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AUTHORITY

OAG D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980; OAG D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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IN REPLY REFER TO
AGDA (M) (18 Nov 69) FOR OT UT 693296
3 December 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 July 1969 (U)

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96345

UAVN-T (WJ12) 29 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CPFOR -65 (RI) (U)

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1. (C) Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities.
   a. (C) Introduction.
      (1) The 1st Infantry Division, during the reporting period, continued in the performance of its general missions:
      (a) In conjunction with GVN forces, the identification and destruction of local force VC and infrastructure in order to provide a secure environment to further GVN control over the area and people.
      (b) Destruction of main force VC/NVA forces, equipment, and base camps.
      (c) Assistance in the training and improvement of GVN forces.
      (d) Overwatch of the TAOI.
      (e) Area preparation (construction and destruction).
      (2) Within the overall framework of these general missions, the principal missions for the reporting period have been:
      (a) Until 18 June, reinforce the An Loc/Quan Loi/Song Be area.
      (b) Target against base areas 359, 360, and 356; after 18 June, concentrate against base areas 355, 356, and 357 around the Trapequeid.
      (c) Detect and destroy enemy forces approaching Saigon through the Iron Triangle-Phu Gung-Da An-Tan Uyen Zone.
      (d) With a minimum of one battalion, protect the Capital Military District from the east and northeast (infiltration and rocket attack).
      (e) Within the TAOI coordinate the security of US installations, reinforce the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces security of key bridges and installations, respond to VC/NVA attacks against allied installations, camps, and headquarters.
      (f) Support the Government of Vietnam Revolutionary Development Program by conducting military operations within the TAOI in coordination with and in support of the 5th ARVN Division, Capital Military District, and respective provinces.
      (g) Maintain security of major lines of communications within the TAOI (Hwy 13-RT Iron; Hwy. 34, 16 - RT Lead; Hwy 7B, 2A, 1A-RT Zinc; Saigon By-Pass).
      (3) The operational trends of the period based on command guidance, experience factors, and the changing tactical environment, remain the same as in the previous reporting period.

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AVD3-T (MED) 29 August 1969
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 July 1969, ROE 050516N 31 (A) (0)

(a) Night operations
(b) Maintaining contact
(c) Small unit operations
(d) "Pipe-Down" Tactics
(e) Thorough search
(f) B-52 exploitation

b. (c) Personnel and Administration.

(1) Personnel:

(a) Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>ND</th>
<th>EN</th>
<th>AVG</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized 1 May 69</td>
<td>1075</td>
<td>15993</td>
<td>17299</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Authorized 31 Jul 69</td>
<td>1082</td>
<td>16022</td>
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<tr>
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<td>16829</td>
<td>18161</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Gains, qualifications, and status:

1. Enlisted:

   a. Replacements received: 594


   (May 05, June 171, July 0).

   c. Credits: None

   d. Qualifications: None

2. Officers:

   a. Replacements received: 519

   b. Outstanding requisitions: 0

   a. Credits: Ample replacements were received for losses, however, a shortage of captains still exists in combat arms, particularly infantry.

   b. Qualifications and status: Lieutenant fill being received for requested captain requirements in combat arms.

(c) Losses:

1. Enlisted: Administrative losses during the period includes reassignment within RVN, rotation and ETS, and board actions:

   Reassignment within RVN: 439
   Rotation and ETS: 3472

2. Officers: There were 404 losses during the quarter due to reassignments within Vietnam, rotation and ETS.

   a. Losses due to casualties were as follows:

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### 1. Maintenance of Morale:

#### 1. Awards and Decorations:

- **Medal of Honor**: 0
- **Distinguished Service Cross**: 16
- **Distinguished Service Medal**: 0
- **Legion of Merit**: 29
- **Silver Star**: 148
- **Distinguished Flying Cross - Valor**: 30
- **Distinguished Flying Cross - Achievement**: 61
- **Soldiers Medal**: 34
- **Bronze Star Medal - Valor**: 558
- **Bronze Star Medal - Achievement**: 2016
- **Army Commendation Medal - Valor**: 354
- **Army Commendation Medal - Achievement**: 2704
- **Purple Heart**: 1361
- **Air Medal - Valor**: 27
- **Air Medal - Achievement**: 2584
- **Certificate of Achievement**: 0
- **Vietnamese Awards**: 196

#### 2. R&R Allocations:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>No of R&amp;R Allocations</th>
<th>No Used</th>
<th>% Used</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>1389</td>
<td>1360</td>
<td>97.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>1330</td>
<td>1374</td>
<td>103.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>1415</td>
<td>101.0%</td>
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### 2. Emergency and Compassionate Leaves:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Emergency</th>
<th>Compassionate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>45</td>
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<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### (2) Personnel Management:

- **Infusion**: During the period 1 May 69 - 31 Jul 69 the 1st Infantry Division was not involved in any infusion programs.
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AVD-2 (AVD) 29 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS C5F-65 (H) (U)

(b) Infantry Personnel: Due to the USARV-directed levy of 11 series personnel from Support Commands throughout RVN started in Apr 69 and completed in May 69, and the increase in 11 series replacements to the 1st Infantry Division, the Division is now at 106.5% in 11 series MOS. This is an increase of 8.3% over the last quarter (1 Feb 69 – 30 Apr 69).

(c) Operations:
(1) General:
(a) The 1st Infantry Division continued its participation in Operation Toan Thang (Complete Victory), Phase III, which began on 17 Feb 69 and continues as of the close of this reporting period. All organic units and those under operational control (OPCON) of the Division are involved. General objectives are to maintain an offensive-oriented, protective "umbrella" in the northern area of the Division's Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI); conduct a vigorous pacification and security campaign in the central and southern TAOI; and assist ARVN and local GVN military units to improve their effectiveness and eventually enable them to take over many of the jobs presently belonging to US forces.

(b) Specific objectives include denying enemy base area utilisation, interdicting VC/NVA infiltration to the south, disrupting enemy logistical operations, and providing support for the GVN from the local population. Battlefield tactics have consisted of both unilateral and combined (i.e. with ARVN forces) ground reconnaissance (formerly called reconnaissance-in-force or RIF), and extensive night ambush operations. In addition, enemy rocket and mortar activities have been hampered by continuous ground and air reconnaissance of the "Rocket Belt". Finally, in the pacification campaign, strong civic action (CIVAC) and payop programs have been combined with a growing population and resources control system.

(c) Although no major combat operations were undertaken, one major project was ended and one began. On June 18, the four-month Song Be – Song Khoi road clearing operation was successfully ended, providing a major access route to central Phuoc Long Province. Then, in June an ambitious program, Operation Dong Tien (Progress Together), was begun with the mission of improving the capabilities of ARVN units through joint ARVN/US operations designed specifically for that purpose.

(2) Force disposition:
(a) Major adjustments in force disposition occurred on 27 Jun 69 when the 1st Division northern Area of Operations (AO) was taken over by the 1st Cavalry Division (Air Mobile). At the same time, the 1st Bde established its new base camp at Bao Tieng, located in the south-western corner of the Michelin Rubber Plantation, and began operating in the plantation and in the "Trapezoid" area to the south. The 11th ACR was again OPCON to the 1st Division on 10 Jun for operations in the Quan Loi/Song Be area and was returned to the 1st Cav on 21 Jun.

(b) The 1st Bde generally provided one US battalion and one to two ARVN battalions to the Song Be road clearing operations in May and Jun 69, one infantry battalion in the vicinity of Song Be, and one mechanised battalion around An Loc and Loo Minh. The 1st Brigade's operations were aided by the 1/4 Cav (TF Hapomaki) which operated in the Quan Loi/Song Be
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RGS GFOR-65 (RT) (U)

29 August 1969

area until 23 May. Then, between 25 and 27 Jun, the brigade terminated these operations and moved to Dau Tieng where it employed one mechanized battalion in the Michelle Plantation, and one infantry battalion in the northern Trap-eozid area.

(c) The 2nd Brigade generally employed three and, in July, four infantry battalions in the southern portion of the TAOI. The battalions supported the intensified pacification program through population and resource control operations in the Di An/Phu Loi area in coordination with local ARVN/GVN forces, the hampering of enemy logistics operations, and the neutralization of the VC Infrastructure (VCI) in the area.

(d) The 3rd Brigade generally employed three to four battalions (2 infantry, 1 mechanized, and 1 armored) in the vicinity of Lai Khe, Ben Cat, An Dien, and Chanh Luu, and in the Trapezoid and northern Iron Triangle. As in the previous period, the brigade conducted offensive operations in these areas to detect and destroy VC/NVA forces and caches, extensive ambush operations to interdict enemy infiltration, combined operations with the 8th ARVN Regiment, and CITC, population and resource control (especially rice denial) and VCI elimination, particularly in the An Dien/Chanh Luu areas.

(e) During the eleven days that the 11th ACR was under the operational control of the 1st Division (10 - 21 Jun), it was engaged in ground reconnaissance and night patrol operations in the Quan Loi/Song Be area. When the Division’s northern TAOI was reduced, the regiment was returned to the 1st Cavalry Division.

(f) Inclusion 3 provides a detailed description of force disposition by battalion size units.

(3) Land Clearing Operations.

(a) Song Be Road Opening Operations:

1. Due to poor maintenance and VC activity, the road between Phuoc Vinh and Song Be (Phuoc Binh) had been closed for three years. As a result, all supplies to Dong Xoai, Bunak, and Song Be, the capital of Phuoc Long Province, had to be air-lifted. The road itself, formerly a single-lane, dry weather pass, was to be made into an all-weather highway, six meters wide, and capable of sustaining class 60 loads. Swaths 200 meters wide were to be cut on either side of the road and additional areas were to be cleared for night defensive positions (NDP) and fire support bases (FSB) and fire support bases (FSB) and fire support bases (FSB) and fire support bases (FSB) and fire support bases (FSB) and fire support bases (FSB) and fire support bases (FSB) and fire support bases (FSB) and fire support bases (FSB) and fire support bases (FSB) and fire support bases (FSB) and fire support bases (FSB) and fire support bases (FSB) and fire support bases (FSB) and fire support bases (FSB) and fire support bases (FSB) and fire support bases (FSB) and fire support bases (FSB) and fire support bases (FSB) and fire support bases (FSB) and fire support bases (FSB) and fire support bases (FSB) and fire support bases (FSB) and fire support bases (FSB) and fire support bases (FSB) and fire support bases (FSB) and fire support bases (FSB) and fire support bases (FSB) and fire support bases (FSB) and fire support 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AVBD-T (USID) 29 August 1969
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R)(U)

Land clearing task, the 301st ARVN Bn undertook road upgrading and bridge repair.

2. The entire operation was under the operational control of the 1st Bde. Security was provided by a task force organized around the of 1/16th Mechanized Battalion, and elements of the 7th and 9th ARVN Regiments, 5th ARVN Division. An advancing series of Fire Support Bases (Remagen I – XVIII) were utilized by the security elements throughout the operation. Enemy contact was light and no major hostile operations were initiated against the project. It is believed that the enemy was more concerned with infiltrating supplies and manpower south, through the concerned area and into War Zone "D", and was both unable and unwilling to begin offensive operations.

5. Phase III (15 – 18 Jun) was a combined operation with the 5th ARVN Division for the establishment of route security between Phu Cong and Phuoc Binh for supply convoys. Under the control of the 1st Bde, resupply convoys travelled between Phuoc Vinh and Phuoc Binh for the first time since 1964. Elements of ten battalions were utilized to provide any interruption in the 500 resupply vehicles which moved along the route. The operation was conducted without incident.

(c) In addition to the Song Be Road Clearing Operations, 15,410 acres were cleared by the combined efforts of the Ist Engr Bn and the LCCs of the 62rd Engr Bn, 20th Engr Bde, from 2 May to 25 Jul 69.

(d) Operation TOAN THANG, Phase III.

(a) General: The 1st Infantry Division continued to participate in Operation TOAN THANG, Phase III, which began 1700O1h Feb 69. Extensive ambushing along historical enemy infiltration routes, the concentration of B-52 and tactical air strikes and extensive suppressive and interdictory artillery fires prevented the enemy from closing on his main objective - the Capital Military District. Faced by increasingly combat proficient ARVN forces, stronger Popular Self-Defense Forces, and continuing pressure from US units, the enemy has gradually been forced to withdraw into remote areas away from population centers. In response to this, the 1st Division has established an interlocking network of Fire Support Bases within its TAOI and decentralized its operations to the Brigade and Battalion levels where small scale, patrolling, and night ambushes are emphasized.

(b) Enemy:

1. During the second quarter of CY 1969, VC and NVA forces terminated their Winter – Spring Campaign which had been thwarted earlier by the Republic of Vietnam and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAP). Having suffered enormous numbers of casualties, the enemy apparently became increasingly reluctant to commit large masses of troops against allied installations. During this period, the enemy advocated and practiced the tactical doctrine of "Committing a small force against a larger force. More extensive use of 'sappers' and stand-off attacks by rocket and mortar fire were attempted to conserve his own force level.

2. When the enemy initiated a Summer Campaign in mid-April 1969, it indicated a significant reorientation of his objectives. Frustrated in his efforts to prevent the ARVN and FWMAP from attaining their Accelerated Pacification goals for the first quarter of 1969, the enemy chose to concentrate on smaller objectives - rural hamlets, Regional Force outposts, Popular Self-Defense Forces, resupply convoys, and remote allied fire support bases. With a series of coordinated attacks by fire and limited ground probes, the enemy has sought to inflict maximum casualties on GW and ARVN forces. His long-range objective, as explained in captured documents of the Communist Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), was to put political pressure on the Americans to withdraw from South Vietnam. However, even
these limited attacks have cost the VC and NVA forces dearly and have inflicted only a minimal number of casualties. Understrength and constantly harassed, the scattered enemy units in the 1st Division's TriQi remained in a most elusive state at the close of this reporting period.

(c) Convoy ambushes on Highway 13.

1. From late April to early June four VC/NVA attempts were made to interdict the Loi Kho to Quan Loi resupply convoys. The first attempt, on 28 Apr, is described in the previous Operation Report (see 1st Division GEL, 1 Feb – 30 Apr 69, (e), 2). The second ambush occurred on 02115h May 69 in the vicinity of XT76789 when Devil convoy received fire from an estimated platoon-size enemy force, again from the 7th NVA Division. Fire was returned; artillery and air support gained, and contact continued as B Company, 2/2, Scout Section, 2/2 (the Recon Platoon of the 2/2 Mechanized Infantry Battalion), and C Troop/1-4 Cav arrived at 1120 hours and A Co/2/2 reinforced at 1205. Fighting continued sporadically until 1325 hours. As a result of the action there were 4 US KIA and 15 US WIA; in addition 4 POL tankers, 1 5-ton and 1 28-ton trucks were destroyed, and 2 5-ton and 1 71-ton reefer were damaged. A search of the area located 8 enemy KIA, 3 AK-47s, 1 RPG launcher, 7 RPG rounds, 4 grenades, and 220 SA rounds.

2. Perhaps emboldened by his limited success, the enemy tried again the following day (3 May). However, this time the ambush force, a re-inforced platoon west of Highway 13, was discovered and engaged by an armored sweep. At 0820 hours vic XT765715 B/2-34 (Tank) Bn received fire and returned it. While artillery and air support increased, a contact occurred at 0830 when a platoon of C/1-4 Cav and at 0845 C/2-30 reinforced. At 1004 hours the Aero-Rifle Platoon, B/1-4 Cav, was inserted vic XT765650 followed by C/2-16 at 1025 in a blocking maneuver. Contact continued sporadically until 1300 hours. There were 1 US KIA and 4 US WIA. In return, the enemy lost 28 men (19 KIA and 9 WIA) and much equipment.

3. Over a month later, the enemy attempted his fourth ambush on Highway 13. At 1310 hours, 5 Jun, vic XT765705 a convoy of the 5th ARVN Division received fire from an unknown size force. B/1-4 Cav reinforced the defenders at 1315 and, supported by air, the skirmish lasted until 1440 hours. Allied losses consisted of only 2 ARVN WIA and 1 ARVN 28-ton truck destroyed. However, the enemy lost 36 dead and 2 WIA.

(d) Attacks of fire support bases (FSBP) Buttons, Gela, and Aachen II, on 12 May are indicative of the enemy's primary type of offensive actions during this period. The enemy initiated the action at FSBP Buttons at 0330 hours, with an attack by 82mm mortar fire followed by a ground probe by an unknown-size force. The defenders, the 1/2 Infantry Battalion, were supported by air and artillery until contact was broken at 0515 hours. The US suffered 2 WIA in contrast to the 35 enemy KIA left on the battlefield along with much equipment. A similar attack was launched against the 1/28th at FSBP Gela at 0415 hours resulting in 3 US KIA, 20 US WIA, 43 enemy KIA, and a great deal of enemy equipment captured. A simultaneous attack on FSBP Aachen II consisted of only RPG (Rocket Propelled Grenade) fire in an unsuccessful attempt to prevent artillery from being fired in support of Gela.

