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20 August 1969

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Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

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SECTION I

OPERATIONS - SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

A. (U) COMMAND: On 25 May 1969, Major General John H. Wright, Jr. assumed command of this Division.

B. (C) OPERATIONS:

1. During this reporting period the Division continued its policy that all combat operations would be conducted in coordination and cooperation with the 1st ARVN Division commanded by Major General Troung and Thua Thien Province Forces commanded by Colonel Thanh.

2. The chronological sequence of combat operations for the period 1 May - 31 July 1969 is as follows:

a. Operation KENTUCKY JUMPER (1 March - continuing) — a Division-wide operation — was initiated at the termination of Operation NEVADA EAGLE and continued through the reporting period. The primary missions of the operation are: to interdict enemy base areas and infiltration routes; to seek out and destroy the NVA/VC forces; to detect, capture or destroy local Viet Cong infrastructure and their sympathizers; and to disrupt the routes of supply between the rice producing lowlands and population centers, and the mountain base areas. In addition the 101st Airborne Division in cooperation and coordination with the 1st ARVN Division and Government of Vietnam agencies continued to conduct combined operations throughout Thua Thien Province to increase the effectiveness of the ARVN Forces and to maintain the favorable environment for the Government of Vietnam's overall pacification plan. All of the following Brigade and Battalion operations are a part of the overall Division Operation KENTUCKY JUMPER: Massachusetts Striker, Bristol Boots, Apache Snow, Montgomery Rendezvous, and Campbell Streamer.


   (1) Task Organization:

   3d ARVN Regiment
   1-501 Inf
   1-502 Inf
   2-327 Inf
   2-501 Inf
   1-3 ARVN Bn (28 April - 8 May)
   2-3 ARVN Bn (15 March - 12 April)
   3-3 ARVN Bn (15 March - 27 April)
   4-3 ARVN Bn (22 April - 8 May)
   Black Panther Co (1 April - 21 April)
   RCN Co, 54th ARVN Regt (7 April - 11 April)

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brigade Control</th>
<th>Support Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-321 Arty (GSR)</td>
<td>B/1-60 Arty (1 March - 5 March)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/326 Med Bn</td>
<td>B/6-33 Arty (1 March - 5 March)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/326 Engr Bn</td>
<td>C/2-11 Arty (1 March - 14 April)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Team, 501st Sig Bn</td>
<td>A/2-11 Arty (1 March - 30 April)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d FSS</td>
<td>B/2-11 Arty (1 March - 30 April)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team 2, 101 MID</td>
<td>A/2-94 Arty (1 March - 5 March)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47 Inf Plt (Scout Dog)</td>
<td>Elements of 7th Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/101 MP</td>
<td>7th Tactical Air Force and 1st Marine Air Wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34 PIO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACP 20 TASS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/101 AHB (6 April - 8 May)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Operation Massachusetts Striker continued to conclusion during this reporting period. The mission was to conduct sustained air mobile operations in the vicinity of the Southern A Shau Valley and astride Highway 614, to locate and destroy enemy forces, caches, and lines of communications. Throughout the operation several fire bases were constructed -- WHIP, FURY, THOR, PIKE, LASH, and SHIELD -- with the accelerated fire base construction concept extending the Division's area of influence into the northwest corner of Quang Nam Province. Reconnaissance in force operations in the area of operations yielded several large caches which depleted the enemy's arsenal and his capability of launching offensive operations in Thua Thien and Quang Nam Provinces.

On 1 May the 1st Battalion, 502 Infantry reacted rapidly to captured documents and subsequent readouts to discover a hospital complex and a heavy machine repair shop near the Laotian Border which yielded over 100 pounds of medical supplies, eight vehicles, and ten weapons. On 6 May 1-502 combat assaulted into an area five kilometers from the Laotian Border again in response to intelligence reports and discovered a recently used medical aid station that contained eighteen weapons and forty cases of medical supplies. This operation was concluded on 8 May 1969 with the following results: 175 NVA/VC KIA, 2 NVA POW's, 1 HDI CHNH, 857 individual weapons captured, in addition to 40 crew-served weapons and 30 vehicles captured.


(1) Task Organization:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A/326 Engr Bn (DS)</th>
<th>A/101 AHB (DS)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-327 Inf</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2-327 Inf</td>
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### Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RGS CSPOR-65 (R1) (U)

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<tr>
<th>Battalion</th>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Formation</th>
<th>Task</th>
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<tr>
<td>2-502 Inf (Reinf)</td>
<td>176 RF Company</td>
<td>FSSS</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3-5 Cav (-) (Reinf)</td>
<td>C/2-34 Arm (-)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1st Bde Scry Plat</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Brigade Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-320 Arty (DS)</td>
<td>B/2-138 Arty 155mm S2 (CSR)</td>
<td>TACP 20 TASS</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B/1-83 Arty 8&quot; S2 (CSR)</td>
<td>MET DET (DS)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A/4-77 ARA (DS)</td>
<td>1/101 MP Co</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B/2-17 Cav (DS)</td>
<td>1/265 RRU (DS)</td>
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</table>

(2) Intelligence gained prior to the initiation of Operation BRISTOL BOOTS indicated that the 4th and 5th NVA Regiments were using the Ruong Ruong Valley and surrounding areas as supply lines and food producing areas for enemy units to the east of Quang Nam Province and to the north in Thua Thien Province's Phu Loc District. The mission assigned to the maneuver elements was to construct fire support bases and to conduct multiple reconnaissance in force operations in their assigned area of operation to locate and destroy enemy forces, installations, equipment and supplies.

On 25 April elements of the 2d Battalion, 327 Infantry began its assaults into the Ruong Ruong Valley followed by elements of the 3-5 Cavalry which began road clearing operations south along QL-545 toward the Ruong Ruong Valley on 26 April. Aggressive reconnaissance in force operations were conducted by the maneuver elements throughout the operation, but only minimal enemy contact—trail watchers and snipers—was experienced. Road clearing operations were curtailed on 2 May when 3-5 Cav (-) became OPCON to the 101st Airborne Division for future operations in the A Shau Valley. On 8 May a series of OPCON shifts took place: 1-327 and 2-502 became OPCON to the 2d Brigade while 1-502 and 1-501 became OPCON to the 1st Brigade. In addition the area of operation was expanded to include a reconnaissance zone along the Laotian Border and Base Area 607. As the maneuver elements of the 1st Brigade moved into this area the enemy withdrew to the west into Laos.

Operation BRISTOL BOOTS was terminated prematurely on 15 May at the 1st Brigade, with 1-501 and 1-502, was redeployed to Tam Ky where it became OPCON to the Americal Division in Operation LAMAR PLAIN. Throughout the twenty-one day operation contact was light and sporadic. It was determined that no large concentrations of enemy forces or installations were in the Ruong Ruong Valley. Results of the operation were: seven NVA killed, one prisoner of war, and sixteen individual weapons captured. Friendly losses were five
killed and thirty-four wounded.

d. Operation APACHE SNOW (10 May - 7 June 1969)

(1) Task Organization:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st ARVN Regiment</th>
<th>3d ARVN Regiment</th>
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<tr>
<td>1-1 ARVN Bn w/FO Party</td>
<td>1-3 ARVN Bn w/FO Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1 ARVN Bn w/FO Party</td>
<td>2-3 ARVN Bn w/FO Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-1 ARVN Bn w/FO Party</td>
<td>3-3 ARVN Bn w/FO Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-1 ARVN Bn w/FO Party</td>
<td>Battery 12 ARVN Arty (DS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery 11 ARVN Arty (DS)</td>
<td>Battery 11 ARVN Arty (DS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery 34 ARVN Arty (DSR)</td>
<td>Battery 34 ARVN Arty (DSR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 LNO Party</td>
<td>1 LNO Party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Intelligence gained prior to Operation APACHE SNOW indicated that elements of the 6th, 9th, and 29th NVA Regiments were using the Northern A Shau Valley as a primary line of communications for movement of material and infiltration of troops to enemy units throughout I Corps Tactical Zone. The mission given to the 3d Brigade and 1st ARVN Regiment was to conduct airmobile assaults into the Northern A Shau Valley in conjunction with the 9th Marines and 3d ARVN Regiment to destroy NVA/VC forces, obstruct enemy routes of egress into Laos, interdict enemy lines of communication, and to locate and destroy enemy caches.

Prior to D-Day, the 1st and 3d ARVN Regiments and the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, constructed three mutually supporting fire bases in and around the Northern A Shau Valley—FB BRADLEY (TD 278122), FB ATHEREDE (TD 355070), and FB CURRAHEE (TD 399949). On D-Day, 10 May 1969, following TAC Air, artillery, and ARA preparations five maneuver battalions (three US—1-506 (-), 2-501 (-), and 3-187; two ARVN —2-1 (-), and 4-1) were inserted into five separate landing zones along the Laotian Border in the Northern A Shau Valley. Following the insertion
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All maneuver battalions initiated reconnaissance in force operations to the east and northeast toward the Valley floor. The insertion of an additional ARVN battalion was accomplished when 2-1 ARVN (-) combat assaulted and secured FB TIGER (TD 253090). The following day 3-1 ARVN Battalion combat assaulted into the Valley to support the other maneuver battalions in their reconnaissance in force operations.

At 114605H, B Company, 3-187 began to receive heavy small arms and machine gun fire from the ridges of Hill 937 marking the beginning of the ten day battle for Dong Ap Bia Mountain. Heavy contact was experienced by the 3-187 Infantry and 1-506 Infantry (redirected to support 3-187 assault on Hill 937) as both battalions assaulted the heavily fortified enemy positions of Dong Ap Bia. On 19 May, A Company, 2-506 Infantry was combat assaulted into the Northern A Shau Valley and became OPCON to 3-187. The following day 2-3 ARVN Battalion combat assaulted into the Valley to add additional support to the attack.

With the support of TAC Air, artillery, and ARA throughout the ten day period, the 3-187 Infantry with A/2-506 OPCON, 2-501 Infantry, 1-506 Infantry, and 2-3 ARVN successfully assaulted and drove the 7th and 8th Battalions of the 29th NVA Regiment from their mountain fortress atop Hill 937 on 20 May. The following day 3-187 became OPCON to the 2d Brigade and 2-506 Infantry was returned to 3d Brigade control.

Throughout the period 21 May - 7 June 1969 enemy contact decreased and discoveries of enemy caches increased as enemy elements withdrew from the area into Base Areas in Laos. 2-501 in conjunction with A Troop, 2-17 Cav following the capture of Dong Ap Bia began pursuit operations west to the Lao Htian Border in order to destroy the remaining defenders of Hill 937. On 22 May, 2-506 with all elements combat assaulted into FB Airborne and conducted extensive search and reconnaissance in force operations in and around FB Airborne to locate NVA Warehouse 54, known to exist in the area.

The 1-506 Infantry, following the capture of Dong Ap Bia, conducted extensive search and clear, in addition to reconnaissance in force operations, from Dong Ap Bia south toward FB Currahee. 4-1 ARVN Battalion moved north and was extracted on 5 June. 2-3 ARVN moved to the south to support 2-327 Infantry in reconnaissance in force operations in the southern A Shau Valley.

This operation was brought to a close on 7 June 1969. The maneuver battalions of the 29th NVA Regiment, in addition to its central headquarters with organic and attached technical units, were rendered combat ineffective and forced to withdraw across the border into Laos preventing them from again using the Northern A Shau Valley as a staging area.
and storage area for future operations into I Corps Tactical Zone. The resultant enemy losses were: 691 NVA/VC KIA, 5 NVA POW, 241 individual and 40 crew served weapons, and four trucks captured. Friendly losses were 78 US KIA, and 536 US WIA.

- Operation MONTGOMERY RENDEZVOUS (8 June 1969 - continuing).

(1) Task Organization:

Task Organization (6 June - 11 July 1969)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TF 2-327</th>
<th>TF 3-5 Cav</th>
<th>2-506</th>
<th>1-506 (-)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-327 Inf (-)</td>
<td>3-5 Cav (-)</td>
<td>2-506</td>
<td>1-506 (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C (-)/2-34 Armor</td>
<td>6/2-327 Inf</td>
<td>A(-)/1-506</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TP Sec A, B Trp 3-5 Cav</td>
<td>3-7 ARVN Cav (APC)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

3d Brigade Control

- B/1-506 Inf
- 1-1 ARVN Bn
- 4-3 ARVN Bn
- 2-3 ARVN Bn
- B-34 Arty
- B/326 Engr Bn (DS)
- B/158 AH (DS)
- TACP 20 TASS
- 3d FSS

Task Organization (11 July 1969 - continuing)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1-327</th>
<th>1-506 (-)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-27 July</td>
<td>TF 3-5 Cav</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-506</td>
<td>3-187</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

G/2-34 Armor
B/1-506
B/1-40 Arty 105mm SP

3d Brigade Control

- B/1-506 Inf
- 1-1 ARVN Bn
- 4-3 ARVN Bn
- 2-3 ARVN Bn
- 3-7 ARVN Cav (APC)
- B-34 Arty

(2) Operation MONTGOMERY RENDEZVOUS, controlled by the 3d Brigade

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in conjunction with the 3d ARVN Regiment, began on 8 June against the NVA forces in the high ground to the east of the A Shau Valley (vicinity FB Airborne) and north of the Rao Lao Valley.

