## UNCLASSIFIED

### AD NUMBER

**AD506145**

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**FROM:** confidential

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**AGO ltr, 29 Apr 1980; AGO ltr, 29 Apr 1980**
SECURITY MARKING

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IN REPLY REFER TO
AGDA (M) (6 Oct 69) FOR OT UT 693133 5 December 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 5th Battalion,
2d Artillery, Period Ending 31 July 1969 (U)

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance
   with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should
   be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days
   of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate
   benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations
   and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

By order of the Secretary of the Army:

Kenneth G. Wickham
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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  5th Battalion, 2d Artillery
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 5th Battalion (AW)(SP) 2d Artillery
AFOS San Francisco 96266

AVFB-PAG-C 4 August 1969


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1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities
   a. Administration/Personnel:

      (1) During this reporting period personnel replacements have been received in sufficient numbers to adequately fulfill operational requirements. During the period May - June 1969, critical shortages in MOS 76Y46 (Unit Supply Sergeant) and MOS 71T20 (Equipment Records Specialist) were experienced. However, the increase of personnel replacements allowed a sufficient number of individuals to be adequately trained in these MOS's through the OJT program with minimum loss of effectiveness in their respective areas. Command letters brought previous personnel shortages to the attention of higher headquarters resulting in the alleviation of serious MOS shortages from the previous reporting period. In addition, this battalion is now starting to receive in appreciable quantities school trained personnel of MOS 16F (Light ADA Crewman), thus reducing the requirement for OJT and increasing the overall effectiveness of the battalion.

      (2) The following awards were presented to assigned and attached personnel:

      **AWARDS**  **PERSONNEL**
      Legion of Merit  1
      Silver Star  7
      Soldier's Medal  1
      Bronze Star (Valor)  1
      28

      For OJT
      693133

      Inclosure

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      Downgraded at 3 year intervals; Declassified after 12 years

AWARDS

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<td>Bronze Star (Meritorious Service)</td>
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<td>Army Commendation Medal (Valor)</td>
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<td>Army Commendation Medal (Meritorious Service)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Purple Heart</td>
<td>49</td>
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(3) The Battalion Headquarters was engaged in normal operations during this reporting period with constant effort directed towards improving the perimeter defense of the headquarters compound. This included placing two rows of concertina on the outside slope of the berm to deny its use to the enemy in the event the barbed wire and tangle foot barriers are penetrated.

(4) There were no administrative or tactical movements of Headquarters, 5th Battalion (AW)(SP) 2d Artillery, during this reporting period.

(5) Battalion personnel statistics as of 31 July 1969.

(a) Current Strength:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
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<tr>
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<td>37 (3 652)</td>
<td>41 (3 653)</td>
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<tr>
<td>D Btry (MG) 71st Arty</td>
<td>2 (0 140)</td>
<td>3 (0 122)</td>
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<tr>
<td>I Btry (SLT) 29th Arty</td>
<td>7 (0 143)</td>
<td>5 (0 133)</td>
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<td>46 (3 933)</td>
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(b) Gains and Losses 1 May 69 - 31 Jul 69:

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<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
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<th>Losses</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>D Btry (MG) 71st Arty</td>
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<tr>
<td>I Btry (SLT) 29th Arty</td>
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OPERATIONAL REPORT OF THE 5TH BATTALION (AW)(SP) 2D ARTILLERY FOR THE PERIOD ENDING 31 JULY 1969, REG COL FOR (R)

CASUALTIES 1 MAY 69 - 31 JUL 69

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<td>NIA</td>
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R&R EXPERIENCE:

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CURRENT ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE 5TH BATTALION (AW)(SP) 2D ARTILLERY IS AT INCLOSURE 1.

OPERATIONS:

1. General: This reporting period was characterized by the repositioning of automatic weapons and searchlight assets consistent with the changing operational situation and the increasing exploitation of the M42A1 indirect fire capabilities.

2. Unit Attachments and Missions:

(a) During this reporting period, the battalion remained assigned to US Army Vietnam and attached to II Field Force Vietnam with operational control of the battalion's assets exercised by II Field Force Vietnam Artillery.
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(b) Batteries A, B, and C remained in attachment for OPCON and logistics to the 1st, 25th, and 9th Infantry Divisions respectively.

(c) Battery D remained in General Support of II Field Force Vietnam Artillery, with elements further attached for OPCON and logistics as follows:

Three sections (6 M42A1's) attached to the 54th Artillery Group; two sections (4 M42A1's) attached to the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF); one section (2 M42A1's) attached to the Capital Military Assistance Command (CMAC); one section (2 M42A1's) supporting the Australian Task Force; and one section (2 M42A1's) supporting missions for II Field Force Vietnam Artillery.

