Infantry (K) resulted in 30 enemy killed and 4 crew served weapons, 3 small arms, 38 HE rounds, and 15 grenades captured. Friendly losses were 6 wounded. On 25 May the division killed a total of 129 enemy. On 6 June at 0555 hours approximately two kilometers west of Ap An Phu (X7 20925) Company B/2-2d Infantry (K) engaged an estimated enemy company size force. The enemy returned fire and light fire teams, aerial rocket artillery, and tactical air supported the contact. At 1140 hours A/2-2d reinforced the contact and at 1355 hours B/2-11th Cavalry reinforced. The continued until 1500 hours. Results were 78 enemy killed and 5 prisoners, 5 HE rounds, 6 crew served weapons, 17 small arms, 940 rounds of small arms ammunition, and
MSS of the brigade was to interdict the southerly movement of Co-andche Warrior and also conducted operations in rounds, XT5671, with the 11th 1CR, conducted an operation in AO Blue (XT7071), against elements of the 165th ACR, conducted an operation in the vicinity of the Crescent in Tana Raider, begun or.

and on supporting units, the enemy's logistical traffic was significantly disrupted in canalizing enemy movements and in denying him his bases. Severe damage was inflicted on two of the three regiments of the 1st NVA Division and on supporting units, the enemy's logistical traffic was significantly disrupted, and the initiative was wrested from the enemy. Operation Montana Raider, begun on 13 April, terminated on 12 May. This was a three-phased operation targeted against one regiment of the 1st Division and two regiments of the 7th Division with each brigade in turn cross-reinforcing with the 17th ACR to exploit B-52 strikes. The 1st Brigade, with the 17th ACR, conducted an operation in the vicinity of the Crescent in AO Red (XT3364, XT4964, XT5066, XT3346). The 2d Brigade, with the 17th ACR, conducted an operation in AO White (XT5556, XT6465, XT5972, XT5066, XT4560) against elements of the 165th Regiment, 7th NVA Division. The 3d Brigade with the 17th ACR, conducted an operation in AO Blue (XT7071, XT7071, XT5671, XT4964, XT4577) against elements of the 209th Regiment, 7th NVA Division. The results were 39 US killed, 151 wounded, and 1 aircraft destroyed with 355 enemy killed and 8 prisoners, 25 individual weapons, 96 crew served weapons, 1,788 large caliber rounds, 79,396 small caliber rounds, 131-9 tons of rice, and 29.45 tons of salt captured. The division also conducted operations in AO Montana Scout against elements of the 1st and 7th NVA Divisions in War Zone C, operations in AO Commando Warrior and AO Creek II against elements of the 5th UC Division in War Zone D, and operations in Kentucky Cougar FACI against enemy forces throughout northern III Corps. Results of Operation Montana Scout were 1,570 enemy killed and 39 prisoners, 399 individual weapons, 59 crew served weapons, 1,694 large caliber rounds, 78,256 small caliber rounds, 65.96 tons of rice, and 14.73 tons of salt captured. Friendly losses were 64 US killed, 376 wounded, 19 aircraft destroyed, and 1 105mm howitzer destroyed. Operations in Commando Warrior and Creek II were conducted by the 3d Brigade. The mission of the brigade was to interdict the southerly movement of the 5th Division out of War Zone D into the heavily populated areas in the vicinity of the Long Binh - Bien Hoa area, to interdict known crossing points on the Song Dong Hai River, and to locate the 275th and 174th Regiments of the 5th Division. Results of these operations were 152 enemy killed and

5 prisoners, 46 individual weapons, 21 crew served weapons, 1,826 large caliber rounds, 77,070 small caliber rounds, 194.56 tons of rice, 42.97 tons of salt, 8.5 tons of flower, 1,000 cans of fish, and 70 tons of assorted foodstuffs captured. Friendly losses were 19 U.S. killed, 104 wounded, and 2 aircraft destroyed. Operations in Kentucky Cougar were initiated on 24 June. Contacts were light and cache finds insignificant. Major results were derived from bomb damage assessment of B-52 strikes in the vicinity of the Crescent and War Zone C. Results were 117 enemy killed and 9 prisoners, 25 individual weapons, 1 crew served weapon, 58 large caliber rounds, 3,467 small caliber rounds, 3,31 tons of rice, and 1.21 tons of salt captured. Psychological operations increased throughout the division. Special leaflets were developed against all known enemy units of battalion, regimental, and divisional size stressing the hardship of the jungle, enemy losses, and ARVN/allied firepower. Special tapes targeted against specific enemy units were developed and broadcast to the enemy in known and suspected locations. Leaflets supporting the Chieu Hoi and Voluntary Information Program were stressed and tapes were used in this connection also. Quick Reaction Psyops were improved and targeted against enemy units in contact and hand held megaphones were used at company level for on-the-ground broadcasting of surrender and Chieu Hoi appeals immediately after contacts. Some of the larger contacts during the period follow. On 6 May, the 2-8th Cavalry continued security of LZ St. Barbara and LZ Carolyn, conducting operations to the north. At 0200 hours, LZ Carolyn began receiving a mortar and rocket attack, followed by a ground assault by an estimated enemy regiment. The assault was from the southeast and north and by 0225 hours a portion of the perimeter had been breached. At 0315 hours, a 105mm howitzer ammunition dump was hit and destroyed; fighting continued throughout the early morning hours. Counter attacks reestablished the perimeter and the enemy force began withdrawing at 0415 hours with contact breaking at 0600 hours. At 0530 hours, elements of Company B were airlifted from LZ Barbara to reinforce and begin a sweep of the battle area. At 0530 hours, A/2-5th Cavalry combat assaulted to block avenues of escape from the battle area to the north. At 1250 hours, B/2-12th Cavalry combat assaulted to block and interdict avenues to the west. The sweep of the battle area revealed the following results: 101 enemy killed, 29 prisoners, and 48 small arms, 23 crew served weapons, 12,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 249 HE rounds, and 259 grenades captured. Friendly losses were 9 U.S. killed and 62 wounded. At 0240 hours on 12 May, the 2-7th Cavalry received 200 rounds of mortar fire at LZ Jamie, followed by a ground attack by an estimated enemy battalion. The perimeter was breached at 0425 hours and one bunker captured. The bunker was later neutralised and the perimeter reestablished. The enemy was forced to withdraw at 0445 hours and contact ceased at 0615 hours. A sweep of the battle area produced 70 enemy killed, 1 prisoner, and 26 small arms, 5 crew served weapons, 47 HE rounds, and 216 grenades captured. Friendly losses were 7 U.S. killed and 35 wounded. At 0315 hours on 12 May, the 2-12th Cavalry received an unknown number of rocket rounds at LZ Grant. This was followed by a ground attack by an estimated two enemy companies which breached the perimeter on the west side and occupied two bunkers. The massed fire of ARA and artillery, coupled with a deployment of the reaction forces from within the landing zone stopped the attack and reestablished the perimeter. All fire ceased at 0445 hours and the enemy withdrew. Results of the contact were 45 enemy killed, 3 prisoners, 26 small arms, 8 crew served weapons, 16 HE rounds, and 96 grenades captured. Friendly casualties were 5 U.S. killed and 40 wounded. During contacts on 12 May, the 1st Cavalry Division accounted for 172 enemy killed and 6 prisoners with 19 U.S. killed and 150 wounded. On 2 June at 1635 hours...
approximately seven kilometers northwest of Dinh Quan (YT529439), a contact by
the 1-8th Cavalry resulted in 29 enemy killed with 22 US wounded. On
12 June at 0200 hours in the vicinity of Landing Zone Joy, a 1-7th Cavalry
contact resulted in 35 enemy killed and 2 prisoners, 14 crew served weapons,
22 small arms, 6,900 rounds of small arms ammunition, and 69 HE rounds
captured. Friendly losses were 5 US killed and 6 wounded. On 16 June at
0146 hours in the vicinity of Landing Zone Ike (XT557718), a contact by
the 2-5th Cavalry resulted in 37 enemy killed and 3 prisoners, 5 crew
served weapons, 11 small arms, 600 rounds of small arms ammunition, 238
grenades, and 28 HE rounds captured. Friendly losses were 3 US killed and
11 wounded. On 20 June at 0005 hours in the vicinity of Landing Zone Ike
(XT557718), a 2-5th Cavalry contact resulted in 37 enemy killed and 3
prisoners, 16 crew served weapons, 33 small arms, 69 HE rounds, 2,150 rounds
of small arms ammunition, 400 grenades, and 6 mines captured. Friendly
losses were 7 US killed and 19 wounded. The month of July was characterized
by light contacts.

(e) 25th Infantry Division. During this quarter the 25th Infantry
Division had three primary objectives. First, to preempt enemy main force
and local force efforts. Second, to place emphasis on the improvement of
the Republic of Vietnam armed forces through combined operations. And
third, to continue the pacification program. During the period greater
emphasis was placed on Night Hawk missions (operations employing armed
helicopters with night observation devices). The effectiveness of the
Combined Reconnaissance and Intelligence Platoon (CRIP) improved consider-
ably. Also, the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) began operations
with Vietnamese LRRP counterparts. Tank-infantry training was conducted
for RF/PF units and maneuver battalions of the division constructed rifle
ranges to emphasize marksmanship for RF/PF units. There was a significant
increase in both the variety and total number of psychological operations
conducted within the division in support of the 1969 pacification program.
Increased emphasis was placed on civic action projects of construction and
distribution in support of unit pacification operations in targeted areas.
An integration of intelligence gathering capabilities with the medical civic
action projects (MEDCAP's) brought renewed emphasis upon this facet of civil
affairs. As the quarter began the division's deployment remained basically
unchanged from the preceding quarter. The 1st Brigade, located around Tay
Ninh City, was responsible for the area in the northernmost quadrant of the
division area. The 2d Brigade remained in the southern half of the TACR
with operations generally reaching as far north as the Van Go Dong River
and northwest to Highway 8A. The 3d Brigade continued to concentrate its
efforts around Dau Tieng with attention focused on the Michelin Rubber
Plantation and the Trapezoid. These areas remained in effect with some
modification in June, the most significant of which was a division boundary
change resulting in the relocation of the 3d Brigade from Dau Tieng to a
forward location at Bao Trai. Initial implementation began on 4 June with
gradual changes continuing until full responsibility for Dau Tieng, the
Michelin Rubber Plantation, and Trapezoid was assumed by the 1st Infantry
Division on 30 June. The 3d Brigade remained in the area until 30 June
while concurrently preparing to commence operations in the lower Hau Nghia
Province east and west of the Van Go Dong. During the period 15 May to 9
June the Rome Plows of the 60th Land Clearing Company cleared over 7,000
acres of possible enemy base areas in Boi Loi Woods. The division's first
sizeable action occurred on 9 May at 1040 hours, when the 1-27th Infantry
made contact with an enemy force of unknown size approximately one kilometer
June at 2200 hours in the vicinity of Bau Dieu, 8 Hung
small arms ammunition destroyed, HE Cavalry while conducting reconnaissance resulted
mately one kilometer east of
losses were
northwest of Ben
and 2 small arms, and 17 small arms, and 28 HE rounds captured. Friendly losses were 2 US killed and 5 wounded.