Contact was sporadic until the early morning of 14 June when the Brigade command post was attacked by sappers at FB BENCHESNADEN (See Page 9), and the following day FB CURRAHM received the brunt of a sapper attack (See Page 9). The 3-5 Cavalry began armored cavalry operations in the A Shau Valley on 20 June, but contact continued to be sporadic with the NVA forces avoiding engagement. On 28 June the 4th Battalion, 1st ARVN Regiment observed a large force of NVA moving south in the open near FB O'REILLY and called in TAC Air which accounted for 37 NVA killed. Contact in the high ground north of the Rao Lao erupted with 1-506 Infantry elements and those of the 3d ARVN Regiment meeting stiff resistance on 8 July. On 13 July, 1-327 Infantry was committed to assist in the area. On 10 July the task organization was changed to support 2d Brigade operations in the Bach Ma. This operation continues with the primary mission of interdiction of the lines of communications of the NVA forces in the Rao Lao and A Shau Valleys. Combined totals as of 31 July were: 451 NVA/VC KIA, 8 NVA POW's, 231 individual and 47 crew-served weapons captured.


(1) Task Organization:

2d Brigade Control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2-327 Inf</th>
<th>2-501 Inf</th>
<th>ARVN</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-502 Inf</td>
<td>C/3-5 Cav</td>
<td>1-54 ARVN Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-327 Inf (27 July - )</td>
<td></td>
<td>3-54 ARVN Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/101 ARW (DS)</td>
<td></td>
<td>B/12th Arty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-321 Arty (DS)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/326 Engr Bn (DS)</td>
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</table>

(2) Operation CAMPHEL STREAMER was initiated at 130600H with the combat assault of 2-502 Inf into FB SLEDGE (23 063927) followed by the 1-54 and 3-54 ARW Battalion into their respective landing zones. This attack was aimed against the 4th NVA Regiment in the Bach Ma Region. A two phased operation — the first phase a reconnaissance in zone to the north by the three assaulting elements to locate and destroy the enemy forces on the north side of the Bach Ma. Contact was very light during the first phase. The second phase commenced on 27 June with the deployment of 1-327 to a screening position south of the Bach Ma in Elephant Valley, and the three maneuver battalions reoriented to the south. On 28 July elements of the 1-54 ARVN Battalion

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made the first significant contact by killing 27 NVA and capturing 22 individual and 9 crew-served weapons. This operation continues with the maneuver elements conducting detailed searches in zone and the 1-327 Inf screening to the south. Results as of 31 July 1969 were: 51 NVA/VC KIA, 1 NVA POW, 27 individual and 14 crew-served weapons captured.

3. Other Significant Activities:

a. Night Operations: Responding to information supplied by a local informant, the Reconnaissance Platoon, 2d Battalion, 327 Infantry on the night of 16-17 July 1969 set up an ambush (vic coordinates YD 972042) on a trail running from Troui Village to the mountainous regions of the Bach Ma (ZC 0792). Aerial reconnaissance was made of the area on the afternoon of the 16th and a tentative ambush site located; the actual ambush site was selected once the platoon moved into the area. The ambush force was organized into an inverted "L" with the base to the north and the stem parallel to the trail. This formation provided for all around security. At 0030 hours several small contacts were initiated in the village northeast of the ambush site and continued sporadically until 0330 hours when the ambush was initiated by three NVA who ran directly into the ambush site and were engaged. A sweep of the ambush site revealed three more NVA who were engaged and killed. The platoon then moved back to the ambush site waiting for first light to make a detailed search. Once the thorough search had been made the unit moved back to the village area, their mission completed. The results of the ambush were seven NVA killed, one NVA prisoner of war, and nine weapons and miscellaneous equipment captured.

On the same night—16-17 July—one platoon from A Company, 2d Battalion, 327 Infantry conducted a successful ambush in the vicinity of ZD 56805 which resulted in eight VC killed and seven weapons captured. On 28 July 1969, another ambush was conducted in the lowlands by the 2d Platoon, D Company, 2d Battalion, 506 Infantry who engaged six Viet Cong at YD 576266 (6 kilometers southwest of LZ Sally) killing six Viet Cong and capturing four weapons.

b. Sapper Attacks on Division Fire Bases:

(1) On the morning of 13 May 1969 at 0330H Fire Base Airborne was assaulted on three sides by elements of the 806th NVA Battalion and the K12 Sapper Battalion supported by 82mm mortar and RPG fire. FB Airborne (YD 355072) is located on the eastern lip of the A Shau Valley on the north end of a long ridge running parallel to the Valley, and was defended by A Company, 2d Battalion, 501 Infantry, and three artillery batteries—C Battery, 2-11 Artillery (4 tubes
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155mm), C Battery, 2-319 Artillery (4 tubes 105mm), and a composite battery (4 tubes 105mm) from B and C Batteries, 2-319 Artillery.

After infiltrating through the concertina wire on the north side of the perimeter the attacking force systematically crossed the northern portion of the fire base tossing satchel charges and grenades in the bunkers they encountered. By 0500 the enemy attack had lost impetus and the men of Airborne drove the attacking force from the hill killing forty of the sappers, while suffering twenty-two killed and sixty-one wounded. In addition five howitzers were either damaged or destroyed.

(2) On the night of 14 June FB Berchtesgaden, located on the eastern lip of the high ground overlooking the A Shau Valley, was attacked by a force of enemy sappers. The units occupying and defending Fire Base Berchtesgaden (YD 423012) were the Command Post 2-327 Inf, Recon/2-327 Inf, Co B (-) 2-327 with one platoon from B/2-327 Inf attached, B/2-306 (-), 3d Brigade Security Platoon, 3d Brigade Tactical Command Post, B/2-319 Artillery (105), C/2-11 Artillery (155). At 113030 hours June following several days of extensive reconnaissance enemy sappers of C2 and C3 Company of the K-3 Battalion, 6th NVA Regiment initiated an attack on the fire base using RPG, SA fire, 82mm mortars and satchel charges. The enemy sappers penetrated the concertina wire after tying down the trip flares and headed for predesignated targets. Three avenues of approach were used; one from the northwest, one from the east, and one from the south across the VIP pad to the Brigade TOC. The fighting bunkers and battalion command post were hit as was the command post and complex of the 3d Brigade Headquarters. Throughout the attack an intensive barrage of 82mm mortar was directed at the 2-327 command post and bunker line until 0330 hours preventing these forces from reinforcing the Brigade command post.

Friendly artillery was employed from surrounding fire bases to provide illumination, in addition to the support from Army Aviation and Air Force. As daylight approached, contact was broken as the enemy pulled back through the wire leaving behind thirty-three dead and three prisoner of war. From these prisoners it was determined that approximately ninety-six NVA had taken part in the attack. Friendly casualties were eleven killed and forty-seven wounded.

(3) At 160125 June 1969, an enemy sapper attack was launched against Fire Support Base Currahee located on the floor of the A Shau Valley. Units occupying and defending the Fire Support Base were B, E, and Command Post of 2-502, A/2-319 Artillery (105),
B/2-11 Artillery (155), ARVN Artillery Battery (105), Metro Station, counter mortar radar section, and a pathfinder detachment. The attack was triggered by the detection of one sapper who had penetrated the wire on the west side of the perimeter. The enemy was engaged with small arms fire and M-79's. Immediately 81mm illumination was provided and direct fire from the 105mm artillery battery was used. At 0200 hours 75 of the enemy began a series of attacks against the entire northwest side of the perimeter. Artillery engaged this activity with continuous direct fire and illumination. A flare ship was on station at 0230 hours to assist and at 0300 hours ARA Cobras were on station and were employed until 0630 hours. At 0440 hours the western portion of the perimeter came under attack. The reaction force was employed to reinforce the bunker line. At 0515 hours the northern portion of the perimeter was attacked and gunships were called to fire within 150 meters of the perimeter wire. This caused approximately 30 enemy to charge the wire firing RPG's. At 0500 hours an air re-supply of ammunition began to arrive and was delivered by 0730 hours. Total results were 51 NVA killed, 3 NVA prisoners of war, with only seven US wounded of which three were evacuated.

On the right of 19 June elements of the 72d Sapper Co, 4th NVA Regiment attacked Fire Base Tomhawk (ZD 113009) -- located on QL-1 in Phu Loc District -- occupied by 1/C/2-501 and C Battery, 1-138 Artillery (155). Enemy elements -- as was indicated in later prisoner of war interrogation and captured documents -- had made a thorough reconnaissance of the fire base for several days to detect weak spots in the perimeter's defenses.

At approximately 0130 hours the Infantry command post located in the southern most portion of the fire base received the primary thrust of the sapper attack. Mortar and RPG rounds poured in from the eastern and southern portions of the perimeter and onto the infantry and artillery command posts as the enemy breached the wire in these areas. Once inside the wire, the sappers moved to key locations destroying bunkers, exposed equipment and artillery positions.

At 0230 hours the platoon leader of 1/C/2-501 organized a small force to regain control of the command post. ARA and med-evacs were on call throughout the night as was a reaction force organized by the 1-327 Infantry. At 0330 hours the main attack on FB Tomhawk ceased while harassing fire continued until 0530 hours. At 0430 two platoons from B/1-327 were moved from FB Roy to blocking positions to the south of FB Tomhawk. At 0530 hours the Reconnaissance Platoon, 1-327 was lifted onto FB Tomhawk and swept across the overrun command post to the southeast, but failed to find signs of enemy activity. At first light elements of C/1-327 were airlifted into the fire base and also swept to the south and southeast where they found staging positions for the attack as well as cached ruksacks. The losses suffered by the
enemy were seventeen killed and one prisoner of war; casualties suffered by friendly forces were thirteen killed and forty wounded. In addition, three 155mm howitzers were destroyed and one rendered inoperative.

4. Enemy losses during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTACTS</th>
<th>VIA</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>KBA</th>
<th>FM</th>
<th>IRG</th>
<th>DSCC</th>
<th>GRAIN - TONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAY</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>277</td>
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<td>12,5785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUNE</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15,0700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JULY</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>122</td>
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<td>17,8235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>907</td>
<td>1164</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>528</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28,9420</td>
</tr>
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5. Friendly losses during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTACTS</th>
<th>VIA</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAY</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>899</td>
<td>899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUNE</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JULY</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>1672</td>
<td>1672</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. C3 Air activities for the months of May, June, and July 1969 included:

a. Close Air Support Sorties flown in the Division AO during the months of May, June, July 1969:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>SUB-TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preplanned Sorties</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>1729</td>
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</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>SUB-TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immediate</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Sky Spots</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flareships</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spooky (Gunships)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL SORTIES 3157

b. There were 62 B52 strikes within the Division AO during the reporting period.

c. During the months of May, June, and July, the 101st Airborne Division employed a total of eight 10,000 pound bombs to construct a total of five landing zones.

d. Tactical Air, dropping 5,664 tons of bombs and 398 tons of napalm, destroyed numerous enemy buildings, bunkers, storage areas, and fighting positions. Tactical Air also accounted for 85 NVA/KC KIA.

C. (C) TRAINING:

1. The Division Airmobility School under the auspices of the 160th Aviation Group was conducted twice during the reporting period; the first, 6-7 June, attendance 27; the second, 18-19 July, attendance 35. There were two additional schools of one-day duration presented for the ARVN; the first, on 28 June for 33 personnel and the second, on 30 June for 40 personnel. The course is designed to familiarize selected personnel with the capabilities and limitations of the division aviation support units.

2. The Screaming Eagle Replacement Training School (SSRTS) along with the Combat Leaders Course (CLC) continued during the reporting period. Classes at the Combat Leaders Course are for a period of six days. Commencing every Monday with an average of 21 students per class. The Replacement Training School is conducted on a continuing basis averaging 2480 men per month. The Combat Leaders Course is for small unit leaders, E-4 and E-5, and it is designed as a refresher course covering all subjects that a leader should know.

3. Reciprocal Mobile Training continued in the Division with combined operations being run in all brigades. Some of the main points that are stressed during all operations are: combat assaults, use of the Claymore mine, patrolling techniques, and use of the scout dog. These
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Type operations have proven beneficial to both the ARVN's and US personnel.

4. During the reporting period the Division conducted a school in rappel training for selected individuals who will act as instructors to train one platoon in each brigade in rappel operations.

5. The Division during the reporting period in conjunction with SFRTS and CIC started a program of training Kit Carson Scouts. The first class of seven (7) Scouts were graduated in June. The purpose of the training is to orient the Hoi Chanh's on American tactics, weapons and customs. The result of this program cannot be fully evaluated at this time, but there are indications that it is successful.

D. (C) CHEMICAL:

1. General. During May, June, and July, the 101st Airborne Division Chemical Section with operational control of the 20th Chemical Detachment (CEC) (ARM) and the 10th Chemical Platoon (DS) (Separate) continued its program of chemical combat support.

2. Operations. During the reporting period, the Division Chemical Section with attached units accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE MISSION</th>
<th>NUMBER OF MISSIONS</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flame Drop</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>400 drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airborne Personnel Detector</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical CS (X0.5)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>95 munitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fougasse Emplacements</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>885 positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerial Defoliation</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>6670 Gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground Defoliation</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7752 Gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerial Insecticide</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>2565 Gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFT Inspection/Servicing</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>57/37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protective Mask Inspection</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops Showered</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IG Teams</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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3. New Techniques:

a. Tactical CS in reconnaissance by fire role with Airborne Personnel Detector Missions: The Division Chemical Section in conjunction with the 2-17th Air Cavalry Squadron is employing tactical CS on significant readings. It was first tried by using four aircraft on the "sniffer" mission: one aircraft with an APD mounted, one Command and Control ship, one gunship for protection and one aircraft carrying the XM15 Cannister Cluster, Tactical CS. The CS munitions were later relocated on the Command and Control aircraft to eliminate the requirement for the fourth aircraft. The C&C ship plots the course of the sniffer ship and the readings obtained. As soon as one area is completed, the C&C immediately returns to the area and drops CS on the sniffer readings while the gunship maintains a position where it can engage personnel leaving the target area. On 6 July this technique was used and 5 NVA/VC were spotted leaving the target area. The gunships engaged these personnel with unknown results.

b. Flame drops utilizing the UH-1H helicopter. In order to clear landing zones of brush and small shrubs, the Division Chemical Section is presently using UH-1 aircraft to drop three 55 gallon drums of thickened fuel. The drums are carried externally in salvaged cargo nets and straps. The entire load is dropped at zero speed and from an altitude of 250 feet above the ground and is ignited by smoke grenades dropped from the aircraft. An area approximately 25 meters in diameter is burned off.

c. Employment of incendiary munitions to burn off areas defoliated with desiccants. In an attempt to start fires in areas where the vegetation had previously dried by defoliant agent BLUE, the Division Chemical Section mounted the fabricated grenade rack system in a UH-1H helicopter and dropped three types of incendiary munitions: thermite grenades, aerial parachute flares, and boxed WP hand grenades from this system. Various altitudes and ground speeds were flown to both concentrate and spread the munitions in the target area. None of these systems proved satisfactory in producing secondary or sustaining fires. Due to the moisture content of the vegetation in the 101st Airborne Division AO, flame drops have failed to initiate large fires. They are effective only in the area they hit.

E. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

1. Enemy situation: During the reporting period, the following information was compiled on the enemy situation.

a. At the beginning of the reporting period, the local force companies were inactive in their respective districts and had the
following number of men: CI13, 100; CI14, 5-10; CI15, 30; CI16, 20; CI17, 30; CI18, 30; and CI19, 20. The Phu Loc Armed Battalion, with a strength of approximately 250 men was a fully combat effective unit. The 5th NVA Regiment with a strength of approximately 1800 men, was located in its traditional base area southwest of Leech Island, vicinity YC 7690. However, allied operation Massachusetts Striker in late April and early May had kept the 5th Regiment off balance and incapable of massing and launching coordinated regimental size attacks. The 4th NVA Regiment, with a strength of approximately 900 men, was operating in its traditional base area in Phu Loc District. The 9th NVA Regiment was believed to be located in the vicinity of Base Area 611 in the northern A Shau Valley. The 6th NVA Regiment was unlocated, but suspected to be in the northern A Shau Valley area.

b. Enemy activity during early May remained at a very low level. NVA forces in the canopy were desperate for food supplies and were directing their plans toward obtaining as large an amount of the May rice harvest as possible.

c. During the month of June, enemy activity remained at a low level until 10 June when Camp Eagle (YD 8218) received 40-50 RPG rounds, ARA, gunships, Spooky engaged suspected enemy locations at coordinates YD 810143 and YD 811138. Elements of the K3 Sapper Battalion (Probably K12 Sapper Battalion, 6th NVA Regiment) attacked Fire Base Berchtesgaden (YD 435010) on 14 June with small arms, RPG's satchel charges, and 122mm rockets. These two attacks are consistent with the readouts of documents captured on 16 May at YD 203053 which stated that the enemy had to protect vital supply lines and attack Allied fire bases in the A Shau Valley area.

d. The month of July witnessed a possible change in enemy offensive efforts. The July attacks on several District Headquarters and an increased rate of rocket attacks against Dong Da Training Center, indicated that the enemy is targeting more heavily against South Vietnamese military and pacification efforts. A June agent report in Quang Nam Province and documents captured in the vicinity of Saigon during early June lend support to this theory.

e. At the end of this reporting period the local force companies had increased the levels of activity in their respective districts with the following strengths: CI13 and CI14 (possibly combined), 110; CI15, 50; CI16, 20; CI17 and CI18 (possibly combined), 80-100; and CI19 disbanded. The Phu Loc Armed Battalion had a strength of approximately 250 men. A PW captured on 11 July at YD 773017 stated that the 5th NVA Regiment had recently received reinforcements. The
5th Regiment operations on 16 and 17 July demonstrated that it is a combat effective unit, with approximately 2000 men. Several PW reports indicate that the 5th Regiment base area is still SW of Leech Island (TD 6588 to TC 7088). The 4th NVA Regiment, with a strength of approximately 900 men, continues to operate in its traditional base area in Phu Loc District and continues to evade contact as Operation Campbell Streamer moved into its second phase. The 29th NVA Regiment was rendered combat ineffective in operations on Dong Ap Bia (TD 3296). The 9th Battalion, 29th Regiment is still possibly in the northern A Shau Valley. The 803rd Regiment possibly is still in the Rao Lao River area (TG 3292) with two battalions. The 806th Battalion, 6th NVA Regiment, is located in the vicinity TD 3310. Elements of the 7th Front continue to operate in the vicinity of Base Area 101, in Quang Tri Province.

2. Viet Cong Infrastructure Activities:

a. May 1969 witnessed a significant rise in the number of Viet Cong Infrastructure incidents. The rice harvest period of 10-15 May was particularly important to enemy units operating in the canopied areas. Agent reports, PW’s and document readouts had indicated that the NVA units in western Thua Thien Province were suffering from a severe shortage of rice, and every effort was being made by the WCI/NVA to collect as much of the harvested rice as possible. After the Spring rice harvest, WCI incidents returned to slightly above the monthly average (110-115 incidents).

(1) During the month of May, 73 new WCI were identified and 53 were eliminated. Of these 53, 4 were of district level or higher.

(2) The following is a table of WCI incidents by district during May 1969:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>FIN/REO PROPAGANDA</th>
<th>INTELLIGENCE</th>
<th>SABOTAGE</th>
<th>KIDNAPPING</th>
<th>TERROR</th>
<th>ASSASS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phong Dien</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quang Dien</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huyen Dien</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vinh Loc</td>
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<td>4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Thu</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>FIN/WG</th>
<th>PROPAGANDA</th>
<th>INTELLIGENCE</th>
<th>SABOTAGE</th>
<th>KIDNAPPING</th>
<th>TERROR</th>
<th>ASSASS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phu Loc</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huong Thuy</td>
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<td>5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thua Thien (P)</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>(132)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) During the month of May, there were 101 contacts in the lowlands; 68 FRI and 33 WNI. Results: 34 VC KIA, 9 US KIA, 33 US WIA. In addition, the WCI appear to be attempting to replace cadre eliminated and to make existing cadre more effective.

b. During the month of June, 157 new WCI were identified and 85 were eliminated. Of these 85, 22 were significant by MACV reporting standards.

(1) The following is a table of WCI incidents by district during June 1969:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>FIN/WG</th>
<th>PROPAGANDA</th>
<th>INTELLIGENCE</th>
<th>SABOTAGE</th>
<th>KIDNAPPING</th>
<th>TERROR</th>
<th>ASSASS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vinh Loc</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Vang</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Thu</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Loc</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huong Tra</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huong Thuy</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nam Hoa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RGS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

**DISTRICT**

**CITY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hue City</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thu Thien (P)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) During June there were 62 contacts in the lowlands, 33 FRI and 22 ENI. Results: 85 VC KIA and 10 US KIA, 76 US WIA. Although the number of contacts in the lowlands decreased, contacts were with company sized enemy elements.

(3) Agent reports, contacts and FW reports indicated a steady build up throughout Phu Thu District. There were numerous reports indicating that the C117 and C118 local force companies had been consolidated and had received NVA replacements in an attempt to regain control over northern Phu Thu District and to disrupt Government of Vietnam pacification efforts in this area. VCI activity increased significantly from two incidents in May to seven in June.

(4) Phu Loc and Phong Dien Districts continued to show a high level of activity during June. Huong Thuy District incidents decreased from 39 reported during May to 27 during June. The primary reason for this decrease appeared to be a consolidation effort on the part of Huong Thuy cadre.

c. 1-20 July witnessed a sharp increase in VCI activity in the lowlands. The reason for this increase was VCI preparation for the series of ground attacks in the lowlands during the period 15-17 July. After this July high period of enemy activity, VCI incidents (statistics terminated 20 July) as well as contacts decreased sharply, returning to the approximate normal rate (25-30 incidents/week).

(1) In addition to attacks on District Headquarters, agent reports, document readouts and FW reports indicated movement of 5th NVA Regiment elements across QL-1 in the vicinity of FB Anzio (ID 9207) into Phu Thu District lowlands to collect rice. VCI activity and numerous contacts made the area near FB Anzio (ID 927073) the most significant hot-spot in the lowlands. In the Phu Thu District lowlands VCI activity and contacts increased sharply indicating an enemy effort to regain control of this district.

(2) These attacks represented an attempt on the enemy's part to carry out the July phase of the "Summer Offensive." It is also the first time in seven months that the 5th NVA Regiment has operated in the lowlands in force.

(3) From 1-20 July 1969, 26 new VCI were identified and 21
eliminated. Of these 21, two were district-level cadre.

(4) The following is a table of VCI incidents for the period 1-20 July by district:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>FIN/ECO</th>
<th>PROPAGANDA</th>
<th>INTELLIGENCE</th>
<th>SABOTAGE</th>
<th>KIDNAPPING</th>
<th>TERROR</th>
<th>ASSASS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phong Dien</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quang Dien</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huong Dien</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vinh Loc</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Vang</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Thu</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Loc</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huong Tra</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huong Thuy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nam Hoa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hue City</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thua Thien (P)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8 (92)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) During the period 1-28 July, there were 190 contacts in the lowlands, 111 FRI and 79 ENI. Results: 178 NVA/VC KIA, 23 NVA/VC WIA, 6 US KIA, and 35 US WIA. This increase can be attributed partially to a lack of US forces in the lowlands. However, the primary reasons for this increase were the 5th NVA Regiment's attempt to operate in the lowlands, and increased enemy activity as part of the last phase of the enemy's "Summer Offensive."

(5) Phu Loc and Huong Thuy Districts were the most active districts through 23 July with 34 and 28 incidents respectively. Phong Dien District remained at approximately the high level of June with 11 incidents reported. Phu Thu District also remained at approximately the June level with 11 incidents reported. Phu Thu District also remained at approximately the June level with five VCI incidents reported. The heaviest VCI activity occurred prior to the lowlands.
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attacks, of 15-17 July. After these attacks, WCI activity decreased sharply as the VC withdrew to the canopied areas to regroup and reorganize.

3. G2 Air Operations:

a. Relocation of the Imagery Interpretation (II) Section, 101st Military Intelligence Detachment. The II Section is in the process of relocating to Phu Bai. This move will enhance the Division’s photo reconnaissance capability since facilities are available there for photo processing. This capability will allow Army photo reconnaissance aircraft from the 245th SAG to land at Phu Bai, deliver the film directly to the II Section for processing, and prepare for another mission.

b. Sensors:

(1) On 29 June, the Division obtained excess Dual Blade equipment from the 3d Marine Division to be employed with this Division’s sensor assets. Equipment obtained included 2xPPS-5 Radar Sets, 3xVS-2, Night Observation Devices, 3x1 ton vehicles with mounted search lights, and 2xPRC-25 Radios.

(2) G2 Air has coordinated with the 3d Marine Division and received four allocations to their sensor school starting 15 July 1969. Allocations for future courses have been requested and a tentative agreement has been obtained.

(3) G2 Air has coordinated the receipt of in-flight readout reports of out-of-country-sensor activations from an Air Force aerial monitor.

(4) During the reporting period unattended ground sensors were employed in the A Shau Valley to monitor infiltration routes into the Division AO. Acoustic, seismic, magnetic, and infra-red devices were used. Sensors were emplaced by aerial delivery from a UH-1H and by hand emplacing in conjunction with combat operations. PSID's also have been used with patrols in the valley. Although no specific EVA has been obtained, numerous activations have been registered and engaged by artillery.

4. Combined Information Control Element:

a. Based on statistical analysis it was determined that 15-20% of all intelligence reports in the lowlands of Thua Thien Province were possibly true, but were not exploited by Sector Forces, primarily because of the lack of mobility. US, ARVN and Sector Forces were not utilizing all intelligence available, as sufficient coordination
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b. The Combined Information Control Element (CICE) was established on 20 May to alleviate this problem. CICE is composed of Government of Vietnam and US personnel co-located with the Thu Thien Sector TC. A Division liaison team is maintained at the CICE to insure a close exchange of intelligence information and coordinate aircraft requirements for CICE reaction forces.

d. To date, the Order of Battle Section of the 101st Airborne Division has provided CICE with targeting information, to include: pattern analysis of target areas, black lists obtained through coordination with the Phoenix Committee, and data base readouts.

5. Weather: During the reporting period the following precipitation data was compiled.

a. Precipitation Data:

(1) Climatological:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Monthly Minimum</th>
<th>Monthly Mean</th>
<th>Monthly Maximum</th>
<th>24 Hour Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Actual:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Monthly Total</th>
<th>24 Hour Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>1.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>1.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>4.73 (Equals Record)</td>
<td>3.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Typhoon Tess: Typhoon Tess affected Camp Eagle on 11 July. The storms closest approach to Camp Eagle was 50 nautical miles and maximum winds near the center of the storm at that time were 45-50 knots. Camp Eagle received 3.13 inches of rain from Tess. Greater rainfall amounts were received to the south of the AO. Maximum winds observed in the area were 37 knots at FB Berchtesgaden. Camp Eagle had 22 knots

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c. Winds of Laos. During June and July strong winds occurred along the ridgelines in the western part of the AO. These winds affected the coastal plains on a few days in June, and on five to eight days in July. The winds are known as the "Winds of Laos." When they occur moderate, occasionally severe mechanical turbulence is present especially over the mountains. Maximum speeds recorded along the ridgelines during July were in excess of 45 knots, and Camp Eagle 30 knots.

