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AUTHORITY

AGO ltr, 2 May 1975; AGO ltr, 2 May 1975

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AGDA (M) (12 Dec 69) FOR OT UT 693329

19 December 1969


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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, QUI NHON
APO 96238

AVCA QN-GO-H 19 August 1969


THRU: Commanding General
1st Logistical Command
ATTN: AVCA GO-O
APO 96384

Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-DST
APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief
United States Army Pacific
ATTN: GPOP-DT
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C., 20310

The Operational Report of this headquarters for the quarterly period ending 31 July is forwarded in accordance with Army Regulation 525-15, USARV Regulation 525-15 and 1st Logistical Command Regulation 525-15.

2 Incl
as
Incl 2 wd HQ, DA

ALBERT E. HUNTER
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

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693329
Inclosure

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Inclosure 1, Significant Enemy Activities  

Inclosure 2, Visitors to USASUPCOM, QN (Inc wd HQ, DA)  

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SECTION II, Lessons Learned

Personnel & Operations
Training, Intelligence and Logistics
Organization
Other

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SECTION I: Significant Activities

1. (FOUO) Throughout the 92 days of the reporting period, the United States Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, continued its logistical operations supporting combat units within the II Corps tactical zone. The command was subjected to a number of attacks as well as rail and highway interdictions, and experienced an appreciable amount of trouble with the petroleum pipeline through pilferage and enemy action, but at no time was the command's support capability seriously impaired.

2. (U) On 8 June, Brigadier General A. E. Hunter replaced BG D. H. Richards as commanding general of the Qui Nhon Support Command. At the change of command ceremony, BG Richards was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal and received decorations from the Vietnamese and Korean governments.

3. (C) Enemy activity during May, June, and July remained relatively light, although a sapper attack on the Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot (ABD) was attempted on 11 July. Damage was slight due to the immediate response of fire fighting crews and the failure of one of the satchel charges to detonate. This incident led to the employment of even more stringent security measures at the ABD than those which had been put into effect after the major enemy attacks there during the previous quarter. Among these new security measures was the employment of "duffle bag" sensor devices at the ABD, Tank Farm No 2, and the Vung Chua Mountain signal site.

4. (C) Other security improvements during the quarter included the approval of free fire zones for the areas surrounding the 86th Maintenance Battalion, the 184th Ordnance Battalion, the 81st Engineer Battalion, the Vung Chua Mountain Signal Site and the 394th Transportation Battalion. A 30 inch Xenon searchlight was put into commission on Ba Hoa Mountain on 15 June. Light beams from this powerful device are capable of illuminating large portions of the eastern slope of Vung Chua. Security construction projects were greatly aided by the employment of local nationals from the 387th Transportation Company to work on perimeter construction at critical installations, enabling security to be improved without drawing from US personnel resources needed to perform the logistical mission.

5. (C) Earlier in the quarter, on 12 May, an enemy mortar attack on the An Khe tank farm destroyed two 10,000 barrel fuel tanks, but this attack did not render as much damage as the enemy attacks on tank farms during the previous quarter.

6. (C) Enemy operations rendered the rail lines unservicable during most of the reporting period, necessitating the resupply of such areas as Tuy Hoa by sea and air. The supply route from Dak To to Ben Het was closed for 40 days in May and June, necessitating resupply by air. Ammunition was resupplied to Ben Het by convoy on 24 June despite an ambush en route. Night convoys continued to be suspended between 2200 and 0200 throughout the quarter. A more complete list of enemy activities is attached at inclosure 1.

7. (C) Pilferage of fuel from US pipelines reached major proportions during the quarter, with losses of approximately seven million gallons in the month of May alone. In an attempt to deter local nationals from pilfering fuel, water...
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was pumped through the line from Qui Nhơn to An Khe for 50 days. At the same time, sections of the pipeline, particularly those running through areas with high pilferage rates, were buried in an effort to make them less accessible to pilferers. While the An Khe line was pumping water, the pilferage rate on the line to Phú Cát increased and theft of the pipe itself became a significant problem as 707 sections of pipe were damaged or stolen during the quarter. In the last days of July, pumping of fuel to An Khe was resumed with the added security measure of a helicopter assigned to fly over the line on a daily basis to check for leaks and incidents of pilferage.

8. (C) While the An Khe pipeline was not in use, fuel was carried to An Khe by truck and pumped from there to Pleiku. The line to Pleiku, having a much lower pilferage rate than the line from Qui Nhơn to An Khe, was kept open throughout the quarter.

9. (C) The overall command consumption of POL during May, June and July totaled 62,210,500 gallons.

10. (C) A number of unit moves were coordinated by this Headquarters during the quarter. The most extensive was the move of the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment from Blackhawk (near Pleiku) to Phan Thiet. The unit departed by LST on 2, 3 and 4 June, after an extensive maintenance stand-down was conducted at the 86th Maintenance Battalion. Three other stand-downs were conducted at the same area during the quarter. Repair parts, technical advisors, a DS contact team and a supply team were on hand to assist these maintenance activities.

11. (C) Phase II of the Artillery Repair and Return (R&R) program was completed on 30 June. Phase III of the program began in July, with increased command emphasis from IFFV. The program combines repair operations with gun crew maintenance training.

12. (U) An extensive series of inventories was conducted at the various storage locations of the US Army Depot (USAD), Qui Nhơn. This has brought about an appreciable improvement in the accuracy of command stock records, enabling the support command to improve its response to supply needs.

13. (C) The office of the ACOFS, Transportation added a movements control center (MCC) to its structural organization. The total amount of cargo moved by the command during the quarter was 1,210,810 short tons. The bulk of this was transported by motor vehicles, although rail accounted for a substantial quantity, particularly in May and June before the most serious of the rail interdictions, and a substantial amount was moved by air despite the closing of Qui Nhơn airfield to all but very light aircraft due to runway repairs.

14. (U) Command strength remained relatively constant during the reporting period. The support command exceeded Department of the Army reenlistment objectives in all categories throughout the three months.

15. (C) No new significant problems were experienced in signal operations during the quarter. A secure voice communication terminal located in the operations office, ACOFS, SP&O was activated and progress was made toward the completion of the dial telephone exchange system. A direct teletype circuit was installed from the support command communications center to the 854th
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Transportation Company, in order to improve communications with the Vung Ro Bay installation.

16. (U) The Staff Judge Advocate's section was expanded during June and July, largely as a result of the new Uniform Code of Military Justice which calls for qualified military lawyers to act as counsel in special courts-martial. The US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon obtained general court-martial jurisdiction and the command's first courts-martial of this type were held in late July.

17. (U) The first half of the Qui Nhon cold storage warehouse was completed in June, allowing the command to release the refrigeration ship, SS Hibueras which had been rented from the United Fruit Company for nearly two years.

18. (U) The programs for improving and modernizing the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) continued to progress, receiving impetus from Project Switch.

19. (U) Civil Affairs operations continued throughout the quarter, with some complications through insufficient coordination between individual and unit civil affairs activities and the command civil affairs program. A significant and illustrative incident occurred in June when the residents of one small village, having seen the massive aid given a neighboring village which had been attacked by the Viet Cong, tore down their own hamlet and claimed that the damage was done by an enemy attack, in the hope of receiving US aid themselves.

2. (U) Key personnel gains and losses during the quarter are listed in Annex B (AGoFS Personnel).

3. (U) A list of Visitors to the Command is attached at inclosure 2.

4. (U) Organizational Chart, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon:
1. (U) The rates and averages for May 1969 through July 1969 for Army motor vehicle accidents and military injuries are now based on an expectancy rate (FY 69) of 7.9 per 1,000,000 miles of exposure and 35.3 injuries per 1,000,000 mandays.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>AMV</th>
<th>ACCIDENT RATE</th>
<th>PI</th>
<th>INJURIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8.82</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>60.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>9.10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>54.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9.03</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>41.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVERAGE</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.97</td>
<td></td>
<td>52.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. (U) The 1st Army Postal Unit processed mail and money orders as indicated below:

a. Incoming mail:
   (1) Pouches: 1,003
   (2) Sacks: 17,802
   (3) Outside pieces: 16,030
   (4) Average transit time: Air mail 5-6 days, MOM 5-6 days, SAM 5-6 days, Surface mail 30-45 days.

b. Outgoing Mail:
   (1) Pouches: 1,147
   (2) Sacks: 6,985
   (3) Outside pieces: 21,937

c. Money orders: There were 30,473 money orders sold during this period for a total value of $2,378,218.63.

3. (C) The command enlisted strength remained relatively constant during the reporting period, rising from 92.5% in May to 93.6% in July.

a. Command enlisted strength:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Enlisted Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>11,116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>11,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>11,695</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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b. Number of replacements received:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>965</td>
<td>1,284</td>
<td>1,585</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Number of casualty reports:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. E4 through E9 promotions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E4</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E4</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E5</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. Arrival and departure of senior enlisted personnel during the period:

ARRIVALS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E8-3</td>
<td>E9-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E8-6</td>
<td>E9-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E8-9</td>
<td>E9-3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DEPARTURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E8-12</td>
<td>E9-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E8-13</td>
<td>E9-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E8-9</td>
<td>E9-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. The command AWOL rate increased slightly in July, but the monthly average has not exceeded four percent. There was a total of 99 AWOL's from the command during the quarter.

g. Increased emphasis on the reenlistment program at every echelon of command resulted in the command exceeding the DA reenlistment objectives in all categories throughout the quarter.

h. Though command officer strength remained relatively constant during the reporting period, critical shortages continued to exist for Transportation Corps Captains (presently at 52.3% fill) and Majors (presently at 33% fill).

(1) Command Officer strength:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officers</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>692</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>634</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(2) Officer replacements received:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Officers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Grade</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company Grade</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officers</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Departure of key officer personnel:

**May**
- COL H. Tucker, CO, 45th GS Gp
- LTC P.J. Dolan, CO, 394th Trans Bn.
- LTC W.T. Duba, CO, Trp Cmd Hqs USAD
- LTC R.L. Farmer, XO, 8th Trans Gp
- LTC G.W. Miller, CO, Composite Svc Bn
- LTC R.M. Peach, Dep Comdr, 45th GS Gp
- LTC B.R. Pierce, ACoS, Svcs

**June**
- BG D.H. Richards, Commanding General
- LTC D.R. Werner, ACoS, SP&O
- LTC L.E. Wright, ACoS, Trans
- MAJ D.D. Cude, S-3 Off, 8th Trans Gp
- MAJ L.C. Gee, XO, 184th Ord Bn

**July**
- LTC B.H. Clearwaters, ACoS, R&D
- LTC R.L. Clise, CO, 240th QM Bn
- LTC C.F. Langley, XO, USAD
- LTC F.X. O'Conner, Chaplain 45th GS Gp
- LTC R.V. Crowson, Chief of Staff

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Arrivals of key officer personnel:

May

COL J.F. Dannington, CO, 45th GS Gp
COL W.D. Wary, CO, 593d GS Gp
LTC J.R. Heck, ACofS, Trans

June

BG A.E. Hunter, Commanding General
LTC J.C. Kramer, CO, 124th Trans Bn
LTC C.T. Kuehn, Dep Staff Chaplain
MAJ C.T. Dugge, Spec Svcs Off
MAJ R.P. Hill, CO, 527th PSC

July

LTC E.J. Flatley, Chaplain, 45th GS Gp
LTC E.H. Schiff, CO, 240t. QM Bn
LTC J.P. Wooten, CO 86th Maint Bn
MAJ R.R Del Sesto, Staff Provost Marshal
MAJ G.L. Ellis, Trans Off, USAD
MAJ J.F. Ferrick, Ch, Oper Eq Dis USAD
MAJ E.A. Gajeski, Dep Staff JA

MAJ C.J. Hunter, Plans Off (ACofS SP&O)
MAJ R.B. Hatton, ACofS R&D
MAJ D.J. Passamanek, Staff Judge Adv
MAJ S.O. Smith, XO, 88th S&S Bn
MAJ W.E. White, Ch Plans & Ops Div (Supply & Services)

The following are statistics pertaining to civilian personnel:

a. US Civilian employees (DAC's)
   Authorized: 79
   Actual: 57

b. Third country nationals:
   None authorized

c. At the end of the quarter, the hiring restriction on local nationals had not been lifted. This restriction went into effect on 28 March 1969.
Normal attrition has reduced the local national workforce by approximately 4.0% per month since the inception of the hiring restriction. The command at present employs 97% of its authorized local national strength. Little difficulty has been experienced so far because the command employed excess "Program 6" local national personnel at the time the restriction became effective. Local nationals (permanent hire) presently total 3,517. The authorized number is 3,625.

d. AIK Funds disbursed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Amount ($) VN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>2,732,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>2,390,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>1,833,330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>6,955,990</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. (U) Education:

a. Correspondence courses enrollment: (New Enrollment)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coop College</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voc-Technical</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Army Extension Courses**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coop College</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voc-Technical</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>0</td>
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</table>

**TOTAL**

<table>
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b. Correspondence Courses (Total Active Enrollments)

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**Army Extension Courses**

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**TOTAL**

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<td></td>
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**= 1190**
c. Group Study Enrollments:

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d. Tests:

<table>
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<th>WO</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>CCT-GE</td>
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<td>SA-EOC</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>ETS Tests</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1015</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1069</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. Interviews:

|                | Enlisted Men...1985 | Officers...206 | Warrant Officers...26 |
1. (C) On 6 May, 1969 a meeting was held in Qui Nhon to determine which Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) unit would be responsible for providing reaction forces within the Qui Nhon area. It was agreed by the Commanding Generals of the Capital ROK Infantry Division (CRID) and 22d ARVN Division that the Koreans would provide reaction forces to US Installations within the Qui Nhon Installation area and the 22d ARVN would provide reaction forces to the City of Qui Nhon and II ARVN Logistical Command (ALC).