(e) A ground bomb damage assessment of three B-52 strikes on 26 May in the Tropoeid was revealing. A search of the strike area by elements of the 1/4 Cav located 133 destroyed bunkers, 34 VC/NVA KIA (80), 222 VC/NVA KIA (80), and a significant quantity of food and documents along with remnants of a munitions factory. Prisoner interrogation revealed that 24 of the destroyed bunkers were occupied at the time of the strike by 8 enemy soldiers each. In the destroyed munitions factory, the unit found 30 anti-tank mines, 100 bengaloopt seeds, 35 claymore bombs, and several tool and die kits.

(f) Results of contacts in the An Loc/Quan Loi area prior to the

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AVDB-T (MD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (R) (U)

Reorganization of the 1st Division PMO may be broken down into three periods of heavy activity:

1. Period I (23 - 25 May): 1st Bde units made contact with the elements of the 7th NVA Division resulting in 173 enemy KIA and 4 FIs.

2. Period II (3 - 8 Jun): 1st Bde units made contact with elements of the 1st and 7th NVA Divisions resulting in 299 enemy KIA and 21 FIs.

3. Period III (9 - 22 Jun): On 9 Jun the 11th ACR, OPCON to the 1st Div, continued operations in the An Loc/Quan Loi area, and from 9 - 22 Jun, the 11th ACR and 1st Bde units continued sporadic contact with the enemy resulting in 169 enemy KIA and 4 FIs.

The following are highlights of the An Loc/Quan Loi operations.

1. On 23 May, 0515 hours, via XT720820, Hinh Du village received a ground attack by an unknown-size enemy force. Fire was returned with air and artillery support and contact was broken at 0715. The attack immediately prompted a sweep of the area by elements of the 2/2 Mechanized Battalion. Sporadic contact with enemy forces throughout 23 May resulted in 38 enemy KIA, and the capture of 2 PPs, 11 crew-served weapons, 32 RPG rounds, 64 mortar rounds, 14 grenades, 550 SA rounds, and 5 - 57mm RR rounds. US losses were 1 KIA, 5 WIA, and 2 helicopters damaged.

2. The 2/2 maintained light contact with enemy forces throughout the following morning. That afternoon at 1518 hours via XT773868 Company B/2-2 received fire from a company-size enemy force. Fire was returned with air and artillery support and Companies A and C, and the Scout Section, 2/2, reinforced the fire fight which lasted until 1640 hours. The results were 17 US WIA, 33 enemy KIA, and much material captured. Meanwhile, at 1635 via XT 703873 Company A and the Scout Section engaged 10 enemy soldiers and received fire from an estimated company-size enemy force. Air and artillery supported the fire fight until it ended at dusk, around 1840 hours. There were 2 US KIA and 7 WIA. A search of the area located 34 enemy KIA, 1 PW, and several pieces of enemy equipment. While this action progressed, at 1825 hours Company C also received fire from an estimated company-size enemy force via XT720870. Fire was returned with air and artillery support until 1930 hours. There were 2 US KIA, while the enemy lost 20 KIA and a quantity of equipment on the battlefield. Total enemy for the day's successful actions were 96 KIA (2C).

3. The last contact was made on 25 May, by Company B/2-2 at 1328 via XT663669. The unit received fire from an estimated company-size enemy force. Fire was returned, air and artillery quickly supported, and Company C/2-2, the Scout Section, and Troop I/3-11 ACR reinforced the contact. When the battle had ended at 1600, there were 2 US KIA, 13 US WIA, 32 enemy KIA and 1 PW.

4. On 3 Jun the 2d Squadron, 11th ACR, under the operational control of the 1st Bde, 1st Infantry Division, made contact with an unknown-size enemy force west of Highway 13 and south of An Loc at 1530 hours via XT657853. The area was saturated with mechanized cavalry forces, supported by Army Aviation elements. Contact lasted until 1650 hours resulting in 36 enemy KIA, and 3 US WIA, and the capture of 10 PPs, 6 crew-served weapons, 56 RPG rounds, 57 mortar rounds, 39 grenades, and 210 SA rounds.

5. On 6 Jun at 0115 hours AFRV Thunder IV (via XT763993) received an unknown number of RPG and mortar rounds followed by a ground probe by an unknown-size enemy force. Fire was returned and contact broken at 0135. At 0200 hours a similar attack was launched; again fire was returned, and artillery and air elements supported the base until the contact was ended at 0215. There were 5 US WIA. As a result, Co B/2-2 swept the area and en-

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A five-hour battle ensued as Co B called on air and artillery support and was  
reinforced by 3/2-2 at 1140 and Troop H/2-11 at 1355. When the struggle  
terminated at 1500 hours, there were 4 US KIA and 14 WIA. Enemy losses in-  
cluded 78 KIA, 5 WIA, 1 CHICOM telephone, several rocket and mortar rounds,  
17 AK 47s, 940 SA. rounds, 68 grenades, and miscellaneous equipment.  

Also on the morning of 6 Jun, the 1st Bde base camp at Quan Loi received an attack by fire with RPGs and mortars followed by a ground  
attack at 0037. The attack was repelled with air, artillery, and mortars  
support and by 0435 hours all contact was broken leaving 4 US WIA. In this  
unsuccessful attempt to infiltrate "sappers" into Quan Loi, enemy losses  
were 17 KIA, 4 WIA, 940 SA. rounds, 68 grenades, and miscellaneous equipment.  

On 18 Jun the 1st Bde began relocating from Quan Loi to Dau Tieng base camp (XT2347). Responsibility for base camp security was assumed  
from the 25th Infantry Division on 30 Jun. The operation, code-named  
"BOSTON PILOT", also transferred responsibility for the Quan Loi base camp,  
and Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces to the 1st Cavalry Division.  

The grand total of enemy casualties in the An Loc/Quan Loi area for the period of 25 May to 9 Jun was 601 KIA (2D) and 29 WIA.  

The An Son operation was a highly successful combined effort. Elements of the 2/18th US Infantry Battalion, the 1st Battalion, 7th ARVN  
Regiment, and 4 regional force companies participated. A task force (TF)  
fueled under the command of a US field grade officer with a combined  
US/ARVN staff, to find and eliminate main force elements of the Dong Nai  
Regiment which had infiltrated the An Son area south of Phu Cuong.  

With sufficient forces available, the TF was able to continuously saturate a confined area that had previously been free of extended  
friendly operations because of our physical inability to operate in swampy  
terrain over long periods. Successively code-named "OPERATION UNIFIED",  
"TF Soberg", and "TF Mars", the TF succeeded in eliminating 83 of the re-  
ported 120 in the area. Of the 83, there were 45 KIA (2D), 23 WIA, and  
15 Ho: Chanho. The success of the operation made it possible for the local  
regional force companies to assume responsibility for the immediate security  
of the area.  

The high number of Ho: Chanho underlined the success of the  
psychological operations employed. A special technique was employed in the  
An Son area. Loudspeaker broadcasts from aircraft, river boats, and vehicles  
were transmitted in accordance with a coordinated maneuver and broadcast  
schedule. During previously announced periods of one hour duration, allied  
troops would cease effective operations to allow enemy troops to rally. En-  
emy forces received detailed instructions through the loudspeaker missions  
and through contacts with trained propaganda teams as to the best procedures  
to be used to rally.  

Operation Dong Tien is a test program which calls for the  
close association of designated RNWF forces with designated US/USARVN forces a  
on a continuing basis in specific areas. The DONG TIEH program began  

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Jul 69 and will last through the rainy season. The major goals of this close and continuous association of units are: (1) to increase the quantity and quality of combined and coordinated joint operations; (2) to materially advance the Division's three major missions (support of pacification, improve the effectiveness of RVNAF and US/ARVN units and intensify combat operations) and (3) to significantly increase the efficiency of critical combat and combat support elements, particularly Army Aviation assets.

2 The overall tactical objective is to weaken the enemy at all levels so that major ARVN and US forces can conduct combined and coordinated operations against main force units in base areas, such as War Zone "C" and War Zone "D," during the dry season. However, the emphasis is on the "upgrading" of all South Vietnamese military units in order to improve their combat effectiveness. If successful, the regional and province forces (RZ/PF) along with the Popular Self-Defense Forces (PSDF) should be improved to the point where they can assume the task of ARVN units committed to rural defense and static security missions, thereby releasing ARVN regular units for operations against enemy main forces. In turn, major ARVN units will have increased their efficiency to the point where they can initiate and conduct counterinsurgency operations against main force units, operate with US units on a co-equal basis, and effectively exploit allied logistical and combat support capabilities.

3 On 2 Jul 69, operation DONG TIEN was initiated by the 3d Bde with the introduction of the 1/8th ARVN Battalion into FSB Cantigny II (XT-520387) for combined operations with the 2/28th Inf. But this was only accomplished after approximately 2 weeks of intensive combined planning and coordination with the 8th ARVN Regiment and the 5th ARVN Division. Representatives from each unit to participate were present at this meeting and direct coordination was made between higher headquarters. While the 1/8th moved into Cantigny, the 1st Bde's Forward Tactical Operations Center (TOC) was established at Ben Cat, headquarters of the 8th ARVN Regt, and integrated into the US/ARVN Combined Coordination Center. On 8 July, the 4/8th ARVN Bn moved into FSB Gela (XT600418) with the 1/28th US Inf Bn, and A Battery, 51st ARVN Artillery paired off with the US 2/33d Field Artillery. The 8th ARVN Recon Company had already been joined with 1 Co, 75th Infantry (1st Division Rangers) on 1 July.

4 During the early weeks of the operation, many standing operating procedures peculiar to joint operations of this nature were established and perfected. The Combined Coordination Center received reports from both ARVN and US units and acted as the catalyst for the lateral flow of information between the US Brigade and the ARVN Regiment. Every evening a combined staff briefing was given to both US and ARVN commanders with counterpart staff briefing one after the other. This mutual briefing generated discussions among staffs and ultimately led to mutually conceived operations. Two staff sections cooperating side by side provided a vehicle for effective staff training for ARVN forces.

US and ARVN physically colocated battalions at fire support bases. Again, counterpart staffs briefed both US and ARVN battalion commanders. Besides the operational significance of these combined briefings, the discussions generated and mutual learning gained were extremely valuable. In the fire support bases, both ARVN and US elements had a specific defensive responsibility with the allied units living and fighting side-by-side. From the fire support base, ARVN battalions conducted operations in separate AO's. On occasion, joint ambushes were conducted.

5 The benefits which have accrued to both US and ARVN units participating in DONG TIEN have been immeasurable. The colocating of these units has provided the opportunity for US units to give additional training to ARVN in areas where most needed. Specific training which has been conducted includes marksmanship, fire support base construction, use of mortars, helicopter resupply, and small unit tactics. One US unit has constructed a
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model ambush site for training purposes. Similarly, the ARVN ability to search VC bunkers and locate enemy caches is leading to increased US proficiency in these areas. It is expected that these combined battalion operations will continue and be expanded in the next reporting period. In addition, plans call for a combined reaction force to be established in early August.

(1) The cumulative results for Operation TOAN THANG, Phase III, which began on 17 Feb 69, for the 1st Infantry Division assigned and OPCON units as of the close of the reporting period are:

1. US: 232 KIA, 1811 WIA (evac); 56 ACAV/APCs, 7 generators, 3 29-ton tankers, 2 Zippo (APC with flamethrower), 55 helicopters, 1 0-10 "Bird Dog", 37 Rome Flows, 71 tankers, 12 29-ton trucks, 2 "gustors" (40mm SP), 2 3/4-ton trucks, 5 1/4-ton trucks, 1 10-ton truck, 1 road grader, 1 cold storage unit, 1-155mm Howitzer, 1 M-199 (155mm SP), 1-4.2" mortar, 1 AVLB (armored bridge layer), 1 VTR (M-88 tank recovery vehicle), 3 bulldozers, and 3 M-548 "Wasala" (tracked cargo carriers) damaged; 1 Zippo, 10 tanks, 1 5-ton truck, 1 3/4-ton truck, 4 ACAV/AFVs, 6 Rome Flows, 4 helicopters, 3 1/4-ton trucks, 1 1-ton trailer, 2 bucket loaders, 1 low boy (low bed trailer) and 1-155mm howitzer destroyed.

2. Enemy: 2,845 WIA (Bc), 276 KIA (pock), 293 captured, 41 ralliers, and 1987 detainees; 1085 individual weapons, 235 crew-served weapons, 273,324 SA rounds, 236 AT mines, 14,587 anti-personnel mines, 2,251 grenades, 1,540 RPG rounds, 946 mortar rounds, 5,453 bunkers, 74.8 tons of rice, 72 rockets, and 1,270 lbs of explosives captured or destroyed.

(3) Monthly totals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>US KIA</th>
<th>VC KIA</th>
<th>VC W</th>
<th>TOTAL ENEMY ELIMINATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>42*</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>414</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*39 were reported but since that time 4 WIA became KIA. The remaining 11 were lost by the 2/2 Infantry Battalion while OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division.

(4) During the reporting period there were 56 B-52 strikes employed in conjunction with general operations. The majority of B-52 strikes were targeted against the build-up of elements of the 1st and 7th NVA Divisions outside of the rubber plantations surrounding the An Loe/Quan Boi area. Combined artillery, Toe Air, and ground follow-up operations were successful in destroying large enemy base camps and staging areas.

d. (c) Training:

(1) Replacement training.

(a) The missions and objectives of the Division Training Command in training replacements were discussed in the previous report.

(b) There were 5555 replacements trained by the Division school during this reporting period.

(c) Since the school opened on 15 February 1969, there have been 9,127 replacements trained.

(2) Mobile Training Teams: The following training was conducted by MTT during this period:

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MONTH | HOURS OF INSTRUCTION | MAN HOURS
May   | 116              | 162
June  | 34               | 466
July  | 500              | 45,331

(3) Sniper Training:

(a) A Division Sniper School was formed and started instruction on 5 May 69.

(b) During this reporting period, 59 snipers successfully completed training in an 18-day course of instruction.

(4) Kit Carson Scout Training: During this reporting period, there were 23 scouts trained by the Division Training Command.

(5) ARVN Training: (a) Infantry Battalion Refresher Training was completed for the 1st Battalion, 9th Regiment, 5th ARVN Division on 19 May 69.

(b) In early June, a Training Circular on ARVN training was published which has proven most successful. The DONG TIEN, a "Progress Together" circular, requires specific actions by all units and staff sections of this Division to assist in upgrading and improving the 5th ARVN Division. This is accomplished by co-locating an ARVN battalion with a 1st Infantry Division battalion and establishing a combined TOC to facilitate combined operations. Under this program, three ARVN battalions were trained during this reporting period. The 5th ARVN Division battalions trained were:

1. 1st Battalion, 9th Regiment
2. 4th Battalion, 8th Regiment
3. 4th Battalion, 7th Regiment

(6) TDY Schools:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COURSE</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>NO OF STUDENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MACV Recondo</td>
<td>Nha Trang</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>Vung Tau</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G IP/SIP</td>
<td>Vung Tau</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A Transition</td>
<td>Vung Tau</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A IP/SIP</td>
<td>Vung Tau</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEST</td>
<td>Republic of Philippines</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEL</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audio-Visual</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACAF Life Support</td>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(7) (c) Intelligence:

(1) During July, two actions were taken to improve the dissemination of both current and in-depth intelligence to subordinate commanders and their staffs. Current intelligence broadcasts, using secure speech communications, were scheduled on a four-hour basis. Procedures followed enabled units down to and including battalion to monitor the update of intelligence data gained during the previous four hours. To increase the amount and improve the accuracy of intelligence information available to the combat commander, mobile intelligence briefing teams were dispatched from Division G2 to subordinate battalions to provide in-depth intelligence briefings of interest to the commander.

(2) In response to the need for expediting the correlation of current intelligence data and developing target information, a G2 targeting section
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was established within the G2 Tactical Operations Center. This section serves as the focal point for immediate coordination of current intelligence target data with the G3 to facilitate a rapid tactical response. The result has been a significant improvement in the timeliness of tactical response.

