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AUTHORITY

AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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18) OACSFOR

19)

AGDA (M) (3 Nov 69) FOR OT-UT-693231

7 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report ⁶ Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 3d Brigade,
82d Airborne Division (U), Ending 31 July 1969 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

AD506020

9) Operational report fragment by period ending 31 July 69

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter. 1) 18 Aug 69

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

12) 64p.

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 3D BRIGADE, 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96228

AV3K-AC

18 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade,
82d Airborne Division for the Period 1 May 1969 to
31 July 1969. (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

The enclosed Operational Report-Lessons Learned is forwarded in
compliance with II FFORCEV Reg 525-21 and USARV Reg 525-15.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

For Report to Kene apt dnf
SAMMY L. OWENS
MAJOR, INFANTRY
Adjutant

Incl
as

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- 2 - CO, 82D SPT BN
- 2 - CO, B/1-17 CAV
- 2 - CO, C/307 ENGR
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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 3d Bde, 82d
Abn Div for Period 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969. (U)

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 - f. Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs
 - g. Civil Operations
 - h. Communications
 - i. Information
 - j. Inspector General
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2. Section 2: Lessons Learned: Commanders' Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 3d Bde, 82d
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1. (C) Section 1, Operational Significant Activities

a. (J) Command.

Command Position	Name	Grade	From	
CG	Dickerson, George W	BG	17 Dec 68	Present
Deputy CO	Smith, Albert C Jr	COL	14 Feb 69	Present
XO	Kennan, Albert C Jr	LTC	25 Apr 69	14 Jun 69
XO	Foss, Peter J	LTC	15 Jun 69	Present
S-1	Rawlings, Earl D.	MAJ	5 Jun 69	26 Jun 69
S-1	Owens, Sammy L	MAJ	27 Jun 69	Present
S-2	Davis, Roy J	MAJ	6 Jul 68	24 Jun 69
S-2	Gorder, Charles W	MAJ	25 Jun 69	Present
S-3	Foss, Peter J	LTC	24 Apr 69	16 Jun 69
S-3	Lawrence, Paul S	LTC	16 Jun 69	Present
S-4	Brandl, Joseph W	MAJ	7 Feb 69	Present
S-5	Planche, Joseph	MAJ	30 Oct 68	Present
CO, 1-505 Inf	Thomas, Grace G Jr	LTC	19 Nov 68	14 Jun 69
CO, 1-505 Inf	Zamparelli, Alfred A	LTC	14 Jun 69	Present
CO, 2-505 Inf	Irons, James V	LTC	19 Oct 68	16 Jun 69
CO, 2-505 Inf	Keenan, Albert C Jr	LTC	16 Jun 69	Present
CO, 1-508 Inf	Lunsford, Paul R	LTC	24 Apr 69	Present
CO, 2/231 Arty	Martin, John R	LTC	22 Aug 69	Present
CO, 82d Spt Bn	Zamparelli, Alfred A	LTC	14 Dec 68	14 Jun 69
CO, 82d Spt Bn	Williams, Bruce H	LTC	14 Jun 69	25 Jul 69
CO, 82d Spt Bn	Wallis, Charles R	LTC	25 Jul 69	Present
CO, C/307 Engr	Allan, Jon A	CPT	6 Mar 69	Present
CO, 518 MID	Kilday, John D	MAJ	28 Sep 68	Present
CO, Trp B/1-17 CAV	Dehneke, Rae W	CPT	28 Nov 68	28 May 69
CO, Trp B/1-17 CAV	May, Stephen A	CPT	29 May 69	Present
CO, 58th Sig Co	Shimortori, Gene N	CPT	20 Jan 69	Present
CO, Co O, 75th Inf (Ranger)	Donald, Peter A	CPT	1 Mar 69	Present

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
EO 1.4 (c) (2) (i)

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div
for period 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969. (U)

b. (C) Personnel, Health, Morale, Safety, and Discipline

(1) Detailed information relating to S-1 activities are as follows:

(a) (C) Strength as of 31 July 1969:

UNIT	AUTH	ASO	PRESENT FOR DUTY
1/505 Inf	920	851	804
2/505 Inf	920	887	844
1/508 Inf	920	879	836
2/321 Arty	526	513	498
32d Spt Bn	563	*658	412
HHC 3d Bde	203	**301	282
B/1-17 Cav	201	199	190
Co C 307th Eng	165	200	196
58th Sig	102	**128	122
518th MID	48	** 61	53
52d Chem	5	7	7
45th PIO	5	4	4
37th Scout Dog	28	33	33
Co O 75th Rngr	61	49	43
TOTAL.....	4667	4770	4524

* The large overage in Support Command and part of the Headquarters Company was experienced because of the large number of assignments of soft skill MCS personnel during the month of July.

** Overage of HHC 3d, Bde, 58th Sig and MI are of operational necessity because the Brigade is presently operating two Headquarters: the Headquarters forward at Camp Red Ball and another Headquarters at Phu Loi responsible for post operations.

(b) (U) R&R utilization for the three month period is as follows:

COUNTRY	INITIAL ALLOCATIONS RECEIVED	STANDBY AND REALLOCATIONS	CANCELLATIONS AND TURNBACKS	NUMBER NO-SHOW	ALLOCATIONS USED
HAWAII	305	12	63	5	249
SIDNEY	205	6	16	5	195
BANKOK	228	4	68	7	151
SINGAPORE	93	2	38	2	27
HONG KONG	157	0	75	9	76
TOKYO	68	4	24	3	54
TAIPEI	105	2	41	3	53
KUALA LUMPUR	10	0	6	0	4
MANILA	26	3	12	0	19
	1197	33	271	34	828

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(c) (U) Postal Activities for May, June and July:

a. Total amount of mail received:	6,430
b. Total amount of mail dispatched:	2,164
c. Total money orders purchased:	\$529,852.60
d. Total money orders cashed:	40,136.36

(d) (C) Total awards processed and approved in May, Jun and July:

Purple Heart	224
Army Commendation	1,014
Air Medal	304
Bronze Star	740
Silver Star	4
Soldiers Medal	9
Legion of Merit	3
TOTAL	2,298

(e) (C) Casualties suffered by the Brigade during May, June and July:

KHA	32
WHA	178
Non Battle Deaths	3
Non Battle Injuries	41
TOTAL	254

(f) (U) Red Cross services during the past quarter: Records indicate the following types of requests for the period 1 May 1969 thru 31 July 1969:

a. Emergency leaves or extensions	108
b. Discharges or government benefits	16
c. Reporting to assist CO	0
d. Reporting for service members	82
e. Reporting for families	152
f. Personal problems	59

(g) (U) Chaplain's activities for May, June and July:

a. Services	508
b. Attendance	13,571
c. Hospital visits	157
d. Counselling	1,031

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SUBJECT Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for period
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(h) (C) Medical: Medical services provided the brigade and attached units are outlined below:

1. Statistical data:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>PATIENTS EXAMINED</u>	<u>PATIENTS IN HOLDING</u>
May	2024	100
June	1369	134
July	<u>1039</u>	<u>89</u>
TOTAL	4432	323

2. Significant Diseases Treated (Cases Treated)

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>FUO</u>	<u>MALARIA</u>	<u>INTESTINAL</u>	<u>VD</u>	<u>DYSENTERY</u>	<u>IRHA</u>	<u>FOOT PROBLEMS</u>	<u>URI</u>	<u>SKIN DX</u>
May	60	2	6	85	42	72	93	85	120
June	55	10	4	31	110	5	73	31	97
July	<u>32</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>65</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>67</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>75</u>
TOTAL	147	16	12	140	217	80	223	145	292

3. Dental Patients Treated:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>CASES</u>
May	440
June	474
July	<u>270</u>
TOTAL	1,184

4. Brigade health status: The general health status of the Brigade appears to remain at satisfactory levels. There have been increases in some diseases. Due to change in weather and the adverse environmental conditions in one of the new Area of Operations (Pineapple) during this quarter, there has been an increase in skin problems, foot diseases, URI and dysentery.

Unit Commanders can best help prevent any great loss of man hours by encouraging increased stimulation of individual efforts toward personal care and hygiene to include dry clothes, extra socks and clean dry boots.

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e. INTELLIGENCE

(1) (C) Operation Tom Thang Phase III continued through July with the 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div remaining in the Saigon area of the III Corps Tactical Zone. During the period several contacts with up to platoon size elements resulted in 267 VC KIA, 10 VC PW, 34 NVA KIA, and 2 NVA PW.

(2) (C) During the period 1 May through 31 July enemy activity was characterized by low level incidents. 122mm rockets were fired into the Brigade AO from locations outside the AO on five occasions during the reporting period. Tan Son Nhut was the target on three occasions. It was hit on only one occasion and no casualties or damage resulted. Rockets were fired from confirmed locations within the Brigade AO on two occasions. In both cases the target was Tan Son Nhut AB with the rockets falling short both times. Rocket attacks on Tan Son Nhut have been made ineffective by an aggressive program of night ambushes, day searches, and H and I fires on logistical rocket firing sites within the AO. Other targets fired on from outside the Brigade AO were the Quang Trung Training Center and Hoc Mon (D) Gia Dinh (P) Headquarters. Assassinations, terrorism, and propaganda activity remained very low during the period. Booby trap incidents increased sharply with the assumption on 15 June of an AO in the Pineapple region southwest of Saigon. During the period from 15 June to 31 July, elements of the Brigade encountered 159 booby traps with 16 or 13% of these causing casualties. During the previous 45 day period in the same area, another U.S. unit had suffered casualties from 18% of the booby traps encountered.

Reconnaissance activity rose and fell sporadically as the enemy attempted to prepare for his, so far abortive, summer offensive. Reconnaissance activities reached minor peaks near the end of May and end of June but ended abruptly in the early part of the succeeding month.

(3) (C) During the period, contacts with groups of more than two or three individuals was rarely achieved. Continuous pressure on the enemy was maintained through the use of reconnaissance, detailed search, "Popper" missions, and joint cordon-and-search operations employing the Combined Holding and Interrogation Center (CHIC). At night extensive ambushes, "Bushmaster" operations, and the integrated radar and sensor network continued to limit enemy movement within or near the area of operations. Intelligence available indicates that although the VC/NVA long range goal is the control of Saigon, he has shifted emphasis to the countryside especially in the Tay Ninh area. Saigon does not appear to be a major objective except for the propaganda value when rockets are fired into the city. Enemy units within the area of interest of the Brigade include the following:

SR 1
Quyet Thang Regiment
Gia Dinh & Sapper Bn
H-5 Water Sapper Bn
268 Regiment

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SR 2
6th Bn
306th Bn
267 Bn
D 12 Sapper Bn

SR 5
Dong Nai Regiment

COSVN
9th VC/NVA Div

(4)

(a) (C) During the reporting period five significant caches were discovered by US troops. One consisting of 106 RPG-2 rounds, 114 75mm RR rounds and 90 pounds of TNT was discovered during land clearing operations. Another cache of caliber .51 ammunition was found a short distance away by the security force for the land clearing operations. Two different caches of grenades and explosives were discovered by US forces in the "Pineapple" plantation during the detailed searches conducted there. A volunteer informant led US troops to 19 rounds of 82mm mortar and small arms ammo. A Hoi Chanh led RVNAF forces to a medium size cache of small arms and 75mm RR ammunition. Generally, enemy cache activities remained at a fairly low level during the period. Most caches had been in place four to six months at the time of discovery. The most recent cache discoveries, however, have been recently emplaced, indicating renewed attempts to establish forward caches which had been seriously depleted by US and allied forces.

(b) (C) SLAR, Red Haze, Firefly, and Sniffer missions have again been employed extensively with results similar to the last two reporting periods. Ground radar employed in conjunction with Dufflebag sensor devices have been quite successful in detecting enemy movement to and from the AO. Movement at night within the AO has continued to decline. It appears that night movement into or out of the AO by groups larger than 3-5 personnel has virtually been eliminated. One problem which still remains is stopping daylight infiltration along major LOC's leading into the Saigon area. This is a job which can best be done by Vietnamese civil and military authorities at their control points.

(c) (C) Ranger Teams from Co "O" (Ranger), 75th Infantry, have operated continuously with the battalions both within and outside the Brigade AO. During the period they accounted for six enemy KIA, provided valuable unit identifications, and confirmed that the enemy normally operates in groups of one to three personnel when in or near the Brigade AO.

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(e) (C) In summary, the enemy has abandoned Saigon as an attainable military target. Major elements of main and local force elements have continued to skirt the Brigade AO, and local guerrilla units and VCI have continued to lose both influence and personnel to the GVN and US Forces in the area.