F. (U) PERSONNEL:

1. During the month of May the Division sustained increased casualties in operations in the A Shau Valley. Assignment priorities were modified emphasizing the operational missions of the infantry battalions, giving highest priority to those units engaged in heaviest contact with the enemy. Increased replacement flow, close monitoring of assignments of 11 Series MOS personnel, and a thorough evaluation of utilization of 11 Series MOS personnel produced a significant improvement in the posture of the infantry battalions by 31 July.

2. During the reporting period the Division experienced extensive personnel turbulence. This was compounded by the casualties mentioned previously. The infantry battalions averaged 86.9% of authorized strength on 1 May, and dropped to 81.5% on 31 July. One battalion dropped to 69% of authorized strength as a result of operations in the A Shau Valley, but by the end of the period it had recovered to 82%. Replacements were phased into units with heavy casualties to preclude inducing a Deros Hump.

3. During the reporting period a new Commanding General, Chief of Staff, C1, C2, C4, and C5 were assigned. The three brigades, DISCOM and 160th Aviation Group along with eight of ten infantry battalions, all battalions of Division Artillery, the 326th Engineer Battalion and the 501st Signal Battalion also had new commanders assigned.

4. Replacement flow in the Division amounted to 32.2% of authorized strength. Officers and warrant officers accounted for 30.0% and enlisted men 32.7% of the Division's authorized strength. In the critical 11 Series MOS, replacements arrived amounting to 34.4% of the Division's authorized strength. Losses of 11 Series exceeded the gains by 297 men. Added to a cumulative shortage in 11 Series from the preceding quarter of 624 men, the Division had a
shortage of 921 11 Series men on 31 July 1969 for the six months then ended. The Division was unable to relieve this shortage from internal resources by on the job training. USARV Regulation 600-200 prohibits utilization of an individual as an infantryman unless he has completed Infantry Advanced Individual Training.

5. During May, June, and July there were no significant trends noted in the Provost Marshal Office. The use of marijuana within the Division continues to be a frequent offense although the number of marijuana offenders during June and July has dropped from the monthly average of 30 to a monthly total of 21 in each of the last two months of the reporting period. Another frequent offense is in traffic law enforcement.

6. During the reporting period the 101st Airborne Division APO continued to provide postal services at a high rate of efficiency.

The following statistics are shown by month:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sales</th>
<th>Number Sold</th>
<th>Number Cashed/Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>$1,172,064.36</td>
<td>18,097</td>
<td>1572/$108,594.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>$1,101,053.35</td>
<td>17,021</td>
<td>1581/$106,808.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>$902,162.03</td>
<td>13,640</td>
<td>11,95/$102,681.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>$3,175,279.74</td>
<td>48,758</td>
<td>1648/$317,786.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dollar Value of Stamps Sold</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>$24,275.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>$24,722.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>$19,181.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>$68,178.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Flow of Mail</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incoming</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>480,401 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>376,323 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outgoing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>98,288 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>105,989 lbs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>421,402 lbs</td>
<td>16 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,278,126 lbs</td>
<td>208,303 lbs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. During May, June, and July the Eagle Beach recreation area was placed into full operation. This facility plays a large role in maintaining good morale of 101st personnel. The therapeutic effect of the salt water on the human body tends to heal jungle rot and clean cuts which are difficult to cure in the jungle. It can accommodate 160 men on standdown, and a total of 1000 personnel can be accommodated on the beach during the day.

8. During the month of May the 101st hosted two Navy malaria research teams in order to make a comparison with the 3d Marine Division. Extensive Wilson-Ekison Testing for Urinary Chloroquine Metabolites and interviewing of all the subjects tested, revealed some interesting observations. Those companies in which anti-malarial tablets were distributed by platoon medics had a considerably higher percentage of regular users than those companies in which the tablets were distributed by squad leaders. Therefore, it is advisable to have platoon medics distribute anti-malarial tablets to platoon personnel. Those companies that had been given the Wilson-Ekison test by battalion medics showed a higher percentage of regular users than those who have not been tested regularly. Personnel who intentionally do not take their anti-malarial pills are rare. The most common reason for missing a pill is the fact that nobody administered pills to the individuals. These observations have been passed on to all those concerned.

9. During the months of May and June the number of aircraft accidents increased significantly; 16 during May, 17 during June. During the first 10 days of July there were seven accidents, and from 11-31 July there were three accidents. A policy was established in June to have an officer in the grade of major or higher investigate all aircraft accidents, and to have all aircraft commanders involved in accidents interviewed by the Assistant Division Commander (Operations).

C. (C) LOGISTICS:

1. General.

a. Division Support Command continued normal logistical functions in support of Division operations. Initially operations were supported logistically from a FSP established at FSB Birmingham. This FSP was operated by the 2d FSSR which also maintained a rear detachment in support of the 2d Brigade base camp at LZ Sally. At the beginning of
the reporting period units receiving support from FSB Birmingham included normal 2d Brigade units; DS/GS divisional aviation, cavalry, and artillery units; and selected corps artillery and engineer units.

b. On 17 May 1969, Division Support Command supported extraction, movement and marshalling of 1st Brigade combat battalions redeploying to Tam Ky to assist the American Division. During this redeployment, Division Support Command coordinated the marshalling of company-sized units at Corregidor Hook Pad and Phu Bai Airfield. The 1st FSSS moved with the brigade to continue to provide logistical support.

c. Preliminary support for Montgomery Rendezvous was provided from FSB Birmingham and Wyoming Hook Pad. Near the end of the reporting period, Division Support Command went ahead with plans for the 3d FSSS to establish a FSP at FSB Blaze, TD 542030. The reason for establishing the FSP at Blaze were to provide more responsive support to the 3d Brigade Forward CP and to reduce the distance between the forward fire support base and the supported units, thus affording savings in CH-47 helicopter blade time. The realization of these goals is almost totally upon continued accessibility of the forward supply point by road. The opening of the FSP at Blaze was closely coordinated with the closing of the FSP at FB Birmingham, and on 20 July, full scale support of Operation Montgomery Rendezvous from FSB Blaze began. At the close of the reporting period a forward refueling area with a storage capacity of 110,000 gallons of JP-4 and a forward ASP containing a two day stockage level of all required ammunition were in full operation. Final plans were being made to co-locate a forward clearing station from the Medical Battalion with the FSSS at FSB Blaze.

d. On 11 July Division Support Command elements reopened the FSSS facilities in the 1st Brigade area of Camp Eagle to provide logistical support to 2d Brigade units participating in Operation Campbell Streamer. Corregidor Hook Pad once again became a center of resupply activity, as the 2d FSSS funneled supplies through Corregidor to units deployed in the Bach Ma area on this operation.

2. Transportation.

a. The Division Movements Control monitored the unit movement of the 1st Brigade from Phu Bai Airfield and Tam Ky Ramp via air and sealift to Tam Ky and Chu Lai. The lift of the Brigade together with supporting elements consisted of sixty-six (66) C-130 aircraft sorties and one (1) LST. The lift was accomplished over a period of four days (15-18 May 1969).

The following number of personnel and equipment were moved on
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Dates indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>PAX</th>
<th>EQUIPMENT (S/T)</th>
<th>MODE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 May 1969</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>.78.4</td>
<td>Air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 May 1969</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>256.2</td>
<td>Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 May 1969</td>
<td>891</td>
<td>2244.2</td>
<td>Air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 May 1969</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>151.8</td>
<td>Air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 May 1969</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>Air</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Daily C-123 Support (two from Phu Bai to Tam Ky and one from Tam Ky to Phu Bai) was flown in support of 1st Brigade administrative requirements.

b. The Division received approximately 23,000 short tons of cargo through the Navy facilities at Tam Ky and Hue Ramp.

c. Aircraft sorties flown in support of the Division.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>PAX</th>
<th>CARGO (S/T)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>2213</td>
<td>12032</td>
<td>6640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>2073</td>
<td>13035</td>
<td>5517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>2325</td>
<td>16962</td>
<td>5595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6611</td>
<td>42030</td>
<td>18092</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Aircraft Maintenance.

a. The 5th Transportation Battalion is presently in the process of adjusting its Authorized Stockage Lists (ASL’s) to more adequately accommodate aircraft repair parts requisitions from the customers. Through the adjustments of the Requisitioning Objectives and Reorder Point, the zero balance of critical items can be reduced.

b. An account with the Logistics Command has been established and confirmed for the procurement of common hardware used in aircraft maintenance. This consists of common non-aviation service items not stocked with any other supply activity in the Division.

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c. To more adequately meet the demands for aircraft engines the Battalion has been assigned the responsibility by AMMC to manage a prepositioned stockage of aircraft engines to support organic aircraft of the Division. This has significantly reduced the previously excessive NSR rate for engines.

d. Communications. During the reporting period the Battalion established an administrative and logistics radio teletype (RTTY) net between A Company, 5th Trans Bn (located at Camp Eagle), B Company, 5th Trans Bn (located at Phu Bai), Aviation Material Management Center (AMMC), Depot A (located at Saigon), and AMMC Depot B (located at Qui Nhon). This net will enable the Battalion to expedite requisitioning, fill, release, and issue of EDP requisitions.

e. Turn in of aircraft. Turn in of crash damaged and combat loss aircraft has been a matter of great concern to the Division. Any aircraft that becomes damaged beyond the repair capability of this Battalion must be turned in to the 34th General Support Group and dropped from accountability. The process of preparing aircraft for turn in is a lengthy and somewhat complicated process involving inventories and the preparation of required paperwork. The aircraft, although not flyable and not repairable within the Division, remains an asset of the Division during the turn in process and as such there is no authorization to requisition a new aircraft until the turn in can be completed. The turn in procedure may take a few days or longer depending upon problems encountered in the inventory, paperwork, and/or the movement of the aircraft to the turn in point. The Battalion is presently coordinating a system with the 34th GSG which will substantially reduce the turn in time frame. It is anticipated that this new system will allow for faster requisition of replacement aircraft and increase the Division’s operational ready percentage of flyable aircraft.

4. Supply.

a. On 20 July a Forward Supply Point was established at Fire Base Blaze to reduce blade time required for resupply and to provide greater support flexibility during the coming monsoon. The FSP includes an 8-point refuel pad for slicks (UH-1H), cobras (AH-1H, and OH-6A) with a 60,000 gallon JP-4 storage capacity. In addition, a 50,000 gallon tank has been emplaced near the hook pad to provide refueling for Chinooks and Cranes. 500 gallon collapsible drums are filled from this tank. The hook pad itself is constructed with FSP and can accommodate over 80 loads at one time. Adjacent to the hook pad is an ammunition storage area constructed with six berms.
b. Rigging Operations. Company E, 426th SW Battalion, with riggers located at all Division Support Command pads and several forward locations, rigged and externally sling loaded approximately 5,875 sorties of Classes I, II & IV, III and V supplies totalling over 4,000 tons to combat elements of the 101st Airborne Division on forward fire bases during the reporting period. In addition, 35 sorties of heavy engineer equipment were externally sling loaded in support of US Navy Seabees at Vinh-loc Island. Rigging support was also provided to units of the 1st ARVN Division. Over 900 sorties were rigged and hooked from FB LaVang in support of ARVN artillery units.

c. Improvements in Class III Supply Operations.

(1) The Camp Eagle Class III yard was reopened for package product distribution on 1 May 1969. This yard serves all Divisional units in the Camp Eagle-Phu Bai area and the 2d Brigade FSEX. In addition, the yard underwent considerable improvement in June. Four slots were constructed to accommodate 10,000 gallon tanks. The tanks are used to fill 500 gallon collapsible drums for hook out. Also added to the yard were three large bermed areas for filling and storing blivets, and two bermed areas for storing package products contained in 55 gallon drums.

(2) To prevent delay in refueling in case of a pump malfunction all Division helicopter refuel pads have been equipped with an emergency alternate refueling system utilizing 500 gallon blivets and 100 GPM pumps.

(3) All POL supply personnel have been given increased instruction on pump operations and maintenance and in eliminating of fire hazards. Fire extinguishers have been placed at each point with larger extinguishers placed strategically at each pad. Fire drills and fire training have been conducted at all refuel points.

d. Project Strip.

(1) A Project Strip Team from USARV inspected the Division Supply Office to determine the effectiveness of the battalion in eliminating excess supplies from stocks and also to check the accuracy of inventories.
and location surveys. In addition, the team checked stock control records to determine whether:

(a) Dues out have been established with balances on hand.
(b) Requisitions are cancelled when not required.
(c) Appropriate follow-up action has been initiated.
(d) Requisitioning objections have been properly computed.

(2) The results of the Project Strip Team pointed out that the 426th S&S Battalion:

(a) Had the best storage of supplies and locator system of any of five divisions inspected.
(b) Had the smallest value of excess identified in any division S&S or S&T battalion to date.
(c) Was the only unit inspected to have achieved a perfect score on a check of items listed above.

(3) In conjunction with the USARV Project Strip Program the 426th S&S Battalion has identified as excess and evacuated approximately 400 tons of supplies, totalling 3.5 million dollars in value during the reporting period.

e. Major items. During the present reporting period, a number of major items shortages within the Division have been resolved. The shortages of major items are primarily a result of the conversion of the Division from the airborne to the airmobile TO&E. Among the more notable of major items received against initial shortages are:

20 - 6,000 lb rough terrain forklifts
9 - 5 ton dump trucks
84 - ½ ton jeeps
137 - ½ ton jeeps
22 - 90MM Recoiless Rifles
33 - 81MM Mortars
99 - M60 Machine guns
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17 - 30KW Generator
5 - 3 ton cranes
102 - RC 292 antennas
106 - Night vision sight, NV/PVS-3
90 - TA 312 telephones

f. Project Edit Challenge. Project Edit/Challenge, another USARV DSU improvement program which institutes the challenge of high priority requests and requests for inordinate quantities of nice-to-have items, continues with an average of seven percent of all requests received being rejected as a result of Edit/Challenge procedures.

g. ASL - Demand Satisfaction. The Division Supply Office maintained an extremely small authorized stockage list which averaged about 450 items. In spite of this notably small ASL and the fact that major items can not be carried on ASL, the Division Supply Office has been able to maintain an average demand accommodation of 49%. The demand satisfaction however, averages at an extremely high 84.4%.

