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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

11 December 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division Artillery, Period Ending 15 July 1969 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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9th Infantry Division Artillery
SECTION I

Significant Activities

1. (C) Introduction:

a. General.

(1) During the period 1 May thru 15 July 1969, Division Artillery continued to support the diverse and dynamic operations of the 9th Infantry Division. The brigades exploited helicopter mobility and night operations to the utmost; however, the frequency of contacts with the enemy decreased significantly over the last reporting period with the size of the contacts being mostly with enemy squad and platoon sized elements. The artillery continued to split batteries and displace frequently to support the far-ranging tactics of the maneuver forces. With the onset of wet weather, greater use was made of the Airmobile Firing Platforms (paddy platforms) in order to maintain flexibility. There was no significant curtailment of maneuver operations because of wet terrain or shortage of artillery fire units, although 1st and 2d Brigades occasionally operated outside of US artillery coverage. There was no attempt to overrun a battery position although standoff attacks were common.
The 6th Battalion, 77th Artillery (6-77 Arty) conducted the ceremonies for "Operation Switch" which signified completion of the turnover of equipment to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam on 26 April 1969. The unit was not officially inactivated, however, until 1 June 1969. During the month of May, 6-77 Artillery completed the equipment turnover and all eligible troops were reassigned within Division Artillery.

On 14 June, it was announced that the 9th Infantry Division (-) would redeploy during August to Hawaii with the mission of PACOM reserve; the 2d Brigade with supporting units would deploy to the Continental United States during July for inactivation, and the 3d Brigade with supporting units would remain in RVN. The 2d Brigade began withdrawal from Kien Hoa Province on 18 June and the 1st Brigade began withdrawal from Dinh Tuong Province on 9 July.

Significant activities of the battalions are described in the following paragraphs.

b. 2d Battalion, 4th Artillery. The Battalion continued to support the 3d Brigade in its Tactical Area of Interest (TAO1) of Long An Province. With Battery A, 1-84 Arty reinforcing and priority of fire from two general support-reinforcing (GSR) non-divisional, 155mm howitzer batteries (Batteries B and C, 5-42 Artillery), displacement and splitting of batteries were relatively infrequent. The Brigade fire support bases and base camps were subjected to intermittent mortar and rocket attacks during the reporting period. The 2-4 Artillery made extensive use of the mobility and rapid direct fire capability of the 155mm SP howitzers of A/1-84 Artillery. The howitzers were employed in pairs along with two M2 "Dusters" for preparations of heavily wooded and booby trapped areas, with the howitzers normally positioned a distance of 800 meters from the target. The 2-4 Artillery is currently replacing their M101A1 105mm howitzers with the M102 model and, at present, two batteries have completed the changeover.

c. 1st Battalion, 11th Artillery. The Battalion continued the mission of direct support to the 1st Brigade in its Tactical Area of Interest (TAO1) of Dinh Tuong Province, while at the same time providing fire support to Dong Tam Base which is located in the 1st Brigade TAO1. The interdiction and spoiling type operations by the Brigade often reached into the adjacent Provinces of Kien Phong to the west and Kien Tuong to the north; therefore, in order to provide continuous support, the 1-11 Artillery displaced a total of 25 times, of which 15 were split battery moves. Although most of the battery splits were for periods of only one to three days, one battery was split for 25 days and another battery for 35 days. During the period 5-11 June, extensive use was made of the "paddy platforms" when Battery B, 1-11 Artillery made three air mobile moves while supporting 4th Battalion, 39th Infantry in the Plain of Reeds. Battery B, 1-84 Artillery continued to provide GSR fires and Battery D, 2-4 Artillery remained attached to 1-11 Artillery.
d. 3d Battalion, 34th Artillery. As part of the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF), the Battalion continued to furnish direct support to 2d Brigade in Kien Hoa Province and occasional strike operations in Go Cong, Vinh Binh and Vinh Long Provinces. The enemy in the Brigade TAOI began avoiding contact with friendly forces in May. The Brigade countered with a series of daily airmobile and watermobile assaults on known comcom-liaison routes and base camps throughout the TAOI and into adjacent provinces. To provide responsive fires for these tactics, 3-34 Artillery made numerous echelon moves and conducted split battery operations. The majority of the moves were made by Batteries A and B which were the barge-mounted batteries while Battery C continued operations on paddy platforms at Fire Support Base Klaw (XS6029) with occasional displacement of two howitzers to provide additional support for operations in central Kien Hoa Province. Upon announcement of the 2d Brigade redeployment, contact with the enemy practically ceased. The withdrawal of Brigade forces from Kien Hoa and the turnover of fire support bases to Province officials and the 7th ARVN Infantry Division began on 18 June. The 3-34 Artillery continued support during the withdrawal and on 30 June closed out operations of Battery C and FSB Klaw with the M102 howitzers and paddy platforms being airlifted to the 2d Bn, 4th Artillery. Battery B followed by closing to Dong Tam and ceasing operations on 6 July. As the last of the Brigade's maneuver battalions (3-47th Inf) cleared the operational area, Battery A returned to Dong Tam and ceased operations on 8 July. The M102 105mm howitzers of Batteries A and B were transferred to 2-4 Artillery.

