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<td>TO:</td>
<td>Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
<td>Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies only; Administrative/Operational Use; 18 AUG 1969. Other requests shall be referred to Office of the Adjutant General (Army), Washington, DC 20310.</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>AUTHORITY</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980</td>
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Best Available Copy
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

AGDA (M) (3 Nov 69)  FT-UT-691231

2 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report, Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division (U), ending 31 July 1969 (U)

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2. Information contained in thiis report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEC 16 1969

003 650
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 3D BRIGADE, 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96228

AV3K-AC

18 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for the Period 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969. (U)

SFE DISTRIBUTION

The enclosed Operational Report-Lessons Learned is forwarded in compliance with II FFORCEV Reg 525-21 and USARV Reg 525-15.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

MAJOR, INFANTRY
Adjutant

Incl

as

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6 - CG, CMAC, SAIGON, RVN (ATTN: G-3)
2 - EA STAFF SECTION THIS HQ
2 - CO, 1-505 ABN INF
2 - CO, 2-505 ABN INF
2 - CO, 1-508 ABN INF
2 - CO, 3-321 ARTY
2 - CO, 82D SPT BN
2 - CO, B/1-17 CAV
2 - CO, C/307 ENGR
10 - S-3, 3D BDE, 82D ABN DIV

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.

FOR OT UT
693231

Inclosure

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   b. Personnel, Health, Morale, Safety, and Discipline
   c. Intelligence and Counterintelligence
   d. Operations, Plans, and Training
   e. Logistics, Transportation, and Engineer Operations
   f. Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs
   g. Civil Operations
   h. Communications
   i. Information
   j. Inspector General
   k. Staff Judge Advocate

2. Section 2: Lessons Learned: Commanders' Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations

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AVBK-AC


1. (e) Section 1, Operational Significant Activities

a. (7) Command.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>Present</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Dickerson, George W</td>
<td>BG</td>
<td>17 Dec 68</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy CO</td>
<td>Smith, Albert C Jr</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>14 Feb 69</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XO</td>
<td>Kennan, Albert C Jr</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>25 Apr 69</td>
<td>14 Jun 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XO</td>
<td>Foss, Peter J</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>15 Jun 69</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-1</td>
<td>Rawlings, Earl D.</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>5 Jun 69</td>
<td>26 Jun 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-1</td>
<td>Owens, Sammy L</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>27 Jun 69</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-2</td>
<td>Davis, Roy J</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>6 Jul 68</td>
<td>24 Jun 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-2</td>
<td>Gorder, Charles W</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>25 Jun 69</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-3</td>
<td>Foss, Peter J</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>24 Apr 69</td>
<td>16 Jun 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-3</td>
<td>Lawrence, Paul S</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>16 Jun 69</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-4</td>
<td>Brannl, Joseph W</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>7 Feb 69</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-5</td>
<td>Maxe, Joseph</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>30 Oct 68</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO, 1-505 Inf</td>
<td>Thomas, Grace G Jr</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>19 Nov 68</td>
<td>14 Jun 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO, 1-505 Inf</td>
<td>Zamparelli, Alfred A</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>14 Jun 69</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO, 2-505 Inf</td>
<td>Irons, James V</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>19 Oct 68</td>
<td>16 Jun 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO, 2-505 Inf</td>
<td>Keenan, Albert C Jr</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>16 Jun 69</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO, 1-508 Inf</td>
<td>Lunsford, Paul R</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>24 Apr 69</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO, 2/311 Arty</td>
<td>Martin, John R</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>22 Aug 69</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO, 82d Spt Bn</td>
<td>Zamparelli, Alfred A</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>14 Dec 68</td>
<td>14 Jun 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO, 82d Spt Bn</td>
<td>Williams, Bruce H</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>14 Jun 69</td>
<td>25 Jul 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO, 82d Spt Bn</td>
<td>Wallis, Charles R</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>25 Jul 69</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO, C/307 Engr</td>
<td>Allan, Jon A</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>6 Mar 69</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO, 318 MID</td>
<td>Kilday, John D</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>28 Sep 68</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO, Trp B/1-17 CAV</td>
<td>Dehneke, Rae W</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>28 Nov 68</td>
<td>28 May 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO, Trp B/1-17 CAV</td>
<td>May, Stephen A</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>29 May 69</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO, 58th Sig Co</td>
<td>Shimortori, Gene N</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>20 Jan 69</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO, Co O, 75th Inf (Ranger)</td>
<td>Donald, Peter A</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>1 Mar 69</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. (C) Personnel, Health, Morale, Safety, and Discipline

