### UNCLASSIFIED

**AD NUMBER**

| AD506525 |

**CLASSIFICATION CHANGES**

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**LIMITATION CHANGES**

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**AUTHORITY**

31 Jul 1981, DoDD 5200.10; AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1982

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 30 June 1969 (U)

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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3t
DgPA2imEnr OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96370

AvDE-MH 15 July 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending
30 June 1969, RCS: SPO-65 (R1) (U)

Commanding General II Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFC-RE-H APO 96266
Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: ATHGC(DST) APO 96375
Commanding General, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT APO 96558

1. (C) Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities

   a. (C) Introduction: During the reporting period 1 May 1969 to 30 June
1969, units under the operational control of the Commanding General, 9th
Infantry Division conducted offensive operations in Dinh Tuong, Long An, Go Cong,
Kien Phong, Kien Tuong, Vinh Binh, Gia Binh, and Kien Hoa Provinces. There
were four major operations during this period: Operation SPEEDY EXPRESS (IV Corps
Dry Season Campaign) terminated 1240011 May 1969, when Operation RICE PADDIES
(IV Corps Wet Season Campaign) began; Operation QUIET THANG and Operation TOAN
THANG III continued from the previous quarter. As in the last reporting period,
the enemy continued his resupply and reorganization missions with emphasis on
recruiting and winning the support of the local population in contested areas.
In addition to attempting to undermine SVN Pacification efforts, he further in-
tensified his efforts to retain control of those areas under his domination.
The enemy was extremely reluctant to enter into decisive engagements, and in an
attempt to survive, has remained in a fragmented configuration. The 9th
Infantry Division continued Airmobile Assaults, Eagle Flight, Checkerboard, Bush
master, Cordon and Search, Reconnaissance in Force, and Special Night Operations
as primary combat operational techniques. Operations were designed to destroy
the enemy, to deny him the opportunity to reorganize and redistribute his forces
and resources, and to impede his efforts to launch offensive operations against
SVN forces and populated areas within the 9th Infantry Division TAOI. The en-
emy's offensive activity was characterized by harassment of outposts, attacks
by fire, and extensive use of mines and booby traps.

   b. (C) Organization

   (1) The 9th Infantry Division provisionally reorganized one brigade head-
quarters company, five infantry battalions, and one artillery battalion from the riverine configuration to standard light infantry and artill-
ery MTOE during the period 1 May through 1 June 1969. Effective 1 June 1969,
USARPAC GO 407, dated 23 May 1969 granted the authority to reorganize the fol-
lowing units with the manning strengths indicated:

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   DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 June 1969, RCS CSFQR-65(R1) "U"

AVD-Ad
15 July 1969

UNIT

UNIT

3d Bn 39th Inf
43
2
875
920

4th Bn 39th Inf
43
2
875
920

3d Bn 47th Inf
43
2
875
920

5th Bn 60th Inf
43
2
875
920

6th Bn 31st Inf
43
2
875
920

1st Bn 11th Arty
44
3
479
526

(2) The 6th Battalion, 77th Artillery and the 31st Transportation Company (Medium Boat) were inactivated, effective 1 June 1969, by authority of USARPAC GO 407.

(3) Effective 12 June 1969, the 9th Infantry Division was directed to prepare redeployment plans as the first step to the Vietnamization Program. Plans were drafted for the 2d Brigade and supporting units to redeploy to CONUS for inactivation; the 3d Brigade to remain in Vietnam and be reorganized as a separate light infantry brigade; and the 1st Brigade, Division Base (-), Division Artillery HHD, 1st Battalion 11th Artillery (105mm), and 1st Battalion 84th Artillery (155mm/8") to redeploy to USARV.

(4) The 9th Infantry Division received tentative approval from the G3 at USARV for the following units to be included in the organization of the 3d Brigade:

UNIT

UNIT

HHC
219

Sig Co
102

Engr Co
165

Spt Bn
841

FA Bn
641

Inf Bn (3)
2760

Inf Bn (Mech)
908

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SUGJET: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 June 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (HL) (U)

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<tr>
<td>Inf Plt (-) (Tracker Tm)</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP Plt</td>
<td>40</td>
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<tr>
<td>MI Det</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>MH Det</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chem Det</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PI Det</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA Det (264th Radar)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACV Unit</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sensor Sect</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA Det (Radar MPQ4)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL STRENGTH</td>
<td>5588</td>
</tr>
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The 9th Infantry Division, in a proposal dated 30 June 1969, requested the following overstrength authorizations for the 3d Brigade:

- HHC: 35
- Engr Co: 12
- Sig Co: 12
- Maint and Sup Co: 27
- Admin Co: 3

This request was made to provide additional personnel in the aviation section of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, to accommodate a 4 LH and 4 UH-1 configuration, as well as other additional personnel needed but not provided by MTOE. The overstrength for the Engineer Company was requested to provide troops and...
equipment for four water supply points plus additional men to operate engineer construction equipment. Additional spaces were requested for the Signal Company because the Signal Company as organized could not provide sufficient VHF communications to support four maneuver battalions. The additional maintenance and support troops were requested to support the mechanized infantry battalion as well as to provide graves registration, POL, and bath support. Three additional spaces were requested for the administration company to provide legal personnel which are required under the Military Justice Act of 1968.

5. Organizational Structure - Incl 1

6. Roster of Key Personnel - Incl 2

7. Division TAOI - Incl 3

c. Personnel and Administration

1. General Data: See Inclosure 4 for information and statistics concerning the following:

a. Maintenance of Unit Strength

b. Personnel Management

c. Development and Maintenance of Morale

d. Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order

2. Significant Activities: The Division Headquarters Commandant Section continued its normal functions of managing the physical aspects of the Division Headquarters complex. These activities included building maintenance, landscaping, parade and ceremony preparations, control of officer billing, and supervision of headquarters mess and supply operations. There were no significant new activities undertaken by this section during the reporting period.

d. Intelligence

1. Discussion

a. General: This reporting period includes two phases of enemy activity; neither phase was very distinct. The first phase was a continuation of the April period of inactivity, which was characterized by two or three high points and a number of large contacts within each of the provinces as enemy units regrouped for specific offensive operations. This gradually evolved into a period of even lower activity. This phase was terminated on 13 June upon the announcement of the withdrawal of two brigades of the division from the Republic of 4

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Vietnam At that time the Viet Cong switched to a propaganda campaign and instituted sporadic, limited attacks by fire throughout the area of operations of the 9th Infantry Division. Apparently the enemy desired to cause maximum casualties with minimum casualties and at the same time demonstrated for propaganda purposes some degree of initiative. The first high point of the reporting period occurred on 12 May, when a significant number of US and ARVN installations received mortar, rocket, and recoilless rifle fire. The following day the 267 Battalion of SR-2 was contacted in Long An Province by elements of the 3d Brigade and the 50th ARVN Infantry Regiment. This contact accounted for 91 enemy killed. Activity then declined until the following week when elements of the 5th Brigade, operating in Dinh Tuong Province, contacted the 261 A Battalion. Documents captured during this contact indicated that the 261 A Battalion was being supported by the 514X Sapper Company and the 522X Rocket Company. During the contact enemy dead numbered 105. Nineteen AK 47's and several pounds of documents were captured. The next large contact occurred in Kien Hoa Province. On 23 May elements of the 3d Brigade contacted the 21 Company of the 516 Battalion in Ham Long District. Eighty enemy troops were killed. After that contact activity within the TAOI declined steadily. Reports and prisoners kept up a barrage of information that a massive offensive was imminent, however surveillance evidenced the opposite. The month ended with a few scattered contacts throughout the TAOI. Confirmed evidence of rockets being used in Dinh Tuong Province occurred on 21 May when Dong Tam Base was shelled with 107mm rockets. Thus a new capability was now available to the enemy in the Province. On 5 June the enemy initiated another high point with 22 enemy-initiated incidents, including 21 attacks by fire. From 14 June until the end of the month a near war stand down existed. All indications were that the enemy was divided into cell, squad, and platoon size elements and was avoiding contact. Reports continued to flourish about a pending massive offensive, but as time passed, the dates for the offensive changed and June faded into July without any offensive taking place.

(b) Long An Province: During the first ten days in May enemy activity remained relatively light in Long An. The number of interdiction incidents indicated a coming offensive. Between 2 and 8 May there were 10 such incidents, most of them occurring on Route 224 near the junction of Route 228. In that same general area elements of the 3d Brigade and the 50th ARVN Regiment made contact with the 267 Battalion on 13 May. There were 91 VC killed in the battle. This was the first contact in recent months with the 267 Battalion. Enemy activity reached its peak for the year in the week between 9 and 15 May. Documents captured in April revealed that the 267 and the 508 Battalions intended a coordinated attack on Thu Thua. Other documents and FW reports also indicated that the enemy was preparing a high point to celebrate Ho Chi Minh's birthday. However, the contact with allied forces is believed to have spoiled the enemy's plans. Around 15 May intelligence indicated that the enemy was withdrawing from contact and conducting resupply, replacement and training.
Vietnam At that time the Viet Cong switched to a propaganda campaign and instituted sporadic, limited attacks by fire throughout the area of operations of the 9th Infantry Division. Apparently the enemy desired to cause maximum casualties with minimum casualties and at the same time demonstrated for propaganda purposes some degree of initiative. The first high point of the reporting period occurred on 12 May, when a significant number of US and ARVN installations received mortar, rocket, and recoilless rifle fire. The following day the 267 Battalion of SR-2 was contacted in Long An Province by elements of the 3d Brigade and the 50th ARVN Infantry Regiment. This contact accounted for 91 enemy killed. Activity then declined until the following week when elements of the 1st Brigade, operating in Dinh Tuong Province, contacted the 261 A Battalion. Documents captured during this contact indicated that the 261 A Battalion was being supported by the 514X Sapper Company and the 522X Rocket Company. During the contact enemy dead numbered 105. Nineteen AK 47s and several pounds of documents were captured. The next large contact occurred in Kien Hoa Province. On 23 May elements of the 2d Brigade contacted the 21 Company of the 516 Battalion in Ha Long District. Eighty enemy troops were killed. After that contact activity within the TAOR declined steadily. Intel reports and prisoners kept up a barrage of information that a massive offensive was imminent, however surveillance media indicated the opposite. The month ended with a few scattered contacts throughout the TAOR. No confirmed evidence of rockets being used in Dinh Tuong Province occurred on 21 May when Dong Tam Base was shelled with 107mm rockets. Thus a new capability was now available to the enemy in the Province. On 5 June the enemy initiated another high point with 22 enemy initiated incidents, including 21 attacks by fire. From 14 June until the end of the month a near enemy stand down existed. All indications were that the enemy was divided into cell, squad, and platoon size elements and was avoiding contact. Reports continued to flourish about a pending massive offensive, but as time passed, the dates for the offensive changed and June faded into July without any offensive taking place.