e. 1st Battalion, 84th Artillery. This Battalion provided general support (GS) to the Division. Additionally, it continued to provide fire support coordination for the infantry battalion operating in TAOR KUDAU, the area surrounding Dong Tam Base Camp, and for the Division Support Command which is charged with perimeter and internal defense of Dong Tam Base. The Battalion also continued to operate the Dong Tam Air Warning Control Center. The three AN/MPQ-4A radar sections, organic to the three DS Battalions, were positioned to cover Dong Tam Base; therefore, the 1-84 Artillery exercised operational control over these sections. Battery A (155mm self-propelled) was GSR to 2-4 Artillery and conducted numerous two-howitzer displacements to 18 different firing positions in Long An Province for purposes of delivering both direct and indirect fires. On 25 June during one of the above mentioned displacements, the lead howitzer was heavily damaged by a land mine at grid XS625562, wounding the section chief, gunner and driver. Batteries B and C (155mm towed) were GSR to the 1-11 Artillery and 3-34 Artillery respectively. Battery B was the airmobile battery with four complete airmobile moves during the reporting period, while Battery C remained at FSB Key (XS5131) reinforcing the fires of 3-34 Artillery until 8 July, then supporting Kien Hoa Province forces until closing into Dong Tam on 15 July to begin processing for redeployment. Battery D (8" self-propelled) operated from Dong Tam Base with a GS mission. This Battery on two occasions displaced to Thu Thua (XS5472) and on one occasion to Tan Tru (XS6562) with the mission of GSR 2-4 Artillery for one and two-day operations. A similar mission of GSR 1-11 Artillery was performed several times by a displacement to FSB Moore (XS2650).
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15 July 1969

f. Ammunition expenditures for the reporting period are shown at Inclosure 1.

2. (C) Organisation.

a. The artillery organization for combat on 15 July 1969 is shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>MISSION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>2nd Bn, 4th Arty (-)</td>
<td>XS 5563</td>
<td>DS 3rd Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 11th Arty (+)</td>
<td>XS 4143</td>
<td>DS 1st Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Btry D, 2d Bn, 4th Arty</td>
<td>XS 1448</td>
<td>Attached 1st Bn, 11th Arty</td>
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<tr>
<td>3rd Bn, 34th Arty</td>
<td>XS 4143</td>
<td>No tactical mission. Standdown in preparation for redeployment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 84th Arty</td>
<td>XS 4143</td>
<td>GS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Btry A, 1st Bn, 84th Arty</td>
<td>XS 5563</td>
<td>GSR 2d Bn, 4th Arty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Btry B, 1st Bn, 84th Arty</td>
<td>XS 2650</td>
<td>GSR 1st Bn, 11th Arty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Btry C, 1st Bn, 84th Arty</td>
<td>XS 4143</td>
<td>GS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Btry D, 1st Bn, 84th Arty</td>
<td>XS 4143</td>
<td>GS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Divisional Artillery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Btry B, 5th Bn, 42d Arty</td>
<td>XS 8372</td>
<td>GSR 9th Inf Div Arty (priority of fires to 2-4 Arty)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Btry C, 5th Bn, 42d Arty</td>
<td>XS 5472</td>
<td>GSR 9th Inf Div Arty (priority of fires to 2-4 Arty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Btry C, 5th Bn, 2d Arty</td>
<td>XS 4143</td>
<td>GS 9th Inf Div (Operational Control 9th Div Arty)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2d Plt, Btry H (SLT), 29th Arty</td>
<td>XS 4143</td>
<td>GS 9th Inf Div</td>
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b. Attached at Inclosure 2 is a roster of commanders of 9th Division Artillery units.

c. Attached at Inclosure 3 is a list of permanent and semi-permanent fire support bases.

3. (U) Personnel & Administration:

a. During the period 1 May 1969 to 15 July 1969, the Division Artillery experienced a shortage of personnel in both basic and support specialties.
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From 1 May 1969 to 15 May 1969, the Division Artillery operated at less than the 95% strength which had been established by 9th Infantry Division as the minimum manning level for artillery units. Replacement flow was accelerated in the latter part of May and the Division Artillery received a significant number of replacements. A majority of the replacements were support personnel; the shortages in the basic MOS's were not alleviated. The Division Artillery had reached a strength of 96.9% when it was announced on 14 June 1969 that two brigades of the 9th Infantry Division would deploy from Vietnam. At that time, all replacement flow into the Division stopped and the strength then declined steadily to its present 91%.


