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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96257

AVIC-WE

15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report - Operation ATLAS WEDGE

SEE DISTRIBUTION:

Transmitted herewith is the Combat Operations After Action Report - ATLAS WEDGE, a reconnaissance in force operation conducted by the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment(-), OPCON to the 1st Infantry Division, during the period 17 - 24 March 1969.

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1. REFERENCES: 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment FRAGO 105 (201300H Mar 69) and FRAGO 106 (221200H Mar 69) to OPCORD 4-68 (Operation TOAN THANG, Phase III). There were no written orders from either the 1st Infantry Division or II Field Force, Vietnam.

2. NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION:
   a. Operation ATLAS WEDGE.
   b. Reconnaissance in Force.


4. LOCATION: Northern Michelin Rubber Plantation to TINH THANG CIDG Camp (XT5351 - XT5153 - XT6367 - XT6565).

5. CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division.

6. GENERAL:
   a. Purpose of Operation: To interdict the southerly movement of the 7th NVA Division towards SAIGON.
   b. Pertinent or unusual aspects of the Operation:
      (1) The unexpected posture of the NVA within the Michelin.
      (2) The marriage of Tac Air, Army aviation, armor, and infantry.
      (3) Operation ATLAS WEDGE was the first operation within the limits of the Michelin Plantation which employed massive firepower.
   c. Task Organization Outline: See ANNEX A.

7. INTELLIGENCE:
   a. Anticipated Enemy Situation: II Field Force intelligence sources indicated that the 7th NVA Division was infiltrating southward from the LOC NINH Area through the Michelin Rubber Plantation toward SAIGON. The 7th NVA Division consisted of three regiments, the 141st, the 165th, and the 320th. Each regiment had an estimated strength of 1,200 men, and the strength of the 7th NVA Division was placed at 5,000. It was believed that at least one regiment was located near the Michelin and that the other units were north of the Michelin Area along the infiltration corridor from Cambodia. There was little intelligence information available on the Michelin.
   b. Enemy Capabilities: The 7th NVA Division was believed to have the capability to engage 1st Infantry Division units along the SAIGON Corridor and to mount a major offensive drive on SAIGON with the support of other enemy units.
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c. Logistics: It was believed that the division was fully equipped and would have supply caches along its route toward SAIGON. Elements of the division would secure routes of supply and withdrawal.

d. Terrain and Weather: Terrain in the DAU TIENG Area consists of thick jungle interdicted by several streams running generally north to south. The Michelin is a typical rubber area, but in the long duration since cessation of full-time operation low ground vegetation had grown up among the trees.

The weather was typical of the dry season with temperatures in the 90's and no precipitation for the duration of the operation. Flying conditions remained excellent with almost unlimited visibility throughout the daylight hours. The dry March weather also favored armored mobility.

e. Enemy Disposition and Tactics: Enemy regimental and battalion commanders normally reconnoiter the objective prior to a large scale attack. Following the reconnaissance, approximately one month is used to rehearse and train. Involved units will then move to a staging area and select locations for regrouping and withdrawal. Covert penetration to neutralize key defenses, harassing indirect fire, and severing routes of reinforcement usually precede battalion-size attacks.

f. Enemy Reaction and Summary of Important Enemy Contacts:

(1) The large body of enemy troops in the Michelin were wholly unprepared for air or ground attack on 17 March 1969, the first day of contact. Air Cavalry Troop Scouts observed large groups of NVA troops in the rubber. They made little effort to hide from Allied observation. Air Cavalry Troop strikes represented the first hostile fire received by the enemy in the Michelin Plantation. During the remainder of the operation, enemy forces attempted to avoid aerial observation.

Enemy forces in the Michelin Area withdraw north and northeast from the Michelin between 17 and 21 March. A FW from the 320th Regiment stated that his unit left the Michelin on 21 March because of Allied operations in the plantation. Information provided by FW's indicated that the 141st left the Michelin on 17 March and moved north.

(2) Major Engagements:

(a) On 17 Mar, Air Cavalry Troop (ACT) received ground fire from an estimated two company enemy force at XT585641. The fire was returned and the Air, artillery, and light fireteams (LFT's) supported. Visual reconnaissance (VR) of the area revealed 30 NVA KBA (BC), 10 bicycles, 6 tons of rice, and 15 50-lb packs.

(b) On 18 Mar, 1st and 3rd Squadrons entered a large bunker complex on the eastern edge of the Michelin Rubber Plantation. The series of contacts began at 1600 hours and continued until 1800 hours. The results of the engagement are as follows:
The five prisoners were identified as members of C18 (Anti-Aircraft Co), 320th NVA Regiment.

(c) 191810, XT553524: B/1/11th ACR received SA/AW fire from an unk size NVA force. The enemy was engaged and LFT supported. Results: 20 NVA KIA (BC), 1 NVA PW, and 1 AK-47; 1 RPG-7 RL's, 1 RPG-2 RL, and 1 R-41 rd CIA.

(d) 191845, XT575558: CIDG Co (3rd Squadron) engaged unk size NVA force. L and M/3/11th ACR reinforced and LFT and SPOOKY supported, resulting in 13 NVA KIA (BC) and 1 VC PW.

(e) 201132, XT591580: The ARP's engaged an estimated company size force while conducting BDA. M and L/3/11th ACR and 1-5th Cav reinforced and LFT and Tac Air supported. Results: 2 US KHA and 20 US WHA. The area was swept the following morning and 70 NVA KIA (BC), 24 AK-47's, 4 AK-50's, 20 SKS's, 80 bunkers, and 10 lbs of documents were found. The bunkers were destroyed and all other items were evacuated.

(f) 211122, XT849503: B/2/28th Inf found a cache consisting of 32 AK-47's, 22 back packs, personal gear, 29 RPG-2 rds, 6,000 rds AK-47 ammunition, 50 blasting caps, 3,200 rds 7.62mm ammunition, 1,300 rds .50-cal ammunition, 8 82mm mortar rds, and 1 case C-3 explosive. All items were evacuated.

(g) 221430, XT600620: C/1/11th ACR engaged an unknown number of NVA in an area that ACT spotted 10 NVA. D/2/28th Inf reinforced. Results: 8 NVA KIA (BC), 1 NVA PW (WIA, later died), and 3 US WHA (2 C/1/11th ACR and 1 D/2/28th Inf).

8. Conclusions: Allied operations pre-empted the southward infiltration of the 7th NVA Division. It appears that the 141st and 320th NVA Regiments are now reassessing their positions.

8. Concept of the Operation: Operation ATL'S WEDGE, a three division (1st Inf Div, 1st Cav Div (AM), and 25th Inf Div) operation, was conceived to destroy a strong enemy buildup in the vicinity of the Michelin Plantation.
The 11th ACR was responsible for reconnaissance in force missions with two squadrons abreast in the Michelin and conducting B-52 BDA's with one squadron while the other squadron searched and cleared the Michelin.

9. EXECUTION:

a. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment received warning orders on 15 March, and, following a II Field Force planning conference on 16 March, received final orders for participation in Operation ATLAS WEDGE. These orders included an AO, objective areas, and the expected commitment of forces, which at this time included one armored cavalry squadron and one infantry battalion. The AO included none of the Michelin Plantation.

b. 17 March 1969: Four OH-6A HH's and the Air Cavalry Troop command and control ship (UH-1H) began their initial reconnaissance of the Regimental AO on the afternoon of 17 March. It soon became evident that the area was being occupied by a large enemy force. Large groups of North Vietnamese Army forces were seen through the rubber trees. ACT aircraft received heavy ground fire via XT5953 as they skirted the Michelin and clearance to fire was requested. While waiting for clearance, every LOH, the C&C ship, and even the FAC's flying at high altitude continued to sight large bodies of enemy troops. The enemy made little or no attempt to hide from the helicopters.