(b) Long An Province: During the first ten days in May enemy activity remained relatively light in Long An. The number of interdiction incidents indicated a coming offensive. Between 2 and 8 May there were 10 such incidents, most of them occurring on Route 224 near the junction of Route 228. In that same general area elements of the 3d Brigade and the 50th ARVN Regiment, made contact with the 267 Battalion on 13 May. There were 91 VC killed in the battle. This was the first contact in recent months with the 267 Battalion. Enemy activity reached its peak for the year in the week between 9 and 15 May. Documents captured in April revealed that the 267 and the 508 Battalions intended a coordinated attack on Thu Thua. Other documents and FW reports also indicated that the enemy was preparing a high point to celebrate Ho Chi Minh’s birthday. However, the contact with allied forces is believed to have spoiled the enemy’s plans. Around 15 May intelligence indicated that the enemy was withdrawing from contact and conducting resupply, replacement and training.
continued for about 12 days. It appeared that some effort was made to move the main force battalions toward the end of the period. This was evidenced by a contact on 22 May in which 105 VC from the 261 A Battalion, the 514X Mortar Company and the 522X Rocket Company were killed. The offensive then tailed off and no attacks by fire occurred in the province for the next two weeks. During this lull the 334 and 332 Sapper Companies combined to become the 334 Sapper Company subordinate to the 2d Dong Thap Regiment. The 336 and the 346 Sapper Companies combined to form the 336 Sapper Company. During the 21 May offensive the use of 107mm rockets was confirmed for the first time, thus demonstrating an increased capability. The enemy initiated two small offensives on the nights of 5-6 and 20-21 June, primarily attacks by fire. Contacts were light and scattered for the entire month with no contacts with major units. A PW captured on 17 June claimed that he was the Finance Officer for MR-2 Headquarters. Intelligence indicated that toward the end of June the Binh Duc Artillery Battalion fragmented into small teams in preparation for attacks by fire on Dong Tau Base. The enemy's offensive effort for the period 1 May - 30 June was periodic attacks by fire.

(d) Kien Hoa Province: The month of May began quietly in Kien Hoa Province. Attacks by fire began with the general surge of activity throughout the Division TAQX on 9 May. Contacts were light and scattered until 10 May when the 530 Battalion was contacted near Ap Phuoc Hau. This was the identification of a new unit that had been reported by agent reports since early February. Thirty-nine enemy were killed and one PW apprehended during the contact. The PW stated that he was the Executive Officer of the Battalion and that missions of the unit were the security of the Ben Tre City Hamlets, attacking New Life Hamlets and setting up ambushes. After 15 May enemy activity dropped to a low level for the remainder of the month. There were only three attacks by fire in the province during that period. On 23 May elements of the 2d Brigade engaged and killed 102 VC from CI Company of the 516 Battalion. During the month of June enemy initiated incidents were primarily directed against GVN personnel and installations. Contact was sporadic until 10 June when elements of the 2d Brigade killed 32 VC from the 3d Company of the 516 Battalion. Reports began appearing that the 516 Battalion had split into the 516 A and 516 B Battalions. Recurring reports and usually reliable intelligence had by now revealed that 516 and 516 A were the same unit and 560 LF Battalion now had the AKA of 516 B. On 13 June the announcement was made of the withdrawal of the US forces from the province. This caused a weak and sporadic claim by enemy propaganda that the VC had driven the Americans out of the Mekong Delta. Intelligence agencies feared a sharp increase in VC activity to support this contention; however, the surge did not develop. Instead, enemy initiated incidents decreased. Apparently the plan was to maintain a low level of activity until after the 9th Infantry Division's withdrawal.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for period Ending 30 June 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

(3) Recapitulation

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<td>175 NCE</td>
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AVDE-MH  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 June 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)  

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<td>Hqs &amp; Spt</td>
<td>NW of My Tho City</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>MCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>263 MF Bn</td>
<td>Dispersed in Cal Lay &amp; Cal Be (D)</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>CE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>514 A MF Bn</td>
<td>NE of My Tho City vic XS 5547</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>MCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>267 B MF Bn</td>
<td>NW of My Tho City vic XS 4054</td>
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<tr>
<td>Binh Duc MF Arty Bn</td>
<td>SW of Sam Giang (D)</td>
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<td>Go Cong Province</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>514 B LF Bn</td>
<td>Go Cong Tri Border Area</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>NCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kien Hoa Province</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>518 MF Bn</td>
<td>Dispersed in Co size elements along coastline of Binh Lai &amp; Thanh Phu (D)</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>MCE</td>
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<tr>
<td>516 LF Bn (516A)</td>
<td>Giong Trom &amp; Ham Long (D)</td>
<td>200-250</td>
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<tr>
<td>560 LF Bn (516B)</td>
<td>Eastern Giong Trom (D)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>SE of Ben Tre City</td>
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<tr>
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<td>580 LF Bn</td>
<td>Truc Giang &amp; Ham Long (D)</td>
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<td>NCE</td>
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(3) Enemy Tactics and Techniques

(a) Indirect Fire Attacks: During the reporting period the enemy remained broken down into platoon or smaller size elements in an attempt to contact with US troops. He concentrated his efforts upon road interdictions, mines, booby traps, and the use of indirect fire against district towns and US/
ARYN installations and positions. The attacks by fire came most often between 2200 and 0200, averaging four rounds per attack. All indications were that the enemy reconnoitered his firing position the night prior to the attack. The attackers were usually three in number. After the attack the weapon was immediately broken down and hidden. Firing positions were usually in populated areas to eliminate danger of being hit with countermortar.

(b) The enemy expanded his propaganda effort upon the announcement of the departure of the 9th Infantry Division. He pictured the withdrawal as being forced upon US elements rather than a step toward peace negotiation. In addition, the enemy increased attacks upon the pacification program by increased shelling of Chieu Ho centers. In Kien Hoa Province, the enemy will concentrate on Mo Cay and Hung My Districts where the pacification has increased, but is still weak. In Dinh Tuong Province, he will probably direct his efforts against Ciao Duc, Ca Be, and Ca Lai Districts; and in Go Cong Province, against Hoa Dong District, especially in the "Coconut Grove" area where he has long concentrated his activities.

(c) The enemy seemed to attempt to surface a shadow government to add legitimacy to his position. Its impact cannot be clearly defined at this time.

(4) Recapitulation of Enemy Losses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Detainees</td>
<td>1080</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pks</td>
<td>251</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hoi Chanhs</td>
<td>92</td>
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<td>Crew Served Weapons</td>
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<td>Small Arms</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ammunition (Rds)</td>
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<td>Mines</td>
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<td>Grain (tons)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sampans</td>
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<tr>
<td>Structures</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bunkers</td>
<td>2745</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Subject: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 June 1969, RCS CSCOR-65 (R1) (U)

(5) Intelligence Sources and Agencies

(a) Progress against the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) by the CI Sections. 9th MI Det continued. VCI targets as they were developed, were passed to the Brigades or other action agencies. The CI Section passed the following number of VCI targets to the Brigades during the reporting period: 1st Brigade - 20 targets, 2nd Brigade - 7 targets, 3rd Brigade - 12 targets. The targets were developed either by the respective PHOENIX Committees or the CI collection teams.

(b) The Division Interrogation Section processed a total of 577 detainees during the reporting period. Of this total 126 were classified Innocent Civilians, 22 were classified Civil Defendants, 165 were classified PWs and 63 were classified Hoa Chans. In addition, the section processed 236 batches of captured documents, of which 141 were of tactical value. The section also processed approximately 184 pounds of captured material, consisting primarily of captured Viet Cong clothing and equipment.

(c) Significant activities and New Techniques

1. The Imagery Interpretation Section, consistent with its basic mission, accomplished the following during the reporting period. A total of 205 aerial photographic missions were received and processed, of which 22 photo interpretation reports were prepared and distributed. The results of 108 Red Haze and 36 SLAR sorties were disseminated. In response to specific requests the section prepared 18 photo mosaics, two target folders, and 12 special targeting readouts.

2. A total of 153 photographic missions were cut and packaged with field plots for dissemination to the division units.

3. During the reporting period an additional infra-red ground terminal, AN-TAQ-1A, was placed into operation, thus permitting two Red Haze sorties to be simultaneously "data linked." This direct transmission of the imagery permitted more rapid readouts of the emissions detected and eliminated the need for the aircraft to return and off-load film at a distant airfield for interpretation. Also a SLAR ground terminal station AN/TAQ-2 was installed, thus giving the capability of SLAR "Data Link".

4. Personnel detectors - XM 3 Airborne Personnel Detector (APD) and XM 2 Manpack Personnel Detector (MPD).

5. During the reporting period there were 1234 personnel detector missions flown for a total flying time of 916 hours. All missions were flown utilizing the UH-1. Results of these missions were reported to the appropriate agencies.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Inf. Div. for Period Ending
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for inclusion in their compilation of intelligence reports.

b) A fourth APD was received during the reporting period, consequently the
9th 9th Infantry Division operations.

(6) Weather and Terrain: During the reporting period, the weather continued to have little adverse effect on either friendly or enemy operations in the TAOC. The most adverse effect on friendly operations was the result of overcast skies in the early evening thus imposing some limitations on the division’s night operations.

(7) Intelligence Sources and Agencies:

(a) The enemy has the capability to:

1. Conduct multi-battalion attacks on province and district seats, other major cities, and military installations.

2. Conduct brief attacks by fire, hide his equipment, and withdraw from the area prior to employment of countermortar techniques.

3. Conduct attacks by fire and harassment on towns, villages, hamlets, outposts and other installations.

4. Conduct sniper and terrorist attacks on key bridges, roads, RD projects, and population centers.

5. Defend base areas and positions with local security forces and reinforce within a four kilometer radius.

6. Disperse major units into platoon and squad size elements.

7. Withdraw and disperse easily.

8. Wage political and psychological warfare on the populace and hold control of any area where there is no friendly security at night.

9. Surface a shadow government at most levels of political activity.

10. Position forces in forward base areas throughout the TAOC in order to support his efforts to control the populace of such areas.

(b) The enemy is vulnerable to:

1. Loss of support of the population.

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1-8 Friendly superior artillery and air power.
2-8 Interdiction of the LOCs and loss of cached supplies.
4-8 Disclosure or capture of attack plans.
5-8 Detection by friendly surveillance devices.
6-8 A breakdown in his infrastructure by aggressive allied actions.
7-8 A lack of combat effective troops and a low morale due to heavy casualties and desertions.
8-8 A loss of logistical support which has resulted in a lack of food and medicine making him vulnerable to hunger, disease, and complication of wounds.

(c) With the departure of the 9th Infantry Division from the Delta, the enemy has the following courses of action available to him.