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<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted</td>
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<td>2041</td>
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5. (C) Intelligence. During the reporting period, the Division Artillery continued to exploit available target acquisition assets to deny free movement of the enemy throughout the night. The attachment of the 264th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar) to the Division greatly increased target acquisition in Dinh Tuong Province. Increased use of ground sensor devices was made by the Division Artillery. The sensors were employed in areas where blanket clearances for firing could normally be granted, thus allowing extremely rapid reaction times. Use of crater analysis, visual spotterings of mortar flashes, and Prisoner of War interrogation reports were made to determine sectors of search of the AN/MPQ-4 radars. POW interrogation reports stressed the extreme accuracy of counterbattery fire around Dong Tam Base.

5. (U) Training.

a. The Division Artillery gunnery contact team, consisting of two Division Artillery staff officers, continued the program of visiting each of the Div Arty firing batteries on a monthly basis. Continued improvement in firing battery and fire direction procedures and techniques have been shown on each visit.

b. The AN/MPQ-4A Countermortar Radars organic to each DS battalion are positioned to cover D.n. Tr. Erâ, and the crews of these radars are under a continuous training program to maintain proficiency in locating hostile mortars. Daily they conduct a high burst (HB) or a center of impact (CI) registration and frequent tests are conducted with a 60mm mortar firing at all angles of elevation to include low angle. This training had proven beneficial as attested by numerous hostile mortar locations detected.
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(UIC-WDF3-YJ)(U)

6. (U) Logistics.

a. During the period of 1 May 69 to 15 Jul 69, the 9th Division Artillery
FADAC generators had relatively little downtime in comparison with the previous
reporting period. This is probably attributable to the fact that the Division
Artillery was issued a total of eight new 3KW,400-cycle,FADAC generators.

b. The 9th Division Artillery had nineteen FADACs and two TPS-25 Radars
that were powered by 3KW,400-cycle generators. The Division maintenance batta-
lion gave Division Artillery excellent support in generator maintenance and train-
ing of generator operators. The support provided included a concentrated effort
to instruct the operators in required daily preventive maintenance, log book
maintenance and operating procedures. Additionally, Division Artillery developed
a generator inspection team that visited all batteries to improve the unit mainte-
nance program. This team checked all aspects of battery-level, generator mainte-
nance including the equipment and the log books and provided assistance in secur-
ing the necessary repair parts.

c. The availability of the FADAC has improved the effectiveness of fire in
the Delta. The existence of a good generator maintenance program in 9th Division
Artillery has made this possible.

7. (U) Civic Action: The Division Artillery civic action program continued to
be active throughout the reporting period. Civic action teams conducting MEDCAPs
and ICAPs treated 28,175 patients on 268 visits to civilian communities. Large
amounts of construction material along with medical and school supplies were
distributed in an attempt to help the Vietnamese Government to pacify villages
and hamlets. Information collected from the visits proved reliable and was
integrated into overall intelligence collection efforts. A new activity was
incorporated in Div Arty's civic action program - that of helping Vietnamese
children with harelips obtain corrective surgery, by providing transportation to
and from Cho Ray Hospital in Saigon. Fifteen individuals benefited from this
program during this reporting period. The civic action program is summarized in
tabular form at Inclosure 4.

SECTION II

Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations

1. (U) Personnel.

a. Personnel Data Cards.

OBSERVATION: Personnel data cards must be meticulously maintained at battalion
level to facilitate unit redeployment.

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(15C-SSP-101)
(U)

EVALUATION: Personnel processing during the planning and execution phases of unit redeployment from Vietnam is a critical operation. Since information necessary to complete the required actions is contained in personnel files that are relatively unavailable to the unit, a personnel data card file must be kept at battalion headquarters. As many rapid decisions are based on the information posted on these cards, the data must be current, correct, and complete. Clerks must be imbued with the responsibility of updating and reviewing this valuable source of information.

RECOMMENDATION: That all units in Vietnam keep completely accurate data cards on their personnel to facilitate smooth redeployment operations.

b. Reevaluation of Individual Pay Allotments for Redeploying Units.

OBSERVATION: Individual pay allotments for personnel assigned to units redeploying from Vietnam must be reviewed at the earliest possible date.

EVALUATION: The majority of men serving in Vietnam allot a significant amount of their pay during their tour. The amount is larger than normal because they are receiving hostile fire pay, a substantial tax relief, and only a small amount of ready cash is needed. When a unit is redeployed from Vietnam, the decrease in pay and accompanying need for ready cash necessitates that allotments be reviewed and revised, or financial difficulties will be encountered.

RECOMMENDATION: That redeploying units establish a mandatory system for their members to review and revise their individual allotments early after notice of departure from the combat zone.