(d) Battery D (MG) 71st Artillery remained in General Support of II Field Force Vietnam Artillery and attached to the 5th Battalion (Ad)(GP) 2d Artillery with firing elements further attached for OPCON and logistical support as follows:

Two sections (8 M55's) attached to the 23rd Artillery Group; one section each (4 M55's) attached to the 54th Artillery Group and 25th Infantry Division; one half section each (2 M55's) attached to the 9th Infantry Division and the Capital Military Assistance Command. One section (4 M55's) is located in the Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command for on-order missions. Headquarters, Battery D (MG) 71st Artillery remains collocated with Headquarters, 5th Battalion (Ad)(GP) 2d Artillery.

(e) Battery I (OLT) 29th Artillery remains attached to the 5th Battalion (Ad)(GP) 2d Artillery and further attached for OPCON and logistics as follows:

First and Third Platoons are attached to the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions respectively with the exception of one (1) searchlight of the First Platoon which is OPCON to the 1st Cav Division, another First Platoon searchlight which is OPCON to CMAC, and one Third Platoon searchlight which is OPCON to the Australian Task Force. The Second Platoon remained in General Support of II Field Force Vietnam with elements OPCON to the 23rd Artillery Group, 54th Artillery Group, the Capital Military Assistance Command, and the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force. The battery headquarters remains collocated with Headquarters, 5th Battalion (Ad)(GP) 2d Artillery.

(f) Current deployment and individual unit missions of the 5th Battalion (Ad)(GP) 2d Artillery are listed at Inclosure 2.

(3) Automatic weapons and searchlight deployments are portrayed graphically at Inclosure 3.

(4) Significant Combat Operations:

(a) 3 May 1969, Thunder III - At approximately 030830H May 1969, Troop B,
34th Armor, was conducting a sweep from Thunder III to An Loc. The sweep made contact with an estimated VC/NVA battalion preparing an ambush at 76571C. Duster Section 22 of A/5/2 Artillery, located at Thunder III, was called to support the engagement. Duster Section 22 fired 400 rounds of 40-mm during the engagement and secured an M48 tank damaged by a mine. Results of the engagement were twelve (12) POW's and eight (8) VC/NVA KIA (confirmed), of which three (3) were credited to Duster Section 22.

(b) 10 May 1969, Southern Perimeter of Duster Compound - At approximately 1200H May 1969, perimeter guards at Post #16 (a tower position), by use of a starlight scope, detected two (2) personnel moving into a heavily wooded gully approximately 200 meters off the southern perimeter of the Duster Compound. Report of this sighting was immediately relayed to Long Binh Post (LBP) TOC, and to Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command (BHTAC) for ID; all perimeter guards oriented their surveillance on the area where the movement had been sighted. At 2000H, perimeter guards sighted one (1) more person running into the gully. This second sighting was relayed to LBP TUC and Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command. A Fire Fly (UHID helicopter with a .50 cal. machine gun and bank of lights for illumination) was requested to check the area and make a reconnaissance by fire. At 2126H, clearance was granted to recon the gully with machine gun fire, and Post #16 initiated interdiction fires which continued until the Fire Fly arrived on station at 2300H. Using the Bien Hoa Artillery discrete frequency, a 5/2 Artillery officer in Post #16 guided the Fire Fly to the area where the movement into the gully had been detected. Immediately after it began searching the area the Fire Fly was brought under AK-47 fire from five (5) different locations in the gully. The gully was then taken under continuous fire from the Fire Fly and two supporting gunships until their basic loads were expended. To insure that the gully area was kept under continuous fire, a Quad .50 from D/71 Artillery was positioned on the high ground outside the perimeter astride the gully to maintain contact and provide fix fires until the Fire Fly and gunships could reload and return. The Quad .50 maintained a continuous volume of .50 cal., M60, and M79 fire for approximately 30 minutes before returning to a Ready Reaction Force (RRF) position when the Fire Fly and gunships returned on station. While the gunships were bringing the area under fire again, a guard in Post #16, by use of a starlight scope, sighted seven (7) personnel attempting to escape the area. The gunships were vectored to the area of this sighting by the Bn TUC officer in Post #16. After expending their basic loads in the area of the last reported movement, the gunships and Fire Fly left station and the Quad .50 once again moved out to keep the area under fire. At approximately 0315H, artillery fire was brought in to seal the probable enemy routes of escape while the Quad .50 continued to provide an intense volume of fixing fires. The Fire Fly and gunships returned to station at 0410H and remained until
called to respond to an emergency request at 0655H. The 50 caliber and M60 fire from Post 216 was maintained on the area until first light (0555H), at which time a joint 5/2 Arty and 3rd ArVN Ranger force of forty (40) men initiated a sweep of the gulley area under the command of Cu, 5/2 Arty. A section of Dusters, two (2) .50 squads, the battalion mission helicopter, and Hunter-Killer team (an observation helicopter and a gunship) supported a 2 kilometer sweep which continued until 0930H. The sweep uncovered no VC/NVA KIA but signs of movement and numerous foot paths were identified in the dense undergrowth along the stream bed in the bottom of the gulley.