1-8 He could strike continually and use propaganda to the effect that the US is being driven out.
2-8 He could hide, let US forces withdraw then attack ARVN/GVN installations and personnel.
3-8 He could hide until US elements stood down with only minimal defensive capability and then attempt to inflict maximum casualties upon US elements.

From all appearances it seems the enemy will allow the division to depart while making only minimal efforts to inflict casualties by indirect fire. He will apparently direct his main effort toward countering the pacification program as it is now developing.

(8) New Techniques

(a) The 9th Infantry Division Duffel Bag Program, now in its second quarter has increased from 12 strings of 71 sensors to 25 strings of 120 sensors. The best type sensors for local use are the ACOUBOY (Acoustical Buoy), MINISID (Miniature Hand-emplaced Seismic Intrusion Detector), MAGID (Magnetic Intrusion Detector), and GSID (Ground Seismic Intrusion Detector). Three types of emplacement have been used: Air dropping the ACOUBOY with an attached spike from a helicopter to stick in the ground; Inserting the ACOUBOY by boat, placing it along side of the river or canal; Hand emplacement, inserting infantry in the target area and emplacing by hand.

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(b) During the period 2793 personnel were detected with 424 target activations. Artillery fires were placed on 287 targets.

c. (c) Operations

1. Combat Operations

(a) TOAN THANG III. The 3d Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG III during the reporting period. The brigade operated with three maneuver battalions (2–60 Inf, 5–60 Inf, and 2(Mech)-47 Inf) in Long An Province until 2 June, when a fourth battalion, the 3–7 Inf, became OPCOM to the brigade. The mission of the brigade was unchanged. On 12 May at 0500 hours an Artillery Aerial Observer was dispatched to an area southwest of Thu Thua to assist a PF outpost which was under attack. During the initial reconnaissance, the AO received heavy automatic weapons fire from an unknown size enemy force. Trp B/3-17 Cav was sent to the area and also received heavy fire. On request of the Province Chief, Recon 2(M)-47 Inf was sent to reinforce territorial forces and immediately came in contact with the enemy. A "pile-on" operation began, utilizing B, C, and D Companies of 2-60 Inf; B and D Companies of 5-60 Inf; and one company each from the 2d and 3d Battalion, 50th ARVN Regiment; 2 PF Platoons, 4 RF Companies; and one PRU Platoon. Assault helicopters, air cavalry, tac air, and artillery supported the operation. Sporadic contact continued throughout the night. At first light, US, ARVN, and territorial forces conducted a sweep of the battlefield, while B and D/5-60 Inf conducted air mobile assaults to the northwest in pursuit of the enemy. By 2000 hours, 13 May the combined sweep and pursuit terminated. Final results of the combined operation were 91 enemy killed, six PNs, 16 crew served weapons, and 15 individual weapons captured. Combined friendly losses were four killed and 37 wounded. Three APCs and seven aircraft were damaged. On 141232H May 1969, Company B, 2-60 Inf made an air mobile assault southwest of Ben Luc (XS 6774). Gunships observed 20-30 VC with weapons evading. Elements of Companies A, D and Recon, 2-60 Inf were inserted to cordon the enemy. Sporadic contact continued throughout the afternoon and evening, with N/3-17 Cav, Artillery, and Tac Air in support. Six US were wounded during the contact; while US forces killed 39 of the enemy and captured two crew served and 17 individual weapons. At 281215H May 1969, Recon/5-60 Inf was inserted in the vicinity of the Eagle's Beak (XS 5977). At 1235 hours, Recon made contact with an unknown size VC force. Companies B and D/5-60 Inf were inserted to reinforce, while B/3-17 Cav, 240th AHC, Artillery, Tac Air, and Navy PBRs supported. Results of the operation were 21 VC (BC). Five US were killed and three were wounded. The 3d Brigade continued to support the 1969 Pacification Development Plan during the reporting period. The 3d Brigade conducted 447 ICAPs, 204 MEDCAPs, and 125 NITECAPs, treating 51,694 patients.
(b) QUIET THANG

Operation QUIET THANG continued during the reporting period. Operation SPICY EXPRESS (Dry Weather phase of Op QUIET THANG) terminated 12000H May 1969. Operation RICE FARMER (Wet Weather phase) was initiated as an extension of QUIET THANG at 01000H June 1969. The 1st Brigade with four maneuver battalions (2-39 Inf, 3-39 Inf, 4-39 Inf, and 6-31 Inf) and the 2nd Brigade with three maneuver battalions (3-60 Inf, 3-47 Inf, 4-47 Inf) continued operations in Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa, Kien Phong, and Go Cong Provinces.

Some of the more significant contacts that occurred during the reporting period were as follows: At 090700H May 1969, a two-day combined operation with elements of the 2-39 Inf, 4-39 Inf, and 12th ARVN Regt was initiated north of Giao Duc (WS 9944). While ARVN and 2-39 Inf forces cordoned and blocked the target, the 4-39 Inf conducted a massive sweep that ended 10 May. The results of the operation were 52 enemy killed and three captured. This operation disrupted the staging area for the 261A VC Battalion. At 120915H May 1969, D/3-39 Inf made contact with an estimated enemy company in the Cam Son Area (WS 1945), sustaining four US KIA and eight WIA. A brief but intense fire fight resulted in 16 enemy killed. Three 9mm pistols and many documents were captured. A combined operation with elements of the 2-39 Inf, 3-39 Inf, and the 12th ARVN Regiment, was initiated 20054SH May 1969 in the Cam Son area (WS 1945). After an artillery preparation and Tac Air strike, troops were lifted into zone (2-39 Inf on the north, 3-39 Inf in the center, and 12th ARVN Regt to the south) sweeping east toward the Ba Rai River. Results of the operation were 21 enemy killed. Friendly losses were two killed and 16 wounded. At 211930H May 1969 Company C, 4-47 Inf engaged a company sized enemy force northeast of Ben Tre. The enemy returned fire with small arms and automatic weapons. A 'Sting Ray' light fire team from the 9th Aviation Battalion and the 3-34 Artillery supported, resulting in 21 enemy killed and 12 secondary explosions. Three US soldiers were wounded. On 21 May, A, B, and C/4-39 Inf moved from night locations into a U-shaped blocking force north of Giao Duc (WS 9844). In the early morning of 22 May, Company D, was inserted to complete the encirclement of the enemy position. A classic "hammer and anvil" operation ensued. Supported by C Btry, 1-11 Arty and B Trp, 3-17 Cav, the operation, which was conducted by a single infantry battalion, resulted in 117 enemy killed and four US wounded. At 241500H May 1969 Company A, 4-47 Infantry conducted footmobile AIF operations in reaction to a "People Sniffer" reading SW of Thoi Son Island (WS 4137). Company A received small arms, automatic weapons, and M/79 fire from an unknown size enemy force. "Crusader" gunships from D/3-5 Cav supported. As the contact continued C/4-47 Inf was inserted as a blocking force. Contact broke at about 2400 hours. A sweep of the contact area revealed 102 enemy dead. US casualties were eight wounded. At 231200H June 1969, A/3-47 Inf conducted a watermobile insertion west of Tiger II (WS 6827) with one platoon of National Police and a Hoi Chanh, who led the allies to a cache containing the following: 17 ChiCom Rifles, 11 submachineguns, seven Soviet light machineguns, one German heavy machinegun, one Thompson submachinegun, one M16,
one AK 47, two BARs, and a large amount of mortar and small arms ammunition. Throughout the reporting period, the 6-31 Inf had the difficult DARMA (Defense Against Rocket and Mortar Attack) mission for Dong Tam Base. That there was a decrease in the number of attacks by fire against Dong Tam during the two-month period is a tribute to the aggressive spirit of the 6-31 Inf. The 1st Brigade supported the 1969 Pacification Development Plan during the reporting period with 555 ICAPs, 700 MEDCAPs, and 76 NITECAPs, treating 82,625 patients.

(2) Assessment

(a) 1st Brigade. During the reporting period, the 1st Brigade killed 1855 enemy and captured 103 PWs. This impressive record, which was achieved through a large number of small unit contacts, contributed significantly to the pacification effort in Dinh Tuong Province. Enemy-initiated incidents were primarily attacks by indirect fire against Dong Tam Base, battalion fire support bases, and ARVN/RF/FF outposts. An increase in combined operations, with tactical integration of allied troops down to company level, provided a valuable training vehicle for ARVN and Territorial Forces. At the end of the period, the 1st Brigade began planning for a phased redeployment to Hawaii.

(b) 2d Brigade. The 2d Brigade killed 1566 enemy during the period, and captured 68 PWs. The number of enemy-initiated incidents varied. From mid-May until the end of the month enemy-initiated incidents increased, with the apparent VC objective of increasing his domination of those areas under his control. During the month of June, his activities consisted predominantly of terrorist incidents, indirect fire attacks, and harassment of GVN outposts. Throughout the period, the 2d Brigade concentrated on the support of the pacification efforts in Kien Hoa Province. The Brigade's ability to react quickly and reinforce any element within the TAOI was a major factor that prevented the VC from mounting a successful offensive. The 2d Brigade began redeployment activities during June. The 3-60 Inf, and the 3-47 Inf had ceased offensive operations by the end of the reporting period. Close coordination was made by the 7th Infantry Division (ARVN) and territorial forces to insure that the momentum developed by the 2d Brigade in Kien Hoa Province would be maintained by GVN forces after the 2d Brigade's redeployment.

(c) 3d Brigade. During the period the 3d Brigade killed 1039 enemy and captured 73 PWs, as the level of enemy activity increased in its TAOI. Indications are that the enemy will continue to remain fragmented and will continue to conduct economy of force operations and attacks by fire against allied military installations. The 3d Brigade will remain in Long An Province after the redeployment of the 1st and 2d Brigades.

(d) A summary of division and maneuver battalion combat statistics for May and June is attached at Inclosure 7.
(3) Combat Support Activities

(a) Artillery Support

Division Artillery firing elements continued to support division operations in Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa, Long An, Kien Phong, Kien Tuong, Vinh Binh, and Gia Dinh Provinces. Fire support was also provided for Army Republic of Vietnam units, Regional Forces, and Civilian Irregular Defense Groups. The 2d Battalion, 4th Artillery supported one of the few pitched battles fought by division forces during the period, the Thu Thua engagement of 12-13 May 1969, in which three batteries fired over 1000 rounds into a tight encirclement of two infantry battalions plus sector forces. On 14 May, the battalion began a program of direct fire with self-propelled 155mm howitzers into treeline fortifications, in support of Regional Forces/Popular Forces. Operations of 1st Battalion, 11th Artillery were highlighted by frequent airmobile displacements and split battery operations. All 1st Brigade operations were closely supported by artillery, despite commitments over a four province area. On one operation, near the Cambodian border, in the northern Plain of Reeds, the battalion put airmobile platforms to effective use. Over 200 enemy dead were credited to the 1-11th Artillery during the two month period. The 3d Battalion, 34th Artillery sent its batteries frequently out of the normal TAGI, the floating barge artillery traveling several times to Vinh Binh Province and once into the South China Sea to support operations in the treacherous mangrove swamps of the Binh Dai Secret Zone. To obtain necessary coverage, it was necessary to split batteries frequently. On 29 June, the first of the battalion's batteries was withdrawn from action, preparatory to redeployment to CONUS and inactivation. The 1st Battalion, 84th Artillery made 20 battery displacements by land and air during the period, on several occasions evading enemy ambushes and snipers. The battalion's self-propelled 155mm howitzers performed creditably in the hazardous but highly successful direct fire assaults on enemy-held tree-lines.