(5) (C) Recapitulation of enemy losses.

<u>Parameter</u>	<u>Within AO</u>	<u>Outside AO</u>
VC KIA (BC)	115	152
VC PW	8	2
NVA KIA (BC)	2	34
NVA PW	2	
<u>Weapons</u>		
Individual	38	119
Green-served	6	7
<u>Ammunition</u>		
Small Arms Rounds	15,065	400
Green-served Rounds	392	7
<u>Recoil</u>		
B-40/B-41	97	
122mm	1	
107mm	1	
<u>Misc</u>		
75mm Rounds	114	

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d. OPERATION, PLANS, AND TRAINING

(1) (C) During the reporting period no operations orders were published. OPORT 6-68 (Toan Thang Phase III) currently in effect was amplified by publication of FRAGO 26 through 42.

(2) (C) During the reporting period six (6) operations plans were published which provided for the reinforcement and defense of critical installations in the Saigon area.

(a) OPLAN 20-69 (SHORTSTOP) to defend AO Park in 5th Ranger area.

(b) OPLAN 21-69 (MARCONI) to defend or reinforce Phu Lau Signal Site.

(c) OPLAN 22-69 (CANNON BALL) to defend or reinforce FSB Copperhead.

(d) OPLAN 23-69 (JAY HAWK) to defend or reinforce Saigon Port and US installations within the Port Area.

(e) OPLAN 24-69 (PENCILS) to reinforce or defend Camp Davies.

(f) OPLAN 25-69 (GUSHER) to reinforce or defend the Nha Be POL Farm.

(3) (C) During the reporting period the Brigade continued pacification, security, and counter rocket/mortar operations in its assigned AO north and west of Saigon. Great emphasis was again put on night operations. The 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry operated in the Ho Bo Woods area for 24 days under the operational control of the US 25th Infantry Division. In June, a shift in the location of the 199th Light Infantry Brigade greatly expanded the 3/82's AO to include the area southwest of Saigon known as the Pineapple. Battalion AO's were expanded to cover the additional terrain. Each battalion was rotated into the Pineapple to operate there for a period of twenty to thirty days. This rotation was made necessary by the nature of the terrain in the area.

Operations in the Brigade AO were, for the most part, company size or smaller. They were characterized by daylight searches and reconnaissance and night ambushes along trails and waterways. Maximum use was made of watercraft to patrol streams and canals and to insert ambushes. Airmobile "Popper" missions were employed whenever the required air assets were available. Each battalion participated in a number of combined operations with both ARVN Army units and RF and PF units. The number and frequency of combined operations increased during the latter part of the reporting period.

Details of operations conducted by elements of the Brigade are as follows:

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(a) 1st Battalion, 505th Infantry

1. Operation TOAN THANG Phase III.

a. 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969.

b. The mission of the Battalion was to initiate combat operations west of Saigon in order to locate, capture, or destroy enemy personnel or equipment with particular emphasis on areas that might be used to launch rocket/mortar attacks on Saigon from within the CMAC AO. The mission also included preventing enemy infiltration, interdicting enemy movement, and identifying and eliminating VC infrastructure.

c. Location: 1 May 69 to 23 May 69-Gia Dinh Province (Sheet 6330 IV)

23 May 69 to 7 July 69-Gia Dinh Province (Sheet 6330 IV)

Hau Nghia Province

(Sheet 6330 IV)

7 July 69 to 31 July 69- Long An Province (Sheets 6230 II, 6330 III)

Hau Nghia Province

(Sheets 6230 I, 6330 IV)

d. Commander: LTC Grace G. Thomas Jr. - 1 May 1969 to 14 June 1969.
LTC Alfred A. Zamparelli 14 June 1969 to 31 July 1969.

e. Forces Involved:

(1) US Forces: US Navy - 7 July 1969 to 31 July 1969.

(2) Other Forces: RF/PF Forces in each district. 53d RF Bn in Gia Dinh Province (1-23 May 1969)

f. Concept of Operation:

(1) During the period 1 May 1969 to 7 July 1969 the battalion operated out of FB All American (X7745005). Standard procedure was to have one rifle company securing FB All American while three rifle companies operated in the battalion AO. Company E secured the Cau Bond Bridge (XT682020) and conducted waterborne operations along the Hoc Mon Canal using engineer assault boats, airboats and Kaener ski barges. Daily operations were platoon size searches, eagle flights, and searches conducted with RF/PF forces. Extensive ambushes and roving patrols were employed to stop night enemy movement and prevent the rocketing of targets from within the AO.

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(2) During the period 7 July 1969 to 31 July 1969 the battalion operated out of FB Chris (XS634750). E Company secured the battalion CP so that all four companies could operate in the field. A rotation system was established so that the companies spent nine (9) days in the field in the Pineapple Area and then they rotated for three (3) days to FB Barbara and FB Kathy where they conducted waterway and canal denial operations. The companies were spread along the Vam Co Dong River in the western half of the AO from FB Barbara (XS575856) to Ben Luc (XS625765). Daily operations included company size combat assaults, platoon size searches, platoon size "Popper" missions and platoon size RIFs. Extensive use of airmobile operations (Popper Missions) was employed in the eastern half of the AO where it was too wet to maintain troops for any length of time. Each company employed an average of 7-8 ambushes per night to prevent enemy movement through the AO. In addition to securing the battalion CP, E Company conducted daily combined operations with the US Navy. Both joint ground and airmobile operations were conducted with the RF/PF Forces.

2. Tactics and Techniques: The following Tactics and Techniques were employed during the period 1 May 1969 - 31 July 1969.

a. Platoon Size Searches: Operations larger than platoon size in this AO had proved to be fruitless because of the advance warning given by large numbers of troops. Platoon or smaller size elements were given areas to conduct a detail search. The searchers used probing rods, mine detectors and physically searched canal banks and streamlines.

b. Popper Missions: Popper missions are eagle flights conducted against hard intelligence. Sniffer missions, agent reports, sightings by aerial observers and radar targets were used to select likely targets for the popper missions. The techniques employed with popper missions was to use two platoons per company. Generally only the light half of the airmobile company (3 slicks) was available and consequently 18 men participated per platoon. The company commander was picked up in the Command and Control Ship before the slicks picked up the troops. An LZ was identified and only gunship LZ preparations were utilized. Once the first element was inserted, the company commander directed the troops on the ground while the slicks were enroute to pick up the second platoon. Once the second platoon was airborne, a second LZ was identified, often several kilometers from the first LZ, and the troops inserted into it. The slicks were sent to refuel and shut down at a nearby airfield, usually Duc Hoa (XS5996) or Tan An (XS5565). Troops were generally given 30-45 minutes on the ground before they were extracted and inserted into a new LZ. Short intensive search of a likely target, then extraction to another selected target if no contact was made.

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c. False Insertions and Then Extractions: In order to deceive the enemy as to the exact troop disposition false insertions and extractions were frequently conducted. False insertions were used late in the evening when elements were being inserted near their ambush sites. Three of four touchdown points were employed with the troops actually exiting the aircraft at any one of the touchdown points. False extractions were used in conjunction with popper missions. The troops were inserted into their final LZ about 1615 hours and allowed to remain on the ground about 30-45 minutes. When it came time for the extraction, the slicks returned to the company CP where they picked up three to four individuals per ship. These individuals either laid on the floor or sat directly behind the pilot and co-pilot so that they could not be seen as the helicopters landed. Once the helicopters had landed, the passengers raised up or slid to the rear so that they could be seen as the helicopters took off.

d. CS Munitions: Because the VC use the thick nipa palm throughout the AO to hide, it was found necessary to employ some weapon to pull them out of these areas. CS munitions were dropped out of a helicopter. The munitions were not successful because of the large percentage duds and because the area they covered was insufficient.

3. Training: Each unit in the battalion conducted all the required training e.g. command information, character guidance, first aid, etc. In addition all the units conducted the following training: Counter-sapper techniques, river crossing, booby traps, swimming, and water safety. Seven members of the battalion also attended sniper school established by the Brigade and by the 9th Infantry Division.

(b) 2d Battalion, 505th Infantry

GENERAL: During the period 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969 the 2d Battalion (Abn) 505th Infantry continued its mission of interdicting enemy infiltration routes to the Saigon area, and denial of suspect and known rocket launching sites, assembly areas and caches. Operations within the AO were typified by reconnaissance in force (RIF), detailed area searches, night ambushes, airborne combat assaults, use of aero-rifle platoons, waterborne patrols, snatch operations, and village cordon and searches. Defensive missions for the reporting period were limited to security of Hoc Mon Bridge (IX712072), the Surveillance Operations Center Fire Base Copperhead (IX805025), and at times, Fire Base All American (IX746600) and the Box Bridge (IS783967)

1. DETAIL AREA SEARCHES AND RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE.
- a. 1 May 1969 - 31 July 1969

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b. Conduct detail searches to locate and capture or destroy enemy caches, and or assembly, lager areas.

c. AOs Denver, Chute and Snoopy located in Gia Dinh, Binh Duong and Hau Nghia Province.

d. LTC Irons (to 15 June) - LTC Keenan (16 June to 31 July)

e. A, B, C and D Companies and Reconnaissance Platoon 2-505. The following companies were under operational control of the Battalion during portions of the reporting period and did participate in day searches and RIFs; C/4-12, D/4-12, B/3-7 199 LIB, and G/2-14 25th Division.

f. Concept of Operations: All Infantry Combat elements of the Battalion conducted searches and RIFs on a daily basis. Generally, each rifle company conducted two platoon size operations daily. The specific areas searched were systematically selected to insure that the entire battalion area of operation was covered. All available intelligence data was considered prior to targeting an area for search or reconnaissance. Special emphasis was placed on thorough searching of canal and streams.

2. NIGHT AMBUSHES:

a. 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969

b. Conducted extensive night ambushes throughout AO to interdict enemy movement and cover known and suspect rocket launching sites.

c. AOs Denver, Chute, Snoopy Provinces of Gia Dinh, Binh Duong, and Hau Nghia.

d. LTC Irons (until 15 June) LTC Keenan (16 June to 31 July)

e. Forces:

(1) A rifle company and reconnaissance platoon 2-505. OPCOM companies mentioned in paragraph 2a, above.

(2) During the second half of June and throughout the month of July some limited participations by popular and regional forces took place. The aggregate strength of the indigenous forces participating in combined ambushes on a given night seldom exceeded three squads.

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f. Concept of Operations: Each rifle company normally conducted 4 to 6 platoon size ambushes per night. These were generally point ambushes of opportunity with the mission of destroying the enemy. Ambush locations were recommended by the Company Commander. Coverage of known and suspected routes of movement, both land and waterway, rocket launch sites, cache sites, and all available intelligence, were considered when selecting ambush locations. Standard patrolling and ambush techniques were used. Emphasis was placed on having alternate means of communication and use of night observation devices. Frequently, infantry ambushes were employed in conjunction with mechanized and riverine patrols and ambushes.

3 AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS: Throughout the reporting period the Battalion made exhaustive use of all airmobile assets. During the last month and a half of the period, the battalion received a portion of the airmobile company force due to other priority brigade operations.

a Reference 2-505 FRAGO 2-69 (GUESS WHAT) Map, Saigon 1/50,000 Sheet 6330 IV

(1) 13-14 May 1969

(2) Missions: Heliborne assault by one rifle company into AN SON (Center of mass XT815095). RIF and search to north destroying all bunkers, tunnels, and booby traps.

(3) Binh Duong Province

(4) LTC Irons

(5) Forces involved: C/2-505, Recon 2-505, 1 PLAT D/2-505, 28th RAG, C/307th Engineers.

(6) Concept of Operations: 1 Rifle company combat assault and sweep to north. 1 rifle platoon and recon platoon block to north and east. RAG boats screen western flank along Saigon River.

b Reference FRAGO 4-69 (BLACK SWAN) Map, Saigon 1/50,000 Sheet 6330 IV

(1) 2-3 June 1969

(2) Mission: 1 rifle company combat assault into AN SON COM (XT815096), sweep to NE destroying bunkers and tunnels during advance.

(3) BINH Duong Province

(4) LTC Irons

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(5) Forces: Companies A, B, C 2-505, Recon 2-505, 26th RAG, 3-17 Cavalry, 167, 265, 794 R.F. Companies.

