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11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 July 1969

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SECTION I - OPERATIONS

1. (C) INTRODUCTION: This Operational Report - Lessons Learned covers the period 1 May through 31 July 1969. During this period the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment continued Operation MONTANA RAIDERS until 14 May 1969. The Blackhorse Regiment operated in the BLACKHORSE TAOI from 15 May to 7 June 1969. During the period 8 - 21 June 1969, the Regiment conducted operations in the AN LOC/QUAN LOI area. The 11th ACR began Operation KENTUCKY COUGAR on 22 June 1969 and was continuing this operation at the end of the reporting period.

The Blackhorse Regiment conducted operations in the III CORPS TACTICAL ZONE with the Regiment (w) under the operational control of II FORCEV, 1st Infantry Division, and the 1st Cavalry Division (AM). Elements of the Regiment have conducted operations in the provinces of BINH LONG, BINH DUONG, TAY BINNH, PHUOC LONG, GIA DINH, BIDDEN HOA, and LONG KAIH.

Squadrons were OPCON to the 1st Cavalry Division (AM), II FORCEV, 1st Infantry Division, TF DOYLE, BIDDEN HOA Tactical Air Command, and the 199th Light Infantry Brigade at different times throughout the reporting period. Troop and platoon size units conducted operations with the 18th Infantry Division, Capital Military Assistance Command, and the 9th and 52nd Infantry Regiments (ARVN).

During portions of the reporting period the following elements of the 1st Infantry Division were OPCON: 2nd-2nd Infantry (Mech), 1-2nd Infantry, and the 1-4th Cavalry. The 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry of the 199th AIB, was OPCON to the Regiment during the quarter. During this same period the following elements of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) were OPCON to the Regiment: 2-7th Cavalry, 1-7th Cavalry, 1-8th Cavalry, 1-5th Cavalry, and the 5-7th Cavalry. The following Vietnamese units were DS or OPCON to the Regiment during the reporting period: 413th Regional Force Command, 18th Infantry Division, 4th Battalion of the 52nd Infantry, Reconnaissance for UT 693340.

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Company of the 9th Infantry Regiment, 4th Battalion of the 9th Infantry Regiment, and the LOC NINH CSF.

The Regimental Headquarters has been at QUAN LOI, LONG GAI, and then back at QUAN LOI. Operation MONTANA RAIDER, conducted in Eastern War Zone C, was targeted on main force units and rear service elements operating in the supply/infiltration routes from CAMBODIA to SOUTH VIETNAM. This operation, involving the 1st and 2nd Squadrons, lasted for 32 days and resulted in 247 enemy killed, 15 enemy captured, 264 weapons captured, and 42 tons of rice confiscated.

On 15 May, the Regiment and elements of the 18th Infantry Division (ARVN) began a 23 day coordinated operation in the BLACKHORSE TAOI. The Regiment operated with two squadrons (1/11 ACR and 2/11 ACR) and had OPCON 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry of the 199th LIE. Contacts with the 33rd NVA Regiment resulted in 124 NVA/VC KIA. On 26 May, the 2nd Squadron was deployed to the AN LOC/QUAN LOI area to counter activities of the 7th NVA Division and the 101D Regiment of the 1st NVA Division. The initial deployment was followed by Regimental Headquarters on 8 June, and by 3rd Squadron on 10 June.

Numerous contacts were made by the elements of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment during the period of 27 May to 30 June resulting in 335 enemy killed and 18 captured. Since these initial engagements, there has been little enemy initiated contact except for Highway 13 ambushes, one on 9 July and the other on 17 July. The results of these ambushes were 4 US KIA, 17 US WIA, 30 NVA/VC KIA, and 2 NVA/VC POW's.

2. (C) ORGANIZATION: The basic structure of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment remained the same throughout the reporting period. (See Incl I).

3. (C) INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES:

a. General: During the reporting period, the 11th ACR operated primarily in Eastern War Zone C, VC Sub-Region 5, VC BA BINH Province, and BINH LONG Province.

b. Order of Battle:

(1) General: Since 1 May, enemy forces in III ZIP have initiated a series of intensive action periods: the Summer Offensive. Utilising their jungle sanctuaries as bases of operations, all main force divisions have concentrated their attention on the peripheral areas of III ZIP. During the first phase of the summer offensive (12 May - 7 June), XUAN LOC and 4N LOC were the focal points. During this phase, the 5th VC Division threw its sapper forces at military installations in XUAN LOC on 16 "a. The 7th
Division made a feint toward AN LOC; the 1st NVA Division attacked allied installations in War Zone C. The 9th VC Division was concentrated in the TAY NINH area.

The second phase of the Summer Offensive began on the evening of 12 June, when the 275th VC Regiment of the 5th VC Division attacked and suffered heavy casualties at LZ JOY near the LONG KHANH/BINH TUY Provincial boundary. The 7th Division attempted to seize and hold AN LOC, but was partially pre-empted by elements of the 2nd and 3rd Squadrons of the 11th ACR operating in the rubber to the west of AN LOC. The 15B and 95C NVA Regiments of the 1st NVA Division continued to attack fire support bases in War Zone C, while the 101D Regiment ambushed convoys along QL 13 in BINH LONG Province. The 9th VC Division focused its attention in the TAY NINH area.

The third phase of the Summer Offensive, according to captured documents and prisoners, was to begin on 5 July and last until 20 July. This phase never materialized, probably because of the heavy losses suffered by the enemy during the first two phases. As the quarter ends, enemy elements are again located in secure base areas, where they are refitting and avoiding contact.

(2) Eastern War Zone C: The preceding quarter saw the final evaluation of intelligence gathered during Phase II of Operation MONTANA RAIDER. Significant intelligence during Phase II came from documents captured on 27 April originating from the headquarters of the 96th Artillery Regiment. Included in these documents were the positions used to rocket LAI KHE and DAU TIENG. Other documents captured throughout the area of operations provided useful intelligence on the operation and missions of the 82nd Rear Service Group.

In Phase III, which began on 7 May, the Regiment directed its attention to the west bank of the SAIGON River in the vicinity of MINH THANH. Little contact was made during the first several days and, as a result, the Regiment was given the mission of searching the east bank of the SAIGON River which was the most likely cache area. On 11 May, the Regiment moved south since the northern section of the area was essentially devoid of enemy. The initial contact of Phase III came on 11 May when the Aero Rifle Platoon, reinforced by G Troop, engaged an enemy element in a bunker complex. This engagement resulted in 8 NVA captured and 5 killed.

A and B Troops also made contact with an entrenched force five kilometers northeast of the Michelin on 11 May. In a night ambush on 12 May, G Troop engaged a squad sized element passing their position. The action resulted in the capture of the Political Security Chief of VC Sub-Region 1. The 96th Artillery Regiment and the 82nd Rear Service Group were also identified by prisoners captured during MONTANA RAIDER Phase III.
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(3) VC Sub-Region 5: During the reporting period in Sub-Region 5, enemy activity consisted of scattered mining incidents, sporadic attacks by fire and small ground probes. After the Regiment moved out of the area, there was evidence that the enemy had increased his logistical activity in northern LAM SON area. There were reports that rear service and political personnel also began moving out of the jungle areas near the northern LAM SON to the population centers. Throughout the quarter the DONG HAI Regiment largely avoided contact and remained in base areas northeast of LAM SON with the K3 Battalion maintaining a presence in the LAM SON area.

(4) VC Ba BIEN Province: The only significant enemy initiated activity in VC BA BIEN Province occurred on 18 May when sapper units of the 5th VC Division launched an attack against XUAN LOC and the 33rd NVA Regiment attacked two villages west of the Provincial Capital. The attack on XUAN LOC was conducted by the 21st Sapper/Reconnaissance Battalion in conjunction with sapper companies of the 95A NVA and 275th VC Regiments. The contact resulted in 54 enemy killed and 8 captured. The operations of the 11th ACR east of Blackhorse between 28 May and 7 June forced elements of the 33rd NVA Regiment from that area, significantly reducing enemy pressure on XUAN LOC.

During June and July, the 5th VC Division moved back into War Zone D and avoided identifiable contact.

(5) BINH LONG Province: As a result of the buildup of enemy forces in BINH LONG Province near the end of May, the 2nd Squadron was dispatched to the AN LOC area. On 8 June, the Regimental Headquarters set up at CAN LOC, and on 10 June, the 3rd Squadron closed on the AN LOC area. Prior to these moves, all three regiments of the 7th NVA Division had been contacted to the south and southwest of AN LOC.

On 6 June, there were several attacks by fire in the AN LOC area. Ground attacks supported by rocket and mortar fire occurred at AN LOC and FSB THUNDER III (XT771655). The 101D NVA Regiment was identified in three ambushes along QL 13 in the southern BINH LONG Province. The enemy avoided significant contact from 7 - 16 June.