After a ninety minute delay, the ACT was given clearance to engage the enemy based on the 1st Division rules of engagement (return fire if fired upon, but in no case commit troops to any contact developed). The ground fire was engaged with LOH and Cobra gunship aircraft.

Additional heavy ground fire was received from within the NE Michelin and permission was requested to place the Air on these anti-aircraft positions. After a two and one-half hour delay, permission was granted, and, throughout the remainder of the day, the Air Cavalry Troop Commander directed Tac air-strikes against the enemy. Two cobs remained on station throughout the day and made repeated strikes against the enemy locations. One LOH was damaged by ground fire and flew to LAI KHE for repairs. The three remaining LOH's continued to fly low level reconnaissance missions and to engage groups of enemy soldiers on numerous occasions. A total of nine air-strikes were placed in the NE Michelin. The air-strikes and Army aviation accounted for a confirmed 30 KBA (BC), 10 bicycles, 6 tons of rice, and 15 50-lb packs.

Based on the day's action, the requests for AO extensions in the Michelin and a new task organization of two armored cavalry squadrons were approved, and 1st and 3rd Squadrons were alerted for movement into the Michelin.

c. 18 March 1969: The Air Cavalry Troop employed five LOH's, one C&C ship, and two cobs at first light in an attempt to re-establish contact with the enemy. Early indications suggested that the majority of the main force units that were present the previous day had departed the area. Several
squad-sized elements were discovered by the LOH's and engaged by the cobras. One scout ship was damaged by ground fire and its observer wounded. Later in the day, an anti-aircraft position was located by the LOH's and neutralized by Tac airstrikes directed by the Troop Commander.

Combat maneuver elements of the 1st Squadron, consisting of B, C, and D Troops, moved west from FSB HOLIDAY INN and Hwy 13 along the "great swath", a large Home Plow cut leading form Hwy 13 to the Michelin. 3rd Squadron departed AO BOOTS at 0500 and conducted a road march west along ROUTE ZINC to Hwy 13, running into the tail end of the 1st Squadron which was beginning the march southwest from XT793546 to the Michelin. The order of March was H/2/11th ACR (OPCON 3rd Squadron), M and L/3/11th ACR, and the Squadron Jump CP. 3rd Squadron arrived at XT793546 by 0730.

Three "choke points" along the cross-country route into the Michelin, where the road could not be paralleled showed the Regimental (-) movement. A/2/28th Inf and two sweep teams from the 919th Engineers were air assaulted into those areas. At each of the locations, mine detectors checked out the culvert sites and route from the side of the road to the culverts. A ford was checked for mines at XT615523 and the AVLB site was also swept. No mines were found. The Squadrons had been prepared to use AVLB's at the choke points, but none were required as the engineer sweep teams were able to clear a path across the critical areas along the existing road.

As each Squadron passed through each "choke point", an element of A/2/28th Inf at the point passed OPCON to the Squadron. When 1st Squadron crossed the final "choke point" at XT615522, A/2/28th Inf fell back into an area via XT617521 and established FSB DOC.

Simultaneously with the slow, uneventful move of the two Squadrons, How/1/11th ACR moved from FSB HOLIDAY INN (XT909335) to FSB THUNDER II (XT783557) to provide fire support and HHT/3/11th ACR cleared NDP BANDIT HILL in TAN BINH Village (XT862362), turned control of AO BOOTS over to TF 2-28th Inf, and began its road march by 1000 hours. HHT/3/11th ACR arrived at its new CP (XT790545) and the Squadron TOC was operating by 1335. By late afternoon, 1st Squadron had deployed its two AVLB's (XT617521 and XT604515) and, proceeding across them, assumed the southwest portion of the AO. 3rd Squadron proceeded across the first AVLB and headed toward the northwest. H/2/11th ACR proceeded along the east flank of the Squadron AO into a heavily wooded area (XT598326) which slowed its progress. H/3/11th ACR, followed by L/3/11th ACR, moved parallel but to the west of H/2/11th ACR and found movement less difficult. The Squadron Commander, "overhead in a CIC ship," directed the ground elements.

Two white teams (4 OH-6A's) were dispatched to aid the control of friendly ground elements. The remaining LOH directed airstrikes to the west of the ground elements. A pink team (one OH-6A and one AH-1G) in support of the 3rd Squadron located an active base camp (BCI) and H/3/11th ACR continued...
movement in its direction. L/3/11th ACR, following closely behind M/3/11th
ACR, was maneuvered by the Squadron Commander to a potential crossing point
across a marshy streamline to redeploy against another base camp (BC2)
discovered earlier by the pink team.

At 1600 hours, two platoons of M/3/11th ACR established contact and engaged
an unknown size enemy force via BC1, killing 2 NVA. The Squadron Commander
immediately called for lift support and two platoons A/1-5th Cav were
lifted from their RON position to an LZ via XT579538. M/3/11th ACR contin-
ued its attack, gaining the first infantry platoon, and moved into BC4.
H/2/11th ACR broke out of the heavily wooded area and, following the same
route, reached the LZ where the second air-inserted platoon of A/1-5th Cav
became PCON. L/3/11th ACR continued to move toward BC2 from the east. At
the included crossing site of the north/south stream to the east of BC2,
L/3/11th ACR engaged a small NVA element via XT575538. The marshy ground
along the stream prevented crossing and the Squadron Commander moved the
Troop further north to find another suitable crossing site.

The Aero Scouts found another active base camp via BC3. Tm H swept between
BC1 and BC4 on into BC3 and immediately came under heavy RPG and AW fire.
During the twenty minute firefight, two tanks were hit by RPG's, one catching
fire and becoming a combat loss. Although 4 US Troopers were wounded, 6 NVA
KIA's were found along with 1 RPG-7 launcher and 1 AK-47. An LZ was
cleared several hundred meters northwest of BC3 to evacuate the wounded.

L Troop continued north. About 1700, it reached a crossing point and turned
west. As L/3/11th ACR crossed the stream, it encountered extremely heavy
RPG fire; due to the lack of clear fields of fire, however, most of the
rounds exploded in the trees. The Troop Commander maneuvered one of his
platoons to the north so as to envelop the enemy from a second direction.
In the process, two troopers from the initial platoon sustained wounds and
several ACAV's were ordered back to the east to clear an LZ so that they
could be evacuated.

The intensity of fire increased as the dustoff arrived. Both platoons were
receiving dense fire and 10 more casualties were sustained, one a platoon
leader who was BC1 at the hospital in LAI KHE. As darkness fell, the
intensity of contact subsided enough for L/3/11th ACR to identify 6 NVA KIA
(BC), but a complete sweep of the area was not possible until morning.
L Troop pulled back to its LZ after completing all its dustoffs and estab-
lished an NDP.