(3) Enemy order of Battle:

(a) The strengths of enemy forces operating in the 1st Infantry Division Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI) is estimated as follows:

Main force military personnel............ 3,675
Local force military personnel............. 1,500
Total estimated combat strength............ 5,175
Logistical support personnel.............. 1,000

Total strength (estimated)............. 6,175

(b) The known rates of infiltration appear to have been adequate to maintain strength in III CTZ and to increase enemy strength in the 1st Division TAOI. Known infiltration into III CTZ was slight during May, June, and July 69. Exact current figures for infiltration into the 1st Infantry TAOI are not known.

(c) Specific reinforcements available from outside the Division TAOI are from the 9th, 5th, 7th, and 1st Divisions. All units within the Division TAOI can be expected to have artillery units in support.

(d) The accepted locations of confirmed enemy units within the Division TAOI and along its periphery are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>EFFECTIVENESS</th>
<th>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VC Division</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95A</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>O/E</td>
<td>YP7780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>174th</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>O/E</td>
<td>N-War Zone B, Phuoc Cong Prov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>274th</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>O/E</td>
<td>N-War Zone D, Phuoc Cong Prov</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Separate Regiments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>EFFECTIVENESS</th>
<th>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dong Nai Regt</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>O/E</td>
<td>Song Be Corridor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101st</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>O/E</td>
<td>Trapezoid/Boi Loi Woods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96th VC Arty Bn</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>O/E</td>
<td>North Phuoc Vinh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35th Artillery</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>O/E</td>
<td>NW of Lai Khe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35th Artillery</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>O/E</td>
<td>Vio Ranzhoek</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Local Force Units:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>EFFECTIVENESS</th>
<th>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C-61 Ben Cat Co</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>O/E</td>
<td>Dispersed along Thi Tinh River</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-62 Chau Thanh Co</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>O/E</td>
<td>SE of Chanh Luu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-63 Lai Thieu Co</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>O/E</td>
<td>An Son, Lai Thieu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-64 Ben Tieng Co</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>O/E</td>
<td>Southern Michelle area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-64 Phu Cong City Plato</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>O/E</td>
<td>An Son area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-300 Dong Nai Co</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>O/E</td>
<td>XT3021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-301 Phu Giao Co</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>O/E</td>
<td>Vic XT7442</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-302 Tan Uyen Plato</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>O/E</td>
<td>XT7417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-303 Co</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>O/E</td>
<td>XT9003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81st Rear Service</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>F/A</td>
<td>Log Area A, War Zone D, large</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85th Rear Service</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>F/A</td>
<td>Log Area C, Long Nguyen Secret</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) The accepted locations of confirmed enemy units considered available as reinforcements are:

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>COMBAT EFF</th>
<th>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st NVA Division</td>
<td>4400</td>
<td>O/E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105 Regt</td>
<td>1150</td>
<td>O/E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>920 Regt</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>O/E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101 D Regt</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>O/E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th NVA Division</td>
<td>4500</td>
<td>O/E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141 Regt</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>O/E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165 Regt</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>O/E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>209 Regt</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>O/E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th VC Division</td>
<td>4500</td>
<td>O/E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>271 Regt</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>O/E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>272 Regt</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>O/E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>274th VC Regiment</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>O/E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th VC Regiment W/WWA</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>O/E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron Triangle Regiment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Force Units</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Arty Bn</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>O/E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Arty Bn</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>O/E</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Main force combat units within the 1st Infantry Division TAOI.

1. 5th VC Division: 5th Division action during the reporting period of May was highlighted by the relocation of two regiments of the Division and also increased attacks in the Dinh Quan and Xuan Lo areas by elements of the Division. On 18 May, sapper elements of the Division were identified in an attack against the 16th ARVN Division Headquarters at Xuan Loc. The K22 and K24 Arty Battalions of the Division were used in a fire support role during the attack. Elements of the 174th Regiment had been identified in sharp contacts throughout the month in and around Dinh Quan (via YT5737). It is believed the Regiment relocated from War Zone D into the area around 10 May.

b. Elements of the 275th Regiment were identified on 21 May in an attack on a PPGP vic YT492989. It was believed that this regiment had also relocated out of War Zone D for the purpose of conducting attacks against Highway 20.

c. The 95A Regiment remained out of contact during May and was still believed to be located in NB U-1 Province. During the month of June, elements of the 95A Regiment were identified in contact south of Gia Ray (XT6413). The regiment had not been identified since April and probably relocated through War Zone D and into Gia Ray area during the month of May. During the end of June, contacts with the regiment had dropped off considerably.

d. The 275th Regiment was identified in the La Nga base area. Since that time the regiment had remained out of contact. Sensor activity and a rallier report indicated the regiment had relocated to War Zone D.

e. The 174th Regiment was identified only once during the month and indications were that it may have withdrawn to War Zone D also.

f. Since mid-June the 5th Division had remained out of any significant contact. It appeared that the division may have been withdrawing some of its forces from Long Khanh Province northward into Phuoc Long Province.

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AVIB-T (MD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

Aerial sensor patterns along with visual reconnaissance indicated that enemy activity had increased along both eastward and westward sides of Route 14 from Dak To Special Forces camp northeast to the Duc Phong and also in the east and southeast of Song Be.

A rally on the 20th of July stated he was a member of the 95A Rgt, 5th VC Div. He indicated that his regiment had relocated to the southeastern Phuoc Long area and was planning attacks on Highway 14 and on the special forces camp in the area. He stated his battalion had conducted an ambush on Route 14 on 16 July, (There was an ambush on an allied convoy on 15 July via YT20856). It was not clear at this time why the 5th VC Division deployed some elements north into Phuoc Long Province, but it indicated one of three possibilities: (1) it was planning to interdict Highway 14 and conduct attacks against Phuoc Long Province; (2) it was redeploying into War Zone C; or (3) the Division was moving back to Cambodia. Intelligence available at the time did not indicate which was most likely.

At this time it was felt that increasing enemy pressure on Binh Long and Tay Ninh Provinces could have indicated that the enemy in the future might conduct attacks on Phuoc Long Province also. The underlying purpose of these attacks could be to strengthen the enemy's hold in these areas, which in turn could aid in setting up their People's Revolutionary Government.

2 Dong Nai Regiment

May 1969: It appears that during May the Dong Nai Regiment had been trying to maneuver three of its four battalions into the southern area of SR-1.

(1) K1 Bn: Elements of the K1 Battalion were identified in the area north of Tan Uyen during the month and it was believed that the whole battalion was working in this area. On 29 May a PW captured east of Lai Thieu was identified as a member of the K1 Bn. There has been no further information on this PW, but his identification of the battalion in this area indicated the possible relocation of some K1 elements out of the area north of Tan Uyen and into the southern area, possibly to aid support to other elements of the Dong Nai located there. A PW captured on 18 May via XT923425 stated he was a member of C1/K1 Battalion. Source stated battalion's strength was approximately 200-225 men. Documents found on 19 May via YT 059442 identified the K1 Battalion. During June movement of K1 elements was believed to be still located north of Tan Uyen. The battalion was still believed to be targeted against allied units in Tan Uyen, Binh Ng, and Minh Co areas.

(2) K2 Bn: The K2 Battalion, which had suffered serious losses in the An Son since Dec 68, was held at a strength of 60-80 men. Analysis indicated it would leave An Son to receive replacements; a 9 May FW from the K3 Bn and a 11 May FW from the room section, K4, confirmed this move. The latter FW stated the battalion had moved to the Boi Loi Woods area via XR940, historically a Dong Nai base area. On 23 May a member of the C3/K2 rallied via XR94166. He stated that K2 had gone north and was returning south again. On 29 May a PW captured via XT9036 was a member of C1/K2. He stated his company had been located in a base camp at Tan Ong (exact location unknown), then moved south to the An Son area in September. The PW had stayed behind in the base camp because of illness, and was captured on a rice supply mission to Binh Ng village. The K2 Bn was last contacted in the An Son area in late March. FW statements indicates it had relocated out of the area during late April or early May and had been replaced by the K3 Battalion.

(3) K3 Bn: The K3 Battalion was located in the Song Be Corridor via XT9742 with a probable mission of securing a probable mission of securing its southp. Hard intelligence indicates this unit has now began its southern deployment. A 6 May FW from DI An local forces stated he had attended a meeting with 13 NVA from the K3 Battalion who were sent to replace losses in

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the Do AN local force unit. A 10 May KIA in the same area (XT969057) was identified as the CO of the K3 Battalion. A 9 May contact in the An Son resulted in the death of the CO of the C3/K3 BN and the capture of a PW from the same unit. PW stated that 30 men of his company, led by the CO, had arrived in An Son on 6 May to replace the K2 Battalion. PWs captured on 15 May from the C2/K3 stated the K3 is located in An Son and plans to infiltrate Saigon and attack the outskirts of the city. A PW captured on 20 May via XT969021 was identified as a member of the finance section of S35. He stated that elements of the K3 are now located in an area south of Lai Thieu, mission unknown. During the month of May two companies of the K3 (C2/C3) were identified in the lower area. It is probable at this time that the battalion has fully relocated into this area and is spread out between An Son, Lai Thieu, and Do An. Mission of the battalion, as indicated by the 15 May PW, is to attack around the outskirts of Saigon.

(4) K4 BN: The K4 Battalion was also located in the Song Be Corridor but was known to have sent cadre and reconnaissance elements south as early as Feb 69 to recon the Thu Duc area. Recent infiltration of K4 elements on 11 May when a PW captured by JHW elements via XT978060 was identified as a member of the reconnaissance element provided by this PW, a contact was initiated the following day near his place of capture, resulting in the death of the CO of the K4 Battalion. The PW stated that 32 men of the K4 had originally arrived in the An Son in Feb 69, but contact had reduced their strength to 29. Documents captured on 18 May via XT959356 identified elements of the K4 Battalion. On the 20th of May a PW captured via XT95205 was identified as a member of the finance section of S25. He stated that the C4 CO, K4 BN, had infiltrated into the Thu Duc area with a strength of 60 men. Their mission was unknown. On 29 May via XT956310 a PW was captured and identified as a member of the reconnaissance element, K4, Dong Nai Regiment. He stated that he was a messenger from a forward headquarters, K4 element in An Son, and was carrying letters to the K4 headquarters located at Dong Trong (H) XT970370. Subject stated he had reconnoitered the area of Vuon Thon (outpost) XT8307 for a future attack. Although only one company of the K4 had been identified in the southern area it was believed that the battalion was trying to relocate all of its units into the area.

In June 1969; The Dong Nai Regiment refrained from initiating any significant contact during the month of June, but was believed to have suffered heavy losses due to allied operations in the lower Lam Son. PWs and documents captured in late May confirmed that the regiment's mission was to relocate its battalions southward into the areas of Lai Thieu, Thu Duc, An Son, and Do An. These battalions were for future offensive actions. Elements of three of the battalions (K2, K3, and K4) had de-loyed into the An Son and Lai Thieu areas, but pre-emptive actions by allied forces took a heavy toll on these units.

(1) The K1 Battalion refrained from any significant action and was believed to be still operating north of Van Uyen coordinating with local force units and resupplying out of Binh My (U).

(2) The K2 Battalion was believed to have withdrawn to the lower Song Be Corridor. PWs captured in the An Son stated that they were members of the C2 Heavy Weapons Company, K2 Battalion. They stated that C3 was left behind when K2 relocated northward in May to receive replacements. PWs confirmed that K3 was drastically under-strength and that there were only 10 men from the battalion left in the An Son area.

(3) The K3 Battalion had been identified numerous times during the month. Allied operations in the An Son are believed to have reduced the battalion's strength from 200 men to approximately 50 men. PWs arrived throughout the month in the An Son stated that K3 elements had relocated to the area for the purpose of replacing the K2 Battalion. The units identified in the An Son were the C2 and C3 companies, K3 BN. The
C2/K3 was believed to have moved to the K4 area and the headquarters, K3, was believed to be still located in the Song Be Corridor. Because of personnel losses it was considered probable that K3 would withdraw its elements from the lower area.

(4) The K4 Battalion was identified only once during the month of June. A PW captured in the Chanh Luu area stated he was on a rice mission to Chanh Luu. He also stated that his company, 05/K4, was located in the Song Be Corridor with the rest of the battalion. The unit was believed to have moved south; however, there was no hard intelligence at the time to substantiate either version. At the end of June, the Dong Nai Regiment was expected to withdraw into secure base areas for a standoff period, with a mission of receiving replacements and resupplying.

2 July 69: The Dong Nai Regiment on 14 July conducted its first significant offensive action in months by attacking the 77th RP compound at Hoa Loi (via XT8225). This action may have been indicative of future plans of the regiment to launch attacks against allied units in S3, with the probable mission of strengthening their hold on certain areas and opening up infiltration routes to the southern Lam Son area. The regiment is believed to have forces spread throughout Binh Dinh Province with moderate to heavy concentrations of its elements in the area of the western Catcher’s Mitt, lower Song Be Corridor, and the An Loc - Hoa Loi areas. Allied operations throughout the lower Lam Son area are believed to have presented any plans the Dong Nai may have had of large scale offensive actions in this area.

(1) The K1 Battalion has remained relatively inactive during July. A contact northeast of Phu Lu identified elements of the battalion moving south. This identification may be an indicator that K1 was deploying some of its elements into the southern area with a possible mission of strengthening other Dong Nai units already located there. It is believed that the major portion of the battalion is still located in the western Catcher’s Mitt, with the continuing mission of resupplying out of Dinh Ny village.

(2) On 11 July the 05/K2 company and elements of the K4 Battalion initiated an attack against the 77th RP compound at Hoa Loi (U) via XT8225. This action may have been indicative of future plans of the regiment to launch attacks against allied units in S3, with the probable mission of strengthening their hold on certain areas and opening up infiltration routes to the southern Lam Son area. After the attack, 05 elements were moved back to an area via XT8250. On 12 July a contact in this area resulted in 2 VC KIA and documents which again identified the 05/K4 Company and elements of the K2 have moved into this area, and the order of battle holds the major portion of the battalion in the lower Song Be Corridor. Its probable mission is to await replacements and resupplying out of Dinh Ny village or to the lower Lam Son area.

(3) The K3 Battalion is believed to still have its three companies spread out through the lower Lam Son area: the C1 Company in 31 An; and the C2 and C3 Companies in An Son. Prior to his capture had indicated that K3 had moved south, however, there was no hard intelligence at the time to substantiate either version. At the end of June, the Dong Nai Regiment was expected to withdraw into secure base areas for a standoff period, with a mission of receiving replacements and resupplying.

2 101st VC Regiment: The 101st Regiment is presently composed of three battalions, the Long An 1, Long An 2, and Long An 3, totaling about 700 personnel. During the reporting period, May through July 69, the battalions of the 101st Regiment moved north from the Citadel area. The 1st and
3rd RNs are thought to be in the Boi Loi Woods while the 2nd RN and regimental HQ are held to be in the western Trapezoid. Owing to heavy losses suffered during the month of May, the Regiment is currently not combat effective and probably will not initiate any attacks until it has received replacements and supplies. In the coming months, the 2nd RN and Regimental HQ will probably relocate out of the Trapezoid, possibly into the Boi Loi Woods area or the Long Nguyen Secret Zone.

Local force units within the 1st Infantry Division TAOI:

a. The O61 Local Force Company: The O61 avoided contact during May and most of June. On 27 June, a rallier said that he was from the Mobile Ranger Unit (possibly the C9 Sapper unit) of O61. During July, the O61 was thought to be along the Thi Tinh River via XT6735. The mission was thought to be assassination of Hoi Chanhs and possibly attacks by fire on allied positions in the Ben Cat area. On 30 July, a rallier who was the Assistant Political Officer of the Ben Cat District Committee identified the positions of the following units which are associated with the O61; the military affairs section of the Ben Cat District Committee (strength 52), the O61 (strength 52); the security section; the C9 Sapper Company (strength 17); the C4 Mortar Platoon; and the C5 Women's Mortar Support Platoon (strength 20 women). The center of mass of these units was XT7135. The O61 will likely continue with its mission of assassination of Hoi Chanhs and harassing allied installations in the area. The capture of several mortars on 1 August from the C4 mortar platoon may temporarily preclude attacks by fire in the vicinity of Ben Cat.

b. O62 Chau Thanh District Units: During the months of May and June O62 avoided contacts. It is believed that the O62 is able to recruit replacements whenever needed. On 10 July, the O62 was identified by 2 P. Ws who stated they supplied C4/RN, Dong Nai Regiment, with mortar rounds. The unit is also directly assisting the Phu Chan Village Committee. Also in the month of July there have been numerous agent reports stating the O62 is in the area of XT690230. The July PWs stated this is the general vicinity of their unit.

c. O63 Lai Thieu District Units: The O63 was inactive in May and was not contacted or identified. During June, the unit suffered the loss of two company commanders, Sau Minh Nh, on 1 and 27 June respectively and this unit has undoubtedly been decimated as a result. The O63 has lost approximately 30 men during the month of June. On 4 July, allied forces received a Chieu Ho who stated the O63 has been nearly eliminated by SVN operations in their AO. He also stated that the unit is now broken down into two and three men groups hiding to avoid contact.

d. O64 Local Force Company: The O64 was not contacted during May, but in June was believed to have conducted a series of mortar attacks on Doi Tieng. The relocation of villagers from the Michelin area has forced the O64 to operate in small units, with elements thought to be dispersed throughout the Michelin area. On 23 July at XT90459, 2 P. Ws identified the O64 and were apparently on a resupply mission. The O64 is currently believed to have the mission of mortaring Doi Tieng and supplying guides to main force units in the area. The strength of the unit is believed to be 120 men and women.

e. O65 Phu Cuong City Platoon: During the month of May, the O65 was inactive and no identification or contacts were recorded. A P. W. apprehended on 6 June stated the mission of the unit was to attack ARVN outposts in the area of the An Son. The unit was not contacted in July and their mission probably remains the same.

f. O301 Phu Giao Company: The O301 was not contacted during the month of May. On 28 June, the 1st Cav Division received a rallier who stated he was a former political officer of the O301. He stated that the unit had a mission to counter US psychological operations and did main force missions in...
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AVFBC-7 (NHQ)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for period ending 31 July 1969, ROC 88FOR-65 (AV) (U)

in the area. The unit has not been contacted or identified since.

f. (C) Logistics.

