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AGDA (M) (24 Nov 69) FOR OT UT 694056

5 January 1970


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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Inci

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US Army Limited War Laboratory
US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

THRU: Commander in Chief
United States Army, Pacific
ATTN: GPOP-DT
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (C) Operations; Significant Activities

   a. (U) COMMAND.

   (1) Commanders.

   CG, USARV

      1 August 1969 - 31 October 1969 GEN Creighton W. Abrams

   DCG, USARV

      1 August 1969 - 31 October 1969 LTG Frank T. Mildren

   CG, Engineer Troops, Vietnam (Provisional)

      1 August 1969 - 14 October 1969 MG David S. Parker

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)


1 August 1969 - 14 October 1969
BG Robert M. Tarbox

14 October 1969 - 31 October 1969
COL William L. Barnes

(2) Distinguished Visitor Summary. During the reporting period, distinguished visitors to this headquarters were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME/DATE</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MG William R. Desobry 2 - 8 August 1969</td>
<td>Director of Operations, ODCSOPS, DA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG William J. Durrenberger 3 - 7 August 1969</td>
<td>ACoS, G-4, USARPAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG Jack C. Fuson 4 August 1969</td>
<td>Director of Transportation, ODCSLOG, DA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Norman Vincent Peale 6 August 1969</td>
<td>Pastor, Marble Collegiate Church, New York City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG Albert E. Milloy 9 - 10 August 1969</td>
<td>CG, 1st Inf Div (Designate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Bruce Palmer, Jr. 10 August 1969</td>
<td>Vice Chief of Staff, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Charles H. Bonesteel, III 10 August 1969</td>
<td>CG, 8th USA/CINCUNC/COMUSFK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG John G. Appel 10 August 1969</td>
<td>Director of Plans, ODCSLOG, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG Fred E. Karhols 10 - 11 August 1969</td>
<td>Deputy Director of Plans, ODCSOPS, USA</td>
</tr>
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AVHGC-DST
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam for Period Ending 31 October 1969,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

BG George S. Blanchard
10 - 11 August 1969

MG Frederick W. Boye, Jr.
10, 12 - 13 August 1969

LTC Chaveng Youngcharoen
17 August 1969

GEN Ralph E. Haines, Jr.
20 - 25 August 1969

Mr. Ben Beeson (GS16)
22 August 1969

BG Samuel Jaskilka
24 August 1969

MG Charles C. Case
1 - 4 September 1969

HON Barry J. Shillito
7 September 1969

HON J. Ronald Fox
7 September 1969

Mr. Paul R. Riley
7 September 1969

Mr. Edward J. Sheridan
7 September 1969

MG William N. Redling
7 September 1969

INCL 3

Director, Plans & Programs, OACSFOR

Chief, Office of Personnel Operations, USA

CG, Royal Thai Forces, Vietnam

CINCUSARPAC

CPD, USARPAC

Dep ACofS for Opns, MACV

CG, USAMECOM

Asst Sec of Def (I&L)

Asst Sec of the Army (I&L)

Dep Asst Sec of Def (S&S)

Dep Asst Sec of Def (Housing)

Dep CG for Log Support, AMC
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

MG R. C. Conroy
7 September 1969

MG John J. Hayes
7 September 1969

BG John D. McLaughlin
7 September 1969

BG William L. Starnes
7 September 1969

GEN Frank S. Besson, Jr.
13 September 1969

LTG Frederick L. Wieseman (USMC)
13 September 1969

LTG Lewis L. Mundel (USAF)
13 September 1969

VADM Edwin B. Hooper (USN)
13 September 1969

RADM John W. Bottoms (USN)
13 September 1969

MG George E. Pickett
15 - 20 September 1969

MG Hugh F. Foster, Jr
15 - 20 September 1969

BG B. F. Bally (USAF)
16 September 1969

ACofS for Logistics, MACV J-4

ASST Dep CofS for Logistics (S&M)

ASST CofS for Logistics, CINCPAC

ASST for Construction Ops, OASD (I&L)

Chairman, Joint Logistics Review Board

Member, JLRB

Member, JLRB

Member, JLRB

ACofS, C-E, DA

CG, USASTRATCOM/ACofS, C-E, USARPAC

Commander of PACEX
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BG Charles W. Ryder, Jr.
17 - 21 September 1969

Dr. R. D. Shelton
18 September 1969

MG Benjamin J. Webster
21 - 24 September 1969

BG Chester H. Johnson
21 - 27 September 1969

Air Marshal Sir Neil Wheeler
25 September 1969

LTG William P. Yarborough
1 - 3 October 1969

BG James K. Terry
1 - 3 October 1969

BG George A. Godding
1 - 3 October 1969

Mr. Charles O. Rossotti
14 October 1969

Mr. Philip A. Odeen
14 October 1969

BG David E. Ott
16 - 19 October 1969

Mr. Leonard Sullivan, Jr. (GS18E)
16 October 1969

ACofS, G-1, USARPAC

ACofS, G-2, USARPAC

ACofS, G-3, USARPAC

COMFEAF

DCINCUSARPAC

Dep Asst Sec of Def (Systems Analysis)

Acting Dep Asst Sec of Def (Regional Programs)

CG, USARUSUPTHAI

Dep Dir of Research and Engineering for SEA Matters, DoD
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Mr. Edward Burke (GS16E)  
17 - 23 October 1969  
Chairman, DoD Team on M551 Sheridan

Mr. V. G. Raviolo (GS16E)  
17 - 23 October 1969  
Member, DoD Team on M551 Sheridan

COL John Ulrich (USA, Ret) (GS16E)  
17 - 23 October 1969  
Member, DoD Team on M551 Sheridan

Dr. George Szego (GS16E)  
17 - 23 October 1969  
Institute of Defense Analysis

Mr. Norman Augustine (GS17E)  
17 - 23 October 1969  
Ofc of Dir of Def (Research & Engineering)

BG Arthur Sweeney  
17 - 23 October 1969  
DCG, USA Weapons Command, Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois

Mr. Frank Vee (GS16E)  
17 - 23 October 1969  
Ofc Sec of Def (I&L)

Mr. Robert Stone, (GS16E)  
17 - 23 October 1969  
Ofc Sec of Def (SA)

GEN Ralph E. Haines, Jr  
18 - 26 October 1969  
CINCUSARPAC

MG Herbert G. Sparrow  
22 - 27 October 1969  
Chief, US Army Audit Agency

BG Manley G. Morrison  
25 - 31 October 1969  
Chief, Med Svc Corps, Ofc of the Surgeon General

VADM L. P. Ramage (USN)  
26 October 1969  
COMSTS

RADM S. H. Moore (USN)  
26 October 1969  
COMSTSFE
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam for Period Ending 31 October 1969,
RCS CSFOR-55 (R2) (U)

b. (C) PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, MORALE AND DISCIPLINE (U)

(1) (U) Morale and Personal Services. Chaplain Activities. There was a 30% increase in attendance at character guidance instruction over the previous quarter. The percentage of the Command attending religious services was 18.8%. The number of services conducted per chaplain per week this quarter was 7.2 as compared to 6 for the same quarter last year. Contributions by Chaplains' Funds to Vietnamese religious/charitable causes during 1st quarter FY 70 totaled $49,993.98.

(2) (U) Medical Services and Medical Supplies.