By 1810 hours, Tm H's sweep had resulted in 34 KIA's and 5 PW's. The aggres-
siveness of Tm H's initial contact was responsible for the fact that there
was only one casualty who was evacuated early in the firefight and no
equipment or vehicle losses. The five PW's were identified as members of C18
(anti-aircraft Co), 320th NVA Regiment. As darkness fell, Tm H pulled back
to its LZ and set up an NDP.
D and B/1/11th ACR established contact at 1600 hours just inside the Michelin Plantation (XT588508), receiving SK and RPG fire from the north. They returned fire and continued to push in a wedge formation with D/1/11th in the lead and B and C/1/11th ACR on the left and right respectively along the western AO border. The formation then oriented on the NVA to the north and continued the push. During the contact vic XT600510, there were 21 NVA KIA's by D Company, 1 NVA KIA by C Troop, and 1 NVA KIA by B Troop. Friendly losses were 1 US KIA and 3 US WIA.

The CIDG Company from MINH THUNH (XT630663), which was OPCON to Air Cavalry Troop and had been working east of the Michelin vic XT5956, moved back into the rubber to RON. As the CIDG cleared the jungle, OPCON passed to 3rd Squad... because ACT could not provide C&C during the hours of darkness. At 1700 hours, the CIDG Company encountered and engaged an unknown size enemy force, killing 2 NVA while sustaining 7 casualties. The CIDG Company proceeded to XT585567 where it established its NDP.

4. 19 March 1969: Darkness precluded total accounting of results of the sweeps on 18 March. Renewed sweeps the next morning found many blood trails and drag marks which substantiated estimates that the action had been considerably more successful than the total bodies and weapons/equipment found would indicate. Progress was slow throughout the day because of extensive bunker complexes found by all elements. These complexes demanded caution and thorough search techniques as well as time-consuming destruction.

The Air Cavalry Troop provided a white team (two OH-6A's) for each squadron as well as a Cobra fireteam and the Troop Commander's ship on station. The Squadrons, while making sporadic contact with RPG teams and platoon-size elements throughout the day, were led from base camp to base camp by the white teams overhead. The enemy's stay-behind force was fighting a harassing and delaying action without allowing himself to become decisively engaged. During the course of the day, two LOH's were damaged by ground fire and one observer slightly wounded. Numerous Tac Air and Cobra strikes were used in support of friendly troops.

1st Squadron assumed operational control over D/2-28th Inf which was airlifted in, resupplied and pushed through another base camp area. During this action, B/1/11th ACR wounded and captured an NVA 15G who was evacuated to the Regimental CP at LAI KHE. Later in the day, B/1/11th ACR encountered SA fire at XT553521. They pushed through the resistance, killing 20 NVA and capturing an NVA officer. RON locations for the night of 19 March were: B/1/11th ACR (XT549533); D/1/11th ACR (XT573523); and D/2-28th Inf was split evenly between the above elements.

3rd Squadron shifted its forces to strengthen each element. L/3/11th ACR sent a platoon north to A/1-5th Cav(-) as well as a platoon to 7m H. In exchange, 7m H released a platoon of tanks (only three as two had been hit
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during the 18 March firefight, to L/3/11t ACT, giving the reconnaissance troop the firepower which it had lacked the previous day.

Upon completion of the realignment of forces, the sweeps were renewed in earnest. Each RIF element employed reconnaissance by fire and other techniques hoping to make contact with the enemy. The CIDG returned to OPCON ACT and again departed the rubber into an area east of the Michelin via XT5957.

At 1045, Troop H received sporadic small arms fire and returned fire, but could not maintain the contact. A sweep of the area resulted in 1 NVA KIA. There were no US casualties.

At 1126 hours, Troop H received SA and the fire and a rocket attack on the firebase could not maintain the contact. A sweep of the contact area via XT594545 resulted in 3 AK-47s, 2 RPG-2 RLs, 10 RPG-2 rds, 9 Chicoms grenades, 1 US grenade, and assorted web gear.

At 1155 hours, elements of A/2-28th Inf tasked with security for the AVLB's received several RPG rounds via XT564515. The volume of return fire silenced the enemy, but the infantry unit's strength, mission, and lack of mobility precluded its sweeping the area. Aerial VR could not generate further contact or identify any results of the return fire.

RIF's continued and many bunkers, most of which were relatively new, were discovered and destroyed without further contact. At 1200 hours, the 3rd Squadron S-2 and the Regimental Intelligence Officer (CO, 541st ?ID) drew heavy machinegun fire from several .51-cal machineguns located via XT554586, while conducting an aerial VR along the edges of the Michelin. The aircraft applied evasive tactics and returned fire as it evacuated the area.

At 1500 hours, the Regimental Commander moved 3rd Squadron elements north out of the rubber to BUICK from which the Squadron would initially form a blocking force to cover planned B-52 strikes to be conducted that night. 1st Squadron was moved into the 3rd Squadron AO and assumed responsibility for FSB DOC.

Although forces were well positioned for the redeployment, resupply requirements slowed immediate repositioning, because the train's areas remained in the previous AO's. The RIF missions were terminated and all troops moved to their resupply points. As each arrived at their resupply points, vehicles were refueled, maintenance checks performed, and personnel fed. When resupply was completed, the units moved toward their new objective areas.

ACT returned the CIDG Co to 3rd Squadron OPCON for the night, leaving it via XT564565 where 3rd Squadron would pick it up during the northward move toward BUICK. A SPOOKY was called in to support the 3rd Squadron's move north, because it would be long after dark before all elements would reach BUICK. The CIDG continued moving north until the mounted elements would catch up with them.
At 1845 hours, as the CIDG Co moved north via XT563569, they reported seeing a relatively good-sized group of NVA moving south toward them via XT562572. The CIDG established a hasty ambush with fireteam support orbiting 2 km to the south. At 1915 hours, the ambush was sprung and the CIDG Co killed 3 NVA, capturing their weapons and equipment. Contact was established and maintained while supporting elements piled-on. TM Y and TM L deployed on line and began to sweep north. Although the sweep was conducted after dark with headlight and SPOTKY illumination, good pursuit accounted for 10 more NVA KIA and 1 NVA (WIA) CIA.

3rd Squadron continued their northward move, but at 2050 hours the march was halted abruptly. Intelligence gathered by Regiment dictated a different deployment and adjustments were to be forthcoming. Every unit was directed to hold in position for the night. 3rd Squadron elements and the CIDG Co formed a common NDP perimeter, and TM H returned to the resupply point to RON.

20 March 1969: During the night, intelligence information was disseminated necessitating the return of 1st Squadron to its previous AO to continue its westward and northwestward RIF through the rubber, and that 3rd Squadron would remain in its old AO and move southwest throughout the day. All elements had the mission of finding the enemy, generating an engagement, and destroying base camps found enroute.

There were three B-52 strikes to the northeast of the Ichelin early on the morning of 20 March. The Regiment was responsible for the BDA of the two western most boxes. At first light, a Cobra team, one white team, and the Aero Rifle Platoon began a BDA of the strike areas. Their initial BDA determined that the western most box was the most lucrative target. At 1132 hours, the ARP's and the 12th TM CIDG Co were inserted and several large base camps were discovered in the area. The ARP's were soon in heavy contact in an active base camp which had not been hit by the B-52 strikes the night before and were engaged and pinned down by intense fire, suffering several casualties. At 1426 hours, upon request of the ACT Commander, the 3rd Squadron Commander immediately moved TM A toward the ARP contact. Within minutes, he added a platoon of tanks from TM M, which, with a white element overhead, was directed to join Team A as soon as possible. The multi-reaction was rapid and the tank platoon caught TM A as it turned southward and passed them at this point in order to lead the reaction force down a trail to the BDA site. Multiple Cobra airstrikes covered the ARP's without further damage being sustained and LOI's provided medivac support until the arrival of TM A, now consisting of platoon each of tanks, ACAV's, and infantry.