(1) On 1 June 1969 a program was implemented to issue M17 protective masks to all incoming personnel undergoing indoctrination at the Division Training Command (DTC). Personnel were to test and fit their masks during training at the DTC and retain them throughout their tour with the Division. Upon DEROS, personnel turn in their masks to DTC for relasue to newly arrived replacements.

(2) During July a program to issue M16 rifles at the DTC to incoming replacements being assigned to maneuver units was developed. A new soldier would zero his weapon during indoctrination training and retain the same weapon throughout his tour with the Division. The program is scheduled for implementation on 1 August 1969. Several problems are envisioned regarding the proper accountability for the weapon between receipt in the Division and the individual's arrival at his assigned unit. Also the rapid return of weapons from combat units to the DTC for relasue to incoming personnel may present difficulties. A thorough analysis of the program will be included in the ODR for the period ending 31 October.

(3) Planning and coordinating for the logistical support of the combined US/ARVN Operation DONG TIEN was begun early in the planning phase of the operation. Face-to-face coordination at all levels proved most effective. Every effort was made to encourage ARVN counter-parts to establish a reliable, workable supply line.

g. (C) Organization: Few organizational changes took place within the 1st Infantry Division during the reporting period.

(1) USARV General Order Number 1577, 10 May 1969, assigned the 269th Field Artillery Detachment Radar to the 1st Infantry Division. 1st Infantry Division General Order Number 4124, 20 May 1969, attached the 269th Field Artillery Detachment Radar to Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 1st Infantry Division Artillery. The battery consists of one officer and eight enlisted men.

(2) Attached to 1st Infantry Division by USARV General Order Number 901, 14 Mar 1969, was Operating Location 3, 5th Weather Squadron. 1st Infantry Division General Order Number 4874, 3 Jun 1969, attached Operating Location 3, 5th Weather Squadron to 1st Aviation Battalion, Combat Weather Team #2 to 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division and Combat Weather Team #3 to 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division.

(3) 1st Infantry Division General Order Number 4871, 1 Jun 1969, reorganized the 35th and 41st Infantry Platoons (Scout Dog) under MTOE 7-167G. Authority for the reorganization was USARPAC General Order Number 34, 16 Jan 1969. The platoons are now authorized 1 officer and 27 enlisted men each.

(4) The 61st Infantry Platoon (Tracker Dog) was reorganized under MTOE 7-167E by 1st Infantry Division General Order Number 5777, 23 Jun 1969. Authority for the reorganization was USARPAC General Order Number 89 dated 31 Jan 1969. Under MTOE 7-167E, the 61st Infantry Platoon (Tracker Dog) is authorized 1 officer and 22 enlisted men. The change had little effect on equipment.

(5) Movement of the Division's 1st Brigade from Quan Loi to Dau Tieng required the following organizational changes published in 1st Infantry Division General Order Number 6141, 23 Jun 1969: the 35th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) was attached to 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division; and the 41st Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) and the 61st Infantry Platoon (Tracker Dog) were attached to 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division.

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AVDB-T (MID) 29 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RVN 132 PAT-69 (14) (U)

h. Pacification Campaign.

(1) During May and Jun 1969, 1st Bde was responsible for 40 such hamlets in Phuoc Long and Minh Long Provinces in what was known as the "northern tier". In this area, pacification was a secondary mission due to the strength of NVA forces. However, the 1st Bde did assist GVN forces by providing help to isolated and threatened hamlets when requested. On or about 22 Jun, 1969, the "northern tier" was turned over to the 25th Division and the 1st Bde was redeployed into Binh Long Sector. At the same time, the 1st Division assumed responsibility for Tri Tam District from the 25th Division. The July 1969 Bde boundaries gave the 1st Bde responsibility for the northern half of Tri Tam District which included the Michelin plantation, Dau Tieng, and the hamlet of Suoi Dua, 2 km south of Dau Tieng.

(3) The pacification goals for May and June of the reporting period did not change. Both GVN and US forces were actively engaged in upgrading selected target hamlets to a "C" category so that by December 1969, at least 90% of the populace throughout the area would be living in "C" category hamlets or better. A "C" category hamlet, by the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) criteria, is one in which the military control of the VC has been broken, at least 50% of the external VC units have been destroyed, most of the VCI have been identified, and the key leaders eliminated.

(4) In July 69, in the wake of announcements of impending US redeployment, President Thieu instituted a new Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) for second semester 1969 ( 1 Jul - 30 Oct 69). The purpose of the new campaign is to upgrade present "C" category hamlets so that at least 50% of the populace are living in "B" category hamlets by 30 October 1969. A "B" category hamlet, by HES criteria, is one in which the VCI have been identified and most of the leaders eliminated, sufficient police are available for both day and night overwatch, hamlet officials have been elected and are living in the hamlet, no VC bases are within a 3 hour walk, and the VC have virtually no influence upon the populace. The concept of target hamlets was changed in July 1969. Under the APC in 1968 and the first half of 1969, upgrading selected target hamlets was accomplished. In the new campaign, population is the most important factor and all hamlets throughout the RVN have been targeted for pacification.
Due to outdated and superseded portions of the pacification LOI 9-69, a new LOI was drafted and incorporates new goals and new ideas to make the second semester 1969 APC a success. The LOI is expected to be published early in the next reporting period.

The statistics on the pacification status of hamlets are as follows:

(a) Pacification Status of Target Hamlets within TAOI as of 31 May 1969:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Hamlets</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phuoc Long</td>
<td>Phuoc Binh</td>
<td>9 5 14</td>
<td>6,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binh Long</td>
<td>Do Duc</td>
<td>4 0 4</td>
<td>1,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>An Loc</td>
<td>5 8 13</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Loc Minh</td>
<td>7 1 8</td>
<td>5,870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chom Thanh</td>
<td>0 1 1</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binh Dinh</td>
<td>Lai Thieu</td>
<td>23 0 25</td>
<td>34,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chau Thanh</td>
<td>11 5 16</td>
<td>23,639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ben Cat</td>
<td>7 1 8</td>
<td>18,455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thu Giao</td>
<td>6 0 6</td>
<td>7,984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>Tan Uyen</td>
<td>9 0 9</td>
<td>15,039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Di An</td>
<td>35 0 35</td>
<td>34,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gia Dinh</td>
<td>Thu Duc</td>
<td>38 5 44</td>
<td>22,777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Population living in A, B, & C hamlets = 95%

(b) Pacification status of Target Hamlets within TAOI as of 30 June 1969:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Hamlets</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Binh Dinh</td>
<td>Lai Thieu</td>
<td>9 0 9</td>
<td>2,138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chau Thanh</td>
<td>12 0 12</td>
<td>17,959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ben Cat</td>
<td>7 3 10</td>
<td>16,959</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tri Tan</td>
<td>2 0 2</td>
<td>3,771</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thu Giao</td>
<td>2 0 2</td>
<td>3,927</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>Tan Uyen</td>
<td>5 0 5</td>
<td>7,532</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Di An</td>
<td>35 0 35</td>
<td>34,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gia Dinh</td>
<td>Thu Duc</td>
<td>37 0 37</td>
<td>115,785</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Population living in A, B, & C hamlets = 97%

(c) Pacification Status of Total Hamlets within TAOI as of 30 July 1969:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Hamlets</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Binh Dinh</td>
<td>Lai Thieu</td>
<td>33 0 33</td>
<td>47,673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chau Thanh</td>
<td>49 0 49</td>
<td>111,757</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ben Cat</td>
<td>11 3 14</td>
<td>26,757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tri Tan</td>
<td>6 2 10</td>
<td>17,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thu Giao</td>
<td>3 0 3</td>
<td>4,559</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>Tan Uyen</td>
<td>10 0 10</td>
<td>16,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Di An</td>
<td>35 0 35</td>
<td>34,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gia Dinh</td>
<td>Thu Duc</td>
<td>49 3 52</td>
<td>156,896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Population living in A, B, & C hamlets = 96%

Population living in A & B hamlets = 40%

Pacification has continued to be highly successful within the 1st Infantry Division's TAOI primarily because of the aggressive combined efforts of GVN and US forces in support of pacification.
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AVDB-T (MED) 29 August 1969
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1969, RCS CSFBR-65 (RI) (U)

1. (C) Psychological Operations.

   (1) Psychological Operations this quarter were aimed at three general
   target groups:

   (a) Civilians
   (b) NVA Soldiers
   (c) VC Soldiers and their relatives

   (2) During the quarter 1382 missions were conducted; 277 hours and 25
   minutes of broadcast time and 1051 hours and 30 minutes of ground operations
   were employed in support of the Division. The following is a breakdown, by
   unit, of support operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
<th>BROADCAST TIME</th>
<th>GROUND OPERATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Bde</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>42:25</td>
<td>853:45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Bde</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>189:25</td>
<td>1481:45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Bde</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>277:25</td>
<td>1051:30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1782</td>
<td>1051:30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. (C) Civic Action/Civil Affairs.

   (1) Civic action projects during the past quarter have been primarily
   in support of the GVN 1969 Pacification Plan. These projects complement
   the plans laid by the village/hamlets to improve their economic situation.
   US support is being de-emphasized and ARVN/GVN image is being raised by
   stressing their assistance and stability.

   (2) 195 ICAPS were conducted, treating 16,623 patients in the Division
   AO. The GVN is gradually assuming responsibility for these operations,
   thereby assisting greatly in developing a more positive attitude in the
   populace toward the government's ability to care for its own people.

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations,
   and Recommendations.

   a. (U) Personnel: None

   b. (C) Operations:

   (1) Bunker Construction.

   (a) Observation: Below-ground bunkers are impractical during the
   rainy season.

   (b) Evaluation: Considerably more engineer effort is expended in
   the waterproofing of underground personnel bunkers than above-ground bunkers.
   The intense rainfall causes underground bunkers to fill with water even
   after considerable engineer attention to drainage.

   (c) Recommendation: Unless absolutely necessary, future personnel
   bunkers should be constructed above ground. If fighting positions are built
   above ground, the height normally used in a foxhole should be reduced one
   third to one half to maintain a low silhouette. Occupants should fight fom
   the kneeling position.

   (2) Mine Sweeping:

   (a) Observation: Mine sweep teams frequently have been required
   to perform sweep operations in the early evening and the hours of darkness.

   (b) Evaluation: The effectiveness of a mine sweep team is greatly
   reduced during the hours of darkness. The vast majority of mines found are
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Detected visually and would not be found by means of flashlights or artillery illumination. In addition, trip wires and other booby traps are difficult to detect in periods of reduced visibility.

(c) Recommendations: If the tactical situation permits, commanders should make every attempt to accomplish sweep operations during daylight.

(3) FSB Construction.

(a) Observation: Infantry brigade and battalion commanders sometimes do not allow time for proper engineer preparation of a fire support base before infantry and artillery units move into the position.

(b) Evaluation: During the rainy season it is essential that roads and drainage be constructed in new fire support bases prior to occupancy. Examples exist in which no prior engineer work was performed and the FSB became such a mud hole that it was untenable and had to be closed after only a week.

(c) Recommendation: If movement into a new fire support base is required during the rainy season, sufficient time should be allowed for construction of roads and drainage by engineers prior to occupancy by artillery and infantry.

(4) Ambushes.

(a) Observation: 'Bushwhacking' type ambushes have resulted in substantial enemy losses. However, these types of operations were not nearly as successful in June as they were in May.

(b) Evaluation: Indications were that continuous bushwhacking operations had set a pattern that was discerned by the enemy. Realizing the danger, he was able to concentrate on avoiding these ambushes.

(c) Recommendation: Alternate bushwhacking and ground reconnaissance operations; concentrate bushwhacking tactics in jungle areas where base camps are known to exist.

(5) Securing Supply Routes and Convoy.

(a) Observation: Periodically the enemy has initiated ambushes of supply convoys along Highway 13. The ambushes, linear with about 30 - 40 troops, were executed vigorously and withdrawn quickly and silently.

(b) Evaluation: After a successful enemy ambush, the brigade will inundate the area with friendly forces. However, once these forces have aligned down, the enemy returns and begins the cycle again. To end the problem, such ambushes must be foreseen, and eliminated before they strike.

(c) Recommendation: Good intelligence and economy of force must be the guides of the securing unit. Various ways of securing roads without committing a large force area: beefing up convoy security elements with armor; armored sweeps; outposting the roads with infantry at key locations; extensive visual reconnaissance by hunter-killer teams; and establish friendly ambushes near likely ambush sites. In addition, all forces used employ a random schedule, avoiding regular patterns.

(6) Land Clearing Operations.

(a) Observation: Rome Plows are often exposed without armored and infantry forces acting as security.

(b) Evaluation: As the use and effectiveness of Rome Flow operations increases and the enemy becomes more aware of this threat, the amount of enemy harassment is also likely to become greater.

(c) Recommendation: It is imperative that ground reconnaissance
operations be conducted before and during Rome Flow cuts. Such security measures should detect enemy presence and prevent surprise attacks on the plows.

(7) VC Booby Traps.

(a) Observation: Units conducting patrols have found grenades half submerged in mud with pins pulled. The grenades are placed upside-down and will detonate if disturbed in any manner. They have been found high banks and streams that were difficult to cross and had only one or two crossing sites. They have also been found in the shade of trees about one foot away from the base of the tree, so an individual seeking the shade of the tree would detonate the grenade.

(b) Evaluation: To prevent casualties, all small unit leaders should be advised of VC use of such booby traps.

(c) Recommendation: That a comprehensive list of booby traps located in a division area be distributed to unit leaders and continually updated.

(8) Daylight Ambushes and Stalker Operations.

(a) Observation: As enemy activity steadily has decreased, the stalker/ambush operation has proven to be the most successful technique for finding the enemy.

(b) Evaluation: Daylight operations center on the stalker operation and daylight ambushes. As enemy activity in the AO decreases and he becomes less willing to stand and fight, increased stealth has been necessary to detect the VC. The use of daylight ambushes has proven successful in intercepting enemy who attempt to flee the area ahead of the stalker element.

(c) Recommendation: That all division elements consider the use of daylight ambushes in conjunction with stalker operations.

(9) Controlling VC Movement in Large Jungle.

(a) Observation: It is difficult to locate and stop the movement of small groups of VC in the Catcher's Mitt, a large area of primarily jungle terrain.

(b) Evaluation: A technique was developed to detect and react to this movement. The airborne personnel detector (Bloodhound) was used every day that aircraft were available. Aerial observation was provided by USAF forward air controllers (FAC), the LOH pilot from a hunter-killer team, and an artillery observer in the Bloodhound ship. When the VC were detected by any of these means, a prompt response was possible using artillery, air strikes, the coho from the hunter-killer team, the FAC aircraft rockets, or the machineguns mounted on the helicopters. If dictated by the nature of the target, troops were inserted in the target area. This technique provided a reliable and rapid means of reducing VC movement through large jungle areas.

(c) Recommendation: That other FWMAF use this technique in large jungle areas.

a. (d) Training.

(1) Sniper Training.

(a) Observation: Limited ranges and fields of fire, especially in jungle ambushes, have limited the effectiveness of snipers.

(b) Evaluation: Ambush positions near roads, Rome Flow cuts, streams and open fields proved the best locations for snipers; however,
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Ambushes should not have their selection based on sniper capabilities alone.