(6) Concept of Operations: 1 US rifle company conduct heliborne assault into AN SON, sweep SW destroying bunkers and tunnels enroute. 1 US company make beach landing and establish blocking force. 3 R.F. companies block to east, RAG blockade Saigon River. 1 US company screen on west bank of Saigon River. Recon 2-505 reaction force, artillery prep and multiple TAC Air Strikes prior to insertion. Results were: 31 VC KIA, 4 POW's, 1 Chieu Hoi, 3 B-40 rockets, 1 RPG-2 launcher, 3 K54 pistols, 6 AK-47s, 1 .45 pistol captured.

c Reference FRAGO 9-69 (COLD STEEL) Map, Saigon 1/50,000 Sheet 6330 IV

(1) 28-29 June 1969

(2) Mission: 2 Companies inserted by helicopter, AN PHU DONG COM (XT870005), RIF to west destroying bunkers and tunnels, locate possible enemy assembly areas and caches.

(3) GIA DINH

(4) LTC Keenan

(5) Forces: Companies A, D, 2-505, Recon 2-505, 1 platoon 3-17 Cavalry, 128th Assault Helicopter Company, National Police Contingent, PSYOPS Team, 2 squads C-307th Engineers, 2 Scout Dog Teams, 1 Company ARVN Rangers and 1 PF Company.

(6) Concept of Operations: 2 US rifle companies inserted by helicopter, RIF to west with 1 company Rangers and 1 company PF blocking to west, RAG boats blocking on river. Rifle companies leave stay behind ambushes. Recon platoon inserted at nightfall by boat to establish ambushes.

4 SNATCH OPERATIONS:

a The 2-505th Infantry participated in six snatch operations during the reporting period.

b The total results of these operations were: 6 VC KIA, 1 PW, 37 detainees, 1 RPG-2 launcher CIA, 2 AK-47 CIA, and 1 AK-47 magazine CIA.

5 VILLAGE CORDON AND SEARCHES:

a Reference FRAGO 2-69 (GUESS WHO), Map, Saigon 1/50,000, Sheet 6330 IV.

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1. 9-11 May 1969
 2. Mission: Cordon and Search of Village Tan Thanh Dong (XT753114)
 3. BINH DUONG Province.
 4. LTC Irons
 5. Forces: A/2-505, R/2-505, Recon 2-505, C/4-12/199, D/4-12/199, 1 platoon C/307th Engineer, CRIP 2/34 Armor, A/2-34 Armor (-), 1 B/17 Cavalry, 3 IPW Teams 518 MID, 82d M.P. Squad, HV Mortar platoon, 1 USAF Flareship, 1 PSYOPS Aircraft, 1 PSYOPS Field Team. Vietnamese forces: National Police Contingent, 168, 312, 774 RF Companies from Binh Duong Province.
 6. Concept of Operations: Establish cordon around 3 separate hamlets with RF establishing internal cordon. Armor and Cavalry occupy screening positions. 1 US rifle platoon, CRIP, 307th Engineer and 3 RF platoons and National Police conduct search of village. Screen entire population utilizing 3d Bde CHIC (Combined Holding Interrogation Center).
- b Reference FRAGO 8-69 (BAYONET) Map, Saigon 1/50,000 Sheet 6330 IV
- 1 26 June 1969
 - 2 Mission: Establish a cordon around BINH MY Hamlet, COM (XT804134), block roads, conduct snatch and search operations in village.
 - 3 BINH DUONG Province
 - 4 LTC Keenan
 - 5 Forces: A/2-505, 1 platoon B/2-505, 1 platoon D/2-505 2 Sniper Teams, Recon 2-505, 1 squad C/307th Engineer, 4.2 platoon.
 - 6 All cordon elements move to area of cordon by ACAV and truck, move into position on foot. RAG boats screen on Saigon River. Recon platoon conduct snatch operations, National Police and District Forces assisted by Engineers, search village.
- c Reference FRAGO 10-69 (COLD DAWN) Map, Saigon 1/50,000 Sheet 6330 IV
- 1 7-8 July 1969
 - 2 Mission: Conduct RIF through village of TAN THANH DONG, COM (XT753114)
 - 3 BINH DUONG Province

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4 LTC Keenan

5 Forces: A, B 2-505, Recon 2-505, 1 platoon B/1-17, 2 squads
307th Engineer, 3d Bde CHIC, 1 RF platoon, 1 RF company, National Police
Contingent.

6 Concept of Operations: Two US rifle companies conduct CA at dawn,
landing near northern part of village. The first company conducts rapid RIF
from north to south. The second company follows 1st company with National
Police conducting detailed house to house search checking ID cards. Cavalry
platoon established roadblock and screen southern portion of village.

d Reference FRAGO 5-69 (SACRAMENTO BEE) Map, Saigon 1/50,000 Sheet 6330 IV

1 7-8 June 1969

2 Mission: Hoc Mon District conduct search of hamlet, COM (XT750645),
US Forces provide cordon forces.

3 GIA DINH Province

4 LTC Irons/MAJ Hoa

5 Forces: A/2-505 (-), 1 platoon C/2-505, Recon 2-505, 1 platoon
B/1-17 Cavalry, 1 squad Engineers, 3d Bde CHIC.

6 US Forces establish cordon around hamlet enabling Vietnamese Forces
to conduct search. Supervise operation of CHIC.

e Reference FRAGO 7-69 (CHARGER II) Map, Saigon 1/50,000 Sheet 6330 IV

1 18-19 June 1969

2 Cordon and search of village COM (XT767127)

3 BINH DUONG Province

4 LTC Keenan

5 Forces:

(a) 1 platoon A, B/2-505, C/2-505, Recon 2-505, 1 company (-) 2/34
Armor, 1 platoon B/17 Cavalry.

(b) 4 PF platoon under control of BINH DUONG Province Chief.

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6 Concept of Operations: US Forces establish infantry, cavalry, and armor cordon of hamlet. Establish roadblocks on Highway 8A. Vietnamese Forces begin search at first light. US Artillery and 4.2 mortar illumination on call.

6. AIRMOBILE "POPPER" MISSIONS: During the period 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969, the Battalion conducted frequent "Popper" missions. Although 1/4 rifle platoon or the reconnaissance platoon often combined with national police and 1/4 of an airmobile company (AMC) for such missions, the availability of the AMC limited the frequency of these operations. To make up for the reduced number of "popper" operations flown with organic forces and normal attachments, the battalion frequently employed an Aero-Rifle Platoon from Troop B 3/17 Cavalry.

a. 1 May 1969 - 31 July 1969

b. Conduct "quick reaction" airmobile operations to find and destroy the enemy and supplies.

c. AO's Denver, Chate, and Snoopy, in GIA BINH, BINH DUONG and HAU HINH Provinces.

d. LTC Irons (to 15 June) - LTC Keenan (16 June - 31 July)

e. (1) One Aero-Rifle platoon B/3-17 Cavalry

(2) National Police from the appropriate Provinces

f. Concept of Operations: Aerial surveillance of a suspected area is maintained by a Hunter-Killer Team (1 OH-6 w/Minigun and one Cobra gunship) and the CAC aircraft. Random insertions are made up by the two UH-1's carrying National Police and Cavalrymen on various targets (suspicious persons, sampans, vehicles, or suspect cache areas). In the event of significant contact, additional organic troops are inserted utilizing the UH-1's.

g. During the reported period, "popper" operations utilizing the Aero-Rifle Platoon were conducted on the following dates:

May 5,7,11,20,21,22,26,29 and 30.

June 2,3,5,7,29

July 1,16

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7. WATERBORNE OPERATIONS: Because of the many rivers, streams and canals within 2/505th ABN, the Battalion made extensive use of watercraft and available Vietnamese (RAG, RF Boats), and the US Navy (PER) waterborne elements. This was especially true when the mission makes cross-country movement by foot increasingly difficult. The watercraft were used to make extensive RIF's and searches along canals i.e., RACH TRA CON (XT765060), transport patrols to the vicinity of ambush locations; establish blocking and screening forces for land operations; waterborne RCP's and establish amphibious ambushes along major waterways i.e., Saigon River. The principal type craft used were RAG, PER, LCM, Ski Barges and Engineer Boats.

8. MAJOR ATTACHMENTS/DETACHMENTS DURING REPORTING PERIOD.

Attachments: 1 May 31 July - 1 Platoon B/1-17 Cavalry
1 May-15 May - C/4-12, D/4-12, B/3-7, 199th LIB

Detachments 15 June-6 July - 1 company OPCON to 1/506 Infantry in
MO Pineapple

1 May - 31 July - 1 platoon OPCON 2/321 Arty at Fire Base
Copperhead for FB security.

25 May - 31 May - 1 platoon OPCON B/1-17 Cavalry for Bde
reaction force

6 July - 31 July - 1 platoon OPCON B/1-17 Cavalry for Bde
reaction force.

9. TRAINING

9.1 General: All training in the Battalion was conducted according to a master testing program. Emphasis was placed on fulfilling mandatory training requirements, weapons training, night firing, counter sapper training, familiarization with night observing devices, first aid, water safety, personnel hygiene and physical fitness. Maintenance training was also conducted on a regular basis. Subjects included in the training program were;

- | | |
|---------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Physical Conditioning | Weapons Care |
| Command Information | Field Sanitation |
| Civil Affairs | Internal Defense (Perimeter Defense) |
| Character Guidance | Military Justice |
| Prevention of Heat Injury | Weapons, water and Vehicle Safety |

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Sentry Duty	SAEDA
Counter Ambush Drill	Met Weather Operations
Night Firing	Geneva Convention (PW Handling)
Supply Economy	Armed Forces Censorship
Code of Contact	Survival, Escape and Evasion
Map Reading	

b. Due to personnel turnover and a lack of sufficient seasoned non-commissioned officers, it was necessary to conduct extensive training in ambush techniques. The majority of this training was conducted by the companies based on doctrinal material published by the Battalion and Brigade. During the period 15 to 25 May a battalion level mobile training team (MIT) presented classes on ambushes techniques to each platoon in the Battalion. Subjects given special emphasis included; selection and reconnaissance sites; moving from intermediate to final positions, establishing local security and early warning procedures, placement of tripflares and claymore mines, basic formations, radio and pyrotechnic signals, and employment of snipers and starlight scopes.

c. The Battalion formed a battalion level 81MM Mortar Platoon assigned to Company E. The platoon consisted of 31 men, one Lieutenant and 4, 81MM Mortars. Training was begun in mid July and by the close of the reporting period the platoon had attained a level of proficiency wherein it was able to fire close indirect fire for committed units. The training generally followed the ATP for a weapons platoon in an Infantry Company. The weapons platoon members were cross-trained on the 106 Recoilless Rifle, 90MM Recoilless Rifle and Flamethrower.

d. Selected members of the Battalion attended the following Brigade and non-Brigade schools;

- (1) Brigade Sniper School
- (2) Brigade Keener Ski-Barge Operator School
- (3) Brigade Radar Operations School (OJT)
- (4) 9th Division Sniper School
- (5) USATF 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM) Radio Operation Commo (AM/GRC-106)

e. Informal on-the-job training (OJT) was carried on continually in the Battalion to insure an adequate number of specialists in such fields as, radio operators, drivers, cooks, switchboard operators, clerks, etc.

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**SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div
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(c) (C) 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry

1. Summary of the concept and execution of operation during the reporting period - See paragraph 4a(6)

2. Map References:

a. AO HERCULES (2 May - 24 May): Operation "Dirty Devil". MAPS: 1:50,000 Sheets Hieu Thien 6231 II and Ban Cat 6331 III.

b. AO DETROIT (24 May - 14 June): MAPS: 1:50,000 Sheet Saigon 6330 IV.

c. AO SWORDFISH (15 June - 7 July): Operation "Wet Devil". MAPS: 1:50,000 Sheets Das Hoa 6230 I, Tan An 6230 II, Saigon 6330 IV, Can Gio: 6330 III.

d. AO DETROIT (7 July - 31 July): MAPS: 1:50,000 Sheet Saigon 6330 IV.

3. Attached as Tabs to this inclosure are overlays showing AO's for the reporting period:

TAB A - AO HERCULES (2 May - 24 May)
TAB B - AO DETROIT (24 May - 15 Jun) (15 Jun - 7 Jul) (7 Jul - 31 Jul)wd, HQ DA
TAB C - AO SWORDFISH (15 Jun - 7 Jul)

4. Combat Operations.

a. Reporting Period: 1 May - 31 July 1969

(1) Date operation started and ended:

(a) 2 May 69 - 24 May 69 - AO HERCULES (operation Dirty Devil)

(b) 24 May - 14 Jun 69 - AO DETROIT

(c) 15 Jun - 7 Jul 69 - AO SWORDFISH - 1-508(-) (Operation Wet Devil)
15 Jun - 7 Jul 69 - AO DETROIT Task force Dry Devil

(d) 7 Jul 69 - 31 Jul 69 - AO DETROIT

(2) Mission of 1-505 during the operation.