Artillery with the 9th Infantry Division fired a total of 96,146 rounds of 105mm howitzer, 44,521 rounds of 155mm howitzer, 7023 rounds of 8 inch howitzer, and 1744 rounds of 175mm gun.

A statistical summary of artillery support is attached as Inclosure 5.

(b) Helicopter Gunship Support

The 9th Aviation Battalion flew 3728 gunship sorties. Missions included escort for VIP flights; aerial displacement of supplies, personnel and equipment by cargo helicopters; medical evacuation; people sniffer convoys; insertions and extractions; and firefly missions. The gunships provided support for units in contact and DARMA missions at Tan An and Dong Tam.
operational report of 9th infantry division for period ending
30 june 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (RL) (U) (C15)

ships accounted for 159 VC KBA(BC). They destroyed 141 structures and 75 sampans. Gunships damaged 18 structures and 36 sampans.

2. Troop D, 3-5 Cavalry supported all division elements during this period, providing an average of seven armed helicopters daily. Missions included reconnaissance, screening and blocking operations. The troop accounted for 238 VC KBA and 354 sampans destroyed.

(c) Tactical Air Support: The number of air sorties increased slightly during this period. A chart reflecting ordinance expended and results obtained is attached as Inclosure 6.

(d) Strategic Air Support: There were no B 52 strikes conducted in support of the 9th Infantry Division during the reporting period.

(e) Naval Fire Support: Naval gunfire was effectively integrated with artillery fire in support of 2d Brigade operations. Naval fire was also employed extensively in support of sensor activities.

(f) Air Cushion Vehicle Support: During the reporting period the Air Cushion Vehicle (ACV) unit with attached infantry and Army aviation elements of the 2d and 3d Brigades conducted reconnaissance, security, and raid missions in Long An and Go Cong Provinces. Two ACVs were operational during the period. Twenty to 24 infantry were carried as part of the cavalry team on all operations. The advent of the wet monsoon season considerably increased trafficability for ACV operations, particularly in the Plain of Reeds. Results during the period were 71 VC/NVA killed, 18 Pks, 17 weapons, and 75 lb of documents captured.

1. (C) Training

(1) During the reporting period the following training was conducted within the 9th Infantry Division:

(a) Replacement Training
(b) Officer/NCO Replacement Training
(c) NCO Leadership Training
(d) Battalion Refresher Training
(e) Sniper School Training

(2) Due to implementation of plans for redeployment of the 1st and 2d Brigades, all training conducted by Reliable Academy was concluded during the month
of June 1969. Current plans are to establish a Replacement Training Center, as organized for a separate light infantry brigade, within the 3d Brigade.

(3) Replacement training, which consisted of five days of intensive orientation and physical training, was received by 107 officers and 2818 enlisted men at Reliable Academy during the reporting period. In addition, several officers assigned as advisors to IV Corps Delta Military Assistance Command received replacement training under a modified training program. Replacement training at Reliable Academy ended on 20 June.

(4) The fourteen day NCO Leadership Course continued to produce highly motivated and efficient small unit leaders. During May and June 156 men completed the course. The final leadership course was completed on 30 June.

(5) The 9th Infantry Division Sniper School graduated four classes during the reporting period. The final class before movement of the school to the 25th Infantry Division was completed on 19 July. The Sniper School also conducted training in the use of starlight scopes for ARVN Cadre from the 9th and 21st Infantry Divisions (ARVN).

g. Logistics: The logistical mission of providing planning, guidance and support for all organic, and attached units and units under the operational control of the 9th Infantry Division, and preparing for redeployment and inactivation was accomplished during the reporting period. Major tactical units supported were two land based brigades and one riverine brigade organic to the 9th Infantry Division. Support was provided to division units operating in Long An, Giai Cong, and Binh Duong Provinces.

(1) Supply

(a) The flow of goods and services continued to improve during the initial portion of the reporting period. In the latter portion the shifting of priorities and transferring of properties from redeploying or inactivating units alleviated shortages in many areas.

(b) Preparing units for redeployment or inactivation required close coordination to insure proper disposition of items on the commander's critical items list, TOE items for inactivating elements and post, camp, and station property. Priorities were established to enable these items to reach the user with the most significant need.

(c) A complete inventory of all items on hand in each unit was performed to facilitate transfer or turn-in of equipment.

(d) The 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry was inactivated and their property books brought to zero balance on 29 June 1969. This unit provided an experience
factor and set the pattern for the remainder of the inactivating units.

(a) There has been noticeable improvement in the availability of building materials for fire bases beyond the basic need of bunkers and other essential defensive positions. Small size lumber continues in critically short supply.

(b) Services: Improvement in availability of goods continued during the reporting period. A shortage of luggage for troops deploying was noticed in the last half of June. Requisitions were submitted and when filled should alleviate this situation.

(c) Support

(a) G4 Staff visits and classes on generator maintenance and vehicle maintenance (to include TABRS and PLL) have significantly lowered the deadline percentage for these critical items throughout the division.

(b) Command Material Maintenance Inspections reflect improved awareness of command interest and organizational level planning in all areas of equipment maintenance.

(4) Transportation

(a) The trailer-on-ship concept of moving heavy timber for certain fire support base construction was initiated during the reporting period. A low bed trailer is loaded on an LCM-8 at Dong Tam and met at My Thuan by a tractor which hauls the lumber to PSPB Danger.

(b) Control of transportation of local national employees to and from My Tho was put in effect. Twenty-three trucks are used to bring the 550 employees with transportation permits to Dong Tam.

(c) Arrangements were made with Ist Log Command to provide shipment of unaccompanied hold baggage for redeploying personnel. The personnel property branch was moved to an area with a capability of processing 165 people per day and reserve capability of 400 with a three day notice.

h. [V] Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs

(1) Psychological Operations

(a) The Accelerated Chieu Hoi Program, beginning 15 June, and PSYOP activities generated by the redeployment of the 9th Infantry Division constituted the two largest PSYOP programs during the reporting period. Other PSYOP activities were carried out as usual. Fifty per cent of all PSYOP air and 71%
AVDI-M1

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 June 1969, HCS CSPOR-65 (RI) (U)

The operational report of 9th Infantry Division for the period ending 30 June 1969 highlights the effectiveness of the Accelerated Chieu Hoi Campaign. Most of the ground missions carried out during the reporting period were conducted within APC area boundaries. These missions were targeted against specific units selected for the accelerated Chieu Hoi campaign as being most susceptible to mass rally. PSYOP media were used to publicize RVNAF achievements and stress the fact that they are now capable of bearing the tactical responsibility of the Delta.

(b) The themes used during the period varied according to the specific programs and targets, but fell generally within these categories: Chieu Hoi, Special Rewards Campaign (Third Party Inducement), GVN Image, ARVN Image, and VIP. The Special Rewards Campaign, created to bolster the effectiveness of the Accelerated Chieu Hoi Campaign, generated a large number of the Hoi Chanhs who rallied throughout the Division TAOI.

(c) Objectives of PSYOP:

1. To build the GVN image and create within the populace a greater respect for the capabilities of the RVNAF.
2. To encourage enemy soldiers to rally, not only as individuals, but as units.
3. To convince the civilian populace, as well as the VC, that the American troops leaving the Delta have done their job and can now return to their homes, confident that the RVNAF is capable of defeating the enemy.
4. Convince the enemy soldier that he has lost and that Chieu Hoi is the only alternative.

(d) Throughout the reporting period, every effort was made to maximize the coordination of PSYOP efforts. The Accelerated Chieu Hoi Campaign was the greatest contributing factor to this. Before and during Chieu Hoi Month, frequent meetings were held including representatives from G5, the brigade S5s, VIP, the Chieu Hoi Ministry, Province PSYOP, and 7th ARVN Division. These meetings succeeded in minimizing duplication of effort and allowing maximum utilization of personnel and assets.

(e) During the reporting period, the total of confirmed Hoi Chanhs was 1600 for the Division TAOI. Of this total, 92 rallied to divisional units. The continued tactical pressure, accompanied by a good sales program in regard to Chieu Hoi Campaigns, continued to account for extremely high returnee rates. The Accelerated Chieu Hoi Campaign served to keep the 9th Infantry Division's raller rate at a high level even though the division's redeployment had been announced.
subject: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 June 1969, RCS CSFOR-65

(f) PSYOP Activity Statistics (1 May - 30 June 1969)

1. Leaflet Missions (total): 7347
   - Air: 3563
   - Ground: 3780

2. Loudspeaker Missions (total): 3986
   - Air: 1029
   - Ground: 2867

3. Rapid Reaction Hours (total): 2110.5

4. Rapid Reaction Leaflets produced by 9th Inf Div: 10

5. Rapid Reaction Leaflets produced by other agencies: 3

(2) Civil Affairs/Civic Action

(a) The 3d Brigade's Special Action Forces in Long An Province, consisting of one US MAT Team supported by one US rifle squad and working closely with RP/FF and RDC, continue with noted success in various areas. ICAPs and NITECAPs were added to their schedule in the first half of the reporting period. Three ambushes were initiated during NITECAPs and, although US troops conducted a sweep of the contact area, the RP/FF platoon took the initiative and led the sweep. The SAF elements are conducting their normal activities of ICAP, MEDCAP, and NITECAP with the GVN S5 and medical representatives. Priority remains on the contested hamlets targeted under the GVN 1969 Pacification Plan. Each SAF continues to find incidents where GVN forces are not staying in the hamlet areas as directed by their respective district chiefs. Such incidents are reported and necessary steps are taken to correct this deficiency. In the latter part of the reporting period, two ambushes conducted by SAF elements resulted in VC body count and weapons captured. Continued emphasis is being placed on training of Territorial Forces by use of combined night ambushes.

(b) Repair and construction projects continued to increase in both quantity and quality during the reporting period. A new determination has been noted in the Vietnamese people, which coupled with a stronger confidence and faith in GVN and US forces, has led to the successful completion of many projects which in the past would not have been started.