(c) Recommendations: All members of an ambush, especially the small unit leader, should be trained in sniper techniques to insure that snipers are positioned as advantageously as possible. Such training can be conducted at the brigade or battalion level.

(2) MOS Training.

(a) Observation: The constant flux of skilled signal personnel due to rotation requirements produces above average training needs.

(b) Evaluation: The need to shift resources and fulfill rotation dates requires a constant source of MOS trained personnel to operate and maintain sophisticated signal equipment. It has been found that the short MOS refresher course provided by the 1st Signal Brigade at Long Binh is an excellent remedy.

(c) Recommendations: That the facilities at Long Binh be expanded to provide additional quotas for Division Signal Battalion and tactical-nike unit's MOS.

(3) In Country Aviation Training.

(a) Observation: The Aviation Battalion is experiencing an increase in the number of night air missions.

(b) Evaluations: The increased number of night missions being performed by the battalion indicated a need for more emphasis on night training, especially when flying under marginal weather conditions.

(c) Recommendations: That emphasis be placed on night flying during the initial in-country orientation and currency ride. A minimum of one hour should be flown at night during the orientation.

(d) (c) Intelligence.

(1) Mine Reporting.

(a) Observation: Frequently Intelligence Summaries report the same mine incident twice at different locations.

(b) Evaluation: When a mine is detected by a mine sweep team, it is reported through the 1st Engineer Battalion TOC. The security element of the mine sweep operation also sends in a mine report, but through his battalion headquarters. When both reports reach G2, it frequently appears that two different mine incidents have occurred since slightly different coordinates are sometimes reported.

(c) Recommendations: That mine incident reports resulting from sweep operations be routed through the 1st Engineer Battalion TOC.

a. (U) Logistics: None

b. (U) Organization: None

c. (C) Pacification.

(1) VCI Hamlet Team.

(a) Observation: Some hamlets in Thu Duc required additional work to bring up their VCI ratings.

(b) Evaluation: The 2-18 Inf is employing a VCI hamlet team consisting of 6 US personnel, 3 Kit Carson Scouts, one National policeman, and one interpreter. The team works with one hamlet for an extended period of
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Time to break the VC contact with their supporters in the hamlets, to detect and neutralize VCI and sympathizers, to provide increased security, and to gain the confidence and respect of the people in the hamlets.

(a) Recommendations: Other battalions with a pacification mission should consider the use of a Hamlet Team.

(b) Recommendations: Commanders should anticipate this and initially attempt to ensure the battalion commander's presence wherever actions are taken to demonstrate the benefits of decentralization of decision making.

(2) Fire Support Bases.

(a) Observations: Difficulties were encountered in pinpointing ARVN personnel locations.

(b) Evaluations: ARVN units continually have unscheduled woodcutting and water carrying details wandering outside of the NDP, and washing details in and around neighboring villages. These forms of uncharted movement outside the NDP and in the proximity of US road security forces require maximum control of US fires and virtually preclude test firing of weapons or reconnaissance by fire.

(c) Recommendations: All US elements in the proximity of ARVN units must be informed of their suspected location. US units must not engage any target without previous positive identification. For the test firing of weapons as well as useful training, a range and berm can be constructed.

(3) Perimeter Defense.

(a) Observations: Significant differences were noted in the conduct of NDP perimeter defense.

(b) Evaluations: ARVN believes in saturation ambushes and LPs around the perimeter as opposed to our practice of a 1000 meter stand off which ensures maximum use of artillery. This has caused blockage to our firing def- cons.

(c) Recommendations: Each unit at the evening briefing, the ARVN IC briefs the proposed fire plan for the NDP and explains why defcons and counter mortar grid cannot be fired - normally due to the proximity of ARVN AFs. This serves as an excellent vehicle to begin discussing our defense SOP of a wall of fire.

(4) Control.

(a) Observations: Locations of ARVN Companies are often reported incorrectly.

(b) Evaluations: There is a tendency of ARVN companies to float out of predesignated NDP and, in general, not be exactly where they are reportedly located.

(c) Recommendations: The S3 can make certain that the AO boundaries...
AVN-T (NSID)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCR CORP-69 (R1) (U)

29 August 1969

on the ARVN battalion commander's map are drawn correctly. The accurate reporting of locations should be a constant topic of conversation between battalion commanders. Joint VNs with the US S3 or commander and the ARVN battalion commander during which the latter has had his troops pop smoke to identify their locations, have effectively brought the point home that ARVN company commanders are not accurately reporting their locations. Making a LOH available to the ARVN battalion commander aids in this respect. In addition, this tends to make him more independent and readily inclined to start small unit operations in the interior of the AO.

(5) Communications.

(a) Observation: Communications between co-equal commanders pose a serious problem.

(b) Evaluation: Communications and support between the two battalion commanders and their staffs has been a key to the success of every joint operation.

(c) Recommendation: A combined TOC, combined briefing, and a daily combined operations coordination meeting are essential so that both sides know what the other is doing. Of extreme importance is keeping the US advisor informed and actually participating.

(6) Ambushes.

(a) Observation: ARVN units have been using ambushes in place of fire support rather than using them to interdict enemy movement.

(b) Evaluation: To date, ARVN ambushes have not been ambushes in the true sense of the word. They serve primarily as security points protecting NDPs or company RONs.

(c) Recommendation: Joint discussion and explanation can improve the utilization of ARVN ambush assets so that they are more offensively oriented.

(7) Search Techniques.

(a) Observation: ARVN's ability to search bunkers and locate caches seems to be equal or better than that of US units.

(b) Evaluation: The ARVN have displayed a good ability to conduct detailed searches of specific areas. They know how to recognize possible cache sites and tunnel complexes.

(c) Recommendation: ARVN search capabilities should be exploited. Additionally, US commanders should ask ARVN for training in this area; we can learn from them too.

(8) Fire Support Training.

(a) Observation: Training of ARVN artillery units is below US standards in some fields.

(b) Evaluation: Prior to beginning the integration of the ARVN artillery unit, the sponsoring US artillery battalion S3 should evaluate the state of training of the battery. ARVN battalions will probably need training in the following areas prior to assigning them an operational mission in support of US/ARVN integrated maneuver forces:

1. Airlift and air mobility training.

2. Radar registration.

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AVN-T (MHI) 29 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCV GMR-65 (MHI) (U)

2. US field artillery tactics and techniques.

(a) Recommendation: Brief training programs should be initiated in the above areas for ARVN batteries. The regular ARVN batteries are already performing their direct support role and are usually very competent. Thus, care should be taken not to injure the pride or feelings of ARVN personnel.

(g) Artillery Command and Control.

(a) US/ARVN command and control coordination has put a strain on interpreters.

(b) Evaluation: The most complicated problem in combined artillery operations is effective command and control. The use of ordinary interpreters is not satisfactory because of the lack of knowledge of technical artillery terminology, tactics, and techniques.

(c) Recommendation: This problem of language can only be overcome by employing English-speaking ARVN artillerymen as follows:

1. Maneuver Battalion Level: In the joint US/ARVN maneuver battalion TOC, an ARVN artillery liaison team is required for exchange of information of friendly positions and scheme of maneuver. In addition, requests for fire from ARVN maneuver companies must be translated into English before being sent to the US artillery battalion TOC since US RTOs speak only English.

2. Direct Support Artillery Battalion Level: An ARVN liaison team in the artillery battalion TOC is required to advise the S3 on ARVN maneuver and artillery tactics, post ARVN artillery air data, relay fire commands to the ARVN battery, and to obtain and forward appropriate clearances to fire to the ARVN battery.

10. Ammunition Supply Rate.

(a) Observation: The ARVN artillery batteries have an extremely low ASR in comparison to a US battery.

(b) Recommendation: This fact must be carefully weighed by the US battalion S3 when recommending future positioning of the ARVN battery. Until such time as their ASR is increased to that level given to US batteries, the ARVN battery should be co-located with a US 105 direct support battery to insure adequate artillery support of the US/ARVN maneuver forces within range.

11. Communications.

(a) Observation: Communications with ARVN artillery poses a serious problem because of the shortage of radios in the battery, and the age and condition of existing equipment.

(b) Evaluation: A Battery, 1st Artillery had 1 VRC-34 and 2 PRC-25 radios on hand and operational; the VHF was in depot maintenance; the VRC-34 was used in the CI role for administrative traffic. The 2 PRC-25s were both used in the 5th Division Artillery command and fire net. It is an ARVN policy to rotate the PRC-25s every 3 hours to preserve equipment and battery life. The ARVN battery commander had to monitor his DIVARTY C&F net, so could not communicate on the fire frequency assigned by the US artillery battalion S3. This problem was solved by allowing the battery to continue to monitor its division's net, with the understanding that once it had deployed to the field, it would monitor only the fire frequency assigned by the US 3d Bn, 33d Artillery.
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AVFI-T (MED)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RGS CSFOR-65 (R1)(U)

(c) Recommendations: This problem is being presented through ARVN command and MACV advisor channels to allow the battery to operate and communicate on the frequency assigned. In future combined operations of this type, all questions concerning command and control of the ARVN artillery unit should be completely resolved before the ARVN battery begins operations.

(12) Fire Support Coordination.

(a) Observation: Coordination at battalion level was lacking at times.

(b) Evaluation: Contact missions within range of ARVN mortars have been fired without coordination with the battalion artillery LO.

(c) Recommendation: A complete understanding of centralized control of the fire support base in the case of a standoff or ground attacks is essential. A complete SOP must be formulated to establish control of fires, accurate reporting of the situation to the combined TOC, emergency signals and the employment of close-in defensive measures.

(13) Intelligence.

(a) Observation: Lateral flow of information is too slow.

(b) Evaluation: During the initial phases of Operation XONG THIEN, lateral reporting of intelligence information by the ARVN unit to the cooperating US unit was not timely, due to differences in language and administrative procedures.

(c) Recommendation: Close coordination at each echelon to insure proper rating of intelligence reporting channels and procedures prior to commencement of joint operations is essential to insure the timely flow of information.

(14) Reporting of Tactical Intelligence.

(a) Observation: The reporting procedure of tactical field intelligence gathered by ARVN troops should be made immediately available to US units during combined operations.

(b) Evaluation: The ARVN advisor holds the key to this solution. Initial reports from the field have to come from him. The final wrap-up can be an exchange of information between the respective S2s.

(c) Recommendation: Establishing good rapport between the US commander, his ARVN opposite, and the advisor is a prerequisite of success and must be given priority of effort.

(15) Aerial Resupply.

(a) Observation: Aerial resupply difficulties were noted with ARVN units.

(b) Evaluation: ARVN is neither trained nor equipped for aerial resupply. Specifically, ARVN is short airlift equipment, slings, etc. Some confusion has been noted in moving supplies off the helipad area to other locations in the fire support base.

(c) Recommendation: The training inadequacy was solved by classes given at Lai Khe by the pathfinders from the 1st Aviation Battalion on rigging and outloading for resupply by helicopter (one CH-47 was made available for this class). Sling equipment was provided from brigade assets. The importance of prior planning in requesting aircraft was stressed.

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AVN-2 (MED)

29 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RMS CMRE-65 (R1) (U)

3. (U) Section I, Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information

For the Commander:

SIGNED

SAMUEL R. WARD JR

13 Inc:
- Organizational Structure CPT, Adj
- List of Key Commanders Asst AG
- Force Report
- 1st Inf Operational Report-Lessons Learned
- 2nd Inf Operational Report-Lessons Learned
- 3rd Inf Operational Report-Lessons Learned
- Support Command Operational Report-Lessons Learned
- Division Chemical Section Operational Report-Lessons Learned
- 5th Arty Bn Operational Report-Lessons Learned
- 1st Engr Bn Operational Report-Lessons Learned
- 11th Engineers Operational Report-Lessons Learned
- Training Notes

Incls 1 - 6, 11 - 13 wd, HQ, DA

DISTRIBUTION:
- 1-23 INF, ATTN: G-3 Analysis
- 1-CC, INSS, ATTN: 7th MED
- 1-CC, USARV, ATTN: AVHCG (SIG)
- 1-CC, USAW, ATTN: AVHCG-MH
- 1-CINCSARAC, ATTN: GPRF-ET
- 1-25th Inf Div, ATTN: 18th MED
- 1-9th Inf Div, ATTN: 19th MED
- 1-1st Cav Div, ATTN: 14th MED
- 1-CMAC
- 1-RNAV
- 1-1st ATP
- 1-17th LIO, ATTN: 44th MED
- 1-11th ACR, ATTN: 28th MED
- 1-17th MED

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AVFdc-RE-H (29 Aug 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

To, Hq II FFORC&V, APO San Francisco 96266

Sub: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVFGC(DST), APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

To: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report-lessons Learned of the 1st Infantry Division for the period ending 31 July 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

E.W. Macdonald
ILR. ASC
Asst AG
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AVHGC-DST (29 Aug 69) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RL) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPO-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned
for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, 1st Infantry
Division.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. (U) Reference item concerning "VC Booby Traps," section II, page 23,
      paragraph 2b(7); concur. A USARV study is presently being conducted which
      will result in a comprehensive list of enemy mines and booby traps employed in
      RVN.

   b. (U) Reference item concerning "MOS Training," section II, page 24,
      paragraph 2c(2); nonconcur. The signal school facilities do not require expan-
      sion, however, some reorientation to meet the needs of field units may be in
      order. Areas recommended for additional stress by units should be addressed to
      this headquarters, ATTN: AVHGC-PT.

   c. (C) Reference item concerning "Logbooks," Tab 7, section II, page 7,
      paragraph 2f(11); concur. The recommendation is valid. The recording of pre-
      mature component failures on DA Form 2408-15 is in contradiction with TM 38-750,
      which requires the failure to be recorded on DA Form 2408-10 and reported as an
      EIR. The unit has been advised of this deficiency.

   d. (C) Reference item concerning "OH-6A LOH," Tab 7, section II, page 7,
      paragraph 2f(12); nonconcur. The unit has been advised to submit an EIR which
      in turn will initiate a study and an evaluation by USAAVSCOM, St Louis, Missouri.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

C. D. Wilson
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
1st Inf Div
II PFV

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GPOP-DT (29 Aug 69) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 24 OCT 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division Support Command
APO San Francisco 96345

JWZ-M4-AT

4 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Support Command for period ending
31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR 65 (MI) (U)

According General
1st Infantry Division
AVP AVT (MEM)
APO 96345

1. (C) SECTION 1, OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

(a) Support Command continued to support the 1st Infantry Division and
attached units from established base camps at Di An, Lai Khe, Phu Loi and
Dau Tieng during Phase III of Operation Toan Thang.

(b) 1st Supply & Transport Battalion:

(1) Beginning late in the previous reporting period, and continuing
through 5 June, personnel from the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion were
stationed at Dong Xoai (17 Apr - 15 May) and FSPB Bunard (16 May - 5 Jun) to
provide support for Phase II of the road clearing operation from Dong Xoai to
Song Be. Operating initially from Dong Xoai, unit personnel later displaced
to FSPB Bunard to provide supply support in Class I, II, and VII, and
Graves Registration services at both locations, with back up support in all
areas available from Di An. Heavy requirements for barrier materials and
associated engineer material continued to be experienced, necessitating frequent,
often daily, convoy operations from Di An to Dong Xoai and Bunard with turn-
novers of the operation and subsequent assumption of control of the newly cleared
road by ARVN. Supply and Transport personnel deactivated the forward activity
and were returned to Di An.

(2) In mid-June, 1st Supply and Transport Battalion received the require-
ment to establish a Forward Support Section at Dau Tieng as a result of the
1st Infantry Division assumption of tactical responsibility for the entire Michelin.
On 30 June a fully operational FSS was activated at Dau Tieng, providing supply
support in Class I, II, and VII, and Graves Registration services to 1st
Infantry Division elements operating from Dau Tieng and satellited
NWP/FSPB. Back up support is provided from Di An for all classes of supply, making regular
convoy operations mandatory.

(3) Throughout the reporting period, the Battalion's POL "jump teams" were
utilized on a continuing basis. Continuing land clearing operations, as well
as road clearing operations in the Song Be corridor required placement of jump
"teams" at FSPB Mono, west of Lai Khe. While primarily operating in support of the
land clearing teams, the "jump teams" provided additional POL support for all
vehicles.

(4) Work has continued on the 1st Supply and Transport sector of the Di An
sector. New perimeter lights and poles have been installed and are
awaiting receipt of generators to become operational. With the advent of the
monsoon season, extensive work has been required to keep fields of fire
open and free from obstructive foliage. Additional work within the wire, to include
replacement of old fougasses, installation of a greater number of trip flares and
gas detection devices has been undertaken. Planned improvements in process
implementation include construction of "stand-off" screens of chain link fence
front of each bunker in the Supply and Transport sector. Further work is in
progress on perimeter communications in an effort to provide a system of fail-
safe command communications between line bunkers, command bunkers, and obser-
vation towers.