Upon arrival of TM A in the BDA area, the Squadron Commander placed the reaction force OCPON ACT. The enemy base camp was located in a wooded area and the terrain around it was relatively clear of dense vegetation.

As the armored vehicles approached the ARP's, some of the ARP's were able
to reinforce Tm A. The tanks cut a swath around the woods, and Tm A began sweeping back and forth through the wooded area between the swath. On its first pass through the area, it came under intense small arms and RPG fire. The tank platoon leader's vehicle was the first target and, although a RPG splash caught the lieutenant in the face and blinded him, he continued the sweep. His tank, however, fell into a bomb crater, removing it from further action. Heavy RPG fire quickly knocked out three other tanks.

The remaining tank plus ACAV's and infantry made one more attack through a portion of the well fortified base camp. By this time, control among the elements on the ground had become critical. The remaining tank no longer had radio communication. Therefore, the Squadron Commander, who had replaced the ACM CO when he had to refuel, decided to take command for one final attack against the remaining hard core of the base camp. He positioned the tank in the center, flanked it with ACAV's, and placed the infantry on line to the rear. For control, he mounted the back deck of the tank and used hand signals to control the attack. Halfway through the base camp, the Squadron Commander was hit by fragments from an enemy hand grenade, but continued directing the operation. On the return sweep, the attacking force retraced its steps through the base camp past the two burning tanks which had already exploded and one which, though burning, had not yet exploded.

It was very late in the afternoon, and when enemy fire subsided, Tm A pulled back to the area it had been using as an LZ and prepared to RON for the night. Dustoff missions continued, the ARPs were extracted, the tank in the bomb crater was recovered, and the NDP was established in a tight and well-dug perimeter. There had been no enemy sighted fleeing the contact area.

Minor contacts elsewhere continued as late as 1900 hours when the remaining two tanks from 4/3/11th ACR engaged a NVA. The violent nature of the afternoon's contact made any appraisal of enemy losses impossible that night. As such, only two NVA KIA's were reported, although 73 more were found the next morning in the enemy bunkers. US losses were 2 KIA (1 ARP and 1 L Troop) and 20 WIA (only two seriously), all of whom were evacuated.

When the 3rd Squadron Commander joined the forces on the ground during the BEA, the Squadron S-3 assumed command of the other elements of the Squadron not involved in the contact and continued to accomplish the original OPLAN which called for an armoured resupply around 1600 hours, then movement of Tm H to join the CIDG Co at DODGE and finally the joining of Tm L and Tm M (now with only one tank platoon) via OLDS for the night.

There were no contacts during the afternoon involving the remainder of the Squadron. Tm L at 1515 hours, however, found an abandoned base camp at XT562545. Its search yielded 4,000 lbs rice, 50 82mm mortar rds, 1 120mm mortar tube and tripod, 44 120 mortar rds, 30 120mm grenades, 2 bicycles, 10 107mm rockets, 50 charges for 120mm mortar rds, and assorted gear and documents. At 1550 hours, Tm M located a base camp vic XT570540, Its
search yielded 3,000 lbs rice, 9 Chica. ground, 7 RPG-2 rds, 7 60mm mortars, and 1 12.7 HMG. As each team completed sweeping the base camp it was in, they started back to the resupply point about 1600 hours. Each team resupplied and headed back to the north.

Th H was the first to depart and headed to rendezvous via DODGE with the CIDG Co which had been led out of the B-52 BDA area by an ACT LOH. Shortly after Th H's departure north, Th M completed resupply and started north to bypass the same north/south stream, head south and eventually rendezvous with Th L at OLDS to RON in an ambush/blocking position for the night. Th L was late in returning to resupply due to the extensive base camp which they had found and destroyed. Th H passed Th M just north of the resupply point as it headed south and Th M headed out.

As Th M approached what was to become their night RON position about 1815 hours, they came under sporadic SA fire from the west across the stream, Th M returned fire and for about thirty minutes ripped up the area with AW fire. The NVA ceased fire and withdrew.

Th L resupplied and departed the supply point at 1830 hours and headed north to join Th M in the area of its just terminated contact and RON in that position. As darkness fell, a SPOOK was called in to support and DEFCON's were called in for adjustment to strengthen defense of the RON positions, especially in the Th A area of contact.

By 2045 hours, Th L rendezvoused with Th M and all aircraft had to depart the area due to a B-52 strike being placed several kilometers north of the Nichelin by the 1st Cav Div (AM). At 2100 hours via XT584555, Th H's AP3 spotted and engaged three to four NVA's moving to the west. SA and RPG fire was returned wounding one US trooper; one US trooper; one NVA was KIA (BC). Illumination by SPOOK resumed by 2143 hours of the Th H and Th L RDP. DEFCON adjustment continued and upon its completion, the situation remained uneventful for the remainder of the night.

At 000745 hrs, D/1/11th ACR moved out of its RON position to join B/1/11th ACR for a sweep of B Troop's contact area the night before. D Company and B Troop were joined by 1st Plt/919th Engineer Company and as they swept toward the west, the engineers destroyed previously located base camps. 1st Squadron RON positions for the night of 22 March were: B/1/11th ACR and one plt/D/2-28th Inf at XT526548 and C and D/1/11th ACR and D/2-28th Inf (-) at XT545357.

f. 21 March 1969: By early morning, the 11th ACR(-) had lost the southern half of its AO within the Nichelin and 1st Squadron moved into what had been 3rd Squadron's AO. 3rd Squadron pulled back to FSB DOC to stand-down for a day pending further developments. This exchange was expedited and 1st Squadron moved into the AO via one of the AVLB's secured by a plt/A/2-28th Inf and proceeded to FORD (XT5777). During the move, 1st

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Squadron received OPCON H/2/11th ACR(-), and the 11INH TH: NH CIDG Co was released from OPCON and were airlifted to their base camp. Early that afternoon, a squadron(-) laager was established at XT566570 for resupply.

Tm A, still OPCON to ACT, swept the previous day's contact area. Still configured with the two remaining tanks from M/3/11th ACR, the platoon of ACAV's from L/3/11th ACR, and its own platoon of infantry, Tm A conducted a systematic search of destruction of the base camp. By 0930 hours, the camp had been destroyed and the results yielded 75 KIA (BC), 24 AK-47 rifles, 4 AK-50 rifles, 20 SKS rifles, and 80 bunkers destroyed. Many destroyed bunkers from the previous day's activity still remained which were not dug up due to the extent of damage to them. In all probability, these bunkers would have yielded more bodies and weapons.

ACT aircraft led Tm A back to FSB DOC. Upon its arrival at FSB DOC, untasking was completed, returning all platforms to their parent headquarters. 3rd Squadron remained in this status until 23 March when it was alerted to depart the Michelin Area and return south to AO BOOTS.

Because of heavy battle damage, only three LOH's were available operation. A Cobra fireteam, the Troop Commander, and the remaining LOH's made a reconnaissance of the previous day's contact area and airstrikes were directed against the enemy fortifications. During the afternoon, all aircraft returned to BIEN HOA for a maintenance standdown. Tac Air and the ACT accounted for 4 KBA for the day.