On 17 June, elements of the 165th and 209th NVA Regiments set up in the rubber to the west of AN LOC. The following night, AN LOC was bombarded by over 300 rounds of mixed enemy ordinance and received an estimated two company ground probe. It is apparent that the enemy intended to launch a major attack against AN LOC on the evening of 17 - 18 June. However, because of the large percentage of new recruits in the 7th NVA Division, ground elements probably became lost or discouraged on the way to the objective. In addition, frequent armored reconnaissance operations and interdicting artillery fires partially pre-empted the 7th NVA Division's actions.

There were three significant friendly initiated contact on 18 June. At XT770454 K Troop Killed 31 NVA, captured 1 POW, and received a HGU CHECK.
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The POW identified his unit as C20, 209th NVA Regiment, while the HOI CHANH was identified as a member of the K5 Battalion, 165th NVA Regiment. At XT69/759 E Troop, while escorting a convoy, killed 7 enemy and captured 2 POWs. The prisoners were from the K9 Battalion, 101D NVA Regiment. The final contact of the day occurred at XT69/927 when I Troop engaged an unknown size enemy force; the contact netted 6 enemy killed.

The 209th NVA Regiment was identified during a contact on 19 June with A/2-2nd Infantry (Mech) at XT699918, in the rubber northwest of AN LOC. This contact resulted in one enemy killed; documents found on the body identified the 209th NVA Regiment, 7th NVA Division. In a series of contacts on 20 and 21 June, the K2 Battalion, 141st Regiment, was identified east of AN LOC. On 22 June, elements of the 3rd Brigade, 1st ACD, moved into LZ WESTCOTT targeted against the 141st NVA Regiment. Sporadic attacks by fire and small scale ground contacts continued throughout the remainder of the month of June.

Two significant incidents occurred during July. On 9 July, a 2nd Squadron and 919th Engineer convoy was ambushed by elements of the 165th and 209th NVA Regiments on QL 13, north of AN LOC. Prisoners and documents found after this contact identified the K5 Battalion of the 165th NVA Regiment and the KB Battalion of the 209th NVA Regiment. Again, on 17 July, a 4 Company convoy moving north on QL 13 was ambushed south of AN LOC in the vicinity of FSB THUNDER III by elements of the K7 Battalion, 101D, 1st NVA Division. As the quarter ended, the 7th NVA Division was again located in secure areas recuperating and resupplying.

c. Major Engagements:

(1) On 11 May at XT62/532, the Aero Rifle Platoon made contact with an unknown enemy force. C Troop and B/5-7th Cavalry reinforced. The contact resulted in 8 NVA captured. Six of the prisoners were from the K34 Battalion, 96th Artillery Regiment, while the other two were members of the 122nd Rear Service Group.

(2) F Troop engaged an enemy element on 11 May at XS40/1933. The engagement resulted in 16 NVA KIA and 1 POW captured. The prisoner was identified as a member of the 33rd NVA Regiment.

(3) On 20 May at XT72/303, an aircraft from Headquarters Troop spotted 10 VC and received small arms fire. Elements of D Company and A/1-26th Infantry were deployed into the area with support by artillery and 105s. Subsequent actions in the area netted 5 VC KIA and 1 AK/7 rifle captured.

(4) On 24 May at XT32/300, A Troop encountered C-184A Company, 33rd NVA Regiment, in a bunker complex. The ensuing four hour battle

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resulted in 15 enemy KIA, 1 US KIA, and 13 US WIA. Captured during the
engagement were two 12.7mm machine guns, two 82mm mortar tubes, and one
RPG-2 launcher.

(5) D/4-12th (199th LIB OPCON 11th ACR) was ambushed by an unknown
enemy force at TS324980 on 28 May. D Company returned fire and was supported
by artillery and LFT. The contact resulted in 9 NVA KIA, 1 AK-47 and 1 RPG-2
launcher captured. There were no friendly casualties.

(6) On 28 May at TS560013, A Troop received RPG and SA fire from
an unknown force. Fire was returned and D Company reinforced. The contact
concluded with 18 NVA KIA and 2 AK-47’s captured. American losses were 1
killed and 3 wounded. Documents taken after the contact from the bodies
identified the 33rd NVA Regiment.

(7) On 29 May at TS 569983, A Troop received RPG and SA fire from
an unknown force. Fire was returned and D Company reinforced. The contact
concluded with 20 NVA KIA, 1 NVA KBA, 1 NVA POW, and
13 US WIA. The enemy unit was identified as the C11 Company of the D9
Battalion, 33rd NVA Regiment.

(8) On 3 June at XT675813, H Company came into contact with an
estimated two enemy companies. The engagement resulted in 20 NVA KIA,
1 NVA KBA, and 10 POW’s captured. The prisoners were from the E8 and K9
Battalions, 101D Regiment.

(9) On 7 June at XT708825, G Troop, while on a reconnaissance
mission, received SA and RPG fire from an enemy force in the rubber. Fire
was returned and support provided by LFT, Tac Air, and artillery. G Troop
was reinforced by C/2-2nd Infantry and F Troop. The six hour contact
resulted in 95 NVA KIA, 3 US KIA and 15 US wounded. Elements of the 165th
NVA Regiment were identified in this action.

(10) On 9 June, L Troop was engaged by an enemy element at XT700907.
Fire was returned and LFT supported. Documents taken from 12 enemy killed
identified the K9 Battalion, 209th NVA Regiment. Friendly losses were 2 US
KIA, 2 CIDG KIA, and 5 CIDG WIA.

(11) On 9 June, B and C/2-2nd Infantry (OPCON 11th ACR) initiated
contact with an unknown sized enemy force at XT819873. E Troop and H Company
reinforced in the contact which cost the enemy 35 killed. US losses were
1 US KIA and 2 US WIA.

(12) On 16 June at FSB SIDEWINDER (XT743820), 2nd Squadron engaged
approximately 20 NVA/VC and were supported by artillery, Spooky, and LFT.
This contact resulted in 7 NVA KIA, 2 US WIA, and 2 AK-47’s.

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On 17 June at XT704854, K Troop, while conducting a reconnaissance mission, spotted and engaged an unknown sized enemy force. Tac Air and LPT supported, and H Company and the Aero Rifle Platoon reinforced. The three and one half hour contact resulted in 31 NVA KIA, 1 US KIA, 1 CIDG KIA, and 1 CIDG WIA. A HOI CHANY, who rallied to K Troop, identified his unit as the Reconnaissance Section of the K5 Battalion, 165th NVA Regiment.

At XT769759 on 18 June, E Troop, while escorting a convoy, received SA fire from an unknown number of NVA/VC. E Troop engaged the enemy with organic weapons and swept the area. The action resulted in 7 NVA/VC KIA, 2 NVA/VC CIA, and 1 US KIA. The POW's identified their unit as the C10 Company of the K9 Battalion, 101D NVA Regiment.

C Troop (OPCON 1st Infantry Division) at XT848464 on 19 June, made contact with an unknown sized enemy force. Enemy losses were 11 NVA KIA and 6 NVA captured. There were no friendly losses. The POW's were identified as members of the Z15 Artillery Company, Sub-Region 5; C3 Company, K2 Battalion, DONG NAI Regiment; C18 Anti-Aircraft Company, DONG NAI Regiment; and D241 Infiltration Group.

On 18 June at XT687868, the 3rd Squadron engaged an unknown sized enemy force. Artillery, LPT, and Spooky supported. The contact resulted in 24 NVA KIA.

On 20 June at XT767757, a convoy received 82mm mortar fire. E and G Troops reinforced and made contact with the unknown enemy force. Support was received from ARA, LFT, Artillery, and Tac Air. Results of the contact were 1 US KIA, 5 US WIA, and 16 NVA KIA.

At XT735935 on 9 July, a convoy, composed of elements of the 2nd Squadron and 919th Engineer Company moving south along QL 13, were ambushed by an estimated force of two NVA Battalions. Team H of the 2nd Squadron, consisting of 1 ACAV platoon and 1 tank platoon, reinforced, while the Aero Rifle Platoon, artillery, Tac Air, ARA, and LFT supported. This contact resulted in 4 US KIA, 15 US WIA, 23 NVA KIA, and 1 NVA captured. The POW identified his unit as the C5 Company of the K5 Battalion, 165th NVA Regiment.

On 17 July, a convoy from H Company was ambushed by elements of the 7th NVA Division as it moved north along Highway 13. Artillery, Tac Air, LFT, and HFT supported, while K and I Troops and the Aero Rifle Platoon reinforced. The results of this engagement were 9 US WIA, 1 ARVN WIA, 1 civilian killed and POW WIA. The POW stated that he was from the K7 Battalion of the 101D Regiment, 1st NVA Division.
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d. Intelligence Sources: In the course of the quarter's operations, the Blackhorse Regiment has employed the following intelligence sources: human sources, captured enemy documents, visual reconnaissance and aerial photography.