(c) 11-12 May 1969, Song Be - At approximately 112300H May 1969, the searchlight crew of Battery I, 29th Artillery located on the perimeter spotted four (4) to six (6) persons moving on the southeast corner of the Song Be base camp. The searchlight crew requested permission to fire, but permission was denied. At approximately 120100H May 1969, personnel of Battery D (IC) 71st Artillery located on the northeast perimeter and the searchlight crew again observed movement of three (3) to five (5) personnel. The movement was reported to the OIC and the persons were engaged by M60 fire from the searchlight position. At 0200H, a squad personnel located on the northwest corner of the perimeter heard noises and at approximately the same time a trip flare went off, illuminating five (5) NVA located inside the wire, fifteen (15) meters from the berm. The NVA were immediately taken under fire by the squad personnel and all five (5) NVA were KIA. Simultaneously, the Quad on the northeast corner of the perimeter spotted movement and immediately engaged six (6) NVA with the Quad, killing all six (6). During this engagement the Quad located on the southeast corner of the perimeter was receiving automatic weapons and small arms fire from personnel in the administrative building located on the airfield. The Quad delivered fire into the building, silencing the hostile fire. During the entire engagement, D/71 Arty and I/29 Arty personnel expended a total of 8000 rounds of .50 cal., 150 rounds of H79, and 5000 rounds of 7.62-mm. Results of the engagement were two (2) Battery D (60) personnel KIA and forty-four (44) VC/VNA KIA (confirmed). The Quad was credited with twenty-seven (27) NVA KIA (confirmed) and two (2) NVA while the searchlight personnel were given credit for seven (7) NVA KIA (confirmed). The following items were captured: Three (3) flamethrowers, six (6) RPG-2's, seven (7) AK-47's, three (3) AK-60's, thirty-eight (38) RPG rounds, thirty-six (36) 40mm rounds, ten (10) 140mm grenades, two (2) satchel charges, 140 VC grenades, thirty-seven (37) AK magazines (loaded), 200 rounds of AK ammunition and one (1) CHICOM radio. The Quad and searchlight personnel were given credit for
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preventing the perimeter from being breached and repelling the ground attack.

(d) 12 May 1969, Dong Tam - Tan Tru Convoy - At approximately 12182OH May 1969 two (2) quad .50's on the return trip of the Dong Tam - Tan Tru convoy approximately 3500 meters northeast of Thu Thua (coordinates X3 4452535) met an AVN convoy approaching from the opposite direction. As the convoys passed, a mine was detonated. Both convoys stopped and began receiving small arms and automatic weapons fire from an unknown size enemy force in the tree line on the east side of the road. The Quad .50's immediately engaged the enemy positions allowing both convoys to continue past the kill zone. During the engagement the Quads expended 7000 rounds of .50 caliber. Ad Commander's estimate - ten (10) VC KIA.

(e) 14 May 1969, Tan An - On 14 May 1969, Dusters 231 and 252 of C/5/2 Arty were on a sweep in support of the 2/47 Inf approximately 45 kilometers southeast of Ben Luc in the vicinity of coordinates X3 668738. At 163CH, when the sweep force was approaching a tree line, they received automatic weapons and small arms fire from an estimated 40-50 man VC force. The Dusters immediately engaged the enemy positions with 40-mm and M60 machine gun fire. Sporadic contact continued until 143CH when the VC made an attempt to break contact and retreat. Dusters 241 and 242 of D/5/2 Arty, located at Ben Luc, arrived on the scene at 150CH. During the engagement the Dusters expended a total of 1,613 rounds of 40-mm and 600 rounds of 7.62-mm. Results of the engagement were one (1) US WIA, treated and returned to duty, thirty-one (31) VC KIA, and four (4) POW's. The Dusters were credited with two (2) VC KIA (confirmed).

(f) 18 May 1969, Xuan Loc - At 180100H May 1969, Husky Compound at Xuan Loc was brought under rocket and mortar attack with a coordinated ground attack launched against the north perimeter of the compound. Quad squads 51 and 52 of Battery D 71st Artillery, positioned at the northwest and northeast corners of the perimeter, respectively, immediately began returning fire at the mortar flashes. The Quad crew on 51 detected a large NVA force moving toward the perimeter through a graveyard and immediately engaged the advancing force. As the engagement increased in intensity, Quad 52 received a direct hit from an RPG and was destroyed. The injured members of the squad were carried to a nearby artillery bunker for medical attention. The remainder of the squad attempted in vain to repel the attacking force using their M60, M79 and M16's. The northeast corner was overrun by the NVA forcing the remainder of the squad to withdraw to a nearby artillery position. During this same period of time, on the northwest corner of the perimeter the crew of Quad 51 continually fired into the attacking enemy for four and one half hours. The attacking force broke contact and withdrew at approximately 053CH. During the engagement the Quads fired 8,000 rounds of .50 cal.,
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 5th Battalion (EP) 2d Artillery for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RQ. C/5/2 Arty (UI) (U)