2. (C) Limited free fire zones were approved on 12 May by the 22d ARVN Div, the Province Chief and the CRID for use around the 86th Maint Bn, 184th Ord Bn, 84th Engr Bn, Vung Chua Signal Site and 394th Trans Bn areas. These free fire zones have considerably expedited the initiation of H&I fire whenever needed. Considerable time delays in obtaining clearance to fire in these areas had been experienced in the past.

3. (C) The first 'duffle bag' equipment was emplaced within the Qui Nhon area on 19 May. Areas which have received this sensor equipment are the Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot (ABD), Tank Farm No 2 and Vung Chua Signal Site

4. (C) A follow-up security inspection of the critical logistical installations within the Qui Nhon area was conducted in May by representatives of I Field Force, Vietnam (IFFV), in response to a joint security meeting held on 19 May. Individuals attending included MG Russ, Deputy Commanding General, IFFV; BG Richards, Commanding General, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon; and representatives from higher as well as from various local headquarters. The meeting was held in order to provide an updated report on the status of improvements recommended in the "Hollis Report" (15 March 1969), regarding adequacy of perimeter barriers, fighting positions, fields of fire and observation, fire support, communications, friendly control of areas contiguous to installations and coordination accomplished with local Vietnamese government officials. The meeting also dealt with the progress made in correcting deficiencies noted during the security inspection conducted 12-15 March 1969.

5. (U) In early June, 8ACCS assumed control of over 200 of the 387th Trans Co local national (LN) employees for perimeter construction projects. This company is composed of LN stevedores and is part of the 394th Trans Bn. These personnel are now scheduled for use in perimeter defense construction projects, which are given varied priorities to ensure that the most essential is completed first, enabling the command to avoid drawing for these construction projects from US manpower resources needed elsewhere.

6. (C) The 8th ROK Company, CRID, was withdrawn by CG, CRID from the Qui Nhon ABD's outer perimeter during the third week in June. This company had provided security for the ABD since late March, 1969. The CRID had tactical requirements which suggested employing the troops elsewhere. Assistance was requested from IFFV, since the Korean CG was reluctant to send the unit back, feeling that security of the ABD had improved to the point that his company would no longer be required. Persuasion from higher headquarters provided impetus for reinstating the company on 20 June.
7. (C) One 30 inch Xenon searchlight was put into commission on Ba Hoa Mountain (CR 0623) on 15 June and has proved to be a tremendous asset to the installations and facilities on the eastern slope of Vung Chua mountain. The light is capable of providing instantaneous illumination to areas unable to receive artillery illumination.

8. (C) On the following day, a meeting was held in Qui Nhon to discuss the Qui Nhon to Phu Cat pipeline. Representatives attending were from the 1st Log Comd, 22d ARVN Div, 173d Abn Bde, USASUPCOM, QN, Binh Dinh Prov, 84th Engr Bn and 240th QM Bn. The following recommendations were made concerning security for this pipeline:

   a. That US forces be assigned the direct mission of security for this pipeline.
   b. That Vietnamese national police be encouraged to close illegal roadside gas stations.
   c. That local nationals be warned of the hazards of pilfering through news and radio media.
   d. That the Vietnamese police be encouraged to arrest LN's involved in pipeline pilferage.

9. (U) Later in July, the first tactical SOP was published in Qui Nhon. This publication simplified security procedures while making them uniform throughout the command. Annexes included in this SOP were: organization, signal, check point system, intelligence and combat intelligence, POW's and detainees, reaction forces, tactical combat support, alert procedures, passive measures, after-action reports; control of civilians and casualty reports.

10. (C) At the end of the quarter, two "Huey" helicopters were approved for use by USASUPCOM, QN for purposes of highway and pipeline surveillance. This was to be on a trial basis to determine their usefulness in these areas and to determine whether they were adequate for accomplishment of the mission.

11. (C) The level of enemy activity against support command units in Northern II Corps Tactical Zone during May-July 1969 remained essentially the same as the previous quarter. However, the intensity of the enemy action was substantially less. This was reflected by decreasing casualty and damage figures.

12. (C) Enemy activity included 30 Sniper incidents, three ground attacks, 36 stand-off attacks, nine ambushes, nine sapper attacks, 12 mining incidents, two mixed attacks, and nine miscellaneous incidents. Of interest is the fact that during this reporting period at least 707 sections of POL pipeline were either damaged or stolen. A brief description of the major incidents is attached at Inclosure 1.
13. (U) Intelligence Activities:

a. The following number of reports of counterintelligence inspections given by the 524th Military Intelligence Detachment were processed by the Security Office:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. The following numbers of requests for security clearances and validations were processed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>NUMBER PROCESSED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. During this period two security violations were reported. Investigations in both cases revealed that the violations resulted in no compromise.

d. The following numbers of war trophies were registered during the quarter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>NUMBER REGISTERED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. (U) No incoming units were processed during this reporting period.

2. (C) The following organizational changes and unit movements occurred:

   a. The 647th Quartermaster Company (Petroleum) Terminal Platoon, 240th Quartermaster Battalion, was attached to the 188th Ordnance Company, 184th Ordnance Battalion, for rations and quarters only. Effective 8 May 1969.

   b. The 90th Heavy Materiel Supply (HMS) Company was released from the 88th Supply and Service (S&S) Battalion, 45th General Support (GS) Group and was re-assigned, less selected personnel and equipment, for all purposes to the US Army Depot, USAD, Qui Nhon. Effective 21 May 1969.

   c. The 666th Transportation Company (Light Truck), 8th Transportation Group, was released from the US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon (USASUPCOM, QN), and was reassigned for all purposes to the US Army Support Command, Da Nang (USASUPCOM, DNG). Effective 5 June 1969.

   d. The 40th AG Army Postal Unit (APU) was released from the USASUPCOM, QN and was reassigned for all purposes to the USASUPCOM, DNG. Effective 10 July 1969.

   e. The 1st Magazine Platoon, 630th Ord Co, 184th Ord Bn; Detachment C, USAD, Qui Nhon; and the 25th Explosive Ordnance Detachment (EOD) were detached from the 304th S&S Co, 593d GS Group, and attached to the 647th QM CP (POL), 240th QM Bn for rations, quarters and vehicle maintenance. Effective 12 July 1969.

   f. The 853d Signal Detachment (Mobile Radio) was designated carrier unit for assigned personnel of the An Khe Detachment (Provisional), 593d GS Group. Effective 20 July 1969.

   g. The 540th Transportation Detachment (BARC) was detached from the Tuy Hoa Detachment (Provisional), 593d GS Group, and attached to the 304th S&S Co, 593d GS Group, for all purposes and attached for operational control (OPCON) to the Commanding Officer, Qui Nhon Outport of Vung Ho Bay. Legal jurisdiction remains with Headquarters, 5th Trans Comd. Effective 20 July 1969.

   h. The 226th S&S Co, Tuy Hoa Detachment (Provisional), 593d GS Group was released from the USASUPCOM, QN, and reassigned for all purposes to the USASUPCOM, DNG. It departed on 25 July 1969.

3. (U) The following operation plan (OPLAN) was published during the quarter: SECRET draft of OPLAN 79-69 (Continuity of Logistical Operations) (U).

4. (U) The following Command Post Exercises (CPX's) were conducted during the quarter:

   a. CPX "Cable Car I" was conducted on 2 July 1969 for CONFIDENTIAL OPLAN 102-69 (Transitional Training and Operations) (U) and determined that the plan is workable.
b. CPX "Bad Trouble" was conducted on 8 July 1969 for SECRET OPLAN 79-69 (Continuity of Logistical Operations) (U). The conclusion reached was that the plan would be workable with some minor changes.

5. (U) Training:

a. The USASUPCOM, QN, Regulation 350-1, EDUCATION AND TRAINING, USASUPCOM, QN, Training, was published and distributed during the quarter. Change 1 to USASUPCOM, QN, Regulation 350-1 has been staffed and approved, with publication and distribution to be completed during the next quarter.

b. An intensive driver safety and driver education program has been initiated throughout the command.

c. The sapper defense training program has been expanded and is continuously receiving command wide emphasis.

d. The Project Skills I program has been expanded to include briefings of newly arrived senior NCOs and officers at Headquarters, USASUPCOM, QN and major subordinate command headquarters.
1. (U) During May and June, weather conditions in the command's area of responsibility had no significant impact on logistical operations. Regular resupply operations continued on QL 19 to Dak To and Pleiku, on QL 1 north to LZ English, and on highway 14 to Dak To. Resupply to Cheo Reo was primarily by air. Runway conditions in Qui Nhon limited aircraft size to nothing larger than a C7-A. Convoy operations were run from Pleiku on a twice monthly basis. Resupply to the Tuy Hoa, Phu Hiep and Vung Ro Bay areas was primarily by sea. As a result of the phase down of the number of support personnel in this area, more frequent convoys were conducted on QL 1 south from Qui Nhon.

2. (U) The month of July marked the beginning of the monsoon season in the highlands. Normal convoy operations to isolated fire bases have been hampered because of bad road conditions. The Goer Company, which had been in stand-down status during the quarter prior to being returned to CONUS for Engineer evaluation, was retained per request of the Fourth Division. At the end of the quarter, several resupply missions had been accomplished by these all-weather, rough terrain vehicles.

3. (C) Enemy activity directed against logistical installations and activities generally caused no major resupply problems. Convoy operations in the Mang Giang Pass were hampered somewhat by enemy ambushes; night shuttle operations continued to be suspended between the hours of 2200 and 0200 each night. OPORD Q136-69 was published to control road closing in the Qui Nhon area. The supply route from Dak To to Ben Het was closed for approximately 40 days during May and June. During this period, the Support Command was unable to resupply Class I and V by convoy, so the 200 US troops in the area were resupplied by helicopters, C7-A aircraft, and airdrop (low level extraction). On 24 June, an ammunition convoy was able to resupply the US artillery units at Ben Het in spite of an ambush which resulted in one US killed in action (KIA), five wounded in action (WIA), and several vehicles damaged. Since this time, regular resupply of Classes I and V has been through-put from Pleiku and retrograde materiel has been removed from the Ben Het area.

4. (C) During May, unit moves coordinated by the Operations Branch consisted of the movement of the 577th Engineer Bn from Tuy Hoa to Dalat, the 299th Engineer Bn from Kon Tum Province to Qui Nhon, the 566th Trans Co from Qui Nhon to Da Nang and the 90th Heavy Material Supply (HMS) Company from Pleiku to Qui Nhon. The 90th HMS was given the mission of operating the heavy equipment yards for the US Army Depot. The reduction of the Class IV Engineer storage mission in the highlands was due to through-put of the majority of heavy construction material to the requesting unit.

5. (C) The major unit move coordinated by this headquarters was the move of the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment from Blackhawk near Pleiku to Phan Thiet. On 29 May, C troop arrived in the Qui Nhon area, at the 86th Maint Bn, for a maintenance stand-down. C troop was followed on 30 and 31 May by A and B troops. Upon arrival, the units were provided 20 bays in a fixed covered maintenance building for organizational maintenance and five bays with direct-support (DS) maintenance personnel on hand to provide on-the-spot DS maintenance. Technical assistance personnel were on hand to advise with any
organizational problems. Repair parts and major subassemblies were on hand. For support purposes, Class A rations were provided along with mess tents. Shower facilities and wash points were established in the living areas. The unit consisted of 720 personnel and 218 vehicles. There were a total of 630 jobs processed through the maintenance facility during a seven day period. The Operations Branch coordinated with ACofS, Maintenance and ACofS, Supply to canvas depot stocks for parts on hand (O/H) in Qui Nhon and to assist in obtaining releases for 62 USARV controlled items. The unit departed the Qui Nhon Port by LST on 2, 3 and 4 June. Also, during the period 18-21 July, B Battery, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery conducted a maintenance stand-down at the 86th Maint Bn area. This move and maintenance program, coordinated for this headquarters by the operations branch, ACofS, SP&O, encountered no major problems.

6. (C) This Headquarters coordinated and monitored the relocation of two USASUPCOM, Qui Nhon units as a result of the directed reduction, redeployment and replacement of US Forces in the Republic of Vietnam. Code named "Keystone Eagle," the 25,000 man replacement operation caused the 40th (AG) A/P to relocate from An Khe to Quang Tri on 10 July 1969 and the 226th S&S Company from Phu Hiep to Chu Lai on 22 July 1969.

7. (C) During the quarter, the Tuy Hoa Detachment at Tuy Hoa (Phu Hiep) was phased down to approximately 130 support personnel. OPORD Q135-69, published by this headquarters on 12 June 69 called for the newly established Logistical Support Activity, (LSA) 59342 to move into facilities evacuated by the 91st Evacuation Hospital by 15 July 69. Due to the move of the 226th S&S Co as a part of "Keystone Eagle," the 304th S&S Co was moved from An Khe to Phu Hiep to form the nucleus of the LSA. Installation defense and coordination functions were turned over to the CO, Tuy Hoa Air Force Base on 25 July 1969. The Class III mission remains unchanged except for the closing down of the Army tank farm at Phu Hiep. The tank farm is to be dismantled and the storage tanks will be transferred to the Phu Hiep Army Airfield and Tuy Hoa AFB. The LSA will continue to provide a Class III retail distribution point at Phu Hiep, the ASP at Phu Hiep having been closed out. Class V resupply is by throughput from Qui Nhon, each unit having a double basic load on hand. Class I resupply is by throughput from Qui Nhon.