(a) Aeromedical Evacuation. The rapid evacuation of patients continues to be one of the major contributors to the high level of medical service enjoyed in Vietnam. Aeromedical evacuation has become routine because of improved distribution of aircraft, refined techniques, higher availability of aircraft, and the assignment of dedicated, skilled pilots. Even though there has not been an increase in aeromedical evacuation units since mid-1968, the number of patients evacuated by air has constantly increased. The patient evacuation workload from 1962 through October 1969, presented below, vividly depicts improvements in medical evacuation, due primarily to the air evacuation means of patient movement.

<table>
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<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>1,914</td>
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<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>202,573</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969 (1 Jan - 31 Oct)</td>
<td>201,982</td>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam for Period Ending 31 October 1969,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(b) Medical Supply.

1 The identification and disposition of excess medical materiel is a matter which has and is continuing to receive added emphasis. The current USARV Medical Excess Program consists of three primary segments: retrograde of excess hospital TOE equipment, retrograde of excess Medical Self-Contained Transportable (MUST) equipment, and the disposition of excesses generated as the result of hospital closures and reduction of requisitioning objectives.

2 USARV hospitals are fixed facilities and as such use a great deal of non-standard, non-TOE medical equipment. Therefore, a substantial amount of TOE medical equipment not required for assigned missions is on hand. A program was implemented on 29 September 1969 to identify, classify and dispose of this equipment. The equipment, based on condition coding, will be retrograded to Okinawa and will be applied against world-wide medical assemblage requirements. Completion of this program is scheduled for the end of January 1970.

3 Advance instructions have been received for the disposition of excess MUST equipment generated as the result of hospital closures. Serviceable MUST equipment will be retrograded directly to CONUS (Toole and Atlanta Army Depots). Actions are currently being taken to prepare the MUST equipment formerly used by the 3d Surgical Hospital for retrograde shipment or local disposition.

(c) Medical Records and Statistics Division.

1 MED-16's for Agranulocytosis. All suspected and confirmed cases of agranulocytosis in USARV hospitals now require submission of a Special Telegraphic Report of Selected Diseases (RCS MED-16). In addition to the hospital and report identification data, the following information will be reported on all cases of agranulocytosis: name, grade, SSAN, unit, age, date admitted to hospital, date arrived RVN, and any remarks deemed pertinent by the attending physician.

2 Battle Casualty Terminology. As of 1 August 1969, the term Injuries Resulting from Hostile Action (IRHA) was discontinued for use on medical records and reports in Vietnam. When considering those wounded in action as a general category, the term Battle Casualty (BC) will be used. On individual medical records (field medical cards and clinical record cover sheets) the term Wounded in Action (WIA) will be used.

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Rapid Adjustments in Military Personnel Ceilings Cause MOS Imbalances. During the period April through June 1969, enlisted personnel replacements (flows) to RVN were approximately 9,900 below that which was requested. In July, approximately 8,100 enlisted replacements were received which had not been requisitioned. This occurred at a time when the Army strength in RVN was being reduced. The initial redeployment and phasedown action reduced the chargeable strength ceiling (operating strength + patients + TDY) from 367,752 to 346,500, a drop of approximately 21,250, which became effective on 31 August. As a result of the unexpected July rise in strength and the new ceiling, the Army operating strength in RVN had to be reduced by about 18,000 personnel. Action was taken to accelerate the normal rotation of personnel back to CONUS and to reduce the flow of replacements into RVN. Requisitions were cancelled for the month of August for 1,800 enlisted personnel and approximately 7,200 personnel were diverted at CONUS ports to other PACOM areas. Requisitions were cancelled for approximately 8,000 enlisted personnel in September and 5,800 in October. Many of these cancellations could be made only in the entry level MOS. Due to these extreme actions, which were taken to rapidly reduce the Army strength in RVN, shortages have resulted in artillery crewmen, truck drivers, engineers, mechanics, cooks, and medical aidmen. These shortages are being adjusted by subsequent requisitions.

Establishment of Vietnam Open Mess Agency. USARV has 159 open mess accounts and 323 other sundry funds which operate as small clubs. With an operation of this magnitude, it was necessary to designate a separate staff agency to supervise and monitor these accounts. The Vietnam Open Mess Agency is designed to provide technical assistance to subordinate commanders, custodians and managers of the open messes. The VOMA also has staff responsibility for the USARV Central Mess Fund.

Establishment of Central Purchasing Agency. Five central Purchasing Offices have been established in Vietnam to standardize procurement procedures and to assist non-appropriated fund activities. The main CPA office is located in Saigon with field offices at Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh and Long Binh. The establishment of these offices will insure that all purchases are authorized by the commands and are fully justified. The primary objectives of Central Purchasing are to buy US, eliminate the opportunity for kickbacks, and prohibit purchases from unauthorized sources.
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(c) (C) INTELLIGENCE.

(1) Significant Enemy Activities.

(a) General. During the past quarter, enemy initiated activity throughout the country remained at a relatively low level with the exception of a country-wide high point which occurred on the night of 11 and 12 August 1967. Enemy attempts to initiate offensive activity in many instances were frustrated by friendly preemptive operations including B-52 strikes, ground search and clear missions, and the denial of food and material through the capture of numerous caches. The main thrust of enemy activity was directed primarily at countering GVN pacification efforts and was conducted by the enemy's local and guerrilla forces. For the most part, enemy main forces were refitting, reorganizing and training for future operations. The infiltration of the 18B NVA Regiment from III CTZ into IV CTZ and the movement of the 28th and 66th NVA Infantry Regiments with elements of the 40th NVA Artillery Regiment from northern II CTZ to the II-III CTZ boundary area along the Phuoc Long - Quang Duc provincial border were particularly significant.

(b) 1 Corps Tactical Zone. Enemy activity in the 1 Corps Tactical Zone during the quarter was generally at a low level. Notable activity occurred during mid-August in Front 4 (a portion of Quang Nam Province) and southern I CTZ. This activity consisted of a well coordinated series of indirect attacks by fire primarily against US installations. Activity decreased in September and October as the enemy focused his attention on the disruption of the GVN pacification program and procurement of rice prior to the beginning of the Northeast Monsoon. Of particular note in southern I CTZ during late August and early September was the activity of the Americal Division which operated against the 2d NVA Division. This activity resulted in the enemy sustaining over 600 KIAs. The NVA division was kept off balance and prevented from initiating offensive activity. Several Hoi Chanhs in southern I CTZ indicated that enemy units faced problems of rice shortages and low morale, particularly in the Piedmont Region adjacent to the coastal lowlands of southern I CTZ. Among the morale problems were indications that resentment and dissension existed between the VC and NVA in Quang Nam Province.

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(c) II Corps Tactical Zone. Enemy initiated activity in II CTZ for the quarter remained at a low level. Activity was highlighted by scattered sapper attacks, interdiction of lines of communication, and isolated attacks by fire. Ambushes and mining along major highways as well as pipeline interdiction were in evidence throughout the period. The 40th NVA Artillery Regiment and the 28th and 66th NVA Infantry Regiments redeployed from northern II CTZ south to MR-10. This move began in mid-August and was completed in September. In Binh Dinh Province, a large concentration of caches was discovered by Allied Forces during early October.

(d) III Corps Tactical Zone. Enemy initiated activity in the III CTZ area increased during August as the enemy formally opened his Fall Campaign. Activity was particularly intense in the An Loc/Loc Ninh area and the border area of northern III CTZ. The activity was not as extensive as previous highpoints due to preemptive allied operations and airstrikes early in the month. VC/NVA initiated activity during September fell to a very low level. The enemy observed a seventy-two hour cease fire after the death of Ho Chi Minh, the leader of the Viet Cong as well as the North Vietnamese. The cease fire was followed by a marked decrease in activity as enemy units probably re-equipped and redeployed for the forthcoming Winter-Spring Campaign. During October, enemy initiated activity remained at a low level. Priority was probably on establishing and stocking new cache sites. Friendly initiatives in the form of B-52 strikes concentrated along the Cambodian border areas of northern Tay Ninh, Binh Long, and Phuoc Long Provinces and the discovery of numerous caches considerably hampered enemy initiatives.