(1) Human Sources: Human sources consist of prisoners of war, ralliers, and agents. Prisoners and ralliers are used most frequently, often on a daily basis. Information concerning enemy unit locations, capabilities, and possible courses of action was derived from extensive interrogation of these individuals by highly trained intelligence personnel. If the information proved reliable and of immediate tactical significance, the POW or rallier was returned to the field where he was able to locate enemy positions or caches. As in the past, information provided by prisoners was exchanged between the 11th ACR and other US and ARVN units adjacent to our area of operations. Agents, even though providing daily reports, were of little value in our intelligence collection effort.

(2) Captured Enemy Documents: Captured enemy documents have been of primary value in establishing enemy unit identifications. These documents were also useful in compiling blacklists and gaining information relating to enemy morale and intentions.

(3) Visual Reconnaissance: Visual reconnaissance missions are flown by Air Cavalry Troop on a daily basis and provide us with the bulk of our immediate tactical intelligence. Trail activity, base camps, bunker complexes, and fighting positions are the most common sightings. Visual Reconnaissance provides the targeting and planning data for B-52 strikes, armored operations, Airmobile Platoon insertions, artillery and Tac Air strikes.

(4) Technical Detectors: Technical detectors include SLAR, Red Haze, Personnel Detector (Sniffer), ground sensors, and ground radar. SLAR, Sniffer, and Red Haze have been of little use in Regimental operations. Ground sensors were used in a limited fashion during the quarter, and an assessment of their value is not possible. However, ground radar has proven useful in a perimeter defensive role.

e. Enemy losses during the reporting period credited to the 11th ACR:

| VC/NVA KIA (BC) | 371 | 278 |
| VC/NVA KIA (POSS) | 13 | 18 |
| VC/NVA POW's | 152 | 21 |
| HOI CH:MH's | 5 | 3 |

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11th ACR OPCON to 11th ACR other units

Detainees 12 0
Individual Weapons Captured/Destroyed 777 41
Crew Served Weapons Captured/Destroyed 125 51
Mines 49 0
Structures 3 2
Fortifications 706 90
Documents (batches) 13 3
Grain Captured/Destroyed (tons) 11 1

4. (C) COMBAT OPERATIONS AND TRAINING:

a. Analysis and Evaluation:

(1) The 11th ACR has put heavy pressure on the NVA/VC main forces elements. The Regiment has conducted reconnaissance into areas in which the enemy has operated with relative freedom in the past. \* reconnaissance missions have uncovered base camps and numerous caches of foo., ammunition, and weapons. Night ambush patrols have restricted the movement of both personnel and supplies. High casualties were inflicted on the NVA/VC main forces.

(2) After suffering high casualties with the Cavalry Troopers on initial encounters, the NVA/VC avoided major contact except to defend important base camps and to ambush convoys. In both instances, the enemy has paid a heavy price in personnel and propaganda.

b. Area of Operations: Operations this quarter were conducted within III CTZ and covered seven provinces: BINH LONG, BINH DUONG, TAY NINH, PHUOC LONG, GIA DINH, BIEN HOA, and LONG KHANH.


d. Training:

(1) Replacement training was accomplished throughout the quarter to prepare replacements to assume their duties as Cavalry Troopers.
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Monthly attendance during the reporting period was as follows:

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(2) Special Training:

(a) M-16 Maintenance: Ten unit armorer's from the Regiment attended a two hour class taught by the USARV M-16 Training Team.

(b) Generator Maintenance: A four day generator maintenance course was conducted by the 185th Maintenance Battalion; four individuals from the Regiment attended the course.

(c) Sniper Training: Six personnel from the Regiment attended the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) Sniper School at Bien Hoa.

5. (C) Combat Support:

a. Army Aviation:

(1) Organization and Employment:

(a) Aviation Platoon, HHT/11th ACR:

1. Organization: The Aviation Platoon consists of a command and control section with two CH-54A and two UH-1H aircraft, and a transport section with six UH-1H aircraft.

2. Employment: The Aviation Platoon operates from a location near the Regimental Command Post and performs command and control, liaison, resupply, courier, and limited troop transport for the Regimental Headquarters and subordinate organic and OPCON units of the Regiment.

(b) Squadron Aviation Sections:

1. Organization: Each of the three squadrons has an organic aviation section consisting of two CH-54A and two UH-1D or UH-1H aircraft.

2. Employment: The aviation section operates from a location near the Squadron Command Post and performs command and control, liaison, observation and reconnaissance, limited troop transport, resupply, and emergency medical evacuation for the squadron.
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(c) Air Cavalry Troop:

1 Organization: The Troop consists of a Troop Headquarters with two UH-1C aircraft, an Aero Scout Platoon with nine OH-6A aircraft, an Aero Rifle Platoon with six UH-1H aircraft, and an Aero Weapons Platoon with nine AH-1G aircraft.

2 Employment: The Troop operates from a forward base area near the Regimental Area of Operation and performs combat operations in an assigned AO, or near the Regimental AO in support of subordinate organic or OPCON units of the Regiment.

When operating in an assigned AO, the Troop uses the Pile-on concept. First, the Aero Scouts perform visual reconnaissance. When a target is located and developed, the Aero Weapons and Aero Rifle Platoon elements are employed. A ready reaction force (RRF) is available for immediate commitment. Experience has shown that during the dry season a tank unit provides the most effective reaction force; whereas, during the rainy season infantry troops are most effective due to trafficability. During the Pile-on, direction and control are transferred to Regimental control until necessary forces are built up to accomplish the mission.

When the Air cavalry Troop supports a squadron or OPCON unit, it is generally given a mission-type order. A mission-type order allows the Troop Commander flexibility in tailoring his unit to accomplish the mission. Missions involving the Air Cavalry Troop in the AO are closely coordinated between the S-2, S-3, and Troop Commander.

The Troop is the primary intelligence gathering element of the Regiment, employing aerial research reconnaissance, ground reconnaissance, bomb damage assessments, sensor (Sniffer) missions, night observation, and firefly missions. Employment of the Troop is based on intelligence or enemy contact. It can be employed to fight and destroy enemy forces as well as to develop the situation or gather intelligence information.

(2) Training: Command emphasis has been placed on orientation checkouts, in-country orientations for newly assigned aviators, and quarterly proficiency checks. An intensive transition program to cross-train aviators on the OH-6A is still in effect. This program allows greater flexibility in assigning aviators within the Aero Scout Platoon of the Air Cavalry Troop.

On the job training was conducted by the 396th Transportation Detachment to qualify crewchiefs and improve the efficiency of mechanics. Personnel were sent to formal courses in various maintenance fields as quotas became available.

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(3) Construction: Construction of the maintenance hanger at Blackhorse was completed during the quarter. The hanger provides eight maintenance bays and allied shops plus a large PSP area for parking. Aircraft availability has risen due to the capability of 24 hour a day maintenance.

(4) Maintenance: During the reporting period the regimental Aviation assets were away from basecamp a majority of the time. Lines of communication of over 100 miles and field type maintenance facilities affected aircraft availability.

While the Regiment was in Blackhorse Base Camp, the AH-1G cobras developed considerable unscheduled maintenance. Upon closing at Blackhorse, three cobras required main rotor head changes; one transmission froze as did one input quill. The UH-1 aircraft were still in good condition.

When the Regiment moved to QUAN LOI, the aircraft availability was beginning to rise. Preparations for this move included the use of a greatly forward support maintenance element and a daily parts run by the 539th TC Company. This is a change from the previous trip where limited maintenance personnel were available and where irregular parts runs were made.

On the return to QUAN LOI the AH-1G cobras were still a problem. With assistance from the 520th Transportation Battalion two battle-damaged cobras were turned in. Replacement cobras were received in June. In addition the 539th TC Company provided night armament maintenance which raised the cobra availability to the extent needed.

b. Chemical:

(1) General: The 33rd Chemical Detachment, consisting of two officers and four enlisted personnel, provided personnel detection, defoliation, and chemical staff support to the Regiment during the reporting period. On 15 July, the detachment received a second XS Personnel Detector which serves as a back-up for the one received during the last quarter.

(2) Personnel Detection: Eighty-two Sniffer missions, using the XS Personnel Detector, were flown in support of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment operations. Upon completion of a mission, the pilots were debriefed by the Sniffer Team OIC and NCOIC. Verified hot spots were evaluated immediately and the results forwarded to Regimental S-2 for analysis and target planning.

(3) CS Drops: The Regiment continued its utilization of CS munitions in a reconnaissance by fire role. Seven CS drops were made during the quarter on verified or suspected enemy troop concentrations. A total of 125 E-158 CS Clusters were used.

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(4) Defoliation: No airborne defoliation missions were flown during the quarter. However, several small scale defoliation projects were conducted at Blackhorse Base Camp. Those areas defoliated were: 541st Detachment area, ammunition dump, and a portion of the perimeter.

(5) Problem Areas:

(a) E-158 CS Clusters became an ASR item during the reporting period because of a theater-wide shortage. Three CS drops were not conducted because no CS Clusters were available.