8. (U) During the quarter, the 1st Logistical Command established a logistics review board and working group to furnish USARV a comprehensive report for the purpose of reviewing world wide logistic support of US combat forces during the Vietnam era. ACofS, SP&O Operations Section furnished the Qui Nhon Support Command ANNEX U - (Command, Control and Coordination). This annex included a general history of Qui Nhon Support Command from its beginning in 1965 to the present time. The annex examined the organization of the command and the changes required by the buildup of supported units from the viewpoint of capabilities for support as opposed to the type of support required. Doctrine and techniques employed by this command which affected command, control, and coordination in the insurgent environment were given specific emphasis. Particular attention was given to the programs, innovations and practices developed to reduce problem areas or more fully utilize existing assets. The problem areas which still exist were discussed with possible solutions suggested for future application in similar tactical situations.
9. (U) During this quarter all CCIP projects have proceeded according to projected task levels. Project Align was combined with Project Report. Project Clarion continued and Project Foresight was at the same time outlined to include the review and revision of plans through December. Projects Alert and Secure now have been taken over by the SACS office.

10. (U) There was only one Monthly Logistical Support Conference during this reporting period. In May the conference was hosted by ACoS, Maintenance and 49 representatives attended. To present a more worthwhile program and to more adequately use the time allotted and the conference room facilities, the format for these conferences has been changed, placing them on a quarterly basis with two or more staff sections acting as hosts. The new series of quarterly conferences will be initiated in August.
1. (U) Telephone Communications:

   a. Telephone communications within the US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon have continued to improve in the Qui Nhon area. Much of the success is due to the additional telephone operators whom the support command has sent TDY to the 41st Signal Battalion to serve as operators for the Phu Thanh switchboard.

   b. Considerable progress toward completion of the dial telephone exchange (DTE), has been made during the quarter. Close coordination between the support command and the 41st Sig Bn enabled the program to near completion by the end of July.

   c. The AUTOSEVCOM terminal, located in the operations section of the ACofS, SP&O office has been activated and will provide secure voice telephone service to headquarters, USASUPCOM, Qui Nhon.

   d. A sole user "hotline" circuit has been installed between the offices of the ACofS Transportation at Qui Nhon Port and the ACofS, SP&O in the support command headquarters compound to provide rapid transfer of operational data. A direct line from SP&O to the operations bunker of the 8th Transportation Group headquarters is presently being installed and should be activated in the near future.

2. (U) FM Radio Communications:

   a. FM Radio Communications within the command have been good, with the exception of frequency interference problems experienced by some units.

   b. Minor transmission problems occurred with the AN/VRC-49 radio relay on Vung Chua Mountain. The main problem stemmed from a lack of operator training and was quickly corrected by the support command signal section.

   c. The alternate tactical operations center (TOC) located within the offices of the ACofS, SP&O was relocated during July by the Command Signal Section. All radios and telephones needed for alert procedures were placed in the office of the Support Command's Special Assistant for Combat Security (SACS). All systems now are fully operational.

3. (U) AM Radio Communications:

   a. All communications of the USASUPCOM, Qui Nhon with 1st Log Comd and the three other support commands have been good, with only a few brief outages. At present the support command net is experiencing equipment difficulties at Tuy Hoa, Vung Ro Bay and Pleiku.

   b. The amount of phone-patch traffic, through the AN/PRC-93 radio set, has been greatly reduced since the installation of a direct telephone circuit to Vung Ro Bay.
4. (U) Communication Center Operations:

a. Teletype communications overall have been quite good during recent months. Some minor circuit outages occurred but were quickly restored by repairmen at the various locations. There have been few problems with the command's secure equipment.

b. Teletype communications requests have been submitted by several units within the support command. The 8th Trans Cp has requested two circuits. One point-to-point circuit has been installed between the 8th Cp S-3 section and the 54th Trans Bn S-3 section in Cha Rang Valley. The second circuit which is now being installed, will be between the 8th Cp S-3 office and the S-3 section at the 124th Trans Bn in Pleiku.

c. A direct teletype circuit from the Qui Nhon Support Command Communications Center to the 854th Trans Company in Vung Ro Bay has also been installed and is operational. This circuit was designed to help facilitate the 5th Transportation Command's operational requirement.

d. The number of teletype messages handled by the USASUPCOM, QN Com Center during the past quarter totaled approximately 17,500 of which nearly 5,000 originated at the Com Center. Over 12,500 messages terminated there.

e. There was continuing improvement in the reduction of "over-precedence" messages during the past quarter. The Command Message Review Board took an active role in this reduction and results have been clearly seen in the reduced time needed to receive messages of high priority.

5. (U) Sole User Voice Circuit:

a. The reliability of sole user voice circuit within the Command was approximately 95% during this reporting period. The major difficulties were experienced by the operations branch of ACoFS, SP&O. Coordination with the 41st Sig Bn circuit control center has helped to alleviate the problem.
1. (C) Ammunition:

a. During the quarter the Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot (ABD) was again attacked by enemy sappers. The resultant loss of ammunition was 2.3 short tons, valued at slightly less than five thousand dollars. This comparatively minimal ammunition loss can be attributed to the extremely quick reaction of the depot firefighting forces. Adequate quantities of water were available and were employed in less than two minutes.

b. Ammunition Statistical Data:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Received</td>
<td>35,845</td>
<td>30,761</td>
<td>22,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issued</td>
<td>32,937</td>
<td>30,572</td>
<td>18,182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rewarehouse</td>
<td>59,042</td>
<td>36,569.8</td>
<td>38,742.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>127,824</td>
<td>97,902.8</td>
<td>78,971.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. (C) Supply: The supply section, this headquarters, implemented and monitored over 30 projects during this period. Statements of the status of some of the more important projects follow:

a. (C) Project Switch, designed to turn over US owned assets to the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces for improvement and modernization of their equipment: During the quarter, the 6/84th Artillery's equipment was transferred to the 45th ARVN Artillery on 12 July 1969. The Qui Nhon Depot for redistribution under Project Switch.

b. (U) Project "TOE Count": This program was initiated on 2 July 1969 and involves the complete physical inventory of all major items on units TO&E's, TDA's, MTTOE's, MTDA's and on temporary loan. Reports have been submitted on the 5000 gallons semi-trailer fuel tank and the 12 ton semi-trailer stake.

c. (U) Project Rags, a reconciliation and cancellation of back orders at DSU level with strict control to insure the elimination of "nice to have" items: Approximately 89,000 requisitions were reconciled, which resulted in canceling approximately eleven thousand of them.

d. (U) Commander's Critical Items List (CCIL) Program: This program identifies items which the unit commander feels are critical to the ability of his unit to accomplish its mission. A trend has been developing in that less emphasis is being placed on repair parts and more on major end items.

e. (U) Project Fill, a program designed to insure that every action is taken to improve the flow of critical supplies to the theater by reporting critical items repeatedly at zero balance and by screening and comparing units' lists of critical items to keep accurate count of lines in critical supply: During the reporting period the supply position has improved but...
additions to the fill list exceeded the deletions. The procedure for marking and managing fill items in the same way as intensive management items (IMI) should provide greater efficiency within the program. There are 1075 lines on the USASUPCOM, Qui Nhon fill list.

f. (U) Project Stop-See, a program for diverting and retrograding shipments of equipment not needed by the Support Command: An approximate total of 1,600 short tons were shipped during the quarter.

g. (U) Project Strip: The program for the 173d Airborne Brigade and the 4th Infantry Division was completed in the preceding quarter. Shipped this quarter were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Short Tons</th>
<th>Line Items</th>
<th>Dollar Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>646</td>
<td>9,700</td>
<td>7.3 Million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

h. (U) Project Count II: This project was a 100% inventory of all supplies in DSU/GSU's and Depots, it began in February and ended in July. The program was effective in improving location and inventory accuracy and allowed identification of vast quantities of excess supplies, which were reported for redistribution or retrograde.

i. (U) Project Orange Ball, a program for providing dry batteries to customers through Class I channels: Dry batteries are maintained under refrigeration from the time of manufacture until they arrive in country. By maintaining dry batteries under refrigeration, the shelf life of the batteries is increased by 50 to 200%. The USAD, Qui Nhon and the Class I points are in the final stages of preparation, with the issue of batteries set to begin in August.

3. (U) Retrograde and Disposal:

a. During this reporting period, 49,728 short tons were shipped by this command. Of this total, 17,760 short tons were unserviceable repairables. Other categories of retrograde cargo include excess depot materiel, Project Stop-See cargo, suspended ammunition, ammunition components, and marine retrograde cargo.

b. Sea-land vans have been used to snip depot excess clothing and tentage plus gas bottles and vehicle components to Japan. Roll on/Roll off (RO/RO) trailers have also been used for the retrograde of large quantities of pipe, boxes etc. This has proven highly successful and time saving due to the RO/RO's capability for being staged at the Qui Nhon Port.

c. The command is at present preparing a shipment of heavy construction material to go by LST from Vung Ro to Okinawa. This should prove beneficial in reducing double handling of cargo.

d. The Property Disposal Activity has 9,946 short tons of scrap and 1,327 short tons of usable on-hand equipment as of 1 August 1969. This on-hand amount will be continually lowered through command emphasis on reducing the amount of scrap.
4. (U) Services:

a. On 25 June 1969 the first half of the refrigerated warehouse at USAD, Qui Nhon became operational. This increased the depot's net refrigerated storage capability by 87,467 cubic feet. The additional storage space allowed the release of the United Fruit Line Ship Hibueras, which had been employed by the command for refrigerated storage for nearly two years. The second half of the refrigerated warehouse is scheduled for completion on 1 September 1969. A plan was approved to transfer the 19th S&S Company's Class I mission to the Class I Division, USAD-QN. Effective 1 August 1969.

b. The Food Service Program continued to receive strong command support throughout the reporting period. The Qui Nhon Support Command Four Star Best Mess Award has continued to be influential in improving the quality of food service operations within the command.

c. Field laundry production in the command was at an all time high for the year, with the three months average totaling approximately 750,000 lbs. This increase is due in part to the 88th S&S Battalion having on hand its full authorization of Eidal laundry units.
1. (U) On 12 May, one 10,000 barrel JP-4 tank and one 10,000 barrel DF-2 tank (both steel bolted tanks) were destroyed at An Khe as a result of enemy action. Another 10,000 barrel tank developed a leak, at Pleiku. A great deal of difficulty was encountered locating the materials and erection kits necessary to rebuild the tanks. The absence of a pipeline construction platoon was also an influential factor in the delay in beginning the reconstruction project.

2. (U) In an effort to decrease the large amount of pipeline pilferage by local nationals, the Qui Nhon to An Khe line was filled with water on 8 June. It was believed that by having water in the line local nationals might break the habit of pilfering product from pipelines. This experiment proved unsuccessful as pipeline pilferage increased on the Phu Cat line. Replenishment of bulk product at the An Khz tank farm was accomplished entirely by line haul means which proved inferior to employment of the pipeline. Instructions were received on 28 July to resume pumping product through the line.

3. (U) On 1 June the first of four pipeline burying projects began, in an effort to eliminate pilferage through heavily populated areas. The first burying project was completed with seven miles of the Qui Nhon to An Khe line buried by 21 July. Five miles of the An Khe to Pleiku line have been buried and are presently being tested. Work began on 4 July burying two eight inch lines between tank farms No 1 and No 2, another area of heavy pilferage concentration. The pipelines between these tank farms extend 1.6 miles and the project is scheduled for completion on 10 August. At present 17.5 miles of eight inch and six inch pipeline running from Vung Ro Bay to Tuy Hoa are scheduled to be buried by 25 August. So far, 3.7 miles of this line have already been buried and tested and were utilized in a pumping operation for the first time on 24 July. No pilferage incidents occurred on the buried section during this operation.

4. (U) POL consumption statistics (figures are in gallons):

   a. Received at Qui Nhon:
      
      | Month | June     | July    |
      |-------|----------|---------|
      | May   | 24,432,300| 21,950,700| 22,092,300|
      |       |          |         |
      b. Received at Tuy Hoa:
      
      | Month | June     | July    |
      |-------|----------|---------|
      | May   | 7,534,500| 5,000,000| 9,061,931|
      |       |          |         |
      c. Product shipped to An Khe by pipeline:
      
      | Month | June     | July    |
      |-------|----------|---------|
      | May   | 8,378,200| 4,021,200| 0
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d. Product shipped to Pleiku by pipeline:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td>4,070,100</td>
<td>3,678,400</td>
<td>2,854,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. Product shipped to Phu Cat by pipeline:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td>4,887,200</td>
<td>3,590,200</td>
<td>4,057,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. Product losses from the pipeline (approximate):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td>7,000,000 (25%)</td>
<td>5,000,000 (29%)</td>
<td>4,800,000 (28.4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

g. TOTAL Command Consumption:

62,210,500
1. (C) Changes in maintenance support organization continued in the Tuy Hoa area with the establishment of a Logistical Support Activity (LSA) to assume the mission previously performed by the 136th Light Maintenance Company, the loss of which was reported last quarter.