June at 2300 hours in the vicinity of Patrol Base Crook, a contact by the 1-5th Infantry resulted in 34 enemy killed and 9 small arms and 5 crew served weapons captured with friendly losses of 1 US wounded. On 15 June at approximately six kilometers southeast of Cam Giang (XT296313), a contact by the 2-12th Infantry resulted in 7 enemy killed and 2 crew served weapons and 7 small arms weapons captured. Friendly casualties were 7 US killed and 14 wounded, with 3 armored personnel carriers destroyed. On 6 June at 0300 hours in the vicinity of Patrol Base Crook (XT205555), a 3-22d Infantry contact resulted in 76 enemy killed and 15 small arms, 12 crew served weapons, and 10,000 rounds of small arms ammunition captured. Friendly casualties were 1 US killed and 2 wounded.

June at 0910 hours approximately three kilometers northwest of Ben Cui (XT294585), a contact by the 2-14th Infantry resulted in 63 enemy killed and 3 prisoners, 5 crew served weapons, 6 small arms, 10 grenades, and 300 rounds of small arms ammunition captured. Friendly losses were 3 US killed and 11 wounded. On 19 June at 2200 hours in the vicinity of Bau Dieu, 8 Hung
small arms ammunition destroyed, HE Cavalry while conducting reconnaissance resulted in 50 enemy killed and 18 small arms and 8 crew served weapons captured. Friendly casualties were two US killed and one wounded. On 14 May at 0445 hours approximately nine kilometers northeast of Xom Ben Cui (XT248051), a 4-23d Infantry (M) contact resulted in 51 enemy killed, with 4 prisoners and 6 crew served weapons, 17 small arms, and 26 HE rounds captured. Friendly losses were 2 US killed and 3 wounded. At 1205 hours on 14 May approximately four kilometers southeast of X Trang Co (XT572304), a contact by 1-5th Infantry resulted in 34 enemy killed and 9 small arms and 5 crew served weapons captured with friendly losses of 1 US wounded. At 1230 hours on 30 May approximately one kilometer northeast of X Rang (1) (XT581237), a contact by the elements of the 1-5th Infantry resulted in 59 enemy killed, and 1 prisoner, 30 small arms, 13 crew served weapons, and 25 grenades captured. Friendly losses were 1 US killed and 2 wounded, with 2 armored personnel carriers destroyed. At 1550 hours on 5 June approximately seven kilometers southeast of Cam Giang (XT296313), a contact by the 4-9th Infantry resulted in 45 enemy killed and 2 crew served weapons and 7 small arms weapons captured. Friendly losses were 1 US killed and 3 wounded. On 5 June at 1248 hours approximately one kilometer south of X Sta Nho (2) (XT568255), a contact by the 2-12th Infantry resulted in 72 enemy killed and 38 small arms, 7 crew served weapons, and 15 HE rounds captured. Friendly casualties were 7 US killed and 14 wounded, with 3 armored personnel carriers destroyed. On 6 June at 1605 hours approximately six kilometers northeast of Gau Kho (XT577504), a contact by the 4-23d Infantry (M) resulted in 51 enemy killed and 2 small arms, 3 crew served weapons, 22 HE rounds, 200 rounds of small arms ammunition, and 10 grenades captured. Friendly losses were 3 US killed and 7 wounded. On 11 June at 0910 hours approximately three kilometers northeast of Ben Cui (XT245485), a contact by the 1-27th Infantry resulted in 62 enemy killed and 3 prisoners, 5 crew served weapons, 6 small arms, 10 grenades, and 300 rounds of small arms ammunition captured. Friendly losses were 3 US killed and 11 wounded. On 19 June at 1610 hours approximately one kilometer east of Ap Bien Ouy (XT267405), a contact by the 3-22d Infantry resulted in 323 enemy killed and 10 prisoners, 39 small arms, 4 crew served weapons, 105 HE rounds, 730 grenades, 3,000 rounds of small arms ammunition captured. There were no friendly casualties. On 9 June at 0930 hours approximately nine kilometers south of Xom Ben Cui (XT245485), a contact by the 2-25th Infantry resulted in 38 enemy killed and 6 crew served weapons, 10 small arms, 20 grenades, and 400 rounds of small arms ammunition captured. Friendly losses were 4 US killed, 9 wounded, 1 tank destroyed, 1 tank damaged, and 7 armored personnel carriers damaged. At 1620 hours on 15 June approximately three kilometers southeast of Ap Long Hung (XT204385), a 4-9th Infantry contact resulted in 57 enemy killed and 8 small arms, 10 crew served weapons, 70 HE rounds, and 4,000 rounds of small arms ammunition captured. There were 3 US wounded. On 27 June at 0700 hours in the vicinity of Bau Dieu, 8 Hung
small arms ammunition destroyed, HE Cavalry while conducting reconnaissance resulted in 50 enemy killed and 18 small arms and 8 crew served weapons captured. Friendly losses were 1 US killed and 1 wounded. On 27 June at 1200 hours in the vicinity of Bau Dieu, 8 Hung
small arms ammunition destroyed, HE Cavalry while conducting reconnaissance resulted in 50 enemy killed and 18 small arms and 8 crew served weapons captured. Friendly losses were 1 US killed and 1 wounded. On 27 June at 0505 hours approximately six kilometers northeast of Tay Ninh
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3d Battalion, 1st Field Force Vietnam for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, HGS CMINL - (BI) (4-DEC-70-A) (4)

(3) 4th Brigade, 8th Infantry Division. The 4th Brigade, 8th Infantry Division continued air mobile assault, eagle flight, checkerboard, bushmaster, cordon and search, reconnaissance, and special night operations as its primary combat operational techniques. Operations were designed to destroy the enemy, to deny him the opportunity to reorganize and reconstitute his forces and resources, and to impede his efforts to launch offensive operations against the GVN forces and populated areas. The enemy's offensive activity was characterized by harassment of outposts, attacks by fire, and extensive use of mines and booby traps. At the beginning of the quarter, efforts tended to operate in platoon and company size elements. This continued until approximately mid-June when the enemy began to move and operate in small groups. The 4th Brigade continued operations in Toan Thang III. The brigade operated with three maneuver battalions (2-60th, 5-60th, and 2-47th Mechanized) in Long An Province until 2 June when a fourth battalion, the 3-7th Infantry, became OPCON to the brigade. The 4th Brigade continued to support the 1969 Pacification Program during the reporting period. On 12 May at 0500 hours an artillery aerial observer was dispatched to an area southwest of Thu Thua to assist a TF outpost which was under attack. During the initial reconnaissance automatic weapons fire was received from an unknown size enemy force. B/3-17th Cavalry was sent to the area and also received heavy fire. In request of the province chief, reconnaissance elements of the 2-47th Infantry (K) were sent to reinforce and immediately in contact with the enemy. A "pile-on" operation began utilizing 3, 4, and 5 Companies of 2-60th Infantry and 5 Companies of 4-60th Infantry; one company each from the 2d and 3d Battalions, 50th ARVN Regiment; 2 RF Platoons; 1 RF Company; and one PRU platoon. Assault helicopters, air cavalry, tactical air, and artillery supported the operation. Sporadic contact continued throughout the night. At first light, US, ARVN, and territorial forces conducted a sweep of the battlefield, while B and D Companies of the 5-60th Infantry conducted airmobile assaults and airmobile assaults to the northwest in pursuit of the enemy. By 2000 hours 13 May the combined sweep and pursuit terminated. Final results of the combined operation were 91 enemy killed, six prisoners, and 16 crew served weapons, and 15 individual weapons captured. Combined friendly losses were 4 killed and 37 wounded. Three armored personnel carriers and seven aircraft were damaged.
On 14 May 1969, Company B, 2-60th Infantry made an airmobile assault southwest of Ben Luc (35-74). Gunships observed twenty to thirty VC with weapons. Elements of Companies A and B of the 2-60th Infantry were inserted to cordon the enemy. Periodic contact continued throughout the afternoon and evening, with 2/7-17th Cavalry, artillery, and tactical air in support. Six VC were wounded while US forces killed 5% of the enemy and captured 2 crew served and 17 individual weapons. On 26 May, reconnaissance elements of the 5-60th Infantry were inserted in the vicinity of the Eagle's Peak (AZ977). At 1235 hours, they made contact with an unknown size VC force. B and D Companies, 5-60th Infantry were inserted to reinforce, while 3-17th Cavalry, the 240th AHC, artillery, tactical air and Navy F-8s supported. Results of the operation were 21 VC killed and 5 US killed and 3 wounded. On 26 July at 0001 hours, due to the rotation of the division headquarters and the 1st and 2nd Brigades, the 3d Brigade was placed OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division. Contact during June and July was light.

The Capital Military Assistance Command (CMAC). The Capital Military Assistance Command (CMAC) conducted offensive operations in the Gia Long Province and adjacent areas during the reporting period to destroy the enemy and preempt his ground and rocket attack capability against Saigon. Operations were characterized by reconnaissance and detailed searches utilizing riverine and airmobile assets in areas inaccessible to foot movement. Extensive night ambushes in conjunction with planned artillery fire highlighted the effort of a vigorous counter-rocket program. A surveillance plan, utilizing aerial observers and ground mounted surveillance radar, was also employed in conjunction with the counter-rocket program. Extensive use was made of aerial areas of operations (AO) extensions and combined operations with adjacent units to thwart the enemy's use of operational boundaries as a means to elude allied forces. Enemy contact remained at a low level during the reporting period. CMAC forces effectively prevented an enemy buildup of forces and supplies with which a significant ground attack could be launched against Saigon. During the period CMAC continued to intensify operations in support of the pacification effort and the destruction of the enemy's offensive capability. On 16 June the 1-9th Infantry Brigade became OPCON to II Field Force Vietnam effective 1400 hours.

The Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command (provisional) (BIHTAC). Ground activity in the BIHTAC TAOR throughout the reporting period was light. The move of the joint BHTAC/LBSZ Tactical Operations Center to the III Corps Compound resulted in improved working conditions and increased the capabilities for communications. During the period BIHTAC exercised OPCON over two infantry battalions, two armored cavalry squadrons, three cavalry troops, one tank troop, and two infantry companies for various periods of time. Army aviation utilized by BIHTAC throughout the period consisted of two hunter-killer teams from the 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry. Although not OPCON to BIHTAC, the 5th RAR, 1st Australian Task Force was given the mission of conducting operations in the eastern portion of the BIHTAC TAOR north of Highway 1 on 15 May. It was released from this mission on 22 May. During the period 12 May through 23 May the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry (-) conducted search and clear operations in AO Green and in the AO Green extension with limited results. During the daily operations conducted they destroyed 20 bunkers, found 2 VC killed, and destroyed 39 rolls of demolition wire. The 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry conducted search and clear operations in AO Green and in the AO Green extension from 14 to 23 June with very limited results. The Duffle Bag program within the BIHTAC AO was aimed at monitoring.
and denying the enemy force use of access routes into the rocket belt around the Bien Hoa - Long Binh area. There were 31 sensors in 6 strings deployed around the north and northwest approaches into the area. Airborne Infrared Detector (APD) support was provided HMTAC by the 29th Chemical Detachment, GCOCN to II FFRCIV. A high percentage of readouts was engaged by artillery. Continuous improvement in the development of the defense against ground/rocket attacks on the Bien Hoa - Long Binh complex was accomplished throughout the reporting period. A major factor is this improvement was the coordinated utilization of ground surveillance radar, Duffle Bag Program, APD reports, hunter killer teams, and the Firefly missions. The improved coordination of all the intelligence and information collection assets enabled more effective planning for ground operations.