2,600 rounds of M60 ammunition and 25 rounds of H79. Results of the engagement were two (2) KIA and two (2) WIA of Battery D (RE) 71st Artillery, one (1) M55 mount and one (1) 2½ ton truck destroyed, and one (1) 2½ ton truck light damage. Forty-three (43) NVA were killed in action, thirty-four (34) of whom were credited to Battery D (RE) 71st Artillery (confirmed). As a result of this action three (3) members of Battery D (RE) 71st Artillery received the Silver Star and four (4) received the Bronze Star with "V" device. Additionally, a Distinguished Service Cross is pending for one (1) man.

(g) 21 May 1969, Dau Tieng - At approximately 210135H May 1969, Duster 111 of B/5/2 Arty was directed to fire unobserved fire on an intelligence target from a perimeter position at Dau Tieng Naco. Responding to this indirect fire mission, Duster 111 fired fifteen (15) extended range rounds on grid X: 56454390. At first light, elements of the 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division swept the area where the 40-mm rounds impacted and found five (5) killed by artillery. Duster 111 was credited with these kills (confirmed).

(h) 22 May 1969, FSB Danger - At approximately 220000H May 1969, Duster 111 of C/5/2 Arty was directed to fire unobserved fire on an intelligence target from the perimeter position at FSB Danger. Responding to this indirect fire mission, Duster 111 fired fifty (50) extended range rounds on grid X: 968443. A sweep of the area where the 40-mm rounds impacted was conducted at first light by the 4/39 Infantry and resulted in one (1) VC killed by artillery credited to Duster 111 (confirmed).

(i) 29 May 1969, Cu Chi - At 291200H May 1969, Dusters 221 and 222 of B/5/2 Arty, together with two 155-mm SP howitzers, were dispatched from Cu Chi to support elements of 1/5 Mech Inf Bn on a contact mission. At 1330H the Dusters and howitzers arrived at the contact point, approximately 2600 meters northwest of Trung Lap. Once on location, the Dusters were positioned 50 meters on either side of the howitzers. One howitzer fired a marking round into a tree line 500 meters from its position where an unknown size enemy force was located. The Dusters, using the impact point as a reference, swept the tree line with fire for approximately 300 meters, expending a total of 350 rounds of 40-mm ammunition. During the firing, three (3) secondary explosions were observed in the tree line. After the firing, the infantry conducted a sweep of the area which resulted in the Dusters being credited with three (3) VC killed by artillery (confirmed).

(j) 1 June 1969, Cu Chi - At 010700H June 1969, Dusters 221 and 222
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 5th Battalion (inf/P) 2d Artillery for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, &CJ C.F.65 (a) (U)

of B/5/2 Arty, together with two 155-mm howitzers, were dispatched from Cu Chi and joined elements of the 1/5 Mech Inf Bn approximately 4 kilometers northwest of Cu Chi (coordinates AT 609141). The task force then moved to a location approximately 5 1/2 kilometers northwest of Cu Chi (coordinates AT 577137), where the Dusters and howitzers established a blocking position. At 0900H, the Dusters fired 440 rounds of 40-mm into a tree line approximately 300 meters from their position. The howitzers also fired in support of the reconnaissance by fire. At 1130H, elements of the 1/5 Mech Inf Bn conducted a sweep of the area, locating 10 to 15 sleeping positions, numerous fighting bunkers, documents, web gear, and three (3) VC killed by artillery. One of the VC killed was credited to the Dusters (confirmed).

(k) 3 June 1969, Tan An - At 031034H June 1969, when elements of the 2/60th Inf were inserted approximately 12 kilometers west-northwest of Bach Kien (coordinates AT 6472), Dusters 231 and 232 of C/5/2 Arty were alerted for an NAPF mission at Tan An. When the infantry established contact with an unknown size VC force, the Dusters along with two 155-mm SP howitzers, departed Tan An and proceeded to the contact location. Upon arrival, the Dusters and howitzers established a blocking position and were directed to fire into a tree line at a range of approximately 400 meters. During this engagement, the Dusters expended 925 rounds of 40-mm ammunition. Air and indirect artillery also supported. The infantry who conducted a sweep of the area after the engagement estimated twenty (20) VC KIA. A positive body count was impossible due to the mutilation of the bodies.