2. (C) During this reporting period, the NCR (National Cash Register) 500 system of the 560th Maintenance Company was utilized to conduct a test on the feasibility of mechanizing the supply and service stock accounts on maintenance battalion NCR systems where the battalions are co-located and time is available on the machines. An evaluation of the test was conducted by the ACofS, Maintenance supply assistance team during the latter part of June and determined that there were significant advantages in the use of the NCR system.

3. (C) Phase II of the Artillery Repair and Return (R&R) Program ended on 30 June 1969. Increased fire missions and difficulty in moving guns from remote fire bases to direct support maintenance areas caused numerous schedule changes and a significant slippage in the program. Phase III of the program was started on 1 July with new quotas established for the DSU's and firm schedules for the supported artillery units. The increased command emphasis being placed on the program by IFFV artillery, due to the benefits being derived from it, should insure completion of all scheduled weapons during the next quarter. The program is now being conducted at three sites: Pleiku, Qui Nhon and Tuy Hoa.

4. (C) The Artillery Phase III Product Improvement Program (PIP) was initiated on 12 May 1969 for the chassis of the M107/M110 Howitzer. To date, eight chassis have under gone PIP. Seven of these chassis were from depot stock and are being exchanged for retrograde weapons. One weapon was completed at Tuy Hoa in conjunction with the Artillery R&R Program. Fifteen additional weapons remain to be completed.

5. (C) During the quarter, four maintenance stand-downs were conducted for supported units. Units involved were 2/1 Cavalry (-); Battery B, 3/6 Artillery; B, 7/17 Cavalry; and D, 2/1 Cavalry. Maintenance shop space was provided at the 86th Maintenance Battalion (GS) compound. Prior to the arrival of the units in the stand-down area, lists of known and projected repair parts requirements together with prescribed load list (PLL) shortages were obtained. The ACofS, Maintenance then expedited the release of the parts for prepositioning at the 86th Maint Bn. Upon arrival of the unit at the stand-down area they were provided with technical advisors to assist with organizational maintenance, a DS contact team and a supply team to expedite release of additional parts required.

6. (C) During July the CMMI Team operating out of the organizational maintenance management section of the Plans, Policies, and Operations Branch, 1st Logistical Command, began operations as an assistance team rather than an inspection team. The team now conducts visits to organic units of the support command and conducts training in organizational maintenance management and operations, together with reviewing unit maintenance programs and recommending changes. The team will continue to reinspect unsatisfactory
areas found by the 1st Log Comd CMMI Team to and conduct roadside spot check inspections with emphasis on safety.

7. (C) The ARVN Modernization and Improvement Program for the transfer of the equipment of the 6/84th Artillery Battalion continued through this reporting period. Transfer of B Battery was completed on 15 June 1969. After the battery's move to An Khe in April, very few problems were encountered by the 560th Light Maintenance (LM) Company in supporting the transfer. The final action was the concurrent transfer of A Battery, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery (HHB) and Service Battery. HHB and Service Battery were co-located at An Khe with the 560th LM Co and the only problems which were encountered with A Battery were minor matters which arose at LSA 593-1 at Bong Son. All items of equipment except the howitzers were rotated to An Khe for processing, due to limited capability at the Bong Son site.

8. (C) A logistical review was begun late in July within each of the maintenance battalions for the maintenance input to the 1st Log Comd report, in conjunction with the DOD Joint Logistics Review Board Study. Battalion input data will be received at this headquarters during the first part of the next reporting period and a SUPCOM evaluation and review will be developed to be forwarded to the 1st Logistical Command.

9. (C) One internal organizational change was made within the ACofS, Maintenance staff section during the quarter. The provisional supply assistance team was reorganized as a "Supply and Maintenance Instruct and Advise Team" to provide assistance in both repair parts supply and DSU/GSU maintenance. The team is now organized as follows:

- Team Chief (WO)
- Supply Specialist (E6 or 7) 2 ea
- Maint Specialist (E6 or 7) 2 ea
1. (U) During the quarter, the office of the ACofS Transportation was re-organized along more functional lines. The requirement of 1st Log Comd Reg 55-40 to form a movement control center (MCC) was implemented with the formation of MCC branch, which consists of air, container, motor transport and sea/rail operations sections. The branch controls the organizational motor transport and watercraft assets of the command, has a container control function and coordinates all shipments by USARV shippers. The staff plans and management branch is primarily a plans section; it supervises all management programs and develops management programs as required. The primary function of this section is to develop data and management analysis for the 1st Logistical Command's command and control improvement program (CCIP). Experience has shown that this function requires a NCO on a full time basis and 75% of an officer's time every month.
2. (C) Within this command, during this reporting period, the tonnage of cargo moved by rail totaled: for the month of May, 3,553 short tons (S/T) for June, 2,693 S/T; and for July, 673 S/T. This steady decrease in the amount of cargo moved is attributed to enemy interdiction of the rail line between Qui Nhon and Phu Hiep. While that line of communication (LOC) was interrupted, it was necessary to divert essential cargo for sea or air movement.

3. (U) Motor transportation performance for May totaled 215,391 S/T; the June total was 257,643 S/T; and the July total was 257,466 S/T, for an overall sum of 730,500 S/T moved by motor transport vehicles during the quarter. The substantial increase in road tonnage during June appeared in spite of decreased vehicle availability due to driver personnel shortages.

4. (FOOU) As a result of rail interdiction, the 5th Transportation Command (Terminal) was required to utilize its organic LCU's and LCM's to support the Tuy Hoa area as well as the areas normally served by these watercraft. Total tonnage handled by the Qui Nhon Port in May was 142,633 S/T; in June, 117,063 S/T; and in July, 129,012 S/T. Total port tonnage for the quarter was 388,708 S/T.

5. (FOOU) Continued use of the Air Force C-7A aircraft has enabled the command to react quickly to rapidly changing requirements. Total air cargo moved during May was 2,089.9 S/T; during June, 1,609 S/T; and during July, 985 S/T, for a quarterly total of 4,683.9 S/T.

6. (U) The ACofS, Transportation encountered a significant personnel turbulence problem with the loss and replacement of many key officers during the quarter.
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ANNEX K ACoFS, ENGINEER

1. (U) Three times during the quarter there were problems with FOL submarine lines at Vung Ro Bay and another such problem appeared in Qui Nhon. On 8 May and 6 June divers were required at Vung Ro Bay to retrieve the lines after they had been cast off a tanker without marker buoys attached. On 10 June divers were required at Qui Nhon to untangle the submarine lines in use from old unserviceable hoses which had been disconnected but not removed. On 21 June divers were required in Vung Ro Bay to check the lines to ensure they were not tangled in the mooring anchors as was feared. These divers were obtained from 5th Special Forces Group on 8 May and 21 June through the IPPV Engineer. Divers for work at Vung Ro and Qui Nhon between 6 and 10 June were provided by the 497th Engineer company (Port Construction) through requests submitted to 1st Logistical Command Engineer branch.

2. (U) Six housetrailers were shipped from the Qui Nhon area and one from Tuy Hoa during the quarter. Four went to various locations for the 1st Infantry Division. The question of ownership of the housetrailers has not yet been resolved. Absolute ownership appears to rest with USARV and local control over utilization rests with the major unit in whose area the trailer is installed. Only four trailers are utilized by units outside of 1st Log Comd, which leaves USAVSCOM, QN in control of the bulk of these trailer assets.

3. (U) The ACoFS Engineer provided technical assistance and acted as coordination center for a project in support of USAID. Five generator sets, each weighing 62 tons and designed to produce 2100 Kw of power were to be transported from the port and emplaced in the Qui Nhon City Power Plant. The process followed on this occasion was to load a generator on a high capacity flat bed trailer with a 100 ton floating crane. It was then hauled to the power plant and unloaded. Due to space limitations at the power plant and the weight distribution of the generators, it was necessary to use a combination of cranes for unloading. The final combination employed was one 40 ton crawler crane, borrowed from the 15th Engineer Group; one 20 ton crawler borrowed from Han Jin Transportation Company; one 20 ton rough terrain crane, from USAID and one 20 ton truck mounted crane from the 184th Ord Bn. Approximately two months elapsed between the agreement to provide assistance and the placing of the last generator. The bulk of this time was spent in trying to obtain use of all the required equipment at one time.

4. (U) On 12 June, the Vinnell Corporation power ship Memphis was damaged by the explosion of an underwater mine attached to her hull. A hole 12x26 ft was opened into a 2000 barrel capacity fuel tank. A Navy damage evaluation team recommended that no repairs be made until the next regularly scheduled dry-dock overhaul of the ship.

5. (U) During June, operational support missions were assigned on orders from Hq, USARV to bury several miles of petroleum pipeline. This measure is to protect these portions of support command pipeline which are most vulnerable to pilferage and damage from enemy action. The 20th Engr Bn buried five miles of six inch line from An Khe west toward Pleiku. The 299th Engr Bn buried seven miles of six inch line from Cha Rang west toward An Khe and 2.3 miles of a double eight inch line between Tank Farm No 1 and the Petroleum Package Depot (old Tank Farm No 2). At Tuy Hoa, the 64th Engr Bn buried 16
miles of double line (one six inch, one eight inch) from Phu Hiep Army Base, south toward Vung Ro Bay.

6. (U) The first half of the Cold Storage Warehouse was completed and turned over for use on 28 June. The scheduled completion date was 4 July. The refrigerated space was ready for immediate use since equipment tests and temperature draw down operations were combined.

7. (U) Repaving of Qui Nhon Army Airfield was started by RMK, BRJ (Raymond, Morrison, Knudsen - Brown & Root, J.A. Jones, a construction combine) on 23 June. Contractor and OICC core samples were used to determine that the surface roughness was not caused by base course failure. The project will limit traffic to only the lightest aircraft for about two months.

8. (U) The dual pipeline project from the POL Jetty to Tank Farm No 1 was completed by rehabilitating the "Golf" line rather than by constructing a second new line. After cleaning and eliminating some elbow joints in the "Golf" line, the maximum flow was increased from 400 barrels per hour to 1700 barrels per hour.

9. (U) The ACofS, Engineer provided coordination of facilities to complete the following unit moves during the period 1 April to 1 July 1969.

a. A and D companies of the 84th Engr Bn relocated south to the Tuy Hoa area.

b. The 19th S&S company relocated to the compound vacated by A Co, 84th Engr Bn.

c. 173d Airborne Brigade Support Battalion relocated from An Khe to compounds vacated by the 19th S&S Co and the 666th Trans Co. The Brigade School of the Support Bn moved into new facilities which were built in the 86th Maintenance Bn compound. The 666th Trans Co was moved out of the support command area.

d. B Co, 299th Engr Bn and a portion of the 15th Light Equipment Co relocated from Dak To to facilities previously occupied by D Co, 84th Engr Bn at Camp Humph.

e. Headquarters of the 70th Medical Bn moved from Phu Tai to the medical compound in Qui Nhon.

f. Headquarters, 55th Medical Group was inactivated, freeing facilities in the medical compound in Qui Nhon.

g. The 90th HEMS Co relocated from Pleiku to occupy excess facilities at location 39 in Cha Rang.

10. (U) The Command Engineer's Office, USASUPCOM, QN was redesignated on 1 July as the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Engineer.
1. (U) The temporary facility of the Chase Manhattan Bank was officially opened 16 June 1969. Brigadier General A. E. Hunter and Mr. Edward Worsoe, Second Vice President of the Chase Manhattan Bank, officiated at the ceremony. This temporary military banking facility (MBF) affords complete banking service for Qui Nhơn to include new accounts, check cashing, money order sales, and redemption of Savings Bonds. The work order for a permanent facility has been approved by USARV, assigned USARV Project No 233 and is presently awaiting funds to be procured at the USARV level.

2. (U) The army cost reduction program in Qui Nhơn continues to progress. On 26 June a savings of $42,900 was validated by the US Army Audit Agency. This was a direct result of efficient action and management on the part of the 5th Transportation Command.

3. (U) Continued emphasis is being placed on the program for reimbursable support to non-army customers. Staff visits are still necessary to insure that the issue points are able to identify reimbursable customers. The average number of documents processed through the Comptroller's office per month is 457.

4. (U) As of 31 July 1969, approximately 6000 financial data records folders (FDRF's) have been mechanized. Although operational problems have not been completely worked out, the system is functioning effectively. In the future, mechanization of records will proceed at a slower pace than originally planned until such time as all of the operational problems encountered can be solved.

5. (U) The office of the Comptroller, HQ USASUPCOM, QN processes approximately 50 reports of survey each month. For a period of time, all surveys were sent to the Staff Judge Advocate for concurrence. After a recent decision by the Chief of Staff, the Comptroller's office has returned to sending only those surveys in which there is a non-concurrence among the survey officer, appointing authority and Comptroller. Through more effective management of reports of survey, the processing time from the initiating action to final processing has been greatly reduced.

6. (U) Effort in the area of reports control has resulted in the rescinding of many recurring reports. This office has submitted a total of 23 reports to 1st Logistical Command for challenge. As of 31 July approximately 15 reports have been rescinded.