(g) 1st Australian Task Force. The 1st Australian Task Force continued participation in Campaign Toan Thang III throughout the reporting period, conducting operations to destroy the enemy and assisting in pacification and civil affairs. The 6th RAR arrived in Vietnam on 19 May, replacing the 4th RAR, which returned to Australia the same date. On 29 May, during Operation Garryowen, a troop of B Squadron, 34 Cavalry Regiment ambushed approximately 20 Viet Cong resulting in 11 enemy killed and 6 small arms, 1 machinegun, 1 rocket launcher, 1,200 rounds of small arms ammunition, 5 rockets, and 22 grenades captured. On 30 May an ambush resulted in 10 enemy killed. On 6 June at Binh Ba village, the 5th RAR reacted as a result of an ambush on a small tank convoy. One company of the 5th RARplus Regional Forces and Popular Forces cordoned the village while another company, supported by tanks and armored personnel carriers, assaulted the enemy in the village. Results of the operation were 43 enemy killed, 6 prisoners and 8 small arms, 3 rocket launchers, and 1 mortar captured. On 11 June a company of the 6th RAR contacted an estimated VC company resulting in 9 VC killed. On 20 June a company of the 6th RAR contacted an estimated 50 VC resulting in 22 VC killed and 1 prisoner.

(h) Company D (Ranger), 151st Infantry. Company D continued operations in Toan Thang III. Teams deployed by the company continued to supply information on enemy locations and activities. During the reporting period the company inserted 311 teams, resulting in 69 sightings and 50 contacts, with 50 enemy killed, 2 US killed, and 50 US wounded.

(i) Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF). Missions for the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF) during the quarter consisted of security operations near Bearcat, Long Thanh, Binh Son, and along Highway 15. The RTAVF also conducted reconnaissance operations throughout its area. On 12 May at 0045 hours approximately ten kilometers southeast of Bearcat (T239918), the 3-31st Infantry received mortar, rocket, and small arms fire. Return fire with organic weapons, supported by artillery and Spooky, resulted in 41 enemy killed and 17 small arms, 15 crew served weapons, and 452 rounds of small arms ammunition captured. Friendly casualties were 1 Thai killed and 11 wounded. On 15 May at 0020 hours southeast of Bearcat (T239918) the 3-31st Infantry received an attack by an estimated enemy battalion, consisting of mortar and rocket fire. Return fire with organic weapons, supported by artillery, light fire teams, and Spooky resulted in 87 enemy killed and 3 small arms, 2 grenades, 1 mine, 24 HE rounds, and 540 rounds of small arms ammunition captured. There were no friendly casualties. On 16 June at 0045 hours, an enemy attack against the 2-1st Infantry resulted in 212 enemy killed and 1 prisoner, 16 small arms, 25 crew served weapons, 823 grenades, and 6 mines captured. Friendly losses were 6 Thais killed and 34 wounded.
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(1) 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate)(Light). Effective 18 June at 1400 hours the 199th Infantry Brigade became OPCON to II PPORCV. The brigade moved to Long Khanh Province and began operations with the 18th ARVN Division in the joint Dong Tien (Progress Together) program. The brigade's operations were targeted against the 5th VC Division and Long Khanh Province local forces. Contact during the months of June and July was light.

(3) Air Operations.

(a) B-52 operations. B-52 operations are discussed in paragraph 10(6)(a) and (b). Inclosure 6 indicates the number and distribution of B-52 strikes in III CTZ.

(b) Army aviation operations.

1. Resources. The following non-divisional resources were under the control of II PPORCV during the reporting period:

   a. Rotary wing:
      14 Assault helicopter companies
      1 Aerial weapons company
      4 Assault support helicopter companies (Med)
      1 Assault support helicopter company (Heavy)
      1 Aviation company (CORPS)
      1 Air cavalry squadron

   b. Fixed wing:
      2 Reconnaissance airplane companies
      1 Utility airplane company
      1 Surveillance airplane company
      4 Assault helicopter companies and 1 assault support helicopter company were assigned to DMIC on 1 July 1969. During May and June, these units were OPCON to IMAC.

   c. At the close of the reporting period, there were 440 helicopters and 93 airplanes assigned. Operational guidance was provided by the Commanding General and implemented by the G2 surveillance and reconnaissance functions, and by G3 in air cavalry, combat assault, armamoid, and general support functions. Command, less operational control, continued to be exercised by the 12th Combat Aviation Group.

   d. Allocation. Aviation resources continued to be allocated to major units by Commanding General, II PPORCV or as directed by higher headquarters. Support was provided all US and allied organizations under the operational control of II PPORCV and III Corps.

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2 employment. The number of assault helicopter companies (AHC) continued to be insufficient to satisfy valid requirements. The policy of allowing each AHC to stand down one day each month has improved availability and quality of maintenance. In addition, the operational limitation of six hours of flying time a day for each committed aircraft has resulted in more efficient utilization of aviation support to II PFFORCE and III Corps by requiring more thorough planning of tactical operations. The use of preparatory fires and smoke on landing zones prior to insertion has reduced the loss of personnel and aircraft to enemy fire.

4 The following changes occurred in force structure:

(a) Gains.

1 Elements of the 3d Increment of the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF) began arriving in RVN on 5 July 1969 when the advance party arrived. The main body arrived in three three-day serials on 19-21 July, 28-30 July, and 3-5 August 1969. The rear party will close in RVN on 12 August 1969. The 3d Increment, RTAVF, consists of the following:

a 3d Brigade, RTAVF
b 1st Infantry Battalion, 3d Brigade, RTAVF
c 2d Infantry Battalion, 3d Brigade, RTAVF
d 3d Infantry Battalion, 3d Brigade, RTAVF
e 3d 105mm Artillery Battalion, Division Artillery, RTAVF
f C Battery, 155mm Artillery Battalion, Division Artillery, RTAVF
g One Troop, Cavalry Squadron, RTAVF

2 6th RAR, 1st Australian Task Force arrived on 19 May.

(b) Losses.

1 Elements of the 1st Increment of the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF) departed as the 3d Increment arrived. The 1st Increment, RTAVF, consisted of the following:

a 1st Brigade, RTAVF
b 1st Infantry Battalion, 1st Brigade, RTAVF
c 2d Infantry Battalion, 1st Brigade, RTAVF
d 3d Infantry Battalion, 1st Brigade, RTAVF
e 1st 105mm Artillery Battalion, Division Artillery, RTAVF
f A Battery, 155mm Artillery Battalion, Division Artillery, RTAVF
g One Troop, Cavalry Squadron, RTAVF

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2. 214th Combat Aviation, consisting of the below listed companies, was transferred to the Delta Military Assistance Command:

a. 155th Assault Helicopter Company
b. 162d Assault Helicopter Company
c. 191st Assault Helicopter Company
d. 147th Assault Support Helicopter Company
e. 4th RAR, 1st Australian Task Force departed 19 May.

5) Training.

(a) Six ARVN battalions completed ARVN Infantry/Ranger Battalion Refresher Training during the period 1 May - 31 July 1969. Four additional battalions were in training at the end of July; one was being retrained due to an unsatisfactory battalion training test in May. The training is progressing on schedule and is proving beneficial to the ARVN battalions.

(b) A program to provide refresher training for divisional engineer battalions and armored cavalry regiments, reinitiated during the last reporting period, was coordinated during this reporting period. One ARVN Armored Cavalry Regiment began refresher training during the reporting period; however, due to operational requirements, the training was stopped. The training will be resumed as soon as possible. One divisional engineer battalion had been trained prior to this reporting period and during July the training of the remaining two was coordinated.

(c) Reciprocal Mobile Training Teams (RMTT) were exchanged between the 25th Infantry Division and the 25th ARVN Division. Operational requirements precluded other units' participating during the reporting period; however, the program has proved to be desirable, and aggressive coordination has been conducted to resume the exchange of teams as soon as practicable.

e. Logistics Operations.

1) Programs and projects.

(a) The G4 Section and Special Liaison Section, II FFORCEN, have emphasized reporting procedures and required documentation of combat losses - the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force. This has improved the resupply of essential equipment attributed to combat losses.

(b) Logistics Readiness Program.

1. The fourth quarter FY 69 Logistics Readiness Meeting for II Field Force Vietnam assigned and attached units was held on 21 July 1969. Topics discussed included Organizational Maintenance and Supply Inspection (OMSI) results, analysis of fourth quarter Materiel Readiness Reports, and weekly Command Deadline Reports.

2. As of 20 June 1969, 16 organizational maintenance and supply inspections had been conducted of II Field Force Vietnam assigned and attached units. Thirteen units received a rating of satisfactory and three units were rated unsatisfactory. The major cause of inspection failures is attributed to maintenance management.
During the period "jungle busting" operations and increased battle damage coupled with the mud of the rainy season strained the equipment of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, resulting in increased deadline rates of M48A3 tanks, M551 Sheridans, and M113 Armored Personnel Carriers. The problem was complicated by extended LOC's and lack of adequate maintenance areas. Close coordination with the 29th General Support Group resulted in the prepositioning of repair parts, the employment of direct support contact teams with each squadron, and intensive efforts to move repair parts forward. The regiment established platoon standdown periods for intensified maintenance and closely monitored both preventive and corrective maintenance operations. At the close of the reporting period the vehicle operational ready rate was improving.

(2) ARVN/Advisor Logistics.

(a) During the quarter ARVN requested significant quantities of barrier materials from available US assets. These unexpected requirements resulted from the RF/PF expansion throughout the III CTZ. Senior Advisor, III Corps Tactical Zone recommended a complete study of barrier material requirements and assets within all provinces, divisions, and the Capital Military District. This study which was closely monitored by Senior Advisor, III Corps Tactical Zone resulted in the reallocation of III CTZ assets to satisfy immediate requirements within Long An Province and II FFORCZV action to assist in Hau Nghia Province. Barrier material requirements for the remainder of III CTZ were forwarded through ARVN channels to JGS.

(b) A II FFORCZV study established the feasibility of relocating rear elements of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and 199th Light Infantry Brigade. As a result Blackhorse base camp will no longer be required for II Field Force Vietnam troop units and can be turned over to RVNAF. The turnover of this base camp will reduce II Field Force Vietnam installation and logistic overhead; provide better utilization of base camps, and provide an excellent facility for RVNAF improvement and modernization programs. II FFORCZV forwarded the study to USARV with the recommendation that Blackhorse be turned over to ARVN by 1 November. Realizing that a project of this nature would require close US/RVAF coordination, CG, II Field Force Vietnam and CG, III Corps Tactical Zone established a Joint Facilities Planning Group for the purpose of effecting a smooth and orderly turnover.

(3) Ammunition.

(a) Ammunition items in short supply continue to be managed through the use of available supply rate (ASR) allocations to insure equitable distribution of available ammunition to all II Field Force Vietnam units. Expenditures of certain high cost, high tonnage items are also controlled through the available supply rate system.

(b) During the quarter, the number of conventional munitions under available supply rate control were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 1969</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1969</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1969</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The quarterly Ammunition Conference was held at II Field Force Vietnam Headquarters on 12 May 1969. Topics discussed included the available supply rate allocation system, stockage level status of available supply rate items, preparation of the World Wide Ammunition Report, and ammunition storage safety.