1. The 12th and 13th of May marked a good example of the strengthened
Vietnamese determination. On these dates approximately 200 enemy troops, mostly NVA, moved into Bo Kinh Hamlet with the mission of attacking the district town of Thu Thua. In the ensuing battle, three US battalions and Thu Thua RF/PF forces met and defeated the NVA force. The victory, however, was costly because the NVA used the town as a battle site. In the final analysis, 366 homes had been completely destroyed by a combination of artillery fire, ground fighting and the NVA burning many houses as they retreated. Two thousand five hundred refugees needed homes and plans were immediately put into effect to restore the town. Among emergency relief items supplied by the 9th Infantry Division were 100 55-gallon water drums, 700 5-gallon water cans, 100,000 board feet of 2" by 4" lumber and 376 sheets of roofing tin. This, together with the determination of the people, has restored Thu Thua to the large and prosperous town it was.

This is an example of the great strides that Vietnamese/US cooperation has taken in Long An Province the past few years. It is to be noted that the residents of Thu Thua blame the VC/NVA, not the US and CVN forces for this incident.

2. Three years ago the province officials of Dinh Tuong Province approved funding for the Cai Be Hospital, but numerous other projects have received priority while the hospital was postponed. Only two hospitals, one in My Tho and one in Cai Be, serve the 600,000 people of the Province. Barely adequate facilities, providing little more than first aid, dot the remainder of the province. The My Tho Hospital affords reasonably good medical coverage for the eastern part of the province, but the facility at Cai Be is considerably inferior. The hospital's physical plant is in deplorable condition. The building is an old schoolhouse, pitifully overcrowded and lacking even the flexibility to separate the maternity and contagious disease wards. A special grant of 1,000,000 $VN has been made available to the 1st Brigade to purchase the needed materials on the local market because of nonavailability through normal supply channels. Besides materials and supervision, the 1st Brigade, until redeployment, be supplementing the medical staff with brigade personnel. The project has received top priority from the 9th Infantry Division and completion of the Cai Be Hospital renovation is anticipated before the 9th Infantry Division Headquarters redeploy.

(c) Distribution of commodities, both through construction projects and assistance to social welfare, continues to be an important and effective part of the division's program.

1. Building materials
   Cement: 265,000 lb
   Tin Sheets: 4561
   Lumber: 324,211 bd ft
   Paint: 50 gal
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Other: 461,167 lb (includes fill, sand, gravel, culverts)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kits</td>
<td>3835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>24,455 lbf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>542 lbf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health items</td>
<td>2838 lb</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Medical Civic Action Program: During this period, although shorter than usual, the number of MEDCAPs and patients treated came very close to meeting the last report’s figures. The CAPs, continuing with approval from the Province Chiefs, Health Chiefs, and Senior Advisors of all the provinces concerned, have produced greater cooperation between the 9th Infantry Division and the 7th Infantry Division (ARVN). Operations were targeted so that they would better support the GVN 1969 Pacification Plan.

A meeting was held between the 7th Infantry Division (ARVN) and the 9th Infantry Division to discuss and coordinate the Vietnamese assumption of the US MEDCAP schedule and CA construction projects. Although the 9th Infantry Division planned to complete or turn over to CA Platoons all construction projects, this was impossible to do with the MEDCAP program. The 7th ARVN Division, having fewer trained personnel, could not assume the complete US schedule but worked out an ambitious program within the framework of their capabilities to provide as much medical assistance as possible to the civilian population in their area of operations.

Since 3 May, the 15th Engineer Battalion has been utilizing a “Mobile MEDCAP” program. Having converted an M 109 “shop van” into a mobile aid station, the 15th Engineer Battalion has provided its battalion surgeons with not only the facilities but also the privacy he needs. The Mobile Team, consisting of the battalion surgeon and three or four medics, has visited Kien Hoa, Dinh Tuong, and Long An Provinces at least twice in its eight operations to date. The van has made appearances in Truc Giang, Ben Tranh, Binh Phuoc, and Cho Gao Districts. During only eight “Mobile CAPs”, the team has treated in excess of 800 patients and received numerous intelligence reports. As a sidelight the 15th Engineer Battalion has distributed an average of 100 pounds of food per operation. “Mobile CAPs” are usually planned through the District Senior Advisor and an RF/PF squad or platoon is provided for security.

Dental Civic Action has continued with noted success. Over a thousand “toothaches” have been eased during the reporting period. The 9th Medical Battalion carried the bulk of this responsibility, having treated over 600 patients in DENTCAPs. The need remains greater than the qualified personnel available.
but more and more of the demand is being met.

(e) ICAP/NITECAP. SP4 Jack Vaughn, the noted 9th Infantry Division medic, or "Goldfinger" as he is called, has continued to thrill Vietnamese audiences. With the large increase in ICAPs and NITECAPs, SP4 Vaughn added these to his schedule. Having gone on 25 ICAPs and NITECAPs, he has thrilled over 20,000 applauding Vietnamese. His travels have taken him to all four provinces in the 9th Infantry Division area and in Long An Province, he has performed in each of the seven districts. His efforts have been rewarded many times with needed intelligence reports on local guerrillas.

(f) Transportation

1 Lanes of communication received special attention during the reporting period in view of the upcoming wet season. There were 57.6 km of roads repaired and six kilometers of roads constructed. Seventeen bridges were constructed and four were repaired.

2 The An Luc Long Village Chief was threatened with death by the local VC if he cooperated with the GVN, and was given an example by the VC killing five Vietnamese who worked for the 2(M)-47 Inf. In spite of this he went to the 25 of the 2(M)-47 Inf and requested help in the building of a foot bridge for an old man who could not construct it himself because of his tubercular condition. The bridge was completed and the obvious defiance against the VC showed the trust that the Vietnamese have acquired in the GVN and US forces.

(g) Community Relations. Community relations projects were more numerous during the reporting period than at any other period covered. The 7th Infantry Division (ARVN) and the 9th Infantry Division Special Services combined to present a series of entertaining events for the 9th Infantry Division GIs at the Ponderosa Service Club. Athletic events included a ping-pong tournament, which the 7th Infantry Division (ARVN) won, and a Tai Kwon Do exhibition (Korean judo and karate). Shows included a cultural drama team from the 7th Infantry Division (ARVN) PSYWAR Section and a special picnic show for orphans and underprivileged children of the My Tho area. The shows and events provided a welcome break for the GIs, and the 7th Infantry Division (ARVN) requested to come back again, showing that they enjoyed the activities as much as the 9th Infantry Division did.

1 The English classes in My Tho drew to a close at the end of the reporting period. Three Hundred students of the My Tho Girls' High School and the Boys' High School received certificates of achievement and awards for top graduates upon completion of the 24 hour course. Another 28 students at the coed high school who got a late start are nearing completion of their course.

2 The 9th Medical Battalion graduated eight students during the reporting period.
period in two four-week courses designed to train the Vietnamese students in advanced first aid. Four of the eight students have gone on to provincial hospitals to continue their training and to apply their knowledge. The 9th Medical Battalion has aided in partially filling the tremendous need for qualified medical help in the Delta area.

The 9th Infantry Division became the first division to receive the Unit Civil Actions Honor Medal, during ceremonies at Dong Tam on 5 July 1969. GEN Cao Van Vien, Chief, Joint General Staff, made the presentation of the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with Palm as well as the Civil Actions Honor Medal, 1st Class, with Oak Leaf to MC Harris W. Kealii, 9th Inf Div. The Civil Actions Honor Medal was presented for significant accomplishments in civil action since the division arrived in Vietnam (19 Dec 66 to 8 Jun 69).

1. **Necessary Support**: During the reporting period a gradual transition between the dry weather program and wet weather program was started. Intermittent showers, which marked the approach of the monsoon season, flooded the fields and made horizontal work difficult. Operations during the period were broken down as follows:

1. **Dry Weather Program**

   (a) During the first part of the period most effort was placed on completing the dry weather program projects. It was extremely important to complete work at fire support bases and Phase III road work so that they would be usable during the wet season.

   (b) During the reporting period work was completed on the upgrade of three existing fire support bases and construction of three new fire support bases.

   (c) Phase I work (opening of road to class 12 military traffic and light civilian traffic) was completed on 39 km of road for a total of 104 km out of 105 km of the program being completed. The remaining one kilometer of road is expected to be finished by 31 July. Phase III work (upgrade of roads to all weather capability) was started and approximately 10 km were completed.

   (d) Approximately 416 acres of land were cleared during this period. This is a total of 786 out of 1950 acres. The shortage of donkeys and Rome Plows continued to delay the land clearing until the entire project was finally halted due to the weather.

2. **Wet Weather Program**

   (a) Planning for the wet weather program was completed. Primary emphasis was placed on the maintenance of MSRs; replacement of tactical bridging,
and construction of new bridges.

With the start of the rains the wet season program was implemented. The importance of the dry weather program was quickly realized when heavy rains fell and flooded the paddies making any further horizontal work difficult.

Combat Support: Combat engineer support was provided by both the 15th and 86th Engineer Battalions to tactical units in the Division TAOR. Support consisted of demolition and booby trap clearing missions, numerous mine sweeps, and road clearing operations. Repair of critical bridges and construction and maintenance of protective systems (plank protection, mine booms, lighting) on QL 4.

Other Engineer Support: Technical assistance and materials were provided to the 7th Infantry Division (ARVN) for bridge repairs. Classes in demolition and booby trap destruction were given to RP/PF units in Long An and Kien Hoa Provinces. Company D, 15th Engineer constructed a rifle range berm for RP/PFs in Kien Hoa and a water tower for the Hoi Chanh Center in Ben Tre.

Signal Support

During the reporting period the areas served by the Division Communications System were as follows: Ben Luc, Rach Kien, Tan An, Binh Phuoc, Tan Tru, Can Giuoc, Dong Tam, Ben Tre, FSPB Moore, FSPB Tiger II, FSPB Danger, FSPB Schroeder, and the floating portion of the Mobile Riverine Brigade.

Signal support to the division during May and June was concentrated primarily on maintaining efficient and reliable communications, and improving existing facilities. Notification of redeployment in mid-June and subsequent preparations for unit moves into substantially reduced requirements for extensive planning and support of major operations. Significant items during May included the return of the USS Benjamin and re-establishment of its VHF link to the division system and the installation of antenna towers at Rach Kien and FSPB Danger. On 18 May 1969, the MARS station commenced operation from its new building designed to provide improved service to members of the division. On 1 June, an infantry battalion of the 199th LBP was attached to the division and based at Can Giuoc. VHF support was provided permitting access to the division system through Tan An. During the period 2-12 June, 1st Brigade operations in the Moc Hoa area were supported by air lifting a VHF terminal to Moc Hoa and VHF relay equipment, the Tuyen Nhon. In addition, an FM retrans station was installed at Tuyen Nhon. Early June saw the first operational test of an experimental communication console for the LOH (Light Observation Helicopter), utilizing AN/PRC-77 radios. The installation was designed and built by the 7th Signal Battalion to provide command and control communications for battalion commanders, using LOH as a C/C ship. Communication equipment organic
to the aircraft proved inadequate for this purpose. Of note is the fact that, while being demonstrated to the Division Commander, the console was used to commit combat troops. Needless to say the demonstration was successful.

