UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER

AD506151

CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

TO: unclassified

FROM: confidential

LIMITATION CHANGES

TO:

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FROM:

Controlling DoD Organization. Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310.

AUTHORITY

AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980; AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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SUBJECT: Operational Report: Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 8th Transportation Group, Period Ending 31 July 1969 (O.

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General
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US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center
8th Transportation Group
10 August 1969

TO: Assistant C of S for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington D.C. 20310

SECTION I
Operations: Significant Activities

A. COMMAND: (U)

1. Colonel Garland A. Lundy commanded the group during the entire period. His principal staff officers were: LTC Robert L. Kempin replacing LTC Raymond L. Ferree as Deputy Commander; MAJOR Thomas G. Stevens replacing MAJOR Tyne D. Gude as S-3; MAJOR Glenn K. Long, Signal Officer/Assistant S-3; LT. V. Scann O'Leanoghne replacing CPT Chester E. Bishop Jr as S-1; CPT Keith G. Kerley, S-2 and CPT Robert J. Coleman, S-4.

2. The 6th Transportation Group (AT) successfully performed its mission of line haul, local haul and combat operations during the 92 days of the reporting period.

3. LTC John G. Kramer resumed command of the 12th Transportation Battalion (Truck) from LTC Tom L. King on 27 June 1969.

4. The 6th Transportation Group received visits from the following dignitaries on the dates indicated:

19 May 1969 - BG G.F.T. Richardson, Dir of Supply and Transport, Army Headquarters, Canberra, Australia.

9 June 1969 - BG Maurice J. Hillier, Controller, USARPAC.


7 July 1969 - COL Swenson, Commanding Officer, 8th Transportation Group.


B. PERSONAL, ADMINISTRATION, MORAL AND DISCIPLINE: (U)

1. During the reporting period, the 8th Transportation Group (FT) was understrength on an average of 316 personnel.

2. There were a total of 36 Special Court Martial cases during the reporting period (14 in May, 13 in June and 9 in July) as opposed to 52 in the previous quarter, a reduction of 31%.

3. On 18 July 1969, the Meritorious Unit Commanding 1st Otr Level Cluster was presented to the 8th Transportation Group and assigned and attached units for the period 2 September 1967 to 31 March 1968 by Brigadier General Albert Z. Hunter, Commanding General, US Army Support Command, Quin Nhon.

4. Morale continued to be high throughout the 8th Transportation Group.

C. OPERATIONS: (C)

1. During this 92-day period, the 8th Transportation Group compiled 15,656,777 ton miles, traveling 3,666,020 miles, hauling 252,329 tons of cargo, 17,365,000 gallons of petroleum and 8,131 pallets. The 302,551 ton miles for 25 June 1969 set a 11-time daily record for the group.

2. The command was involved in 7 major ambushes, 17 sniping incidents and 1 mining incident during the period. The statistical results of these encounters were:

KIA (Friendly) = 2
WIA (Friendly) = 22
KIA and WIA (Enemy) = Unknown
PCH's = 2

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RED: due to enemy action - 570
Tonnage not moved due to enemy action - 6042 s/t

3. Enemy action within the first part of the quarter, decreased significantly during the last two months. The enemy directed his activities against bridges, rail lines and roads. This action proved to be more detrimental to line and personnel than to movement. Seven separate enemy operations involving damage to the highway took place during the quarter.

4. On 3 June 1969, the 666th Transportation Company (Light Truck) was detached from 6th Transportation Group and moved to Bien Hoa. This move was made by both rail and air. All the equipment was moved by LST, while about half of the personnel went by air. The heavy lift transport was transferred to the 512th Transportation Company (Light Truck).

5. The Qui Nhon to An Khe pipeline was closed down from 6 June 1969 to 30 July 1969. This was due to both an increase of enemy actions and enemy interruption. The 6th Group was in need of additional petroleum hauling requirements. To facilitate accomplishment of this increased mission, a platoon of twenty 5,000 gallon tankers was moved from Phouc to An Khe. This gave greater flexibility in the movement of petroleum to the Qui Nhon to Phouc pipeline. Depending on the status of the pipeline, 6th Transportation Group truckers could be committed from other locations, An Khe or Qui Nhon to accomplish the mission of line haul of petroleum.