7. (U) a. The following audits were performed by the Internal Review Branch:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name of Fund</th>
<th>Date Completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annual</td>
<td>Qui Nhơn NCO Open Mess</td>
<td>9 May 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qui Nhơn Officer's Open Mess</td>
<td>7 July 1969</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
b. During the period 3 to 7 June 1969, the Pleiku open messes were visited by the internal review branch in order to assist the annexation of the other open messes in the area and the establishment of an expanded accounting office. Open messes of Artillery, Engineer, Signal, Special Forces, and MACV units were visited during this period.

c. During the period 20 to 24 May 1969 there was another such visit at the Tuy Hoa open messes, to provide assistance in the preparation of financial statements. Another visit was made to the Tuy Hoa messes during the period 26 June to 9 July 1969 for the purpose of assisting newly assigned personnel in the establishment of accounting records for both open messes.

d. The following regulations and circulars were initiated and published by the Internal Review Branch:

(1) USASUPCOM, QN 230-6, 1 May 1969, pertaining to the withholding tax of local national employees of applicable nonappropriated funds.

(2) USASUPCOM, QN Reg 230-7, 12 July 1969, pertaining to the administration and operation of annexes to open messes in this command.

(3) USASUPCOM, QN Cir 335-2, 16 July 1969, pertaining to the submission of various statements and reports by nonappropriated funds.

e. Reproduction and command-wide dissemination was made of the following directives:

(1) Appendix I, USARV Cir 230-1, Open Mess Check List for Commanders.

(2) Appendix II, USARV Cir 230-1, Open Mess Check List for Boards of Governors.

(3) Appendix III, USARV Cir 230-1, Open Mess Check List for Custodians.

f. The following visitors arrived at the Internal Review Branch:

(1) SFC Gerts, 1st Log Comd Comptroller Section, 19-21 June 1969.

(2) MAJ Walker, USARV Internal Review Branch, 4-6 July 1969, a follow-up review on materiel handling equipment.
A pre GAO Audit Team visited this command during the period 14-16 July 1969 to report on POL Accountability.

g. Effective with the period ending 25 July 1969, the Internal Review Branch is assuming the responsibility, after proper coordination with ACofS, Personnel, of reviewing the financial statements of all Vietnamese labor funds in this command. Steps have been initiated to revise the present regulation to incorporate additional requirements and samples in order to facilitate operations at the unit level.
1. (U) Fires in overcrowded refugee areas and hamlets have been a serious and continuing problem for the Civil Affairs office this headquarters. Many of these fires have been caused by fuel pilfered from support command pipelines. Assistance has been provided by the Command, upon request, through the Binh Dinh Province Social Welfare Office, many units of the command responding with food, lumber, firewood, tentage and money to help fire victims.

2. (U) Pilferage of fuel from the QNSC pipeline to Phu Cat and An Khe rose to major problem proportions during the quarter. The ACoS, Petroleum and the 240th QM Battalion requested assistance from the Civil Affairs Office in coordinating a campaign to inform the local population of the dangers involved in pilfering highly volatile fuel from the pipelines. In cooperation with the Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) and the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS), a campaign on the dangers of fuel pilferage was conducted using teams of Vietnamese with loudspeakers for face-to-face contact, an airplane with a tape recorded message which flew over the pipeline areas, in addition to hand distribution of 300,000 leaflets. Government of Vietnam (GVN) officials have rendered little support to the effort to control and prosecute pilferers, and without their backing the effort, an exposed pipeline offers local nationals too much temptation to pilfer fuel for personal use such as cooking and vehicle operation and for sale on the blackmarket.

3. (U) Lack of construction material (particularly lumber and roofing materials) due to in-country shortages and command controls has seriously affected many civil affairs projects in the construction and planning stages. Requests for these materials for ARVN and reactionary force (RF) dependent housing projects, refugee housing projects and school construction have far exceeded the supplies made available.

4. (U) Civil Affairs activities in the Tuy Hoa and An Khe areas have decreased substantially due to unit withdrawals. MEDCAP and DENTCAP programs were particularly affected. Elements of the 41st Civil Affairs Company will take over some of the discontinued projects.
1. The Inspector General’s section at this command conducted eighteen annual general inspections (AGI’s) and one reinspection during the reporting period. All units inspected received satisfactory ratings (only a satisfactory or unsatisfactory rating is given). Inspections of Support Command units were conducted in the An Khe, Tuy Hoa, Pleiku, and Qui Nhon areas.

2. Also during the quarter, the Inspector General (IG) published a revised schedule of annual general inspections to reflect changes required by USASUPCOM, QN unit moves and changes in the inspection schedules of higher headquarters.

3. In the past three months, the IG’s office has processed 20 justified complaints, 20 unjustified complaints and 147 requests for assistance.

4. Eight visits were made by Inspectors General detailed to USASUPCOM, QN compounds and areas. These visits were for the purpose of conducting complaint and request for assistance sessions for members of the respective compounds. Sessions were held at Tuy Hoa, Vung Ro Bay, An Khe, Cheo Reo, 184th Ord Bn compound at Phu Tai, US Army Depots at Qui Nhon and Long My (two visits), 86th Maint Bn compound at Cha Rang and 8th Trans Gp compound at Phu Tai. These sessions were in addition to the complaint and request for assistance periods held during the scheduled AGI’s.

5. The IG’s office performed staff coordination on the replies regarding corrective action by units cited in special inspection of the Qui Nhon area conducted by the MACV IG on 14-20 April 1969.
1. (U) Visits to the US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon were made in May by Chaplain (COL) Ray M. Rowland, 1st Log Chaplain and Chaplain (COL) Richard R. Bell, IFFV Chaplain. In June the command was visited by Chaplain (COL) Gerard J. Gefell, USARV Chaplain. In July Chaplains Bell, and Rowland visited again along with Chaplain (LTC) Thomas L. McMinn, 101st Airborne Brigade Chaplain; Chaplain (LTC) E.J. Christoph, Deputy 1st Log Chaplain; Chaplain (COL) Frederick O. Hunt, new IFFV Chaplain; and Chaplain (LTC) Patrick J. Hessian, 173d Airborne Brigade Chaplain.

2. (U) Chaplains training conferences were conducted in May, sponsored by chaplains of the 5th Transportation Terminal Command; in June, by the 86th Maintenance Battalion at Ck Rae Rang Valley and in July by the Staff Chaplain's Office. The July conference was held at the Qui Hoa Leprosarium. General Hunter addressed the chaplains and toured the Leprosarium with them. Chaplain Rowland of the 1st Log Comd was present on all of these occasions.

3. (U) Changes in personnel occurred throughout this period. The Staff Chaplain's section continues to receive adequate replacements, enabling the command chaplains activities to continue smoothly.

4. (U) An increase in attendance at all religious services was noted during the quarter. Except for one or two exceptions all chaplains are conducting many more services per week than the four required by USARV. 1st Log Comd Projects "Prayer", "Chit Chat", "Street Corner" and a greater general emphasis on the character guidance program continue to be influential factors in the increased attendance.

5. (U) In June the sacrament of Confirmation was administered to fourteen Roman Catholics of the command by the Most Reverend Dominic Van Doan, Bishop of Qui Nhon. In July, 194th anniversary of the Chaplains Corps was celebrated with an open house and an explanation of the accomplishments of the chaplaincy, past and present. Over two hundred personnel, officers and enlisted men, took part in the anniversary celebration.

6. (U) Regular Sunday observances and additional weekday services were conducted by all chaplains of the command. Evening devotional services are conducted by many of the chaplains.

7. (U) Eighteen chaplains are assigned to the USASUPCOM, Qui Nhon. Coordination and cooperation with the eight additional chaplains assigned to non-support command units in this area continues to be a Staff Chaplain activity. The following indicates the extent of support command Chaplains' activities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total attendance at all services</td>
<td>60,080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of services conducted</td>
<td>2,875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of attendance at C.G. Classes</td>
<td>31,049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of visits made to the hospital</td>
<td>964</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The following indicates the extent of support command chaplains' activities:

Number of counsels and interviews ........................................... 5,816
Community Relations (meetings, services, etc.) .......................... 307
Other parish administrations .................................................... 1,418

8. (U) Civic action programs conducted by the chaplains have been operated within the individual units to which the chaplains are assigned. Statistics on money received and disbursed through the Consolidated Chaplains' Fund for civic actions are as follows:

For Churches ................................................................. $ 881.19
For Schools and Orphanages ................................................... $2,398.62
Miscellaneous and Charitable and benevolent causes ................... $2,780.51
1. (U) On 1 June 1969, the Commanding General, this headquarters, was given authority to convene a general court-martial by DA General Order 34, dated 27 May 1969. This includes the authority to convene general courts-martial for the US Army Support Command Da Nang as well as for this command, to pay claims against the United States Government up to and including $1000 and to approve unfitness discharges under AR 635-212 and to waive certain requirements of that regulation.

2. (U) On 28 July 1969, the first general court-martial was convened by this command. Two cases were tried.

3. (U) The following statistics are submitted:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Special Courts-Martial</th>
<th>Summary Courts-Martial</th>
<th>General Courts-Martial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 109</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 85</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 51</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article 15's</th>
<th>US Claims filed</th>
<th>US Claims forwarded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 347</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 336</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 442</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US Claims paid</th>
<th>Foreign Claims filed</th>
<th>Foreign Claims paid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. (U) The decline in special courts-martial may be attributed to the new uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) which requires that qualified military lawyers act as counsel in special courts-martial. The increased use of Article 15 and increased employment of elimination under AR 635-212 permitting swifter removal of undesirable elements has also influenced the decreased number of special courts.

5. (U) Of the 299 cases tried during the quarter, 51 dealt with drug abuse, particularly with possession or use of marijuana.
1. (U) The most significant event in PIO operations during the reporting period was the publication of a monthly command newspaper, "The Logman". The six-page publication is printed by means of multilith and is distributed in 2,500 copies to all units in the Qui Nhon Support Command. Its purpose is to improve the command information and public information program within the US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon.

2. (U) A request for authorization for a commercially printed command newspaper for the command has been submitted to USARV. If approved, the monthly multilith "Logman", will be replaced by a printed newspaper following the Stars and Stripes format. This should provide an even more effective means of disseminating both public and command information.

3. (U) Work was begun on an orientation brochure to be given to all incoming senior NCO's and officers. Input has been received from various staff sections, and a layout for the brochure, to be called "Command and Responsibility," is presently in draft form.

4. (U) Command emphasis was placed on the hometown news release program with the result that more releases were submitted to the PIO during the month of July. However, the large number of releases which were incorrectly prepared or excessively late resulted in an overall decrease in the number of hometown news releases for the quarter.

5. (U) Specific figures on news production and command information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hometown Releases</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hometown Photo Release</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General News</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. (U) The Staff Provost Marshal continued to maintain close liaison with the local Military Police Provost Marshal and Criminal Investigation Division (CID) offices and to coordinate the requirements of the command for Military Police support. During the quarter, the Provost Marshal's office processed and monitored approximately 120 Serious Incident Reports, 375 CID reports of Investigation, and 800 Military Police Reports (19-32).

2. (U) In addition, the Provost Marshal has worked on special projects desired by the Commanding General. This has included observing and monitoring the status of law, discipline, and order in the city of Qui Nhon. The Provost Marshal has observed three night raids and a cordon and sweep conducted through a combined Military Police operation in the city of Qui Nhon in which at least ten AWOL's or deserters were apprehended. The section coordinates with SJA, Area PM, and Deputy Installation Coordinator in updating present off limit, on limit, and curfew regulations and prepares various endorsements and after action reports on minor and major incidents, for the commanding general.

3. (U) The Provost Marshal's Office also started maintaining (in conjunction with Safety) an accident file which includes the number, type, and various descriptions of all accidents involving 1st Logistical Command Personnel in the USASUPCOM, Qui Nhon.
1. (U) The US Army Support Command Qui Nhon, held a Softball Tournament for the Upper II Corps Area in July. Seventeen teams were entered, including two teams from the Fourth Infantry Division and one from the 173d Airborne Brigade. The 527th Personnel Service Company took first place, with Co A, US Army Depot taking second and the 14th Transportation company coming in third.

2. (U) Copies of the 1968 edition of the World Book Encyclopedia have been donated to all Field Collection Libraries by Field Enterprise Educational Corporation. Other library activities included a library workshop which was conducted in Saigon July 8-10 for GI library assistants. The library at Tuy Hoa Detachment (Prov) was closed in late June and the library at the 27th Trans Bn is being sealed in for airconditioning. A building at HQ, 268th Combat Aviation Bn was inspected for possible use by the Tuy Hoa library. The Qui Nhon library was slightly remodeled and new taping tables, new shelves and decorative items such as oil paintings were added. Requests and justification for another, larger, building for the Qui Nhon library were submitted.

3. (U) Forty entertainment units toured Upper II CTZN during the reporting period.

   a. USO Handshake and Variety Shows 16
   b. Commercial Shows 7
   c. Area Military Touring Shows 11
   d. Command Military Touring Shows 5
   e. Informal Shows 1

4. (U) One entertainment center became inoperative and closed due to the relocation of the 173d Abn Bde from An Khe to Phu Tai Valley. Attendance at the Red Beach Rec. Area Entertainment Center increased due to the changing of operating hours.

5. (U) Plans were approved and work has begun on two multi-purpose crafts shops, one at Phu Heip and the other at Long My Depot. Plans were approved and work is in progress on two photo centers to be located in the Qui Nhon area.

6. (U) A Fine Arts contest was conducted in April with 67 entries from all locations in Upper II Corp area. In July the Thirteenth Interservice Photography Contest was conducted with 84 entries from Upper II Corp area. A Vietnam-wide crafts Directors Conference and Workshop was conducted in Saigon during June. The Support Command Special Services section also noted that the number of scheduled classes in Fine Arts and Photography has increased and an exhibit of GI art work was displayed in the USASUPCOM, Qui Nhon library.
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SECTION II, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

A PERSONNEL
None.