(b) Problems were encountered during the burning of vegetation around the perimeter. Vegetation was wet during the early morning hours and the project could not begin until the afternoon. Vast quantities of diesel fuel were required on an area before burning was accomplished.

c. Signal:

(1) Combat operations during the reporting period required more flexible communications than in previous periods. Plans for the necessary communications between Regimental Headquarters and the 1st Cavalry Division (AII) were implemented with no difficulty. Existing VHF/UHF facilities at DAU TIENG and QUAN LOI were used by the 1st Cavalry Division (AII) to fulfill our TF multi-channel requirements. In addition, the DSO supplied the Regimental CP with an AN/VCS-2 SSB transmitter on call.

(2) An AB-577 mast with multiple 292 head was erected in the RTOC area. The added height of this mast provided more reliable communications. Because of the densely wooded and jungled areas, an F: retransmission site was established at NUI BA DEN. The 1st Infantry Division (DSO) made this resource available as requested.

(3) HF radio (RTT) was established between the forward and rear areas. This gave the Regiment added concentrator capability since a JCC-17 was co-located with the HF terminal at BIEN HOA. The JCC-17 was supported by the 53rd Signal Battalion, II FFORCEV, to give us flexible theater concentrator support. Upon displacement to QUAN LOI, the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division (AII) made available utilisation of tower AB 566/I for mounting RTOC antennas; therefore, optimum FM communications were effected. Operations this quarter necessitated the deployment of small liaison groups to the Province Tactical Headquarters and OPCON units. Existing FM radios had to be relocated from the RHT to fill the communications requirement (approximately three 924's).

(4) An SB-86 was employed to satisfy wire operations. Internal common user and sole user circuits were established per IW 11th ARM tactical SOP. VHF/UHF multi-channel requirements along with hot lines were requested from II FFORCEV Signal Center and coordinated with the
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higher division GSO office. In addition, all trunks and necessary common user circuits were maintained at the BIEN HOA (rear) switchboard.

d. Artillery

(1) During the period 1 May - 31 July 1969, artillery provided direct and general support for the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and its OPCON units. From 1 - 14 May, the organic Howitzer Batteries for the 1st and 2nd Squadrons provided continuous direct support to their respective squadrons during Operation MONTANRAIDER, Phase II. A/1-21st Artillery provided direct for the 5/7th Cavalry. Fire Control was handled by HQ/8-21st Artillery.

Operation TOAN THANG, Phase III, in and around the BLACKHORSE TAOR, had 1st and 2nd Squadron Howitzer Batteries again provide direct support to their respective squadrons. C/2-40th Artillery provided direct support to the 4-12th Infantry which was OPCON to the 11th ACR. The operation lasted from 15 May to 11 June with Fire Control under HQ/7-9th Artillery.

On 23 June, Fire Control passed to HQ/4-27th Artillery. 2nd and 3rd Squadron Howitzer Batteries directly supported their organic squadrons. General support for Operation SHORTSTOP was provided by divisional units: B/1-5th Arty, C/1-7th Arty, E/1-5th Arty, and B/1-21st Arty. Corps Support during the operation came from C/2-13th Arty, A/6-27th Arty, A/3-197th Arty, and F/16th Arty.

(2) Types of Missions Fired:

(a) Defensive concentrations
(b) Registrations
(c) Preparations
(d) Harassing and interdicting fires
(e) Illumination
(f) Intelligence targets
(g) Special preplanned fires
(h) ARVN support

(3) New Techniques: None.
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4 Total Expenditures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MISSION</th>
<th>ROUNDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed Targets</td>
<td>6,834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquired Targets</td>
<td>11,935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter Battery</td>
<td>955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation</td>
<td>2,119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special</td>
<td>3,763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>25,953</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. Engineer:

(1) General: During this reporting period elements of the 919th Engineer Company (Armored) participated in Operations MONTANA RAIDER, TOAN THIING, and KENTUCKY COUGAR, while providing direct combat engineer support to elements of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. One operator and one 30 Kw generator were dispatched to the SONG BE Bridge for light security in support of the 1st Infantry Division.

(2) Operations:

(a) 1st Platoon: The 1st Platoon provided direct support to the 1st Squadron. On 1 May, the platoon laagered at LZ RITA with the 2nd Squadron. The next day the platoon conducted a tactical mine sweep between FSB JIKE and the AN LOC Rubber Plantation. The ensuing sweep revealed three anti-tank mines weighing approximately 30 pounds. The Engineers then marched to QUAN LOI, arriving at 1800 hours on 3 May, and began a maintenance stand down which lasted until 7 May.

On 8 May, the 1st Platoon left QUAN LOI with an AVLB and a bulldozer, and proceeded the 1st Squadron to their proposed laager position at XT642707. The Engineers immediately began construction of what was to become FSB GREENE. When the 1st Squadron arrived, the platoon had finished the berm, land clearing, construction of a Hook pad and a VIP pad, dug a sump, and cleared fields of fire. Also during the day, they conducted a mine sweep from FSB GREENE to FSB JKE, returned to FSB GREENE, and escorted and inserted an AVLB at XT644757 for resupply convoys.

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On 10 May, the platoon swept the road from FSB GREENE to FSB JOE, then north to 3N LOC. Here they picked up a tactical vehicle convoy and escorted them to FSB GREENE. OPCON to A Troop, they left FSB GREENE, moved to a new night defensive position south of FSB JOE, and immediately began construction of what was to become FSB S11. The 12th and 13th of May were spent mine sweeping and inserting AVLB's in order to resupply the 1st Squadron.

On 14 May, the Engineers, OPCON to C Troop, left FSB S11 and proceeded south through the Michelin Rubber Plantation. They inserted an AVLB at XT644495 and crossed the 1st Squadron. The Engineers and the 1st Squadron proceeded south to BIFN H09 via BIFN C17, PHUOC GOUTH, and DI KH. The platoon went on to Camp Blackhorse, where they remained until 19 June. During this period the Engineers swept the road from Blackhorse to 3N LOC. Also during this period the platoon pulled general maintenance on the Blackhorse perimeter and constructed a new north and south gate; and, participated in night ambush patrols in the vicinity of BLACKHORSE.

The platoon moved with the 1st Squadron to LAI KHE on 19 June. On 20 and 21 June the Engineers, using explosives and organic tools constructed an AVLB site at XT847534 and positioned the bridge. They also were used as security force for the 1st Engineer Battalion sweep teams and as a reaction force for the resupply convoy from LAI KHE to FSB THUNDRT II.

From 25 June to 7 July, the platoon was stationed at FSB FRIEDA. Here the Engineers conducted daily mine sweep operations and acted as security for the resupply convoy to QUAN LOI.

From 7 - 31 July, the 1st Platoon was stationed at FSB FRIEDA (XT583175). Here the Engineers conducted daily mine sweeps to BEF C17 Bridge. On 18 July, the platoon made contact with the enemy while they were returning to FSB FRIEDA. Approximately ten to fifteen NVA were encountered and one PC was captured. The following day while supporting A Troop, the Engineers blew 10 bunkers (XT624356) ranging in size from 5x5 feet to 15x20 feet with up to 5 feet overhead cover. Returning to FSB FRIEDA, the platoon made contact with 7 to 10 VC which resulted in 4 enemy KIA and 1 enemy wounded.

(b) 2nd Platoon: The 2nd Platoon, 919th Engineer Company (Armored), provided direct support for the 3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. From 1 May to 14 June, the platoon was located at FSB HARP'S FERRY. During this period the Engineers swept the roads connecting FSB TIN, FSB OAKLAND, FSB BENDIT HILL, and HARP'S FERRY in the 3N SON District.

On 17 June, the 2nd Platoon participated with I Troop in reconnoitering a deserted village at XT069826. During the reconnaissance enemy troops were spotted by members of the 2nd Platoon which resulted in 7 KIA. Returning to the same area with I Troop the next day, the Engineers made contact killing 3 NVA. On 19 June, while on a mine sweeping operation with I Troop,
the 1st Squad of the 2nd Platoon came under fire from enemy positions in
the rubber. The combined efforts of the 1st Squad and I Troop resulted in
35 NVA KIA.

On 21 June, the 2nd Platoon became attached to " Company and two
days later moved out on a reconnaissance mission. The Engineers were used
as right and left security while on the move, and it was their responsibility
to search and destroy any bunker complexes that were found. On 29 June,
a battalion sized bunker complex was discovered and the 2nd Platoon had time
to destroy approximately twenty bunkers before moving out with " company,
leaving many intact. The complex was fairly new and showed signs of recent
activity.

During the month of July, the platoon conducted daily mine sweeps and culvert
reconnaissance between AN LOC and FSB THUNDER III. They were often called
for vehicle recovery missions. On 17 July, the Engineers, stationed at
QUAN LOI, began a maintenance stand down that was to last until the end of
the reporting period.