(l) 6 June 1969, FJPB Thunder III - At 061300H June 1969, Dusters 241 and 242 of B/5/2 Arty departed FJPB Thunder III to support the 1/4 Cav which was in contact with an estimated NVA battalion located 2 kilometers north of Thunder III, (coordinates AT 767697). When the Dusters arrived on location they were placed on line with the Cav elements and directed to fire into a tree line approximately 600 meters to their front. The Dusters engaged the enemy, expending 130 rounds of 40-mm and 3,500 rounds of 14.50 ammunition. After the engagement, a sweep of the area revealed eighteen (18) NVA KIA and two (2) FOJ's (confirmed).

(m) 6 June 1969, Cu Chi - Tay Ninh Convoy - At 061100H June 1969, the Cu Chi - Tay Ninh convoy came upon friendly elements who were in contact with an estimated VC battalion at CP 25 (coordinates AT 397568). Quads 22 and 23 of B/71 Arty, the first two (2) of four (4) Quads escorting the convoy, pulled off the roadside and laid down a base of fire allowing the convoy to pass. The VC, firing from a tree line on the north side of the road, attacked with automatic weapons, RPG's, and small arms. Quads 53 and 54 continued with the convoy to Tay Ninh. Quads 22 and 23 maintained contact.

until 1300H when they rejoined the convoy on the return trip to Cu Chi. During the engagement the Quad expended a total of 7500 rounds of .50 cal. Results of the engagement were one (1) cargo truck disabled by command detonated mine and another damaged by an RPG. Quad 23 sustained a bullet hole in the radiator. The Quads were credited by the Military Police with 25 VC KIA.

(n) 6 June 1969, Duster Compound - At 060140H June 1969, Duster Compound came under a rocket and RPG attack. A total of eighteen (18) rounds of mixed RPG and 107-mm rockets were fired from three (3) firing positions, each approximately 350 meters off the east perimeter. Three (3) RPG's impacted inside the perimeter and three (3) 107-mm rockets and twelve (12) RPG's impacted outside. Duster 141 of D/5/2 Arty, which occupied Post #5A on the east perimeter, observed the flashes and immediately silenced the enemy positions with twelve (12) rounds of 40-mm. At approximately 0600 when Long Binh Post came under a rocket attack, the section chief of the same Duster observed flashes at azimuth 0925 mils and reported it to the Battalion Duty Officer. The azimuth was relayed to Bien Hoa Tactical Operations Center (BHTOC) and at 0615H BHTOC requested the Dusters to fire counter-rocket fire into grids YT 161144 and YT 161141. At 0616H, Duster 141 fired fifty (50) rounds of 40-mm into each of these grids. One secondary explosion was observed on the second mission and the rocket attack ceased. At first light, elements of 5/2 arty swept the area of the suspected launch positions used against Duster Compound. Found on the sweep were three (3) firing positions, 200 feet of electrical wire, four 4.5v batteries wired in series, three 107-mm fuse containers and plugs, and one (1) RPG-2, intact and ready for firing.

(o) 14 July 1969, Nui Ba Den - At 140630H July 1969, Dusters 121 and 122 of B/5/2 Arty departed Tay Ninh in support of the 4/23 Infantry on a search and destroy mission in the vicinity of Nui Ba Den Mountain. After reaching the base of the mountain (coordinates XT 296566), the Dusters, during the period 1000H to 1400H, fired 7000 rounds of 40-mm ammunition into caves on the southeast side of the mountain (coordinates XT 296566). After the engagement, a sweep of the area, conducted by the Infantry, resulted in the Dusters being credited with nine (9) VC KIA (confirmed).

(p) 15 July 1969, Nui Ba Den - At 150600H July 1969, Dusters 211 and 212 of B/5/2 Arty departed Tay Ninh in support of the 4/23 Infantry on a search and destroy mission in the vicinity of Nui Ba Den Mountain. Upon reaching the base of the mountain (coordinates XT 300580), the Dusters fired 365 rounds of 40-mm ammunition into grid XT 300580 during the period 1415H to 1430H. After the engagement, a sweep of the area resulted in the Dusters
Subject: Operational Report of the 5th Battalion (Artillery) 2d Artillery for being credited with two (2) VC KIA and one (1) bunker destroyed (confirmed).

(a) 16 July 1969, Lai Khe - Dusters 221 and 222 of A/5/2 Arty were securing a section of the perimeter at Lai Khe base camp during the evening of 16 July 1969. At approximately 1930Z the Duster crews observed movement of an unknown number of VC in a tree line approximately 1200 meters from the perimeter. The Dusters immediately engaged the VC, expending forty (40) rounds of 40-mm ammunition. The Duty Officer, 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, who was observing the engagement from the perimeter, credited the Dusters with two (2) VC KIA.