On 13 June 1969 a conference was held at II Field Force Vietnam headquarters to discuss and focus attention on prevention of ammunition and other materiel storage site losses from fire or enemy attack.

Transportation.

A fixed wing airlift conference was sponsored by II Field Force Vietnam on 13 July 1969. Attendees, consisting of II Field Force Vietnam unit users, transportation managers and airlift operators, were briefed on airlift procedures. Special emphasis was placed on the judicious use of emergency airlift priorities and the importance of advance planning to preclude disruption of previously scheduled resupply missions. The recovery program for 463L aluminum pallets was discussed. Lack of material handling equipment at forward airfields has compounded a prompt and responsive recovery program. Continued close coordination between army elements and the Air Force recovery teams effort will be necessary to return pallets before they are damaged or misappropriated to other use.

United States Air Force C123/C130 sorties flown from the Common Service Airlift System in support of II Field Force Vietnam units are summarized in Inclosure 3.

Engineer Support.

General. Engineer support during the reporting period was provided throughout the III CTZ in the form of airfield maintenance and rehabilitation, upgrading and construction of artillery fire support bases, improving lines of communication, and support of tactical operations.

Combat support. Engineer activities were characterized by a wide variety of combat support during the reporting period.

Hinesweeps were conducted on 15,652 kilometers of L LC and secondary roads. Minefields were cleared in the Phuoc Vinh area, Bien Hoa Air Base area, the Rang Rang area, and in the Tra Cu area.

Combat engineers provided demolition support to the maneuver elements through the destruction of bunker complexes and base camps. These demolition specialists also assisted in neutralizing booby traps.

Land clearing operations continued to play an important role in engineer combat support. A total of 43,739 acres of jungle were cleared by both divisional land clearing teams and the 62d Engineer Battalion. The Song Be Road cut, completed on 11 June 1969, provided a 200 meter cleared area on both sides of the road from Phuoc Vinh to Song Be, a total of 87 kilometers. This cut, termed Operation Song Tam III, was in conjunction with the 30th ARVN Engineer Group and the upgrade program for the route. Other major cutting operations were:

62d Engineer Battalion; Lai Khe Rocket Belt, Phuoc Vinh Rocket Belt, Gang Toi, Hat Dich, Crescent, Trapezoid, Sherwood Forest, and FSB Crook areas.

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(2) Divisional land clearing teams: Northwest of Cu Chi along Routes QL-1 and 171-19 by the 25th Infantry Division and in the Ben Cat area by the 1st Infantry Division.

a) Establishment and upgrade of fire support bases and landing zones.

(1) General. Engineer effort in the establishment and upgrade of fire support bases and landing zones includes base construction, construction of tactical operation centers, stabilization of gun pads and interior roads, and assisting in the preparation of defensive personnel positions.

(2) Fire support bases and landing zones were established, or upgraded, at the following number of locations (by unit): 1st Cavalry Division (AT)-24; 1st Infantry Division-27; 25th Infantry Division-11; 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division-0; 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division-9; 159th Light Infantry Brigade-1; non-divisional engineers-Fire Support Bases Harper Ferry, Keene, Joy, Neagans, Buell, Crook, Elaine, Barbara and at support bases at Can Guoc, Thach Kien, Tan Truc, Ben Luoc, and Song Be.

b) Amphibious operations. The 20th Engineer Brigade provided boats, motors, and operators for the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) for amphibious operations on the Saigon River in the 1st Cavalry's area of responsibility.

c) Clearing road interdictions. During the reporting period, the following interdictions of II Field Force critical roads were cleared by divisional engineers backed up when necessary by non-divisional engineers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>ROAD BLOCKS</th>
<th>CRATERS</th>
<th>CULVERTS DAMAGED</th>
<th>BRIDGES DAMAGED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* One bridge, a Bailey bridge on Route QL 4 was damaged by an overloaded vehicle on 6 May 69.

(1) The Phu Long Bridge at Lai Thien was damaged by enemy action on 12 May 1969. An enemy sapper element dropped one span on the Saigon end of the bridge. A rapid response by the ARVN 30th Engineer Group, supported by the US 20th Engineer Brigade, in replacing an HMT6 float bridge at the site denied the enemy any tactical advantage he may have gained from damaging the bridge. A contract was let to Eiffel Asia to repair the bridge and increase the capacity from Class 20 to Class 35. Expected date of completion of the project is 1 October 1969.

2. LOC construction.

a) The CY 1969 LOC paving program for III CTZ continued to progress. The 20th Engineer Brigade completed the following positions of its paving program during the quarter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ROUTE</th>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>PERCENT COMPLETED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>QL-122</td>
<td>Cu Chi</td>
<td>Tay Ninh</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QL-13</td>
<td>Phu Cuong</td>
<td>Lai Khe</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QL-20</td>
<td>JOT QL-1</td>
<td>Oia Kien</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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b Airfield construction. A C-7 capable airstrip was constructed at the Duc Hue Special Forces camp by the 20th Engineer Brigade. Prior to the opening of the airstrip on 6 June 1969, the camp relied on helicopter resupply.

c Airfield upgrade. An important part of the airfield program is the upgrade of heavily used fields. Cu Chi airfield was paved with asphaltic concrete, providing an all-weather C-130 capable strip.aving operations were started at Tay Ninh West. The airfields at Bu Dop and Long Xanh were also upgraded.

d Continuous maintenance of airfields is particularly important, especially on fields with laterite surfaces. The airfields at Lai Khe, Katum, Loc Ninh, Bunan, Song Be, Tonle Cham, Quan Loi, and Xuan Loc were worked on by the 20th Engineer Brigade under this continuous program.

e The importance of secondary roads to both the military and pacification efforts has been realized and a program of opening these roads has been initiated. To date, the following amounts of secondary road have been opened to both civilian and military traffic under the program by both US and ARVN engineers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>KILOMETERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Long An</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tay Ninh</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binh Duong</td>
<td>96.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hau Nghia</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gia Dinh</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Plans are being made during the current wet season to open additional roads during the coming dry season. This is a joint effort between the US and ARVN engineers and the various province public works departments.

1 Bridge Protection.

b Thirty-two bridges in the III Corps area have been designated as critical to military operations as well as the civilian economy. A program was initiated to provide pier protection and security lighting on these bridges. Through the combined efforts of US and ARVN engineers as well as a civilian contractor, the following progress has been made:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>COMPLETE</th>
<th>IN PROGRESS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pier Protection</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Lighting</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Four bridges do not have piers.
** Work will start on permanent security lighting at the Phu Long Bridge when repairs to the bridge are completed on or about 1 October 1969.

The pier protection systems are built in two general designs, a cage and a floating collar. Both designs provide a standoff from the piers to prevent a sapper from gaining access to the pier itself. The cage type extends above and below the water level and provides a platform for guards.
to observe the area as well as the water. The floating collar is, as the term implies, a collar surrounding the pier that actually floats on the surface. A combination of chain link fence and concertina wire are suspended from this collar. A guard is stationed on the collar to provide security. This position at water level enables him to observe the water as well as the surrounding area.

(b) Status of primary land line of communication.

1 For the purpose of this report, the following terms concerning the condition of land lines of communication are defined:

A. Condition I: The route is capable of carrying up to Class 57 (all division loads).

b. Condition II: Up to Class 35 loads (the majority of logistical transport, e.g. 5,000 gallon fuel tankers).

C. Condition III: Up to Class 16 loads (armored personnel carriers and 2 1/2 ton trucks).

d. Condition IV: Can carry only light civilian traffic.

e. Condition V: Closed to all traffic.

2 Route QL-1.

a Cambodian border (XT284244) to Go Dau Ha (XT383250), Condition I.
b Go Dau Ha (XT383250) to Cu Chi (XT628126), Condition I.
c Cu Chi (XT628126) to Saigon (XS793942), Condition I.
d Saigon (XS793942) to JCT 316 (YT072130), Condition I.
e JCT 316 (YT072130) to Xuan Loc (YT456080), Condition I.

3 Route QL-2.

a JCT QL-1 (XS845914) to Ben Luc (XS618758), Condition I.
b Ben Luc (XS618758) to IV CTZ Boundary (XS599600), Condition III.

4 Route QL-13.

a JCT QL-1 (XS799771) to Phu Cuong (XT810148), Condition III.
b Phu Cuong (XT810148) to An Loo (XT755885), Condition I.
c An Loo (XT755885) to Cambodian border, Condition IV.

5 Route QL-14.

a Dong Xoai (XT799759) to JCT Highway 511 (YT289977), Condition I.
b JCT Highway 511 (YT289977) to II-III CTZ boundary (YT588175), Condition V.
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   a. Bien Hoa (YT02114) to Baria (Y8380607), Condition I.
   b. Baria (Y8380607) to Vung Tau (YS274444), Condition III.

7. Route QL-20. JCT QL-1 (TT343301) to II-III CTZ boundary (TT763572), Condition III.

8. Route QL-22. Go Dau Ha (XT384251) to Tay Ninh (XT199950), Condition I.

9. Route LTL-16. Bien Hoa (YT02114) to JCT LTL-1A, Condition II.

10. Route LTL-1A.
    a. Dong Xoai (YT079759) to Huoc Vinh (XT975491), Condition I.
    b. Huoc Vinh (XT975491) to JCT QL-13 (XT012140), Condition I.

11. Route LTL-2. JCT QL-1 (TT473045) to Baria (Y8380607), Condition III.

12. Route LTL-5A.
    a. Saigon (XS818690) to Ong Thin Bridge (XS615775), Condition I.
    b. Ong Thin Bridge (XS815775) to Can Giuoc (XS830731), Condition II.
    c. Can Giuoc (XS830731) to Can Ho Ferry, Condition IV.

13. Route LTL-23.
    a. Baria (Y8380607) to YS628653, Condition II.
    b. YS628653 to Can Tho (XS021809), Condition V.

14. Route TL 9A. JCT QL 1 (XT739003) to Duc Hoa (XS98966), Condition II.

15. Route LTL 26 and Route 239, Tay Ninh (XT259950) to Dau Tieng (XT490460), Condition I.

16. LTL-19. Trang Bang (XT488194) to JCT LTL-26 (XT457354), Condition I.

f. Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs.

(1) Psychological Operations. The II FFORCEV psychological operations program directed against Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army personnel, as well as civilians under the influence of the Viet Cong, continued during the reporting quarter. Over 60 million leaflets were disseminated by Army and Air Force aircraft. More than 3,500 psychological warfare sorties were flown and 8,500 aerial loudspeaker hours were broadcast in support of tactical operations. The period was highlighted by two new psychological campaigns. Operation Explorer directed at the internal weaknesses of specific enemy units, and Operation Family Tree which was directed at the headquarters of enemy units at all levels to exploit inconsistencies in enemy subordinate unit reporting.

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(2) Civil Affairs and Military Civic Action.

(a) During this quarter continuing emphasis was placed on a closer working relationship with CORDS representatives at all echelons, local GVN officials, and RVNAF personnel. The effectiveness of the province-oriented civil affairs platoons as a coordination link between US/RVNAF units and the advisory staff continued to improve during the quarter.

(b) Additional emphasis was placed on the effective monitoring of civic action support within III CTZ. Monthly reports were received from all OPCON units of II FFORCO of their civic action support during the month. These reports enable this headquarters to get an overall picture of civic action support in III CTZ and thus improve planning and coordination.