(3) During this reporting period two new types of antennas were tested for possible use within the division. Experiments were conducted to investigate the theory that a double antenna oriented "exactly" North and South, would exhibit omni-directional characteristics. Results were encouraging, but inconclusive, and further testing was interrupted by redeployment. Tests were also conducted with the Mark III field expedient antenna for use with portable FM equipment. Performance was excellent and compared favorably with the BC 292 ground plane. The principal drawback of the antenna, which uses a doublet configuration, is the lack of trees or other supports for installation in the flat terrain of the Delta. Use in fixed facilities has proved very successful.

(4) Phase out of division communications, pursuant to redeployment, required extensive coordination and detailed planning. The necessity to maintain adequate and responsive communications while releasing assets for shipment or turn-in, was accomplished with minimal confusion and no loss of essential command and control.

IV. (c) Army Aviation

(1) The 9th Infantry Division, in supporting two Corps Tactical Areas, obtains its aviation assets from both II Field Force and IV Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ). During the past quarter the 9th Infantry Division has been supported by the 214th Combat Aviation Battalion (CAB) with two Assault Helicopter Companies (AHC) per day in direct support of the 1st and 2d Brigades operating in Kien Hoa and Dinh Tu-long Provinces. The 3d Brigade has been supported by II Field Force with an AHC on a mission basis operating in Long An Province.

(2) The division lift requirement has been supported by IV CTZ with the 147th Assault Support Helicopter Company (ASHC). Daily requirements involve three CH-47s flying an average of 18 hours and 36 sorties per day. Heavy lift requirements for the 3d Brigade have been supported by II Field Force with a CH-47 flying an average of 14.7 hours and nine sorties per day.

(3) The division CH-54 requirements are supplied by II Field Force. Division requirements for CH-54s arise two or three times a week for an average of three sorties per day and two hours blade time. A recapitulation of heavy lift support shows that 10,789 tons of cargo and 21,605 passengers were lifted for a total of 2,091.7 flying hours in support of the division.

(4) Cavalry troop support for the division consists of D/3-5 cavalry which is organic to the division and B/3-17 Cavalry which is in direct support. Additional cavalry troops are supplied to the division by both II Field Force and IV CTZ.
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OPERATIONAL REPORT 7TH INFANTRY DIVISION FOR PERIOD ENDING
30 JUNE 1969 BCS C/AVDR-69 (HI) (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

15 July 1969

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on a mission basis as required

1. (C) Chemical Operations

   (1) Personnel detectors (People Sniffer) - XM3 Airborne Personnel Detector (APD) and XM2 Manpack Personnel Detector (MPD)

      (a) During the reporting period there were 1234 missions flown for a total flying time of 915.0 hours. All missions were flown utilizing the UH-1. Results of these missions were reported to C2 and to brigade and/or air cavalry units for inclusion in their compilation of intelligence reports. With the arrival of the fourth APD, the MPD has been completely phased out of 9th Infantry Division operations.

      (b) During the reporting period sniffing results have shown considerable improvement. This is due largely to the improved symptomatic weather conditions; high winds have subsided and ideal sniffing conditions often occur during the inversion condition which follows rains.

   (2) Riot Control Agent Operation

      (a) During the reporting period there were no missions flown utilizing bulk CS due to the lack of suitable targets.

      (b) There were 22 E-158 Tactical CS Clusters expended during the reporting period. These were used by the 3d Brigade on point type targets developed from sniffer readings.

   (3) Defoliation

      (a) During the two-month period of this report one defoliation request was forwarded through channels. Long An Province has been the most active in providing potential targets. All base camp areas have been adequately sprayed and all approved projects in this area have been completed.

      (b) In May and June seven ground spray targets were completed expending 2,765 gallons of water soluble agents representing a coverage of 137.5 hectares. Helispray operations totaled 2770 gallons of herbicide dispersed covering an area of 287 hectares. Total coverage for air and ground operations were 424.5 hectares coverage with 4975 gallons expended.

      (c) Allocation of aircraft for herbicide operations was given a relatively low priority during most of the reporting period. Short blade time allotments combined with the time required for preparation of the first mission of each day, have caused a low rate of gallons sprayed per blade time allocated.

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(4) Flame Expedients

(a) A flame expedient known as the "Flame Bath" has been employed and improved during the reporting period. The expedient air-dropped from a UH-1H aircraft at an altitude of 1500 ft, is assembled from 55 gallons of Ethanol Fuel, 55 gallons of pinaprine, and 55 gallons of JP4. The three barrels are stacked on their sides in a triangular configuration, and held together with two 20 foot cargo straps. Ignition is obtained by wiring two M26AL surface flares to the cargo straps and rigging them for pin pull ignition initiated by lanyard pull upon release of the cargo by the pilot.

(b) Results from using this weapon have been excellent. Infantry units favor its usage on booby trapped areas, and have reported burned off areas as large as 100 meters in diameter resulting from the drop of a single munition.
2. (C) **Section IV. Lessons Learned, Commanders' Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations**

   a. (C) **Personnel**

      (1) (U) **Skin Disease**

         **Observation:** That the rainy season has increased the non-effectiveness rate resulting from skin disease in the Delta.

         **Evaluation:** The command policy of limiting combat operations to 48 hours remained the only effective control measure in reducing total skin disease. During the rainy season the entire body of combat foot troops is continuously wet and both bacterial infections and inflammatory fungal infections show significant increases at the onset of this season. The rainy season has shown us that the troop incapacitation level is in direct ratio to environmental inauspicious conditions.

         **Recommendation:** That the command policy of limiting operations in "wady areas" to 48 hours followed by a 24 hour "drying out" period is the most important method of treatment of disease of the feet and body skin conditions. This policy should be continued throughout the rainy season.

   (2) (U) **Offense Rates**

      **Observation:** Division offense rates remained below the USARV average in all categories. However, periods of selective enforcement can quickly change this favorable posture in any of the offense categories on a weekly basis.

      **Evaluation:** Continuing command emphasis, intensive troop education, and proper command action are required to maintain a low offense rate. Without these, selective enforcement serves to raise and lower the offense rate while producing little in the way of tangible results.

      **Recommendation:** A coordinated effort involving all aspects of the command is required to effectively reduce offense rates. In addition to the enforcement effort, which should be consistent rather than sporadic, assistance in the maintenance of law and order should be sought from all General and Special Staff Sections as well as unit commanders. Formation of a type of disciplinary control council would be beneficial in this respect.

   (3) (C) **Detainee Processing**

      **Observation:** Disposition of detainees is often unnecessarily prolonged because of administrative delay in processing required paperwork.
EVALUATION: Certain administrative steps are required by regulations before proper disposition can be made of a PW/detainee. Routine handling and normal distribution channels are not rapid enough to satisfy the time limits established by USARV and local provinces. This is especially true in the case of Civil Defendants. i.e., Long An Province will not accept a Civil Defendant that has been held in excess of 48 hours.

RECOMMENDATION: That negotiations be conducted with Long An Province to extend their limit of 48 hours to something more realistic. Additionally, that a standard operating procedure be established, designating internal routing of detainees and establishing priorities in order to preclude administrative delays

(4) (C) Hospital Detainee Ward

OBSERVATION: The lack of a special prisoner ward in the 3d Surgical Hospital creates serious custodial and security problems and requires the use of excessive military police personnel resources.

EVALUATION: Detainees being treated at medical facilities or evacuated through medical channels presently share the same facilities as US personnel. They are frequently located in several different wards, intermingled with US personnel. This frequently requires the use of several guards when one or two would suffice.

RECOMMENDATION: That a prison ward or isolation area be established to house all PW/Detainees for ease of handling and security.

(5) (U) Replacement Personnel

OBSERVATION: Replacement personnel, especially in medical MOSs do not possess the requisite qualifications.

EVALUATION: Experience has demonstrated that individuals with medical MOSs are being assigned with grade and MOS not commensurate with appropriate skill level. In an attempt to satisfy present and future needs, a comprehensive training program has been initiated with the assistance of Headquarters and Company A clearing station and the 3d Surgical Hospital.

RECOMMENDATION: That this type of training program be continued.

(6) (C) Redeployment

OBSERVATION: During this reporting period, two of the division's brigades and the division base were given orders to redeploy to CONUS and Hawaii.
remaining brigade was given orders to remain in the Republic of Vietnam for further service and redesignation similar to a light infantry brigade.

EVALUATION: The accomplishment of the announced redeployment was seriously hampered by a lack of information concerning criteria for personnel deploying or remaining in country. Effective planning was therefore hampered as hand receipt holders, advance parties, and various teams associated with the move could not be determined accurately. The most serious problem concerned the requirements to load equipment for shipment, without knowing what personnel were to redeploy with the unit. This makes it very difficult to retain supply accountability and have the equipment loaded into the CONEXs in time for redeployment. Also the many unsolved individual inquiries concerning redeployment status caused a marked decrease in the morale of all personnel, except those who received curtailments for subsequent reassignment to units moving to CONUS.

RECOMMENDATION: That future troop withdrawals be planned well in advance, and more timely decisions made as to composition of deploying units, so that personnel turbulence may be minimized, and redeployment planning may proceed in an orderly manner.

(7) (C) Personnel and Administration

OBSERVATION: Minor casualties, not requiring medical evacuation, are often times not reported expeditiously to higher headquarters.

EVALUATION: Minor casualties, those sustained in combat and not requiring treatment in the field or requiring only minor field treatment, are often not reported to higher headquarters until after the unit returns from its operations, and are then reported by unit medical facilities only as a basis for Purple Heart qualification. Late reports are submitted to brigade and division headquarters from two to five days after the incident.

RECOMMENDATION: To insure that casualty figures of all units, to include company, battalion, brigade, and division, are the same, commanders at lowest levels should report all casualties to higher headquarters, as soon as possible, no matter how slight the wound.

(C) Operations

(1) (C) Decreased Levels of Tactical Operations

OBSERVATION: As Brigade units stood down in preparation for redeployment, the Brigade TAOI was covered adequately with available forces by using platoon size airmobile insertions to locate and establish contact with the enemy.
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EVALUATION: A given area could be covered with decreasing troop assets by using fully the assault lift provided by the 162d Assault Helicopter Company. Multiple insertions over a wide area of suspected enemy locations increases the probability of contact without decreasing effective combat power. Once contact is gained, reinforcing elements could rapidly deploy at decisive points, instead of spending time searching for the enemy.

RECOMMENDATION: That the technique of multiple platoon-size airmobile insertions over a broad area of likely targets be employed.