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DOWNGRADED AT 2 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200300
During the quarter, the battalion was called upon to meet heavy transportation requirements throughout the division's area of operation. Commitments included troop moves, transport of POL and supplies, and retrograde movement of salvage material. Total mileage recorded by the battalion during the quarter was 205,298 miles, a slight increase over the previous quarter. The total mileage, however, represents a significant increase per vehicle due to losses incurred as a result of age/mileage washouts, maintenance down time, personnel and repair parts availability. With the establishment of Dau Tieng FSS, tonnage moved forward has increased significantly during the latter part of the reporting period.

The battalion training program, established during the previous quarter in response to division requirements, continued throughout the current quarter. Command information, character guidance and mission related subject areas were presented. During the latter part of the quarter, classes were conducted with the assistance of the division S3J covering changes to the UCMJ and their effect upon individual rights and protections. A series of special classes followed by a written exam was conducted emphasizing safety practices related to all areas of individual and organizational activities. Author emphasis on safety was provided through safety seminars for all NCO's of the battalion.

The battalion continued operation of the Di An (South) Post Exchange during the reporting period. A general program of renovation, stock relocation, and enlargement of existing storage facilities, instituted last quarter, continued throughout the current reporting period.

Divisional strength supported by the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion during the quarter averaged 21,685 men. Stockage levels maintained by the battalion for Class I, and III items in support of the division were as follows:

(1) Class I: Ration Stock objective On Hand
A Component 3 days 66313 ration
B Component 14 days N/A
C Component 5 days 66653 ration
D Component 5 days 488 ration

(2) Class III: Product Stock objective On Hand
JP-4 160000 235000
AV GAS 11200 29000
MOG 49000 69500
DIESEL 75000 118500

Tonnage moved forward to divisional elements:
Class I - 3000,30 tons
Class II&VII - 2028.90 tons
Class III - 23403.50 tons

1st Medical Battalion:

(1) During the reporting period, the 1st Medical Battalion continued to provide division and unit level medical service to all units of the 1st Infantry Division and supporting units.

(2) Headquarters and Co A supported 2nd Bde and provided area support from its location in the Di An Base Camp. In addition to this support, Headquarters and Co A actively engaged in the ICAP Program. During this period a total of fifty-two (52) ICAPS were conducted. On these ICAPS a total exceeding 5,000 patients were seen. From 19 May to 25 May 1969 Headquarters and Co A trained two (2) ARVN medical personnel in medical procedures.

(3) Company B provided division level support to 2nd Bde units at Di An Base Camp from the beginning of the period until 23 June 1969. On 12 March 1969 a thirty (30) man element from Co B moved overland to Quan Loi and established a Forward Medical clearing facility in conjunction with Co B, 15th Med. Bn. This facility was set up to support 1st Inf. troops operating in this area. On 20 June 1969 this facility was closed and the forward element returned to Di in Base Camp. On 23 June 1969 Co B moved overland to Dau Tieng Base Camp where they set up a complete medical company treatment facility to support 1st Inf. troops in the base camp and outlaying area. This facility was completely operational on 26 June 1969.
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(4) Co C supported 1st Bde units from its location in Lai Khe Base Camp on 17 March 1969. A twelve (12) man detachment was established from Lai Khe to Song Xoi and then to Bunkr and established a forward medical clearing facility. The purpose of this element was to support the 1st Bde units clearing the road to Song Be. On 5 June 1969 the element returned to Lai Khe.

(5) Company D supported 1st Bde units from its location in the Lai Khe Base Camp and provided support for the Lai Khe Village Dispensary.

(c) 701st Maintenance Battalions

(1) From 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969 battalion units continued to support the 1st Infantry Division and attached units from Di An, Lai Khe and Phu Loi.

One major change has occurred during the quarter. The 1st Brigade was relocated from the Quan Loi base camp to the Dau Tieng base camp on 5 June 1969. A contact team was sent from Company D to support the 1st Brigade elements in this area. It consisted of two officers and twenty-seven men from the armament, electronics, and truck/automotive section and a Vehicle Tank Recovery crew. Special contact teams and technical assistance teams were dispatched as required to field and base camp locations. Battalion totals of jobs completed and tons of equipment moved are included as enclosure 1. The major operation supported was Phase III of "Can Thang.

(2) Maintenance and Supply Operations:

(a) Company A: During the period 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969, Company A continued to support non-brigade units located in the Di An - Phu Loi area and provide back-up support to the forward support companies. Emphasis continued in the Tech Supply area with the turn-in of many tons of excess serviceable supplies the major accomplishment. Even with the reduction to 1,600 lines stocked, over 50% of the lines remained at zero balance.

(b) Company B: Company B continued to support the 2d Brigade and attached units from its location at Di An base camp. During the first portion of the quarter the primary mission was the preparation of supported units for a possible VC offensive. Company B continued to have maintenance responsibility for the 100KW generators at key bridge sites. Frequent liaison and technical assistance visits to the sites insured maximum operational time for these vital pieces of equipment. The rainy season increased the number of recovery operations. With the transfer of ground surveillance radar responsibility to Division Artillery, B Company expanded its signal section to meet the additional work load.

(c) Company C: Company C continued to support the 3d Brigade and attached units from its location at Lai Khe base camp. In addition, the support of the 1st Engineer Battalion and HHC 1st Infantry Division was acquired. C Co. provided support for the Song So road opening operation. A contact team of one officer and six enlisted men accompanied the 1/16 Mechanized Infantry Battalion and provided BS service on site.

(d) Company D: Company D continued to support the 1st Brigade and non-brigade units at Lai Khe base camp during this period. On 5 June 1969 the 1st Brigade moved to the Dau Tieng base camp. A contact team consisting of one officer and 27 enlisted men, including a VTR, were sent to Dau Tieng to provide support. Supporting a brigade in two widely separated locations over an unsecured road has caused many problems in the area of supply.

(e) Company E: Company E continued to perform its primary mission of "cot support aircraft and aircraft supply within the 1st Division. No major operations were conducted during the quarter. Withdrawal of the contact team from Lai Khe to Phu Loi was accomplished without adverse effect on LOH availability. The increased demand for on site maintenance generated by removal of the contact team was small, however, the additional capability within the unit was significant in terms of manpower utilization.

(3) Logistics:

(a) Company A: In the company area included new showers for the enlisted men, concrete sidewalks for a large portion of the company area, a new tower and bunker built by the east gate, and an addition to the company supply room.

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(b) Company B: In anticipation of the upcoming monsoon season, 150 loads of laterite fill have been hauled and spread in low spots throughout the company and shop areas. A 40X80 foot movie theater was built and painted for troop comfort. All latrines and containers were painted. Sidewalks were built throughout the company area. One urinal was built near the EM latrine. A fence was constructed enclosing the shop area. Concrete floors were laid in 3 bays in the maintenance building. A new tool room was constructed in the mechanical maintenance building. The orderly room ceiling was built and painted. A new company sign was painted and installed in front of the company bulletin board. The service and evacuation and armament sections painted the exterior of their shop buildings.

(c) Company C: A new hot water heater has been constructed in the company area to provide adequate hot water for the showers and mess hall.

(d) Company D: The principal activities that were engaged by the unit, other than mission were upgrading the company and shop areas which consisted of mainly renovating the orderly room, shop office and billeting areas.

(e) Company E: Larger sumps were completed for mess hall and showers.

(4) Civil Assistance:
The 701st Maintenance Battalion worked on improving the facilities of the Dong Toi Hamlet school. A flag pole was erected, the well repaired, and a fence constructed around the school grounds. These efforts brought about a greater friendliness and understanding between the men of the battalion and the Vietnamese people.

(5) Base Development:
(1) Construction completed during the reporting period:
(a) Containment area for 7,700 men (change 7 to CD 66-206 20-79).
(b) Operations Center (change to CD 17-120-04-24).
(c) Mail Center Office (change 2 to CD 66-1230-79)
(d) Water fill points (change 1 to CD 17-201-04-74).

(2) Construction started during the reporting period and still under construction.

(3) New Construction Directive (CD) issued during the reporting period for a water supply facility at the Division Training Command CD 517-001-01.


(c) Change 1 to CD 69-200-10. Class II and IV covered storage.

(6) Division Transportation Office:
(1) Convoy operations: During the reporting period the 120 conducted convoy operations to Lai Khe, Quan Loi, Bien Thi and Phuoc Vinh for the purpose of base camp resupply and in support of tactical operations.

Convoy operations to Lai Khe: Convoy operations to Phuoc Vinh

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of convoys</th>
<th>Number of convoys</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>170</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of vehicles</th>
<th>Number of vehicles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5,315</td>
<td>5,268</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Tons</th>
<th>Total Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>160,440</td>
<td>195,690</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total miles</th>
<th>Total miles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>137,104</td>
<td>181,896</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average vehicles per convoy</th>
<th>Average vehicles per convoy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Convoy operations to Quan Loi:

(a) Number of convoys: 150
(b) Number of vehicles: 6,726
(c) Total miles: 374,470
(d) Average vehicles per convoy: 45

Convoy operations to Dau Tieng:

(a) Number of convoys: 62
(b) Number of vehicles: 914
(c) Total miles: 21,768
(d) Total Tons: 27,310
(e) Average vehicles per convoy: 15

(2) Airlift operations: The total amount of fixed wing support received by the division is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>NUMBER OF SORTIES</th>
<th>TROOPS MOVED</th>
<th>POUNDS OF CARGO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>1,302,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-123</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>2237</td>
<td>1,197,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-7A</td>
<td>1537</td>
<td>20,924</td>
<td>81,610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>1,690</td>
<td>23,710</td>
<td>2,581,796</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(f) Division Ammunition Office:

(1) During this reporting period, the 1st Infantry Division was issued short tons of ammunition in support of combat operations as follows:

a. Air Shipments - 516 Short Tons
b. Land Convoys - 1,524 Short Tons

(2) On 1 May 1969 the 1st Logistical Command assumed operational responsibility for the 1st Khe ASP. Ammunition stockage has been adequate for the support of using 1st Infantry Division Units.

(3) Convoy resupply of Class V to Dau Tieng units commenced 30 Jun 1969.

C. (C) SECTION II. LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. PERSONNEL: NONE
B. OPERATIONS: NONE
C. TRAINING: NONE
D. INTELLIGENCE: NONE
E. CIVIL ASSISTANCE: NONE
F. LOGISTICS

(1) 30KW Injected Engines:

(a) Observation: Injector heads are freezing.

(b) Evaluation: Investigation has shown that units are not draining the fuel system on the 30KW injected engines as often as required. This causes the water that collects in the system to be forced into the injector heads and the injectors freeze.

(c) Recommendation: All units should closely follow the pertinent TM's on operator maintenance.

(2) Air Conditioners:

(a) Observation: Blower fans and compressors are burning up.

(b) Evaluation: Clogged screens, filters, and vents are the basic problem.

(c) Recommendation: Threads on shafts and exposed screw terminals should be protected with a cover. All inlet and outlet holes should be taped or covered to prevent forcing dirt/water from entering.

(3) M48A3 Tanks:

(a) Observation: Track and road wheels are being broken in jungle terrain.

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(b) Evaluation: When traversing dense jungle terrain, bamboo and other items are often caught between the mud flaps and the track, frequently resulting in broken track or road wheel arms.

(c) Recommendations: Cut off the mud flaps and part of the fender, even with the hull.

(4) Co-Axial Machine Gun of M48A3 Tank:

(a) Observation: The co-axial machine gun mounted in the commander's cupola of the M48A3 tank is seldom used for its intended use as a spotting rifle.

(b) Evaluation: Tank personnel prefer to use this weapon as other than a spotting rifle.

(c) Recommendations: Possible M60 for Vietnam. Remove the machine gun from the turret. Use a ground mount tripod, cut the legs off 12 inches from the pivot point, flatten out the ends of the legs and weld the trip of the commander's cupola.

(5) Radar Set AN/TPS-5:

(a) Observation: Often there is recurrent condensation in the radar transit case.

(b) Evaluation: The usual cause is saturated desiccant in the case cover.

(c) Recommendations: The saturated desiccant can be replaced with the small desiccant bags packed with the replacement modules until the original type can be obtained.

(6) Cable, Special Purpose, Electrical, UX 8666:

(a) Observation: A field expedient method has been found to repair a cable made unserviceable by the opening of audio pin #27 or #28.

(b) Evaluation: Two strands of WD-1 copper wire are taped the length of the cable and connected on each end to jacks of a headset H-226. The cable then connects one of the two headset plugs on the CI unit. When a serviceable headset is then connected to the other plug on the CI unit in the normal manner, the radar again becomes operational.

(c) Recommendations: This repair method should be used in lieu of deadlining the radar of parts.

(7) M671:

(a) Observation: The major problem encountered to date has been the total destruction of the entire clutch assembly to include the fork and flange housing.

(b) Evaluation: Such destruction is senseless and is caused by prolonged use or abuse with insufficient clutch free travel.

(c) Recommendations: Command emphasis needs to be placed on the proper use of the M671 and frequent checks made for adequate clutch adjustment.

(8) 100KW Generator - Holt Bros:

(a) Observation: The governor on the generator is easily damaged and replacements are difficult to obtain.

(b) Evaluation: One of the most common cause of governors failure is dirty engine oil, water in the oil, or fuel in the oil.

(c) Recommendations: The TM recommends changing the oil and oil filter every 250 hours. In Vietnam the oil and filter should be changed every 100 to 150 hours because of the severe operating conditions. In addition, the oil should be checked daily for fuel and water contamination.
(9) Generators:

(a) Observation: During the rainy season rainwater gets into the fuel.

(b) Evaluation: Fuel drums should be placed at an angle such that the drain plug is at the very bottom.

(c) Recommendation: Once daily, preferably prior to operating the generator, the drain plug should be opened allowing all residue and sediments to be eliminated from the fuel supply.

(10) 100KW Generator - Holt Bros:

(a) Observation: As the generator cover is now constructed the removal is both time consuming and potentially damaging to the front panel of the control box.

(b) Evaluation: The complete angle iron brace can be removed from the generator allowing the cover to slide back and off the generator. The brace is extraneous anyway. In tight areas where the cover has to be removed by lifting straight up, the bottom flange of the angle iron brace at the engine end of the generator has to be removed with a cutting torch.

(c) Recommendation: Either of these two modifications should be performed prior to removal of the generator cover.

(11) Logbooks:

(a) Observation: Aircraft log book historical records are not utilized to greatest advantage.

(b) Evaluation: Normal practice dictates a minimum of essential data is recorded on the DA Form 2408-15. Experience has shown that recording premature component failures and unusual structural repairs is desirable. It would be beneficial to all echelons of maintenance. Maximum aircraft utilization and repair personnel turnover emphasize the value of historical data which may preclude serious material failures and which conserve resources.

(c) Recommendation: That additional emphasis be placed on aircraft historical data at all echelons of maintenance.

(12) OH-6A LOH:

(a) Observation: Excessive maintenance is required for high frequency vibrations on the OH-6A LOH.

(b) Evaluation: The OH-6A helicopter will develop high frequency vibrations requiring immediate maintenance attention prior to scheduled inspections. Although there are several sources for this vibration level, the tail rotor is the primary cause and required frequent balancing and premature replacement. A redesigned tail rotor assembly is unsatisfactory for the same reasons and the high failure rate due to blade collapse. It should be noted that downtime due to high frequency vibrations for causes other than the tail rotor increase significantly above 1000 hours aircraft time.

(c) Recommendation: That tail rotor design and high speed component time before overhaul (TBO) be re-evaluated to unscheduled maintenance.

SECTION III, HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY SURVEY INFORMATION:

None

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DAHL M. GURNEY, JR.

OFF, GSC

Adjutant

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
Office of the Chemical Officer
APO 96345

AVDB-CM 1 August 1969

SUBJECT: Feeder Report to Operational Report 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1969 (U)

1. (C) Section I, Operations: Significant Activities

a. General:

(1) During the period 1 May 1969 through 31 July 1969, the 1st Infantry Division Chemical Section continued to perform personnel detection, defoliation, burning of vegetation and employment of CS in support of combat operations.

(2) The 242d Chemical Detachment (CBRC) assigned to augment the Chemical Section, continued to process defoliation requests, monitor the status of defoliation projects in the division TAOI and provide personnel for other chemical operations. During the period 1 May 1969 to 23 June 1969, LT Jon G Fisher was the detachment commander. CPT Gary L Stair commanded the detachment from 24 June 1969 to 31 July 1969.