At first light, two LOH's were sent northeast of the rubber plantation to develop areas for B-52 strikes. Because of the number of LOH aircraft available, two UH-1H's were sent into the area to fly in a scouting capacity. One of the LOH's spotted what appeared to be a group of NVA litter cases being evacuated from the area. C/1/11th ACR and one plat D/1/11th ACR, diverted in support of ACT operations, immediately moved into the area and a heavy contact ensued at 1430 hours. The tank platoon killed 2 NVA in a brief engagement at XT5957 and C/1/11th ACR established contact with an unknown size NVA force at XT6062, killing 8 NVA by 1500 hours.

Other 1st Squadron elements, who were pushing out of the northeast tip of the Michelin Plantation and moving along a trace to the northeast (XT590540 - XT590580) to sweep H/3/11th ACR's area of contact on 20 March, continued south to vic XT598577 where they found 14 NVA KBA. These elements, cutting their BDA short, turned around and oriented NNE to sweep through C/1/11th ACR(+)'s contact area and to the edge of the MINH THAN Plantation vic FOX (XT623647).

Aero Scouts of the ACT provided MEDIVAC support for the ground elements in contact and, with the increased firepower of an extra M-60 MG, screened the flanks of the contact to prevent enemy exfiltration from the area. Two LOH's and one UH-1H were damaged by ground fire, resulting in 1 KHA and 3 WHA. The result of the day's action was 34 NVA KIA/KBA and 3 NVA FW's.
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h. 23 March 1969: The ACT attempted to acquire targets in the area between the Michelin and the MINH THANH. C/1/11th ACR, GHOST to ACT, had light contact during the morning, and ACT was unsuccessful in generating targets. Later, all 1st Squadron elements resupplied and moved into blocking positions between the MINH THANH and Michelin plantations. At 1800 hours, the 1st Squadron established four larger ambush positions along the MINH THANH/Michelin Road in the following configuration: D/1/11th ACR at XT623644; H/2/11th ACR at XT590602; and B and C/1/11th ACR at XT607615 with AP's between the RON positions.

i. 24 - 25 March 1969: On 24 March, the 1st Squadron (+) moved out of their blocking positions and moved through the Michelin and then east along the "great swath" (XT794545 - XT614523) to a RON location via XT88552. At the same time, H/1/11th ACR extracted from FSB THUNDER II (XT783557) and moved to FSB HOLIDAY INN (XT909335). On 25 March, 1st Squadron moved to LAI KHE and combat elements moved to the IRON TRANGLE to conduct Operation OMEGA.

10. STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF ENEMY LOSSES:

a. Ground Elements:

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<th>19</th>
<th>20</th>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL KIA (BC)</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>12</td>
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b. Air Elements:

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<tr>
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<th>19</th>
<th>20</th>
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<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>77</td>
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<tr>
<td>KBA (POSS)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
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c. Total Enemy Losses: 335 NVA KIA (BC), 40 NVA KIA (POSS), and 11 NVA FW's and 77 individual weapons, 11 crew-served weapons, 10 107mm rockets, 1 120mm mortar, 159 mortar rounds, and 6 tons rice.

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11. **COMBAT SUPPORT:**

   a. Artillery:

   (1) The following units provided direct or general support during Operation ATLAS WEDGE:

   **DIRECT SUPPORT** | **GENERAL SUPPORT**
   --- | ---
   How/1/11th ACR (155mm) | A Co, 3rd Bn, 197th Arty (155mm)
   B Co, 8th Bn, 6th Arty (155mm) | B Co, 1st Bn, 7th Arty (105mm)
   D Co, 1st Bn, 5th Arty (105mm) | F Co, 8th Bn, 6th Arty (4.2-in)

   On 17 March, B/8-6th and D/1-5th Arty moved to FSB DOC (XT617521) to provide direct support to 1st and 3rd Squadrons during their RIF’s in and around the Michelin RubberPlantation. On 21 March, How/1/11th ACR moved to FSB THUNDER II (XT733558) to provide direct artillery support to the 3rd Squadron in their operations in the southeastern Michelin.

   All tubes remained in place for the duration of the operation. Coverage of the AO was adequate. Ground elements were never out of range of the 155mm Self-Propelled M-109’s.

   (2) Types of Missions: Artillery fired an aggressive intelligence target program in the northeast corner of the AO, accounting for 43% of the total rounds fired during the operation. The general support battery, A/3-197th Arty, took an active part in this phase. Although clearances within the Michelin were difficult to obtain, close support and contact missions fired from FSB DOC accounted for 45% of the total rounds expended during the operation.

   (3) Timeliness and Effectiveness: Due to bloc clearances from ARVN authorities, timeliness was satisfactory in most of the AO. No significant problems were encountered in coordinating clearances with other US commands.

   Artillery fire in the rubber and jungle was moderately effective. 155mm rounds with delay fuses penetrated the rubber canopy and jungle upper canopy, but was ineffective against bunkers and tunnels.

   (4) Now Techniques: None.

   b. Air Force:

   (1) O-1: The O-1 compiled 93.0 flying hours during Operation ATLAS WEDGE.

   **MISSION** | **# SORTIES**
   --- | ---
   FAC | 21
   Reconnaissance | 11
   TOTAL | 32
(2) Fighter Support:

(a) Missions:

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<tr>
<td>Pre-planned</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Immediate</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>88</td>
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(b) Sorties:

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<tr>
<td>Strike</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pre-planned</td>
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<tr>
<td>Immediate</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
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(3) Size and Composition of Forces:

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(4) Munitions Expended:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M-117</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-62</td>
<td>18C</td>
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<tr>
<td>Napalm</td>
<td>98</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBU-24 (Pods)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAU-3 Rkt (Pods)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>20mm Cannon</td>
<td>26,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) Bomb Damage Assessment: 48 KBA (BC), 57 KBA (POSS), 151 bunkers destroyed, 37 bunkers damaged, 121 bunkers uncovered, 8 secondary explosions, 6 structures destroyed, 300 meters of trenchline uncovered, 305 meters of trenchline destroyed, and 1,000 lbs of rice destroyed.

c. Chemical:

(1) On 17 March, 33rd Chemical Detachment personnel dropped 40 E-158 CS clusters in two sorties on enemy troops in bunkers and covered
areas to flush them into the open. Although the CS caused some movement into the open by enemy personnel in the drop area, the overall effect was not entirely satisfactory. Strong inversion conditions, particularly prevalent during the hours 1130 to 1330, caused the agent to rise and dissipate rather than stay in the area and diffuse.

(2) The Detachment provided one officer (the Detachment Commander) as OIC of the CP at BIEN HOA. This measure facilitated smoother control and communication with units of the Regiment.

d. Engineer:

(1) General: On 17 March, the Regimental Commander, S-3, and Engineer performed a detailed reconnaissance of the proposed AO. The route to the Michelin from FSB THUNDER II over the "great swath" was found to be suitable if a AVIB was emplaced at XT613521. Reconnaissance also determined that with minimal site preparation, the Michelin could be exited from the north or east. During the visual reconnaissance, extensive enemy activity was observed within the plantation.

On 18 March, the Regimental Engineer and two sweep elements were air assaulted onto the route west of FSB THUNDER II where the road could not be paralleled. At each of the four locations swept, mine detectors checked out the culvert sites and routes from the side of the road to the culverts. A ford was checked for mines at XT615523 and the AVIB site was also swept. No mines were found.

The 1st Squadron was accompanied by the tank and two engineer squads from the 1st Plt/979th Engr Co. The 3rd Squadron was supported by one squad of engineers. 1st Platoon was attached to D/1/11th ACR for most of the operation and aided that unit considerably for security and vehicle recovery. Upon termination of the operation, the 1st Platoon swept from the Michelin through FSB DOC to FSB THUNDER II.