(2) (C) Parakeet Operations

OBSERVATION: The Parakeet operation employs a six man Ranger Team, one UH-1D slick, and two Cobra gunships. Once a target has been detected the operation is conducted like an airmobile raid, utilizing a rapid insertion, violent action on the target, and then an extraction. The gunships provide additional firepower to sustain the operation.

RECOMMENDATION: That units continue to develop this technique and make its results known to other US and ARVN units.

(3) (C) Return of Detainees to Brigade IPW

OBSERVATION: Frequently detainees, thought to be innocent civilians, have been released by units in the field, only to learn later that they were actually VC.

EVALUATION: In the guerrilla type warfare encountered in the Delta, it is often impossible to distinguish the VC from a civilian by means of dress, age, identification papers, or sex. Many VC have been discovered with legitimate SVN identification papers. On several occasions personnel have been released in the field, only to discover at a later date that these personnel were VC.

RECOMMENDATION: All detainees regardless of age, sex, or identification papers should be evacuated for questioning by IPW teams. (See also para 2d(2) below)

(4) (C) Stay Behind Ambush

OBSERVATION: The stay-behind ambush has proven very effective.

EVALUATION: The VC employ the tactic of moving into the areas which have just been swept by US forces, believing that there will usually not be further operations in the area for a number of days. Small US elements left behind when the main force is extracted have been very successful in engaging the enemy.
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RECOMMENDATION: That units continue to develop and refine this technique for further exploitation.

5 (C) Night Search Operations

OBSERVATION: The use of night search operations has reached the point of diminishing returns in Dinh Tuong Province.

EVALUATION: The enemy has adapted his night movement tactics to cease movement and take available cover at the sound of any helicopter, making him virtually undetectable by night observation devices from aircraft.

RECOMMENDATION: Substitute the night raid for the night search technique, using ground troops to search out known or suspected LOCs, base camps, radar sightings, and ground sensor activations.

6 (C) Booby Trap Clearing

OBSERVATION: Soldiers have been observed using the M79 grenade launcher to dispose of booby traps.

EVALUATION: The practice of using the M79 as a means to clear booby traps has proven to be highly dangerous. On two occasions during the reporting period, members of infantry units were observed using this method. On both occasions, injuries were sustained by personnel in the area. The expected size of secondary explosions and poor judgement as to what protective cover should have been taken were the main factors for the injuries in both cases. The proper use of demolitions or a grappling hook are far safer methods of clearing booby traps.

RECOMMENDATION: All personnel should be forbidden to use the M79 grenade launcher as a means to clear booby traps and should be instructed in the approved methods of booby trap clearing.

7 (C) Main Gate Facilities

OBSERVATION: The main gate facilities at Dong Tam were inadequate for proper processing of the 3500 Vietnamese civilian employees and hundreds of military and civilian vehicles entering and leaving the base daily.

EVALUATION: A new gate building was constructed to permit a more detailed search of employees and expedite pass exchange. An additional access road was constructed on the west side of the gate house to permit segregation of military and civilian vehicular traffic, thereby easing the usual congestion during peak hours.
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RECOMMENDATION: None.

(8) (C) Command Posts

OBSERVATION: The 2d Brigade operated two battalions based aboard the Mobile Riverine Base Ships and one Replacement battalion in Kien Hoa Province. A Joint Tactical Operations Center (Army-Navy JTOC), heavy in operations personnel, worked aboard the USS Benewah. A second Tactical Operations Center, heavy in intelligence personnel, operated at Ben Tre.

EVALUATION: Two full-time command posts provided the Brigade Commander with effective command, control, and communications generally near any significant contact, regardless of adverse weather conditions encountered during the monsoon season, and without significant increase in personnel requirements. The focus of intelligence effort was at the most effective source of such information, the Sector TOC, while planning and operational coordination were accomplished readily in the JTOC.

RECOMMENDATION: That multiple command posts be considered a valid concept where conditions (weather, dispersion, area of operations) make them advisable.

c. (U) Training: None.

d. (C) Intelligence

(1) (C) Aerial Photographic Coverage During Monsoon Season

OBSERVATION: 9 X 18 format photography taken during the increased cloudiness of the monsoon season often results in poor imagery quality.

EVALUATION: Poor quality photography with excessive cloud cover during the monsoon season is produced because of altitude at which the picture is taken and camera focal length required for a usable scale.

RECOMMENDATION: The use of 9 X 9 format, supplemented by low panoramic and oblique photography will produce better results during this climatic period. However, low pan and oblique format photography do not permit the assembly of mosaics.

(2) (C) Evacuation Channels for Innocent Civilians

OBSERVATION: Local Vietnamese authorities are the most reliable identifiers of Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI).

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EVALUATION: Not all VC can be identified by DPW questioning techniques. The higher level infrastructure personnel are of high intelligence and usually have a well-rehearsed cover story and legitimate identification papers.

RECOMMENDATION: All detainees classified as innocent civilians should be returned to the local authorities in the area of capture. Many VC have been identified at the local level, by face to face contact with police and DPW authorities.

3) (C) Evaluation of Red Haze Missions

EVALUATION: Red Haze sensors have been known to record heat returns from burning and smouldering rice stacks and field rubble. During the dry season in the Delta, there is considerable intentional burning of fields for agricultural purposes, and grass fires in the plain of Reeds are continuous.

RECOMMENDATION: Past experience has revealed that all heat returns on a Red Haze mission are not necessarily of military significance. Imagery interpreters should consider this possibility when interpreting Red Haze missions.

4) (C) Aerial Photography Requirements

EVALUATION: Due to the short reaction time of combat operations and intelligence, normal Air Force photographic coverage has not proved timely and in many cases given inadequate coverage of a particular area. The hand-held camera program available through Military Intelligence Battalion (Aerial Reconnaissance Support) assets has proved very valuable for giving the ground commander a real time study of terrain and fortifications in a particular area.

RECOMMENDATION: That more facilities be established for the faster, more explicit hand-held camera photo coverage.

5) (C) Ground Intrusion Detectors (Duffle Bag)

EVALUATION: Ground intrusion detectors were effectively employed to
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Period Ending June 1969, RCS CSWOM-65 (H1) (U)

assist in target acquisition, early warning, and force conservation.

EVALUATION: Successful planning and installation of sensor fields permitted the brigades to monitor selected areas for enemy movement. These sensor fields were used in conjunction with other intelligence for acquisition of artillery and airmobile targets. Troop units were employed 600 meters or more from sensor fields, using the field as an early warning device and permitting artillery fire to engage the field area. This method enabled the ground troops to react rapidly or prepare to ambush enemy moving in their direction. Sensor fields were also used as an aid to troop conservation by employment on known base areas, LOCs, and infiltration routes. This eliminated the need for troop operations to monitor enemy movement. In most cases of activation, VT artillery was fired on the field location. Unfortunately, on some occasions, quick fuse artillery and 2.75 rockets were fired on the fields thereby destroying the equipment.

RECOMMENDATION: Maximum employment of the Ground Intrusion Detectors for beneficial surveillance of desired areas is recommended.

(6) (C) Agent Nets

Observation: US operated Intelligence Agent Networks have been determined to be unreliable and possibly used as part of a VC deception operation.

EVALUATION: US operated Agent Networks in Dinh Tuong Province gain most of their information through elicitation. The rural areas of the province are mostly populated with VC dependents, sympathizers, infrastructure, intelligence agents and guerrillas. When a subagent elicits information from these people, they usually receive what information the VC want them to have. US Nets were required to meet a prescribed number of agent reports per month. This prevented selectivity and upgrading of reliable sources due to the requirement to expand networks to meet production standards. Agent handlers were unable to properly analyze and evaluate reports due to the volume.

During the months of November 1968 through January 1969, these agents continued to report Main Force units throughout the TAOI. From 14 November 1968 until 30 June 1969, no significant contact was made based on these agents' reports. Captured documents, contacts, PWs, ralliers, and reliable intelligence confirmed that many of the units, (continually reported by agents) had been absent from the province prior to February 1969. The continual reporting prevented detection, by agent reports, when the Main Forces returned to the TAOI prior to the Post Tet (23 Feb 69, Winter-Spring) offensive. Lack of contact with some of these units since early April indicate that these units left the TAOI again. Through three Third Party induced Hoi Chua's, who were actually VC agents attempting to infiltrate friendly units as Kia Carb Scout, it was learned that the US handled agent who induced them was a VC intelligence agent.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 June 1969, RSC CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

RECOMMENDATION: That a thorough area study be made prior to determining what type reports will be acceptable. Elicitation works well in some parts of Vietnam; however, in an area largely controlled by the VC, penetration and infiltration agents provide the most reliable intelligence. This type agent does require more planning and more time to establish, but is well worth the effort. Intelligence agents should be required to provide intelligence only. Additional requirements such as the Third Party Inducement Program endanger the agent, reduce the agent's effort to produce intelligence, and increase the probability of falsified reports. Agent handlers must be permitted to concentrate on obtaining reliable reports through developing good agents. No volume requirements should ever be imposed on agent networks. A few delayed or "untimely" reports gained through personal clandestine observation, are much more valid than reports gained by asking a fisherman if he has seen any VC. To be effective, agent handlers should keep abreast of the tactical situation and maintain records of other intelligence gathering sources in order to adequately evaluate their agents.

a. (C) Logistics

(1) (U) Road Construction

OBSERVATION: Roads using paddy fill for base material hold up quite well during the wet season if care is taken in their construction.

EVALUATION: A road base made of paddy fill can be made by dozing fill from both sides of the road. The base is made in six inch layers with extreme care being taken to ensure that each layer is properly compacted. Ideally, each level should be stabilized with lime, however lime is not always available or economical. When the required road elevation is reached, the surface is graded and then capped with two 3 inch lifts of 1½ inch minus rock. Each layer of rock should be properly rolled.

RECOMMENDATION: With proper care taken in construction, the above method will produce a tactical road capable of handling traffic in all types of weather. This method should be considered when planning programs of tactical road construction since it is not as time consuming and does not require special equipment.

(2) (C) Road Maintenance

OBSERVATION: The establishment of secondary roads within the division TAD have enough rock and laterite in their surfaces to require only periodic grading during the wet season.

EVALUATION: Heavy rains and heavy military traffic will cause secondary
Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 June 1969, RCS CSPOR-65 (R1) (U)

roads to deteriorate if the crown of the roads is not maintained. If ruts are allowed to form, the road will become impassable. By simple periodic upgrading, the crown of the road may be maintained; and, if ruts are graded out as they appear, the road may be kept passable.

RECOMMENDATION: An effective program of periodic road maintenance should be established within the division TAOI. By this means, a great many road problems may be taken care of before they become serious.

(3) (C) Equipment Losses - Medical Evacuation

OBSERVATION: Equipment evacuated with medically evacuated personnel was often lost.