(e) IV Corps Tactical Zone. Enemy initiated activity in IV Corps Tactical Zone remained at a low level. Enemy activity was highlighted by both movement within the CTZ and increased infiltration activity along the Cambodian border. The 273d VC Regiment moved from the Seven Mountains area in Chau Doc south to the Three Sisters area and then to the U Minh Forest area in western MR-3. Significant friendly initiated contacts were made with elements of the 273d VC Regiment in the vicinity of Rach Gia and in the U Minh Forest resulting in large numbers of enemy casualties, greatly reducing the regiment's combat effectiveness. The highlight of the quarter was the infiltration of the 18B NVA Regiment into the Seven Mountains.
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area in Chau Doc Province. This regiment, which previously operated in III CTZ, is the first NVA unit to move into IV CTZ. Infiltration of NVA replacement personnel was also in evidence. During the period the enemy continued to carry out operations designed to counter GVN pacification programs.

(2) Intelligence Operations and Training.

(a) Operation Special Watch was instituted on 18 August. Special Watch is initiated when intelligence reports indicate an increase in enemy activity which poses a threat of attack by fire, sapper attack or ground attack against the Long Binh Military Complex. Intelligence information reported within a radius of 30 km of Long Binh Military Complex receives special attention. Daily checks, as a minimum, are made with G2, III TFV and J2 MACV for such reports. Daily checks are also made with all USAF, USA, ARVN and FWMAF intelligence agencies in the area for late information.

(b) The 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (Aerial Reconnaissance Support) (MIBARS) conducted in-country orientation courses to acquaint newly assigned Image Interpreter (II) and G2 Air personnel with imagery interpretation and G2 air problems peculiar to tactical operations in the Republic of Vietnam, and to orient ES-38 Photographic Darkroom Group operators on ES-38 operation and maintenance procedures. The courses were presented monthly at the 1st MIBARS School in Saigon.

(c) The Americal Division conducted an operational test of the new wheel numeral code/authentication system (KAC-288) from 15 August to 15 September 1969. The comments and recommendations of this headquarters incorporating the Americal Division test results, were dispatched to USARPAC on 25 September 1969. HQ USARV recommended that the KAC-288 wheel code system be approved and accepted as a replacement for the KAC-Q series and that implementation of the wheel code system within RVN be expedited.

d. (C) PLANS, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING. (U)

(1) (U) Turnover of Blackhorse Base Camp.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam for Period Ending 31 October 1969,
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a On 21 July 1969, II FFORCEV initiated action to relocate the 11th ACR Base Camp from Blackhorse to Bien Hoa Army Base with elements at Di An and Camp Frenzell-Jones. A USARV planning and operating group (UPOG), which had official representation from II FFV and 11th ACR, prepared a plan for the turnover of the Blackhorse Base Camp to ARVN. This plan was approved by MACV on 10 August 1969, after which RVN representatives were added to UPOG.

b On 12 August 1969, first elements of the 11th ACR began relocating from Blackhorse.

c The movement of the 199th LIB, a tenant unit, from Blackhorse commenced on 28 August 1969.

d The RVN Joint General Staff formally accepted Blackhorse Base Camp on 28 August 1969.

e The physical turnover of Blackhorse Base Camp from US to RVN occurred in one day. A ceremony was held at 1100 hours, and turnover was completed at 1200 hours, 24 October 1969.

(2) (C) The Deployment of the M551 Sheridan.

a During the quarter, Sheridans were issued to the following units:

- 3d Squadron, 11th ACR - 27 each
- 2d Squadron, 11th ACR - 27 each
- Trp D/17th Cav, 199th LIB - 9 each

b A New Equipment Training Team conducted crew and organizational maintenance training for each unit. Training in MOS 41C, fire control repairman; 45K, turret mechanic; and 63H, track mechanic, for units providing direct support and general support maintenance was conducted at Long Binh.
During the period 17-23 October, a special team from the Defense Department visited all Sheridan-equipped units to review the Sheridan program in USARV. A report of the team's findings will be available after they conduct a similar review of Sheridan equipped units in Europe.

(3) (C) The Redeployment of US Army Units from RVN.

a (UNCLAS-FOUO) Phase I redeployment, Keystone Eagle, was completed on 27 August 1969. A total of 14,369 US Army personnel of the 1st Infantry Division, three non-divisional active Army units, and 20 reserve component units were redeployed to CONUS and Hawaii under Keystone Eagle.

b (C) Phase II redeployment, Keystone Cardinal, was announced by the President on 17 September 1969. The US Army portion of the increment consisted of 14,082 personnel spaces. Fourteen active Army units and ten reserve component units to be redeployed to CONUS for inactivation or demobilization. Thirty-eight units were to be inactivated in RVN, and 31 units and two accounts were to be reduced in strength. As of 31 October 1969, nine units have redeployed from RVN and nine units have been inactivated for a total of 2,743 personnel spaces. A list of redeployed or inactivated units is provided at Inclosure 1.

c (C) As of 31 October 1969, only two of the original 43 Reserve and National Guard units deployed to RVN remain in-country. These remaining two units the 377th CS Company and Company D, 151st Infantry (Ranger) will depart in November 1969.

d (U) On 19 September 1969, USARV published a Redeployment Guide for Units to assist them in preparing for redeployment or inactivation. The guide is based upon experience gained during Keystone Eagle. Included are lessons learned from Keystone Eagle, sample checklists, orders and manifests, guidelines and other reference material to assist units in preparing for redeployment or inactivation.

(4) (U) The Vietnam Artillery Mortar Aviation Incident Study (VAMAIS)

During the report period an analysis of friendly fire incidents attributed
Artillery ammunition expenditures for this quarter ending 30 September 1969 increased 0.2 percent over the previous quarter. Total expenditures were 2,957,677 rounds. Of this total 7.2 percent, or 215,755 rounds, were expended on interdiction targets. The interdiction expenditures decreased 3.9 percent compared to the quarter ending 30 June 1969.

(6) (U) USCONARC Liaison Team Visit.

During the period 11 through 28 September 1969, a USCONARC Liaison Team visited HQ USARV and subordinate commands. The team was composed of representatives from Headquarters USCONARC and selected Army Service Schools. The purpose of the visit was to determine through observation, conference and interview, the adequacy of USCONARC Service Schools and ATC training in preparing personnel for assignment to RVN.

(7) (U) Training Newsletters.

Combat operations continued to be analyzed and material of value to tactical units in RVN was extracted and published in the form of Training Newsletters. In addition to the three Training Newsletters published, a letter, subject: "Land Clearing Operations" was distributed on 20 October 1969. Training Newsletters published during the reporting period were:

- Training Newsletter Number 3-69 6 August 1969
  Aero-Medical Evacuation Procedures and Equipment
- Training Newsletter Number 4-69 20 September 1969
  Pathfinders
Training Newsletter Number 5-69

Night Firing Training and Techniques

(8) (C) NVA/VC Small Unit Tactics and Techniques Study.