(3) The 266th Chemical Platoon provided chemical support to the 1st Infantry Division. This support consisted of burning vegetation along stream lines where Rome Plow operations were not possible; dropping of persistent CS, employment of fougasses; defoliation and burning of base camp perimeters, and operating the airborne personnel detector on "Bloodhound" missions. During the period 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969 the platoon was commanded by CPT William R Dias.

b. Operations:

(1) Personnel Detection Missions (Bloodhound): Missions continued to be flown for the Division G-2 on a daily basis in a large area surveillance role. A total of 235 missions were flown in this role during the reporting period. In addition, on 16 July 1969, a three man crew and detector was placed with the Air Cavalry Troop to be used in conjunction with their hunter-killer search teams. Results of this type operation are inconclusive at this time but are
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AVUE-CH 1 August 1969

SUBJECT: Feeder Report to Operational Report 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1969 (U)

expected to contribute significantly as the Air Cavalry Troop develops and improves their techniques of employment. Considerable difficulty was experienced with the take-up reel on the recorder of the XW-3 airborne personnel detector. An equipment improvement report has been submitted to modify the design of the take-up reel.

(2) Riot Control Agent CS:

(a) Nonpersistent CS: A total of 45 E-158 CS clusters were dropped on 3 missions. The employment of these munitions was on post B-52 strikes after "last bomb" and on exploitation of the Bloodhound detector sennings. Although a light-fire team and hunter-killer team were over the CS targets there were no known cases of the enemy being affected by the CS. During the month of July, the "Nifty Nite" was used on several occasions upon discovery of extensive tunnel and bunker complexes. Using the M7 series CS grenades with the "Nifty Nite" was successful in driving unprotected personnel out from cover and in one instance asphyxiating several of the enemy with protective masks.

(b) Persistent CS: A total of 260 drums or 20,800 pounds of CS were dropped during the report period. The bulk CS was used in conjunction with the road opening and large convoy operations from SONG BE to PHUOC VTH. The CS was dropped into suspected ambush routes two days prior to the convoy movements.

(3) Defoliation: Only limited C-123 aerial defoliation missions were flown in the division's TAOI due to the size of the AO and the division's extensive pacification program. During this period only 244 sorties were flown. The only defoliation operations conducted by the division consisted of LAI KHE, DI AN and LAU TINNG Base Camp perimeters. These operations were conducted using a tracked vehicle mounted with a 600 gallon POL pod and 50 GPH POL pump. The same field expedient rig was used to dispense diesel fuel for burning operations where defoliation was not permitted. Approximately 120,000 gallons of diesel fuel were sprayed using this method.

(4) Personnel Marking and Identification System (PMIS): During the period 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969 the 266th Chemical Platoon assisted Major John P. Sanders, WPN EV ENG LAB, GIVL, EDG ARS, in the employment and evaluation of the PMIS with the 1st Infantry Division. The item consists of a helicopter mounted Agavenco sprayer, which sprays a suspension of zinc sulfide in mineral oil. An ultraviolet light source was available for detection of the zinc sulfide. Areas to be sprayed were VC/NVA infiltration routes and/or staging areas used by the enemy to move into villages and hamlets on food resupply and forced labor missions. These areas were remote from the villages so as not to mark innocent civilians. A desired characteristic of the area to be sprayed was low vegetation, such as grasses and low shrubs, so as to allow the zinc sulfide to settle to a level that would insure contact with personnel traveling through the area.
operations were planned a few days in advance of seal and search operations conducted against target villages. During the conduct of the village seal, personnel to be examined were walked into a darkened building, blindfolded and examined individually for the lime colored luminous spots of the zinc sulfide visible under the ultraviolet light. All operations were successful in identifying marked personnel. In each operation the personnel were turned over to the National Police and/or ARVN investigation channels. During the period 4 PMIS spray missions were flown and 66 persons were identified as having been in unauthorized areas. It was noted the zinc sulfide remains in an area for several weeks. Clothes laundered after contact with sprayed areas remained marked sufficiently to be detected by the ultraviolet light source.

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Observations, Evaluation and Recommendations.

Personnel Marking and Identification System (PMIS).

a. Observation: The Personnel Marking and Identification System has been used during its test and evaluation period with the 1st Infantry Division with notable success in identifying VC suspects.

b. Evaluation: This system is effective in marking personnel when there is a degree of isolation between enemy base camp areas and areas traversed by the general populace. A wide variety of employment means would be available to the intelligence gathering system if this system were presently in Vietnam for use. The characteristic of this suspension remaining in the area for several weeks makes it feasible only if a system is made available for identifying when and from which area the person has been marked. This limitation is most likely to be present if regular use is made of the system in the area. If intensive interrogation of marked personnel was promptly evaluated, a large quantity of data could be made available for intelligence channels.

c. Recommendations: That a system of dye be added to the present suspension to provide a capability for continued use of this system in any area.

HERBERT JEO
LTC, Ch
Division Chemical Officer
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST AVIATION BATTALION (COMBAT)
1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 96345

AVDB-AVN
1 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Aviation Battalion (Combat) for the period ending 31 July 1969, RCS (SFOR) (RI)

Commanding General,
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDB-T (MID)
APO 96345

1. Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

   a. The 1st Aviation Battalion continued to provide general aviation support to the 1st Infantry Division throughout the period of this report. The aircraft resources of the battalion were committed daily for missions assigned by the Division Aircraft Coordination Center (ACC) in support of combat operations. On 10 June 1969 the 1st Aviation Battalion was missioned to provide air cover for a joint US/ARVN convoy operation traveling between Lam Son and Song Be. The operation commenced on 15 June 1969 and terminated on 17 June 1969. A great deal of effort and planning went into the operation to insure the convoy had continuous air cover. A forward ACC element was established at Phüoc Vinh to provide control of the aviation assets covering the convoy. Three Pathfinders from the 1st Aviation Battalion were located at Phüoc Vinh to assist in the control of gunships on strip alert. An additional element of Pathfinders was located at Bunard where a forward airfield had been established. Bunard provided a jump off field for an airborne ready reaction force (ARF) and refueling and rearming point for gunships. Other assets which were committed from the Aviation Battalion were: one C6 aircraft with the Aviation Battalion CO and 2-3 on board. Two light fire teams and one Hunter-Killer team from Company B, Four Hunter-Killer teams, one C6 and four lift ships for the ARFs from Troop D, 1/4 Cavalry. Four light fire teams from II FFV. Two assisted in air coverage and two were on strip alert. The operation was a complete success. The convoy had continuous air coverage and no incidents occurred. As a result of liaison visits to the 25th Infantry Division the 1st Aviation Battalion wrote an experiment plan to test the Night Hawk System and Mortar Aerial Delivery System (MADS). The plan was approved by the 1st Infantry Division and immediate steps were taken to obtain the equipment and build the systems. Both systems have been tested and are presently being utilized on missions. The Mortar Aerial Delivery System (MADS) which consist of a UH-1 helicopter equipped with two 4.2 inch mortar round storage racks and a launch platform is being utilized to drop and mark sensor devices. This has been a very effective and accurate means of placing sensors in the desired area. The Night Hawk system is a UH-1 helicopter with a mini-gun and an AN/TVS-4 night sighting device coaxially mounted with a Xenon searchlight on each side of the aircraft. This system is utilized at night to observe infiltration and supply routes. The aircraft is flown approximately 700 feet above the ground in a blackout condition. The searchlight operators scan the terrain with the AN/TVS-4 for targets and once sighted they turn on the searchlight. The target is then taken under fire by the mini-gun. To date this system has sunk two sampans and killed two VC.

Incl 9

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The Mini-Cav operation has been discontinued and the assets are being used for other missions. The Pathfinder Section of the Battalion Headquarters continued in the mission of inspecting all aerial supply equipment. The section is also augmenting the aerial rifle platoon of Troop D (AIR), 1st Squadron 4th Cavalry. During the period 14 June to 16 June 1969 the Pathfinders established a forward airfield at Bunard. They provided air traffic control, POL services and a rearmament point for gunships participating in the convoy operation from May thru June 1969. Five members of the detachment were airlifted to the airstrip adjacent to the Special Forces Camp and were operational by the afternoon of 16 June 1969. Personnel were utilized at both ends of the airstrip to handle transient traffic and to park the UH-1D/H lift aircraft, Hunter Killer team, LOH's and six light fire teams that were on strip alert. During this period 35 sorties of C-130, C-123, and C7A Air Force fixed wing aircraft were controlled. Due to the number of aircraft involved with the Song Be convoy operation, POL facilities were operated and controlled by the Pathfinders. The Pathfinders, with a minimum of personnel and equipment, ran a smooth and successful operation at Bunard. The Aviation Battalion Staff members are continuing to make assistance visits to all divisional aviation units. These visits will continue on a quarterly basis with the exception of the Safety Officer who will continue to make monthly visits.

b. Battalion Command Structure at the end of the reporting period

Enclosure #1.

The Aviation Battalion provided the division with aviation support everyday of the reporting period. Training of newly assigned pilots in the LOH continues in Company B; however training is beginning to be accomplished in Brigade Aviation Sections. The 3rd Brigade has a qualified instructor pilot in the LOH. Counter sapper training was conducted for all members of the battalion during the period 26 May thru 7 June 1969. Command Information was conducted weekly by unit commanders and Character Guidance was conducted monthly by a guest chaplain. During the month of May all officers and several enlisted men were qualified with the .38 caliber pistol.

c. Operations:

(1) Observations: The Aviation Battalion has been conducting Mini-Cav operations during the period of this report. The Mini-Cav consisted of two US-11A's, one US-1 MKO and one Hunter Killer team. The inability of the Mini-Cav to insert more than twelve combat troops...
makes this operation unsatisfactory in 80% of our AO. In addition the Hunter-Killer team is unable to provide the desirable fun cover on insertions.

(2) Evaluation: It is imperative that successful airmobile cavalry operations have a minimum of four lift ships. This is particularly true in jungle terrain with few landing zones available. This provides a minimum of 24 combat troops being inserted into a tactical environment. The lift ships should also have a light fire team to cover all insertions and extractions.

(3) Recommendation: That the Mini-Cav be discontinued, or provide additional lift ships and a light fire team for all insertions and extractions.

c. Training:

(1) Observation: The battalion is experiencing an increase in the number of night missions.

(2) Evaluation: The increased number of night missions being performed by the battalion indicated a need for more emphasis on training in that particular area, especially when flying under marginal weather conditions.

(3) Recommendation: That emphasis be placed on night flying during the initial in-country orientation and currency ride. A minimum of one hour should be flown at night during the orientation.

d. Intelligence: None

e. Logistics:

(1) Observation: The unit FORSTAT D Report rating has continued to be low during the period of this report.

(2) Evaluation: The low rating is due to the battalion being reorganized from E series TOE to G series TOE which changed and added reportable equipment. The mission of the battalion has not changed and there was no drastic change in major items of equipment. The C-4 rating is not indicative of the battalion's capability to perform its mission.

(3) Recommendation: That continued efforts be made to obtain equipment to raise C-4 rating.

f. Organization:

(1) Change to G series MTCE.

(a) Observation: The battalion came under the G series 075G MTCE on 22 March 1969.

(b) Evaluation: The MTCE was evaluated and recommended changes to the MTCE were submitted. A request for retention of certain items of equipment was also submitted.

(c) Recommendation: Evaluation of the MTCE be continued and changes be submitted as necessary.

g. Other: Statistical data for the quarter:

(1) Hours flown 17,422

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45
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(2) Sorties flown: 33,030
(3) Passengers moved: 40,397
(4) Cargo moved (tons): 989.7

[Signature]

ROBERT F. EYMAN
JTC, IN
Commanding
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST ENGINEER BATTALION
APO SF 96345

AVDB-CE-0 3 August 1969


TO: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDB-T-(MHD)

   a. Organization:
      (1). Headquarters and Headquarters Company provided command and staff supervision for combat engineering in the 1st Infantry Division and engineer equipment support for Battalion operations.

      Engineer equipment support was provided by the heavy equipment platoon and consisted of TOE and non-TOE items, such as: 20 ton rough terrain cranes, graders, 5 ton dump trucks, sheepsfoot and grid rollers, bulldozers, an airborne dozer (Case 450 on loan from II Field Force), 10 ton tractors with low bed trailers, and a sandbag filling/ditching machine. The Rome Plow section is organic to Headquarters Company and consists of six (6) Rome Flows, four (4) M48 Tanks, one (1) Armored Personnel Carrier, and a complete maintenance section. The Rome Plow section is placed in direct support of 1st Infantry Division units to accomplish area clearance operations in the TAOI. The AVLB (Armored Vehicular Launched Bridge) section, attached to Headquarters Company, consists of three (3) AVLB launchers and six (6) bridges. One AVLB is located at Lai Khe and two are located in Dau Tieng to support missions in the Michelin Rubber Plantation and Trapazoid. The Water Point section.

Incl 10
provides potable water to units in the field. Erdalator units are presently located at Thunder II (XT785558), FSB Mahone (XT521419), and FSB Gala (XT603418).

(2) A Company provided direct combat engineer support to the 1st Brigade both at Quan Loi and Dau Tieng. During the first two weeks of the quarter, 1st Platoon constructed a sixty (60) foot steel observation tower on the Quan Loi base camp perimeter. The platoon then moved to Thunder III (XT768653) located just north of Chon Thanh on QL-13. While at the fire support base the platoon constructed two tin roofed mess-halls, two latrines, two showers, and six 105mm Howitzer laterite pads. In addition, the fire support base road network and drainage were upgraded.

The 2nd Platoon of A Company provided combat engineer support to the road opening and Rome Plow operation from Dong Xoai (YT078757) to Song Be (YU140067). The platoon constructed the temporary night defensive positions and installed air mobile towers and helipads at each of these locations.

The 3rd Platoon was committed to the upgrade of the Quan Loi perimeter and construction of a new company area. In conjunction with the relocation of the 1st Brigade, A Company moved to Dau Tieng on 18 June 1969. From then until the end of the quarter, A Company has been actively involved in base camp and perimeter improvements as well as construction of new facilities in their company area. A daily mine sweep operation was conducted from Dau Tieng to FSB Mahone (XT521419) to permit overland resupply to that fire support base.

(3) B Company provided direct combat engineer support to the 2nd Brigade which is headquartered in Di An. During the month of May, three mine sweep teams supported the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in the open-
ing of Routes Zinc and Lead. At 0600, B Company had a daily RRP standby to repair road damage or remove road blocks. Major construction projects for the month were the Division Training Command's all-weather sniper range and the 2nd Brigade's model fire support base, Pagoda Inn (XII22: 72). The sniper range was 900 meters by 900 meters and was complete with pop-up targets. At Pagoda Inn, B Company constructed six, two (30) two man fighting positions and machine gun bunkers, a UH-1H helicopter pad, a thirty foot radar tower, two Duster turnaround pads and eight shower and latrine pads, in addition to drainage and road network.

During June, B Company's mine sweep team commitments increased from three to five teams when the 11th ACR moved out and 1/16th Infantry assumed the road opening responsibility. A 250 foot by 50 foot ammunition supply point was renovated for the 1/7th Artillery. At FSB United (XII22: 117), a tactical operations center was completed in less than one day. Work continued at the Division Training Command with the construction of an asphalt hardstand, 150 meters of wooden fence, numerous foot bridges, and earthworks.

Construction of the Division Standdown Center in Di An began in June and is still in progress. This project consists of latrines, showers, a swimming pool, concrete sidewalks, a wooden privacy fence, a central theater with projection booth, an athletic field, a maintenance room, and drainage throughout the area.

B Company's final major project of the quarter was the construction of Fire Support Base Normandy III at (XII22: 316). The difficulty and the amount of effort required to complete the FSB were considerably greater for the rainy season than would have been required if the FSB were construc-
ruited two months earlier. Concrete mess pads, shower and latrine pads, a 15 foot by 24 foot tactical operations center, fighting positions, access road, interior road network, and an extensive drainage system were constructed. An attempt will be made to cement stabilize the road network and artillery gun pads.

(4). C Company provided direct combat engineer support to the 3rd Brigade headquartered in Lai Khe. During May, two platoons of C Company were involved in mine sweep operations. Three squads operated out of a RON position near the town of An Dien. Two of the three squads swept Route Zinc from Ben Cat to Check Point Charlie (XT831339) and the other squad swept from Ben Cat to FSB Lorraine (XT709409) on Route 240. An additional sweep team operated with the 984th Land Clearing Company sweeping critical roads, trails, and AVLB launching sites. At the end of May, C Company assumed the mine sweep from FSB Mahone (XT521419) to Dau Tieng.