5. Ground Maintenance.

a. Immediate action on the information provided by the weekly 2406 input from divisional units has resulted in significant reduction of vehicular deadline rates. A list containing all deadline organizational repair parts is compiled and circulated to all MRK's and selected members of the Material Section. A search is made of all available repair parts sources and any parts thus obtained are personally delivered to the unit requiring them.

b. The Material Section has increased the frequency and magnitude of technical assistance visits to customer units. These TAV's are directed toward solution of a specific problem that the customer has.

c. The Technical Supply Platoon has continued the program of retrograding excess repair parts to Da Nang Depot. This prevents the accumulation of items not required by the Division and makes them available for requisition by other depot customers. This is especially important in the area of high dollar value items.

d. The Stock Accounting Section of the Technical Supply Platoon has initiated a cyclic inventory and quarterly review program. In this program, the entire ASL is completely inventoried once each quarter and
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All adjustments are made to stock accounting records. The update net asset position contributes to more effective management of stocks for better service to the customer.

e. The 801st Maintenance Battalion established vehicle wash points at Camp Evans and two at Camp Eagle, one in the 1st Brigade area and one in the base camp area. This has caused an improvement in division vehicle appearance and maintenance as evidenced by the number of vehicles receiving a satisfactory rating on Road Side Spot Check Inspections when compared to lst Quarter results.

f. USARV Material Readiness Assistance Team visited the Division and provided instructions on the preparation and disposition of TAMS forms. Classes were conducted on the preparation of DA Form 2406 (Material Readiness Report) with a total of 129 Division personnel attending.

g. Russian vehicles captured in the A Shau Valley were turned over to the Battalion, through G5, for rehabilitation. A command car and three trucks were rebuilt by the Mechanical Maintenance Platoon and Service Section and turned back to G5 for distribution to the Province Chief as part of the pacification program. The Command car was presented to the President of the Republic of Vietnam.

h. LTC Furrier of WECOM visited the battalion to discuss artillery weapons problems. He informed the Armament Platoon that tests are being conducted to correct the low life-span of the present recoil system of the 105mm M102 howitzer. He also stated that the rear sight assembly for the M-79 Grenade Launcher will be issued as a unit instead of 22 separate parts.

i. Mr. McKay of CANIDAIR LIMITED, the producer of the XM571, visited the battalion to discuss supply and maintenance problems and procedures. He received a comprehensive report from the units and the Mechanical Maintenance Platoon and informed us that all problems would be reported to TACOM.

H. (C) CIVIL AFFAIRS:

1. During this reporting period, Division pacification efforts continued to reap beneficial results within Thu Thien Province. While tactical operations were conducted in the highlands, pacification efforts were concentrated in the more populated lowlands. RP/PP forces have efficiently and effectively assumed the majority of the security responsibilities in the lowlands to restore the confidence of the population in their ability to provide their own security. This
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confidence has increased local intelligence sources and has enhanced the refugee resettlement program with 39,220 refugees returning to their former homes. Division trucks and helicopters assisted in the movement of the refugees and their household goods.

2. A survey, conducted of all districts within the Province, revealed that approximately 3,000 school desks and benches are required for all schools in the Province. In an effort to supply these desks and benches, five Vietnamese carpenters have been employed by the G5 Section. Also, DIVARTY and 2/17th Cav are supporting this project with voluntary troop labor.

3. MEDCAP Support. Medical assistance and support were provided throughout the Province by both divisional and non-divisional units with a total of 236 MEDCAPs conducted. Twenty-five thousand six hundred and twelve (25,612) medical patients and 1,053 dental patients were treated. In May MAG-36 began a weekly training session with Government of Vietnam medical workers. Similar training sessions during MEDCAP activities are conducted by other MEDCAP teams as well. These training sessions will expand as more Vietnamese medical facilities and personnel become available. Classes on sanitation and child care for young women in Phong Dien District were begun in June by Third Brigade Civic Action personnel. Results will be evaluated for possible expansion to other districts.

4. Coordination with Civil Officials.

a. On 28 May, the citizens of Con Son Village were recognized for an ingenious utilization of empty 40mm ammunition containers. A heating and cooking unit was fabricated from the empty containers with rice chaff utilized as fuel. The unit is capable of 10 to 12 hours of burning time before recharging is necessary.

b. On 30 May, Major General Wright, Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division and Colonel Thanh, Thua Thien Province Chief, attended the dedication of the Dong Khanh Primary School.

c. Eight additional Soviet made GAZ-63 1.5 ton trucks were delivered to Colonel Thanh, Province Chief, in early June. These trucks were for use as spare parts for three vehicles delivered earlier for civic action work.

d. Quoc Hoc High School held its dedication ceremony for the newly reconstructed library on 14 June. MG Wright, Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division; Mr. Ky, Headmaster of the school; and members of the official party toured the library after it was officially opened with a ribbon cutting. MG Wright presented the school with 250 newly purchased
books on behalf of MAG-36 and school children of Cheshire, Connecticut, who donated the money.

e. The G5 Section assisted Hoi Phuc Thien Bao Sinh Orphanage in establishing a sewing school in June. Twenty young women from all districts of the Province made up the first class. Since only four sewing machines were available, a used machine was purchased and loaded to the orphanage.

f. On 23 June, a cultural drama team visited FB Roy in recognition of Foreign Forces Day in Vietnam. Following introductions by the Province S5, local girls from Dong Khanh High School spoke and presented flowers to the Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division. They also presented a 90-minute music and magic program to the audience.

g. On 9 July, fire destroyed 261 homes in Con Son Village and left approximately 1,300 individuals homeless. The Third Brigade and Division G5 delivered 8,600 pounds of food to the village on the same day. G5 also furnished 54 salvaged OP medium tents to CORDS for use by the victims of the fire.

5. Major projects completed during the reporting period:

   a. Loc Dien Dispensary (YD 972062) (Phu Loc).
   b. Loc Hai Market Place (AT 889964) (Phu Loc).
   c. Huong Tra District Road Repair (YD 727237 - YD 699225) (Huong Tra).
   d. An Cuu School Rebuilt (YD 784204) (Hue).
   e. Kuan Hoa Primary School Rebuilt (YD 773215) (Hue).
   f. Dong Khanh School Addition (YD 788240) (Hue).
   g. Nine (9) Phu Thu District Wells (YD 840203 - YD 894213) (Phu Thu).
   h. Quoc Hoc Library Dedication (YD 764211) (Hue).

6. Projects initiated prior and completed during the period included 13 schools, 3 village headquarters, 2 marketplaces, 3 dispensaries, and 8 other significant projects for a total of 29 projects.

7. Projects initiated and completed during the period included 2 schools, 3 village headquarters, 4 dispensaries, and 33 other major projects for a total of 42 projects.
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8. Current Projects:

a. Type of Projects: Schools - 26; village headquarters - 6; dispensaries - 3; marketplaces - 3; orphanages - 6; others - 8; Total - 52.

b. Projects by Districts: Huong Dien - 2; Phong Dien - 6; Quang Dien - 2; Huong Tra - 6; Phu Vang - 10; Huong Thuy - 8; Nam Ha - 3; Phu Thu - 1; Vinh Loc - 2; Phu Loc - 6; Hue - 6; Total - 52.

9. Commodities issued during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Masonite/Flywood/Asbestos</td>
<td>394 Sheets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tin</td>
<td>329 Sheets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paint</td>
<td>30 Gals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebar</td>
<td>1,487 Meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement</td>
<td>1,678 Bags</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sand</td>
<td>234 Cubic Meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gravel</td>
<td>154 Cubic Meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction Lumber</td>
<td>7,236 Board Feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scrap Lumber</td>
<td>335,560 Board Feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>138,616 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>3,906 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational Kits</td>
<td>33 kits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soap</td>
<td>1,394 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Pumps</td>
<td>13 Pumps</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ammo Boxes</td>
<td>3,709 Boxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer Stakes</td>
<td>745 Stakes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Kits</td>
<td>1,470 Kits</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Fill Dirt 352 Cubic Meters
PSF 470 Planks
Concertina Wire 86 Rolls

I. (U) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS:

1. Statistics. Type and quantity of propaganda media employed.
   a. Leaflets Disseminated: 72,364,840
   b. Loudspeaker Broadcasts: 928,000
   c. Movies Shown: 123
   d. TV Programs Conducted: 14
   e. Quick-Reaction Leaflets: 20,000
   f. PSTOJ Mobile Teams: 42

2. During this quarter aerial broadcasts, standard tapes, and leaflets were employed to the maximum, along with several new ones developed by JUSPAO, the 7th PSTOJ Battalion, and within the Division. Our major PSTOJ effort was targeted against known and suspected NVA and VC positions as well as against populated areas with known or suspected enemy sympathizers in an effort to deny them freedom of movement and the support that is necessary to their survival. Leaflets and posters were also disseminated, and ground broadcasts conducted in Government of Vietnam controlled populated areas in an effort to retain and strengthen the population's support of the Government of Vietnam, keep a wedge between them and the enemy, and to inform them of the VIP and medical programs available to them.

3. In compliance with JUSPAO policies, propaganda was developed within the Division to exploit NVA/VC military defeats, and stress RVNAP victories, and the growing strength of the PF/RFs. This propaganda was usually in the form of quick-reaction leaflets and live broadcasts by Hoi Chans or other Government of Vietnam PSTOJ personnel.

4. A total of 24 Hoi Chans rallied to the Government of Vietnam within the Division AO during this reporting period. This low figure can be attributed to a concentrated push in the area of operations against the enemy, and the resulting movement of the enemy deep into the mountains. With the enemy deserting the coastal plains, and piedmont areas, many potential Hoi Chans are being denied the opportunity to rally.

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5. During the reporting period, continued support was provided during cordon operations to include ground loudspeaker and movie teams, aerial loudspeaker broadcasts and leaflet drops, armed propaganda team activity, and cultural drama team performances.

6. The Division PSYOP printing capability has continued to be used to the maximum for producing quick-reaction leaflets on Hoi Chanh and all important exploitable PSYOP situations that arise. The printing capability was also utilized to print VCI leaflets for use during PSYOP Mobile Team operations, and to print standard leaflets when they were needed for an immediate situation and were not available.

   a. Surrender or Die (Forces in the A Shau Valley)

   b. Chieu Hoi Quick-Reaction leaflets were prepared on ralliers on the Division PSYOP printing capability for exploitation of these ralliers in their former base areas. This was done by interviewing ralliers as soon as possible after they came in. If they could be exploited, a picture was taken and written statements were obtained. These would then be transferred to a quantity of leaflets suitable for aerial or ground dissemination in the base areas of the rallier's former unit. All leaflets of this type were generally a Chieu Hoi appeal with the Hoi Chanh's written statement concerning the treatment he was receiving and expounding the merit of the Chieu Hoi Program.

   c. Pro-GVN and pro-RP/PF leaflets were produced after victories by the ARVN, and Popular and Regional Forces. Also mentioned and praised were the National Police.

7. Leaflets, tapes, and live broadcasts directed at NVA units are being used in the Division's current operations in the A Shau Valley, and surrounding areas. Daily aerial broadcasts and leaflet drops are being made in support of these operations.

8. The Division is conducting an operation aimed at the Montagnard tribesman in the A Shau Valley and the surrounding areas. The purpose of the operation is to persuade them to Chieu Hoi and resettle to Montagnard Villages in GVN controlled areas. Since there is no written language for the Montagnards, picture leaflets were directed at them with a theme encouraging them to Chieu Hoi.

9. The use of PSYOP Mobile Teams in the Division AO is steadily increasing. This is due primarily to the excellent working relationship between the Division PSYOP Section and the Revolutionary Development
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Center. A PSYOP Mobile Team consists of a MEDCAP, ground loudspeaker and/or a movie team, depending on the situation, a cultural drama team, armed propaganda squad, and Revolutionary Development Team speakers. The team is usually sent into villages that intelligence sources indicate have enemy families/sympathizers or active enemy political cadre.

10. All ralliers and PWs within the Division AO have reported that they have been subjected to many Allied broadcasts and leaflet drops. Most of them stated that they listened to the broadcasts, read the leaflets and believed what they heard and saw. They also indicated that many of their comrades wished to rally, but could not as they had no opportunity because they were being closely watched by their cadre, and did not have any chance to get into the lowlands.

11. The Division PSYOP Section has just completed a cohesive effort utilizing all the assets and resources which are available, to persuade the 4th NVA Regiment to rally to the SVN by persuading its members that they have been deceived and exploited by the Government of North Vietnam and its Communist allies to support an immoral, unpopular, and futile cause, and to convince them that their only means of avoiding death and burial in a lonely unmarked grave is to Chieu Hoi to the Government of South Vietnam. The operation was initiated on 30 April 1969, and ended 31 July 1969. An after action report will be submitted.