(a) Conduct search and destroy operations in AO HERCULES

(b) Conduct detail searches and extensive night ambushes in AO DETROIT.

(c) Conduct detail operations in AO SWORDFISH.

(d) Conduct detailed searches and extensive night ambushes in AO DETROIT.

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(3) Location - Province (See Tabs A, B, and C)

(a) Nam Nghia, Binh Duong - AO HERCULES

(b) Gia Dinh - AO DETROIT

(c) Nam Nghia, Long An, Gia Dinh - AO SWORDFISH
Gia Dinh - AO DETROIT

(d) Gia Dinh - AO DETROIT

(h) Name of Commander:

(a) LTC Paul R. Lumsford - 1-508

(b) MAJ Thomas S. Myerckin - Task Force Dry Devil.

(5) Forces involved.

(a) U.S. Forces:

Operation Dirty Devil - 1-508 Bn CP, 3 rifle companies
1-508, HEC & E Co, 1-508.

1-508 Inf.

Operation Wet Devil - 1-508 Bn CP, 1 Co OPCON from 1-505 and 2-505,
1 Co 1-508, HEC (-) & E(-)/1-508.

Task Force Dry Devil - TF CP. 3 rifle Co's 1-508, HEC(-) and E Co (-)/1-508.
1-508 Inf.

(b) Other Forces:

Operation Dirty Devil - AO DETROIT - 53d RF Bn.

Operation Wet Devil - 55th RF Bn, 60th ARVN.

Task Force Dry Devil - 53d RF Bn.

AO DETROIT - 53d RF Bn.

(6) Concept of the Operations: On 1 May 69 the 1-508 Inf was relieved of responsibility for AO DETROIT and placed OPCON to 2/25 Inf Div. The concept of the operation was the 1-508(-) to move by air and land to FSB PATTON (XT593217) and initiate search and destroy operations in AO HERCULES, a known enemy lager area and infiltration route. One company of the 1-508 remained in AO DETROIT OPCON 1-505 Inf.

On 2 May 69 the 1-508(-) moved by CH-47 helicopter to FSB PATTON. Bn support elements moved to FSB PATTON by convey. Companies C and D on order moved into AO HERCULES and began conducting reconnaissance in force operations. Company A provided FSB security and Company B remained in AO DETROIT OPCON 1-505 Inf. The Battalion CP was located at FSB PATTON.

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Operations in AO HERCULES were characterized by company RIF's, NDP's, ambushes on suspected enemy infiltration routes and combat air assaults.

The operation terminated at 1200 hours, 24 May 69 when responsibility for the area of operation was reassumed by the 2/25 Inf. On that date the 1-508 (-) returned to its assigned area of operation in the 3rd Bde, 82nd Abn Div area of operation. Return movement was conducted overland by convoy and by CH-47 helicopter.

Upon return to AO DETROIT the 1-508 resumed operations in the AO and security of FSB HARDCORE (XS754936) and FSB STEPHANIE (XS763906). Operations were characterized by detail searches, extensive night ambushes and joint RIF's and cordon and search operations with the 53rd RF Bn. The Bn CP was located at FSB HARDCORE.

On 15 Jun 69, the 1-508 Inf assumed responsibility of AO SWORDFISH in addition to AO DETROIT. The concept of operation was the 1-508(-) to move by air and land to FSB CLAUDETTE (XS666926), FSB BARBARA (XS575856), and PB KATHY (XS627887) and commence denial operations and stay-behind ambushes in AO SWORDFISH, a known enemy cache area and infiltration route. Elements of the 1-508 (-) moved by UH1D helicopter to FSB BARBARA, PB KATHY, and into the AO. The Bn CP and support elements moved overland by convoy to FSB CLAUDETTE. Co B/1-508 moved to FSB BARBARA with 2 platoons operating in the AO, Co C(-) 1-505 had security of FSB CLAUDETTE and PB KATHY, and Co D(-) 2-505 had 2 platoons operating in the AO. Companies A, C and D/1-508 remained operational in AO DETROIT under the command of Task Force Dry Devil. The task force CP was located at FSB HARDCORE.

Operations in AO SWORDFISH by the 1-508 (-) were characterized by combat air assaults, airmobile checkpoints, Popper Missions, amphibious insertions and extractions by River Patrol Boats (PBR) and Ski Barges, stay-behind sampan ambushes, company and platoon size RIF's. Operations in AO DETROIT by Task Force Dry Devil consisted of detail searches, extensive night ambushes and combined operations with the 53rd RF Bn.

The operation terminated at 1300 hrs, 7 Jul 69, when responsibility for AO SWORDFISH was assumed by the 1-505 Inf. On that date the 1-508 (-) returned to its assigned area of operation (AO DETROIT) in the 3rd Bde, 82nd Abn Div area of operations. Return movement was conducted by UH1D helicopter and overland convoy. The Bn CP was located at FSB HARDCORE.

Upon being relieved of responsibility for AO SWORDFISH the 1-508 Inf resumed operations in AO DETROIT, the operations consisting of detail searches, extensive night ambushes, and combined operations with the 53rd RF Bn.

5. Tactics and Techniques:

a. Tactics and techniques used in Operation Dirty Devil in AO HERCULES:

(1) 60mm, 81mm and 105mm rounds suspended in trees - usually command detonated, were common VC booby traps employed in the Hobo Wood area.

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(2) A large number of frag grenades, both US and ChiCom PZ type, with trip wire were also common to the Hoho Wood area.

(3) Effective use of snipers and shadow techniques. VC will walk on your flank and tail you.

(h) Counter measures employed:

(a) 3-man point:

Ours trail

Checks ground and eye level for enemy and booby traps.

Checks trees for snipers and booby traps.

(b) Emplacement 50-150 meters in front of platoon, depending on terrain.

(5) Perimeter always swept at dusk and dawn. Mast contact stand to. Mast minute had no practical value.

(6) M-79's were employed as mortar from Co CP for H & I.

(7) Always dig in - two man positions, 50% alert minimum.

(8) M-60 tripods and flak jackets set up for night issues, brought in with night packet by logistics helicopter.

(9) Prior to moving out, DT's were plotted along route of march. Some rounds were fired in while moving, that way it was possible to have rounds on a sniper in seconds.

(10) Do not move through cuts in rice paddy dikes, especially those made by mechanized units for passage of APC's. Such cuts were often mined.

(b.) Period 24 May - 7 Jul 69 (TF Dry Devil) - AO DETROIT.
7 Jul - 31 Jul 69 (1-508) - AO DETROIT.

(1) Extensive night ambushes, 6 - 9 ambushes per rifle company.

(2) Detail search of grids or sections of grids.

(3) Maximum utilization of starlight scopes.

(4) Use of probing rods.

(5) Navigating canals and swamps with air boats.

(6) Combined KIP's and blocking positions with the Regional Forces.

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- (7) Proper coordination of night ambushes with Regional and Popular Forces.
- (8) Extensive small unit tactics utilized.
- (c) Period 15 Jun - 7 Jul 69 - 1-508 (-) - AO SWORDFISH
- (1) Units traveled cross corridor; traveling parallel with hedgerows and canals left unit subject to ambush by hostile forces.
- (2) Insertions and extractions with River Patrol Boats (PRB), Ski Barges, and sampans.
- (3) Maximum use of airmobile companies for relocation of troops, Popper Missions, and airmobile checkpoints.
- (4) Due to the inundated nature of the terrain, movement overland was only 2000 meters per day.
- (5) Troops were in water most of the time. Time during daylight hours was allotted for drying out.
- (6) To save blade and flight time all resupply was lifted from FFI at FSB Claudette.
- (7) Extra ropes and snap links should be issued due to numerous stream and canal crossings.
- (8) Check the banks and the beds of canals, VC VC usually used them for hiding caches.
- (6) Training (Note: *indicates mandatory training):
 - (a) Brigade or higher headquarters training conducted during the reporting period:
 - (1) Sniper Training - 9th Inf Div (3 personnel) July 69.
 - (2) Night firing of M-16 with starlight scope - 3/82 (10 personnel) June 69.
 - (3) Air boat and Ski Barge operating and maintenance - 3/82 (10 personnel) June 69.
 - (4) Generator operator and mechanic course - 3/82, May 69.

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(b.) Company and Battalion taught subjects during the period 1 May-31 July 1969.

*(1) Command Information (Subjects).

- (a) Medical Benefits
- (b) Whenever You're Ready.
- (c) Reduced Fare - Military Air Travel
- (d) Protect Your Health
- (e) Customs, Laws and You
- (f) Returning to CONUS
- (g) Making Your Pay Work For You
- (h) The Enemy You Face
- (i) POW's and You.
- (j) Weapons Control in Secure Areas
- (k) Soldiers Armed Against Com-mun
- (l) G.I. Benefits
- (m) Your Extensions
- (n) Path to a Commission

*(2) Character Guidance (Subject).

- (a) Venereal Disease.
- (b) Clean Speech
- (c) Marriage Makeup

*(3) Armed Forces Censorship

*(4) SAEDA.

*(5) Weapons Firing (Zero and Familiarisation).

(6) Tunnel Teams.

*(7) Safeguarding Defense Information.

*(8) Civil Affairs.

*(9) CBR Refresher - Riot Control Masks.

(10) Counter Sapper Training.

(11) Mighty Mite, Flame Thrower, M3 CS Launcher.

(c) Company and Battalion taught training during period 1 Aug - 30 Jun 69:

*(1) Command Information (Subject).

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- (a) Defense against Enemy Propaganda.
 - (b) International Communism.
 - (c) Aggression from the North.
 - (d) Blue Print for Aggression.
 - (e) Serving Your Country Overseas.
 - (f) History of South Vietnam.
 - (g) How to get War Trophies Home.
 - (h) Protect Your Health.
 - (i) The Red Cross.
 - (j) Heroes of Vietnam.
 - (k) The Constitution of Vietnam.
 - (l) Deadly Games.
 - (m) Warrant Officer Program.
 - (n) Me? Ambassador.
 - (o) Minority Groups.
 - (p) Your Reserve Obligation.
- *(2) Character Guidance (Subject).
- (a) Right.
 - (b) Clean Speech.
- *(3) Weapons Firing (Zero and Familiarization).
- *(4) Armed Forces Censorship.
- *(5) Civil Affairs.
- *(6) Safety Training.
- *(7) Survival, Escape and Evasion.
- (8) Field Sanitation.
 - (9) M-16 Firing with Starlight Scope Mounted.
- *(10) Code of Conduct.
- *(11) Geneva Convention.
- *(12) Mighty Mite, Flamethrower, M3 CS Launcher.

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- (d) Company and Battalion Taught Subjects - Period 1 Jul - 31 Jul 69:
 - *(1) Command Information(Subjects).
 - (a) Facts About the U.S.
 - (b) Selling America.
 - (c) True Patriotism.
 - (d) A Soldier's Career.
 - (e) Marijuana Means Trouble.
 - (f) Deadly Games.
 - (g) Getting Along in Vietnam.
 - (h) AER.
 - (i) Making Your Pay Work For You.
 - (j) USARV Direct Commission Program.
 - (k) Legal Assistance for You.
 - (l) Military Justice Act 1969.
 - (m) Lifesaving Tips Your Friend the M-16.
 - (n) Promotion Re-evaluation.
 - (o) Enlisted Promotion System.
 - *(2) Character Guidance (Subjects).
 - (a) Heritage.
 - (b) Marriage.
 - *(3) CER (Flamethrower, Mighty Mite, E8 CS Launcher).
 - (h) Combat in Built-Up Areas.
 - (5) Stability Operations.
 - *(6) Armed Forces Censorship.
 - (7) Supply Economy.
 - *(8) Civil Affairs, Vietnam and Relations with the Vietnamese.
 - *(9) Small Arms Familiarisation.
 - (10) Range Estimation at Night.
 - *(11) Survival, Escape and Evasion.

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(d) 3rd Battalion, 321st Artillery.

1. (C) Combat Operations.

a. Operation Tom Thang (Phase III) continued throughout the period.

b. The Battalion mission remained as direct support to the Brigade and Battery C, 3rd Battalion, 197th Artillery remain in general support to the Brigade.

c. Units located at fire support bases Copperhead, Harrison, Hardcore and All American are all in Gia Dinh Province. Units occupying fire support base Barbara were in Long An Province.

d. LTC John R. Martin remained in command of the Battalion for the entire reporting period.

e. Concept of operations: The Battalion operated within the general guidelines described as characteristics of the standard direct support mission. During this period, one infantry battalion and one artillery battery were moved to an AO outside of the basic Brigade AO. The battery location was accessible by air and water only. Rotation of units between the external and basic AO was on a monthly basis and to provide some continuity, this Battalion offset the battery rotation by two weeks from the infantry battalion rotation schedule. Liaison personnel remained with their assigned infantry battalion as did the forward observers. The "habitual association" was felt to be less important than maintaining continuity for operations.

f. Location of units:

HQB 2/321-Camp Copperhead (IT806026).