On 22 March 1969, the USARV NVA/VC Study, a single, comprehensive document including a compilation of NVA/VC small unit tactics and techniques, was published and distributed. Local distribution included all USARV units down to and including battalion level, the USARV staff and COMUSMACV. Copies were also furnished DA, interested major US Army commands and CONUS service schools. The study was published in loose-leaf form to facilitate changes. On 21 July 1969, USARV was tasked by MACV to expand the NVA/VC Small Unit Tactics and Techniques study. On 23 August 1969, Chapter VI, Engineer and Sapper Techniques, was updated, published and distributed. On 28 August 1969, a comprehensive update and expansion of the study was initiated. Data has been collected from the MACV Intelligence Library, CICV, CMIC, CDEC, CMEC and the MACV J2 Research and Analysis Section. Other sources included the Joint Operations Center, RVNAF High Command; RVNAF J2 Section; JGS; and the N2 Section, COMNAVFORV. Data collection and evaluation have been completed for the expansion. Seven new chapters have been written and two other chapters of the original study have been rewritten. Publication is anticipated during the first part of the next quarter.

(9) (C) ENSURE Program.

a Guidance from DA was received during the reporting period which outlined the criteria for ENSURE request approval. These are: the item must be urgently required; procurement time must be relatively short; and the item must make a significant improvement in operations.

b ENSURE activities during the period 1 August to 31 October 1969 were:

1 ENSURE 240; Sniper Rifles: The first increment of 40 rifles arrived during October. A total of 1435 rifles are scheduled for shipment.
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2 ENSURE 131.1; Boston Whaler: Twenty of these shallow draft boats arrived and were issued to MACV advisors. The final thirty boats are scheduled to arrive in November.

3 ENSURE 263; XM191: This multi-shot flame weapon has been modified to correct a malfunction in the trigger mechanism. Operational quantities have begun to arrive and are being allocated to units for new equipment training and operational evaluation.

4 ENSURE 318; Heavy Duty High Pressure Cleaning System: Six of these cleaning systems have arrived and are currently being evaluated by the Support Commands.

5 ENSURE 218.1; Belly Armor for the M113A1: Initial kits are being shipped by air and the program is running ahead of schedule.

6 ENSURE 309.1; Disc Harrows: This request was submitted and approved during the reporting period. The harrows are to be used with the D9G Tractor for secondary land clearing operations. The evaluation will be conducted by the 62d Engineer Battalion.

(10) (C) Sniper Program.

Prior to redeployment, the 9th Infantry Division had developed an extremely active and effective sniper program. The Division had procured special weapons and sights and established a Sniper Training School staffed by personnel trained by the Army Marksmanship Training Unit (AMTU) at Fort Benning. During the period 7 November 1968 through 11 June 1969, 9th Infantry Division snipers produced 1000 kills. When the 9th Infantry Division redeployed their sniper assets were transferred to the 25th Infantry Division. In order to employ this highly successful sniper program throughout Vietnam a total of 1425 accurized M-14 rifles with adjustable ranging telescopes have been requested under the ENSURE program and are scheduled for delivery by March 1970. Sniper training teams consisting of one officer, seven sniper instructors and one gunsmith, trained by the AMTU at Fort Benning, will be provided each Division. This will give the
dissions the capability of establishing and maintaining an active sniper program. The sniper program is another highly effective method of taking freedom of movement away from the enemy and should prove to be of continued value as the tempo of the war decreases.

(II) (U) USARV Advisor School.

The USARV Advisor School at Di An was established by COMUSMACV in February 1968 as part of the Regional Force Popular Force (RF/PF) improvement program. The primary missions of the school are:

(a) To provide motivation and training for personnel assigned to the Regional and Popular Forces Mobile Advisory Teams and other personnel as directed.

(b) To monitor, evaluate and recommend changes to the RF/PF Advisor program.

(c) To accomplish these missions the school presents a detailed 16-day program of instruction geared to the peculiarities of RF/PF operations. A class begins every nine days with each having a capacity of 100 students. The first class graduated on 1 April 1968 and in October 1969 the 5,000th student graduated and deployed in support of the Mobile Advisory Team program.

e. (C) LOGISTICS.

(1) (C) Ammunition Supply.

(a) Seven ammunition items were under Available Supply Rate (ASR)/allocation management at the end of October 1969. Items under ASR/allocation were:

- Ctg 40mm HE, B535
- *Rkt 2.75" HE Hv, PD, H534
- *Flr Trip Surface M49, L495
- Rkt 2.75" Flechette, H459
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Proj 155mm Illum, D505  *Rkt 2.75" HE Lt, PD, H490
*Sig Illum Gd, WSP, L312

*Items under DA ASR management

(b) Cycle IV of the Class V inventory was completed in August 1969. Net Inventory Adjustment was -0.3%, indicating the necessity and value of a continuing cyclic Class V inventory program.

(c) Phase IV of the USARV Class V Retrograde Program commenced on 1 July 1969 with an objective of 1,000 ST per month for the period of 1 July - 31 December 1969. Indications are that approximately 7,600 ST will be retrograded by the end of the October ammunition month.

(d) Average Class V receipts for the reporting period will be less than the issues. An unusually low receipt month, due primarily to vessel slippage, was experienced in August.

(e) The Armed Services Explosive Safety Board (ASESB) terminated their tour of US Army Class V installations on 5 September 1969. During close-out interviews at this and higher headquarters, the team was generally complimentary of conditions noted in the various installations. A few of the comments made by Board members are as follows:

1. Double barging (two barges abreast at the same pier during unloading) should be kept to a minimum or avoided if possible.

2. Supervisors should be aware of Net Explosive Weight limitations for each facility under control.

3. Slings should be inspected periodically; chain type slings should be avoided whenever possible.

4. Loads leaving a port/barge site should be secured regardless of the distance to the ASP or Depot.
Project Manager for the 2.75" Rocket System, accompanied by Picatinny Arsenal technicians, visited Vietnam during the period 1 through 7 October 1969. The party visited Army Aviation units in each of the CTZs in an effort to gain first hand information on the operational support aspects of this system. The Project Manager conducted briefings at Headquarters USARV on future concepts for the employment of this weapon system. Of particular interest to USARV were the following support concepts:

1. Rockets would be shipped already assembled in containers that could be used as storage containers up until the rockets were loaded aboard the gunships.

2. Ready round trailers to transport rockets from storage area to rearm point.

3. Disposable launching pods to reduce the rearm time.

2. Services Activities.

(a) Cargo discharged and handled in RVN ports (ST):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Discharged</th>
<th>Handled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>456,835</td>
<td>640,869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>401,490</td>
<td>590,509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>415,499</td>
<td>610,447</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Sea Land Container Service:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dry Vans</th>
<th>Reefer Vans</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>1,613</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>1,958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>1,076</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>1,313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>1,773</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>2,133</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(c) Motor Transport Tonnage (ST):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Port and Beach</th>
<th>Local</th>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>305,628</td>
<td>282,243</td>
<td>133,644</td>
<td>721,515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>239,015</td>
<td>257,067</td>
<td>125,200</td>
<td>621,282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>227,999</td>
<td>293,854</td>
<td>131,658</td>
<td>653,511</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/RO) Service from Okinawa (Semi-trailers and vans):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>273</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>419</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(e) Rail Tonnage (ST):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>US Military Sponsored</th>
<th>Non-US Military Sponsored</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>41,045</td>
<td>26,108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>35,392</td>
<td>6,786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>31,710</td>
<td>27,428</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(f) Rail Passengers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>US Military Sponsored</th>
<th>Non-US Military Sponsored</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>164,915</td>
<td>30,822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>195,929</td>
<td>16,259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>235,060</td>
<td>11,754</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(g) Air Passenger Movements (Out of Country):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Programmed</th>
<th>Allocated</th>
<th>Actually Moved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>37,839</td>
<td>35,886</td>
<td>38,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>42,106</td>
<td>41,684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>30,232</td>
<td>26,855</td>
<td>26,574</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(h) Intra-RVN Cargo/Passenger Movements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cargo</th>
<th>Passengers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>49,247</td>
<td>176,055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>49,938</td>
<td>162,718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>51,781</td>
<td>145,876</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(i) Emergency Airlift Shipments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tactical</th>
<th>Emergency Resupply</th>
<th>Combat Essential</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) (U) Graves Registration Operations: Summary of mortuary operations is as follows:

(a) Remains processed.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>USA Mortuary, TSN</th>
<th>USA Mortuary, DNG</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>716</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Personal Property Division Status:

- Cases received 1 Jul - 30 Sep 69: 1,958
- Cases shipped 1 Jul - 30 Sep 69: 2,467
- Cases on hand 30 Sep 69: 365

(4) (C) Class III Supply and Distribution:

Consumption of bulk petroleum by US Forces, FWMAF, and RVNAF in II, III, and IV CTZ, and Army in I CTZ during the quarter was as follows:

- Jul: 2,607,800 Bbl
- Aug: 2,617,300 Bbl
- Sep: 2,523,300 Bbl

f. (U) COMMAND MANAGEMENT: None.

g. (U) INSPECTOR GENERAL:

During the period, 239 complaints and 1,826 requests for assistance were processed. Of the 239 complaints, 81 were justified. This represents a slight decrease in complaints and a considerable decrease in requests for assistance when compared with the previous period. This is probably due to the increased emphasis placed on the "Open Door" policy by unit commanders. The largest group of complaints concerned unit administration to include job dissatisfaction, medical treatment, disciplinary matters,
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morale, and promotions. There was no indication of problem areas which could result in conditions detrimental to the efficiency or reputation of the command.

(2) HQ USARV conducted annual general inspections of 44 USARV organizations during this period. Areas most often found to be unsatisfactory or deficient were: unit orders announcing forfeitures or reductions which cited an incorrect authority; units failing to maintain an adequate supply of blank conversion forms on hand for C-day conversion of MPC; units delivering accountable mail to persons other than the addressee without written authorization; units holding official registered mail overnight in containers that do not meet the security requirements of AR 380-5; failure to include the maiden name of mother and wife and the statement "savings deposits for pay residue if missing" on the Record of Emergency Data (DA Form 41); Equipment Inspection and Maintenance Worksheets, for recording weekly preventive maintenance services on M17 protective masks, were not being maintained in many units; unauthorized splices and alterations were made to the electrical wiring in troop billets and work areas; and some ammunition had not been stored on dunnage. The misuse of issue priority designators 02 and 05 in requisitioning spare parts and supplies continues to be a deficiency in the majority of units inspected.

h. (U) COMMAND INFORMATION. None.

i. (U) CIVIL AFFAIRS.

(1) Employment of Civil Affairs Platoons. During this period a joint MACV/USARV survey was conducted to determine the optimum employment of civil affairs platoons. The survey found that the CA platoons are most frequently employed in support of Province and District Senior Advisors. The platoons compliment advisory efforts by accomplishing tasks beyond the capabilities of the advisory teams. In II, III, and IV CTZs the platoons were employed primarily in community development civic action programs. In I CTZ the predominance of CA platoon effort was pointed toward assisting refugee resettlement. The shift toward increasing the support of community development has been possible because of improved security. The survey indicated that close cooperation by CA platoons with the regional CORDS
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organizations maximized the capabilities of each organization which in turn increased the efficiency of economic and social development programs.

(2) Management Improvement of the Kit Carson Scout Program. The KCS program showed an increase of 245 Scouts during this period. The number of Scouts employed in each unit continued to be dependent upon willingness of qualified returnees to serve in the employing unit's area of operation. MACV transferred 200 Scout spaces from the redeploying 3d Marine Division to USARV. This increased the USARV ceiling to 2400 spaces. USARV also assumed administrative responsibility for 48 Scouts assigned to the III MAF 3d and 4th Combined Action Groups.

(j) COMMAND HISTORY. Significant projects completed during the period were an after-action interview report on Operation Keystone Eagle and an in-depth report on the Binh Dinh Province pacification program. Three DA sponsored activities were coordinated during the reporting period: A civilian artist visited from 30 August to 17 September; During September and October, Army Artist Team IX prepared works for inclusion in the Army War Art Collection; and an Army Pictorial Center team filmed sequences for a "Big Picture" television film on the activities of Army artists and military historians.

k. AVIATION.

(1) Air Operations.

(a) Joint Air Operation Group (JAOG): The third quarterly meeting of the MACV JAOG was held on 6 October 1969. The results of this meeting were:

1. Chairmanship of the JAOG, which is rotated on a quarterly basis, was transferred from MG Allen M. Burdett, Jr., HQ USARV to BG W. T. Johnson, HQ III MAF, effective 6 October 1969.

2. The Artillery and Air Strike Warning System Directive (MACV Dir 95-13) was completed by the JAOG and submitted to MACV on 18 August 1969 for final approval and publication.
Recommended changes to the Tactical Aerodrome Directory to incorporate additional artillery and air strike information have been forwarded to the Aeronautical Chart and Information Service for publication.

A steering committee of the JAOG Working Group Chairman and the MACV JAOG Secretariate was established to coordinate the working groups' activities.

The scope of responsibilities for the JAOG (NOTAM) working group was expanded as recommended by USARV to include all flight information services. This group has been redesignated the Flight Information Working Group.

(b) DA (OPOPOMO) convened a conference on 30 October 1969 to resolve career progression and management problems associated with air traffic controllers. MOS 93K, Army Enroute Traffic Controller, has been especially misused. This MOS has been applied to TOE's and TDA's where there was no requirement for enroute traffic control. With no opportunity to practice these skills, the controllers rapidly lost their proficiency. The conference concluded with decision to eliminate the Army enroute control specialty, to reidentify the 93K MOS as an approach controller and to align the air traffic controller MOS system with current Army aviation doctrine.

(2) Aviation Training.

(a) AH-1G: During the reporting period, the AH-1G training team transitioned 90 aviators, graduated 18 aviators from the one Instructor Pilot/Standardization Instructor Pilot (IP/SIP) course conducted, and qualified 15 additional aviators as IP/SIPs during non-school training time.

(b) OH-6A: Forty-three aviators were qualified as IP/SIPs through formal courses and four aviators as IP/SIPs during non-school training time.

(c) T-55-L-11 Engine: The New Equipment Training Team (NETT) course operated below capacity during the reporting period because the
arrival of the CH-47C in RVN was delayed. Twenty-six maintenance personnel completed the course of instruction.

(d) OH-58A: The NETT arrived in RVN during August and began pilot transition and maintenance training on 1 September 1969. At the end of the reporting period, twenty-three pilots had been transitioned in the OH-58A.

(e) The Army Aviation Refresher Training School (AARTS) continued to operate at maximum capacity. A total of 1,261 personnel were graduated during the reporting period. The POI has been changed to include a C-47 Maintenance Supervision Course.

(3) Logistics.

(a) Aircraft Armament.

1 The XM-8 (40mm grenade launcher for the LOH) is being procured by DA and a distribution plan will be worked out during the scheduled March 1970 Closed Loop Support Conference.