(b) 20 July 1969, Lai Ba Den - at 200600Z July 1969, Dusters 241 and 242 of B/5/2 Arty departed Tay Ninh in support of the 4/23 Infantry on a search and destroy mission in the vicinity of Lai Ba Den Mountain. At 1145Z, while the Dusters and the infantry elements were on line at coordinates 21°29'56", ten (10) rounds of 82-mm mortar fire were received by the force, one (1) round impacting directly on an infantry APC, wounding one occupant. The Dusters, along with supporting artillery and the infantry's mortars, immediately returned fire into the suspected enemy position at coordinates 21°28'75". The Dusters fired a total of 388 rounds of 40-mm ammunition into the enemy position. During the firing one secondary explosion was observed. A sweep of the area resulted in the discovery of eleven (11) NVA KIA and one mortar position destroyed. The Dusters, artillery, and infantry were all credited with the enemy killed.

c. Logistics/Maintenance:

(1) Maintenance Problems: The overmileage status of the battalion's Duster fleet has been vastly improved by the replacement of all but seven (7) overmileage tracks during this reporting period. Through command efforts the excessively high road mileage has been reduced by 16,000 miles per quarter. This reduction in mileage, while not affecting the mission, will significantly contribute to lessening mechanical failures and usage of available repair parts. Recent reports indicate that there will be a steady monthly flow of closed loop replacement N/A's which will continue to reduce the number of overmileage and overage vehicles.

(2) Repair Parts Supply: Even with larger than normal demands made upon the supply system, the system has continued to show enormous improvement. Direct support units are capable of processing requests more efficiently; thereby, providing faster delivery of repair parts. This expeditious service has significantly reduced the equipment deadline status of
AVFD-F4G-C

4 August 1969

SUNWLT: Operational Report of the 5th Battalion (A;J)(JP) 2d Artillery For
the Period Ending 31 July 1969, AGI C'EORCE-65 (n) (U)

this battalion. Direct support unit AJL's and battery PLL's still reflect
a zero balance of near 50%; however, only a few of these are critical line
items.

(3) Summary of Overall Maintenance Posture:

(a) Close surveillance of unit maintenance activities through the
GSF/COS programs of II FFORCEV and the battalion continued through this
reporting period. All seven batteries were inspected by both the battalion
and the II FFORCEV teams in conjunction with the AGI. All batteries re-
ceived "Satisfactory" ratings (based on a SAT/UNSAT rating scale). All re-
ports reflect an upward trend in equipment maintenance and training of per-
sonnel.

(b) The maintenance sections of this battalion are at full TOE strength.
The maintenance personnel assigned are not all school trained; however, there
are no critical gaps. Upon completion of the present "Cross Training" and
"On the Job Training" programs, the maintenance standards should show vast
improvement.

(c) In summary, except for the searchlight battery, the overall mainte-
nance posture of the battalion continues to show improvement. With the im-
pending arrival of additional rebuilt Dusters, further improvement is ex-
pected.

(4) Total mileage travelled for the months of April, May, and June for
each battery.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Headquarters Battery</th>
<th>1 1/2 ton</th>
<th>3/4 ton</th>
<th>2 1/2 ton</th>
<th>5 ton</th>
<th>12.2 ton</th>
<th>mi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>11,689</td>
<td>4,993</td>
<td>5,613</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>499</td>
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<td>May</td>
<td>8,754</td>
<td>3,802</td>
<td>2,734</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>10,480</td>
<td>6,166</td>
<td>3,790</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>30,923</td>
<td>15,711</td>
<td>12,137</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>1,566</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Battery A

<table>
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<th>Month</th>
<th>1 1/2 ton</th>
<th>3/4 ton</th>
<th>2 1/2 ton</th>
<th>5 ton</th>
<th>12.2 ton</th>
<th>mi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>4,185</td>
<td>7,547</td>
<td>4,370</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>8,683</td>
<td>315</td>
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<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>6108</td>
<td>1,776</td>
<td>4,765</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>8,381</td>
<td>485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>4,185</td>
<td>1,287</td>
<td>6,662</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>5,838</td>
<td>313</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>14,482</td>
<td>3,810</td>
<td>15,198</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>22,902</td>
<td>1,113</td>
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12

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<tr>
<th>Battery</th>
<th>1 ton</th>
<th>3/4 ton</th>
<th>2 1/2 ton</th>
<th>5 ton</th>
<th>14.2 &amp;</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battery B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>3955</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>3446</td>
<td>1294</td>
<td>5177</td>
<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>4045</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>4775</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>4542</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>4100</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>3700</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>4200</td>
<td>44</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>12100</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>11921</td>
<td>2493</td>
<td>14019</td>
<td>178</td>
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</table>

| Battery C  |       |         |           |       |        |   |
| April      | 7363  | 2196    | 1173      | 689   | 586    | ---|
| May        | 6370  | 1632    | 2075      | 850   | 2006   | ---|
| June       | 4770  | 1172    | 4759      | 1298  | 1712   | ---|
| TOTAL      | 18503 | 5250    | 8007      | 2837  | 4304   | --- |