6. The refrigeration van was lost to Phouc by road on 10 June 1969. This was a test to see how well the vehicle and the Class I perishables would stand up on the rough road. This test run was completed without problems. Rations moved on the road completed a two round in two days, while it took an average of five days by air. To cut time and increase visibility, stores are now integrated into convoy operations to Phouc.

7. The Tactical Operations Center building was completed on 19 June 1969. With the completion of this building, both tactical and normal operations could be carried on during a rain and periods of troop control on the highways without conflict. The overall time support that was established allowed the Group Commander to maintain his area of operation in most of the remainder of the quarter.

8. The target report that Qui Nhon had an addition mission of hauling 4500 s/t June 24. This mission was completed on 20 June 1969. This mission will continue until the Qui Nhon Air Field resumes operations.

9. A General Post Mortem of the continuity of logistical support is a sore need for destruction of logistical support we held at the Qui Nhon Support Base on 5 July 1969. Other support division Group was to conduct transportation routes in support of numerous hypothetical operations. All transportation support was to be available as requested. It was realized that the effectiveness of transportation routes to remain open would proactively determine the degree and capability in the Qui Nhon area.
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10. The 545th Transport Team Company (Light Truck) was relocated in Phu Hoi on 15 July 1969. The move was due to removal of US troops from the area. While the area was not nearly as good as the area they left, a large amount of work on the part of the personnel greatly improved the new facilities.

11. Helicopter support for convoy operations was received on a two week trial basis commencing 30 July 1969. The first two days saw a large improvement in convoy discipline. The convoy commanders were made aware of both guns in the convoys and bunching of vehicles. This information was not readily available to them on the ground. In addition, a battalion commander was able to visit a company that was located about 100 miles away. This would have been difficult and time consuming without a helicopter.

D. TRAINING: (U)

1. Training was conducted on each of the 32 days of the reporting period in accordance with the master training schedule and other applicable directives. A great deal of improvement in both the quality of instruction and the maintenance of training records was accomplished by the battalions during this quarter. As in the past, the majority of the training was conducted in the evenings after the convoys had returned.

2. Continued emphasis on Project Skills I resulted in more efficiently trained soldiers in the MOS skills required.

3. Extensive effort was placed on support training during the period. The aim is to make each man familiar with support activities and techniques. This training is done on a continuing basis as new personnel become assigned to the battalions.

E. SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE: (C)

1. During the reporting period, the 8th Transportation Group exercised control and command of physical security for Compound Complex Carlisle: a six square mile area of the Qui Nhon Defense Installion encompassing fourteen US compounds and facilities. The 70th Medical Battlion, the 310th Field Artillery, and "A" Company, 56th Engineer Battalion departed the compound and were replaced by the 137th Support Battalion (Airborne) and the 173rd Support Battalion. Additionally, the 19th Supply and Service Company was relocated, but remained within the 8th Group's area of responsibility.

2. Beginning on 5 May 1969, after a six day training period, patrols were conducted on a regular basis to prevent enemy sniper units from setting up defensive positions in the proximity of friendly compounds. Consisting entirely of logistical troops, these patrols were primarily conducted on the Qui Nhon Chaukoutin (BR 906 232) which hosts all the facilities in Compound Complex Carlisle. Movement was discovered and destroyed.

3. The enemy successfully perpetrated two attacks against US compounds during the quarter. Both attacks were surprisingly similar in nature. In neither case did the enemy attempt to penetrate the perimeter, but rather utilized the command tower and dense foliage of the Qui Nhon Chaukoutin to launch 6 to 24 rocket, primarily on troop billets. In both instances, both fire was
employed simultaneously with the rockets in a widely scattered pattern to confuse US personnel and hinder rapid reaction in the compound under attack. On 7 June 1969, "E" Company, USAD suffered 17 US KIA, two seriously, and on 15 July 1969, the 173rd Support Battalion (Airborne) lost one US KIA and 8 US WIA.