EVALUATION: In most instances the equipment of medically evacuated personnel was evacuated with the individual. A lack of proper accountability for this equipment at the hospital resulted in unnecessary paperwork. Each unit attempted to pick up evacuated equipment, but found that the equipment had disappeared prior to the unit representative's arrival at the hospital.

RECOMMENDATION: That more stringent accountability procedures be employed at the hospital to insure that evacuated equipment is immediately identified with the evacuated individual and that this equipment be turned over to authorized personnel only.

f. (U) Organization: None
g. (C) Other

(1) (U) Communications: Frequency Interference

OBSERVATION: Considerable frequency interference has occurred on the high frequency band of the AN/VRC-46. It was noticed that the interference occurred more frequently when switching from secure voice to normal operation.

EVALUATION: When operating the radio set in the non-secure mode, the X-mode/normal switch must be in the normal position.

RECOMMENDATION: To determine the switch positions, place the squelch in the new "off" position and remove the retaining cap from the X-mode cable connector. If rushing noise does not occur, the radio set is in X-mode condition.

(2) (C) Berm Construction

OBSERVATION: The heavy monsoon rains quickly eroded steep walled berms
thus exposing personnel and equipment to direct enemy fire.

EVALUATION: Obviously, a gradual slope on berms would decrease the tendency to erode, but this may not be practicable due to the large amount of space necessary to build such a berm. If one slope of the berm is reveted, this area may be cut in half. Various means of stabilizing berms could be used also to prevent erosion and decrease the amount of maintenance required to maintain the berm.

RECOMMENDATION: The interior slope of all berms should consist of some type of revetment if space is limited. The slope of the berm should not exceed 20 per cent. Also, grass should be planted on the outer slope to further prevent erosion.

3) (U) Grass Cultivation

OBSERVATION: Heavy rains continuously wash away grass seed planted on a steeply inclined surface, thus hindering attempts to stabilize the surface.

EVALUATION: Some means of retaining the grass seed on a slope should be used. Typical means, such as the use of straw or burlap, are not effective because they do not last long enough in the climate of the Mekong River Delta. The application of a thin layer of penobrine over the freshly planted grass seed is effective, but wears away with repeated heavy rains. It has been found that repeated applications of penobrine do not prohibit the growth of grass if the applications are applied thinly and over a period of time determined by the amount and intensity of local rains.

RECOMMENDATION: Grass seed can be retained on an inclined surface, if penobrine is continuously applied to the area on a scheduled basis determined by local weather conditions.

4) (C) Force Status (FORSTAT) Procedures

OBSERVATION: Under present FORSTAT procedures, units may be required to maintain unneeded and unwanted items.

EVALUATION: At present, commanders are required to keep and maintain all RICCI-1 items, regardless of their necessity, solely to maintain a high REDCON. Many RICCI-1 items not required in a particular location may be critical in another area of the command. Also, under the present system an organization may be very close to a C-2, but actually rated on a C-3, because of a few unneeded and unwanted items, e.g., cipher machines, and radiometers in a maintenance battalion.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH
15 July 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 June 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

RECOMMENDATION: That commanders be given some leeway in deciding which RICC-1 items are actually critical. They should not be penalized for not having equipment for which they have no use.

(5) (c) Inspection of Equipment

OBSERVATION: Upon receipt of redeployment instructions, a planning group was established at Dong Tam by USARV composed primarily of 1st Logistics Command personnel. The 1st Log Command brought with them some 50 enlisted men, mostly inspection and classification personnel, to handle the large quantity of equipment to be transferred to USARV as a result of the inactivation of one brigade and the schedule of USARV critical items. These personnel were set up within one of the forward support companies of the Maintenance Battalion to assist with inspection and classification of equipment being turned in.

EVALUATION: Although the 1st Log Command personnel worked within the existing command structure, they were not under its direct control. What developed was a dual chain of command that reached all the way down to the individual soldier working at the inspection point. This caused some problems for the division, since the 1st Log Command personnel did not, in all cases, follow division policy. It caused more serious problems for the 1st Log personnel who were trying to accomplish their mission, since they did not have control over all personnel.

RECOMMENDATION: If similar conditions exist when other divisions redeploy, it is recommended that the logistical support furnished the division for redeployment be attached to the division and integrated into its existing command and control structure. The 1st Log coordinating group could be set up within the DISCOM Headquarters and the DISCOM XO given primary responsibility. Ideally, one of the forward support companies of the maintenance battalion should be relieved of its mission and that brigade's support picked up by the rest of the battalion and by lst Log maintenance units. This company could then be augmented by a packing and preserving platoon, and given the responsibility for inspection and classification of equipment. Other lst Log augmentation needed would be requested by the coordinating group in DISCOM Headquarters and attached directly to DISCOM units. Policies, directions, and requirements would then be passed through this group who would have the authority of the command chain. The only personnel who should not be attached to, and under the control of, the division would be the chief inspector for each commodity area, who would establish standards for equipment being turned in through lst Log channel.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 June 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

16 Incl
1. 9th Inf Div-Organization
   Task Organization and Unit Location
2. Roster of Key Personnel
3. Tactical Area of Interest
4. Personnel and Administration Data
5. Artillery Support
6. G3 Aiz Operational Support Chart
7. G3 Tabulated Operations Data
8. Base Operations
9. 1st Div-Operational Report-Lessons-Learned (ORLL)
10. 2d Bde ORLL
11. 3d Bde ORLL
12. DISCOM ORLL
13. 15th Engr Bn ORLL
14. 9th Sig Bn ORLL
15. 9th Avn Bn ORLL
16. 9th MP Bn ORLL

Incl. 1-4 and 8-16 wd HQ, DA

Covered in Division ORLL

R. G. GARD, JR.
COL, GS
Chief of Staff

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CONFIDENTIAL

AVFEC-RE-H (4 Sep 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1969, CCS CFOR-65 (HI) (U)

DA, HQ II FFORCEN, APO San Francisco 96266 12 SEP 1969

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHC (LMT), APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: CION-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report -
Lessons Learned of the 9th Infantry Division for the period ending 31
July 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

E.G. Macdonald
ILT. ACC
Asst CG

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-U$T (15 July 1969) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period
Ending 30 June 1969, RCS CFRH-65 (1st) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 23 OCT 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-DT, APO '90558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (C) Reference item concerning "Detainee Processing," section II, page 31, paragraph 2a(3); nonconcur. The Vietnamese law requires a civil defendant to be brought before a judicial power within 24 hours of his arrest. However, the policy of Long An Province extends this limit to seven days. USARV Supplement 1 to AR633-50 provides sufficient latitude to minimize administrative delays.

b. (U) Reference item concerning "Hospital Detainee Ward," section II, page 32, paragraph 2a(4); concur. POWs are provided the same medical treatment provided US personnel under the terms of the Geneva Convention. This requires that certain patients be placed within the hospital according to the location of specialized equipment. In some cases, segregation or isolation by types of patients is required to prevent cross contamination or spread of contagious disease. This recommendation has been included in Supplement 1 to AR633-50.

c. (C) Reference item concerning "Return of Detainees to Brigade IFW," section II, page 34, paragraph 2b(3); nonconcur. The recommendation that all detainees regardless of age, sex or identification papers should be evacuated for questioning by IFW teams is unrealistic. If a large number of detainees is anticipated during a specific operation, it is suggested that IFW personnel be attached to battalion or lower level in order to screen detainees prior to evacuation. This is a common practice of several units in RVN. Limited screening at lower echelons could also be accomplished by Kit Carson Scouts. No action by USAF or DA is recommended.

d. (C) Reference item concerning "Evacuation Channels for Innocent Civilians," section II, page 36, paragraph 2(2); concur. Face to face identification may be achieved by returning seemingly innocent civilian detainees to local authorities or by having a representative of local authorities accompany the unit/IFW team.

e. (C) Reference item concerning "Aerial Photography Requirement," section II, page 37, paragraph 2d(4); concur. Most divisions and separate brigades have hand-receipted cameras from the supporting 1st Military Intelligence Battalion's Aerial Reconnaissance Support (ARABS) Detachments.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHCC-1ST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period
Ending 30 June 1969, CSFOR-65 (KL) (U)

located in each Corps Tactical Zone. Additionally, the supporting MIBARS
detachment may be called upon periodically to accomplish a hand held camera
mission. Funds for the presently used non-standard hand held cameras are
limited; however, USARV has requested 472 Polaroid cameras (ENSURE 217) in
support of the Hand Held Camera Program. These cameras are scheduled to
arrive in RVN in late 1969. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

f. (U) Reference item concerning "Force Status (FORSTAT) procedures,"
section II, page 41, paragraph 2q(4); concur. Units are not required to
keep unneeded and unwanted items. Under the provisions of USA RV Regulation
310-32, commanders may turn in equipment they consider non essential 'o mis-
son accomplishment. Should any of those items be of the RICC-1 category,
resulting in a lower readiness rating, the reason for the lower rating can
be amplified by using the ROMEO Report (Remarks) in the FORSTAT system.
This report allows the indicator up to 297 letters of free verse to amplify
any facet of the DELTA Report (Readiness).

g. (U) Reference item concerning "Inspection of Equipment," section
II, page 42, paragraph 2g(5); nonconcur. Normally, supporting logistic
elements will function as assisting forces to deploying units. Consisting
of both civilian and military personnel, these elements will provide the
experience required to tell the unit how to package and preserve, clean,
and perform certain maintenance. Augmentation of the deploying unit with
1st Logistical Command troops would reduce the flexibility which now exists,
i.e., the capability to move individuals or groups to other sites on short
notice when required, without impairing the continuing unit effort. Another
area which would be adversely affected by attachment of 1st Logistical Com-
mand troops is inspection and classification. Current thinking is that
classification should be performed by supporting DSU's only. Attachment
of the experts to a division would still require extra personnel at the DSU.
The result would be a duplication of effort at a time when there are barely
enough technical personnel to perform all the missions assigned.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON
1LT, AC/G
Assistant Adjutant General

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

GPOP-DP (15 Jul 69) 3d ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (HI)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 19 NOV 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C. P. Hquet

CPT, AGC

Asst AG

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CONFIDENTIAL
GPOP-DT (15 Jul 69) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 9th Infantry Division
for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 19 NOV 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department
of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C. C. SHORT
CPT, AGG
Asst AG
## CONFIDENTIAL

**ARTILLERY SUPPORT**

**SUMMARY OF MSG FIRED**

### DIVISION ARTILLERY

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### NON-DIVISION ARTILLERY

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**Fired in Support of RVN-RP/PP**

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## Air Operational Summary

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Incl 6

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## COMBAT STATISTICS

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## FRIENDLY LOSSES

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52
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 9th Infantry Division

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May 69 to 30 June 69.

CG, 9th Infantry Division

13 July 1969

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N/A

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