(c) As an adjunct to the existing Community Relations Program, II FFORCO and III CTZ conducted the Third Quarterly Combined Civilian Orientation Conference (CCOC) aimed at middle echelon government officials, religious and educational leaders, and other opinion makers within III CTZ. The objective of this conference was to increase the degree of civilian support for GVN in achieving security and pacification within the RVN. The conference included a visit to the Command and Staff College, Military Academy, and POLWAR College in Dalat and was well received by attendees.

g. Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support.

(1) Revolutionary Development. The first phase of the 1969 pacification Campaign which ended on 30 June 1969 was marked by significant progress in all areas, with a record extension of government control. Progress during the period May through July indicates that sustained efforts have finally brought forth meaningful, identifiable results, with little interference from the enemy. Hamlet security status was greatly improved with 82 percent of the Central Pacification Development Council (CPDC) goal of 286 hamlets being met for the first semester. The unofficial figures for July show a continuing upward turn in secure population, with an estimated 3,061,000 people now living within GVN security. The Village Self Development (VSD) program has continued to show progress with 118 of the 402 villages in II Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) in the fifth phase of the six implementation phases. Local government has shown improvement with more than 360 village/hamlet chiefs graduating from the second training course conducted at the National Training Center in Vung Tau. Over 90 percent of the villages, and in excess of 84 percent of the hamlets in III CTZ have elected officials.

(2) Territorial Security. During the reporting period, the Regional/Popular Force (RF/PF) showed an increased ability to provide territorial security in the III Corps Tactical Zone. Except for the attacks during the Summer Offensive in May and June, the level of enemy activity decreased considerably. Despite the relative lull in enemy activity, the RF/PF inflicted heavier personnel and equipment losses on the enemy than during the previous period. RF/PF improvement can be attributed to the increased awareness by Vietnamese leaders of the importance of RF/PF, and to the increase in fire power, numbers, training, and improved communications. Fire power and communications improvements have been achieved through the Equipment Modernization Program, which has enhanced RF/PF morale and operational effectiveness.
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(3) Refugee Program.

(a) During the reporting period excellent progress was achieved toward resettlement goals. The number resettled during the period was 33,600. The first semester (February - June 1969) goal for resettlement was surpassed by some 3,000. With better performance being achieved by Social Welfare and Relief Services (SWR) and funds being made available, it is anticipated that the year-end goal will be reached early.

(b) Emergency relief to war victims was prompt and effective during the period. Presently, all benefits have been paid to the 2,260 war victims in Long An, and reconstruction is complete. In Tay Ninh, 90 percent of all benefits have been paid, with reconstruction 75 percent complete. The GVN is showing an increased ability to provide prompt assistance to war victims, and in so doing, creating a more favorable image.

(4) Chieu Hoi.

(a) During the reporting period the Chieu Hoi program was credited with 1,821 ralliers. This is a 28 percent increase from the previous quarter (1,424). In May there were 607 ralliers, in June 470, and in July there were 744. July's total is the highest number of Hoi Chanh since March 1967 (912). In February, March, and April, 995 (70 percent) of the total ralliers (1,424) were credited to the Third Party Inducement Program. Of the number who rallied in the past quarter (May - July), 1,254 (70 percent) of the total of 1,821 were once again attributed to the cash awards program.

(b) The lull in enemy activity and his inability to date to achieve a decisive victory has created a psychological climate which prompted defections. Other factors which have influenced the upward trend in Hoi Chanh during the quarter were the military pressures brought to bear by FMRAF and the Vietnamese military and para-military forces, the impact of the intensified pyops effort, and the declining influence of Viet Cong propaganda. Many of the Hoi Chanh have reported fear and hardship as the major reason for their defection. Others say that they have become disenchanted with the Viet Cong's promise of victory and a better way of life.

(5) New Life Development.

(a) During the reporting period activities have centered on the preparation and submission of Program Support Requirements for the 1970/71 time frame. Other significant items are:

1. The 1969 Village Self Development Program continues to show progress. Results to date from this program, which is being used as a tool to teach people to participate in their government, suggest that one of the prime objectives of building a link between the people and their government is moving forward.

2. The GVN has placed increased emphasis on land reform and has determined that all expropriated and former French lands will be distributed by 31 October 1969. In the interim, a "Land to the Tiller" program is being developed which envisions the distribution of one million hectares throughout Vietnam. A third program being studied deals with the issuance of land titles to Montagnards.

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On 28 May 1969, staff responsibility for "Provincial and Lesser Roads and Bridges Program" was transferred from MACORDS to Military Assistance Command, Director of Construction (MACDC). MACDC has previously had only the advisory effort on the National and Inter-provincial Highway Network.

The Agricultural Development Bank has made it possible for farmers having one hectare or less to receive loans merely by securing the certification of the Provincial Agricultural Service Chief that they are growing IR-8/5 rice.

**Communications.** Significant changes in communications in support of II Field Force Vietnam operations during the reporting period are outlined below:

1. During the early part of May 1969, a team of pole linemen from the 53d Signal Battalion (Corps), under the supervision of the Signal Office, identified and recorded the WD-1 wire line, spiral-4 cable, and 26 pair cable in the command area. More than two miles of unused WD-1 wire and several hundred feet of spiral-4 and 26 pair cable were removed from the surrounding telephone poles and buildings. As a result of this project, the appearance of the command area was improved, existing wiring was simplified, and an accurate diagram of the command area wiring was recorded for use in future planning.

2. On 17 May, the new 1000 line dial telephone exchange at Plantation became operational. The new exchange replaced the tactical 600 line dial exchange. With the additional capacity, all subscribers on the manual switchboard (Redcatcher), serving the 199th Light Infantry Brigade (Rear) base camp, were placed on the new dial exchange. The Redcatcher switchboard was released in mid-July for use elsewhere.

3. During mid-May, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment moved to Long Giao and reverted to the operational control (OPCON) of Headquarters, II FFORCEN. The 53d Signal Battalion (Corps) provided a 12-channel VHF radio-carrier system for tactical telephone and teletype communications from Headquarters, II FFORCEN to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. A tactical message center facility and a high frequency radio teletype station were also provided as supplemental communications means.

4. The 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (AM) moved its forward element to Bien Hoa Army Base in late May. The move necessitated the installation of a multi-pair communications cable from the Bien Hoa Army area frame to the 3d Brigade forward area. Subsequently, the forward element relocated to Long Giao and existing circuits were extended to that location through the Corps Area Communications System (CACS). The 53d Signal Battalion (Corps) temporarily provided three circuits between the Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (AM), Phuoc Vinh and the 3d Brigade at Long Giao over existing tactical systems, for additional communications during the re-location.

5. In mid-June, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment moved from Long Giao to Quan Loi and the 199th Light Infantry Brigade moved its forward element into Long Giao. The 199th Light Infantry Brigade utilized the same 12-channel VHF radio-carrier system which had been provided to that location for the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. A high frequency radio teletype
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communications station was also provided for supplemental communications. the 199th light infantry brigade (pgd) also moved its narrowband auto-sevocom terminal. auto-sevocom circuit requirements were handled by the 1st signal brigade, after coordination with the signal section, ii fforscv.

(6) during june all ii fforscv temporary address indicating groups (aig) were converted to permanent designations and have been included in changes made to allied communications publication 100 us supp-2 ( ). the new designations permit inclusion of out-of-country addresses and will not require resubmittal each six months for renewal as is necessary for temporary aig's. ii fforscv is currently using only one temporary aig.

(7) macv determined that its high frequency radio teletype net was no longer necessary as a back up for the macv command center's primary teletype net. the ii fforscv station was deactivated on 23 june.

(8) a reevaluation of corps area communication system (cacs) circuits was conducted during the month of june and submitted to usarv c-e. units were required to justify all of their cacs circuits. as a result of the reevaluation, many redundant and inactive circuits were deactivated.

(9) new joint southeast asia ground tactical nestor keylists were issued to units in each of the four corps tactical zones (ctz) in rvn during june and became effective on 1 july. the keylist for iii ctz, akak-8161, replaced all existing keylists within this zone except the one utilized for the ii fforscv pk command net (secure). initially, it was not intended that macv advisors or special forces be integrated on implementation date; however, exception was requested from and granted by macv, allowing the iii ctz advisors to be included during the initial phase in. special forces elements were granted approval for integration on 31 july by headquarters, ii field force vietnam. usage of this joint southeast asia keylist provides significant improvement in the comparability of secure voice communications between adjacent units and simplifies command and control when elements of one unit are placed under operational control of another.

(10) the revised ar 105-31, message preparation and processing, dated february 1969 became effective on 1 july. the revised message forms, dd form 173 dated 1 july 1969 which is utilized in conjunction with ar 105-31, was distributed to all users in june. a message format guide, which condensed pertinent instructions in the revised regulation to enable releasers, draftsman, and clerical personnel to adopt the revised procedures with a smooth transition, was prepared by the ii fforscv signal office and distributed to all staff sections in june. transition to the new procedures was accomplished with minimal confusion and degradation in quality of message preparation.

(11) the tan son nhut tandem switch was activated in early july, giving plantation class a subscribers direct long distance dial capability throughout vietnam and thailand. plantation class c subscribers were also afforded a direct dial capability to long binh, bien hoa, and macv. as a result, the capabilities of the plantation network have been greatly enhanced.

(12) during july, a review was conducted of restoration priorities for defense communications system (dcs) circuits in support of ii fforscv and iii ctz. dcs circuits considered in the review were assigned restoration priorities of one and two. the review was conducted to insure the restoration program was functioning as intended. as a result of the review, several
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restoration priorities were altered to reflect present usage of circuits.

(13) On 14 July, a 12-channel VHF radio-carrier system was installed to provide lateral communications between Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division, Lai Khe and Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (AN), Phuoc Vinh. The communications equipment and personnel for both terminals were provided from 1st Infantry Division assets. The system contains several common user and dedicated telephone circuits.

(14) On 20 July, BHTAC experienced difficulty communicating with two OPCON units by FM radio. Through coordination by the Signal section, II FFORCEN, the BHTAC Signal officer and the 199th Light Infantry Brigade Signal officer, a FM retransmission station was established at the 199th Light Infantry Brigade (B) location and manned by personnel from BHTAC and 53d Signal Battalion (Corps). This station was operational for twelve days and insured high quality command control communications for BHTAC and its OPCON units.

(15) A reevaluation of AUTOSSVOCOM narrowband terminals under the control of CG, II FFORCEN/SA III CTZ was conducted during July. The reevaluation disclosed that two terminals, one already installed, were no longer required and could be released for reassignment.

(16) The teletype circuit from the II FFORCEN Main Communications Center to the 197th Light Infantry Brigade (B) Communications Center was deactivated on 25 July. The small amount of message traffic previously passed over this circuit is now sent to the 199th Light Infantry Brigade (FWD) Communications Center. This deactivation released terminal equipment for use in fulfilling other requirements.

(17) A review of II FFORCEN communications requirements indicated no further need for the II FFORCEN Command Net AM Single Sideband (Voice). The net was deactivated on 31 July and the radio equipment released for other uses.