1. NVA forces reportedly ambushed 8th Group convoys at the base of the Meng Giang Pass (Bn 230 506). On three separate occasions, an enemy force, estimated to be a reinforced company, launched simultaneous mortar, B-40 rockets, and automatic weapons fire at passing convoys. In all cases, swift reaction by the convoy commanders and close coordination with the tactical elements prevented major disasters. On 24 June 1969, a convoy from the 124th Transportation Battalion reached the besieged garrison at Ben Hot in a maneuver more resembling a tactical assault than an ambush. Knowing that there were three enemy platoons in the proximity of the road between Dak To and Ben Hot, the convoy was nevertheless able to run a 6000 meter kill zone and deliver the much needed 175mm ammunition to the firebase.

F. LOGISTICS: (U) Since the last reporting period, the on hand total of 5 ton cargo trucks, 15t series, has improved only slightly. At present, only 31.2% of the total authorized 5 ton cargo trucks are on hand. Sonatrailers, 12 ton SEF, and M127 series are becoming critically short. The group has only 76.5% of its authorized trailers.
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SECTIOII II

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Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Actions and Recommendations.

A. PERSONAL: (U) None.

B. OPERATIONS: (C)

1. ITEM: Map Books for Convoy Commanders.

(a) OBSERVATION: Early in May a convoy commander was unable to accurately pin point his position during combat with the enemy. While he did have maps with him, they were not organized and lacked reference points on them.

(b) EVALUATION: Convoy commanders and other convoy control personnel now carry map books arranged in loose-leaf books. These maps have coordinates of such reference points as bridges, storages, and pump stations printed on the maps. This enables the convoy commander to quickly locate his position on the ground either in the case of an attack or in case assistance is required to recover a breakdown.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That other commands adopt the map book for their convoy commanders utilization.

2. ITEM: Dedication of Tractors and Trailers in Out of the Way Locations.

(a) OBSERVATION: Twenty six (26) 12 ton SAP trailers became stranded in Dannot during a period of high enemy activity. These trailers were moved in and left for unloading. An increase in enemy activity in the area precluded return to pick up the trailers for several weeks. These transportation assets were lost to the line level operations for several weeks.

(b) EVALUATION: Transportation assets such as sap trailers should not be left for unloading in an area that is not normally serviced by convoys. The convoys should move to the area, unload, and return with all assets. By utilizing a dedicated tractor trailer system in a little used area, a large number of assets will not be lost to operations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the dedicated tractor trailer system be used for little used areas in a combat zone.

C. TRAINING: (U) None.

D. DISARMAMENT. MOD SECURITY: (C)

ITEM: Special Security

OBSERVATION: During the quarter, patrolling was initiated on the 25
Mon Gir Mountain adjacent to Company Divisions. This area of area
and the foliage does not give the patrollers a clear view when only 50
feet beyond the perimeter.

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EVALUATION: Patrolling of this route is critical to the defense of US installations and detail HU's efforts have proven relatively futile. However every effort must be made to provide security for the patrols.

RECOMMENDATION: That the policy initiated in this command be considered for implementation in other areas where applicable. An ambush sweep a given area, it is paralleled by a gun truck inside the perimeter equipped with machine guns and in radio contact with the patrol. If contact is made, the patrol marks their position with smoke and the gun truck covers the withdrawal by firing on the mountain above the smoke.

E. LOGISTICS: (v)

1. ITEM: Vehicle Assets

   (a) OBSERVATION: The 8th Transportation Group has 240 5 ton cargo trucks authorized and 75 on hand. Nineteen 5 ton cargo "drop side" were received since the last reporting period. Of the 640 semitrailers authorized, 490 were on hand.

   (b) EVALUATION: The critical shortage of 5 ton cargo trucks and 12 ton semitrailers continues to hinder our load-carrying capability in performing our line haul mission.

   (c) RECOMMENDATION: That 5 ton cargo trucks and 12 ton semitrailers be made available so the 8th Transportation Group can better perform its mission.