B OPERATIONS

1. (C) Static Ambush Positions.
   a. Observation: On 11 July 1969, the Ammunition Base Depot (ABD) perimeter was penetrated by sappers without being observed.
   
   b. Evaluation: The 8th ROK Company had been given the mission of ABD security and had established 20 ambush positions around the perimeter of that installation. At the time of the penetration these positions were relatively static. The enemy discovered this weakness and was able to avoid the ambush sites.
   
   c. Recommendation: Established patterns in defense must never be allowed. Ambush positions should vary in location from night to night.

2. (C) Perimeter Surveillance.
   a. Observation: On 11 July 1969 the ABD perimeter was penetrated by sappers without being observed.
   
   b. Evaluation: Sapper personnel were able to penetrate the ABD without being spotted, having selected a point equidistant between two towers which offered them concealment. This area had been permitted to grow over with foliage.
   
   c. Recommendation: Grass and weeds grow rapidly in this climate. It is necessary to insure that all weeds etc. growing in and around a perimeter fence be burned, cut down and sprayed with defoliant to guard against providing the enemy with natural concealment.

3. (C) POL Bird Cages.
   a. Observation: On 11 May 1969 an attack was conducted on Tank Farm 2 (now known as the Package POL Yard). The POL tank unit was enclosed with a chain link fence cage ("Birdcage").
   
   b. Evaluation: The remaining POL tank in the Package POL Yard, was hit by a B-40 rocket. The round was fired at the tank, but was first detonated by the "bird cage" surrounding the tank. Even though the B-40 was detonated by the "bird cage" the projectile, plus fragments of the round, penetrated the tank causing a slight explosion. The tank was a complete loss because of this attack but most of the fuel was saved since the fragments failed to ignite the diesel fuel within the tank. The bird cage did not provide adequate protection. It did cause the premature explosion of the B-40 rocket, but the projectile still had sufficient force and velocity to penetrate the tank and cause an explosion there. If the fuel within the tank had been other than diesel, a devastating explosion could have resulted.
CONFiDENTIAL

c. Recommendation: All POL tanks should be surrounded by mounds of reinforced earth up to the top of the tank, providing the tank with greater safeguards against attacks such as this.

4. (C) Use of CMMI Team in ARVN Modernization and Improvement Program.

a. Observation: The utilization of a CMMI Team to accomplish the initial technical inspections for transfer of equipment under the ARVN modernization and improvement program greatly facilitated the preparation of equipment for transfer.

b. Evaluation: The use of a CMMI Team helped standardize the inspections, minimized the coordination required and expedited the reporting of results.

c. Recommendation: That utilization of CMMI Teams to conduct initial inspections be adopted as a standard procedure in ARVN modernization and improvement programs.

5. (C) Maintenance Stand-down.

a. Observation: A maintenance stand-down period in conjunction with the transfer of equipment under the ARVN modernization and improvement program has proved highly beneficial.

b. Evaluation: The stand-down period allows more efficient preparation of combat essential equipment and is necessary to insure timely transfer of the equipment.

c. Recommendation: As a minimum, a 14 day stand-down should be provided to accomplish organizational and support maintenance prior to the transfer of equipment under ARVN modernization and improvement programs.

E LOGISTICS

1. (U) POL Tank Repair.

a. Observation: Considerable difficulty was experienced in replacing and repairing POL tanks.

b. Evaluation: The difficulty was primarily due to problems encountered in locating materials and erection kits for rebuilding the tanks and to the lack of a pipeline construction platoon.

c. Recommendation: An emergency supply of bolted steel tank materials and erection kits should always be on hand for emergencies and a pipeline construction engineer platoon should be available for such occasions.
2. (C) Repair Parts Support for ARVN Modernization and Improvement Program.

a. Observation: Repair parts support from the US Army Inventory Control Center, Vietnam (USAICCV) was insufficient during the transfer of equipment from the 6/84th Artillery Battalion under the ARVN modernization and improvement program.

b. Evaluation: Based upon a survey conducted by this headquarters, none of the requisitions which were passed to USAICCV were filled. In addition, despite many attempts to obtain status, only one status report was received. The first set of requisitions were passed to USAICCV on 4 April 1969 and the first status report was received on 4 July 1969. The status report which was received reflected that the majority of repair parts were at zero balance in USARV and had been referred to ARVN but could not be obtained. As a result, this headquarters conducted another reconciliation and processing of the requisitions at each level of supply. This resulted in a 25% fill.

c. Recommendation: (1) That PLL requisitions not be passed to USAICCV until 30 days prior to the completion of the transfer.

(2) That the PLL requisitions be reconciled and screened at each level of supply within the support command on a monthly basis.

(3) That NORS repair parts requisitions be phoned to USAICCV for intensive management.

3. (C) Rail Line of Communication (LOC).

a. Observation: The rail LOC to Tuy Hoa and Phu Cat has not been reliable.

b. Evaluation: During the reporting period the rail LOC was frequently closed by enemy action and POL pipeline fires. This reduced tonnage, as compared to the previous quarter, by 1500 short tons (S/T). The original concept of operations for the support of Tuy Hoa was to use a rail LOC. This was also true to a lesser degree for Phu Cat. The Vietnamese Rail Service (VNRS) is responsible for both operation and maintenance of the rolling stock and has had some difficulty in meeting operational requirements. However, this problem is not as important as the totally inadequate maintenance performed on US Government-owned rail equipment. As an example, only one of four reefer cars is operational, due to lack of proper organizational maintenance. The lack of a reliable rail LOC has necessitated the use of organizational watercraft and trucks to support Tuy Hoa and to some degree Phu Cat (primarily contractor trucks). This has reduced the command's support capacity and flexibility and has created frequent serious operational problems.

c. Recommendation: Future commitment of support operations to use of rail LOC should be completely evaluated. In this case the commitment was made before all factors were known or evaluated.

4. (C) USAF and ARVN Ammunition Vessels.

a. Observation: USAF and ARVN ammunition vessels are arriving in the port three or four at a time, creating a vessel backlog.
b. Evaluation: Commanders have failed to appoint Civil Affairs Officers on orders, and commands authorized full-time Civil Affairs Officers have saddled these people with other duties, such as Civilian Personnel Officer or Legal Officer, which greatly reduce their efforts to organize and direct civic action programs within their unit areas.

c. Recommendation: That unit commanders be encouraged to provide more adequate support to the civil affairs program.

2. (C) US Security Requirements for Logistical Installations.

a. Observation: The Qui Nhon Logistical Installation is located almost entirely within the Binh Dinh Province self-defense area. Primary responsibility for tactical security within this area lies with local government troops.

b. Evaluation: US Logistical Compounds are located at the base of heavily wooded mountains. Innumerable natural caves located throughout these mountains offer the enemy natural cover and concealment. Tactical sweeps are required through these areas to prevent enemy strength buildup and to acquire data on enemy troop movements. Local forces and Vietnamese national troops are unable to perform these missions due to involvement in local pacification programs, thus the defense of US Logistical Installations is, at best, passive. Coordination with other FWMAF operating in the general area occasionally can produce tangible results when clearances from all political and military authorities are obtained. The main supply routes, pipelines and railways in this area, used extensively by US Logistical forces, are subject to frequent interdiction by hostile forces or elements of the local populace engaged in pilferage. Local government troops are reluctant to stop this pilferage and are frequently ineffective in preventing hostile interdiction of principal supply routes. There is one US tactical company (D/58) assigned the mission of security of US Logistical Installations. Its primary efforts have been directed toward the tank farms and the Qui Nhon ABD.

c. Recommendation: US Logistical Installations should be located entirely within US Tactical Areas of responsibility (TAOR's) to insure more active security measures. In addition, a Security Battalion should be assigned to the support command for all security arrangements necessary for positive defensive measures.

G OTHER

1. (U) Coordination Problems in Civil Affairs Activities.

a. Observation: On the night of 4 May 1969, a fire destroyed a double row of refugee houses bordering three sides of the Holy Family Hospital in Qui Nhon. The refugees were squatters who had built makeshift houses on both sides of a public street, converting it from a vehicular to a pedestrian street. These people had tapped into the power lines supplying the hospital and had affected its flow of current. Binh Dinh Province officials had been trying unsuccessfully to resettle these people.

b. Evaluation: The fire provided a ready opportunity to resettle them and the province officials made an immediate decision not to let the squatters
rebuild in the same area. However, on the morning of 5 May 1969, the civil affairs section was informed that US military personnel were unloading lumber in the destroyed area. The Civil Affairs Officer had to physically prevent the truck from being unloaded. The intention to rebuild was contrary to Province plans for the people. This is an example of a civic action not in the best interests of the Vietnamese government and people caused by lack of prior coordination with proper officials.

c. Recommendation: More command emphasis should be placed on coordination of individual unit civil affairs activities with the command civil affairs program.

2. (U) Hung My and Hoi Ha Incident.

a. Observation: On 14 June 1969, Hung My Hamlet in Phu Cat District was destroyed by enemy mortar fire. Province officials requested assistance of the Support Command in rebuilding the hamlet. Contributions of food and materials were made by ARVN, ROK and US forces and by province agencies. A neighboring hamlet, Hoi Ha, in poor condition saw all the help being given to Hung My and decided to obtain some aid also. One night the residents pulled down their entire village, told the District Chief that the Viet Cong had destroyed it and requested help to rebuild the hamlet.

b. Evaluation: This illustrates two points for Civil Affairs consideration: (1) The effect that massive aid to one area will have upon another. (2) Disaster causes should be thoroughly investigated, prior to providing assistance, to insure that the cause is worthy of support.

c. Recommendation: None

3. (C) Maintenance Stand-down Periods.

a. Observation: The benefits of maintenance stand-down periods are directly proportional to the time actually allocated for performance of maintenance.

b. Evaluation: In the case of the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry in particular, maintenance activity had to be curtailed prior to completion in order for the unit to meet its port call time. Even though a 24 hour effort was expended during the available time frame and results were most successful, more work could have been accomplished if more time were available.

c. Recommendation: That maintenance stand-down periods be scheduled so that each company-sized unit receives a minimum of four days maintenance time.

4. (U) Internal Review.

a. Observation: Until July 1969, the reporting requirements for local national labor funds consisted of submitting copies of minutes and financial statements to ACoS, Personnel, this headquarters. At the end of July some of these reports were reviewed by the Internal Review Branch and were found
to contain an exceptional number of errors. Accordingly, requests were forwarded to the various units for the submission of corrected reports. Beginning with the reports for the periods ending 25 or 31 July (depending on the type of funds involved) one copy of each of these statements will be forwarded direct to the Internal Review Branch for review and appropriate action.

b. Evaluation: These labor funds in the past were checked only during the annual general inspections of the units. These inspections have been determined to be insufficient due to the large turn-over of personnel in this command. Effective immediately, personnel of the Internal Review Branch will conduct visits to the various units to assist the responsible personnel in the maintenance of records and to perform on the spot corrections of errors detected. These visits should substantially decrease the number of errors and malpractices currently present in these funds.

c. Recommendation: None.

5. (U) Mechanized Pay Records.

a. Observation: A number of problems and delays were encountered in the mechanization of pay records, due to lack of properly trained personnel and to inadequate equipment.

b. Evaluation: Before undertaking a project of this nature and scope, a study should have been made to insure that adequately trained personnel were available and that equipment was available in sufficient amounts. In this way the program could have progressed smoothly and the initial goals set could have been attained.

c. Recommendation: None.
AVG0-WE (15 May 1966)
SUBJECT: Operational Reports - Lessons Learned of the USASUPCOM Qui Nhơn
for Period Ending 31 July 1969 RCS CSFR-65 (U)

DA: Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384 15 OCT 1969

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,
    APO 96375

1. (U) The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters,
   USASUPCOM Qui Nhơn for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 is forwarded.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:
   a. Reference item concerning Static Ambush Positions, page 75, paragraph B1. Concur. The example cited provides a valuable lesson learned from this incident as to the effectiveness of static ambush positions. This lesson learned was distributed to the command by way of a message reemphasizing the principle of "security by irregularity".
   b. Reference item concerning Perimeter Surveillance, page 75, paragraph B2. Concur. The clearance of foliage in and around perimeter positions has been the object of intensive efforts to reduce concealed approaches to and through the positions.
   c. Reference item concerning chain link RPG standoff screens for protection of POL storage tanks, page 75, paragraph B3. Concur. This headquarters conducted a study concerning the effectiveness of 9 gauge chain link fence for barriers employed in conjunction with the RPG screens; the cost of construction of chain link fence by itself was not warranted due to the lack of effective protection provided. Further, the US Army Engineer Construction Agency, Vietnam was requested to accomplish a study relative to the feasibility and cost of providing earthwork barriers for POL storage tanks in conjunction with erection of RPG screens for all exposed surfaces including tank tops. The study concluded that the cost of such construction would require 3.47 years for amortization. With this information, the Support Commands were directed to construct antisapper chain link fences around the bases of POL storage tanks and around the pumps and manifold systems in the tank farms. The anti-sapper fences are designed to deter enemy personnel from approaching the tanks and equipment pending their defeat or ejection from the perimeter by reaction forces.
   d. Reference item concerning CMH Team in ARVN Modernization and Improvement Program, page 76, paragraph B4. Concur. CMH Teams conducting initial inspections of equipment will result in standardized inspections. Standardized inspections are vitally important for equipment being transferred under the ARVN Modernization and Improvement Program to assure that all ARVN units receive equipment of the same condition and serviceability. 1st Log Comd CMH teams will assist when requested.
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AVCA GO-MH
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the USASUPCOM QUI NHON
for Period Ending 31 July 1969 RC5-GMR-65 (U)

e. Reference item concerning Maintenance Stand-down, page 76, paragraph B5. Concur. Stand-down will provide the maintenance time required to place equipment in a serviceable condition. Equipment transferred under the ARVN Modernization and Improvement Program must be in the best possible condition so that the ARVN Forces will be sustained at a high combat readiness posture. No action required by higher headquarters.

f. Reference item concerning POL tank repair, page 76, paragraph E1. Concur. The Qui Nhon Depot encountered difficulty identifying the correct erection kits required to repair unserviceable tanks reference 1 in Ch.LL. It was determined that the correct erection kits were not available in the QNH depot and the director of POL, QNH SUPCOM, contacted this headquarters for assistance. Erection kits were shipped from the IEN depot. Erection kits have been redistributed between SUPCOM depots to insure their future availability when required. The 643d Pipeline Construction Platoon was being utilized to perform repairs on POL tanks until it was inactivated in February this year. This unit was the only engineer unit in Vietnam that had trained personnel to perform repairs on POL tanks. The recommendation made in subject J, that a pipeline construction engineer platoon be available for emergency repair of POL tanks, is valid.

g. Reference item concerning repair parts support for ARVN Modernization and Improvement Program, page 77, paragraph E28.