(18) The Signal Office, II FFORCEN, coordinated communications matters concerning the phase-out of tactical communications in the 9th Infantry Division and the augmentation of signal assets to support the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. The 3d Brigade is being organized under the Light Infantry Brigade concept and is under the operational control of the 25th Infantry Division. As the 9th Division Signal Battalion prepared its equipment and personnel to stand down for redeployment, the 1st Signal Brigade assumed responsibility for certain communications support in the 9th Infantry Division area. Signal personnel and equipment support for the 3d Brigade was coordinated with USARP, 25th Infantry Division, 9th Infantry Division, and the 3d Brigade. The following support will be provided to the 3d Brigade:

(a) A new AB-216 communications tower has been approved and is planned for construction at Tan An by the 1st Signal Brigade.

(b) Transfer of two (2) AN/MRC-69 Radio Terminals Sets and related equipment to the 25th Infantry Division has been approved. This equipment will be utilized to establish a 12-channel communications system from the 25th Infantry Division Headquarters at Cu Chi to the 3d Brigade at Tan An.
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(c) Establishment of a 1-channel VHF system between the 5th Brigade base camp and their elements at Tan An airfield by the 1st Signal Brigade.

(d) Four additional AN/MRC-69 radio terminal sets and twelve additional radio relay operators have been approved for the 5th Brigade over and above those currently authorized. The equipment and personnel will be allocated to the 3rd Signal Battalion (11 FFORDC7) and further assigned to the 3rd Brigade for establishment of required internal communications.

I. Information.

(1) During the reporting period, "The Hurricane" continued to emphasize the pacification, nation-building, and other CORE activities of II Field Force. The magazine issues for May, June, and July contained 27 feature articles; 7 emphasized the subjects concerning CORE, while seven stories spotlighted specialized US Army units in the III CTZ. Improvements in the ARVN, RF, and IF was covered in two articles and unique locations or subjects were featured in two others. The B-52 bomber program and New Zealand soldiers were also highlighted.

(2) Production in the Radio/TV section continued to increase with the assignment of two new personnel. Additionally, television production was resumed during the last month of the quarter and three filmed features were produced. Radio feature work also rose to a high of 23 radio productions released. The hometown taped interview output for the quarter rose to 92.

(3) The Public Information section similarly increased its output to a new high of 153 stories released to all news media. Hometown news releases forwarded by the section totalled 163.

(4) Civilian news media relations were considerably enhanced during the reporting period. At the direction of the Commanding General, the Information Office inaugurated a bi-monthly, regularly scheduled press up-date briefing. Held on the second and fourth Mondays of each month, the conference features a G2, O3, and CORES up-date briefing on the III CTZ situation. The briefings are conducted by the regular G2, O3, CORES briefers and have been received extremely well by the press. Attending the May, June, and July briefings were 177 press representatives. Also during the same period 15 newsmen interviewed the Commanding General on subjects ranging from the current tactical situation to his personal experiences in World War II. Two of the interviews were filmed for television by CBS and NBC.

J. Inspector General. During the reporting period the Inspector General completed one inspection and conducted five investigations/inquiries.

k. Staff Judge Advocate.

(1) During the reporting period personnel of the Staff Judge Advocate's section continued to visit units in the field to provide legal assistance and guidance in the handling of military justice matters. Although this section lost the two enlisted lawyers to reassignment, it gained a JAGC Captain on 4 May and a 1st Lieutenant non-JAGC lawyer on 14 July, and the quality and quantity of legal assistance and military justice services rendered continued to show substantial improvement. In preparation of implementation of the Military Justice Act of 1968, which becomes effective on 1 August 1969, Change 2, II FFORDC7 Regulation 27-2, was published to

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consolidate special court-martial jurisdiction at brigade, group, and regimental level. Detailed instructions implementing the Military Justice Act of 1968 were also published and distributed to the field.

(2) The staff judge advocate verified the classification by the 219th Military Intelligence Detachment of a number of detainees as to their status as civil defendants or prisoners of war.

(3) Two general courts-martial were conducted for such offenses as involuntary manslaughter, causing a false alarm in the presence of the enemy by detonating two hand grenades, and detonating two hand grenades under such circumstances as to endanger human life.

(4) The office of the staff judge advocate continued to provide legal support for post, camp, and station functions.

(5) During the second quarter of 1969, claims processing has remained at a rather high level. Claims incident to service (AR27-29) increased both in the number of claims paid and the total amount paid. Claims on hand and claims being forwarded through channels to this office show a slight decline which indicates a possible decline in claims paid for the next quarterly report. Foreign claims (AR27-28) increased slightly over the preceding quarter. The foreign claims are being investigated by unit claims officers and returned to this office well within the USAF Foreign Claims Division’s suspense date. This reflects better organization at the unit level and a closer liaison between the units and the office of the staff judge advocate.

2. (c) Section II, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel.

(1) Performance of GVN during emergencies.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the attacks on Long An and Tay Ninh, GVN personnel performed with exceptional competence in providing emergency aid and reconstruction assistance.

(b) EVALUATION: The competence displayed here adds favorably to the image and performance of the GVN. It is a bright spot in recent pacification efforts.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That this be used as an example in showing the GVN’s increasing ability to grab hold of a situation where immediate action is needed and perform competently with relatively little US assistance.

(2) Need for additional Community Development Assistants.

(a) OBSERVATION: For adequate advisory assistance in each province and to further Vietnamese the operation, a minimum of one Community Development assistant (Vietnamese) per district is required.

(b) EVALUATION: With increased emphasis being placed at the village level, it is difficult, and frequently impossible, for present staffing to adequately advise and monitor the Village Self Development Program.
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(c) RECOMMENDATION: Increase the Community Development Assistant authorized strength to allow the employment of one per district.

I. Operations.

(1) Ambush Patrol Ambushed.

(a) OBSERVATION: Security and communications are vitally necessary in moving troops at night.

(b) EVALUATION: The leader of a Mobile Advisory Team along with the team medic departed an RF company outpost to set up a night ambush some 2,000 meters from the outpost. After the patrol had occupied its intended position, lights were observed in the vicinity of a newly constructed but unoccupied outpost. The MAT leader decided to move the ambush position to better observe the lights. He persuaded the Vietnamese to move the patrol onto the road which is the main thoroughfare in the area. The patrol did not notify the company outpost of its decision to move nor did it notify another friendly ambush patrol in the area. The patrol moved down the road without either point or flank security and without proper dispersion. The VC heard the patrol coming and quickly set up ambushes which they activated at 2130 hours. Using small arms, grenades, and B40 rockets the VC killed or wounded the entire patrol with the first few volleys. The results of the action were eight RF killed, one US advisor killed (MAT leader), six RF wounded and one US advisor wounded. The patrol lost ten M16 rifles, two M479 grenade launchers, one pistol, and two radios. The other friendly patrol could not assist the beleaguered patrol because it did not know about the change in positions and could not determine what was happening. After three hours the RF company, whose commander still did not know what had happened, moved from its outpost in two elements to investigate the firing and to assist any friendly troops in the area. Both elements made contact with the VC as the enemy was withdrawing from its position. The next morning the patrol survivors were recovered.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That this incident be used for instruction at the USARV In-Country Advisors School.

(2) FP Patrol Ambushed.

(a) OBSERVATION: The enemy will take advantage of non-varying operational procedures.

(b) EVALUATION: At 2000 hours on 15 May 1969 an estimated VC company entered Quan Tre Hamlet in Long Thanh District, Bien Hoa Province and set up a "V"-shaped ambush along Highway 15 for the purpose of ambushing the Long An Village FP platoon which was patrolling along the road near the hamlet. Local villagers witnessed the VC preparations, but did not give any warning to local authorities for fear of reprisal by the VC. At 2030 hours the PF entered the kill zone and took heavy casualties when the VC detonated a claymore mine. The PF lost seven killed, two wounded, six M16 rifles, one 45 caliber pistol, and one damaged radio. Two VC were killed and witnesses said that some wounded were carried away. An investigation disclosed that the PF were in the habit of following the same line of march during their nightly patrols and that they patrolled at about the same time every night. The PF rarely strayed from the main highway to cover suspected
or possible enemy locations. The VC in the area were well aware of the 1st MCRF's established pattern. There was a good VC intelligence network in the village which kept the enemy well informed of the 1st MCRF's movements in addition to keeping other inhabitants in constant fear of reprisal should they inform officials of VC activity. The 1st MCRF contributed to the effectiveness of the intelligence network by not changing their procedures.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all advisors urge counterparts to continually change patrol and ambush procedures in order to avoid establishing patterns.

(3) Critical Bridge Destroyed.

(a) OBSERVATION: Sappers will take advantage of decreased activity during rain storms to infiltrate.

(b) EVALUATION: At 0500 hours on 12 May 1969 the west span of the Phu Long Bridge at XT857048, Binh Duong Province was destroyed by an explosion set by an enemy sapper. It is believed that a sapper entered the river to the north of the bridge and floated downstream to the bridge piers. Using a nylon cord, remnants of which were found later, he attached an estimated 100 pounds of explosives to the pier standoff. He proceeded downstream with the detonating wire and left the river about 100 meters from the bridge, from where he apparently detonated the charge. The detonating wire was found after the explosion. The Phu Long Bridge was considered one of the critical bridges in III CTZ and as such had an RF Company assigned for security. Mobile Advisory Team III-3 was also assigned to advise the RF on their security mission. The RF had one 13-foot fiberglass boat normally powered by an outboard motor. On the night of the 12th, however, the motor was not working and the crewmen were using oars. During most of the night until shortly before the explosion there had been heavy rainfall. During the rainfall the boat was not used to inspect the piers and to petrol the river in the area of the bridge. Also, during this period the guards on the bridge had withdrawn to their bunkers in order to avoid the rain. In the opinion of the investigating officer, these guards were not attentive while in the bunkers and the sapper was able to make his way to the bridge without detection.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That advisors be instructed to advise counterparts on the importance of maintaining normal security activity during periods of rainfall and reduced visibility.

(4) Defoliation.

(a) OBSERVATION: Damage claims resulting from defoliation missions continue to be submitted.

(b) EVALUATION: Many claims are unfounded and should be investigated by technical specialists. Neither USAID or CORDS III CTZ have the capability to do this.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: A joint US/GVN team of experienced military chemical officers should be organised to investigate defoliation claims and to train responsible provincial officials to recognize defoliation damage.
(5) Protein Production.

(a) OBSERVATION: There is an increasing interest in growing feed grains both as a second crop on paddy land and on upland soils.

(b) EVALUATION: Feed grains can and should be locally grown to substitute for imported corn.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Sorghum production should be stressed and varietal trials initiated on irrigated and upland soils.

(6) Food Commodity Consumption.

(a) OBSERVATION: Bulgur distributed as a PL 480 food for human consumption is regularly diverted to use as animal feed because Vietnamese consider it unpalatable.

(b) EVALUATION: Repeated efforts to educate the Vietnamese people on the dietary advantages of including bulgur in their diets have failed. Indications are that nothing short of a major famine will induce Vietnamese to eat bulgur.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Since there is a need for sustaining gains and for continued expansion of markets for US agricultural products and for generating piaster assets to support mission operations, economic development, or other US interests, bulgur should continue to be imported, although its distribution as animal feed should be legalized.

(7) Use of Floating Boundaries.

(a) OBSERVATION: The use of floating boundaries should be considered so as to deny the enemy the advantage of fixed boundaries.

(b) EVALUATION: Traditionally, the enemy has taken advantage of fixed friendly boundaries both military and political. This has been particularly evident in his methods of infiltration and movement of supplies and equipment. Typical examples of boundaries that the enemy has exploited are:

1. The boundary between Binh Long Province and Tay Kinh Province from the Cambodian border (Fishhook) toward Hochiminh and along the Saigon River.