A Btry 2/321-1 May to 13 June, FSB All American (IT745005);
15 June to 13 July, FSB Harrison (IT736055); 13 July to current date,
FSB Barbara (IS577854).

B Btry 2/321/1 May to 15 June FSB Harrison; 15 June to 13 July, FSB Barbara;
13 July to current date, FSB Harrison.

C Btry 2/321- 1 May to 24 May, FSB Patton (IT580215); 24 May to 1 Aug,
FSB Hardcore (IS752937)

C Btry 3/197-FSB Copperhead.

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2. (C) Tactics and Techniques.

a. On 15 June, this Battalion assumed responsibility for FSB Barbara (XS577854). It had previously been occupied by a unit with M101 howitzers. The area was extremely wet due to low elevation, monsoon weather and poor drainage. The M101 howitzers were fired sitting on the soil and the unit had had problems with howitzers sinking into the mud. Prior to occupation by this Battalion, Brigade engineers constructed heavy wooden platforms with protruding steel pipes on which the M102 base plate was lowered. These platforms provided an exceptionally stable platform and the howitzers were kept out of the mire.

b. Due to the terrain and current monsoon rains, the majority of the missions fired are fired using fuse and time VT. Observation has shown that effect obtained with point detonating fuse is minimal to non-existent.

3. (U) Training.

During the period the following specialized training was conducted.

a. Gunner's test - A six week period of battery level training was directed. At the end of this period, a Battalion test team tested all batteries. Personnel tested were PFC's and SP4's who are performing duties as Gunners, Assistant Gunners and in two cases, Chiefs of Sections. A very low percentage of candidates received passing scores. Possible reasons for this are: inexperience, shortage of NCO's in grade E5 and E6 which necessitates placing untrained personnel in critical positions and also prompts a base of established knowledge to build around, mission requirements and maintenance time occupy periods needed for training.

b. Drivers training - A permanent weekly school at Battalion level has been established to qualify new personnel in $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{3}{4}$ and $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton vehicles and covering operation, maintenance, records, safety and road signs. Personnel completing the courses are licenced. A large portion of incoming personnel are not licenced in COMUS which makes the course necessary. Personnel arriving with licences are oriented on Vietnamese road signs and local maintenance problems and recertified to drive. Traffic accidents and maintenance problems have decreased since this training was initiated.

c. Generator training - Seven three day schools were conducted at Battalion level during this period. Students were generator operators and maintenance personnel. Operation, maintenance, repair and records were covered in great detail. A marked improvement in generator deadline rate resulted.

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d. Extensive training has been initiated and will continue over next 30 to 45 days in the area of forward observers, firedirection center and liaison section procedures and techniques. Emphasis is being placed on refresher training in areas which are not frequently used but in which proficiency must be maintained.

4. (C) Organisation.

2nd Battalion, 321st Artillery is organized as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>MISSION</u>
HHB 2/321	DS 3/82
A/2/321	Priority of fires - 1/505 Infantry
B/2/321	Priority of fires - 2/505 Infantry
C/2/321	Priority of fires - 1/508 Infantry
C/3/197	GS 3/82

5. (C) Enemy killed by artillery during the period.

<u>BTRY</u>	<u>NO. KRA</u>
A	12
B	8
C	<u>69</u>
TOTAL	89

(e) (C) Troop B, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry.

1. Organization: Troop B, 1/17 Cavalry was organized under the 17-570 MTOE. In addition one infantry platoon from either 1/505 Inf or 2/505 Inf has been continuously OPCON from the close of the last reporting period until 25 July. Three line platoons consisting of nine ACAV's each, and the CP group composed of three ACAV's have been the primary combat elements of the troop.

2. Activities: During this reporting period, B Troop has performed a variety of missions to include mounted and dismounted reconnaissance in force and searches, engineer security and tunnel clearing, cordons and searches, fire base security, convoy escorts, resource control points, reaction missions in support of the infantry battalions, and night ambushes, both mounted and dismounted. The Troop has been responsible for the security of the Thong Tay Hoi Bridge (IS784967) from 15 June to 25 July.

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3. Significant Actions:

a. 2d Plt, B Troop, acted as reaction force at XT701115 to A Co, 2/505 Inf, 022330 May. Results: 3 VC KIA, 1 VC POW, 2 AK-47's captured. (OPCON 2/505)

b. 2d Plt, B Troop, with C Co, 307th Rngr, at XT675085, 031500 May discovered a cache of 150 B-40 rockets, 120 75mm RR rounds, 30 60mm mortar rounds, and approximately 50 lbs of TNT. (OPCON 2/505)

c. 3d Plt, B Troop, 051445 May, at XT663098, discovered a cache of 200 .51 caliber rounds, 4000 .30 caliber rounds, 5000 7.62mm AK-47 rounds.

d. HQ ACAV's escorting a 1/508 convoy in the vicinity of FSB Patton, 231500 May, lost one ACV destroyed by a 20 lb VC mine. Results one ACAV destroyed, 5 US WIA (minor) (U' N 1/508)

e. 3d Plt, B Troop, while on a night defensive position with B Co, 1/505, engaged a group of 5 VC, 262130 May at XT711028. Results: 2 VC KIA, 1 VC POW, 1 B-40 launcher and 2 AK-50's captured. (OPCON 1/505)

f. 2d Plt, B Troop, reacted to A Co, 2/505 snatch operation and was ambushed on the way to the infantry position, 102330 July, at XT700014. Results: 2 US KHA, 5 WHA (3 minor), 1 ACAV destroyed. Enemy: 5 VC KIA, 1 B-40 launcher and 2 AK-47's captured. (OPCON 2/505) Two days later Cu Chi PF's captured 4 VC who had been seriously wounded in the same action.

g. 1st Plt, B Troop, with C Co, 2/505, on a reconnaissance in force, 271330 July, at XT660085, engaged VC in canal line. Results: 1 VC KIA, 1 VC POW. (OPCON 2/505)

h. Several small medical caches, small amounts of small arms ammunition, and 2 SKS rifles (partially destroyed) have been found during the reporting period while on dismounted operations.

(f) (C) The 52d Chemical Detachment continued its mission of providing special chemical operations support to the Brigade.

1. Defoliation operations were conducted to reduce enemy ambush sites and avenues of approach, increase fields of fire and improve radar effectiveness. A summary of the defoliation missions conducted is as follows.

(a) Aerial Defoliation (UH-1D aircraft with Agavenco aerial spray apparatus)

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(1) Vic AO Chute (IX790100): 7 missions, 29 sorties, 1375 gal agent Orange, 960 gal agent Blue, total area: 2750 acres (only roadway, waterways, trails and treelines received primary consideration)

(2) Hoc Man Bridge and canal (IX712073 to IX700052): 2 missions, 6 sorties, 250 gal agent Blue, total area: approx 85 acres.

(3) FSB Barbara (IX584856) and FSB Kathy (IX623886): 1 mission, 4 sorties, 130 gal agent Orange.

(b) Ground or Water Based Defoliation (Power-Driven Decontaminating Apparatus or salvage pumps on wheeled vehicles or LCM)

(1) Rach Tra Canal (IX767064 to IX814077): approx 23 acres.

(2) "VC Island" (IX775066): 1 acre.

(3) Box Bridge (IX783967): approx 8 acres

(4) FSB All American (IX745005): approx 8 acres

(5) Phu Loi Post Perimeter (IX855160): approx 75 acres

(6) FSB Hardcore (IX752937): approx 30% of 7 acres

2. Airborne Personnel Detector (Sniffer) missions were conducted to provide information on enemy troop locations and activities for the S2 collection plan. A total of 33 missions were scheduled with 25 completed for a flight time of 45 hours.

3. Riot Control Agents were employed in conjunction with sniffer missions and in support of ground operations. A total of 22 non-persistent CS munitions (E158) were used in 5 sorties and 800 lbs of persistent CS-1 were dropped via X3639928 on 20 June.

4. Miscellaneous: Assistance in tunnel search and denial operations was provided the 2/505th Inf on 28 July. During the reporting period, technical inspections of chemical equipment for turn in were performed for the following items: 230 protective masks, 177 mask carriers, 104 decontaminating apparatus, and 33 chemical agent detector kits. The 52d Chemical Detachment ammunition storage area was transferred from Tam Son Nhut to Phu Loi Post starting on 16 June and completed on 22 June.

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5. CBR training conducted during the period included the following:

a. During the period 20 May through 5 June, instruction on the construction, emplacement, and maintenance of flame field expedients was conducted of the defense sectors on Phu Loi Post. Approximately 35 persons received the instruction.

b. A class on the operation, maintenance and employment of the M9K1-7 portable flamethrower was conducted at the Hoc N'a Bridge on 20 June. The class culminated with the demonstration of the flamethrower using thickened fuel. Approximately 60 persons received the training.

(g) (C) During the reporting period the Brigade conducted training in accordance with USARV Reg 350-1. Special training was conducted by mobile training teams on night firing proficiency, use of the starlight scope AN/PVS-2, and countersapper techniques. An airboat maintenance school and operator/maintenance course for Keener Ski-Barges were conducted by the 82d Support Battalion. Joint radar training was conducted with ARVN radar operators from CMD Signal Company. During this training a total of 69 ARVN radar operators received instruction aimed toward improving their proficiency in acquiring and identifying radar targets. During the reporting period the first class of snipers was trained in the 3/82 Sniper School. Fourteen men were graduated as qualified snipers from this course. Additional classes have not been scheduled pending the arrival of sniper equipment. Eight men from the Brigade were qualified as snipers at the 9th Infantry Division Sniper School. Nineteen men were trained at the United States Army Training Facility, 1st Signal Brigade. Personnel attending these courses received training on radar and radio operation and maintenance. Eleven men from Company O, 75th Infantry (Ranger), graduated from the 5th SFG Recondo School at Nha Trang.

e. Logistics, Transportation, and Engineer Operations.

(1) (C) During this period the Support Battalion continued to provide supply, maintenance, medical services and miscellaneous services for all assigned and attached elements of the Brigade. The Forward Support Element at Tan Son Nhut has continued to provide support maintenance of automotive, track, engineer and miscellaneous equipment. In addition the FSE has continued to provide the forward material services to the Brigade maneuver Battalions and other forward elements.

(2) (C) Organization for Support:

a. The 82d Support Battalion is organized under the following MTOE:

(1) Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, MTOE 29-2464 PAC 1/68

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- (2) Company A (Administration) MTOE 12-197 PAC 4/68
- (3) Company B (Medical) MTOE 8-197 PAC 1/68
- (4) Company C (Maintenance and Supply) MTOE 29-247 PAC 2/68
- (3) (C) Material Services:
 - (a) Class I: During this reporting period the following quantities of items were issued to supported customers:

<u>ITEMS</u>	<u>POUNDRAGE</u>
Perishables	683,727
Non-Perishables	243,441
C-Rations	534,465
Sundries	50,320
LRPS	2,186
TOTAL	1,514,139 lbs (757 Tons)

(b) Class II: Most items of this category (clothing, individual equipment, tentage, hand tools) are received, stored, and issued by BSO. The issue of clothing to replacements at the Brigade Supply Service Stock and to the Brigade units continued at significant levels during the three month period. A total of 4,285 eq. tropical fatigue coats and 6,165 eq. fatigue trousers was issued. These figures, however, are less by one-third than those issues reported in the last report. A lower level of replacement turnover is the reason for this decrease.

During this period the FSE continued to maintain a stock of fast moving expendable items for use by the Brigade units in the Tan Son Nhut area. Due to demand experience the stockage level of some items, including all mess hall expendable supplies and various batteries, were doubled. Data on the number of batteries distributed includes those distributed at the Phu Loi area.

<u>BATTERY</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>MESS WARE - PAPER AND PLASTIC</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
BA 30	38,752ea	PLATES (CTN)	1361
BA 42	4,774ea	CUPS (CTN)	728
BA 58	4,701ea	KNIFE (CTN)	571
BA 386	11,901ea	FORK (CTN)	593
BA 200	1,857ea	SPOON (CTN)	587

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(c) Class III: POL products are received from depot, stored at the FSE and issued to using units in bulk, package products, vehicle re-fuel station and through mobile re-fuel (2½ Ton Tankers) for delivery on site. Gasoline and diesel fuels are the major items of issue. Bulk quantities issued during this period are cited below.