2. (C) Operations.

a. M109 Direct Fire Precautions:

OBSERVATION: Use of the M109 (SP) howitzer in the direct fire role at ranges between 450 and 800 meters results in low velocity shell fragments falling into the firing battery area.

EVALUATION: Increasing the distance between the M109 and the direct fire target reduces the danger to personnel from low velocity fragments but at the same time reduces the effectiveness of the direct fire. The optimum distance is the closest range tactically possible which produces negligible risk to firing battery personnel who are necessarily exposed to ground fire and/or low velocity fragments. Experience so far has shown the optimum distance between the M109 and the direct fire target to be 800 meters.

RECOMMENDATION: That 800 meters be used as the optimum distance between the M109 howitzer and direct fire targets, if the tactical situation permits.
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b. Tracked Vehicle Driver Protection.

OBSERVATION: The lightly armored bottom hull of self-propelled artillery and associated tracked equipment offers inadequate protection for the crew.

EVALUATION: Recently a M48 self-propelled howitzer was damaged by a mine exploded in a culvert, and the driver was seriously injured when the blast blew a hole through the hull under the operator's compartment. While the practice of sandbagging the hull vehicle thus is effective, there is insufficient Naval to
floor clearance to provide adequate manhandling in the driver's compartment of the hull.

RECOMMENDATION: That the driver seat be raised in the hull vehicle for:

(1) Increased visibility.
(2) Improved manhandling.

OBSERVATION: During 10 weeks operation, 10 M48A3 tanks have been hit by enemy explosive ordnance in the test area. Test results indicate a set. However, it can be seen that vital engine parts and other critical tanks and equipment are vulnerable to enemy attack.

EVALUATION: Since June 1968 the M48A3 has replaced the M48A1A3 in the division artillery. It has been noted that the new tank is more robust. The M48A1A3 has given the division artillery - radio-teletype capability on the basis, which the M48A3A3 cannot maintain in support of the division's riverine forces. Using its radio-teletype capability, the M48A1A3 has given outstanding efficiency while the M48A3A3 has shown that a highly trained operator is needed on the M48A1A3.

RECOMMENDATION: That all division artillery elements requiring M48A1A3 radio-teletype communications be issued the M48A3A3, and if required to use with the M48A1A3. That specialized training be given to the operators.

d. Use of ground surveillance radars in conjunction with search sensor devices.

OBSERVATION: Ground sensor devices can detect personnel movement in the immediate area of the devices. They cannot, however, continue surveillance when the personnel have moved through their field of view.

EVALUATION: In the 1940's and 1950's, many search sensor devices were employed in such a manner that they would be effective in this situation. It would be beneficial to develop newer devices which would be able to track personnel in the field and track personnel.
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RECOMMENDATION: That units employing ground sensor devices coordinate with ground surveillance radars to ensure that surveillance of targets required by these devices can be continued until artillery can be fired on the target.

e. Use of artillery fire direction channels for transmission of radar-acquired targets.

OBSERVATION: To reduce the time between detection of a radar target and delivery of artillery fire, all ground surveillance radars within the 9th Inf Div report sightings to the nearest artillery unit.

EVALUATION: Ground surveillance radars normally operate in the intelligence radio net of the organization operating the radar. Using intelligence channels, target sightings would be relayed to the Brigade S-2, passed to the artillery liaison officer, relayed to the artillery battalion and sent to an artillery battery to fire on the target. Using this system no processing of firing data can be done until the target information reaches the battery. The infantry units normally have no capability to rapidly react on radar sightings unless the sightings occur close to an infantry unit. To expedite prompt delivery of artillery fire on radar sightings, all ground surveillance radars pass sightings direct to the nearest artillery unit. The artillery unit processes the sighting as a fire mission, and requests the clearances to fire from the clearing agencies. Upon receipt of the clearances to fire, the radar sighting is sent into intelligence channels by the processing artillery unit. Use of these procedures has drastically reduced the time required to place fire on a radar sighting and has not appreciably delayed the use of the radar sightings in the intelligence cycle.

RECOMMENDATION: That units employing ground surveillance radars have them enter the nearest artillery unit's fire direction net to make the initial report of a radar sighting, and have the artillery unit process this sighting as a request for fire.

f. Air Cavalry and Forward Air Controller Coordination.

OBSERVATION: Coordination and delivery of close air support can be aided by placing the air cavalry unit and forward air controller in direct communications.