2. The boundary between the 25th ARVN Division and the 5th ARVN Division.

3. The IV Corps/III Corps boundary out of the Parrot's Beak north and south.

4. The boundary between the 25th Infantry Division and the 1st Infantry Division.

5. The boundary between the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division and the 25th Infantry Division from the Parrot's Beak through Pineapple.

6. The boundary out of the Hat Dich and north to Route 1 involving the 199th Infantry Brigade, RTAVF, and 1st ATF. In order to frustrate the enemy's habitual use of existing boundaries, "floating" boundaries with predesignated AO's should be established between units which would permit and encourage
friendly units to operate across long-standing political and military boundaries. "Floating" boundaries can be established by a system wherein adjacent units predetermine a series of AO's along the entire length of their mutual boundary or boundaries. Any AO or series of AO's can then be easily obtained by direct coordination. In essence, the "floating" boundary is a series of predesignated AO's, mutually agreed upon by all concerned, obtainable on short notice, which will facilitate rapid cross boundary operations.

(a) RECOMMENDATION: That all units consider establishing floating boundaries and predesignated AO's in coordination with adjacent ARVN, US, and SVNAP units in order to deny the enemy any advantage.

(b) Employment of the Detector, Concealed Personnel, Aircraft Mounted, AN/PSN-1 (People Sniffer).

(a) OBSERVATION: One of the better personnel detection devices developed is the AN/PSN-1 "People Sniffer." However, followup of detected targets must be considered.

(b) EVALUATION: Although the instrument is not foolproof, with proper training and experience a crew can detect indications of personnel on the ground. When the AN/PSN-1 detector locates an area which provides high intensity readings, additional followup should be conducted to determine if an enemy force is, in fact, present in the area. The followup may be by low level visual reconnaissance, visual reconnaissance combined with an E-158 CS drop, insertion of aerial rifle Platoons, or other small reconnaissance forces. Another effective technique is the employment of detector aircraft with armed helicopters in hunter-killer teams, with standby reaction forces prepared to pile on. If a target appears lucrative and no followup is available, it can be engaged by artillery fire. While it is desirable that promising targets be followed up, it is still the commander's responsibility to determine whether the target acquired by the detector or other significant targets receive priority of effort.

(a) RECOMMENDATION: That the above techniques be considered after the location of a target by a detector instrument.

(9) Fire Support Base Construction and Development.

(a) OBSERVATION: The construction and development of fire support bases must be planned well in advance to include the close out phase.

(b) EVALUATION: The development of a fire support base can be viewed as having six interdependent phases.

1. These phases are:
   a. Planning.
   b. Combat assault and initial clearing.
   c. Immediate tactical construction.
   d. Final defensive structure.
   e. Rehabilitation and upgrade.

1. Close out.

2. The planning sequence is as follows:
   a. Determine user requirements - infantry, artillery, and engineer representatives coordinate on what facilities are to be incorporated into the fire support base.
   b. Determine construction priorities - these are also agreed upon after coordination among the infantry, artillery, and engineer representatives. The following priority can be used:
      1. Temporary logistical pad.
      2. 105mm howitzer positions.
      3. Perimeter berm.
      4. Artillery FDC.
      5. Infantry TOC.
      6. Ammunition supply point.
      7. VIP pad.
      10. 155mm howitzer positions (if applicable).

   Items 1 through 10 are not mutually exclusive. With proper organization and management of assets, many of the tasks proceed simultaneously.

   c. Develop site plan - once the construction priorities have been established, a site plan is developed based on knowledge of the terrain, weather, and enemy. Aerial reconnaissance and aerial photography play a big part in the development of the site plan.

   d. Determine equipment, material, and troop requirements - at this point, the tactical commander is relieved of further construction planning responsibility. The brigade engineer determines requirements and obtains approvals and material releases through brigade channels. In the case of engineer equipment, requests are sent directly to the engineer battalion.

   e. Schedule lifts and construction effort - tactical troop and logistical lifts are arranged by the tactical commander. Lifts of engineer equipment are coordinated by the brigade engineer through brigade channels. Construction effort is scheduled by the engineer unit commander.

   f. Combat assault and initial clearing. Engineers accompany the infantry on the combat assault. If the area is so heavily forested or overgrown that
4 Immediate tactical construction. The first engineer equipment brought into a landing zone is one or two Case 450 bulldozers, a light tractor which is hauled by the Flying Crane. The 450's are used to clear fields of fire, small trees, and to clear and level artillery gun positions. Next equipment in is the International Harvester 3414 backhoe, carried externally by the CH-47. The backhoe digs emplacements for the TOC, FDC, medical bunker, and perimeter bunkers. The third type of equipment utilized is the Caterpillar D6B bulldozer. Because of its weight, the D6B is split into two loads. The tracks and blade are carried by a Chinook, while the body constitutes a Flying Crane load. The douser is assembled on the ground, an operation which takes 30 - 90 minutes depending on the crane pilot's placement of the D6B body. Ideally the body is set down right on the tracks. As soon as the situation permits, the D6B's and 450's begin work on the perimeter berm, while infantry and artillery troops, with engineer technical advice, begin work on wire entanglements and perimeter bunker construction. The tactical commander has the option of constructing "quick-fix" bunkers which can later be upgraded or constructing the standard perimeter bunker right away.

5 Final defensive structures. As early as possible, work begins on the TOC, FDC, medical bunker, etc. This is dependent on delivery of the "Firebase Kit", a standard package of lumber and other materials, which is delivered by Chinookes. The goal is to have overhead cover for the TOC and FDC along with "quick fix" bunkers by the end of the first day. Work is continued on the wire entanglements to include tanglefoot and channelizing wire as desired by the tactical commander. Also during this phase, infantry and artillery troops, with engineer technical advice, construct individual sleeping positions out of sandbagged 60" or 72" half culvert sections. As structures are completed, the engineer equipment and troops begin phasing out in order to prepare for other employment. Some engineers normally remain behind, along with one or two pieces of equipment to expand fields of fire and develop surface drainage. Within 72-96 hours after insertion, the fire base is essentially complete.

6 Rehabilitation and upgrade. Engineer troops and equipment remain on a fire base as priorities permit. They work in upgrading the fire base with respect to drainage, rehabilitation of damaged or improperly constructed facilities, and constant inspection of all facilities to ensure their continued structural safety. Surveying teams are available to prepare topographic maps of the base to assist the commander in maintaining good surface drainage. On long term fire bases, equipment is returned to the area to reclear fields of fire, improve drainage, and do repair work as required.

7 Close out. When the decision has been made to close out a fire base, the brigade engineer provides troops and equipment as necessary to assist in the dismantling of the fire base. Structures are disassembled in such a way as to salvage the maximum amount of material, especially timbers, culvert, M8A1 matting, and chain-link-fence. This is done not only to deny the use of the materials to the enemy, but to reconstitute fire base kits.
are filled and berms levelled as desired by the tactical commander. Ordinarily, one combat engineer platoon and one rifle company dismantle a fire support base.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the above be considered in construction and development of fire support bases.

(10) Use of aerial rocket artillery.

(a) OBSERVATION: Aerial rocket artillery has been very successful in extending the range of organic division artillery. However, in the use of aerial rocket artillery, certain factors must be considered in order to preclude the occurrence of accidents.

(b) EVALUATION: When using aerial rocket artillery, the following factors should be considered:

1 Direction of attack. Aerial rocket artillery employs an area weapons system but strives continuously to deliver precision fire. Since the dispersion pattern of the system is greater in range than in deflection, flanking or enfilading fire is used whenever possible. Consequently, ARA sections attack the target in a direction parallel to the friendly lines if at all possible in order to provide the closest possible fire support. The direction of attack is specified by the controller (observer); however, the ARA section leader may question the direction if he feels a safer or more effective direction of attack is possible. In cases in which a conflict of opinion arises, the direction of attack must be acceptable to the supported commander. Other considerations in selecting the direction of attack are:

a Tube artillery gun-target line. If ARA and tube artillery are engaging targets in the same general area, a direction of attack must be selected that will not conflict with the gun target line.

b ARA and fighter attacks within the same general area are preferably made on parallel or near parallel courses. The targets should be separated by at least 750 meters. When attacking targets separated by less than 1000 meters fighters and ARA should make alternating attacks. Beyond 1000 meters, simultaneous attacks are possible. Targets attacked during darkness should be separated by 4000 meters and must be alternately attacked.

c Due to the vulnerability of helicopters, a direction of attack should be selected which avoids over flight of anti-aircraft positions.

2 Friendly locations. The artillery observer (FO or LNO) will cause all friendly positions to be marked with smoke, panels, flares, or strobe lights. If friendly dispositions are other than linear, care must be exercised to fully describe dispositions and specifically identify the most forward elements. If visual marking devices are not available, a clearly recognizable geographical feature such as a road, canal, or well defined tree line may be used (e.g. "all friendly troops are east of the road" or "all friendly troops are along the tree line to the north"). Friendly locations will be remarked prior to each pass to preclude the possibility of misorientation. This is particularly necessary in heavily forested areas where no prominent terrain features exist. If strobe lights are used to mark friendly positions at night, they must be left on long enough to preclude possible misidentification as enemy mortar or small arms fire.
Target identification. The artillery observer will identify target by polar plot from the friendly locations. Direction will be given in degrees from magnetic north and distance will be stated in meters. To further aid target identification, clearly identifiable terrain features may be used.

Adjustment of fire. ARA will normally be adjusted from the gun-target line. Other lines of adjustment may be utilized when mutually agreeable to the observer and the ARA section leader. Normally, on the initial firing run only one pair of rockets will be fired for marking purposes. The observer will adjust as necessary to bring the rounds on target. The wing ship will fire the initial correction. If the adjustment is less than 100 meters, the wing ship will fire for effect. If more than 100 meters, additional marking pairs will be fired until within 100 meters of the target.

Troop safety considerations.

a. General. Minimum safe distances (MSD) for troop safety are based on a combination of system dispersion and fragmentation effects. Since the greatest dispersion is in range, closer fire support can be provided if the direction of attack is parallel to friendly lines. When the situation dictates a direction of attack other than parallel to friendly deployments, MSD's must be increased due to the range dispersion of the system. The decision to employ aerial artillery fires closer than the MSD's prescribed rests with the maneuver element commander. However, he must realize that he is exposing his troops to the possibility of accidental injury. When the distance between his troops and the target area is 200 meters or less, the maneuver element commander must warn his troops and insure they take appropriate protective measures.

b. Minimum safe distances. The MSD's reflected below are increased by 50 meters if the direction of attack is other than parallel to friendly troops.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDINANCE</th>
<th>FUSE</th>
<th>MSD (Troops prone and protected)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M151 (10 lb warhead HE)</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>50 meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XM229 (17 lb warhead HE)</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>100 meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M151 (10 lb warhead HE)</td>
<td>VT</td>
<td>150 meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XM229 (17 lb warhead HE)</td>
<td>VT</td>
<td>200 meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flechette</td>
<td>BD</td>
<td>600 meters *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>50 meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smoke</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>50 meters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This extreme MSD is based not on delivery error but rather on lack of data on which to predict lateral and range effects for varying methods of attack.

(a) RECOMMENDATION: That the above considerations be given attention when use of aerial rocket artillery is contemplated.

(2) Ammunition losses.