(1) Detailed information relating to S-1 activities are as follows:

(a) (C) Strength as of 31 July 1969:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>AGS</th>
<th>PRESENT FOR DUTY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/505 Inf</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>851</td>
<td>804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/505 Inf</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>887</td>
<td>844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/508 Inf</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>879</td>
<td>836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/321 Arty</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32d Spt Bn</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHB 3d Bde</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/1-17 Cav</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co C 307th Eng</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58th Sig</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>518th MID</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52d Chem</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45th PIO</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37th Scout Dog</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co O 75th Rng</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>4557</strong></td>
<td><strong>1770</strong></td>
<td><strong>1524</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The large overage in Support Command and part of the Headquarters Company was experienced because of the large number of assignments of soft skill MOS personnel during the month of July.

** Overage of HHC 3d, Bde, 58th Sig and MI are of operational necessity because the Brigade is presently operating two Headquarters; the Headquarters forward at Camp Red Ball and another Headquarters at Hu Loi responsible for post operations.

(b) (U) R&R utilization for the three month period is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>INITIAL ALLOCATIONS RECEIVED</th>
<th>STANDBY AND REALLOCATIONS</th>
<th>CANCELLATIONS AND TURNBACKS</th>
<th>NUMBER NO-SHOW</th>
<th>ALLOCATIONS USED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HAWAII</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>249</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIDIERT</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BANGKOK</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SINGAPORE</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HONG KONG</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOKYO</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAIPEI</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUALA LUMPUR</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANILA</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) (U) Postal Activities for May, June and July:

- Total amount of mail received: 6,430
- Total amount of mail dispatched: 2,164
- Total money orders purchased: $529,852.60
- Total money orders cashed: 40,136.36

(d) (C) Total awards processed and approved in May, Jun and July:

- Purple Heart: 224
- Army Commendation: 1,014
- Air Medal: 304
- Bronze Star: 740
- Silver Star: 4
- Soldier's Medal: 9
- Legion of Merit: 3
- Total: 2,298

(e) (C) Casualties suffered by the Brigade during May, June and July:

- KHA: 32
- WHA: 178
- Non Battle Deaths: 3
- Non Battle Injuries: 41
- Total: 254

(f) (U) Red Cross services during the past quarter: Records indicate the following types of requests for the period 1 May 1969 thru 31 July 1969:

- Emergency leaves or extensions: 108
- Discharges or government benefits: 16
- Reporting to assist CO: 0
- Reporting for service members: 82
- Reporting for families: 152
- Personal problems: 59

(g) (U) Chaplain's activities for May, June and July:

- Services: 508
- Attendance: 13,571
- Hospital visits: 157
- Counselling: 1,031
1. Statistical data:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>PATIENTS EXAMINED</th>
<th>PATIENTS IN HOLDING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>2024</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>1369</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>1039</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>4432</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
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</table>

2. Significant Diseases Treated (Cases Treated)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>FUO</th>
<th>MALARIA</th>
<th>INTESTINAL</th>
<th>VD</th>
<th>DYSENTERY</th>
<th>IRHA</th>
<th>FOOT PROBLEMS</th>
<th>URI</th>
<th>SKIN DX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>120</td>
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<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Dental Patients Treated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>CASES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,184</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Brigade health status: The general health status of the Brigade appears to remain at satisfactory levels. There have been increases in some diseases. Due to change in weather and the adverse environmental conditions in one of the new Area of Operations (Pineapple) during this quarter, there has been an increase in skin problems, foot diseases, URI and dysentery.

Unit Commanders can best help prevent any great loss of man hours by encouraging increased stimulation of individual efforts toward personal care and hygiene to include dry clothes, extra socks and clean dry boots.
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of the 3d Bde, 82d ABN Div
for the period 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969. (V)

6. INTELLIGENCE

(1) (C) Operation Tam Thang Phase III continued through July with the
3d Bde, 82d ABN Div remaining in the Saigon area of the III Corps Tactical
Zone. During the period several contacts with up to platoon size elements
resulted in 267 VC KIA, 10 VC WIA, 3d NVA KIA, and 2 NVA WIA.