| Battery D  |       |         |           |       |        |   |
| April      | 4892  | 2587    | 8514      | 328   | 1433   | 55 |
| May        | 4676  | 3687    | 4841      | 42    | 104    | 154 |
| June       | 4269  | 6398    | 4010      | 82    | 1298   | 23 |
| TOTAL      | 15837 | 12672   | 19395     | 432   | 525    | 247 |

| Battery D 71st |       |         |           |       |        |   |
| April        | 1299  | 1679    | 365       | ---   | 1423   | ---|
| May          | 1028  | 20      | 903       | ---   | 1531   | ---|
| June         | 1205  | 88      | 507       | ---   | 853    | ---|
| TOTAL        | 3532  | 1787    | 1775      | ---   | 3733   | ---|

| Battery I 29th |       |         |           |       |        |   |
| April         | 19823 | 4143    | 298       | ---   | ---    | ---|
| May           | 27668 | 5217    | 1081      | ---   | ---    | ---|
| June          | 26280 | 3754    | 662       | ---   | ---    | ---|
| TOTAL         | 73777 | 13114   | 1981      | ---   | ---    | ---|

2. (c) Section 2: Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations
   
   a. Personnel: None
   
   b. Operations:
      
      (1) Increased Mining Operations Conducted By The VC/KVA
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 5th Battalion (Armored) 2d Artillery for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, NCO SP 65 (R1) (U)

(a) OBSERVATION: The increased number of successful mining incidents encountered by elements of this battalion indicates a necessity for more frequent and thorough mine sweeping operations.

(b) EVALUATION: During this reporting period a total of eight (8) M22A1 Dusters were involved in mining incidents. Not all of these incidents occurred on established roads, three (3) having occurred while supporting infantry sweeps on open terrain. Some of the incidents occurred where terrain features required the Dusters to return from a mission using the same route used earlier in the day.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The following guidance should be provided to all Duster personnel involved in convoy duty or sweep operations:

1. Prior to traveling on hard surface roads the AD Commander must ensure that, as a minimum, a visual check for the presence of mines has been made.

2. Prior to traveling on dirt roads, the AD Commander must confirm that an electronic sweep has been conducted by the supported unit.

3. When traveling cross country or on trails, Dusters must not be driven in ruts or in the tracks of other vehicles unless the driver sees the tracks being made by a preceding vehicle. AD Commanders must avoid their vehicles being channeled into terrain which provides little maneuverability and is therefore a high risk mine area. If, however, this is not possible (due to obstacles, terrain features or enemy activity) a request will be made of the supported unit that the channel be swept by attached engineer personnel immediately in front of the lead vehicle. Whenever possible, a different route of return to the base camp will be selected to preclude mines being emplaced between the time of original passage and return over the same route. Again, if this is not possible, the AD Commander must request that the route again be swept by engineer personnel prior to use.

4. Mining incidents normally precede an ambush. Crews of damaged vehicles must remain alert during recovery from a mining incident. Personnel on other vehicles must be instantly responsive to protect the crews of disabled vehicles.

(2) Injuries Resulting From Mining Incidents

(a) OBSERVATION: The increased use of command detonated mines by the VC/NVA against the M22A1 Duster has resulted in an increased number of injuries to crewmen. Some of these injuries have been flash burns received by crewmen riding in the turret.
S U J E C T: Operational report of the 5th Battalion (A); (P) 2d Artillery for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, (C): (P) (F) 65 (H) (U)

(b) EVALUATION: The basic design of the M4A1 Duster permits a portion of any explosion beneath the under carriage to travel up the spent cartridge deflector shoot assembly into the mount. During operations crewmen are required to ride inside the mount in order to be prepared to deliver timely and accurate fire. Experience has shown that crewmen who wear their protective body armor, properly adjusted, and have their fatigue jacket sleeves rolled down are less likely to receive serious burns in the event of a mine explosion.

(c) CONCLUSION: Personnel conducting operations in suspected enemy locations should wear their protective body armor properly laced on both sides and zipped closed in the front. If it is suspected that the area of operation has been mined, the personnel should also roll down the sleeves of their fatigue jackets.

3. Operation Lightning Immediate Destruction Force (LID)

(a) OBJECTIVE: Lightning Immediate Destruction Force (LID) operations developed by the 25th Infantry Division have met with great success.