EVALUATION: On several recent occasions contact was established with the enemy in difficult terrain and under poor weather conditions. Additional troop units were lifted into the area to reinforce the unit in contact and to seal off enemy routes of withdrawal. While the newly arrived infantry units maneuvered through the thick vegetation, the air cavalry troop fixed the enemy in position. As the situation developed, the commander decided that airstrikes would be employed to reduce the enemy strong points. The air cavalry unit was the only element with a complete knowledge of the enemy and friendly dispositions. The Airborne Forward Air Controller (FAO) was directed to contact the air cavalry commander on
the cavalry INR. a check with all the cavalry aircraft quickly established friendly locations and the target area. The cavalry commander was able to establish final ground coordination through the marine Warfare commander, and the airstrikes were placed directly on the designated targets. This technique enabled the cavalry to remain in close support of the ground elements while the airstrikes were in progress.

RECOMMENDATION: That consideration be given to establishment of this technique as a standard practice. The cavalry units are, many times, the only elements in contact with the enemy with a complete picture of the tactical situation. Their assistance in marking targets and friendly locations and in briefing the airborne FAC can be invaluable.

g. Airmobiling Paddy Platforms.

OBSERVATION: The requirement to load 3000 pounds of ballast for an externally helicopter-launched firing platform can be turned into an asset. The weight of the loaded platform (10,000) exceeds the lift capability of a CH-47, but is much less than the max capacity of a CH-54; hence, properly loading the platform to the capacity of the CH-54 will significantly improve the reaction time required to close a battery into a position requiring paddy platforms.

EVALUATION: Ten platforms were used to airmobile a firing battery to its position in the Plain of Reeds. To satisfy the ballast requirement and make efficient use of air assets, the six platforms were airmobiled with the M102 howitzer, an A-22 bag of section equipment and an A-22 bag of ammunition on each (Incl 5). The CH-54 is capable of transporting these platforms which weigh approximately 16,000 to 17,000 lbs. The remaining four platforms were loaded with ammunition. A gun platform thus rigged provides the same reaction time, if not less, as that of a normal airmobile operation with the ammo and section equipment piggyback. Two, 20-foot, tie-down straps with ratchets were required to secure the two A-22 bags. The bags were secured on each flank of the howitzer adjacent to the wheels. The howitzer was secured using the mounting base provided on the platform and by securing the firing roller to the platform. Care was taken to ensure that the A-22 bags were equally loaded and placed so that the original center of gravity of the platform would not change. The entire load was then rigged using twelve, 20 ft., 2-loop straps and a large clevis. The gun platforms were brought into position and then an ammo service platform positioned between each pair of howitzers. Positioning the service platforms in close proximity to the firing platforms requires a very experienced ground guide. After positioning, solid steel planking was placed between the platforms as walkways. Two howitzer sections shared a service platform upon which was stored the ammunition, section equipment and personnel equipment. The tenth platform was used by the battery fire direction center.

RECOMMENDATION: That when the use of the mobile firing platform is required, the platforms be rigged as described above. Second, that ratchet type, tie-down devices be issued batteries employing platforms on a basis of two per platform. Third, that only a very experienced guide be used to control the landing zone.
The artillery liaison officer aboard the infantry battalion commander's command and control aircraft frequently loses communication using an AN/PRC-25 (or AN/PRC-77) radio. The loss is equally pronounced in air-to-air communication as it is in air-to-ground communication. Effective communication with the AN/PRC-25 can be gained by using a locally fabricated, skid-mounted, external antenna.

**EVALUATION:** Dependable communications are required by the arty LNO at ranges of 25 to 30 km when operating in an airmobile environment. This can be achieved by using an improvised antenna. Prior to using this antenna, the liaison officers usually folded the multi-section whip antenna of the AN/PRC-25 so that two sections protruded outside the aircraft door with the radio on the floor. This procedure was marginally satisfactory since the communication was very directional. The dependable range was limited to about 8 to 10 km and was degraded when the aircraft operated at low altitudes. An improvised antenna was made locally from available materials. The antenna element was a five foot length of stranded, bare conductor attached to a length of coaxial cable which was connected to the radio. The antenna was attached to the vertical supports of the aircraft skids by using the required lengths of nylon cord (Incl 6). The antenna was attached as the liaison officer boarded the aircraft for the day and removed when the aircraft was released. This set-up gives dependable communication at ranges of 25 km. The antenna does not have noticeable directivity, and communication at low altitudes is improved. The antenna has been mounted with its axis both parallel and perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the aircraft with no differences noted.

**RECOMMENDATION:** That in those instances where an additional radio is required aboard UH-1D type aircraft, an antenna of a design similar to that described above be used.

**Observation:** Artillery liaison officers have problems monitoring all necessary FM nets while working from a command and control helicopter. By using components from an aircraft headset and PRC-25 headset, a modified headset can be made to eliminate those problems.