J. MEDICAL:

1. During the reporting period, the 326th Medical Battalion continued medical support of all assigned and attached units of the 101st Airborne Division. Division operations received first priority and MEDCAP support and special projects were continued in accordance with our manpower, equipment, and supplies availability. The clearing platoon, C Company, 326th Medical Battalion was deployed twice during the reporting period in conjunction with Operation APACHE SNOW. Also deployed during the period was the clearing platoon of A Company to Tam Ky in support of the 1st Brigade in conjunction with an operation with the American Division. The movement of the Headquarters & Support Company from Bien Hoa to the area behind Division Support Command at Camp Eagle was completed on 17 May 1969. This move was initiated on 1 May 1969. The mission of Headquarters & Support Company at the present time is to provide division-level medical service and unit-level medical service, as required, on an area basis to divisional units operating in the division base area. These units include HHC 101st Airborne Division, 101st MP Company, 10th Chemical Platoon, 101st
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Hq Detachment, HHC & Band 101st Airborne Division Support Command, 426th Supply & Service, 265th BHC, 501st Signal, and 5th Transportation Battalion. Total population supported is approximately 2500. On 24 July 1969, the Air Ambulance Platoon (Eagle Dust-Off) acquired one (1) LOH-6A helicopter to use on an experimental basis. It is the contention that the LOH can be utilized to make aeromedical evacuation pick-ups in areas too small to fly the UH-lH to the ground, necessitating the use of the hoist with jungle penetrator or stokes litter. It is anticipated that a 30 day period will give us enough statistics upon which to determine the value of the LOH as an aeromedical evacuation helicopter.

2. As in previous quarters, the 326th Medical Battalion has continued the allocation of its assets in order to provide medical service to the 101st Airborne Division throughout the entire area of operation. In addition, the clearing platoon, A Company, was deployed with the 1st Brigade to Tam Ky. Eagle Dust-Off operations have continued their aeromedical evacuation support of the Division, to include the support of operations of the 1st Brigade at Tam Ky. The results of using a LOH-6A helicopter for medevac missions will be compiled and reported in the next quarterly OPR. During the report period, 2137 missions were flown, evacuating 3401 patients (includes 36 GIs). The number of hoist missions pulled was 242 with 471 patients being evacuated. Also, 35 POWs were taken by Dust-Off to medical facilities.

3. The following are the medical statistics for 326th Medical Battalion for the period 1 May through 31 July 1969:

Total patients seen at clearing station......................... 8,915
Total dental patients........................................... 2,353
Total admissions.................................................. 629
Total transferred.................................................. 812

RECAPITULATION

IRHA............................................................ 204
NHC............................................................. 464

MEDICAL DISEASES

Malaria.......................................................... 66
FUO's............................................................ 333

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Diarrhea............................................................... 596
Skin Diseases............................................................. 1,007
N/P............................................................................. 368
Gastroenteritis............................................................. 324
Foot Problems............................................................. 432
Heat Injuries............................................................... 103
VD............................................................................. 295
Med Evac Missions........................................................ 1,099
Med Cap II Total Number of Persons Treated..................... 483

Medical Supply: 4994 line items shipped at approximately 26,710 pounds.

K, (U) SIGNAL:

The 501st Signal Battalion continued to provide communications support for Division Operations Kentucky Jumper, Apache Snow, Campbell Streamer, and to Operation Lamar Plain conducted by the 1st Brigade attached to the Americal Division. It operated 4-channel VHF systems at FB's ROY, BASTOGNE, BIRMINGHAM, AIRBORNE, BERCHTESGADEN, EAGLE'S NEST, CURRAHEE, BLAZE, RAKKASAN, and to LZ SALTS, CAMP EVANS, and EAGLE BEACH. In the Americal Division AO, it operated 4-channel systems between FSB's HAU DOC, PROFESSIONAL, and the 1st Brigade Base Camp at Tam Ky. The Battalion also operated stations in the Division Admin/Log Net (HF/SSB/RTT) and the Division O&I Net (HF/SSB/RTT) from Tam Ky to Camp Eagle.

In support of plans for the deployment of a Division TAC Command Post the Battalion formulated plans for the installation of five RT-524's and one CEC-106 in a CONEX container, and the installation of a dismounted AN/VTC-10 in another CONEX container to allow rapidly deployable and responsive communications. During this period, the Battalion filled 52 requests for public address systems, completed 291 work order for organizational electronics repair, and 331 work orders for direct support maintenance of crypto equipment.

L, (U) ENGINEER:

1. During the reporting period, engineer assets were heavily committed to fire base construction and improvement in support of the Division's Operation Kentucky Jumper. Nine new fire bases were constructed, ranging from FSB DAVIS in northern Thua Thien Province to FSB SLEDGE atop Bach Ma Mountain in the south. Additionally,
battalion was responsible for the construction of over 90 landing zones and a C7A Caribou pioneer airstrip on the floor of the A Shau Valley. At the brigade and Division base camps, engineers accomplished numerous base improvement missions including TOC's, FDC's, helipads, bunkers, billets, and interior road maintenance. In July, elements of the 326th Engineer Battalion constructed a seven kilometer road between Camp Eagle and FSB PANTHER III.

2. Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 326th Engineer Battalion, was in general support of the battalion's three line companies for the duration of the reporting period. In that the equipment platoons are organic to the Headquarters Company, they were directly concerned with all equipment support in the Division's area of operations. From 1 May through 31 July, the following equipment support was provided to the battalion's line companies and Divisional organizations:

- D5A Bulldozer - 2221 hours
- M450 - 4722 hours
- Cat 112F Grader - 1410 hours
- Front Loader - 1166 hours
- 3t11 Backhoe - 587 hours
- M8S-100 - 590 hours
- 5 T Dump Truck - 4091 hours
- 2½ T Dump Truck - 2202 hours

a. Providing the above support in the Division's area of operations required 144 "Chinook" (CH-47) and 192 "Crane" (CH-54) sorties. These sorties constituted an overall 30% increase over the previous quarter's requirements. The equipment support rendered by Headquarters Company was utilized on more than 16 fire bases with approximately 65 percent of the quarter's total effort devoted to assist in the construction of nine new fire bases.

b. In early June, Headquarters Company's training of personnel in techniques of sectionalizing its heavy equipment for air movement paid off. The end result was the ten day construction of a C7A Caribou pioneer airstrip on the floor of the A Shau Valley. Equipment, including four D5A bulldozers, two M450 bulldozers, two TD-6
bulldozers (Seabees), two MRS-100's, four graders, two backhoes, five 3/4 ton dump trucks, three sheepfoot rollers, two Vibrapacs, and one 13-wheel roller was staged from Camp Eagle to FSB BLAZE on 5 June and from FSB BLAZE to LZ FOXY on 6 June. C Company's 1st Platoon received the mission of initial land clearing of the runway, approaches, and clear zones and was inserted with the infantry security on 5 June.

Initially, the main concern centered around the problem of standing water. The water table in the valley was extremely high and had to be lowered in order to dry out the soil, chiefly of clay silt composition. In addition, bomb and shell craters in the area varied from ten to thirty feet in diameter and were filled with water. After rough clearing and stripping had been accomplished, parallel drainage ditches were cut to permit the water to drain. As the runway dried, the remaining organic silty material on top was stripped and dumped outside the ditch lines. At station 10+00 (1,000 feet) a 36-inch diameter culvert, 90 feet long, was placed under the runway. The culvert, reassembled at Camp Eagle, was airlifted to LZ FOXY in four sections and installed without difficulty. The remainder of the construction effort was devoted to building up the runway surfaces and compaction to obtain the desired CBR.

On 13 June, runway marking panels were placed and the strip was checked by Air Force representatives. A C7A Caribou, "Flying Virginia," landed at LZ FOXY at 1520 hours. It off-loaded supplies and departed. The aircraft utilized approximately 700 feet of the runways 1500 feet on both landing and take-off. Following the Caribou's departure, equipment was dismantled for airlift to Camp Eagle the following morning. Actual construction time was 54 hours.

c. Five kilometers south of Camp Eagle was the location of a deserted FSB, designated Panther III (later redesignated FSB Arsenal). In the area surrounding this FSB and south in the mountain regions, the enemy launches most of their 122mm rocket attacks against Camp Eagle and Phu Bai military complexes. In order to cover this area with artillery fire it was decided to reopen Panther III. The reopening was to have a secondary function also; it was to be constructed in a very deliberate manner; for use as a training model as well as a functional FSB. Due to its close proximity to Camp Eagle, it was decided to resupply the FSB by road rather than air. Thus, on 4 July, 626th Engineer Battalion received the responsibility for constructing a road to FSB Arsenal. Many different recons were required prior to this date in selecting
The final trace. The road started to follow one ridgeline, but when the slopes became prohibitive, side hill cuts were required. The hill upon
which FSB Arsenal is located is very steep and great care had to be
exerted in making these side hill cuts. Two main streams were
encountered and in each one were placed 2-60" culverts of 50' length.
Two other areas had culverts placed of 2-36' in diameter and 30'
in length. Construction of the road to Panther III provided
support to the Division while concurrently providing training
and experience to the engineers. The emplacement and construction
of "Texas Ford" was a first for the battalion. The topography of
the trace of the road was such that valuable experience in making
side hill cuts and stage method techniques was gained.

The Headquarters Company also had the responsibility of
providing tactical potable water for the Division. To do this
there were water points at An Lo Bridge, FSB CURRABEE, FSB
BT KINGHAM, Tam Py, Eagle Beach, and Camp Eagle. During the
quarter 5,342,301 gallons of potable water were produced and
distributed by these water points. Other operations successfully
accomplished by the Headquarters Company included dust suppression
at the four principle brigade and Division base camps; reconnaissance
missions of tactical bridges and lines of communications, bunkers,
and towers. Additionally, the company provided equipment support
of the lst Brigade's reinforcement of the Americal Division.

3. In support of the 45th Engineer Group's construction of
Route 547 from FSB BASTOGNE to the A Shau Valley, elements of the
326th Engineer Battalion cleared five security landing zones located
along the route. Many of these landing zones had to be rappelled
into due to the thick jungle terrain.

K. (C) ARMY AVIATION:

1. The mission of the 160th Aviation Group is to provide
aviation support to the Division and aviation special staff personnel
to the Division Headquarters.

a. During the 92 day period 1 May 1969 through 31 July 1969,
the 160th Aviation Group provided continuous aviation support to
the combat operations of the 101st Airborne Division. Primary
support involved the "Kentucky Jumper" campaign of which the last
phase of "Massachusetts Striker" was the major operation supported.
Additional operations supported during "Kentucky Jumper" included
the last ten days of "Bristol Boote," the initial assault of
"Apache Snow" into the A Shau Valley, continuing support of
operation "Campbell Streamer" which began on 13 July and continues
SUBJECT: Operational Rep. t - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile) for period ending 31 July 1969, RCS GFOR-69 (M1) (U)

as of this date. The 101's AHB has also provided an attack helicopter platoon to support Alpha and Bravo companies located at Chu Lai in support of the 1st Brigade during operation "Lamar Plain."

b. Concurrent operations supported throughout the reporting period involved the ISMC, Special Forces FOB, CCN and the normal five minute standby for dust-off escort and other emergencies.

2. The following statistical data is provided for the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>HRS FLOWN</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>PAX</th>
<th>TONS CARGO</th>
<th>AIRCRAFT RECOVERIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>101 AHB</td>
<td>14,866</td>
<td>42,500</td>
<td>46,032</td>
<td>2,701</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>158 AHB</td>
<td>18,714</td>
<td>51,116</td>
<td>74,190</td>
<td>2,427</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>159 ASHB</td>
<td>10,151</td>
<td>29,013</td>
<td>64,539</td>
<td>51,218</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>163 Avn Co (GS)</td>
<td>2,412</td>
<td>12,106</td>
<td>10,586</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Elements of the 160th Aviation Group participated in over 488 combat assaults.

4. 75 incidents of ground fire was recorded. Identification of incidents by mission is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>UH-1H</th>
<th>AH-1G</th>
<th>CH-47</th>
<th>CH-54</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed Escort</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Helicopter Close Support</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop Helicopter Operations</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistical Resupply</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (FOB, CCN, Sniffer, Flare, etc.)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Aircraft losses incurred during operations are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DAMAGED</th>
<th>DESTROYED</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combat</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Combat</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coverage has been provided for 22 visiting general officers or equivalent and support has been provided to 63 correspondents.
II. Section 2. Lessons Learned; Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

A. (U) PERSONNEL:

None.

B. (C) OPERATIONS:

1. Use of Light Observation Helicopter (LOH)

a. Observation: During recent operations the OH-6A has been particularly valuable in the evacuation of wounded from forward areas and for delivery of ammunition and other essential supplies to elements in contact.

b. Evaluation: During periods of heavy close contact UH-1H helicopters (resupply and medical evacuation) were not able to land in the vicinity of troops without receiving heavy ground fire. The OH-6A with its great maneuverability and speed was able to get in and out of small forward landing zones with little difficulty. Therefore, casualties were extracted from the forward LZ, by OH-6A to a larger secure LZ away from the contact area. From there they were further evacuated by the UH-1H MEDEVAC aircraft. Ammunition, medical supplies and water were likewise shuttled by LOH from the secure LZ to the forward position, relieving the commander of troops of the responsibility of carrying these men and supplies over a long distance. This use of the OH-6A helicopter has become a standing operating procedure in this Division. With contact imminent a small LZ is cleared to the rear of the attacking troops. The LOH will provide not only MEDEVAC capability, but will keep the troops supplied with ammunition and other combat essentials.

c. Recommendation: That this use of the OH-6A (LOH) be tested to see if it is feasible in other areas or only peculiar to this theater.

2. Target Marking Methods for C-47 Gunships

a. Observation: During cloudy or misty nights it has been difficult to accurately direct the fires of the C-47 gunships. The aerial flares are not sufficient to light up a target, particularly when the wind carries the flare out of the target area.

b. Evaluation: A more accurate means of target indication is necessary. The 81mm mortar is an effective system of marking targets.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDC-CC
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS GFORD-65 (R1) (U)

for the gunships. The mortar is laid on the target and an illumination round is fired and fused so that it ignites just before impact and continues to burn upon hitting the ground. In this manner, the gunship, while illuminating a general area with its flares, is also aware of the specific target.

c. Recommendation: Recommend targets for C-47 gunships, during conditions of adverse visibility, be marked with 81mm illumination rounds.