(1) Records at this headquarters reveals the following information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total requisitions received from QNH</td>
<td>882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denials by USAICCV</td>
<td>496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referrals to USAICCV</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denials from USAICCV IEN</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referrals to USAICCV CRB</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denials from USAICCV CRB</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Line Filled</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Fill</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) All requisitions received were by direction processed off-line both at USAICCV and at the depots to prevent the item from being backordered should the depot receiving the USAICCV referral order be at zero balance. Off-line processing of this nature preclude establishment of a definitive audit trail by document number.

(3) All requisitions refused by USAICCV due to zero balances in all 1st Log Cond depots and those denied by the depots were turned over to HQ, USARV for subsequent screening against the ARVN supply system for possible fill.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVCA GO-MH
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the USASUPCOM QUI NHON for Period Ending 31 July 1969 RCS CSPQR-65 (U)

(4) Nonconcur with the recommendation that PLL requisitions be held and passed to the USAICCV 30 days prior to completion of transfer. At the time of transfer of the 6th Bn, 84th Arty, the USAICCV was simultaneously off line processing PLL requisitions for three other ARVN Modernization and Improvement Projects. To permit the best possible results for the units concerned and to reduce interruption of normal workload, the current policy of processing requisitions on an as required basis should be continued.

(5) Nonconcur with the recommendation that NIRS repair part requisitions be telephoned to the USAICCV for intensive management. The current Red Ball procedures should be followed for NIRS requirement. These procedures permit the USAICCV to either fill the NIRS requirement from in-country assets on an expedited basis or to pass the requirement to CONUS supply source for expedited fill. The fact that a telephone call is made and received does not permit the USAICCV to react to a NIRS requirement as rapidly as does the receipt of the unit's requisition.


(1) Records at this headquarters indicate enemy interdictions over the rail line between Phu Cat and Tuy Hoa increased during this reporting period. From February through April 1969, there were 17 incidents over this segment of rail, three of which were caused by pipeline fires. During the period May through July 1969, there were 21 incidents, four of which were caused by pipeline fires. Even with the increase in enemy interdictions, records indicate rail tonnage increased over this segment of line from 15,257 STONS (February - April 1969) to 27,989 STONS (May - July 1969), an increase of 12,732 STONS.

(2) The Vietnamese Railway System (VNRs) is responsible for operation and maintenance of U.S. owned rolling stock and motive power under contract agreements with the U.S. Army. MACV-TMA manages the operational contract and MR, 1st Logistical Command, ACOFS, Transportation, manages the maintenance contract.

(3) Maintenance of equipment remains a problem, but does not constitute the major obstacle to rail utilization. Certainly the problem is not insurmountable and can be rectified by following established policy and by coordination between this headquarters and Qui Nhon Support Command.

(4) A fixed facility such as rail in the Vietnam environment is extremely vulnerable to enemy interdiction. Even so, rail is still the cheapest land mode of transportation for large tonnages of cargo and should be utilized to the fullest extent. Plans should be available to augment rail by motor and/or water when interdictions occur. It is important to the internal development of the Republic of South Vietnam that expansion of the Vietnam railroad system continue.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVCA GO-11H

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the USASUPCOM QUI NHON for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSPOR-65 (U)

1. Reference item concerning USAF and ARVN Ammunition Vessels, page 77, paragraph 24. Nonconcur. Movement managers, who are responsive to the requests of commodity managers for such items as ammunition, are in a better position to evaluate acceptance rates of ABD's. Diversion of ammunition to QNH Port has happened once in the past four months. This is not a ship scheduling problem. The causes for diversion are:

(1) Shift of combat from one area to another creating the need for ammunition at QNH.

(2) Overstockage in other ASP's thus requiring ammunition to be diverted to QNH where the ASP could accept cargo.

(3) Diversion of ships to meet requirements and to forestall or minimize delays are already conducted by 1st Log Comd. Available cost data indicates that diversion is generally less expensive than holding ships at Cap St. Jacques or Subic Bay. Current operational procedures should continue.

j. Reference item concerning Mechanization of Stock Account Records, page 78, paragraph 85. Concur. This headquarters by letter AVCA DS, subjects Requirements for Mechanized Stock Record Accounting Systems, dated 18 July 1969, recommended to USAWV the mechanization of nine supply and service companies in 1st Logistical Command with NCR 500 systems. The automation of these previously manual accounts will undoubtedly provide benefits indicated in the evaluation. Changes or deletions to NCR 500 programs are a responsibility of the Computer Systems Command. If changes were made to the systems, complete general supply accounts could be placed on NCR 500 systems; however, the system would quickly reach a saturation point because of overload.

k. Reference item concerning Civil Affairs Programs, page 78, paragraph 21. Concur. Unit Commanders should be required to appoint Civil Affairs Officers on orders and to insure that they are given priority in the performance of Civil Affairs functions. The accomplishment of this action will be made an item of future inspections by this headquarters.

l. Reference item concerning Security Requirements for Logistics Installations, page 79, paragraph 22. Concur in part. The location of logistics installations within US TAORs is not always feasible in the sense that additional security measures would be provided by the presence of US combat elements. These units are concerned with their primary mission, that of finding and defeating the enemy; the protection of logistics installations is not an appropriate mission for such units. The solution appears to be in providing the logistical commander with a capability for defense of his own installations. The only way this can be achieved is through flexibility in the organization of the logistics units so that security force elements are included within their TDA. Again, the requirement for security in each particular area has to be closely evaluated because of differences in terrain.
and enemy threat. It is the recommendation of this headquarters that, in future conflicts of the type found in RVN, logistics units be provided with a security force or "packet", similar to the way the US Air Force organizes their air bases. It has been observed in Vietnam that each USAF base is properly organized for security, in that Air Police security elements are provided in sufficient numbers and with adequate equipment to properly organize the security of the base without a requirement to draw personnel from operational and support units. This functional approach to security precludes degradation of the primary mission that is found in the US Army combat service support elements currently deployed in RVN.

m. Reference item concerning Maintenance Stand-down period, page 80, paragraph C3. Concur. Maintenance stand-down periods are necessary to place equipment in the highest equipment serviceability criteria rating. Proper daily operator maintenance will result in equipment being maintained in a better serviceability criteria and therefore reduce the amount of maintenance stand-down time required. No action required by higher headquarters.

n. Reference item concerning Mechanized Pay Records, page 81, paragraph F5. Adequate equipment in one of lst Logistical Commands most outstanding data processing installations was available for the conversion. Automatic data processing equipment configuration and availability was no problem.

3. (U) Concur with the basic report as modified by this indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

C. D. STAFFORD
1Lt, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

CP:
USASUPCOM QNH
1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. (U) Reference item concerning "POL Tank Repair," section II, page 76, paragraph 2e(1); concur. Pipeline repair is an engineer function. Emergency repair requirements for pipelines and POL storage tanks should be addressed to engineer units supporting the area.

   b. (C) Reference item concerning "US Security Requirements for Logistical Installations," section II, page 79, paragraph F2 and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2e; concur. The recommendation by 1st Log Command that logistical units be assigned or provided security forces should be considered on an individual case basis only. The defense doctrine of logistical installations as stated in FM 101-10-2, chapter 3 provides that unit or installation security (in a limited threat environment) is the responsibility of assigned personnel, and that such defense can be accomplished for short durations utilizing organic personnel. In environments where the nature of the threat is such that the unit's capability to perform its intended mission is adversely affected, doctrine as previously referenced provides for additional security or reaction forces as needed to provide proper security. To assist the logistical installation commander in base defense, full use of available combat branch officers should be made in the planning, organization and supervision of installation security.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
USASUPCOMQui Nhon
1st Log Comd

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 5 DEC 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. Shortt
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
SIGNIFICANT ENEMY ACTIVITIES

1. (C) 051600H May (02230362) 12 Km SSE of Tuy Hoa: A sniper fired tracer rounds into fuel on the ground next to a pipeline crew repairing the Tuy Hoa Vung Ro Bay pipeline. The fuel started a pipeline fire which burned 2 US personnel and 6 Vietnamese children.

2. (C) 061000H May (02087718) 27 Km NNE of Tuy Hoa: A train hit an unknown type mine derailing the engine and two cars. The engine was heavily damaged. Small arms fire was received but there were no reported casualties.

3. (C) 111035H May (BR245491) 24 Km W of An Khe: Pump station No 8 received 10 rounds of 82mm mortar fire inside perimeter along with an unknown amount of small arms fire. An unknown amount of 82mm mortar fire impacted outside the perimeter. Gunships were overhead immediately and returned fire with unknown results. An 8th Trans Gp westbound convoy of 64 vehicles on QL 19 was passing pump station No 8 at the time of the attack and received eight rounds of 82mm mortar fire and some small arms (SA) fire but suffered no casualties or damage. The convoy did not stop. It was estimated that the enemy force was of company size. Fire came from the north side of the road. Results: (PS #8) 3 US wounded in action (WIA), the day room wall, day room equipment and new latrine were destroyed; two tires and the fuel tank on a 5 ton lowboy and two tires on a 3/4 ton truck were blown from shrapnel; one 600 gallon water trailer was destroyed and the platform water tank was damaged by shrapnel.

4. (C) 120000H May (CR047225) in Qui Nhon: At Tank Farm No 2, tank No 6 hit by what was thought to have been mortar fire. The tank was buckled and damaged by shrapnel but did not flame, only smoldered. The tank farm also received some sniper fire inside the perimeter. A "spooky" gunship was on station but could not fire. Results: 5 US slightly WIA. At 0600H, the following items were found at guard post No 5 next to a telephone pole: Two satchel charges, fuses and one grenade. There was also a heavy blood trail.

5. (C) 120100H May (BR939324) 15 Km WNW of Qui Nhon: Location No 39 received six rounds of M-79 fire. There was no damage. Four US WIA, two slight, two serious.

6. (C) 120140H May (BR455455) in An Khe: The An Khe tank farm received two mortar rounds which destroyed tank No 1 (JP-4) and tank No 2 (DF-2). One mortar round is believed to have knocked down the fence around tank No 9 (AVGAS). At 0300H, two EM suffered burns; one, from the 647th QM Co, suffered burns over 40% of his body and the other, from 560th LT Maint Co, suffered light burns. At 0302H, the manifold caught fire from overflowing burning fuel and was badly damaged. Also, the 1X6 inch pumps were destroyed. Damage to the manifold was estimated at 50% and has been repaired.

7. (C) 162315H May (CR069209) in Qui Nhon: Camp Granite received 18 rounds of B-40 rocket fire along with an unknown amount of SA fire. The firing was thought to have come from the nearby Buddhist Cemetery. Fire was also reported coming from Wang Chua Mountain (GRID CR0419). A gunship was on station but did not fire. Artillery support was received. Small arms fire was also Incl 1.
reported around the Qui Nhon Main PX. Results: 18 US WIA (14 were hospitalized), two buildings and one tower damaged; enemy casualties were unknown.

8. (C) 171345H May (BR928383) 19 Km NW of Qui Nhon: A train hit two or three mines placed on the railroad. Small arms fire was received from both sides of the railroad after the mine explosions. The train was returning empty to Qui Nhon. Results: five ARVN WIA, two cars destroyed, two cars damaged and six feet of track blown up.

9. (C) 201400H May (B9899375) 32 Km SW of Qui Nhon: A train from Tuy Hoa, enroute to Qui Nhon, hit three-command detonated mines. The engine was 20% destroyed, two cars and a hopper were derailed. There were no friendly casualties.

10. (C) 201330H May (Z189566) 3 Km NW of Pleiku Log Complex: An 88th S&S Bn five man patrol made contact with an estimated 15 VC force. The patrol received small arms, automatic weapons, and hand grenade fire. They returned fire with small arms and M-79 fire. One US was WIA. Enemy casualties are unknown.