The CEV joined the 2nd Platoon at FSB DOC on 20 March. They swept the road from FSB DOC to the Michelin daily during the operation to secure supply convoys. On the final day of the operation, the 2nd Platoon was air assaulted into FSB THUNDER II and swept the "great swath" back to FSB DOC at critical points to speed extraction. The CEV was used extensively as a dozer to clear fields of fire and to prepare the berms around FSB DOC.

(2) Problem Area:

(a) More detailed engineer support planning at Squadron level should precede future operations. Although attached to troops, engineer platoons were often denied adequate food and water rations, because insufficient provision was made for their requirements.
(b) Once again the 1½-ton cargo trailer has proved inadequate for tracked operations. One M548 tracked cargo carrier per platoon would ease this cross-country mobility problem.

(3) Evaluation:

(a) The combat air assault of engineer sweep teams to critical points along the "great swath" expedited the march to contact, allowing the Regiment to run up a good body count on the first day of the operation.

(b) Vehicle recovery operations were facilitated by the engineer tank and technical advice by the engineers.

12. COUNTER ACTION/PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE: None.

13. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT:

a. Logistical Support:

(1) General: The Regimental Trains, which consisted of the field trains of the 1st and 3rd Squadrons and a twenty-five man contact team from the 140th Heavy Maintenance Company, moved from BIEN HOA to LAI KHE in order to provide logistical support to units participating in Operation ATLAS WEDGE. All classes of supply except repair parts were furnished by 1st Infantry Division units based in LAI KHE.

Although maintenance support was adequate, recovery and evacuation capabilities were severely restricted. It is recommended that the contact team be expanded to include more recovery and evacuation capability in future operations of this type.

(2) Resupply: Class I, III, and V stockage objectives were increased to support the Regiment. Even with these increases, however, there were several instances where Regimental logistical vehicles had to wait for 1st Logistical Command convoys to reach LAI KHE.

As there was no land LOC, CH-47 aircraft accomplished all resupply to the combat elements. Approximately 35 sorties were flown each day to resupply organic and OPCON units. CH-47 assets were provided by II FFV Headquarters.

(3) Pertinent or Unusual Aspects of the Operation: Moving the Regimental logistical base from BIEN HOA to LAI KHE required both coordination with 1st Logistical Command, 29th General Support Group, and 1st Infantry Division and also re-evaluation of lines of logistical communication. Following the deployment, however, emphasis centered on the execution of the support plan. Control and allocation of resupply aircraft as well as maintenance assets were the two major areas of involvement.
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(4) Evaluation:

(a) The Regimental Trains is capable of moving with the combat elements and providing responsive support with little prior notice.

(b) Commanders at all levels must plan their resupply as thoroughly as they plan their tactical operations. On two occasions, the momentum of the attack was reduced to allow combat elements to resupply.

(c) Resupply must be staggered so that only one-third of the combat force is being resupplied at any one time. This process leaves the Commander with two-thirds of his force to continue combat operations.

b. Signel:

(1) Radio Nets and Telephone Circuitry:

(a) Radio Nets: FM radio nets were used in accordance with the current 11th ACR SOI with no special purpose nets created for Operation ATLAS WEDGE. An FM automatic retransmission/manual relay manned by Regimental Communications Platoons personal atop NUI CHAN (Hill 837 vic XUAN LOC), although not created for ATLAS WEDGE, found considerable use because of extended operating distances. AM-RATT communications were maintained between the CP Rear (BIEN HOA) and CP Forward at LAI KHE. In addition to operating as a Regimental Utility Net between Squadron Headquarters and Regimental Headquarters, the net relayed teletypewriter traffic received by the serving communications center at BIEN HOA (53rd Signal Battalion MSC-17) to the Forward CP. The 12th Signal Battalion, 1st Infantry Division, provided a 12 channel VHF radio system connecting the Regimental Rear CP at BIEN HOA and a 12 land line carrier system connecting the CP to the VHF complex at LAI KHE.

(b) Telephone circuits beyond normal intra-CP circuits were as follows:

1 Regimental CP (LAI KHE): Blackhorse Forward Switch - Danger Main (4 trunks); Blackhorse Forward Switch - Blackhorse Switch BIEN HOA (1 trunk); Blackhorse Forward Switch - Dynamite Switch (1 trunk); S-3 RTOC - G-3 RTOC (hot line); S-2 RTOC - G-2 RTOC (hot line); S-3 Air RTOC - G-2/3 Air RTOC (hot line); S-3 RTOC - Air Cav Trp Ops BIEN HOA (hot line); and S-3 RTOC - Regimental Command Group Operations BIEN HOA (hot line).

2 Regimental Rear BIEN HOA: Blackhorse Switch - Blackhorse Forward Switch; Blackhorse Switch - Danger Main (2 trunks); Blackhorse Switch - Hurricane TOC Switch (2 trunks); Blackhorse Switch - Plantation Switch (3 trunks); Blackhorse Switch - LONG GIAC Switch (2 trunks); Blackhorse Switch - Flame Switch (1 trunk).
Communications to Higher Headquarters: Communications to the 1st Infantry Division to which the Regiment was OPCON was accomplished by FM radio in both a secure and clear text mode and by telephone. Proximity to the 1st Infantry Division Communications Center enabled record traffic to be picked up by a Regimental motor messenger and returned to the Regimental CP. Because elements of the Regiment continued to perform missions OPCON to II FFORCEV (BHTAC) and CMAC, an AN/GRC-106 station was maintained on an on-call status in the II FFORCEV SSB Command Net, and telephone liaison was made as required through the trunking previously listed.

Communication to Subordinate and OPCON Headquarters: Contact was maintained through FM secure and non-secure radio facilities. In addition, organic squadrons maintained a duty hour/on call station in the Regimental Utility RATT Net. Communications to twins elements were made by FM radio and local telephone lines.

Special Equipment:

(a) An antenna mast AB-577, a telescoping antenna with a multiple ground plane antenna was used during the operation. The ease and speed of erection as well as the reduced cleared area requirement proved to be a major asset. Fewer constraints were imposed relative to CP placement by eliminating the need for time-consuming "gin-pole" antenna erection techniques and large cleared area requirements. An extender kit to increase the height of the antenna would definitely prove a necessity in heavily forested areas.

(b) Operation of the AN/GRC-163 radio system was also attempted during the operation. The conjunction with the system operation, a special test was conducted for Electronics Command (ECOM) representatives at USARV C-E. This test entailed the erection and evaluation of a telescoping mast, AB-864, in lieu of rather flimsy masts normally issued. In addition to being far sturdier, these antennas provided the same advantages enumerated in para (4) (a) above. Channel signalling difficulties (channel ringing has proved to be a weak performing sub-system) precluded operational use of the GRC-163 system; circuit quality, however, was excellent.