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>MOGAS</u>	<u>DF #2</u>	<u>JF#4 (AVN)</u>
May	30,400	22,900	700
June	33,600	24,200	700
July (1-22)	<u>30,200</u>	<u>19,200</u>	<u>300</u>
TOTAL(Gal)	124,200	66,300	1700

(d) Class IV: During this period greater control over construction within the Brigade was attained by routing all proposed construction through the Brigade S-4 for final approval. No issues of construction material were made unless items were a part of a project that had S-4 approval. Most projects have been temporarily halted because construction lumber has become a USARV controlled item and Brigade stocks of this item are at a zero balance. A very limited supply of construction materials are stocked at the FSE in the form of a Push-Package (Project Jump) for a battalion stand contingency operation. Other supplies are requested by the customers through the FSE against BSO stocks. The BSO ships the supplies to the customer through the FSE. Most of these materials are used for the construction of fire bases.

The following issues were made on fast moving fortification items that are stocked at the FSE and the Phu Loi Base Camp.

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>U/I</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Barbed wire	RL	103
8' Engineer Stakes	EA	4,150
5' Engineer Stakes	EA	688
3' Engineer Stakes	EA	2,664
Concertina wire	CL	2,319
Sandbags	HD	4,467 (446,700 ea)

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(e) Class V: The Brigade ammunition office has processed the following number of issues and/or turn-in's:

Number of issues	269
Number of excess turn-in's	12
Number of salvage turn-in's	24
Number of unreserviceable turn-in	49

(f) Class VII: The Brigade has continued to receive substantial quantities of TOE major and items. The receipts of significance were:

1. 13ea Trucks, Utility $\frac{1}{2}$ Ton M151A1
2. 4ea Compressors, Reciprocating $3\frac{1}{2}$ CFM
3. 73ea Antenna Group RC-292
4. 43ea Night Vision Sights AN/PVS-3
5. 9ea Telephone Sets TA-1/PT
6. 235ea Loudspeakers LS-454/'
7. 36ea Flamethrowers, Portable
8. 50ea Detectors Sets, Mine
9. 7ea Generator Sets 5kw and over
10. 24ea Generator Sets 5kw and under

The Commander's Critical Items List has continued to be an effective tool in the receipt of mission essential critical items needed by units of the Brigade. During the reporting period a total of 35 items were reported. A total of 16 of the items have been received already and up to date status is known on all the items not yet received.

(g) Class VIII: Medical supplies received directly from the depot are issued directly to the FSE Hospital and Battalion Medical Platoons. Approximately 85% of the items requested by customers are stocked in sufficient quantities for immediate issue. Quantities of the faster moving items issued during this period are cited below.

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5. Miscellaneous Services:

(a) Map Supply: Thirty-five (35) Map line items are stored at the FSE. The Map Supply Section issued 1,830 maps to the Brigade during this period.

(b) Captured Enemy Equipment: Captured items of equipment were turned over to the FSE by the Brigade. No items have been turned into CMAC during this period. Explosive items are released to USAF EOD personnel immediately.

(c) Transportation: Requirements for this period were mainly hauling equipment from depot to BSO, FSE and battalion forward areas. The provisional Truck Platoon is administered by C Company, 82d Support Battalion and provided back-up support by the 48th Transportation Group. Total short tons moved during this period was 2,250.

(d) Maintenance: (C) Direct support maintenance is provided to the Brigade by Company C, 82d Support Battalion. Organizational maintenance is the responsibility of the using unit. Back-up support maintenance is provided by the 27th General Support Group. Job order status for this period is as follows:

<u>JCS</u>	<u>RECEIVED</u>	<u>COMPLETED</u>	<u>VACUATED</u>	<u>ON HAND</u>
Armament	381	320	93	168
Electronics	795	491	455	304
Automotive	300	235	0	65
Generators	37	35	0	2

This status represents work received and accomplished at both the main shop and at the FSE.

(a) Maintenance Problems:

1. The engine for the M113A1 caused considerable difficulty due to unknown faults apparently during engine rebuild or overhaul. The cylinder head gasket blows after 12 to 36 hours of operation.

2. Nine engines were replaced during this period of which 5 were defective; all had the same defect - blown head gaskets.

3. The AMC representative was contacted and came to check some of the defective engines. It was related that this problem existed Command wide. The Technical Representative referred the problem to the Saigon Army Depot for a possible solution.

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(6) Technical Supply: Pertinent data for this period is cited below:

a. Requests received	7,028
b. ASL issues	2,720
c. Total requests received	5,513
d. Total replenishment requests	2,407
e. Total transactions	23,557
f. ASL lines	4,345
g. Fringe lines	6,041
h. Demand satisfaction	49%
i. Demand accomodation	78%

Problem Area: Tech Supply had a critical need for more adequate storage area. Primarily a warehouse for small repair parts.

Solution: Tech Supply has obtained a warehouse building which is 50'x20' with 10' interior height. It was obtained through the self help program. This building is presently under construction.

(7) (C) Engineer: During the reported period, each Infantry Battalion was supported by a minimum of one OPCON Engineer Squad. This support was increased to a maximum of one OPCON Engineer Platoon as required. All other Brigade units were supported on a mission basis.

(a) Combat Engineer Support to the Infantry

1. Mine detector Teams
2. Demolition Teams

(b) Fire Base/Patrol Base Support

1. Tactical Bunker Construction
2. Messhall Construction
2. Road Construction and Repair
4. Helipad Construction
5. Delivery of Sandbag Fill
6. Overhead Cover for Surveillance Radar
7. Observation Towers
8. General Earthwork and Drainage.
2. Water Purification Units at FSB's Harrison, Patton, Claudette, Barbara and Chris

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(c) Red Ball Support

1. General's Mess Improvements
2. S-1 Office Improvements
3. Bunker for 58th Signal Company
4. TOC Improvements
5. General Improvement of Grounds and Perimeter Defenses

(d) Phu Loi Support

1. Sand and Gravel Transport
2. Construction of Brigade Stand-Down area (16-16x32 buildings on concrete slabs).
3. Improvements to Road Net

(e) Trains Area Support

1. Grasse Rack Construction for 2/505 Infantry
2. Ammo Berm Construction for 1/505 Infantry
3. Water Tower Construction for 2/505 Infantry
4. General Earthwork and Road, Hardstand, and Drainage Improvements

(f) Civic Action Projects.

1. Repair of Schoolhouse Roof (Vinh Loc)
2. Earthwork (Vinh Tinh)
3. Leveling of 25 Acres of Damaged Rice Paddy Vicinity Fire Support Base All American

(g) Special Projects

1. Construction of 6 - 105mm Howitzer Firing Platforms for 2/321 Arty. Bn. at FB Barbara.

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2. Construction of a Floating Dock for Watercraft at the Cau Bong Bridge.
 3. Construction of One 16 x 24 Southeast Asia Hut, One Greaserack, and Three Helipads for HQ, CMAC
- (h) Special Operations
1. A Protective Minefield of Unknown Origin was Cleared at FSB Barbara. Approximately 55 M-16 Bounding Mines were Destroyed
 2. In Support of 1/508 Infantry, 7 KM of Route 7A were cleared daily for 23 days. The following mines were found.

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>FIRING SYSTEM</u>
7	Chicom TNT	Pressure
1	105mm Dud	Pressure
1	105mm dud	Electric
1	Unknown Loose Explosive	Pressure
1	M-79 Round	Electric

(i) Land Clearing/Tunnel Clearing Operations in AO Snoopy, begun 19 Jan 69, were completed during the reporting period. Final results are:

1. Area Cleared: 2,138 Acres
2. Tunnels Destroyed: 53,727 Meters
3. Material Captured:
 - (a) B-40 Rounds - 108
 - (b) B-40 Fuses - 40
 - (c) 81mm Mortar Rounds - 10
 - (d) 60mm Mortar Rounds - 33
 - (e) Mortar Fuses - 22 cans
 - (f) 75mm Recoilless Rifle Rounds - 114
 - (g) 51 Caliber Rounds - 200
 - (h) SKS Rounds - 4,000
 - (i) AK-47 Rounds - 5,000
 - (j) M-60 Rounds - 1 Box
 - (k) M-16 Rounds - 2 Boxes, 2 Magazines
 - (l) 4.2 Mortar Rounds - 1
 - (m) 155mm Rounds - 1
 - (n) 105mm Rounds - 1

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- (o) Land Mines - 2
- (p) BBT - 1
- (q) .AK-50 Rifles - 2
- (r) M-1 Rifle - 1
- (s) Thompson Submachinegun - 1
- (t) M-16 Bipod - 1
- (u) TNT - 3 cases
- (v) Miscellaneous items of US clothing and equipment - 17

4. POW's - 2

f. (G) Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs: During the reporting period psychological operations were carried out using leaflet drops, loudspeaker missions (ground and aerial), leaflet distribution, face to face discussions, and the displaying of posters. Brigade psychological operations were primarily supported by the 6th Psyop Battalion. The original HE Team (audio and visual capabilities) was supplemented with an HB Team (audio capabilities) and an additional vehicle. Psychological operations within the Brigade are now conducted by one officer, 2 NCOs, one EM and an ARVN interpreter and all OPCON from the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion.

The themes most often used in operations are:

- a. Third Party Inducement (TPI)
- b. Voluntary Informant Program (VIP)
- c. Chieu Hoi Program
- d. Rewards Program
- e. Support the GVN
- f. Atrocities of the VC
- g. Allied forces are your friends
- h. News and Music (especially during Medcamps)

Psyops accomplishments during the reporting period are as follows:

a. Air leaflet missions	18	Leaflets dropped	526,000
b. Ground Leaflet missions	50	Leaflets dispersed	21,370
c. Air loudspeaker missions	41	Hours	52
d. Ground loudspeaker missions	101	Hours	265
e. Audio Visual	38	Hours	61
f. Newspapers distributed	6810		
g. Magazines distributed	3185		
h. Posters distributed	5590		
i. Cultural Drama Team	3		

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Besides the stated psychological operations; the HB Team was of great assistance in providing publicity for the Brigade Medcap/Dentcaps program, controlling the civilian population during cordon and search operations, providing safety information to the villages concerning nearby operations, and providing quick reaction Chieu Hoi appeals when elements of the command were in contact. The HB Team was utilized in a similar capacity in addition to showing movies in the hamlets.

In support of the Brigade psychological operations program, on request from the US Air Force, through Capital Military Assistance Command, missions were flown by C-47 aircraft and U-10. Known as "Gabby" and "Earlyword" respectively, those crafts are available to enhance the psyops effort. Additional materials were available from JUSPAO, and 4th Psyops Group.

During the reporting period all the organic equipment that is available to the Brigade was demonstrated at a commanders conference at Camp Red Ball. The 25 watt bullhorn, for use at company levels; the 250 watt backpack used by the psyops team on tactical operations such as combat assaults; the 1000 watt speaker and the Earlyword System utilizing the U-10 aircraft were all demonstrated.

During this reporting period an Armed Propaganda Team for Gia Dinh Province Chieu Hoi Center became OPCON to the Brigade. Utilized on Medcaps and Dentcaps to spread information throughout the hamlet concerning Third Party Inducement, Voluntary Informant, and Chieu Hoi Program, the A/T gathered considerable information concerning the VC and VCI in certain areas. In addition, they were utilized in the area around Camp Red Ball to check whatever grievances the people of An Nhon Village might have.

The reporting period saw increased cooperation between Psyops elements of S-5 and the Counterintelligence section of the 518th MID concerning the programs mentioned above. Continued cooperation should enhance the success of the TFI and VIP programs in the AO.

Seventeen solation payments totaling 46,868VND were made as condolence to persons injured or suffering loss due to accidents involving the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division.

g. (C) Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support: During the reporting period civil operations continued in the original area of operations of Tan Binh, Co Vap and Hoc Mon. Continued support of the hamlet officials, GVN and support in the form of aid to the villages (Medcaps, Dentcaps, sanitary facilities improvement, road improvement, commodity distribution, agricultural programs etc.) resulted in the upgrading of the entire original area of operations to the desired minimum level of security and pacification. As of the 30 June Hamlet Evaluation System Report, all the hamlets of Tan Binh, Co Vap and Hoc Mon had a Hamlet Evaluation System rating of "C" or better.