2 The XM-27El armament subsystem (mini-gun) has been made available for use in the Night Hawk system. Twenty-three Night Hawk systems are currently in the field and the 34th General Support Group is fabricating an additional thirteen. The ACTIV evaluation of the system in the III Corps Tactical Zone was completed on 31 October. A final report is currently being prepared.

(b) Aircraft Maintenance.

1 USARV Supplement Number 1, dated 28 October 1969, to AR 711-45 has been published. This supplement directs stringent accountability procedures at the DSU level for critical repairable aircraft parts.

2 A new maintenance manpower report (RCS-AVHAV-14) has been developed which will provide improved accountability and permit continuous monitoring of manpower utilization of aircraft maintenance personnel.
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(c) Avionics. Units having the Selected Lightweight Avionics Equipment (SLAE) installed in OH-6 helicopters have experienced problems caused by moisture seeping into the radios, particularly the ARC-114(FM). The Electronics Command and the 34th General Support Group are investigating the problem. One approach which has shown promise is the use of Chemtronics All Purpose Glue (503-6, as a waterproofing lent. As an interim measure, units have been advised to re-install the doors or cover the radio pedestal at night.

1. (U) ENGINEER.

(i) Operations.

(a) The 19th Engineer Battalion (Combat) moved from LZ Lowboy, near Duc Pho (BS 912146) to Bao Loc and assumed the support missions previously assigned to the 116th Engineer Battalion. The 116th Engineer Battalion redeployed to Fort Lewis, Washington.

(b) The 497th Engineer Company (PC) deployed from Long Binh to Cam Ranh Bay to assume responsibility for projects in the area requiring port construction capabilities.

(ii) Mine Warfare.

(a) Eight expedient mine clearing rollers fabricated by the 1st Logistical Command were distributed to engineer units for testing. Test results are expected to be available during January 1970.

(b) New equipment training for the AN/PRS-7 metallic and non-metallic portable mine detector was accomplished at major unit locations throughout Vietnam. These detectors are expected to begin arriving in-country during December 1969, and will provide a capability to detect non-metallic mines.

(c) A comprehensive report entitled "Mine Warfare in Vietnam" was published in August 1969. This report outlined the mining problems encountered in Vietnam and the measures available to counter the threat.
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(d) The Mine Warfare Center represented USARV in the US Army Combat Development Command's Mine-Countermine Warfare Conference held from 20 to 22 October 1969 at Fort Belvoir. A presentation on countermine activities in RVN was given at the conference by the USARV representative.

(3) Construction.

(a) Significant reprogramming has been undertaken to provide for the construction of ARVN facilities and MACV advisor facilities in support of the Vietnamization concept. The closing of some facilities and the reduction in force has released some construction funds which have been applied against requirements for the ARVN and the MACV construction programs.

(b) The USARV Facilities Review Board was reconstituted in early September to examine the present construction program by facility complex. This has been done to curtail unnecessary construction in RVN. Thus far, the Facilities Review Board has examined projects with a value of $31,353,000 and has approved projects totaling $10,477,000. Funded projects which are not approved will be used as a source of reprogramming funds. The review will be completed in mid-November.

(4) Mapping and Intelligence.

(a) The previously reported large scale city plan of the Long Binh Complex is currently undergoing final edit. Compilation of the Cam Ranh Bay project is progressing on schedule and should be printed during May 1970. The city plan of Phan Rang will be printed during the coming quarter.

(b) Due to previously reported problems involving distance measuring equipment and security and lack of progress, the First Order Traverse has been undergoing an in-depth study to determine near team geodetic needs and the advisability of continuing the project during hostilities. At this time it seems certain that the project will be suspended for an indefinite period of time.

(c) The aerial photography effort has been directed towards the LOC.
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program and other mapping requirements. During the past quarter, particular emphasis has been placed on photography required for base planning mosaics. This trend is expected to continue for some time. As a result, the present commercial photography contract will be extended for an additional year.

(d) Tactical Scale Terrain Studies and Hamlet Studies continue to be produced for the Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, at the previously cited rate of one tactical terrain study per month and one hamlet study per quarter.

(e) Engineer Terrain Intelligence activities will continue to decrease in both I CTZ and in the delta (with the exception of hydrographic surveys). Present activities include road reconnaissance and layout for XXIV Corps, operation of the soils laboratory at Long Binh in conjunction with USAECAv, and several port surveys throughout Vietnam.

(5) Supply.

(a) As of 31 October, 669 pieces of commercial construction equipment have been received in RVN under the Military Construction Army-Lines of Communication (MCA-LOC) Program. This represents all of the items originally planned for purchase. Since the original purchase, some items for quality control and welding have been requested. These items have begun to arrive and will probably continue to arrive throughout the month of November.

(b) The transfer of equipment to two ARVN Construction Battalions and one ARVN Heavy Equipment Company has been completed. Equipment is being assembled for transfer to another construction battalion and another heavy equipment company. This transfer is to be completed in March 1970.

m. (C) COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS.

Two programs were conducted at Vung Tau to train RVNAF personnel in the operation and maintenance of the Integrated Communication System - Southeast Asia (ICS-SEA). Both the formal program, presented by the
ARVN Signal School and a complementary OJT program conducted by the 16th Signal Battalion, trained Technical Controller personnel, MOS 32D. Training in three other MOSs: Microwave Repair, Fixed Station Carrier Repair, and Dial Telephone Exchange Repair will be given as more English-speaking personnel become available for training.

m. (U) MILITARY JUSTICE AND LEGAL AFFAIRS. None.


a. (U) PERSONNEL.

(1) Absentee Apprehension Roster.

(a) OBSERVATION: On 2 May 1969, the Data Service Center (DSC) was requested to provide a printout of personnel dropped from the rolls (DFRd) based on morning report entries. It was conceived that this printout could be republished and distributed to provost marshals, finance officers and ports of embarkation as an Absentee Apprehension Roster.

(b) EVALUATION: Upon receipt of the first printout, a manual check indicated that only ten percent of the personnel listed on the printout were found to have a DD Form 553 (Absentee Wanted by the Armed Forces) on file with the USARV Provost Marshal. To correct this discrepancy, the following actions have been initiated:

1. All DD Forms 553 are codified and key punched on a continuing basis.

2. Two printouts are provided by DSC, one based on morning report entries and one on the DD Form 553. Each printout is broken down by major command and alpha sequence (alphabetical listing). The printouts are then cross-referenced and discrepancies identified.

3. Each major command is furnished a printout reflecting those personnel reported as DFRd through morning report entries which do not have a corresponding DD Form 553 on file. A separate printout is furnished reflecting personnel who have a DD Form 553 on file with no substantiating.
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morning report record. The major command is requested to verify the information contained in the printouts and to effect the necessary corrections. These actions are beginning to improve the accuracy of absentee information. Future printouts of the Absentee Apprehension Roster will provide accurate data on a timely basis to all interested agencies, including provost marshals, finance officers, postal outlets and other services and commands.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That other commands faced with the problem of providing Absentee Apprehension Rosters consider the method outlined above.

(2) Treatment of Prisoners of War.

(a) OBSERVATION: Prisoners of War (PW) or detainee patients have received extensive medical treatment at two US PW hospitals; the US Army PW Hospital at Long Binh and the 17th Field Hospital near Qui Nhon. The current PW patient workload does not warrant the continued operation of two separate facilities. Improved patient management and decreased combat activity has caused each PW hospital to fall below 100 patients by the end of September.