(2) (C) During the period 1 May through 31 July enemy activity was
characterized by low level incidents. 122mm rockets were fired into the Brigade
AO from locations outside the AO on five occasions during the reporting
period. Tan Son Nhat was the target on three occasions. It was hit on only
case occasion and no casualties or damage resulted. Rockets were fired from
confirmed locations locations within the Brigade AO on two occasions. In both
other cases the target was Tan Son Nhat AB with the rockets falling short both times.
Rocket attacks on Tan Son Nhat have been shown ineffective by an aggressive
program of night ambushes, day searches, and H and I fires on logistical rocket
firing sites within the AO. Other targets fired on from outside the Brigade
AO were the Quang Tri Training Center and Hoc Mon (D) Gia Din (P) Headquarters.
Assassinations, terrorism, and propaganda activity remained very low during the
period. Booby trap incidents increased sharply with the assumption on 15 June
of an AO in the Pineapple region southwest of Saigon. During the period from
15 June to 31 July, elements of the Brigade encountered 159 booby traps with
16 or 1% of these causing casualties. During the previous 15 day period in the
same area, another U.S. unit had suffered casualties from 1% of the booby traps
encountered.

Reconnaissance activity rose and fell sporadically as the enemy attempted to
prepare for his, so far abortive, summer offensive. Reconnaissance activities
reached minor peaks near the end of May and end of June but ended abruptly
in the early part of the succeeding month.

(3) (C) During the period, contacts with groups of more than two or three
individuals was rarely achieved. Continuous pressure on the enemy was maintained
through the use of reconnaissance, detailed search, "Pepper" missions, and joint
operation-and-search operations employing the Combined Holding and Interrogation
Center (CHIC). At night extensive ambushes, "Bushmaster" operations, and the
integrated radar and sensor network continued to limit enemy movement within or
near the area of operations. Intelligence available indicates that although
the VC/NVA long range goal is the control of Saigon, he has shifted emphasis to
the countryside especially in the Tay Ninh area. Saigon does not appear to be a
major objective except for the propaganda value when rockets are fired into the
city. Enemy units within the area of interest of the Brigade include the
following:

268th Regiment
Chuc Thang Regiment
Gia Din (P) Sapper BN
H-5 Water Sapper BN

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During the reporting period five significant caches were discovered by US troops. One consisting of 106 Rho-2 rounds, 111 75mm RR rounds and 90 pounds of TNT was discovered during land clearing operations. Another cache of caliber .51 ammunition was found a short distance away by the security force for the land clearing operations. Two different caches of grenades and explosives were discovered by US forces in the "Pineapple" plantation during the detailed searches conducted there. A volunteer informer led US troops to 19 rounds of 82mm mortar and small arms ammo. A Hoi Chanh led RVNAF forces to a medium size cache of small arms and 75mm RR ammunition. Generally, enemy cache activities remained at a fairly low level during the period. Most caches had been in place four to six months at the time of discovery. The most recent cache discoveries, however, have been recently emplaced, indicating renewed attempts to establish forward caches which had been seriously depleted by US and allied forces.

\( \text{(b) (C) SIFAR, Red Base, Firefly, and Sniffer missions have again been employed extensively with results similar to the last two reporting periods. Ground radar employed in conjunction with Dufflebag sensor devices have been quite successful in detecting enemy movement in and from the AO. Movement at night within the AO has continued to decline. It appears that most movement into or out of the AO by groups larger than 3-5 personnel has virtually been eliminated. One problem which still remains is stopping daylight infiltration along major LOC's leading into the Saigon area. This is a job which can best be done by Vietnamese civil and military authorities at their control points.} \)

\( \text{(c) Ranger Teams from Co "O" (Ranger), 75th Infantry, have operated continuously with the battalions both within and outside the Brigade AO. During the period they accounted for six enemy KIA, provided valuable unit identifications, and confirmed that the enemy normally operates in groups of one to three personnel when in or near the Brigade AO.} \)
In summary, the enemy has abandoned Saigon as an attainable military target. Major elements of main and local force elements have continued to skirt the Brigade AO, and local guerrilla units and VCI have continued to lose both influence and personnel to the GVN and US Forces in the area.

Recapitulation of enemy losses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Within AO</th>
<th>Outside AO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VC KIA (RC)</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC Pk</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVA KIA (RC)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVA Pk</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-crewed</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms Rounds</td>
<td>15,065</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-crewed Rounds</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
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<td>75mm Rounds</td>
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do.  OPERATION, PLANS, AND TRAINING

(1)  (C) During the reporting period no operations orders were published. OPORT 6-68 (Toan Thang Phase III) currently in effect was amplified by publication of FRAGO 26 through 42.

(2)  (C) During the reporting period six (6) operations plans were published which provided for the reinforcement and defense of critical installations in the Saigon area.