(c) 3rd Platoon: During the quarter the 3rd Platoon of the
919th Engineer Company (Armored) provided direct support for the 2nd
Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. On 1 May, the Engineers were at
L3 HIGH where they were preparing to move to QUAN LOI. The next day the
platoon air assaulted a mine sweep team along the route that was to be used
for the road march to QUAN LOI. The sweep team discovered several anti-tank
mines which were extracted. The platoon and the 2nd Squadron arrived at
QUAN LOI at 1900 hours and began a maintenance stand down which lasted
until 7 May.

On 7 May, the platoon left QUAN LOI and traveled south along Route 245. They
proceeded south through the NAM THANH Rubber Plantation and turned west,
mine sweeping LIT 13 with negative results. On 8 "J", 1,000 meters south
of the SE corner of the rubber plantation, the Engineers prepared - NDF.
The following day the platoon moved to a new location at "J668624" and regen
constructed a NDF for the 2nd Squadron. After detecting and thwarting enemy
movement near the NDF, the Engineers swept the area of a mine on 20 May
and found five rocket grenades, which later were destroyed. From 18 - 24 "J", the
platoon was stationed at Blackhorse where they conducted daily mine
sweeps between Blackhorse and QUAN LOC.

In 26 May, they marched with the 2nd Squadron to QUAN LOI. On 1 June, the
platoon constructed a NDF with the 1st Engineer Battalion at K701820.
On the night of 6 June, this NDF came under attack. The following day the
Engineers swept the area and discovered 18 NVA KIA's, 9 AK-47's, 17 RPG-2's,
6 RPG launchers, 25 hand grenades, 19 rifle grenades, 3 Beng-lore torpedos,
and 9 82mm shells. On 7 June, conducting normal mine sweep operations with

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G Troop, the mine sweep team was ambushed at XT711839. The sweep of the contact area revealed 78 NVA KIA's. The platoon also destroyed a Viet Cong village at XT700838 which consisted of 14 hootches.

On 6 June, the 3rd Platoon constructed an NDP at XT739820, which was to be called FSB SIDEKINDER. The platoon remained at this location until 28 June, acting as the reactionary force for the resupply convoy to QUAN LOI.

From 29 June to 8 July, the platoon was stationed at LOC MINH and at FSB ALICE where they were engaged in numerous civic action projects. On 9 July, the platoon was escorting a resupply convoy from QUAN LOI to LOC MINH when the convoy was ambushed. The action resulted in 22 NVA KIA, 1 PIK, 4 Engineers KIA, and 11 Engineers WIA. The next day the platoon moved to QUAN LOI and remained there until 31 July awaiting replacements for combat lost ACVs.

(d) 4th Platoon: During the month of July parts of the 4th Platoon were located at Blackhorse where they participated in a daily mine sweep from Blackhorse to the intersection of Routes 1 and 2 with negative results. During the majority of July two squads of the 4th Platoon were located at QUAN LOI where they provided direct support for Regimental Headquarters and were used as a ready reaction force for perimeter defense.

On the night of 12 May, the perimeter of QUAN LOI was breached by NVA armor and the 4th Platoon was sent as a reaction force to close the gap. The ensuing action resulted in 1 Engineer KIA and 12 NVA KIA. On 19 July, the platoon moved to Blackhorse Base Camp with Regimental Headquarters.

On 7 June, the entire 4th Platoon proceeded to QUAN LOI with Regimental Headquarters. During the months of June and July, the Engineers repaired and maintained the Regimental Headquarters area at QUAN LOI and did extensive work on the perimeter wire. During this time the platoon was also used as a ready reaction force for perimeter defense.

On 16 June, members of the platoon were airlifted into AP PHU LO (XT686906) where they destroyed persistent CS gas to prevent the Viet Cong from using the village. During the week of 15 – 21 June, the platoon provided security for the maintenance section of the 919th Engineer Company while they constructed an ARVN FSB at XT688746.

During the month of July, the platoon provided convoy security on QL 13 from QUAN LOI to THUNDER III and from QUAN LOI to LOC MINH. On 17 July, the 4th Platoon established a convoy ambush on QL 13. The ensuing action resulted in 13 NVA KIA. The main guns of the company's CSV's were put to extensive and effective use. To our knowledge, this is the first time the main gun of a CSV was fired in combat in Vietnam.
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SUBJECT:    Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 July 1969

(a) Maintenance Section: Elements of the maintenance section of the 119th Engineer Company moved to QUAN LOI on 8 June and remained there until the end of the reporting period. During this quarter the section hauled over 4,000 cubic yards of material and did extensive work on the perimeter, drainage ditches, and airport repair at QUAN LOI. They constructed five RNN IDP’s, two RNN-PSE’s, fortified a village (XTH1159), and provided support for numerous civil aff airs projects in the LOC MINH area. Also, the section constructed FSB BETTY and did extensive repair on FSB SIDEBENDER and FSB THUNDER III.

(3) New Equipment: None.

(4) Base Camp Development: During the reporting period the Engineers constructed two watch towers, two guard bunkers, and ten gates.

6. (C) CIVIL SERVICE SUPPORT:

a. Logistics:

(1) General: The 29th General Support Group and the 3rd Ordnance Battalion provided logistical support to the 11th ACR during the quarter. Maintenance support was split between the 185th Maintenance Battalion and the BTR CAT LSA. Supply support was provided by both the 2/6th Supply and Service Battalion and the 506th Supply and Service Detachment, BTR CAT LSA.

(2) Supply:

(a) Class I: Rations were drawn from the nearest Class I point. During Operations HOMESTAIRE RAIDS and KENTUCKY COUGAR, rations were drawn the 15th S&T Battalion at QUAN LOI. When the Regimental Headquarters and the 1st and 2nd Squadrons returned to Blackhorse for the first time in FY69, the 506th S&S Detachment was almost completely overwhelmed by the increased load. Convoys had to be doubled and only the concentrated effort of personnel kept the mess halls in operation.

(b) Class II and IV:

1. Barrier material and supplies were drawn from PAAE 208 yard in LONG BINH. Due to the mobile nature of operations conducted in the QUAN LOI area and frequent FSB construction, a working arrangement was made with the 15th S&S Battalion to draw barrier material from them on an emergency basis, then reimburse them when our own assets were convoys up from LONG Binh.

2. The 1st Squadron drew four M13A1’s, APC-Launched Bridge in May. A lightweight bridge on the M13A1 chassis had the maintenance problems associated with all hydralic operated equipment, and it was of limited use to troops operating with cross-attached tanks.
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AVICL-ME

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 July 1969

1 The 11th ACR vehicle turnover is shown for the primary combat vehicles for the period from 1 July to 31 July 1969:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>AUTO</th>
<th>MAINT/MILEAGE</th>
<th>CBT LOSS</th>
<th>FLOAT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M48A3</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8 (7)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M113A1</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23 (18)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M113A1</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>38 (28)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures in parentheses indicate the number of vehicles lost due to mines.

4 Replacement vehicles were issued against both combat losses and maintenance/mileage turn-ins. However, toward the end of the period only combat loss vehicles were replaced, and units would go several weeks with no replacement vehicles for non-combat loss turn-ins.

(c) Class III & V:

1 Class III was drawn from both the 266th S&S Battalion and BEAR CAT LSA, during the quarter. On operations MONTANA RAIDIER and KENTUCKY COUGAR, the 15th S&S Battalion at QUAN LOI was used. During the period 15 July to 7 June 1969, when the 11th ACR (-) returned to Blackhorse, and elements of the 199th MI and 3rd Brigade of the 1st Cav Div (M) moved in, the 506th S&S Detachment's fuel storage facilities had to be doubled.

2 Class V was drawn from the 3rd Ordnance Battalion or from ASP's near the Regimental areas of operation. When the Regiment (-) was at Blackhorse, the ammunition storage point was worked continuously to support it. An outstanding job of adopting work areas and procedures to rapidly handle a vastly increased workload with minimum delays was accomplished.

(d) Aerial Resupply:

1 Rotary Wing: Operations MONTANA RAIDIER and KENTUCKY COUGAR were supplied almost totally by air. While the Regiment (-) operated in the BLACKHORSE AO, the Blackhorse hook pod again became active and required some clearing up to accept the increased traffic. The QUAN LOI area of operations required from 20 - 30 C-130 sorties per day.

2 Fixed Wing: During the month of July, the 2nd Squadron was operating out of LOC HOP and securing the fixed wing airstrip there (IZ KELLY). At first the fixed wing resupply was adequate, but then higher priority resupply caused a large backlog in HOP HQA, and rotary wing...
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SUICUS (Operations) Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period
July 1969

(c) Maintenance

1. The ACTIV evaluation of the M551 ended in May and the results were published by USAVE. It noted the initial maintenance problem encountered with the vehicle, but it lasted just when the vehicles of the 11th ACR were nearing the 1,500 mile usage and were coming out of their first "jungle busting" test on Operation MONTANA RAIDER. The tremendoushaving that vehicles take in the "jungle" was reflected by the high deadline rate of the M551, particularly for engine & power train components at the conclusion of MONTANA RAIDER. It took several weeks of intensified maintenance to increase the operational level after Operation MONTANA RAIDER.