2. ITEM: Modified 5 Ton Tractors.

   (c) OBSERVATION: Due to the temporary closing of Qui Nhon Airfield, the 8th Transportation Group was reassigned the mission of hauling mail from Phu Cat AFB to Qui Nhon. Since suitable secure vans weren't a part of 8th Group's assets, two 7 ton shop vans were hand received from Property Disposal and rehabilitated into usable condition by interchanging parts from other trailers at 8th Group's Centralized Trailer Maintenance Facility (CTMF).

   (b) EVALUATION: After being returned to a usable condition those trailers were hooked up to 5 ton tractor. A problem resulted in failure of the tractor pulling logs arms in contact with the rear dural of the 5 ton tractor, since the van wasn't originally designed to be pulled by a 5 ton. This problem was resolved by removing the outside rear dual wheels on the 5 ton tractors. To date no adverse effects have been noticed.

   (c) RECOMMENDATION: That units faced with similar problems be made aware of this variable modification.

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10 August 1969

[Signature]

Colonel, FC
Commanding
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 8th Transportation Group (MT) for the
Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1)

TO: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO-0,
APO 96384

1. (U) The Operational Report, Lessons Learned of the 8th Transportation
Group for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 has been reviewed by
this headquarters and the following comments are submitted:

   a. SECTION II, paragraph B 1: Concur. The evaluation illustrates the
      validity of the recommendation.

   b. SECTION II, paragraph B 2: Concur. The policy recommended would
      be valuable in obtaining maximum use of transportation assets.

   c. SECTION II, paragraph D: Concur. The Special Assistant for Combat
      Security, this headquarters, is in the process of publishing periodic
      defense circulars dealing with various subjects of interest to commanders
      in the Qui Nhon area. The recommendation by the 8th Trans Gp will
      be incorporated into this program.

   d. SECTION II, paragraph E 1: Concur. Vehicle shortages in both
      semitrailers and 5 ton cargo trucks exist command wide. Relief with regard
      to the 5 ton trucks is expected by early September.

   e. SECTION II, paragraph E 2: Concur. The evaluation illustrates the
      validity of the recommendation.

2. (U) The report is considered adequate as modified by the above comments.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/Signed/

Richard A. Daniels
CPT, AGC
Asst Adjutant General
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 8th Transportation Battalion for Period Ending 31 July 1969 RGCS CSPCR-65 (U)

DI, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96584

16 OCT 1969

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC DST, APO 96575

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by headquarters, 8th Transportation Battalion for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning dedication of tractors and trailers, page 6, paragraph B2. Concur with evaluation in paragraph B2(b); however, nonconcur with recommendation as stated. Recommend that in truck operations supporting little used areas, the tractor wait for cargo to be off-loaded from the trailer so that the trailer can be returned to the CULT system.

b. Reference item concerning modified 5-Ton tractors, page 7, paragraph B(2). Nonconcur. Removal of the outside rear dual wheels on 5-Ton tractors constitutes a definite troop safety hazard. Specifically, this unauthorized "field expedient" reduces the effective width of the tractor from 8 feet to 6 feet thus limiting road contact and reducing tractor stability. Recommend the 8th Trans Bn submit a suggestion or MDR thru channels describing proposed modification of 5-Ton tractors to Tank-Automotive Command (TACOM). TACOM engineering personnel must thoroughly evaluate the proposal prior to adoption and application by any unit. If the suggestion or MDR is declared valid by TACOM an MWO will be published authorizing removal of outside rear dual wheels.

3. Concur with the basic report as modified by this and previous indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. STAFFORD
Ct. Adjutant General

ULS 4839

USASUFCON GNE
8th Trans Bn
AVHGC-DST (10 Aug 69) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969 RCS CSFOR-65 (kl)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 24 OCT 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-DT, APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) and concurs with the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. W. WILSON
LT. GEN.
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
8th Trans Gp.
1st Log Comd.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 8th Trans Gp (MT) for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 30 OCT 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

D. A. TUCKER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 8th Transportation Group

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May 69 to 31 July 69.

CO, 8th Transportation Group

10 August 1969

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N/A

N/A

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