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION:

a. General: During the period 17 - 23 March, the Jump S-1 Section, consisting of one officer and one NCO, displaced to LAI KHE to provide liaison between the Forward Command Group at LAI KHE and the Regimental Adjutant at Blackhorse Forward in BIEN HOA. The Jump S-1 Section prepared all correspondence for the Command Group, reported daily personnel statuses to the command, made recommendations on assignments, and coordinated with G-1 and the Provost Marshall, 1st Infantry Division, on awards, visits, legal problems, and matters of uniform wear.
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b. Morale: Arrangements made with 2-2 Infantry permitted use of their officers' and EM clubs.

c. Law and Order: Coordination with 1st Infantry Division G-1 and Provost Marshall, pertaining to 11th ACR violations of 1st Division uniform regulations were settled to everyone's satisfaction. There were no disciplinary problems.

d. Casualties: 5 US KIA and 53 WIA. There were 3 WIA in other 11th ACR units not involved in the operation.
**CONFIDENTIAL**

**ANNEX A**

Task Organization Outline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>3rd Squadron</th>
<th>Regimental Control</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1st Squadron</strong></td>
<td><strong>3rd Squadron</strong></td>
<td><strong>Regimental Control</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Troop</td>
<td>L Troop</td>
<td>How/1/11th ACR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Troop</td>
<td>M Company(-)</td>
<td>B/8-6th Arty (DS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Company</td>
<td>H Company(-)</td>
<td>D/8-6th Arty(-) (DS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plat/3rd Engr Co</td>
<td>A/1-28th Cav</td>
<td>D/1-5th Arty (DS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A/2-28th Inf</td>
<td>ACT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flat/3rd Engr Co</td>
<td>MINH THANH CIDG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Add D/2-28th Inf to 1st Squadron.

| 21 March |

Delete H(-) and CIDG from 3rd Squadron and Regimental Control respectively. Add H(-) to 1st Squadron.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>22 March</th>
<th>1-4th Cav</th>
<th>Regimental Control</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1st Squadron</strong></td>
<td><strong>3rd Squadron</strong></td>
<td><strong>1-4th Cav</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Troop</td>
<td>L Troop</td>
<td>C/1-4th Cav</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Troop</td>
<td>M Company(-)</td>
<td>Plat/B/1-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Company</td>
<td>H Company(-)</td>
<td>A/1-28th Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H Company(-)</td>
<td></td>
<td>A/2-28th Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/2-28th Inf</td>
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</table>

On 22 March, 3rd Squadron moved back to AO MUSTANG.

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BLOWUP OF CIDG CO CONTACT AT XT57550 ON 191845H MAR 69 (TN'S L AND M REINFORCED, RESULTING IN 13 NVA KIA AND 1 PW)

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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Scdn CO landed to reorganize and direct second sweep of the hard core of the enemy base camp

Bomb Craters in which the ARP'S were pinned

Initial Swath

Tm A

Bomb Crater in which Platoon leader's tank fell

Initial Attack thru Base Camp

Hard Core of Base Camp

Final Assault

Tm A LZ/RON

WOODS

WOODS

ANNEX F
3-11 ACR - ATLAS WEDGE
Diagram of BDA Contact - 20 March 1969

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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ANNEX J

HQ, 11th Armd Cav Regt
LAI KHE (TX769382) RVN
201300H March 1969

FRAGO 105 to OPORD 4-68 (Operation TOAN THANG PHASE III) (U)

Task Org

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<tr>
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<th>Task Org</th>
<th>Task Org</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TF 1/11</td>
<td>TF 3/11</td>
<td>TF 2/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/11 Cav (–)</td>
<td>3/11 Cav (–)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>F/2/11 Cav</td>
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<tr>
<td>G/1/11 Cav</td>
<td>H/2/11 Cav (–)</td>
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<td>D/1/11 Cav</td>
<td>M/3/11 Cav (–)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/2-28 Inf</td>
<td>A/2-28 Inf</td>
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<td>Plat/919 Engr</td>
<td>Plat/919 Engr</td>
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<tr>
<td>TF MAXON (Base Camp Security)</td>
<td>TF 2-27 Inf (–)</td>
<td>Regt Con</td>
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<tr>
<td>G/2/11 Cav</td>
<td>B/2-28 Inf</td>
<td>Air Cav Trp</td>
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<tr>
<td>How/2/11 Cav</td>
<td>C/2-28 Inf</td>
<td>B-6 Arty DS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Plat/H/2/11 Cav</td>
<td>I/3/11 Cav</td>
<td>B/1-27 Arty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>K/3/11 Cav</td>
<td>F/6-6 Arty</td>
</tr>
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<td>Recon Plat/2-28 Inf</td>
<td>Recon Plat/919 Engr</td>
<td>B/8-16 Arty (155) DS</td>
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<td></td>
<td>A/1-16 Inf</td>
<td>D/1-5 Arty (105) DS</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Plat/K/3/11 Cav</td>
<td>Co MINH THANH CIDG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(OPCON ACT in daytime)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OPCON 3/11 at night</td>
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</table>

1. (C) SITUATION

b. Friendly Forces: No change.

2. (C) Mission: 11th ACR secures BLACKHORSE Base Camp; cont overwatch for
LONG BINH/BIEN HOA area; conducts RIF and NAP opns in AO MUSTANG; conducts
opns ATLAS WEDGE to destroy enemy in AO and prevent exfiltration towards SAIGON;
cont responsibility for defense of SONG BE Bridge, secures Engr work parties
along Routes 1 & 2; cont overwatch of 20th Engr Bde opns in XUAN LOC area;
places one Recon Trp w/Sheridans OPCON CMAC; places Sqdn (–) w/2 Recon Trps
OPCON BHTAC.

RANGED AS 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 15 YEARS.
080 25 2503.50

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FRAGO 105 to OPORD 4-68 (Operation TOAN THANH PHASE III) (U)

3. (C) EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations:

(1) Maneuver: 11th ACR continues RIF, NAP & C&S opns in BLACKHORSE AO with TF 3/11, TF 1/11, TF MAXON, TF 2-28 Inf and Regt Air Cav Trp; 2/11 Cav (-) w/2 Recon Trps OPCON BHTAC; one Recon Trp 1/11 Cav OPCON CHAC; TF MAXON cont overwatch of 20th Engr Bde opns in XUAN LOC area & security of BLACKHORSE Base Camp; TF 2-28 Inf cont responsibility for AO MUSTANG, ground, rocket and mortar defense of BIEN HOA/LONG BINH within AO, and defense of SONG BE Bridge; TF/11 Cav and 3/11 Cav conduct combined opn ATLAS WEDGE in sector; destroy enemy and prevent exfiltration from the Michelin area towards SAIGON.

(2) Fires: No change.

b. TF 1/11:

(1) Destroy enemy in zone.
(2) Be prepared to release OPCON one Recon Trp to TF 3/11 ACR on order.
(3) Be prepared to resume opns in AO MUSTANG on order.

c. TF 3/11 Cav:

(1) Destroy enemy in zone.
(2) Be prepared to release OPCON H Co (-) to TF 2/11 ACR.
(3) Be prepared to assume OPCON one Recon Trp from TF 1/11 ACR on order.
(4) Be prepared to resume opns in AO MUSTANG on order.
(5) Secure FSB DOC.

d. 2-28 Inf:

(1) Continue responsibility for 11th ACR missions in AO MUSTANG.
(2) Conduct RIF and NAP opns in AO.
(3) Provide for ground, rocket and mortar defense of BIEN HOA/LONG BINH area in AO.
(4) Continue defense of SONG BE Bridge.
(5) Provide security for hamlet/village elections in AO.
(6) Continue security of Routes Lead and Zinc.
(7) Continue pacification of hamlets in AO.
(8) Provide RRF for TAN UTEN, PHUOC HOI, and SONG BE Bridge.
(9) Continue security of convoys on Routes Lead & Zinc.
(10) Be prepared for opns in eastern CATCHERS MITT on order.
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FRAGO 105 to OPORD 4-68 (Operation TOAN THANG PHASE III) (U)

e. TF MAXON:

(1) Continue responsibility for BLACKHORSE TAGR & TAOI and security of BLACKHORSE Base Camp.
(2) Secure Engr work parties along routes 1 & 2.
(3) Assume overwatch of 20th Engr Bde ops in XUAN LOC area.
(4) Conduct combined ops w/18Inf Div ARVN as feasible.

f. Air Cav Trp: Continue current mission.
g. Coordinating Instructions: DTRLAUTH.