(b) EVALUATION: The LID Force consists of two (2) M4A1 Dusters deployed with two (2) M109 3P howitzers (155-mm) in direct support of maneuver elements. The LID Force remains at a given location on call until contact is established. Upon receipt of a mission, the LID Force is dispatched to a selected rendezvous point where they are met by members of the maneuver element and escorted to the area of contact. Upon reaching their destination, the Dusters and howitzers come on line, with the Dusters flanking the howitzers. The howitzers fire a marking round into the center of the target area. The Dusters then saturate the entire target area with 40-mm rounds. Observation observers are sometimes used to assist in controlling fires; however, this is not essential to the operation. The LID Force is employed essentially as a sub-maneuver fire element, given a zone of operation, fired and checked by the maneuver commander. After the firing phase has been completed, dismounted infantry sweep the area. LID operations may be executed either on call or pre-planned. The operations have proved very effective in producing body count, captured weapons, destruction of bunkers, neutralization of booby traps in the area of employment and consequently, minimize infantry casualties.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: All units supported by M4A1 Dusters should consider adopting the principle of the LID operation.
SLOT: Operational report of the 5th Battalion (AP)(JP) 2d Artillery for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, FA/5 2d Artillery (U)

4 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational report of the 5th Battalion (AP)(JP) 2d Artillery for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, FA/5 2d Artillery (U)

Training: None

Intelligence: None

Logistics: Replacement Searchlights

(1) OBSERVATION: The lack of replacements for the heavily used fleet of searchlights, AN/M63-3, indicates the need for the establishment of a closed loop program for this item of equipment.

(2) EVALUATION: A request for a closed loop program for searchlights was disapproved by United States Army Vietnam and this headquarters was instructed to turn in the searchlight set when either the vehicle or searchlight was not economically repairable. This is being accomplished; however, there are no replacements available for the sets that have been turned in. The battalion is presently short five (5) searchlight sets and the scheduled replacements will not meet the shortages being experienced. Due to the age and hours of operation experienced by the searchlight sets, it is foreseen that the entire searchlight fleet will have to be replaced in the near future. In order to prevent a significant reduction in the number of searchlights available for deployment a systematic replacement program is needed. A request for reconsideration of the closed loop system has been submitted by this headquarters.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That the request for a closed loop program for the replacement of searchlights be approved and implemented as expeditiously as possible.

Organization: Battery TOE's

(1) OBSERVATION: The TOE's for Headquarters and Headquarters Battery and the M2A1 batteries do not provide sufficient maintenance personnel and equipment to support the high mileage mission in Vietnam.

(2) EVALUATION: The TOE's for this battalion were designed for a battalion with the primary mission of air defense, in which the average mileage of the unit's vehicles would be relatively low. However, this battalion's ground support mission in Vietnam includes such high mileage tasks as convoy escort, road clearing operations, and search and destroy operations. The additional mileage has resulted in a corresponding increase in the amount of maintenance required to keep the equipment operational. Additional maintenance capabilities are therefore required at both battalion and battery level. This headquarters has submitted new MTOE's for both the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery and M2A1 batteries. These MTOE's not only provide for additional mechanics, but also diagnostic equipment that will provide these mechanics with the tools necessary to more rapidly isolate problem areas.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 5th Battalion (P) 2d Artillery for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, HQ CIPOL-65 (R) (U)

(3) RECOMMENDATION: These MTOS's should be approved and implemented as expeditiously as possible.

g. Other: None

THEODORE H. SCHMIDT
LTC, ADA
Commanding

3 Incl
1. Battalion Organizational Structure
2. Unit Deployment and Missions
3. Automatic Weapons and Search Light Positions Distribution

Incl 2 and 3 wd HQ, DA

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3-II FORCSV Arty
1-Bn File
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DA, HEADQUARTERS, II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM ARTILLERY, APO 96266

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFBC-RE, APO 96266

1. The quarterly report of the 5th Battalion (AW)(SP), 2d Artillery has been reviewed by this headquarters and is considered adequate.

2. Reference paragraph 2e, subject report. Department of the Army has disapproved a closed loop system because new AN/MSS-3 searchlights can be provided at less expense than required to retrograde systems offshore for rebuild.

3. Reference paragraph 2f, subject report. The MTOE's are presently being staffed at this headquarters and will be forwarded through channels to USARV on or about 1 September 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

AQUIPA E. STIFE
Major, FA
Adjutant
AVFBC-RE-H (4 Sep 69) 2nd Ind


DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 8 SEP 1969

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHCS(DST), APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GFOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 5th Battalion, 2d Artillery for the period ending 31 July 1969, as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

B.G. MACDONALD
ILT, AGC
Asst AG
AVHGC-DST (4 Aug 69) 3d Ind


HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, 5th Battalion (AW) (SP), 2d Artillery.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning "Replacement Searchlights", section II, page 16, paragraph 2e, and 1st Indorsement. Two AN/MSS-3 searchlights have been allocated to the unit in September 1969 and two in October 1969.

   b. Reference item concerning "Battery TOEs", section II, page 16, paragraph 2f; concur. When the MTOE arrives at this headquarters, it will be evaluated and processed in accordance with established procedures. Informal coordination with the unit indicated that trade-off spaces will be identified for the additional mechanics.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

C. D. Wilson
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
5/2d Arty
II FFV
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 5th Battalion (AW)(SP), 2d Artillery for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 29 SEP 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 5th Battalion, 2d Artillery**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May 69 to 31 July 69.
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