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Extensions to the original area of operations placed the 3/82 Pacifica-
tion program into 5 additional districts and 3 additional provinces to include:
Binh Chanh District, Gia Dinh Province; Phu Hoa District, Binh Duong Province;
Cu Chi and Duc Hoa Districts in Hau Hgia Province and Ben Luc District in Long
An Province. In these areas, with several cordon and search operations, Medcaps,
Dentcaps, Psyops coverage and intelligence elements were at a maximum. The area
of operations is approximately 32 km in length.

During the reporting period the Vinh Loc Village area pacification pl
was incorporated into the Model Pacification Study to include background, ma-
ternity efforts in the area, psyops coverage and civic action. The Model Pacifica-
tion Plan graphically describes the concept, planning and implementation re-
sponsible for bringing the "E" rated hamlets to a HES rating of "C" within a
short period of time. The Model Pacification Plan was briefed to the following:

Commanding General, II Field Force
Commanding General, Capital Military Assistance Command
Commanding General, Capital Military District (Vietnamese)
Deputy Commanding General, Capital Military District (Vietnamese)
Deputy Commander, United States Military Assistance Command Staff
G-5, United States Army, Vietnam
Commanding Officer, 4th SYCP Group
Joint United States Public Affairs Office

With help from the aid station at Camp Red Ball, a medical advisory team has
been working daily in An Nhon Village, surrounding Camp Red Ball. They have been
working with much success at two aid stations and one maternity clinic with notice-
able improvements noted.

An agricultural improvement program has been established by 2/321 Artillery
S-5. As part of an overall agricultural improvement program originating at
province level (Gia Dinh), the Artillery is attempting to upgrade the rural economy
by diversification of crops. Sixteen different seeds have been introduced to sev-
eral farmers in the Hoc Non District. Along with the seeds, the Battalion S-5
has distributed fertilizer, lime and a weekly program for destroying pests like
bugs. This is a pilot program, but with continued success the program will grow
in size.

A combined Bde/Bn S-5 effort was initiated during the reporting period. Each
Saturday morning a different group of school students from within the AO were
treated to a trip to the Saigon Zoo. With cooperation from the US Air Force, in
the form of a bus driver, about 45 youngsters a week were given their first op-
portunity to see the Saigon Zoo and for many the first opportunity to see Saigon.

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After lunch at the Zoo, the bus returns to their hamlet schoolhouse by way of the Presidential palace, the American Embassy and the Saigon docks. In addition to being a big hit with the young people, it neutralizes VC propaganda which claims Saigon is in ruins.

A total of 103 Medcaps treating 16,044 patients were held in the AO including entensiras during the reporting period. In conjunction with these, there were 28 Dentcaps treating 1,221 patients. These Dentcaps were held by either the US Air Force Dental Team from Tan Son Nhut Air Base or by a team from the 36th Medical Detachment.

In coordination with civic action projects the following material and commodities were distributed during the reporting period:

Cement	11945 lbs
Tin sheets	125
Lumber	3645 bd ft
Paint	36 gal
Briquets	38000
Sand	30 M ³
Culverts	29
Wire	26 rolls
Cement pillars	10
Gravel	21 M ³
Engineer stakes	105
Lime	4000 lbs
Fertiliser	2000 lbs
Seeds	200 lbs
Food	4000 lbs
Sand Bags	2800
Health items	600 lbs
Clothing	300 lbs

b. (C) Communications:

(1) During the reporting period 1 May - 31 July 1969, the 58th Signal Company and communications elements of subordinate battalions maintained the following Brigade operational and administrative communications systems:

(a) VHF Radio Relay Systems:

(1) 12-channel radio relay systems provide sole-user telephone "hotlines" for TOC operational traffic, dedicated teletypewriter circuits for command and control traffic, and common-user telephone trunks for administrative between CMAC, the Brigade Main Command Post at Camp Red Ball, the Brigade Rear Base Camp at Phu Loi Post.

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(2) 4-channel radio relay systems provide TOC to TOC hotlines, artillery coordination hotlines, and common-user telephone trunks between the Brigade Main CP and the fire support bases of the subordinate infantry battalions and artillery battalion. An additional system provides access for each of the infantry battalion rear areas and the Forward Support Element of the Support Battalion at Tan Son Nhut into the Brigade telephone system.

(b) FM Radio Nets: The Brigade operates a Brigade Command Net, a Brigade Secure Net, and a Brigade Surveillance Net primarily for tactical operational traffic and enters the CMAC Command and Secure Nets.

(c) Radioteletypewriter Net: The Brigade maintains an AN/SSB RTT net including all its subordinate battalions. Though normally passing only limited intelligence traffic, the net has proved invaluable for maintaining administrative and casualty reporting traffic with battalions operating temporarily under a different headquarters at extended ranges from Brigade.

(2) Additional communications support provided from outside the Brigade consists primarily of base camp communications.

(a) At Camp Red Ball the 69th Signal Battalion provides 16 dial lines into the MACV Dial Telephone Exchange and 3 trunks from the Brigade Chippewa Main switchboard to MACV, providing access to the area system. At Tan Son Nhut, the Air Force provides six dial lines from the Brigade Trains area to the Tan Son Nhut Dial Exchange.

(b) At Phu Loi Post, Company B/44, 36th Signal Battalion, provides post signal functions including a manual telephone exchange with access to the Corps area network and over-the-counter communications center service with access into the world-wide communications center network.

(c) CMAC provides a radioteletypewriter set AN/GRC-142 at Camp Red Ball for entry into the CMAC RTT net.

(d) The 69th Signal Battalion and the 40th Signal Battalion provided telephone pole installation support to the Brigade for specific projects like the Vinh Loc Signal civic action project.

(3) The Brigade MARS Station, established on 1 April 1969 and operated by the 58th Signal Company, completed the following numbers of MARS calls during the reporting period.

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>CALLS COMPLETED</u>	<u>RED CROSS PRIORITY CALLS</u>
May	338	7
June	472	14
July	444	11

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i. During the reporting period the Public Information Office accomplished the following activities:

(1) Hometown news released:	846
(2) Photographs with caption released:	48
(3) Features/news stories:	55
(4) Processed film:	118
(5) Photographs processed/distributed:	2044
(6) Radio Broadcasts:	0
(7) Number of National news media representatives escorted:	7

j. (C) Inspector General

(1) The Inspector General coordinated with the following units which have received their Command Readiness Inspection: C/307 Engr, 1/508 Inf, 2/321 Arty, 1/505 Inf, 0/15 Engr, HHC, 3d Bde, 518 MI Det, and 82d Spt Bn. The inspection team consisted of the principal staff of the S-1 through S-5 and Brigade Signal, Chemical, and Surgeon special staff sections. The Deputy Brigade Commander was the head of the inspection team.

(2) Fifteen investigations were conducted by this office. Eight requests for assistance were received and completed. The majority of the complaints received have been found to be unjustified.

(3) On 5 July 1969, the Acting Inspector General presented a 50 minute orientation to a new Replacement Training class on the agencies available in the Brigade to assist them with their problems and the policies of the Commanding General.

k. (C) Staff Judge Advocate: During the reporting period the following Staff Judge Advocate activities were accomplished:

1. Total Persons Punished: 327

(a) E-4 and below	<u>207</u>
(b) E-5 and above	<u>40</u>
(c) Commissioned	<u>80</u>

2. Personnel who were offered and refused to accept nonjudicial punishment under Article 15, UCMJ: 7

3. Actions favorable to persons, i.e. suspension of sentence: 6

4. Actions unfavorable to persons, i.e. vacation of suspension: 2

5. Total number of appeals: 6

6. Summary Courts: 2

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7. Special Courts: 23

8. Legal Assistance:

<u>TYPE OF ASSISTANCE</u>	<u>INTERVIEW</u>	<u>INSTRUMENTS</u>
Citizenship, Immigration, Passports	<u>6</u>	<u>2</u>
Power of Attorney	<u>2</u>	<u>37</u>
Domestic Relations and Paternity	<u>32</u>	<u>0</u>
Personal Property - Automobiles etc	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>
Real Property - Sale, Leases, etc	<u>5</u>	<u>3</u>
Personal Finances, Debts, Insurance, etc	<u>9</u>	<u>0</u>
Wills and Estates	<u>6</u>	<u>10</u>
TOTAL:	<u>63</u>	<u>54</u>

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2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commanders Observation, Evaluation, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel, None.

b. Operations.

(1) Kit Carson Scouts.

(a) OBSERVATION: In AO HERCULES the Kit Carson Scout proved to be an invaluable asset.

(b) EVALUATION: The ability of the Kit Carson Scouts to read the terrain for information concerning enemy mines/booby traps and tunnels and their ability to gain information from the local population assisted greatly in making Operation Dirty Devil a success.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: More Kit Carson Scouts should be attached to company size units. A desirable number of Kit Carson per company would be 10. This number would allow the company to have at least two per platoon and two retained with the company CP. For purposes of companionship, Kit Carson Scouts should whenever possible be employed in pairs.

(2) Fighting in built Up Areas.

(a) OBSERVATION: In the built up areas in AO HERCULES all of the houses were connected by tunnels and had extremely well built bunkers on the interior of the houses.

(b) EVALUATION: The enemy would fire upon friendly forces from one area in the village. Once his location was pinpointed he would rapidly move to another section of the village by way of these tunnels. At this time he would place fire upon the flanks and rear of the friendly forces.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When fighting in built up areas, maximum use should be made of medium and heavy artillery with delayed action fuses. If TAC Air is utilized, 750 lb high drag bombs should be used against the bunkers and tunnels. Troops searching the area must move extremely slow and must search several buildings concurrently. Flamethrowers should be retained at the FSE where units can use them to clear buildings and bunkers.

(3) S-3 TOC and S-2 TOC Communications:

(a) OBSERVATION: In AO HERCULES there was a continuous flow of traffic on the tactical nets and a sufficient amount on the intelligence nets to warrant a S-3 and S-2 TOC.

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(b) **EVALUATION:** Due to the steady flow of traffic on the operations nets, it became extremely difficult to transmit or receive intelligence information that might affect immediate or pending operations. During this period the 1-508 used an intelligence net and was able to reduce the amount of non-operational traffic over the Battalion Command Net and to transmit traffic concerning intelligence to higher headquarters with no delay.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That the Bn S-2 set up and maintain an intelligence net (S-2 TOC) to higher headquarters so that all intelligence traffic will be transmitted over this net and not tie up the command net.

(4) Use of Ranger Teams

(a) **OBSERVATION:** The 1-508 gained valuable information concerning enemy movement from the ranger teams.

(b) **EVALUATION:** In AO HERCULFS it was discovered that the best technique for clandestine insertions of Ranger Teams into surveillance sites was via attachment to TOE units. By doing this the 1-508 obtained valuable information and the Ranger Teams killed 4 VC/NVA (BC).

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** Ranger Teams should be attached to a company sized element by resupply helicopter. The element will then RTV into the desired area of operation for the Ranger Teams and will drop them off at a suitable position, then the company or platoon will continue with its normal mission.

(5) Overland Troop Movement in AO SWORDFISH.

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Due to the inundated nature of the terrain in AO SWORDFISH overland movement was difficult.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Two thousand meters per day was the maximum distance rifle companies could be expected to move. Beyond that troops became exhausted, both physically and mentally. The physical condition of personnel had to be given more than the usual amount of consideration.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** When possible, unit commanders should plan daily operations that do not cover more than 2 kilometers. For more distant and extended operations, helicopters, river patrol boats (PBR) and ski barges are a necessity. When preparing for operations in areas such as AO SWORDFISH personnel must be briefed thoroughly on the type of terrain to expect and also be told to carry as light a load as possible. Mission essential items (i.e., demolition equipment) should be kept on hand at the FSE helipad.

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(6) Navy River Patrol Boats (PER)

(a) OBSERVATION: In areas adjacent to the Vam Co Long and Ben Luc Rivers, Navy river patrol boats (PER) provided an excellent means of transportation.

(b) EVALUATION: Navy River Patrol Boats (PER) provided an excellent highly responsive means for moving and re-locating troop elements and for the clandestine insertions and extractions of sampan ambush teams. The river patrol boats and Infantry troops complimented each other, the boats transported the troop elements and the troops conducted denial operations, preventing hostile forces the chance to ambush the patrol boats.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Any unit operating vicinity of the Vam Co Long and/or the Ben Luc Rivers should effect staff coordination with River Div Hqs located at Ben Luc. Brigade level SCIs should be exchanged with the River Div Hqs at Ben Luc to insure continued and close communications and coordination.

(7) Airmobile Combat Assaults and Checkpoints and Lopper Missions.