3. Sapper Attacks

a. Observation: Elements of this Division suffered four well-planned and well-executed sapper attacks during the reporting period. Only one of these attacks was detected prior to the enemy force penetrating the defensive perimeter, and this was due to an alert soldier rather than a sophisticated device.

b. Evaluation: A defensive position manned by alert soldiers with good observation and fields of fire cannot be breached by stealth. Reconnaissance by fire and H and I fires will merely delay an enemy of this type. Trip flares and other early warning devices can be effectively neutralized by a careful enemy, but the alert sentry suffers none of these disadvantages. If given proper rest and proper tools (starlights and other NOD), the combat soldier can easily disrupt the best laid plans of a sapper unit. Through increased efforts on training and mental preparation of the individual soldier, sapper attacks can be effectively neutralized.

c. Recommendation: That BCT and AIT curriculums include a familiarization course on sapper units, missions, and tactics.

4. Use of Open Fighting Positions in Static Defense

a. Observation: Defense of static positions cannot rely on heavily bunkered positions entirely. Only open fighting positions can offer the degree of observation and fire needed to insure an adequate defense.

b. Evaluation: Personnel in bunkers often have an extremely limited view of their assigned sectors through portals of the fortification. The ability to hear is measurably impaired. There is a tendency for personnel who fight from a bunker to become too comfortable and the chances of falling asleep are much greater. All of these disadvantages are eliminated by use of open fighting positions.

c. Recommendation: That defense of static positions rely primarily
on open fighting positions backed up by bunkers for protection from indirect fire.

5. Use of Barrier Wire Within Fire Bases

a. Observation: During sapper attacks supplementary barrier wire within the fire base slows down and confuses the sapper should the perimeter wire be penetrated.

b. Evaluation: As a result of the mortar and sapper attack on FB BERTHESCAIEN, barrier wire within the fire base proved invaluable in confusing and slowing down, and channelizing the sappers once they penetrated the perimeter. The supplementary wire is emplaced after darkness and removed during the day. This concertina supplementary wire adds depth to the more permanent outer defensive wire.

c. Recommendation: That continuing emphasis be placed on defensive techniques and tactics.

C. (U) TRAINING:

1. Course of Instruction for Engineer Equipment Repairman

a. Observation: Inspecting and diagnosing engineer equipment (i.e., chainsaws, generators, flame throwers) is very difficult for the average repairman. The training they received during their course of instruction in CONUS is inadequate for application here in Vietnam where generator power is so critical. When dealing with radar generators, for example, time lost in improperly identifying the problem can multiply due to repair part return time.

b. Evaluation: A school trained engineer equipment man has little opportunity to become acquainted with the type equipment which we use and generally lacks the knowledge necessary for the situation.

c. Recommendation: That an in-country school be made available for instruction and practical exercise on 10 kW and other generators, chainsaws, pumps, compressors, and refrigeration units for men requiring this instruction.

2. Insertion Procedures

a. Observation: Methods of inserting troops into marginal LZ's or areas where there are no LZ's is under continual scrutiny. By comparison with rappel insertions, use of the hook (CH-47) with ladder is a much quicker way to insert combat loaded troops with their equipment.
b. Evaluation: Rappel inserting four men per time takes from 8-16 minutes. The hook with ladder has required as little as 18 minutes to insert 31 fully loaded troops. Prior to deciding which insertion method will be used, certain items must be taken into consideration. The LZ must be relatively secure in order to permit use of a CH-47. Safety has to be stressed, particularly if the hook has to depart the area hastily. The best precaution is to have each troop rigged with Swiss seat, snap link, and gloves.

c. Recommendation: Continue to train all individuals in both insertion methods. Training and execution will be conducted by only qualified persons. Develop techniques for inserting accompanying supplies concurrently with the troops by using the same aircraft.

D. (C) CHEMICAL:

1. Fabricated Grenade Rack System with XM54 CS Hand Grenades versus XM15, Canister Cluster, Tactical CS, When Used Against Point Targets

   a. Observation: Employment techniques for the XM15 munition from UH-1 helicopters are not sufficiently accurate for use against point targets.

   b. Evaluation: XM15 CS Cluster are employed against targets by the bombardier estimating the drop point and the aircraft maintaining constant ground speed and altitude over the target. Additionally, the minimum employment altitude of 700 feet further reduces accuracy. Variation of these parameters results in inaccurate drops. The grenade rack system is independent of aircraft ground speed and altitude and "lays down" a line source of agent CS reducing the criticality of the drop point.

   c. Recommendation: That the fabricated grenade rack system be used in support of troops in contact when engaging point targets or when a high degree of accuracy is required. The XM15 munition system should be restricted to use against area targets and reconnaissance by fire roles.

2. Employment of 105mm Tactical CS Cartridge, XM629

   a. Observation: Large concentrations of 105mm tactical CS fires are highly effective against personnel in bunkers without respiratory protection.

   b. Evaluation: On two occasions, a total of 255 105mm CS rounds
were fired on three targets consisting of enemy personnel in bunkers. In one target area close to friendly positions, six to eight NVA were observed abandoning their bunkers. They appeared to be confused and ran toward friendly positions where they were killed by small arms fire. It was also observed that a heavy concentration of CS was required on the target before the above results were obtained. When CS rounds are fire point detonating, they can be adjusted closer to friendly locations than HE. Data corrections given in the firing table supplement dated November 1967 were not accurate for transfer from HE to CS resulting in a 500 meter error at a range of 7000 meters. This required the Aerial Observer to adjust to the target using CS rounds.

c. Recommendation: That batteries fire at maximum rate of fire for two to three minutes against all targets engaged with the 105mm tactical CS cartridge, XM629 and that the data corrections given in the firing table supplement be corrected for more accurate transfer from HE to CS rounds. Also, the 105mm CS round can be used in support of troops in contact when their close proximity to enemy positions precludes the use of HE.

2. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

1. Significant Events and Activities

a. Observation: During the past months significant events within the Division AO were not published with the local analysis and forwarded to subordinate, lateral, and higher headquarters.

b. Evaluation: A system of publishing significant information in perspective was needed. A monthly period was decided upon to take tactical advantage of trends noted.

c. Solution: A Monthly Intelligence Summary highlighting significant events and evaluating trends in enemy activity was initiated. It is forwarded to interested commands NLT the 5th day of the month following the month evaluated.

2. Weekly Intelligence Target Estimate

a. Observation: Pattern analysis revealed large concentrations of enemy activity throughout the AO. A system of disseminating the information to tactical commanders was needed.

b. Evaluation: Analysis of concentrated enemy activity was published in daily INTSUMS and in special reports, however, insufficient emphasis was being placed on the exploitation of these areas of interest.
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CINCPAC-65 (R-1)

C. Solution: The G2 Section initiated a Weekly Intelligence Targeting Report which consists of a narrative description of intelligence information and overlays depicting the concentrations of activity; the report is forwarded to major subordinate and lateral commands, with an information copy to XXIV Corps.

3. Reduction of Personnel Requiring Tactical Interrogation of PW's Support

   a. Observation: When Brigade IPW Teams cannot be collocated with the forward Brigade CP, problems in communication and timely collection, processing and dissemination of intelligence arise.

   b. Evaluation: This occurred when the 3d Brigade CP was moved from Camp Evans to FSB Berchtesgaden near the A Shau Valley. The IPW Team was left behind, along with other support elements when the 3d Brigade CP made its move, because there was no room nor adequate facilities for the team at the fire base. Evacuation and exploitation of captured documents and prisoners was greatly delayed, and interrogator reports and document readouts were not reaching Brigade and Division on a timely basis. Communication between Division and 3d Brigade was often difficult, and the separation of the Brigade CP from its home base and support elements produced difficulties in PW/document evacuation and in sending interrogators and/or document readout specialists to the Brigade CP when required.

   c. Solution: In order to expedite and simplify IPW support to the Brigade, the Brigade IPW team was temporarily disbanded and rejoined the IPW Section at Division Headquarters, and a two-man interrogation team sent to FSB Berchtesgaden to support the Brigade, resulting in the following:

      (1) Since transportation is more readily available at Division Headquarters than at Camp Evans or FSB Berchtesgaden, the time element involved in evacuating prisoners/documents is greatly reduced, and intelligence extracted from these sources of information reaches the Brigade CP on a more timely basis.

      (2) The need for frequent travel by IPW personnel between Camp Eagle and Camp Evans was eliminated.

      (3) It was found that the two-man interrogation team at 3d Brigade CP (Forward) can provide the Brigade S2 with immediate support when needed.

F. (U) LOGISTICS:

1. Labeling of Crates at Depots
a. Observation: During this reporting period, a number of inventories have been taken of stocks on hand. The results of these inventories have always been less than ideal.

b. Evaluation: Closer examination into this area reveals that the principle cause of inventory discrepancies stems from improper labeling of the contents of crates received. This problem is compounded by the fact that about 10% of all items received in the Class II, IV and III areas of supply arrive identified on TOGD as "Genes" and without DD Form 1348 attached. Until such time as Depots can take necessary remedial action, a receiving procedure has been instituted that the contents may have been tampered with (many crates are opened at Depot and some packs removed for issue). The crate will later be sealed and Reband and shipped to a DSU for issue with the lesser quantity indicated on an attached DD Form 1348 which subsequently becomes separated from the crate and is lost. The receiving DSU assumes the original quantity indicated on the crate to be correct. Another common practice is to reuse undamaged crates for shipping supplies from Depots. This practice generates inventory errors in that should the DD Form 1348 become detached and lost, the receiving DSU assumes the crate to be filled with the original item. If the old markings are not obliterated, and they seldom are, the receiver may not realize that a crate originally marked as containing a certain item of supply actually contains something else.

c. Recommendation: That reused or partially filled crates be properly labeled at Depots to reflect the exact quantity and type item within the box and that old markings be completely obliterated. In addition, a copy of DD Form 1348 should be glued to the exterior of each crate indicating the requisitioner's document number, supplementary addressse, item nomenclature, FSN, unit of issue, and quantity.

2. Damage to Air Items

a. Observation: Excessive damage to air items is due to smoke grenades burning nets.

b. Evaluation: Many hook pales on the fire bases are very small. It is difficult to keep air items out of the area when smoke grenades are thrown to signal helicopters. However, the burning of nets with smoke grenades is a useless waste of valuable material.

c. Recommendation: That supported units dig a pit to drop smoke grenades into and use a guide to direct the pilot where to release the load.
AVDQ-GC
SUBJ: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 July 1969, ACS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

G. (U) ORGANIZATION:

None

H. (U) SIGNAL:

1. Amplifier (AN-3349) Malfunction

   a. Observation: Fluctuations in voltage or low voltage is one of the main causes of blown amplifiers.

   b. Evaluation: Operators must monitor the voltmeter on AN/CRC-142 and AN/VSC-2 radio sets.

   c. Recommendation: That operators be instructed on the danger of operating with voltage fluctuation or low voltages.

2. Unsatisfactory RTT Transmissions

   a. Observation: Poor RTT transmission has been experienced at short distances.

   b. Evaluation: Transmission could be improved by proper orientation and polarization of the antennas.

   c. Recommendation: Unless operational necessity dictates otherwise, antennas of all stations in a net will be polarized, i.e., whip to whip and doublet to doublet.

3. Radio Interference

   a. Observation: The AS-2169/G (L-P) antenna normally used with the AN/CRC-163 radio will increase the range of FM communications, but it may also lead to unwanted interference in another unit's AO.

   b. Evaluation: When the 2d Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division initially deployed to FSB Whip near the A Shau Valley, severe interference was received from a unit operating a movement control net at Da Nang at a distance in excess of 60 KM. The unit at Da Nang was using an AS-2169/G (L-P) antenna with a RT-524 radio. The frequency on which the interference was experienced had been assigned to both units on a low power shared basis. Under normal conditions, both units would have been able to use the frequency without interfering with the other. But due to the directivity and increased gain associated with the AS-2169/G (L-P) antenna, the unit in Da Nang had increased its effective area of communications, and interference resulted on the shared frequency.
c. Recommendation: When using the AS-2169/G (L-P) with a RT 524 or PRC-25, care must be taken to insure that other units are not interfered with. Likewise, all radio officers, particularly those who make frequency assignments, should be made aware of these facts so that they will be able to recognize and solve this type of frequency problem.

4. Use of AN/MRC-66 VHF Terminal with the AN/GRC-163 VHF Terminal

a. Observation: The AN/MRC-66 and the AN/GRC-163 Radio Terminals are compatible.

b. Evaluation: The AN/GRC-163 and AN/MRC-66 VHF terminals can be used together. The combination will provide four voice channels; however, the two additional TT circuits normally associated with the GRC-163 will be lost.

c. Recommendation: That the AN/GRC-163 and AN/MRC-68 be used for a VHF system when like terminals are not available.