2. The 140th Maintenance Company Contact Team continued to expand during the quarter to provide responsive support maintenance to the 11th ACR. The idea of one contact team to support the Regiment was stretched to its limit in July when the squadrons were working in the COUD LOI area, one squadron in the LAI KHE area, one tank company in DANG TENG, one ACAV troop in SONG BE, one ACAV/Shadun troop in Blackhorse and one ACAV platoon in PHUOC VINH. Discussions with the 185th Maintenance Battalion and the 29th General Support Group in July produced a decision to form a separate maintenance contact team for each squadron. In late July, the three contact teams were being formed and personnel and equipment were assembling on the three squadrons.

3. Recovery of downed vehicles was an extremely difficult problem during Operation Montana Raider because there was no LLOG to units in the field. Operations in the Blackhorse area and subsequently, operation Kentucky Cougar, both had LLOG's, but the rainy season added a new difficulty. Heavy tracked vehicles sheared numerous final drives and overheated both engines and transmissions when working on water-soaked ground. Once a tank went down in water, at least minimum of two, and sometimes three similar vehicles were required to recover it. In one case in the Blackhorse area, D Co required 10 hours to move 700 meters to dry ground.

4. Vehicle evacuation was less of a problem during operation Kentucky Cougar because of lessons learned in Operation Montana Raider. Scheduling of tank transportation was still tight because of heavy commitments, but use of Philco Ford lowboys alleviated many of the evacuation problems for the light tracked and wheeled vehicles.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Mounted Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 July 1969

RCS GSFOR-65 (R)

18 August 1969

b. Medical:

(1) General: The general health of the Regiment during this reporting period continues to reflect progress in spite of the change of seasons from dry to wet and the increased tactical activity of the Regiment in the QUAN LOI area. Medical statistics indicate various increases and decreases concerning non-battle injuries, man days lost, and certain diseases such as malaria, diarrheal, respiratory, venereal, and dermatological. All fluctuations are directly related to the change in seasons and increase in tactical activity. Since the arrival of the new Regimental Surgeon, renewed emphasis has been placed on higher standards involving preventive medicine, sanitary discipline, quality of flight physicals, and control of malaria and venereal disease resulting in definite advancements toward intended goals.

(2) Non-battle injuries reported through medical channels in the Cavalry vary from abrasions and lacerations to injuries of a serious nature requiring hospitalization and evacuation out of the Republic of Vietnam. During the quarter the total of non-battle injuries averaged 211 per month, indicating a 30% increase from the previous reporting period. The number of injuries requiring hospitalization increased 37%. Man days lost as a result of non-battle injuries hospitalised averaged 263 a month with a 115% increase over the previous quarter.

(3) Significant diseases diagnosed during the period are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISEASE</th>
<th>NUMBER OF CASES</th>
<th>% INCREASE/DECREASE FROM LAST QUARTER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infectious Hepatitis</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>+475%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>+132%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diarrheal</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>+22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respiratory</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>+22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venereal</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>-23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dermatological</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>+21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heat Injury</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infectious Mononucleosis</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acute Hemolytic Anemia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Medical care facilities used during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HOSPITAL</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7th Surgical Hospital</td>
<td>LONG XAIO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th Evacuation Hospital</td>
<td>LONG HINH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35th Evacuation Hospital</td>
<td>VUONG TAU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36th Evacuation Hospital</td>
<td>LONG HINH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33rd Evacuation Hospital</td>
<td>LONG HINH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Field Hospital</td>
<td>CAM RINEH BAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Convalescent Center</td>
<td>LAI KHE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Surgical Hospital</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(5) MEDCAP activities have declined during this reporting period as can be seen by a comparison between the total number of Vietnamese patients treated last quarter and this quarter (1 Feb – 30 Apr, 5593; 1 May – 31 July, 2666).

(a) MEDCAP's initiated by the 37th Medical Company during the latter of the first quarter have met with great success during the past three months. A team of workers has visited the XUAN LOC Provincial Hospital daily giving formal instruction in proper standards of patient care to Vietnamese medical personnel. Numerous MEDCAP's and DENTCAP's were also conducted in and around the village of TOI GIAO.

(b) There was a significant decline in the number of MEDCAP's carried out by the squadrons. This is attributed to the many changes in the tactical situation of the 11th ACR. Medical personnel in the areas where previous MEDCAP's were held have been redeployed to new areas deemed necessary by the tactical situation.

(6) The Regimental Surgeon's Office is still receiving daily telephonic patient status reports on admissions, transfers, and final dispositions from hospitals treating 11th ACR personnel. However, the notification of mail clerks at Blackhorse Base Camp has been discontinued because of a bad communications problem incurred since our recent move to BIEN HCA. Presently, the surgeon's office is notifying the S-1 section of each squadron on patient status. Upon obtaining two class "A" phones in the surgeon's office, it is hoped that the old casualty mail system can be resumed. Completion of postal locator cards on each change in patient status within hospitals in Vietnam has also been discontinued. It is felt that by the time postal locator cards reach the 7th APU, the information is obsolete. However, the surgeon's office does complete postal locator cards on patients evacuated out of Vietnam.

(7) Newly established policy procedures and work accomplishments by the Regimental Surgeon have had a definite positive effect upon not only the Regiment's medical operations, but also operations of the entire Regiment.

(a) The importance of preventive medicine is receiving more command interest throughout USARV and the Regiment. Past weaknesses, mainly in the field of sanitation, were attributed to the lack of basic training involving personnel assigned to preventive medicine teams. To alleviate this situation, the Regimental Surgeon scheduled classes for Field Sanitation Team members and organized a special Field Sanitation Team that will operate out of and be under the direct control of the Regimental Surgeon. The establishment of this special team will allow the Regimental Surgeon to be constantly aware of field sanitation conditions.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armor Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 July 1969

18 August 1969

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(b) The area of personnel has always been a problem concerning assignments, use of medical personnel in the field, and career management techniques. The Regimental Surgeon has taken definite steps to alleviate these problems by establishing new medical personnel assignment policies. Directives concerning the proper use of medical personnel in the field and rear areas have been forwarded to all commanders.

(c) Quality flight medicine is another important area where the Regimental Surgeon has placed much emphasis. In order to att this high quality, the Regimental Surgeon has established a definite schedule concerning the time flight medicine can be obtained, and guidelines concerning flight medicine testing procedures that have markedly improved the flight medicine program and the status of the Flight Surgeon within the Regimental structure.

7. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION:

a. Strength:

(1) Strength figures by month:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>AUTO</th>
<th>ASCD</th>
<th>FDY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>4,384</td>
<td>4,452</td>
<td>4,265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>4,384</td>
<td>4,405</td>
<td>4,205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>4,384</td>
<td>4,506</td>
<td>4,293</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Hospital returnees: During the quarter 195 personnel were returned to duty after hospitalization. This figure does not include personnel who were treated and released immediately.

(3) Casualties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>KH</th>
<th>VIA</th>
<th>HC</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>HN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 July 1969

b. MOS Shortages:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GRADE</th>
<th>MOS</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>SHORTAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E5</td>
<td>17E20</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E5</td>
<td>17E40</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E5</td>
<td>26G20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E55</td>
<td>31G40</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E4</td>
<td>36E20</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E4</td>
<td>45G20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E5</td>
<td>54J40</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E5</td>
<td>76Z20</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E4</td>
<td>63G40</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E3</td>
<td>66H20</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E4</td>
<td>11E20</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E5</td>
<td>11E20</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E5</td>
<td>11E20</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E5</td>
<td>17E40</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E5</td>
<td>62E20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E3</td>
<td>64H10</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E3</td>
<td>67G10</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E5</td>
<td>67V20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E4</td>
<td>71T20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E5</td>
<td>92E20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Replacements: The quality of replacements remained at an acceptable level. The training cycles conducted by the Regiment Training School provided a thorough orientation of personnel to their new environment. The training program provides refresher training in basic skills with emphasis on troop leading procedures, tactics, and safety.
d. Services:

(1) Religious:

(a) General: During this quarter the attendance percentages for the Regiment rose to 15.8%, and represents an increase of approximately four percentage points over the preceding period. The 165 Catholic services had a total attendance of 3672, and the Protestants held 185 services with a total attendance of 5875. There also were 25 communion services during the reporting period. The marked increase in attendance is attributed to the combined operations of the Regiment which made it possible for the Chaplains to reach their units at a time when personnel could most easily attend services.

(b) On Memorial Day a special service was held at the Regimental Chapel. A crowd of approximately 200 attended to pay homage to their fallen comrades at arms. Another 24 memorial services were held throughout the Regiment during the quarter.