**EVALUATION:** Command and control helicopters are generally equipped with a console having only two (2) FM radios. These radios are used by the infantry commander to monitor company internal nets and the battalion operations net. The artillery liaison officer must use a PRC-25 radio to monitor his fire nets and he is unable to monitor operations from the console, unless he wears two separate headsets. Wearing two headsets is cumbersome and guarantees the wearer a headache after an hour or so. By using components of the above mentioned headsets, a headset can be modified allowing the liaison officer to operate his fire net through

his PRC-25 and to monitor all conversations and operations being conducted over the console channels. The modifications are easily made using the left earphone and ten (10) pin connector of the PRC-25 headset. The liaison officer can then monitor the infantry nets through the left earphone and the artillery nets through the right earphone.

RECOMMENDATION: That artillery liaison officers employing PRC-25 radios have their comms section modify a headset which allows him to monitor infantry operations and the fire net.

3. (U) Training. None

4. (U) Intelligence. None

5. (C) Logistics.

a. M102 Howitzer Bevel Gear Assembly.

OBSERVATION: Field experience has shown that the machine keys in the bevel gear, FSN 1015-012-4485, tend to break during heavy or sustained firing.

EVALUATION: The poor quality of the present machine keys of the bevel gear assembly has led to frequent downtime. During heavy or sustained firing the machine key tends to split longitudinally. Also the excess free play, associated with the varying machine key sizes, causes the bevel gears to wear heavily and shear teeth. The teeth on the gears are subjected to a heavy jolt as the gear slips on the operating handle shaft. Once the gears are chipped and have slipped, the breech will not close. Also when replacing the bevel gears the retaining ring is usually broken and must be replaced. The machine keys can be locally manufactured by the DS maintenance unit.

RECOMMENDATION: That units equipped with the M102 howitzer contact their maintenance support unit for the machining of additional keys. In addition the units should increase their PLL supply of the bevel gear assembly to include the machine key and retainer ring.

b. Distribution of Basic Items Issue Lists to Expedite Inventory of TOE Property.

OBSERVATION: Complete inventory of TOE property is difficult and time-consuming unless Basic Items Issue Lists are readily available to hand receipt holders.

EVALUATION: In preparing a unit for redeployment from Vietnam, one of the first actions to be completed must be a complete inventory of all TOE property and components thereof. As Basic Items Issue Lists are not usually available to the equipment user, copies should be made and distributed to all sections having the items of equipment. Once this has been done, inventory is simple and missing components can be easily identified and procured.
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AVDE-AO


RECOMMENDATION: That units planning for redeployment from Vietnam prepare sufficient copies of Basic Items Issue Lists for distribution to all hand-receipt holders.

c. Facilitating Turn-in of Equipment Prior to Unit Redeployment.

OBSERVATION: Equipment not being deployed with a unit from Vietnam often must be moved by the unit to several different locations in order to receive technical inspection and be returned to supply channels.

EVALUATION: In order to substantially reduce handling of equipment not being retrograded from Vietnam and to expedite the return to supply channels of serviceable or repairable assets, maintenance technical inspections must be collocated with supply receiving personnel. This is especially significant in the turn-in of office equipment, furniture, and TA 50-901 equipment and other bulky, relatively simple items. Items requiring specialized test equipment could still be routed to maintenance facilities for inspection.

RECOMMENDATION: That during large volume turn-in of equipment, inspection and supply personnel be consolidated at one location to reduce unit workloads and prevent damage through unnecessary handling.

6. (U) Organization. None

7. (C) Other. Deception.

OBSERVATION: The characteristic fervor with which an area is policed of material by the Viet Cong and the value of artillery ammunition to him for booby traps can be combined to lure the enemy into a known location for engagement by artillery.

EVALUATION: An externally loaded A-22 bag containing simulated ammunition was dropped from a CH-47 aircraft. The bag of simulated ammunition in wooden boxes impacted on a preplanned grid adjacent to a known VC base area within surveillance range of an AN/TPS-25 radar. The area in which the bag was dropped was monitored by the TPS-25 as it approached the release point. The bag was tracked by the TPS-25 as it approached the release point. The bag was located on the ground by the TPS-25 and an observer on board the CH-47. The bag was dropped in the early evening approximately 40 minutes prior to curfew into a clear area adjacent to a wood line. About 20 minutes after the drop an OH-6A aircraft arrived over the area and adjusted artillery on a nearby grid. This gave the appearance of interdictory fire but served to register the batteries on a known location adjacent to the bag of ammunition. The area was monitored by the TPS-25 during the period of curfew and their sightings of personnel were engaged with artillery. A total of 11 personnel were engaged during the

Night. The following day the area was found to be picked clean of the residue from the drop. This technique of luring the enemy from his base area can be effectively used, but a high degree of realism must be achieved. The area for the drop must be carefully selected and the operation cannot be conducted too frequently.