I. (U) MAINTENANCE:

1. Movie Projectors

a. Observation: Under the Closed Loop Program, units are turning in commercial Bell and Howell and commercial Graflex projectors with Cine lenses, but are receiving military AN/PFP-1 and military AS-2 type projectors in return, with Cine lenses.

b. Evaluation: There are currently eight types of 16mm projectors covered by the Closed Loop Program. Of these, five are commercial projectors, manufactured by either Bell and Howell or Graflex, and the other three are military standard projectors. Cine lenses have been procured for the commercial type projectors and are in the hands of units which have these projectors. One of the Bell and Howell models is issued with the lens, while the lens is a separate property book item for the other models. The military standard projectors are not issued with a Cine lens. The Cine lens that fits the commercial projectors will not fit the military standard projectors because of the differences in lens diameter and focal distances. On 6 May 1969, USARV Com-Electronics, was contacted. They indicated that there was a Cine lens for the AS-2 projector and although they did not have the FSN immediately available, they indicated that they would research it. They also indicated that the commercial type projectors were being phased out of RVN and being replaced by the AN/PFP-1 and AS-2 projectors. AS-2 projectors are designed for film account.
customers (entertainment) and the AN/PFP-1 is designed for TOE
customers (training aid). On 25 May 1969, information was received
for the effect that Cine lenses were available for the AN/PFP-1
and AS-7 projectors in limited quantities, but there is no Cine
lens available, in-country, for the AS-2 projector. The avail-
ability of these two lenses has not reduced the problem because
these are projectors designated for TOE issue rather than troop
morale and entertainment use.

c. Recommendation: Recommend that all serviceable Cine Lenses,
that are carried as separate line items, be turned in through
maintenance channels as the respective projectors are turned in
under the Closed Loop Program. These lenses will not fit the
military standard projector they would get in return and are a
high dollar item that could be reissued to other units that do not have
Cine Lens for commercial type projectors. Turn-in credit, on issue
document DS Form 2765-1, would be given the unit. Recommend that
ICCV initiate immediate action to procure a Cine lens that will
fit the AS-2 projector in a quantity large enough to satisfy all
film account customers who possess AS-2 projectors and/or will
receive AS-2 projectors under the Closed Loop Program.

2. AN/PRC-25 Radios

a. Observation: Closed Loop replacement of AN/PRC-25 family
radio is extremely slow.

b. Evaluation: The RT-505 and RT-841 receiver-transmitter for
the AN/PRC-25 family radios were declared to be closed loop items
as of 1 May 1969. Under the closed loop program, unserviceable
items that are nonrepairable at the DS level are turned in through
maintenance channels and a replacement serviceable item is issued
in exchange. As of 4 July 1969, 31 each RT-505's and 4 each RT-841's
have been turned in for closed loop replacement. Of this quantity,
27 each RT-505's (87.1%) and 4 each RT-841's (100%) have been turned
in for a period of 30 days or longer and 12 each RT-505's (38.7%)
and 4 each RT-841's (100%) have been turned in for an excess of
60 days. This is too long a period between turn-in and replacement
for a critical item and for a program that is designed to maintain
a high degree of unit readiness by replacing unserviceable items rapidly.

c. Recommendation: Recommend that adequate assets be obtained
to provide closed loop support for an item before the item is declared
a part of the closed loop support program.
3. Controlled Cannibalization

a. Observation: Division units do not benefit from unserviceable material as a source of serviceable repair parts through a controlled cannibalization point.

b. Evaluation: The 1st Corps CC&S Activity is located in Da Nang. Transportation to move material is either through Navy facilities or by truck convoy. Movement by either of the two means is time consuming and costly to the government. An attempt has been made to keep unserviceable material on hand to insure the availability of serviceable subassemblies and non-supply items; however, lack of available storage space and lack of demands causes the material to be shipped with serviceable items and non-supply items intact.

c. Recommendation: Recommend that 1st Corps establish a CC&S Activity in the Northern 1st Corps. Also it is recommended that 1st Corps establish a Controlled Cannibalization Point in the Northern 1st Corps area. This would provide all units with an activity to procure hard-to-get items and non-supply items peculiar to equipment in this area. A CC&S Activity in the Northern 1st Corps area would save valuable man hours and reduce the cost of preparation, transportation, shipment and turn-in of materiel.

J. (U) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS:

None

K. (U) SAFETY:

1. Observation: The 158th Assault Helicopter Battalion has had seven major accidents at Pinnacle LZ's and three major accidents in confined areas.

2. Evaluation: Gross weight was the primary factor in four of these major accidents. Predeployment training in these areas was inadequate. In-country check rides did not include operating into and out of confined or Pinnacle areas.

3. Recommendation: Ninety-day proficiency check rides must include Pinnacle approaches. Designated secure pinnacles are available in the Camp Eagle vicinity. Confined area practice may be obtained by using a bit of imagination in an open area with a tree row or cluster making the approach over the trees and a takeoff over the trees. A hovering descent into a confined area can be practiced in the same sort of area by using two trees a safe distance apart. Emphasis must be constantly placed on proper supervision of loading by air crews.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Airborne Division
(Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 July 1979, ESC CEPOD-6: III. 3.

III. Section 3. Department of the Army Survey Information: None.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 101st Airborne Division (AM) for Period Ending 31 July 1969, ACS CPUPM-65 (KU)(V)

DA, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, APO SF 96308 10 SEP 1969

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, APO SF 96375

1. The ORRL of the 101st Airborne Division (AM) has been reviewed at HQ, XXIV Corps and is forwarded in accordance with USARV Reg 525-15.

2. Except as noted below, Concur with Commander's observations, evaluations and recommendations.

   a. Reference item concerning Course of Instruction for Engineer Equipment Repairman, section II, page 48, paragraph Cl; Concur. Recommend USARV provide and in-country school for instruction and practical exercise in maintenance of selected engineer equipment; or, establish a technical assistance team to visit requesting units and provide 2-3 day instruction in trouble shooting the particular makes and models of engineer equipment on hand in the unit.

   b. Reference item concerning Employment of 105mm Tactical CS Cartridge, XM629, section II, page 49, paragraph D2; Nonconcur. A battery of 105mm howitzers firing at a maximum rate of fire for 2 minutes would place 120 rounds of CS or 480 CS canisters on a target. Considering the amount of CS contained in each canister, approximately .8 pounds, this procedure would over-saturate the target. Experience has shown that the procedures outlined in paragraph 2C, page II of FT 105-H-6, PROV SUPP 1, November 1967, are effective for employment of Cartridge, Tactical CS, XM629. The 105mm CS round can be fired with a point detonating fuze setting, thereby permitting adjustment of the round closer to friendly troops without endangering these troops. However, the 105mm CS cartridge is designed to operate so that the round function point is above the terrain and short of the target thereby allowing the CS canisters to fall on the target and achieve desired area coverage.

   c. Reference item concerning Damage to Air Items, section II, page 52, paragraph F2; Concur. The use of pits for smoke grenades would not only preclude the burning of air items but would also prevent grass and brush fires in the LZ. It is recommended that the information contained in the observation, evaluation and recommendation be disseminated to all units.

   d. Reference item concerning Radio Interference, section II, page 53, paragraph H3; Concur with one change. Delete AS-2169/G (L-P) and substitute AS-2236/GRC. Coordination with originator revealed the antenna in question is the AS-2236/GRC which is primarily used by USMC units in Vietnam. This antenna is highly directional and provides increased gain as opposed to other antennas associated with the RT 524 or PRC 25.
SITUATION REPORT 161ST AIRBORNE DIVISION (M) FOR PERIOD ENDING 31 JULY 1969, RCS C0608-65 (U)

e. Reference item concerning Controlled Cannibalization, section II, page 56, paragraph 13; Nonconcur. Direct and General support units (GSU's/GSU's) currently have limited authority under UCMJ Reg 750-50, subject: Maintenance of Supplies and Equipment, to remove items from uneconomically repairable equipment prior to evacuation to cannibalization points in order to remove essential equipment from deadline.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. D. PECCO
MAJ, AGC
ASST AG
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile).

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (C) Reference item concerning "Sapper Attacks", section II, page 47, paragraph B3; concur. The increased incidence of sapper attacks and the conversion of some NVA to sapper organizations has stimulated a search for effective countermeasures by US Forces. The requirement to train personnel bound for Vietnam in sapper tactics was recognized by USCONARC during a Liaison Team Visit in June 1969.

b. (U) Reference item concerning "Course of Instruction for Engineer Equipment Repairman", section II, page 48, paragraph C1; concur. This recommendation is being considered in a current evaluation of in-country training requirements.

c. (C) Reference item concerning "Chemical", section II, page 49, paragraph 2D; nonconcur. Each system has advantages and disadvantages when compared with each other. Both systems are suitable for attacking point targets. The choice of systems should be left to the discretion of the local commander.

d. (U) Reference item concerning "Labeling of Crates at Depots", section II, page 51, paragraph F1; concur. Normal depot procedures call for changing the markings when the original quantity marked on the crate is changed or when a container is re-used to ship other than the original contents. One copy of the DD Form 1348 is stapled in a heavy plastic envelope on the outside of the container, and the remaining copies placed inside the container. A reminder will be published in the October 1969 USARV Commander's Notes.
AVHGC-DST (20 Aug 69) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

   e. (U) Reference item concerning "Use of AN/MRC-68 VHF Terminal with the AN/GRC-163 VHF Terminal", section II, page 54, paragraph H4. This headquarters is not able to concur based upon the information available. An ECOM representative has been scheduled to visit the Division to further investigate the recommendation.

   f. (U) Reference item concerning "Movie Projectors," section II, page 54, paragraph I1; concur. Twelve hundred Cine lenses and attachments are presently on requisition from CONUS for holders of the AS-2 projector. The unit should insure that requisitions are current so that there is no delay in issue when items are received.

   g. (U) Reference item concerning "Safety", section II, page 56, paragraph 2K; concur. USARV Supplement 1 to AR 95-4, which governs the Flight Standardization Program, lists those items which must be included in the 90-day proficiency check ride. Commanders are encouraged to add training requirements to adapt the check ride listing to local conditions.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
C.B. Wilson
LT, A
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
101st Abn Div (AM)
XXIV Corps
GPOP-111 (20 Aug 69) 3d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 30Oct 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
CONFIDENTIAL

Inclomwe

Incl 1 (Task Organization) to CEBL, 101st Airborne Division
for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS GPOM-65 (R1) (U)

1st Brigade, 101st Abn Div
(OPCON Americal Div)

HHC 1st Bde
1-501 Inf
1-502 Inf
2-326 Arty (-) (DS)
A/326 Engr (-) (DS)
PSYX (Psd Surv Spt Ele)

A/326 Med
B/801 Maint
1/4/126 SPS
1/265 REC
1/101 MP Co
PST/A/501 Sig
TACP 2D TASS
A2 Inf Flat (Scout Dog)
557 Inf Flat (Cbt Trackers)
Team 101 MI Det
A/101 ABS
B/2-17 Cav

3d Brigade, 101st Abn Div

HHC 3d Bde
1-506 Inf
2-506 Inf (OPCON 2d Bde)
3-187 Inf
2-319 Arty (DS)
B Co (-) 326 Engr (DS)

PSYX
C/326 Med
D/801 Maint
3/4/126 SPS
3/265 REC
3/101 MP Co
58 Inf Flat (Scout Dog)
Team 101 MI Det
PST/A/501 Sig
TACP 2D TASS
25 PI Det
3-5 Cav (-) (OPCON)
C/2-34 Armor (OPCOM)

2d Brigade, 101st Abn Div

HHC 2d Bde
2-327 Inf
1-327 Inf
2-501 Inf
2-502 Inf
1-321 Arty (DS)
C/326 Engr (DS)

PSYX

B/326 Med
C/801 Maint
2/4/126 SPS
2/265 REC
2/101 MP Co
47 Inf Flat (Scout Dog)
Team 101 MI Det
PST/A/501 Sig
TACP 2D TASS
24 PI Det

160th Aviation Group

HHC 160 Avn Op
101 ABS (-)
158 ABS
159 ASHB
163 Avn Co
478 Avn Co (-) (CH-54A)
359 Avn Sup Det
352 Trans Det
273 Trans Det
159 Trans Det
169 Trans Det
625 Trans Det
327 Trans Det
499 Trans Det
510 Trans Det
516 Trans Det
527 Trans Det
530 Trans Det
649 Trans Det
168 Trans Det

Incl 1

CONFIDENTIAL
Inclosure 1 (Task Organization) to OMLL, 101st Airborne Division
for Period Ending 31 July 1969, OCR RFD-65 (RL) (U)

Division Artillery
HHB 101st Abn Div Arty
A/-77 Arty (ARA)
A, B/2-94 Arty
1 Bn 83 Arty (OSR)
A/6-33 Arty (OSR)
B/6-33 Arty (OSR)
A/1-40 Arty (OSR)
2-138 Arty (155 SP) (GS)
A Btry (Amm) 377 Arty
331 Trans Det
265 Trans Det
388 Trans Det
266 Fld Arty Det (Radar)
650 Trans Det (Acft Maint)

Division Support Command
HHC and Band
801 Maint Bn (-)
67 Maint Co (GS)
426 S&S Bn (-)
SCOF (-) 501 Sig Bn
326 Xed Bn (-)
5 Trans Det (Acmt Maint)

Task Force 3-506
(OPCON I FFV Phan Thiet)
D/2-320 Arty (DS)
Flt/HQ/326 Engr
3-506 MT Det (Prov)

Division Troops
HHB 101 Abn Div
2-17 Air Cav
L Co 75 Inf (ranger) (Attached)
332 Trans Det
333 Trans Det
507 Trans Det
326 Engr Bn (-)
501 Sig Bn (-)
101 KP Co (-)
265 ERC (-)
10 Cal Flat
20 Cal Det
22 Mil Hist Det
Det 16, Sub Unit 1, 1st ANGLICO
101 MT Det (-)
4th Det, 7 Payop Bn
7 Flt, 29 CA Co (GS)
101 Post Exchange Det
27 Engr Bn 45 Op (GS)
Operation Location 6
5th Weather Det
Flt/D/1-44 Arty (MSF) (GS)
Sec/C/29 Arty (Searchlight) (GS)
Sec/C/65 Arty (Quad 50) (GS)
### Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 101st Airborne Division

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May 69 to 31 July 69.

**CC, 101st Airborne Division**

**REPORT DATE**
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**SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES**
N/A