(a) OBSERVATION: Unit ammunition storage points frequently contain quantities in excess of basic loads and operational requirements.

(b) EVALUATION: During this quarter two unit ammunition storage points have been destroyed resulting in ammunition and material losses valued at over $700,000.00. One incident was caused by an enemy rocket attack and the other by an accidentally discharged flare. In both instances, the quantity of ammunition on hand was excessive.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The II Field Force program of inspections of Army Aircraft Logistic Areas (AALA) and unit ammunition storage points should be continued. Logistical and safety conferences should continue to emphasize minimum storage levels, safe storage procedures and preventive measures.

d. Training.

(1) Training of provincial and district officials.

(a) OBSERVATION: Province and district officials who have the responsibility for supervision of the Village Self Development (VSD) Program and for the in-province training of local officials do not have an adequate understanding of the program and its goals.

(b) EVALUATION: The VSD Program was started without adequate training for those exercising province and district responsibilities. The program progresses according to the degree of knowledge of the program and motivation toward the program of province and district officials.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Province and district officials responsible for supervising the VSD Program or for training of local officials should be required to attend the basic four-week Village/Hamlet officials orientation training course at the National Training Center at Vung Tau.

d. Intelligence - None.

e. Logistics.


(a) OBSERVATION: Critical deficiencies exist in A&DSL Company storage of ammunition.

(b) EVALUATION: In the early morning of 11 April 1969, the enemy launched a rocket attack against the Sector Headquarters and A&DSL Company of Tay Ninh Sector. Two rockets made direct hits on the A&DSL company supply room and detonated artillery rounds stored there. The resulting explosions destroyed most of the headquarters area and killed or wounded a number of troops who had been sleeping in the company area. Inspections conducted during the reporting period have disclosed critical deficiencies.
in the manner in which ammunition is stored at sector A&DSL compares in III CTZ. The major problem facing the company commanders is the lack of space to properly disperse the ammunition. In addition to the amount of ordnance sectors must store for assigned units, each is required to store a fifteen-day emergency reserve supply of 155mm and 105mm howitzer ammunition for other division and corps artillery units that could be deployed there at some future time. Each artillery unit carries two or three basic loads and has reserve loads in its own supply channels. Rarely do any of the units use the emergency reserve and then only to rotate the load. In some sectors the rounds have been stored for several years without rotation. The bulk and potential danger of 1,500 to 2,000 high explosive rounds present a storage problem to the A&DSL Companies. Several have eliminated the danger by removing the rounds to areas away from the other company facilities. Others have encountered difficulty in their removal attempts due to an inability to gain title to additional land, and the ones who are relocating the rounds have had to divert units to provide security for the new location.

(a) RECOMMENDATION: That province advisors continually monitor the ammunition storage procedures making optimum use of available space and materials, and that they acquaint higher headquarters of situations requiring changes they are unable to effect.

f. Organization. RD Cadre.

(a) OBSERVATION: Additional efficiency in the employment of the Revolutionary Development Cadre program in the 1964 Pacification Plan can be achieved if greater use is made of the concept of deploying the 30-man group as 8-man teams.

(b) EVALUATION: The basic consideration in the current 30-man RD Cadre Group organization is to enable simultaneous coverage of at least three hamlets within a village under a centrally located control group. This organization enables one group to make maximum use of its inherent resources. This concept of deployment is not being utilised in all areas at the present time for the following reasons:

1. Insufficient supporting forces in an area has resulted in the Cadre Groups being utilized in a security role.

2. Many groups have inadequate communication capabilities due to the shortage of HT-1 radios.

(c) RECOMMENDATION:

1. That more emphasis be placed on deploying the RD Cadre Groups in 8-man teams, especially in villages where the mission is to raise the hamlets from a "C" to an "A" or "B" category.

2. That adequate supporting forces be deployed with each Cadre Group to preclude the Cadre Group devoting a majority of its time and resources to self-security missions.

3. That priority should be given to the task of equipping each Cadre Group with the requisite number of HT-1 radios. The basic allocation of three radios per group is insufficient since the group has four components.

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9. Other: None

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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CG, USACSC - 1
CG, II FFV - 2
CG, USAAMS - 1
CG, USAMPH - 1
ACofS, G1 II FFV - 1
ACofS, G2 II FFV - 1
ACofS, G3 II FFV - 5
ACofS, G4 II FFV - 1
ACofS, G5 II FFV - 1
DEPORDS - 1
CDCLNO - 1
7th Hist Det - 5
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 24 OCT 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning "Performance of GVN during emergencies", section II, page 44, paragraph 2a(1); concur. Exploitation of GVN successes and their ability to cope with emergency situations is conducted by ARVN POLWAR units, the Vietnamese Information Service, and US PSYOP agencies supporting these Vietnamese organizations. In addition, these successes are covered in command information publications and the American public news media have given considerable coverage to GVN successes because of the emphasis on Vietnamization of the war.

   b. Reference item concerning "Ambush Patrol Ambushed"; "PF Patrol Ambushed"; and "Critical Bridge Destroyed", section II, pages 45 and 46, paragraphs 2b(1); 2b(2); and 2b(3) respectively; concur. These items have been provided to the USARV Advisor School for reference and possible use as combat examples.

   c. Reference item concerning "Employment of the Detector, Concealed Personnel, Aircraft Mounted, XM3 (People Sniffer)", section II, page 48, paragraph 2b(8); concur. The evaluation is generally the same as the follow-up or reaction planning outlined in USARV Pamphlet 525-2, Utilization and Employment of Personnel Detector. However, it is recommended that the reaction plan be considered prior to the actual "People Sniffer" mission. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

3. Several of the observations, evaluations and recommendations reported in the ORELL pertain directly to the advisory effort. These items, listed below, are concurred in by this headquarters. A copy of the ORELL with this headquarters' indorsement has been forwarded to Headquarters, MACV for information and action if appropriate.

   a. Defoliation; section II, page 46, paragraph 2b(4).

   b. Protein Production; section II, page 47, paragraph 2b(5).
AVHGC-DST (31 Jul 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for
Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSPOR-65 (R1) (W-DHO-TO-A) (U)

c. Food Commodity Consumption; section II, page 47, paragraph 2b(6).
d. Use of Floating Boundaries; section II, page 47, paragraph 2b(7).
e. Training of provincial and district officials; section II, page 53,
paragraph 2c(1).
f. Deficiencies in Administrative and Direct Support Logistics (A&DSL)
Company Ammunition Storage; section II, page 53, paragraph 2e(1).
g. RD Cadre; section II, page 54, paragraph 2f.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
HQ, II FFV
MACV

57
GPOP-DT (31 Jul 69) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, II Field Force Vietnam
   for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)
HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 19 NOV 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department
   of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. Short
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
### STATISTICAL SUMMARY

USAF C130/C123 "ORTIES"

1 MAY 69 - 31 JUL 69

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
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<th>E</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>247</td>
<td>1774</td>
<td>2039</td>
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</table>

TOTAL SHORT TONS: 13,258

TOTAL PASSENGERS: 25,311

Incl 3

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### STATISTICAL SUMMARY

**CLOSE AIR SUPPORT**

1 May - 31 July 1969

#### 1. (C) FAC-Controlled Air Sorties Flown by

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FAC</th>
<th>US TOTAL</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tr>
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<td>14,888</td>
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#### 2. (C) FAC Controlled Sorties in Support of NVAF

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<tr>
<td>FAC</td>
<td>2,652</td>
<td>6,444</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAC</td>
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#### 3. (C) FAC Controlled Sorties in Support of FACAF

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<tr>
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<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tr>
<td>FAC</td>
<td>8,198</td>
<td>8,663</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAC</td>
<td>65</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### 4. (C) Distribution of Sorties (FAC-Controlled) in Support Of

| FACAF   | 6,444    |       |
| 1st Inf Div | 1,911    | 6,444 |
| 1st Cav Div (AH) | 2,338 | 6,444 |
| 9th Inf Div | 6,77 | 6,444 |
| 6th Inf Div | 2,486 | 6,444 |
| FACAF | 296      |       |
| FACAF | 56       |       |
| FACAF | 425      |       |
| FACAF | 227      |       |
| FACAF | 348      |       |
| FACAF | 15       |       |
| FACAF | 6        |       |

#### 5. (C) FAC-Controlled (Combat Sky Spot) Missions in Support Of

| FACAF   | 146      |       |
| 1st Inf Div | 29      | 146    |
| 1st Cav Div (AH) | 63 | 146 |
| 9th Inf Div | 8 | 146 |
| 6th Inf Div | 69 | 146 |
| FACAF | 37      |       |
| FACAF | 43      |       |
| FACAF | 12      |       |
| FACAF | 427     |       |

#### 6. (C) Results

| FACAF | 795      |       |
| FACAF | 65       |       |
| FACAF | 2,196    |       |
| FACAF | 314      |       |
| FACAF | 70       |       |
| FACAF | 9        |       |

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**Inc 4**

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### AVIATION STATISTICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>HOURS</td>
<td>54,340</td>
<td>51,955</td>
<td>39,913</td>
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<td>TROOPS LIFTED</td>
<td>282,567</td>
<td>274,312</td>
<td>205,341</td>
<td>760,220</td>
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<td>TONS OF CARGO</td>
<td>30,655</td>
<td>28,375</td>
<td>25,213</td>
<td>84,223</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>JULY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HOURS</td>
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<td>7,827</td>
<td>8,203</td>
<td>25,628</td>
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<tr>
<td>TROOPS LIFTED</td>
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<td>2,357</td>
<td>2,808</td>
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<td>TONS OF CARGO</td>
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<td>121</td>
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#### PERSONNEL

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIVILIANS WIA</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>132</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIVILIANS KIA</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC KIA</td>
<td>828</td>
<td>684</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>1,795</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above statistics include all 12th Avn Gp (CBT) assets.

The reduction in hours flown, troops lifted, cargo hauled and VC KIA is directly related to the loss of 4 AHC's and 1 ASHC, transferred to IV Corps on 1 July 69. Flying time for these units is approximately 12,400 hours per month.
## Statistical Summary

**B-52 Bombing Missions (U)**

1 May - 31 Jul 69

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Strike</th>
<th>Short Range</th>
<th>Medium Range</th>
<th>Long Range</th>
<th>Precise</th>
<th>TL AMM</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Cav (Ad)</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td></td>
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<td>60</td>
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<td>II FEV</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>51</td>
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<td>III Corps</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th SFG</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>RTAF</td>
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<td>60</td>
<td>45</td>
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Incl 6

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# II Field Force Vietnam TR Os List

1 May 69 - 31 Jul 69

## OPCOM UNITS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Cav Div (AV)</td>
<td>26 Oct 68</td>
<td>PHUOC VNH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Inf Div</td>
<td>15 Mar 66</td>
<td>LAI KHE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Inf Div</td>
<td>22 Mar 66</td>
<td>GU CHI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNAC</td>
<td>4 Jun 68</td>
<td>SAIGON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bde, 9th Inf Div</td>
<td>26 Jul 69</td>
<td>TAN AN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bde, 82 Abn Div</td>
<td>3 Oct 68</td>
<td>SAIGON</td>
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<tr>
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## TENANT UNIT

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## ASSIGNED UNITS

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Incl 8
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, II Field Force Vietnam

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May 69 to 31 July 69.

CC, II Field Force Vietnam

Undated

N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310