4. (U) ADMIN & LOG: SOP.

5. (U) Command and Signal: FRAGO eff upon receipt.

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ANNEX A: Ops Overlay

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ANNEX A (Opm Overlay) to FRAGO 105 to OPORD 4-68 (Opn TOAN THANG PHASE III) (U)

DISTRIBUTION: Same as OPORD 4-68

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ANNEX K

HQ, 11th Armd Cav Regt
LAI KHE (TX769382) RVN
221200H March 1969

FRAGO 106 to OPORD 4-68 (Operation TOAN THANG PHRASE III) (U)

Task Org

<table>
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<th>TF 3/11</th>
<th>TF 2/11</th>
<th>TF HAPONSKI</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/11 Cav (-)</td>
<td>3/11 Cav (-)</td>
<td>B/2/11 Cav</td>
<td>C/4/1 Cav</td>
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<tr>
<td>B/1/1 Cav</td>
<td>I/3/11 Cav</td>
<td>F/2/11 Cav</td>
<td>A/1-28 Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/1/1 Cav</td>
<td>L/3/11 Cav</td>
<td>A/2-28 Inf</td>
<td>Flat/B/1/4 Cav</td>
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<td>D/2-28 Inf</td>
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<td>H/2/11 Cav (-)</td>
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<td>D/22-28 Inf</td>
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<tr>
<td>Plat/919 Engr</td>
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TF MAXON (Base Camp Security) TF 2-28 Inf (-) Regt Con

G/2/11 Cav C/2-28 Inf Air Cav Trp

How/2/11 Cav A/1-16 Inf 8-6 Arty (DS)

Plat/H/2/11 Cav K/3/11 Cav B/1-7 Arty

Recon Plat/2-28 Inf Recon Plat/2-28 Inf F/8-6 Arty

Plat/K/3/11 Cav Plat/919 Engr B/8-6 Arty (105)

1. (C) SITUATION


b. Friendly Forces: No change.


2. (C) MISSION: 11th ACR secures BLACKHORSE Base Camp; cont overwatch for LONG BINH/Bien Hoa area; conducts RIF and NAP opns in AO MUSTANG; conducts opns ATLAS WEDGE to destroy enemy in AO and prevent exfiltration towards SAIGON; cont responsibility for defense of SONG BE Bridge; secures Engr work parties along Routes 1 & 2; cont overwatch of 20th Engr Bde opns in XUAN LOC area; places one Recon Trp w/2d Inf Bn OPCON CMAC; places Sqdn (-) w/2 Recon Trps OPCON RHTC.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

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FRAGO 106 to OPORD 4-69 (Operation TOAN THANG PHASE III) (U)

3. (c) EXECUTION:

a. Concept of Operations:

(1) Maneuver: 11th ACR conducts RIF, NAP & C&S ops in BLACKHORSE AOw/TF 1/11 Cav, TF 3/11 Cav, TF HAPONSKI, TF 2-28 Inf and Regt Air Cav Trp, 2/11 Cav (-) w/2 Recon Trps OPCON WHITAC, one Recon Trp 1/11 Cav OPCON CMC, TF MAXON cont overwatch of 20th Engr Bde ops in XUAN LOC area and secularity BLACKHORSE Base Camp; TF 3/11 Cav conducts ops in and assumes responsibility for AO ROOTS and defense of SONG BE Bridge; TF 2-28 Inf assumes responsibility for AO JADE, cont responsibility for ground, rocket and mortar defenses of BIEN HU LONG BINH within AO SABER, 1/11 Cav and TF HAPONSKI conduct combined opns ATLAS WEDGE in sector to destroy enemy and prevent exfiltration from the Michelin area towards SAIGON.

(2) Fires: No change.

b. TF 1/11:

(1) Conduct search and destroy operations in OBJ ORANGE.
(2) Continue current missions.
(3) Be prepared for movement back to AO SADDLE 1/0 24 Mar 69.

c. TF 2/11:

d. TF 3/11:

(1) Move overland from FSB DOC to AO BOOTS immediately.
(2) Assume responsibility for AO BOOTS.
(3) Assume OPCON 1/3/11 Cav and B/2-28 Inf upon closure of CP at BANDIT HILL.
(4) Be prepared to conduct combined opns w/5 Inf Div ARVN with one Recon Trp, one Tk Plt and one company size element (-).

e. TF HAPONSKI:

(1) Conduct search and destroy ops in NE MICHELIN.
(2) Clear in order OBJ's LILY, ROSE & VIOLET. Occupy ROSE & VIOLET night of 21-22 Mar 69 to interdict exfiltration from direction of OBJ ORANGE.
(3) Assume OPCON 4/2-28 Inf and responsibility for security of FSB DOC and AVLB's in vicinity.
(4) Be prepared to assist withdrawal of TF 1/11 Cav Thru the MICHELIN back to AO MUSTANG.

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FRAGO 106 to OPORD 4-68 (Operation TOAN THANG PHASE III) (U)

f. TF 2-28:

(1) Move CP&HQ elements from BANDIT HILL to HOLIDAY INN immediately.
(2) Release OPCON I Trp & B Co 2-28 to TF 3/11 upon closure of CP TF 3/11 at BANDIT HILL.
(3) Continue current missions.
(4) Be prepared to establish FSB and conduct operations in Eastern CATCHERS MITT 0/A 24 Mar 69.
(5) Assume responsibility for AO MUSTANG less AO BOOTS.

h. MAXON:

Air Cav Trp: Continue current mission.

i. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) Responsibility for AO BOOTS reverts to #/11 Cav upon closure of CP at BANDIT HILL.
(2) DIRLAUTH.

4. (U) ADMIN & LOG: SOP

5. (U) Command & Signal: FRAGO eff upon receipt.

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COL

ANNEX A: Ops Overlay AO MUSTANG
ANNEX B: Ops Overlay ATLAS WEDGE

DISTRIBUTION: Same as OPORD 4-68

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AO MUSTANG TO FRAGO 106
WO OPORD 4-68
(CAMPAIGN TOAN THANG PHASE
III (U))

MAP RELIEF RVN 1: 50000

AO BOOTS
3/11

2/28
TERM CON

2X11
PC E.X.
54. DIV ARVN
EFF 200500H

XI
X
2

37

3/11
2-28

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LAI KHE (VT 769382) RVN
22120H March 1969

NOTE: THIS COPY NOT DRAWN TO SCALE

HQ 11th ARMD CAV RCT

28
98
AO SABER
2-28

NOTE: COPY NOT TO SCALE
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ANNEX B: OP OVERLAY—ATLAS WEDGE
TO FRAGO 106 TO OPORD 4-68
(Campaign Toan Thang Phase III) (U)

MAP RELIEF: 1:50000

NOTE: COPY NOT DRAWN TO SCALE
### Combat After Action Report - Operation Atlas Wedge, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

**Combat After Action Report, 17 - 24 March 1969.**

CO, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

<table>
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<td>43</td>
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**Abstract**

**Sponsoring Military Activity**

**OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310**