RECOMMENDATION: That this and similar techniques be used to lure the enemy into an area of our choosing, at the time we desire. Further, that this area be located so that it can be monitored with target surveillance devices and is within effective range of artillery.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DONALD H. SCOOGIN
CPT, FA
Adjutant

6 Incl

1-Record of Amo Expenditures
2-Commanders of Artillery Units
3-Permanent and Semi-Permanent Fire Support Bases
4-Civic Action Program
5-Airmobile Firing Platform
6-Improvised AN/PRC-25 Antenna

Incls 2, 3 and 4 wd HQ, DA

Copies Furnished:

Commanding General, II FORCEN Artillery, APO SF 96266
Commandant, The Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma 73503
Commanding Officer, 2d Bn, 4th Arty, APO SF 96377
Commanding Officer, 1st Bn, 11th Arty, APO SF 96370
Commanding Officer, 1st Bn, 84th Arty, APO SF 96370

CONFIDENTIAL
TO: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVPFC-RE-H,
APO 96266

5 August 1969

1. This headquarters has reviewed and concurred with the Operational Report—Lessons Learned from Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division Artillery for the period ending 15 July 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

R. G. GARD, JR
COL, GS
Chief of Staff
AVFBC-RE-H (2 Sep 69) 2nd Inf
(UIC-WDP3-Au) (U)

DA, HQ II PFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 TO SEP 19

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(Ist), APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 9th Infantry Division Artillery for the period ending 15 July 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

S G. MACDONALD
CON-FIDENTIAL

AVNOC-DST (15 Jul 69) 3d Inf
(UIC-W9P3-AAA) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 17 OCT 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPO-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 15 July 1969 from Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division Artillery.

2. (C) Comments follow:
   a. (U) Reference item concerning "Reevaluation of Individual Pay Allocations for Redeploying Units", section II, page 7, paragraph 1b; concur. The USARV Redeployment Guide for Units has been amended to include a section on finance out-processing procedures. This section covers the reevaluation of individual pay allotments.
   b. (U) Reference item concerning "M109 Direct Fire Precautions", section II, page 7, paragraph 2a; concur. Unit SOPs should be established to make it mandatory for personnel in the battery area to wear a flak vest and steel helmet whenever firing howitzers in the direct fire role. This will reduce the number of friendly casualties from shell fragments in the firing battery area. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.
   c. (U) Reference item concerning "Tracked Vehicle Driver Protection", section II, page 7, paragraph 2b; concur. The Customer Assistance Office, Vietnam was informed and will query Weapons Command on the possibility of reinforcing the operator's compartment floor with steel armor plate.
   d. (U) Reference item concerning "AN/GRC-142 Operations", section II, page 8, paragraph 2c; concur. The AN/GRC-142 radio sets are scheduled to replace all existing AN/GRC-46's. This process requires a change over period. The AN/GRC-142 was designed to operate with compatible AN sets and units having both must have a continuing training program to ensure successful operations.
   e. (C) Reference item concerning "Use of ground surveillance radars in conjunction with ground sensor devices", section II, page 8, paragraph 2d; concur. This item will be included in Combat Intelligence Lessons, a quarterly USARV publication. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.
   f. (U) Reference item concerning "Use of artillery fire direction channels for transmission of radar acquired targets", section II, page 9,
paragraph 2e: concur. This item has been extracted and will be considered for possible inclusion in a USARV Training Newsletter.

g. (U) Reference item concerning "Modified Antenna for AN/PRC 25 when inside the UH-1D aircraft", section II, page 11, paragraph 2h: concur. Excellent results have also been achieved by using an AB 15 antenna base, with the associated antenna sections. The antenna is taped to the skid, parallel to the long axis of the skid. Insulating tape must be used to prevent the antenna from grounding out against the aircraft.

h. (U) Reference item concerning "M102 Howitzer Bevel Gear Assembly", section II, page 12, paragraph 5a: concur. The machine key is requisitioned as part of the bevel gear set. Support maintenance has the capability to fabricate replacement keys for those that fail prematurely. The above information will be published in the USARV Maintenance Information Summary. The unit is advised that an EIR should be submitted to insure that proper corrective action is initiated.

i. (U) Reference item concerning "Facilitating Turn-in of Equipment Prior to Unit Redeployment", section II, page 12, paragraph 5c: concur. Normal procedures for the day to day supply turn-in cannot be utilized by a unit scheduled for redeployment. These procedures are too time consuming for the large quantities of different equipment involved. The USARV Redeployment Guide for Units recommends turn-in procedures for redeploying units.

j. (C) Reference item concerning "Deception", section II, page 13, paragraph 7: concur. The concept and procedures are valid. The material described in the evaluation could have contributed to the aid and comfort of the enemy and the A22 bag, if serviceable, could have been used for future airlift missions. Materials should be selected which are not required by US Forces and are of little or no value to the enemy.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C.B. WILSON
LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy stern:
9th Inf Div Artillery
II FFV

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 9th Infantry Division
Artillery for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 4 Nov 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department
of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