(a) OBSERVATION: In order to conduct pepper operations against hard intelligence or swiftly relocate troop elements, helicopters are a necessity in inundated areas.

(b) EVALUATION: Due to the inundated nature of the terrain and since the objective of the battalion was to conduct denial operations, helicopters became of necessity the primary means of transport. When air assets were available they proved to be invaluable. Besides having troops airlifted to new objectives swiftly, having experienced and efficient gunships were a definite asset to cover operations and to spot and mark enemy personnel and positions.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When units are working in inundated areas the maximum amount of airmobile assets should be made available in order to conduct effective combat operations. So that all airmobile operations may be conducted efficiently and with minimum loss of life, unit commanders should brief all element leaders on the procedures and methods for setting up pickup and landing zones (ie :Z configuration, marking chalks, speed of loading and unloading helicopters).

(8) Sampan Operation.

(a) OBSERVATION: Sampans were used for quiet and efficient insertions of daylight patrols and night ambushes.

(b) EVALUATION: Since there were numerous canals suited for movement by sampans, some units found them to be useful to cover a great deal of ground effectively with the minimum amount of time. A type of waterborne Eagle Flight was possible. Three to four men were able to move in one sampan, five to six sampans were used together to provide needed security and an adequate size force.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: Battalion size elements should have at their disposal when operating in areas such as AO SWORDFISH at least ten sampans. They will be used by companies when leaders deem the tactical situation permits. Personnel using these sampans should have adequate communications, be strong swimmers and be familiar with life saving techniques.

(9) Night Firing of M-16 Rifle.

(a) OBSERVATION: In a combat situation, through questioning of troops, few personnel have ever fired their weapons at night.

(b) EVALUATION: It has been proved that individuals have a tendency to fire high during the hours of darkness while on ambush.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all personnel, regardless of time in country, be allowed to fire their weapons at night, while the company is on a stand-down at the firebase. It will be done on the battalion firing range and would be the ideal time to conduct night firing training.

(10) Joint US/ARVN Cordon and Search Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: There is a tendency for ARVN units to select too large of an area for cordon and search operations.

(b) EVALUATION: Areas selected by ARVN units were too large to be adequately searched for the number of troops employed. It has been found to be better to over-cordon and have excess search troops, than not to have enough.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Extensive planning and coordination should be conducted prior to a joint US/ARVN cordon and search operation. In many instances the cordon area will have to be reduced to permit a successful operation.

(11) PHYSICAL FITNESS

(a) OBSERVATION: Personnel assigned duty at a semi-permanent firebase should maintain a high degree of physical combat proficiency.

(b) EVALUATION: The various staff personnel assigned duty at a semi-permanent firebase; ie. T.O.C., Communications, Medical, Cooks, and Supply personnel; because of the nature of their particular jobs, have a need for an effective physical training program in order to maintain a high degree of physical combat proficiency.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: A physical training program incorporating Army Drill 1 should be organized for the above mentioned personnel. The number of repetitions of each exercise can be increased as desired up to 12. Army Drill 1 should be followed by a run up to a distance of one mile or 10 minutes. It is recommended that the program be organized and supervised by Officers and NCO's. Period for physical training should be planned so that all those personnel working in shifts can be given an opportunity to participate.

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(12) AERO-Rifle Platoon

(a) OBSERVATION: The Aero-Rifle Platoon may be employed in an economy of force role.

(b) EVALUATION: The composition and rapid response time of the Aero-Rifle Platoon makes it well suited for an economy of force mission. The Aero-Rifle Platoon, consisting of 1 C&C, 1 Hunter-Killer Team and 2 lift ships with personnel, could be deployed against the enemy either in a blocking position or in a limited objective attack. After the initial insertion elements organic to the battalion could be inserted, utilizing the two troop helicopters.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: In addition to Eagle Flights the Aero-Rifle Platoon should be available for use in the economy force mission against small localized enemy forces.

(13) Use of Riot Control Agent CS (Tear Gas)

(a) OBSERVATION: Riot control munitions should be used more extensively, where possible, to exploit tactically the ability to temporarily disable unprotected enemy troops or "flush" them from concealed or fortified positions.

(b) EVALUATION: All Brigade tactical units are currently equipped with the XM28 lightweight riot control agent mask. When non-persistent riot control munitions are used, such as the E158 (aerial) or E8 (ground), the CS concentration usually dissipates within 10 minutes after employment. Riot control agent CS may temporarily disable unprotected hostile troops, suppress their fires, "flush" them out of concealed positions, and reduce their ability to maneuver. Riot control munitions are especially useful when the exact location of enemy troops is unknown, in dense vegetation, or in conjunction with sensor readings, as one munition (E158) will initially cover an area of approximately 6500 square meters. However, these munitions should not be employed in close proximity to densely populated areas, as the civilians may experience extreme discomfort. As a guideline, on a warm day (lapse condition) riot control munitions should not be employed within 2 kilometers of friendly villages (downwind of target area); on cool, overcast days (neutral conditions) the minimum distance should be at least twice this.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: Riot control munitions should be used more extensively weather or terrain permitting, to reduce enemy observation, fire and movement or "flush" from concealed positions, especially in support of sensor readings or when enemy location is uncertain.

(14) Use of antiplant agents in firebase/perimeter defoliation.

(a) OBSERVATION: Defoliants or the chemicals used to defoliate vegetation in RVN, are in extremely short supply and insufficient quantities are on hand for defoliation of all areas within firebases and base camps.

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(b) EVALUATION: Defoliants should be used on the vegetation in areas inaccessible for removal by methods such as cutting or burning. These may be areas within barbed wire aprons or contain uncharted minefields, etc. In areas readily accessible, where cutting or burning may not be used for removal of vegetation, a mixture of JP-4 and diesel fuel (one to one ratio) is almost as effective as the defoliants. Hand pumps, such as a 2½ gallon hand pump fire extinguisher should be used. Do NOT use any type of power-driven machinery to disperse the JP-4/diesel mixture, as it is extremely flammable and any sparks may cause the mixture to ignite violently.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Defoliants should be used for vegetation removal primarily where access to the area is restricted by barbed wire entanglements, minefields, etc. In areas which are accessible, vegetation may be removed by cutting, burning or application of a JP-4/diesel mixture using a hand pump sprayer.

c. Training. None.

d. Intelligence. None.

e. Logistics. None.

f. Organization. None.

g. Other.

(1) AN/MRC-163 Usage.

(a) OBSERVATION: The first AN/MRC-163 system was established during this period and an evaluation of system performance follows. As new AN/MRC-163 equipment is issued the Brigade, it will be used to replace existing AN/MRC-112 systems.

(b) EVALUATION:

1. A 5-km AN/MRC-163 system was activated to replace an existing AN/MRC-112 system between the Brigade CP and Brigade Trains.

2. The new system operated with much greater reliability than the AN/MRC-112 system. The quality of the AN/MRC-10 Radio and AN/TCC-3 (AN/MRC-112) is somewhat better (lower noise, better frequency response) than the RT-524, R-442 and AN/TCC-70 (AN/MRC-163) when properly aligned. However, this is more than compensated by higher component reliability in the AN/MRC-163 and the fact that the AN/MRC-163 is almost completely "operator proof".

(3) It was noted that the Narrow-Band Filter, FL-4001 (Narrow Band) can be used in place of the wide-Band Filter in the R-422 without degrading the voice capability. The teletype mode was not tested under this condition.

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4. The repair of the AN/TCC-70 is extremely difficult when a failure does occur. One AN/TCC-70 has been deadlined approximately 60 days and another over 90 days due to the difficulty of obtaining parts. This equipment was evidently introduced without sufficient depot support available.

5. The weight of the antenna head is too great for the mast normally used with the AN/GRC-163. Erection is extremely difficult.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Parts supply problems for the AN/TCC-70 should be resolved as soon as possible.

2. Heavier mast sections or a lighter antenna head is required for the antenna.

(2) Nestor Key Change.

(a) OBSERVATIONS: In July, II Field Force established a common Nestor Key List for all units operating within the III Corps Tactical Zone. In order to maintain compatibility, key changes must occur simultaneously in all units. The time chosen was midnight, local time.

(b) EVALUATION: From a tactical point of view, midnight is the least desirable time for a key change, in that the maximum number of enemy contacts occur from 2200-0200. In addition, where several units share the same keygun, moving between areas at night to change key settings is both inconvenient and dangerous.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that the daily Nestor Key change occur at 0600H.

(3) LOE Radio Problems.

(a) OBSERVATION: During heavy rains, the LOE FM radios (AN/ARC-54) have proven extremely vulnerable to water damage.

(b) EVALUATION:

1. The LOE does not have the weather protection enjoyed by the Huey and is quite susceptible to leaks during heavy weather.

2. Rain will follow antenna, control and handset cables into the radio compartment, shorting connectors and making the radio inoperative.

3. Local efforts to protect cables have met with only limited success.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that [REDACTED] improve the water proofing of the AN/ARC-54 radio.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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(4) Radios in Ambush Sites.

(a) OBSERVATIONS: In assaulting US ambush sites, VC-NVA units often direct initial fire against the unit radio/radio operator.

(b) EVALUATION: In two US ambushes that made heavy contact during the reporting period, the enemy located the position of the unit's radio prior to initiating their assault. The initial fire then took out the radio, radio operator and ambush leader. The radio's position may well have been located from the 10' whip antenna.

(c) RECOMMENDATION:

1. The 3-foot whip antenna should be used wherever terrain and distance permit.

2. Sufficient AN/GRA-39 remotes should be provided to separate the platoon leader from his radio at each ambush site.

(5) Signal Civic Action

(a) OBSERVATION: A number of civic action projects in the communications area could be conducted at a minimal cost to the government if a source for minor items of Signal equipment were available.

(b) EVALUATION:

1. An inter-hamlet telephone system was established by this Brigade for the village of Vi-h Loc. Expendable items such as telephone poles and wire were obtained with no difficulty, but telephones and a manual switchboard were unobtainable through either normal logistics channels or through Civic Action Agencies.

2. The return in security and economic development for the limited system already installed has been enormous. However, no expansion of this system is possible without additional equipment.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: Non-expendable items of military equipment should be available through normal supply channels for use to Civic Action projects. Approval of these projects at Division or Separate Brigade level should be sufficient authority to requisition.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



AVFBC-RE-H (18 August 1969) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne
Division for the Period 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969 (U)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 12 SEP 1969

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHEC(DST), APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558


TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for the period ending 31 July 1969, with the following comment: Reference paragraph 2g(2). The current crypto period for the four separate Corps - Zones' Joint SEA Ground Tactical NESTOR Keylists was established in order to be compatible with that of other common keylists being utilized. Recently, this headquarters queried II FFORCEV OPCON units as to the optimum time for changing the key setting and received various recommendations. This matter will be discussed with representatives of OPCON units at a NESTOR conference to be conducted at this headquarters on 29 September 1969 with a view toward arriving at an optimum time for the changeover. Subsequently, the matter will be discussed at a MACV NESTOR conference to be conducted in the near future.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


B. G. MACDONALD
ILT, AGC
Asst AG

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

[REDACTED]

AVHCC-PGT (18 Aug 69) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne
Division for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSPOR (R1)(U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 7 OCT 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (U) Reference item concerning "Kit Carson Scouts", section II, page 51, paragraph 2b(1); concur. Each major unit establishes a basis for the employment of Kit Carson Scouts (KCS). This headquarters then allocates the KCSs, within USARV space ceiling limitations, based upon the reported employment by the major unit.

b. (C) Reference item concerning "Use of antiplant agents in firebase/perimeter defoliation", section II, page 55, paragraph 2b(14); nonconcur. Diesel oil is an acceptable defoliant. Its use as a defoliant is outlined in TM 5-630, Repairs and Utilities: Grounds Maintenance and Land Management, dated 1 May 1958. The JP4 defoliation mixture as recommended has a low flash point and is unacceptable for use from the safety standpoint.

c. (C) Reference item concerning "LOH Radio Problems", section II, page 57, paragraph 2g(3); concur. The unit is advised to submit an EIR to insure that corrective action is properly initiated.

d. (U) Reference item concerning "Signal Civic Action", section II, page 58, paragraph 2g(5); concur. Military equipment may assist in developing an area, however no mechanical system should be installed if it cannot be maintained technically and economically by the people subsequent to the US unit's departure from the area. Prior to the installation of a system of this nature, the Province Senior Advisor should be consulted and his approval obtained.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


C. D. WILSON
1LT, ACC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
3d Bde, 82d Abn Div
II FFV

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[REDACTED]

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division
for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 17 OCT 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


D. A. TUCKER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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