11. (C) 240525H May (Z12053) Pleiku Log Complex: The 62d Maint Bn received one round of 122mm rocket fire which impacted in the road, close to battalion headquarters. The road suffered a four foot crater caused by the rocket.

12. (C) 241015H May (BR245491) 24 Km W of An Khe: A 62 vehicle westbound convoy from the 54th Trans Bn, on Highway 19, was ambushed by an estimated company size enemy force employing SA, automatic weapons (AW), mortar, and B-40 rocket fire. Elements of 1/69th Armor Bn, 504th MP's, and gunships supported the convoy. The road was reopened and the convoy cleared the ambush area by 1100H. Results: Two US WIA (523d Trans Co) and two trucks destroyed (one guntruck and one 5 ton cargo truck).

13. (C) 290600H May (BR92382) 23 Km NW of Qui Nhon (approximately 6 Km N of the 86th Maint Bn Compound): Road team No 76 discovered a VC cave. A hand grenade was thrown into the cave and was followed by a search of the area. There were no friendly casualties; the enemy lost two men killed in action (KIA), one prisoner of war (POW) was taken, six VC suspects detained and two individual weapons were captured in action (CIA). The prisoner stated that one of those KIA was a company commander from the 2-10 Battalion. He also stated that the strength of the C-1st Co was 70 men, the C-2d Co was 90 men, and the C-3d Co was 65 men. He did not know the strength of the C-4th Co or the Bn Hq Co. He estimated the position of the E-2-10 Bn to be BR840295, approximately 9 Km W of the 86th Maint Bn compound.

14. (C) 301400H May (BR999372) 18 Km NW of QN on QL No 19: A pipeline crew from the 240th QM Bn found a cache of approximately 40, 55 gallon drums of POL. The product was in a wooded area very close to Valve No 31.

15. (C) 312355H May (BR30856) approximately 18 Km W of An Khe: Pump station No 7 received three rounds of rocket propelled grenade (RPG) fire resulting in heavy damage to the radio shack and shower building. There were no casualties.
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16. (O) 031045H Jun (BR264724) 22 Km W of An Khe on QL 19: A westbound 27th Trans Bn convoy was ambushed by an estimated reinforced enemy platoon employing 82mm mortar, B-40 rocket, SA, and AW fire from the north side of the road. Two gunships were on the scene at 1055H and a reaction force from B-2/8th Inf and C-1/69th Armor supported the convoy. The convoy suffered one US WIA and two vehicles damaged, one requiring recovery. Tactical forces swept area with negative results.

17. (O) 060930H Jun (CQ19637) 15 Km N of Tuy Hoa: The train from Tuy Hoa hit a mine, the extent of damage was not reported. There were four civilians wounded in action.

18. (O) 072330H Jun (BR992335) 8 Km W of Qui Nhon: Co E, USAF received an unknown amount of SA and three rounds of B-40 rocket fire from an estimated 10 to 15 VC, resulting in 11 US WIA (5 required hospitalization).

19. 081005H Jun (BR867327) 24 Km W of Qui Nhon on highway 19: A westbound convoy was removing a coupling from the pipeline when a booby trap attached to the coupling exploded, resulting in one US WIA (blinded).

20. (C) 081540H Jun (BR634446) 5 Km NW of Binh Khe: An 8th Trans Op 29 vehicle westbound convoy was ambushed by an estimated two enemy platoons employing four rounds of B-40 rocket fire, 12 rounds of 82mm mortar and an unknown amount of SA fire from both sides of the road. The convoy did not stop. Two gunships flying cover for the convoy engaged the enemy. Results: no friendly casualties, seven enemy, KIA. At 1630H (BR50461) 8 Km E of An Khe, the same convoy was again ambushed by an estimated two platoons to one company of enemy troops employing heavy SA, AW, 82mm mortar and B-40 rockets, firing from both sides of the road. Guntrucks in the convoy returned fire and gunships were on station within three min. A Mogas tanker was hit by a B-40 rocket round which failed to explode. Five US troops were WIA (slight), one tanker was destroyed, one tanker, two tractors, and one guntruck were damaged; the enemy lost two men KIA.

21. (C) 092335H Jun (CQ046224) in Qui Nhon: The POL package yard received five rounds of B-40 rocket fire. One round went through the pump shed, slightly damaging a valve. One round went through the fence, impacting into the ground. Three rounds impacted near the pump shed. SA fire was returned and gunships were on station. One US soldier (134th QM Co) was WIA; Enemy casualties unknown.

22. (C) 111145H Jun (ZL95671) approximately 20 Km N of Pleiku on Highway 14: A 124th Trans Bn northbound convoy consisting of 28 vehicles was ambushed by an unknown size enemy force employing 82mm mortar fire. Gunships were on station and tanks & APC's were at the scene. One 5 ton tractor had its windshield and front tires damaged and there were three shrapnel holes in the 5,000 gal JP-4 tanker. Both vehicles were abandoned. An attempt was made to recover the vehicles but the reaction forces asked recovery personnel to leave the area.

23. (G) 171635H Jun (CQ097228) Le Thanh Ton St, Qui Nhon: A grenade was thrown into an ARVN guard post resulting in 2 ARVN KIA.
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24. (C) 221055H Jun (CQ138576) 11 Km N of Tuy Hoa: The Tuy Hoa - Qui Nhon train detonated a 155mm round set up as a mine. Three cars were derailed.

25. (C) 231830H Jun (YB835265) in Ben Het: A convoy bound for Dak To underwent a mortar attack as soon as it departed the Ben Het Compound. They received an unknown amount and type of mortar rounds resulting in two US personnel WIA (both 1st Log), one vehicle was destroyed and one vehicle damaged.

26. (C) 2/1802H Jun (YB918259-918259) 8 Km E of Ben Het: A Pleiku to Ben Het convoy from the 124th Trans Bn, consisting of 16 vehicles, was ambushed by an estimated reinforced NVA platoon firing mortars, rockets, artillery, SA and AW from both sides of the road. One five ton tractor S&F destroyed. One US soldier was KIA, two US WIA (all 1st Log). Enemy casualties are unknown.

27. (C) 22207H Jun (ZA201534) Pleiku Logistical Complex: The 62d Maint Bn received eight or nine rounds of mixed 82mm mortar and 122mm rocket fire. The signal shop received heavy damage. There were no friendly casualties.

28. (C) 22434H Jun (AR60527) in Pleiku: Camp Wilson received two rounds of 122mm rocket fire inside the perimeter. One round was a dud. One round hit a troop billet causing heavy damage to the building and 4 US WIA (all 1st Log).

29. (C) 260655H Jun (CR057218) W side of Qui Nhon on the New ARVN Road: Grenades were found positioned on the pipeline attached to a fuel container, set to explode when the container was moved. Members of the 240th QM En pipeline crew said that RF trainees had been observed in the booby trap area one hour previously.

30. (C) 261420H Jun (BR094359) 19 Km NW of Qui Nhon: Two men from a pipeline maintenance crew were walking about 100 to 200 yards S of railroad bridge No 6 when they witnessed an explosion and fire at the bridge. They saw two Vietnamese in uniform running from the vicinity. When the crewmen reached the bridge, they found that three satchel charges had been blown on the pipeline and that 20 sections of pipeline had been damaged. It also appeared that someone had attempted to dismantle the bridge and set a charge to it. The bridge was greatly weakened by the POL fire and explosion. Six sections of pipe were replaced and gaskets were replaced in 14 more sections. The blast and fire also bent the RR tracks severely and burned some wooden RR ties.

31. (C) 27100H Jun (CN083236) in Qui Nhon City: A 4 lb mine was found under the POL line at the Vietnamese rail yard, but was tossed aside as it was wrapped in rags. Some children found it and took the mine out. They pulled the detonator and the blasting cap exploded injuring the children. ARVN has been requested to sweep the area.

32. (C) 218100H Jun (BR165314) 33 Km W of An Khe on QL 19: An eastbound, 30 vehicle, 27th Trans Bn convoy was ambushed by an unknown size enemy force 300 to 400 meters S of the road, employing SA, AW, and mortar fire. The convoy returned fire with SA, M-79, and AW, but did not stop. The enemy was engaged immediately by overhead gunships and by APC's from the 2/8th Mech Inf with unknown results. There was one US WIA (88th Trans Co) but no damage to the convoy.
33. (C) 032010H Jul (CR087235) at 122 Phan Boi Chau St in Qui Nhon City: An unidentified young VN male threw a grenade into a Korean restaurant. VN National Police saw the youth toss the hand grenade, but could not apprehend him. Results: Six friendly personnel WIA (1 VN female, 3 ROK soldiers, 2 Korean civilians).

34. (C) 040420H Jul (ZA215536) at the Pleiku logistical center: The 88th S&S Bn received three rounds of suspected 122mm rocket fire. A fourth round impacted outside of the perimeter. Results: one US soldier was WIA (shrapnel in foot) and the security building was damaged by shrapnel.

35. (C) 060530H Jul (CQ225336) approx 18 Km SE of Tuy Hoa: There was a fire on the Tuy Hoa - Vung Ro pipeline, probably due to attempted pilferage. The fire crews arrived at 0615H. Results: five VN civilians were burned to death and four bicycles, one motorcycle, approx 100 VN "collection cans", 27 sections of 6" pipe, and 12 sections of 8" pipe were destroyed by the fire.

36. (C) 071220H Jul (CR07001949) in QN: Tank Farm No 1 personnel found a loaded M72 rocket just outside of the tank farm. A guard was posted on the rocket until the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team arrived and disarmed it.

37. (C) 071230H Jul (BR932379) 19 Km NW of QN: The Phu Cat train hit a mine, resulting in two meters of track blown up and one hopper car damaged. All repairs were completed on the afternoon of 7 July. There were no casualties reported.

38. (C) 081015H Jul (BR027512) 26 Km E of Pleiku: A 2 1/2 ton truck from 523d Trang Co hit a mine on highway 19, resulting in one US WIA (not seriously) and the rear axel of the vehicle blown off.

39. (C) 081640H Jul (BR963358) approximately 18 Km NW of Qui Nhon on the An Khe pipeline: A fire was reported in a village about 1 1/2 miles from the pipeline. The cause of the fire is unknown. An estimated 300 to 350, five gallon cans of JP-4 were destroyed in the fire along with the homes of over a thousand people.

40. (C) 100630H Jul (CQ032727) 10 Km SE of Dong Xuan: On the Qui Nhon - Tuy Hoa railroad line, the Tuy Hoa train hit a mine causing damage to the extent that 500 S/T of cargo were delayed or diverted.

41. (C) 101050H Jul (BR930380) 19 Km NW of Qui Nhon on the Phu Cat pipeline: A Vietnamese civilian spotted a pipeline fire and while attempting to put it out, stepped on a mine and was critically wounded. The pipeline crew spotted a second land mine nearby and called in EOD personnel who destroyed it in place.

42. (C) 110410H Jul (CR028173): Personnel at the Qui Nhon AHD heard an explosion and found that a pad of 5A ammunition was on fire. Fire truck and water trucks were sent to the scene. The fire was out by 0445H when another explosion took place. A sweep of the area revealed that satchel charges were causing the explosions. 5A Area D, lost three pallets of A-212L (21,000 rounds). Pad 62 lost two rounds of 90mm HE tracer, and 30 rounds of 90mm cannister. Pad 71, containing 105mm ammunition received no damage because...
the satchel charge placed there malfunctioned. EOD took the satchel charge away. Bare footprints leading from the pads to a concealed hole in the perimeter fence were found later that morning, along with some communist propaganda leaflets.

43. (C) 152335H Jul (BR990248) Qui Nhon Compound Complex C: The 173d Abn Inf compound received five rounds of B-40 rocket fire. One round hit the mess hall and three rounds hit troop barracks. Results were one US soldier KIA, eight WIA (all minor). The mess hall has a 3½ ft hole in roof and minor damage to the floor and screens. The troop barracks was hit on the 2d floor level causing holes in two mattresses and some damage to some wall and foot lockers.

44. (C) 191955H Jul (BR948331) Qui Nhon Compound Complex A: 86th Maint Bn Post No 3 received four rounds of SA fire. The rounds landed in front of the tower with no casualties or damage. Tracer and muzzle flash were spotted and fire returned with 30 rounds of M-60 fire with unknown results. At 2000H the same day, a 2½ ton truck received heavy fire. The truck driver got into the jeep behind his truck, leaving the truck on side of the road. The jeep received fire as it entered 86th Maint compound. There were no friendly casualties. Later on, at 2133H, 54th Trans Bn Post No 3 received 20 rounds of SA fire with negative casualties or damage. Fire was returned with 30 of M-60 fire with unknown results.

45. (C) 230230H Jul (BR905324) 18 Km NW of QN of Highway 19: The 901st PF (popular forces) platoon, guarding Bridge No 5, was attacked by an estimated multi-platoon VC force. The VC secured the bridge and then attacked the hamlet headquarters at Nhon Tho and half destroyed it. The contact lasted 1½ to 2 hrs. VC employed SA, mortar and B-40 rocket fire. Results were two PF KIA, five PF WIA; Bridge No 5 was 80% destroyed and a bypass has since been built. The enemy lost three men KIA (body count).
**REPORT TITLE**
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon

**DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)**
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May 69 to 31 July 69.

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**REPORT DATE**
12 August 1969

**TOTAL NO OF PAGES**
68

**NO. OF REPS**

**CONTRACT OR GRANT NO**

**PROJECT NO**
N/A

**OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)**

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT**

**SPECIAL NOTICES**

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OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

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