(c) Through the Regimental S-5, the Consolidated Chaplain Fund has donated $320.00 to the village of XEN CO. This money comes from the free-will offerings of the men of the Regiment and is to be used for school supplies. Another donation of $500.00 was made to the Evangelical Church of XUAN LOC for general improvements of their church school.

(2) Red Cross: During the reporting period the Red Cross Field Unit at Blackhorse Base Camp handled 463 cases. A total of 147 emergency leaves were granted, and they received 45 hardship discharge requests. Also, 34 made for emergency leave totalled $2410.

(3) Special Services:

(a) USO Shows: During the period 1 May - 31 July 69, Special Services had only one handshake tour by a celebrity. This tour was by Spanish movie actor Ricardo Montalban.

(b) Movies shown five nights a week to the units of Blackhorse Base Camp. A total of ten movies are kept on hand at all times by Special Services Officer, who procures these movies from the Army & Air Force Motion Picture Service in Saigon.

(4) Information: During the quarter great emphasis was placed on the publication of the first two issues of the Regimental Newspaper, The Blackhorse. Because the format and style of the newspaper had to be designed with a lack of precedents, the job caused a decrease in the time and manpower available for external news and photo releases. Plans for the newspaper were approved in early May, and the Information Officer went to Tokyo the first week of June to negotiate the printing contract with Pacific Stars & Stripes, and to direct the printing of the first issue. Both issues consisted of eight pages with no color, and were printed in the quantity of 6,000 copies to achieve an approximate 1-to-1 ratio. The first two issues,
June and July 69, were considered successful in their primary function of augmenting command information channels in the Regiment, and fostering high morale and esprit de corps among Blackhorse Troopers. Efforts are being made to upgrade both content and quality of the publication, as well as provide a more equitable distribution in the field. Despite the emphasis given publication of the Regimental Newspaper, continued efforts have been directed toward inducing news media to cover the Regiment's operations with their own personnel. This effort has succeeded with the television networks, the civilian wire services, and Stars & Stripes. Their efforts have been bolstered by photo coverage from 53rd Signal Battalion and news coverage by the USARV Information Office. The current Information Officer assumed his post on 1 July, and has gained approval of a plan to incorporate a series of news stringers in each troop and company with a previous plan for personnel at that level to handle Army Hometown News Release Forms on awards and promotions. The total production of these releases has tripled since the last reporting period but is still far below their potential number in regard to awards and promotions. Plans have been approved, and materials requisitioned for construction of a mobile photo processing laboratory. Completion of this lab will provide a marked improvement in photo production, speed, quantity and quality.

**Statistical Summary:**

| News Releases | 28  |
| Photo Releases | 99  |
| Hometown News Releases | 1,181 |

(a) The 7th Army Postal Unit is operating over TOE strength. The authorized strength is 1 officer and 15 enlisted men; however, the present strength is 1 officer and 17 enlisted men.

(b) The total value of money orders sold, including fees, was $968,956.77 for the months of May, June, and July (through 18 July). The total number of money orders sold was 13,789, while 730 money orders were cashed for a value of $52,928.62. The total stamp sales for the period was $10,750.

(c) Breakdown of incoming and outgoing mail:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RECEIVED</th>
<th>DISP TCHED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pouches (Letter Mail)</td>
<td>434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacks (Parcel Post)</td>
<td>2710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside Pieces</td>
<td>1265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered Mail</td>
<td>1847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insured Mail</td>
<td>664</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) During the period 1 May - 31 July 69, airmail was received at the 7th Army Postal Unit 79 days, and surface mail 3 days. The average transit time was five days for air mail, and 48 days for surface mail.
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AVIC-WF

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 July 1969

(a) The parcel post, money order and locator windows are open daily from 0830-1600 hours, seven days a week. We also have two money order clerks in the field approximately five days a month to service 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment personnel in their forward positions.

(b) Post Exchange:
   (a) General: The sales of the Blackhorse Post Exchange and its concessions have increased over the period from May to the present.
   (b) Post Exchange Statistical Summary Chart:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.A.ES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Retail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concessions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   These figures are projected through 31 July 1969.

   (c) A concentrated effort has been made to secure a gift shop which would carry Vietnamese gifts at a reasonable cost to the GI, as well as a shop which would carry camera accessories and items of interest from other oriental countries. Both are planned for the coming quarter.

   (d) Awards and Decorations:

   (1) Statistical Summary:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AWARD</th>
<th>APPROVED</th>
<th>PENDING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CMH</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSC</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IM</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFC</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS(V)</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACM(V)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH(V)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS(SVC)</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.C.(SVC)</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM(ACH)</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   (2) Foreign Awards - Statistical Summary:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AWARD</th>
<th>SUBMITTED</th>
<th>APPROVED</th>
<th>PENDING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gallantry Cross with Cold Star</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallantry Cross with Silver Star</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallantry Cross with Bronze Star</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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AVIC-WE
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 July 1969 

Foreign Awards - Statistics Summary cont'd

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AWARD</th>
<th>TRIED</th>
<th>APPROVED</th>
<th>PENDING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces Honor</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medal, Pinked Class</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces Honor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medal, Second Class</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armor Badge</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. Maintenance of Discipline and Law and Order

(1) Courts-Martial Status:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>TRIED</th>
<th>COURT</th>
<th>JUDGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The courts-martial during the quarter involved the following offenses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCAL ARTICLE NO.</th>
<th>VIOLATIONS JUDGED</th>
<th>NO. COURT PRACT'S</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>96 (M1B)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92 (Disobeying an order)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108 (Wrongful disposition of govt. property)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121 (Larceny)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128 (Assault)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134 (Carrying a concealed weapon)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. (FOOD) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS:

a. General: During the quarter the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 6th PSYOP Battalion, both held briefings utilizing the airborne propagandist teams, who conducted effective in dealing with villagers in the Blackhorse and 11th ACR OAs. In the Quang Loi AO, both the VC Local Force and the 7th NVA Division were subjected to daily aerial loudspeaker and leaflet missions. Villagers and binalots were also targeted to aid the Allied Forces in finding, fixing, and destroying the enemy.

b. Leaflet and loudspeaker missions were flown by both 6th PSYOP Battalion in support of the 11th ACR, and by our own S-5 section in Aviation Platoon aircraft. Themes most often emphasized were the "Open End", Pacification, and Volunteer Informant Programs. Over 16 missions were flown releasing 375,000 leaflets.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th ARVN Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 July 1969

a. Ralliers: It is usually possible to determine which unit's PSIOP caused a VC or NVA to rally. During the reporting period at least one VC rallied as a direct result of an 11th ARVN$.30 loudspeaker broadc"ast.

d. Popular Attitude: The general attitude of the population in our AO's continues to be mostly apathetic. Except in isolated instances, villagers remain unconcerned about the outcome of the war. US forces alternately gratify and infuriate the people; one week they provide MADC P's, the next week maneuvers cause crop damage. Because of family ties to VC in the area, almost all villagers provide some support, moral or physical, to the enemy. However, there are numerous instances where villagers aided Allied Forces by providing intelligence and assistance.

e. New Techniques and Equipment: S-5 and the PSTOF Office are working loudspeaker tapes and leaflets using relatives of the VC Loc-L Forces in the LOC Ninh area. The relatives addressed their messages directly to their husbands, sons, fathers, daughters, etc., who were working for the VC. Results are unknown at this time.

9. (FORO) CIVIC ACTION:

a. Significant Projects Completed: Of significance during the quarter was the completion of a school in T.N Kinh. Seven years ago the original school had been destroyed by the VC. The village provided 100% of the labor necessary for construction, each family sharing in the work. Materials were provided by both GVN and US Forces. Also, a house for the two new teachers was constructed within the US compound. Over 400 students were enrolled upon the school's completion. The entire project was an excellent example of cooperation between Vietnamese civilians, the GVN, and US Forces.

During the quarter the construction of the market in Kinh -X was completed. This was also built 100% by the villagers, with the materials provided by Regimental S-5. The purpose of the market is to stimulate the local economy, and to minimize travel over the mine infested roads to PHUOC VTH and T.N UXIN. The market has met an excellent reception.

b. Commodities Distributed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engineer stakes</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concertina wire</td>
<td>12 sleeves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School kits</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUSPECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cav lry Regiment for Period Ending 31 July 1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sandbags</td>
<td>13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement</td>
<td>600 lbs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber</td>
<td>3,000 Bd ft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tin</td>
<td>144 sheets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paint</td>
<td>45 gal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloth</td>
<td>200 lbs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>300 lbs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flags</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hats</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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SESSION: II - LESSON LEARNED

1. (c) LESSON LEARNED:

   a. Personnel: None.

   b. Operations:

      (1) OBSERVATION: Combined operations of US and ARVN units are complex and require more coordination than other US operations. However, the benefits gained from more efficient utilization of all available military units is well worth the expended effort.