CPT, AOC
Asst AG
CONFIDENTIAL

1. Missions fired and results obtained are indicated by category of target in Table I.

2. Targets are categorized in the following classifications:
   a. Confirmed: Location is known and presence of enemy determined by contact or by observation of activity by air or ground observers. Includes hard targets such as bunker complexes.
   b. Acquired: Location is based on SLAR, SPARS, Red Base, ground surveillance radar, airborne personnel detectors and other detection devices. Fires are based on timely reaction and meet all of the following conditions:
      (1) Detection by one or more of above sensor devices.
      (2) Validation by analysis of enemy pattern of operations.
      (3) Terrain analysis by competent targeting agencies.
   c. Counterbattery: Known or suspect locations fired on immediately before, during, or immediately after enemy rocket/Mortar/artillery attacks.
   d. Preparatory: Fires placed on LZ's, beachheads and objectives or areas prior to air assault or occupation by friendly forces. Includes reconnaissance by fire and blocking missions.
   e. Interdiction: Fires delivered for the purpose of denying the enemy the use of an area or point. Includes targets fired as a result of agent reports which are not sufficiently reliable to fall in the confirmed category.
   f. Special Purpose: Registrations, marking missions, navigation missions, calibrations, adjustment of defensive concentrations, and illumination missions.
   g. Others: Fires for training, demonstrations, service practice and other categories not listed.
   h. ARVN Support: Fires placed on targets at the request of ARVN forces. These are also included in the target categories and the total.

3. Artillery fires delivered during the reporting period resulted in the following significant surveillance:
   a. Enemy killed: 389
   b. bunkers and military structures destroyed: 464
   c. Stopped Infringements: 14
   d. Ground, explosive devices observed: 178
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| May   | 2-4  | 105  | 65     | 1312   | 0    | 0     | 317    | 11356  | 57   | 1282 |
| June  | 98   | 2432 | 1      | 6      | 541  | 12857 | 81     | 2312   | 25   | 598  |
| July  | 43   | 1520 | 0      | 0      | 214  | 9642  | 27     | 598    | 5    | 292  |
| TOTAL | 206  | 5264 | 1      | 6      | 1072 | 33865 | 193    | 1487   | 193  | 1487 |

| May   | 3-34 | 105  | 316    | 3124   | 1    | 3     | 1380   | 24407  | 27   | 362  |
| June  | 332  | 3889 | 9      | 67     | 1388 | 24482 | 39     | 1008   | 39   |1008  |
| July  | 13   | 135  | 0      | 0      | 142  | 3099  | 1      | 29     | 1    | 29   |
| TOTAL | 661  | 7148 | 10     | 70     | 2910 | 51988 | 67     | 1399   | 67   | 1399 |

| May   | 1-15 | 25   | 95     | 1352   | 8    | 63    | 863    | 13408  | 0    | 0    |
| June  | 131  | 2082 | 0      | 0      | 943  | 11954 | 0      | 0      | 0    | 0    |
| July  | 56   | 662  | 0      | 0      | 415  | 6931  | 11     | 545    | 11   | 545  |
| TOTAL | 282  | 4096 | 8      | 63     | 2221 | 32393 | 11     | 545    | 11   | 545  |

| May   | 1-84 | 25   | 28     | 236    | 11   | 50    | 278    | 1858   | 0    | 0    |
| June  | 17   | 144  | 2      | 9      | 220  | 1780  | 0      | 0      | 0    | 0    |
| July  | 6    | 44   | 1      | 2      | 117  | 597   | 0      | 0      | 0    | 0    |
| TOTAL | 51   | 424  | 14     | 61     | 615  | 4235  | 0      | 0      | 0    | 0    |
Inclosure 5 to Operational Report for the Period Ending 15 July 1969

Mobile Equipment Required

12 ft. 2-loop straps, PSN 1670-758-3794
Large J-visor, PSN 1670-090-5354
2 x 4-22 bags, PSN 1670-242-0169
20 ft. quick-release, tie-down straps, PSN 1670-725-1437
20 ft. nylon rope

Jack
Remove Lunette
Secure firing roller to platform with rope
Secure A-22 Bag to base with tie-down straps

Three, 2-loop, 12 ft. straps on each corner and attached in the center to a large clevis.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVEZ-AC

Inclosure (Operational Report for the Period Ending 15 July 1969. (RCS/GSPH-65)
(UIC-UDP3-1A) (U)

15 July 1969

60"

Center conductor soldered to antenna, coax shield stripped back

Nylon cord attach to skid supports

Approximate length = 5'

Coaxial cable

Antenna-stranded bare conductor

All/HRC-25 Radio

Vertical Support

Skid

Antenna
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 9th Infantry Division Artillery

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May 69 to 15 July 69.

CO, 9th Infantry Division Artillery

15 July 1969

R & D