(a)  OPLAN 20-69 (SHORTSTOP) to defend AO Park in 5th Ranger area.

(b)  OPLAN 21-69 (MARCONI) to defend or reinforce Phu Lau Signal Site.

(c)  OPLAN 22-69 (CANNON BALL) to defend or reinforce FSB Copperhead.

(d)  OPLAN 23-69 (JAY HAWK) to defend or reinforce Saigon Port and US installations within the Port Area.

(e)  OPLAN 24-69 (PENCILS) to reinforce or defend Camp Davies.

(f)  OPLAN 25-69 (GUSHER) to reinforce or defend the Nha Be POL Farm.

(3)  (C) During the reporting period the Brigade continued pacification, security, and counter rocket/mortar operations in its assigned AO north and west of Saigon. Great emphasis was again put on night operations. The 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry operated in the Ho Bo Woods area for 26 days under the operational control of the US 25th Infantry Division. In June, a shift in the location of the 199th Light Infantry Brigade greatly expanded the 3/82's AO to include the area southwest of Saigon known as the Pineapple. Battalion AO's were expanded to cover the additional terrain. Each battalion was rotated into the Pineapple to operate there for a period of twenty to thirty days. This rotation was made necessary by the nature of the terrain in the area.

Operations in the Brigade AO were, for the most part, company size or smaller. They were characterized by daylight searches and reconnaissance and night ambushes along trails and waterways. Maximum use was made of watercraft to patrol streams and canals and to insert ambushes. Airmobile "Popper" missions were employed whenever the required air assets were available. Each battalion participated in a number of combined operations with both ARVN Army units and RF and PF units. The number and frequency of combined operations increased during the latter part of the reporting period.

Details of operations conducted by elements of the Brigade are as follows:

(a) 1st Battalion, 505th Infantry

1. Operation TOAN THANG Phase III.

a. 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969.

b. The mission of the Battalion was to initiate combat operations west of Saigon in order to locate, capture, or destroy enemy personnel or equipment with particular emphasis on areas that might be used to launch rocket/mortar attacks on Saigon from within the CMAC AO. The mission also included preventing enemy infiltration, interdicting enemy movement, and identifying and eliminating VC infrastructure.

2. Location: 1 May 69 to 23 May 69—Gia Dinh Province (Sheet 6330 IV)

23 May 69 to 7 July 69—Gia Dinh Province (Sheet 6330 IV)

Hau Nghia Province (Sheet 6330 IV)

7 July 69 to 31 July 69—Long An Province (Sheets 6230 II, 6330 III)

Hau Nghia Province (Sheets 6230 I, 6330 IV)


4. Forces Involved:


(2) Other Forces: RF/PP Forces in each district. 53d RF BN in Gia Dinh Province (1-23 May 1969)

5. Concept of Operation:

(1) During the period 1 May 1969 to 7 July 1969 the battalion operated out of FB All American (X7745003). Standard procedure was to have one rifle company securing FB All American while three rifle companies operated in the battalion AO. Company E secured the Cau Bond Bridge (X7682020) and conducted waterborne operations along the Hoc Mon Canal using engineer assault boats, airboats and Keener ski barges. Daily operations were platoon size searches, eagle flights, and searches conducted with RF/PP forces. Extensive ambushes and roving patrols were employed to stop night enemy movement and prevent the rocketing of targets from within the AO.
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for the period 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969. (U)

(2) During the period 7 July 1969 to 31 July 1969 the battalion operated out of FB Chris (XS634750). E Company secured the battalion CP so that all four companies could operate in the field. A rotation system was established so that the companies spent nine (9) days in the field in the Pineapple Area and then they rotated for three (3) days to FB Barb and FB Kathy where they conducted waterway and canal denial operations. The companies were spread along the Van Co Dong River in the western half of the AO from FB Barb (XS575856) to Ben Luc (XS625765). Daily operations included company size combat assaults, platoon size searches, platoon size "Popper" missions and platoon size RIFs. Extensive use of airmobile operations (Popper Missions) was employed in the eastern half of the AO where it was too wet to maintain troops for any length of time. Each company employed an average of 7-8 ambushes per night to prevent enemy movement through the AO. In addition to securing the battalion CP, E Company conducted daily combined operations with the US Navy. Both joint ground and airmobile operations were conducted with the RF/PF Forces.