      EVALUATION: US advisors serve as the point of contact for a US unit working with an ARVN unit. However, at the battalion and regimental levels a Liaison officer (LIO) is required to represent the US unit to both the advisor and the ARVN Commander and staff. This LIO must be carefully selected and well versed in the operations of his parent unit.

      RECOMMENDATION: When conducting combined US and ARVN operations, the US unit must maintain a liaison officer with the ARVN unit.

      (2) OBSERVATION: When the Regiment moves in a new AO, it usually makes a large number of heavy contacts. After the initial encounters in which a large number of IWA/VI are usually eliminated, the enemy seems to avoid contact with the Regiment except to defend fortified enemy base camps and to carry out a few ambushes.

      EVALUATION: After the VC/IWA test an armored unit several times, they apparently choose to avoid further heavy contact.

      RECOMMENDATION: After the initial intensive contacts in a new area, the Regiment should be changed from "jungle busting" to pacification.

      (3) OBSERVATION: The Howitzer Battery of the 3rd Squadron initiated a program of moving every two or three days. They were receiving incoming mortars on their IDP when they remained in one place for extended periods of time.

      EVALUATION: The mortar attacks have ceased since the program was initiated. The interior of the fire bases do not become a quagmire during the rainy season. The Howitzer engines and automotive material are exercised more frequently. Ammunition storage capabilities are limited. Firebase defenses are kept to a minimum.
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Ending 31 Jul''

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All batteries should move more frequently.
Close liaison between battery commanders and squadron supply officers be
maintained for resupply of ammunition.

(4) OBSERVATION: Counter-battery preplanned fires were initiated
after three days of rocket attacks.

EVALUATION: The schedule of rocket and mortar attacks in the
QUAI LOI area was followed closely by the Operations Section, 8/6th Artillery
and a timed counterfire program was initiated. Mortar and rocket attacks
ceased as of the date the program began.

RECOMMENDATION: Closely monitor time and direction of attacks
and plan counterfire accordingly.

b. Training: None.
c. Intelligence:

(1) OBSERVATION: Enemy Movement.

EVALUATION: It has been noted, based on prisoners interrogation,
that the enemy generally begins to move the bulk of his troops and supplies
at approximately 1600 hours.

RECOMMENDATION: To reduce enemy movement during the last hours
of light, a maximum effort must be made to establish aerial dusk patrols to
VR the area of operation. Additionally, H & I fires must be planned so that
clearances are obtained prior to the normal clearance time of 2100 hours.
Also, ambush patrols must be positioned early in the evening to exploit
enemy movement before last light.

(2) OBSERVATION: Employment of 350 and .50 Caliber machine-guns.

EVALUATION: Based on interrogation of prisoners following
enemy initiated ambushes along QL 12, it was learned that guns mounted on
armored vehicles generally fire too high.

RECOMMENDATION: In order to inflict the greatest number of
casualties upon enemy forces, it is imperative that crew members on all
armored vehicles be impressed with the necessity of shooting low.

(3) OBSERVATION: Convoy Ambushes.

EVALUATION: Based on prisoner interrogation and experience
of elements of the 116th ACR, it has been observed that ambush
positions will generally be located within 0-100 meters of the road.

RECOMMENDATION: Once an ambush is triggered, convoy units
must initially sweep both sides of the road in close contact.
CONFIDENTIAL

AMC-93
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st TMC and TMC Support for Period Ending 31 July 1969

The enemy, by the time the initial area is complete, may enhance it
shoulder deep in the trees and possibly deeper to cut off the advancing force as it
attempts to withdraw from the ambush site. Some all-vehicle units
withdraw in the same direction. All vehicle effort must be made to pin down
the enemy. The killing zone and the direction of withdrawal by these
units trigger andเฉลย the ambush site's artillery. northeast and northwest
should be employed against likely ambush sites until the
block the escape of the ambush units.

a. Medical: None.

b. Signal:

1) OBSERVATION: Implementation of a USR call device circuit
to the 1st 49B center was delayed two days because the terminal
equipment (TE) did not have the line 90 current position
or line 90 position (30 MA).

EVALUATION: This headquarters does not have the equipment or
trained personnel to install non-TE concentrator hardware. The supporting
unit must provide the guidance and equipment for prearrangement.

RECOMMENDATION: Coordination for implementation and alignment
of equipment (TE) should be carried out with the supporting
headquarters.

V) OBSERVATION: The signal maintenance support capability of the
direct support task is inadequate in forward tactical areas for timely
repairs.

EVALUATION: Organic elements of the Regiment often work far
forward of the direct support channels offered by their DS unit. Contact
teams provided have been serving as a collection and evacuation point to
t heir parent units thereby introducing additional time delays.

RECOMMENDATION: The forward signal support task should be
considerably expanded in personnel and repair items to give more timely
service at several locations.

g. Medical: None.
h. Base Camp Development: None.
i. PSYOPS/Civic Action: None.

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AVIC-ME

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 Jul 69 RCS CG, DA -65 (R)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

6 Incls
Incls 1, 2, 3 and 6 wd HQ, DA
Incl 6 published as Combat After Action Report - 69X027

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1 CO, 2nd Squadron, 11th ACR
1 CO, 3rd Squadron, 11th ACR
1 CO, Air Cav Trp, 11th ACR
6 2nd MHD, 11th ACR

THOMAS P.K. RADFORD
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant
AVDAGM 1969 (9 September 1969) 1st Inf

UNCLASSIFIED Operational Report of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

For the Period Ending 9 July 1969, COMDR (CH), US Army

DA, US, 11th Armored Cavalry Division (AH), AR Convention Center, New York City

TO: Ltr. Gen. 11th Field Force

From: 824th APO San Francisco, Calif

1. This Report is made in accordance with the current regulations for the Quarterly NCO's Report to be submitted by the 20th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Armored Division for the quarter ending 9 July 1969.

2. Report is for week in which ends 9 July 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER,

[Signature]

KROSTY, F. J.
Sgt. MJC
Ass't CG

DA, HQ II FFORC Aust, APO San Francisco 96266 18 SEP 1969

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for the period ending 31 July 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

B.G. MACDONALD
Lt. AG
Asst AG
SECRET

ARMS-Day (19 Aug 69) 1419

SUBJECT: Operational Report on the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 July 1969, R-CSPOR-69 (R1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, TRINITY, APO San Francisco 96211 (U)

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPO 450, APO 96211

RE: Commanded in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPO 450, APO 96211

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

2. (C) Reference item concerning "Enemy Movement", "Employment of M60 and .50 Caliber Machineguns" and "Convoy Ambushes", section II, page 33, paragraphs 2d(1), (2) and (3) respectively; concur. These are excellent examples of how detailed PW interrogation can be used to obtain valuable information. These lessons learned will be published in the quarterly USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON

ILT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy form:
11th ACR
II FFW

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS.
DO NOT DISCLOSE OR DISCLOSED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ABOVE DOWNGRADE SCHEDULE.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 OCT 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff For Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. Smith
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
**CONFIDENTIAL**

Army Aviation Statistical Summary

1. Sorties flown:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MISSION</th>
<th>OH-6A</th>
<th>OH-6AA*</th>
<th>AH-1G</th>
<th>UH-1C</th>
<th>UH-1D</th>
<th>UH-1H</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command and Control</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>1054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop Lift</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualty Evacuation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>817</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
<td>816</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Helicopter</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Number Passengers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>PASSENGERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH-6AA</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>3726</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Tons Cargo:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>TONS CARGO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*CH-6A LHN armed with minigun

Incl 4
4. Hours Flown by Aircraft:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>HOURS FLOWN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>4037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>1737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1F</td>
<td>3497</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Results of Fire:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VC/NVA KBA (BC)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC/NVA KBA (FOSS)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures Destroyed</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures Damaged</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Ammunition Expended:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ROUNDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.62</td>
<td>240,313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>5,113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40mm</td>
<td>13,492</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Aircraft Availability (% Operational Ready):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1F</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. Aircraft Non-Operational Ready (Maintenance):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. Aircraft Non-Operational Ready (Maintenance): ²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-6A</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹Percent of hours downtime due to supply.
²Percent of hours downtime due to maintenance.
1. FAC and VR Sorties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>NUMBER OF SORTIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O-1</td>
<td>456</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Tactical Air Sorties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>NUMBER OF SORTIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F-100</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-4C</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-57</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-37</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-1E</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Ordnance:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Napalm</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK-81</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK-82</td>
<td>442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK-197</td>
<td>534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBU-24</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Bomb Damage Assessment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers Destroyed</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers Damaged</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers Uncovered</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATEGORY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting Positions Destroyed</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trenchline destroyed</td>
<td>365 meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures Destroyed</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar Positions Destroyed</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 cal Sites Destroyed</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Explosions</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustained Fires</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBA (confirmed)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBA (possible)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155 gal Barrels Destroyed</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meters of Roads Cleared</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May 69 to 31 July 69.

CO, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
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