(b) EVALUATION: If only emergency care, resuscitative and post operative surgical care were provided PWs by US hospitals, separate facilities solely devoted to PW treatment could be eliminated. Each USARV hospital could accept PW patients from within their operational area and provide care until the PW was medically transportable. The PWs could then be transferred to the nearest ARVN hospital. MACV proposed this system to ARVN and in September 1969 the following agreement was reached: Selected ARVN hospitals will accept PWs from US hospitals when the patient’s condition permits transfer. In exchange for the added workload on ARVN hospitals, USARV hospitals will assist with the reconstructive and rehabilitative surgical backlog in ARVN hospitals. The new system was implemented 25 September 1969. This allowed the 17th Field Hospital to be closed on 7 October 1969 and the US Army PW Hospital at Long Binh will be phased out over a several week period.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That in future conflicts involving similar circumstances, arrangements be made to have the host nation accept primary
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responsibility for PW medical treatment.

(4) Mobile Dental Teams

(a) OBSERVATION: The use of mobile dental teams to provide temporary, on-site dental support at Battalion Fire Support Bases has proven to be an effective means of preventing loss of personnel for dental reasons. These teams operate from mobile dental vans or in space provided by Fire Base commanders. In some cases, fire bases cannot accommodate the mobile van due to the tactical situation and suitable space to set up field dental operating equipment is not available.

(b) EVALUATION: It is not always possible to transport a mobile dental van to a Battalion Fire Support Base to provide on-site dental support. In most instances, however, dental personnel with minimum field operating equipment can be transported to a fire base. The primary deterrent to the latter approach has been the lack of sufficient space within which to operate. It should be noted that aid station space used for this purpose will not interfere with the treatment of mass casualties. Field dental equipment can be quickly reduced to a compact package and removed if necessary.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the concept of providing mobile dental support to personnel in isolated locations such as Fire Bases continue to be developed.

(4) Dapsone (DDS) Prophylaxis

(a) OBSERVATION: Fifteen cases of agranulocytosis in US troops, resulting in seven deaths due to sepsis, required an immediate review of drug regimens used in malaria prophylaxis. All of the patients were on C-P Dapsone prophylaxis and none were on C-P alone. Dapsone has been previously reported to produce agranulocytosis. All patients were receiving dapsone from three weeks to three months prior to onset of agranulocytosis. One patient had taken only dapsone and had not taken any other medication.

(b) EVALUATION: In accordance with accepted policy in the management of a drug capable of devastating hematologic side effects, administration can only be justified if an actual disease process can be demonstrated or
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in a more liberal interpretation, an actual attack rate of significance is reported. Although all of Vietnam can be considered a potential reservoir of falciparum malaria, only attack rates give valid data as to true incidence and risk to US troops. It has been consistently demonstrated that over 85% of cases of falciparum malaria occur in combat troops. It is only in this group, or a treatment group, that dapsone can be considered for prophylactic or therapeutic administration.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Dapsone should not be routinely required as an anti-malaria drug for US troops. Its use should be restricted to those situations in which exposure to falciparum malaria will result in unacceptable combat manpower losses. This procedure is presently being followed by USARV units.

b. (C) INTELLIGENCE.

(1) The Use of Autodin Card Message Service to Request Checks From US Army Investigative Records Repository (USAIRR).

(a) OBSERVATION: The average time required to complete a check of USAIRR using U.S. Postal Facilities was approximately 17 days from the date of initiation. This headquarters processes approximately 2000 such requests per month, primarily for the purpose of validating or issuing security clearances.

(b) EVALUATION: The use of Autodin Card Message Service was initiated on 18 August 1969. A card is punched for each required check and these cards are taken to the Long Binh Communications Center daily for automatic transmission to the Defense Central Index of Investigations, Fort Holabird, Maryland. Replies to checks which disclose an entirely favorable investigation or no record, may be transmitted by the same system to Long Binh Communications Center where reply cards are automatically punched. Checks which disclose derogatory information are returned by mail with derogatory information in dossier or summary format. The average completion time, to include checks which are returned by mail, has been reduced to approximately eight days using this system. The advantage to the command is that personnel may be
RECOMMENDATION: That the above procedure be considered for adoption by other Army theater headquarters.

(2) Sensor Symbols.

(a) OBSERVATION: US Army Forces in Vietnam employ five types of sensors for intelligence collection and target acquisition: Side-Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR), Airborne Infrared Sensor (IR), Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR), Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS), and the Airborne Personnel Detector (APD). The results of sensor activity are presented regularly at command briefings and also plotted on G2 working maps and overlays. In order to completely describe all sensor activity, there are several variables which must be shown; locations of SLAR and IR returns, significant APD readings, GSR detected targets, UGS fields and activations, and targets that have been engaged. Tactical units in Vietnam have independently developed various graphic means to depict sensor returns and friendly responses. The lack of sensor symbol uniformity among the several tactical commands makes briefings to representatives of higher and adjacent headquarters unnecessarily confusing.

(b) EVALUATION: Standardization of sensor symbols is highly desirable. Described below and portrayed at inclosure 2 are symbols proposed by the 25th Infantry Division to standardize graphic representation of sensor activity by US Army units in the Republic of Vietnam. The symbol system has proven effective under combat conditions and has been suggested for use by all appropriate US Army units in the Republic of Vietnam.

1. SLAR acquired targets are depicted by a square.
2. IR returns are shown by an equilateral triangle.
3. Locations of significant APD readings are shown by a circle.
4 GSR acquired targets are shown by an "X".

5 Those targets that are acquired and engaged are indicated by a circle around the symbol.

6 The location of UGS fields are shown by an isosceles triangle with a number in the center representing the number of sensors in the field. Numbers in two squares below the triangle indicate the number of times the field was activated and the number of activations which were engaged by friendly forces.

7 Patterns of sensor activity for two or more days are indicated by color coding symbols to represent successive twenty-four hour periods.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the sensor symbols as described above and portrayed at Inclosure 2 be adopted for Army-wide use.

c. (U) OPERATIONS. None.

d. (U) ORGANIZATION. None.

e. (U) TRAINING. None.

f. (U) LOGISTICS.

(1) Deployment of Equipment.

(a) OBSERVATION: Frequently, new equipment deployed to this command has had low Operational Ready Rates due to the unavailability of spare parts and other support items.

(b) EVALUATION: Provisioning of new equipment deployed to overseas areas is defined by AR 700-70. This regulation recognizes the fact that maintenance and supply support requirements begin with the delivery of new equipment, and it requires prior distribution of repair parts and support items. Frequently, the commodity command responsible for the item of equipment is unable to meet the requirements of AR 700-70. When this
happens, the commodity command requests a waiver from the gaining overseas commander. All too frequently the waiver is granted because a delay in its arrival would jeopardize the accomplishment of the unit's mission. This sometimes results in the unsatisfactory performance of the equipment and customer dissatisfaction.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION**: That DA take action to insure that the commodity commands properly plan for the deployment of new equipment so that waivers of AR 700-70 will not be required.

(2) **Pipeline Security**.

(a) **OBSERVATION**: Pipelines in areas which are not under the complete control and constant observation of friendly forces are highly vulnerable to acts of sabotage and pilferage.

(b) **EVALUATION**: Pipelines in Vietnam are highly vulnerable to sabotage and other forms of enemy interdiction. The concept of pipeline operations calls for its use behind the combat zone, running through COMZ.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION**: That when establishing a petroleum distribution system in nonsecure areas, pipelines should not be considered unless significant losses due to enemy action and pilferage can be accepted.

(3) **Pipeline Burial**.