1st Platoon began the upgrade of Route LTL-14 from Ben Cat to Dau Tieng. The first part of the project was to construct a 400 meter causeway and AVLB bypass at (XT605347). After completion of the causeway, the platoon moved to NDP Mons VI (XT558401) and began construction of a culvert site (XT543374) outside the town of Thanh An. A command detonated 250 lb bomb destroyed a bucket loader and temporarily stopped work at that location. The platoon then moved to FSB Cantigny II (XT528393) just south of FSB Mahone (XT521419) to start work on a culvert site at (XT524408). Cantigny II was an example of what can happen to a FSB when constructed during the rainy season. The FSB had to be abandoned after a week and the platoon moved to FSB Mahone (XT521419) (see lesson learned b-7).
While the 1st Platoon was working on LTL-14, the 2nd Platoon moved to FSB Lorraine (XT799409) and began a series of projects including two concrete mess pads, four shower and latrine pads, a 15 foot by 24 foot tactical operations center, and a 350 meter access road. The 3rd Platoon began two projects on Route 13-13 north of Lai Khe. This main supply route had deteriorated during the beginning of the rainy season. A road upgrading project had to be initiated in early July to improve the road from Lai Khe to Thunder II (XT785558). Additionally, a dozer and disk harrows were used to clear grass on each side of Route 13 to make wires from command detonated mines easier to find and to eliminate ambush sites.

(5) D Company provided general support to the 1st Infantry Division at Lai Khe. Throughout the quarter, D Company had two mine sweep teams located at Thunder I (XT799513) and one sweep team at Thunder II (XT785558). Those three teams opened the road from Lai Khe to Thunder II daily. In addition to performing the sweep operations, the squad assisted in improving the living conditions and drainage at the two fire support bases. The dump trucks of the mine sweep teams were used to haul laterite for upgrading six kilometers of road south of Thunder II.

The remaining two platoons of D Company were responsible for construction in the Division Headquarters Block. A chain link fence was constructed around the DTIC and briefing room areas. A total of 3000 feet of fence was constructed. Over 600 cubic yards of concrete were poured for a 4800 foot network of sidewalks throughout the headquarters area. A Parsons building was constructed behind the command building and now serves as the Division Protocol Office. Overhead covers were constructed for sidewalks in the vicinity of the command building. A "Pike-sized" LITWIMT TOWARD sign was constructed and concrete was poured for the slab.
of the WAR Memorial. Subgrade preparation was performed for the asphalt paving of the entrance loop in front of Division Headquarters. In the Commanding General's Villa area, a cook's building was constructed and construction is currently in progress for a protective cover over the CG's trailer. A latrine-shower facility for the WCQ-VIP area is also in progress and a service road has been constructed to that facility.

(6) E Company (Bridge) provided general support to the 1st Infantry Division. River search and destroy operations at Cat Lai (XS969900), Power Plant at Thu Duc (XS926972), and FSB Cheyenne (XS001995), in support of 2/18th Infantry, continued. Seven LTR half-pontons were used to ferry infantry AP patrols in the small rivers and streams northeast of Saigon while bridge erection boats were used in the larger waterways. On 15 July 1969, the boats and personnel working out of the Power Plant and FSB Cheyenne moved to FSB Seminole (XS980962) where they will operate on both daylight search and destroy operations and night ambushes. 1st Platoon of E Company was involved in a variety of bridging operations during the quarter. The first was the repair of the 437 foot bridge across the Song Be River at (XT925441). In order to assist in the repair, a 137 foot M4T6 float bridge was constructed to pass traffic while the permanent bridge was closed. The platoon returned to the Song Be River at the same location on 11 June to construct a float bridge, this time to pass a 600 vehicle ARVN convoy enroute to Song Be.

On 3 July, the Bailey Bridge at Ben Cat (XT738328) collapsed due to an excessive load of two M48 tanks. E Company was called to construct a M4T6 float bridge to pass traffic while the river was cleared of the collapsed bridge in preparation for the construction of a Bailey Bridge. The final
The bridging mission of the quarter took place at Dau Tieng (XT433469) where the 1-4 Company constructed a 160 foot fully reinforced Class 75 M76 float bridge across the Saigon River. The floats were airlifted from Dau Tieng to the bridge site by Chinook and the bridge was completed in a record time of nine hours.

(9) During this quarter, the 1st Engineer Battalion Rome Plow section cleared 3,127 acres of jungle in support of the 1st Infantry Division.

Due to two ambushes on Route 13 north of Chon Thanh, the Rome Plow section moved to Thunder III and began cutting a swath 300 meters wide on each side of the road from Chon Thanh to the beginning of the Rubber Plantation south of An Loc. This operation was completed on 13 June with a total of 1,512 acres cleared.

From 23 to 30 June, the Rome Plows cleared 610 acres along Route 249 from Ben Cat to FSB Lorraine. On 4 July, the Rome Plows moved to a RON position in the vicinity of old FSB Huertgen (XT693327) and cleared 107 acres the following two days in a heavily mined area.

On 14 July the Rome Flow section moved to a RON location north of Tan Uyen (XT9526) and began a 200 acre cut of dense jungle. This operation terminated on 13 July.

b. Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence

(1) Daily Intelligence Reports from the 1st Infantry Division Headquarters and 3rd Brigade Headquarters are processed by the Battalion S-2 and disseminated to subordinate units. Daily records of MSR upgrading and mine incidents in the 1st Infantry Division TACI are maintained, and reports of mining activity are forwarded to higher headquarters for analysis.

During this quarter, the 1st Engineer Battalion Tunnel Bat Team
participated in eight (8) tunnel exploration missions. Working with various units of the 1st Infantry Division and the 11th Armored Cav-
alarly Regiment, the Tunnel Rats explored more than fifty (50) individ-
ual tunnels and bunkers. Most of these tunnels and bunkers were de-
stroyed using CS gas or demolitions.

While working with C Troop, 1/4 Cav, the Tunnel Rats participated
in an enemy engagement which resulted in 7 NVA KIA (BC) and 2 NVA WIA
(Wv). While operating with the 1/26th Infantry, an estimated five VC
were killed when trapped inside a tunnel that was destroyed by demoli-
tions. While operating with the AMP's of the 1/4 Cav, one VC was kil-
led by demolitions detonated under a trap door.

The Tunnel Rats either evacuated or destroyed the following:
4 AK-47 rifles, 4 RPG-2 launchers, 25 RPG rounds, 1000 AK-47 rounds,
15 mortar rounds, 15 blasting caps, a number of tools, medical supplies,
cooking gear, webgear, and documents.

(1) As of 31 July 1969, the Battalion Staff was:

Commanding Officer - LTC Rodney E. Cox
Executive Officer - MAJ Lawrence E. Mullins
Assistant Division Engineer - MAJ Dennis J. York
Base Development Officer - MAJ Louis E. Stout
S-1 - CPT John W. Nelson, III
S-2 - CPT Robert G Norton, Jr
S-3 - MAJ Albert R. Colon
S-4 - CPT Owen L. Spanoaus
CO PHO - CPT Robert J. Hanso
CO A Co - CPT Jackie E. Bippes
The overall Battalion enlisted strength has been above 98% TES authorized level throughout the quarter. The officer strength has been slightly above authorized level, however, all officers have been fully authorized.

Personnel changes within the quarter were 243 departures and 331 replacements. There continues to be a shortage of Engineer Squad Leaders MOS: 12B40. The Battalion, even though overstrength in officers, has a shortage of lieutenants.

The Song Be Road Opening operation was the most significant operation in the area of pacification in which the 1st Engineer Battalion participate. Eighty-eighth kilometers of road were upgraded and four Bailey bridges were constructed by the 301st ARVN Engineer Battalion. 9,243 acres of jungle were cleared from 200 meters on each side of the road by the three 1st Clearing Companies of the 62nd Engineer Battalion. To coordinate the joint effort by U.S. and ARVN engineer forces and the U.S. Infantry security, the 1st Engineer Battalion established an Engineer Coordinating Center. This ECC proved extremely effective in coordinating efforts and consolidating reports.

The climax of the road opening was the movement of 600 ARVN vehicles from Phu Cuong to Song Be. During this movement, the 1st Engineer Battalion was responsible for sweeping for mines and booby traps from Beo.
Cat (XT741330) to the Song Be Bridge (XT925442) and from Dong Xoai (YT079757) to the intersection of Routes QL-14 and HL-311. The 1st Engineer Battalion tank section assisted in securing the mine sweep teams and also Thunder ran the road prior to the convoy passing. Four Ready Reaction Task Forces were positioned so that damage to the road could be quickly repaired to keep the convoys moving. At Bunard (YT253896), A Company had a bucket loader, dozer, three dump trucks, and a platoon minus. At Phuoc Vinh (XT962499), C Company had a dozer, AVLB, two dump trucks, and a platoon minus. At Lai Khe, D Company had a dozer and three dump trucks loaded with rock. At FSB Jim (XT882362), B Company had a bucket loader and three dump trucks loaded with laterite. If any of the Task Forces had to be omitted, rapid repair of blown culverts and craters could have been accomplished.

E Company installed 9-Float M476 bridge at (XT925442) to provide a rapid bypass across the Song Be River. In addition, E Company had two M476 dryspans prepared and rigged for airlift.

e. Civic Affairs:

Four dump trucks with operators from Headquarters Heavy Equipment Section assisted the 794th Regional Force Company (ARVN) in the upgrade of Route 2A north of Phu Guong during the first week in July. A total of 128 loads of laterite were hauled on this civic action program.

The Battalion Chaplin continued his support of the Ben Cat Orphansage by weekly visits and frequent gifts to the children.

The Battalion Surgeon continued his support of weekly MEDCAP program in the villages of Xom Xoai and Ben Cat. Instead of conducting his own MEDCAP in Xom Xoai, the surgeon would offer advice and the Vietnamese would conduct the MEDCAP. This close cooperation not only provides good
medical care to the Vietnamese people, but, in addition, provides valuable training to Vietnamese nurses participating in the MEDCAP.

f. Training

Training during the quarter was primarily presented at Company level. Range firing was conducted twice monthly with all TOE weapons, shotguns, and 90mm Recoilless Rifles being fired.

Special emphasis was placed on training of newly arrived officers in mine sweep operations. Each new officer was required to accompany a typical morning mine sweep operation shortly after arriving in the Battalion.

2. Section 2, Lessons Learned - Commanders Observation, Evaluation, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel:

(1) Observation: There is a lack of intermediate speed radio operators authorized in the TOE of the 1st Engineer Battalion for the combat environment in Vietnam.

Evaluation: The Battalion Communications Section is required to maintain radio communication in the tactical operations center twenty-four hours daily and, additionally, has forwardcomo elements deployed at field locations.

Recommendation: That the TOE should authorize two additional intermediate speed radio operators (MOS 0582).

b. Operations:

(1) Observation: Engineer operations are adversely affected by the lack of aircraft support for command and control and maintenance parts resupply.

Note: Current aircraft allotment to the 1st Engineer
Battalion has been a UH-1D helicopter for approximately three (3) half days per week. Due to the fact that 1st Engineer Battalion elements are located at a majority of the fire support bases in the 1st Infantry Division FAC and the line companies are at three separate locations, it requires two full days of aircraft time to visit all the job sites. The desirable situation would be for the Battalion Commander, his staff, or the line company commanders to visit the job sites daily. In addition, an aircraft is required to fly Rome Flow repair parts to that section's field location.

**Recommendation:** That the 1st Engineer Battalion be allocated a UH-1D helicopter for ten (10) hours station time and five (5) hours blade time per day.

(2) **Observation:** There is a lack of airmobile engineer equipment in the 1st Engineer Battalion and the 1st Infantry Division.

**Evaluation:** Construction of fire support bases and night defensive positions at remote locations requires airmobile dozers and airmobile backhoes for clearing of the fire support base, pushing up the defensive berm, drainage, and excavation for TOC's and sumps. Some NDP's and FSB's are inaccessible except by air making readily available airmobile equipment essential to accomplish the forementioned engineer work. The current plan is to request this equipment from II Field Force non-divisional engineer units, however, the equipment is usually not available.

**Recommendation:** That the 1st Engineer Battalion be issued two (2) airmobile dozers and three (3) airmobile backhoes, the two dozers in general support and one backhoe to each line company in support of each Bri...

(3) **Observation:** Below ground bunkers are impractical during the
Considerably more engineer effort is expended in the waterproofing of underground personnel bunkers than above ground bunkers. Additionally, underground bunkers frequently will fill with water even after considerable engineer attention to drainage due to the intense considerable rainfall.

Recommendation: That all future personnel bunkers be constructed above ground. Correspondingly, the height of the conventional fighting position should be reduced one third to one half when placed above ground to maintain a low silhouette. Occupants will fight from the kneeling position.

4. Observation: Vertical construction at fire support bases, such as latrines and showers, frequently is being destroyed when a fire support base closes.

Evaluation: Numerous latrines, showers, and other small structures at fire support bases are constructed in such a manner that they can not be moved when the fire support base closes.

Recommendation: That all vertical construction at fire support bases be constructed small enough and light enough that it can be transported by vehicle or helicopter, or if this is not possible, be constructed in such a manner that it can be dismantled and the construction material salvaged.

5. Observation: Frequently mine sweep teams have been required to perform sweep operations in the early evening and the hours of darkness.

Evaluation: The effectiveness of a mine sweep team is greatly reduced during the hours of darkness. The vast majority of mines found are detected visually and thus would not be found operating with flashlight or artillery illumination. Additionally, trip wires and other
booby traps would be difficult to detect.

Recommendation: That tactical commanders make every attempt to accomplish sweep operations during daylight if the tactical situation permits.

(6) Observation: Mine sweep teams operating in unpacified areas have discovered mines planted on or near the road after the mine sweep team and security have completed the sweep operation.

Evaluation: On both Routes 240 and LTL-14 in unpacified areas, vehicles have detonated mines that were placed on the road after the sweep operation has been completed.

Recommendation: That at the conclusion of a mine sweep operation in an unpacified area, the road be outposted with Infantry security while the road is in use.

(7) Observation: Infantry Brigade and Battalion Commanders are not allowing time for proper engineer preparation of a fire support base before Infantry and Artillery units move into the position.

Evaluation: During the rainy season it is essential that roads and drainage be constructed in a new fire support base prior to occupancy. Cantigny II is an example where no prior engineer work was performed and the FSB became such a mud hole that it was untenable and had to be closed after only a week. Normandy III is an example where considerable engineer effort was employed prior to occupancy and a livable fire support base now exists.

Recommendation: That if movement into a new fire support base is required during the rainy season, sufficient time for construction of roads and drainage prior to occupancy be allowed.
o. Training - None

d. Intelligence:

(1) **Observation:** Frequently the 1st Infantry Division Daily Intelligence summary reports the same mine incident twice at different locations.

**Evaluation:** When a mine is detected by a mine sweep team it is reported through the 1st Engineer Battalion TOC. The security element of the mine sweep operation also sends in a mine report, but through his Battalion headquarters. Both reports eventually reach G-2 where frequently G-2 will think that two different mine incidents have occurred since they received slightly different coordinates.

**Recommendation:** That mine incident reports resulting from sweep operations be coordinated through the 1st Engineer Battalion TOC.

e. Logistics:

(1) **Observation:** Shortage of construction materials is causing considerable delay in numerous construction projects.

**Evaluation:** There exists a critical shortage of 1", 2", and 4" lumber, plywood, plumbing supplies, concrete aggregate, and washed sand. Work stoppages have occurred in most of the basecamp vertical construction projects due to lack of materials.

**Recommendation:** That support at depot level and above maintain stockage levels in accordance with existing demands.

(2) **Observation:** The effectiveness of engineer troops performing landing zone clearing missions has been hampered by the unreliability of the Remington Chain Saw.

**Evaluation:** The Remington Chain Saw was not designed to handle the heavy work load encountered in landing zone missions. On a typical
landing zone mission, Remington Chain Saws were deadlined eighty (80) percent of the time.

**Recommendation:** That the Remington Chain Saw be replaced with a heavier duty chain saw.

(3) **Observation:** The Chaplin of a divisional engineer battalion is not authorized a radio for his 1/2 ton truck.

**Evaluation:** The Chaplin is continuously on the road in his vehicle visiting troops at fire support bases. Frequently there is an urgent need to contact the Chaplin, which is impossible without a radio.

**Recommendation:** That the Chaplin in a divisional engineer battalion be authorized a radio for his vehicle.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

John W. Nelson, CPT, Adjunct
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 1st Infantry Division**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May 69 to 31 July 69.

CG, 1st Infantry Division

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**ABSTRACT**

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