(a) **OBSERVATION**: The decision was made to bury existing pipelines in those areas having a high incidence of pilferage. Problems with leaking gaskets and improperly installed couplings have resulted in underground leaks which require the pipeline to be dug up for repair.

(b) **EVALUATION**: Coupled pipelines predominately used in Vietnam are not designed for burial. The thin walls are subject to punctures and the rubber gaskets decompose, dry out, or crack, thereby disrupting operations.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION**: That only welded pipe be considered for burial purposes. The "Swage-Bond" process of preparing pipe for burial,
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Currently being tested by industry, should be investigated by DA. This is a method whereby a sleeve is applied over the junction of two sections of pipe and compressed to form a tight seal.


(a) OBSERVATION: The installation of perimeter security lighting for base defense should be included in the construction annex of Base Development Plans.

(b) EVALUATION: Security lighting has proven to be an invaluable aid in perimeter defense, particularly against sappers. Because provisions for such lighting were not included in the base construction plans, it has become necessary to procure materials from in-country resources. Shortages in electrical power and lighting materials have caused excessive delays in installation. Makeshift installation of lighting systems has further complicated the problem. These systems are usually inadequate and require additional expense to modify or rebuild when acceptable materials become available.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Provisions for perimeter security lighting be included in Base Development construction plans to insure adequacy at minimum cost.

5. Land Use Requests.

(a) OBSERVATION: The time required to process Land Use Requests (LUR's) in order to obtain Land Use Concurrence (LUC) is excessive and is unresponsive to the real estate requirements of US Forces and other FWMAF.

(b) EVALUATION: The average time to process a LUR exceeds six months. Currently there are approximately 416 LUR's awaiting action by the Government of Vietnam. Of these, approximately 141 (82%) are over six months old and have received no action. In many cases, land has been requested, US Forces have used the land and later moved to a new location before the Government of Vietnam responded to the
the request for an LUC and as a result, claims have arisen and been submitted to the US for payment. Under the Pentalateral Agreement, the Government of Vietnam is responsible for indemnification of owners whose land is used by the US and other FWMAF.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that MACV review the procedures for processing LUCs with the aim of reducing the time required for obtaining final approval from the Government of Vietnam.

(6) Transfer of Water Supply Systems.

(a) OBSERVATION: When a water supply system, which provides water to an installation occupied jointly by both US and ARVN units, is transferred to ARVN for operation, maintenance and control, it is difficult to insure that potable water is delivered to the US user.

(b) EVALUATION: The Dong Tam Water Supply and Distribution System was transferred to ARVN. The system supplies water to one US battalion in addition to ARVN units located at Dong Tam. ARVN personnel were trained to operate the water treatment plant and pumping facility and are qualified individuals. However, no training was provided for ARVN water consumers to insure the conservation of water. Consequently, taps are left open and air collects in the lines. This reduces the chlorine content in the system and results in non-potable water being delivered to the user. An additional problem is the inability of the ARVN supply system to react rapidly to requests for water treatment chemicals.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the US retain control, operate and maintain utilities systems which will continue in joint usage. This position will be recommended in all future actions. A study is presently underway at MACV to determine a solution to the problem of inadequate R&U capability within ARVN.

(7) Vandalism of Vacated Real Property.

(a) OBSERVATION: It is very difficult to prevent unauthorized dismantling and stripping of the buildings vacated by redeploying units.
(b) EVALUATION: USARV has recently released two major US installations to the ARVN and has reinfused numerous other US units within country. Vacant structures have been vandalized and stripped by the vacating unit, other units in the area, or by ARVN personnel when circumstances are such that they are allowed free entry to the installation. Many factors make control of stripping difficult. In locations where installations are supported by a facilities engineering contractor, standard procedures provide for the vacating unit to return facilities to the contractor who maintains property accountability. Security then becomes the responsibility of the installation commander, who normally draws his security resources from tenant units. As units depart, these security forces are also depleted. A further contributing factor is that commands at all levels are not sufficiently responsive in determining the disposition of vacated facilities. This lengthens the time that facilities remain vacant and subject to vandalism. Installations that have been most effective in controlling stripping and vandalism have employed strong command emphasis, disciplinary action against offenders, action to fix pecuniary liability, and resident guards in the vacated facilities.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When units are identified for redeployment or relocation, the disposition of facilities they occupy must be promptly determined. The facilities will either be occupied by US units, turned over to RVNAF units, dismantled or destroyed. Until this determination has been made, the installation commander should keep a token number of troops living in the area. In addition, strong command emphasis must be exercised at all levels to prevent stripping. This information will be added to the publication, USARV Redeployment Guide for Units.

(8) Outprocessing Facilities.

(a) OBSERVATION: Outprocessing facilities in areas which will serve as staging areas for redeploying units should be identified and constructed well before retrograde operations begin.

(b) EVALUATION: Recent retrograde operations caused a large backlog of unprocessed materials and equipment, primarily because facilities to handle the surge of material requiring processing were lacking.
Initial DOD guidance prohibiting construction of outprocessing facilities until moves are announced did not allow sufficient response time for the completion of required construction. Subsequent DOD guidance permits advanced construction of outprocessing facilities where needed.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That personnel concerned with retrograde operations initiate programs to construct needed outprocessing facilities in areas that will definitely be used to support the processing of retrograde material, as soon as these areas are identified. These facilities should be constructed well in advance of announced redeployments.

g. (U) COMMUNICATIONS. None.

h. (U) MATERIAL. None.

i. (U) OTHER. None.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

GEORGE L. MABRY, JR.
Major General, US Army
Chief of Staff

41

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

JOHN F. DUNN
Colonel, AGC
Deputy Adjutant General
# SUMMARY OF REDEPLOYMENT ACTIONS

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>ACTION</th>
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<td>448th AG Det</td>
<td>16 Oct 69</td>
<td>Redeployed to CONUS</td>
<td>Keystone Cardinal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1018th CS Co (S&amp;S)</td>
<td>16 Oct 69</td>
<td>Redeployed to CONUS</td>
<td>Clear Adjust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22d Med Hoop (Surg)</td>
<td>18 Oct 69</td>
<td>Inactivated in RVN</td>
<td>Keystone Cardinal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34th TC Plt</td>
<td>18 Oct 69</td>
<td>Inactivated in RVN</td>
<td>Keystone Cardinal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>534th CS Plt (Const &amp; Fort)</td>
<td>22 Oct 69</td>
<td>Inactivated in RVN</td>
<td>Keystone Cardinal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th Med Hoop (Evac)</td>
<td>22 Oct 69</td>
<td>Inactivated in RVN</td>
<td>Keystone Cardinal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>520th Med Co (Clearing)</td>
<td>26 Oct 69</td>
<td>Inactivated in RVN</td>
<td>Keystone Cardinal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45th Med Det</td>
<td>30 Oct 69</td>
<td>Inactivated in RVN</td>
<td>Keystone Cardinal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th TC Plt (Lt Trk)</td>
<td>30 Oct 69</td>
<td>Inactivated in RVN</td>
<td>Keystone Cardinal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SENSOR SYMBOLES

*SLN-----------------------------

*IL-----------------------------

*SIGNIFICANT AND READINGS-------

*GSR-----------------------------

TARGETS ENGAGED-----------------

GCS FIELD AND NO OF SENSORS------

GCS ACTIVATIONS------------------

ENGAGED-------------------------

*Symbols are colored solid (except GSR). Targets engaged are indicated by enclosing the appropriate symbol with a circle outline.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, US Army, Vietnam

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug 69 to 31 Oct 69.

CG, US Army, Vietnam

14 November 1969

N/A

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