2. Tactics and Techniques: The following Tactics and Techniques were employed during the period 1 May 1969 - 31 July 1969.

a. Platoon Size Searches: Operations larger than platoon size in this AO had proved to be fruitless because of the advance warning given by large numbers of troops. Platoon or smaller size elements were given areas to conduct a detail search. The searchers used probing rods, mine detectors and physically searched canal banks and streamlines.

b. Popper Missions: Popper missions are eagle flights conducted against hard intelligence. Sniffer missions, agent reports, sightings by aerial observers and radar targets were used to select likely targets for the popper missions. The techniques employed with popper missions was to use two Platoons per company. Generally only the light half of the airmobile company (3 slicks) was available and consequently 18 men participated per platoon. The company commander was picked up in the Command and Control Ship before the slicks picked up the troops. An LZ was identified and only gunship LZ preparations were utilized. Once the first element was inserted, the company commander directed the troops on the ground while the slicks were enroute to pick up the second platoon. Once the second platoon was airborne, a second LZ was identified, often several kilometers from the first LZ, and the troops inserted into it. The slicks were sent to refuel and shut down at a nearby airfield, usually Duc Hoa (XS5996) or Tan An (XS5565). Troops were generally given 30-45 minutes on the ground before they were extracted and inserted into a new LZ. Short intensive search of a likely target, then extraction to another selected target if no contact was made.
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g. False Insertions and Then Extractions: In order to deceive the enemy as to the exact troop disposition false insertions and extractions were frequently conducted. False insertions were used late in the evening when elements were being inserted near their ambush sites. Three of four touchdown points were employed with the troops actually exiting the aircraft at any one of the touchdown points. False extractions were used in conjunction with popper missions. The troops were inserted into their final LZ about 1615 hours and allowed to remain on the ground about 30-45 minutes. When it came time for the extraction, the slicks returned to the company CP where they picked up three to four individuals per ship. These individuals either lay on the floor or sat directly behind the pilot and co-pilot so that they could not be seen as the helicopters landed. Once the helicopters had landed, the passengers raised up or slid to the rear so that they could be seen as the helicopters took off.

h. CS Munitions: Because the VC use the thick nipa palm throughout the AO to hide, it was found necessary to employ some weapon to pull them out of these areas. CS munitions were dropped out of a helicopter. The munitions were not successful because of the large percentage duds and because the area they covered was insufficient.

i. Training: Each unit in the battalion conducted all the required training e.g. command information, character guidance, first aid, etc. In addition all the units conducted the following training: Counter-sapper techniques, river crossing, booby traps, swimming, and water safety. Seven members of the battalion also attended sniper school established by the Brigade and by the 9th Infantry Division.

(b) 2d Battalion, 505th Infantry

GENERAL: During the period 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969 the 2d Battalion (Abn) 505th Infantry continued its mission of interdicting enemy infiltration routes to the Saigon area, and denial of suspect and known rocket launching sites, assembly areas and caches. Operations within the AO were typified by reconnaissance in force (RIF), detailed area searches, night ambushes, air-mobile combat assaults, use of aero-rifle Platoons, waterborne patrols, snatch operations, and village cordon and searches. Defensive missions for the reporting period were limited to security of Hoc Mon Bridge (X772072), the Surveillance Operations Center Fire Base Copperhead (X705025), and at times, Fire Base All American (X774523) and the Box Bridge (X5763967).

1. DETAIL AREA SEARCHES AND RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE.

a. 1 May 1969 - 31 July 1969

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b. Conduct detailed searches to locate and capture or destroy enemy caches, and or assembly, larger areas.

c. AOs Denver, Chute and Snoopy located in Gia Dinh, Minh Dao, and Nha Ngia Province.

d. LTC Irwin (to 15 June) - LTC Keenan (16 June to 31 July)

2. Concept of Operations: All Infantry Combat elements of the Battalion conducted searches and RIFs on a daily basis. Generally, each rifle company conducted two platoon size operations daily. The specific areas searched were systematically selected to ensure that the entire battalion area of operation was covered. All available intelligence data was considered prior to targeting an area for search or reconnaissance. Special emphasis was placed on thorough searching of canal and streams.

2. NIGHT AMBUSHES:

a. 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969

b. Conducted extensive night ambushes throughout AO to interdict enemy movement and cover known and suspect rocket launching sites.

c. AOs Denver, Chute, Snoopy Provences of Gia Dinh, Minh Dao, and Nha Ngia.

d. LTC Irwin (until 15 June) LTC Keenan (16 June to 31 July)

e. Forces:

(1) A rifle company and reconnaissance platoon 2-505. OPCON companies mentioned in paragraph 2A, above.

(2) During the second half of June and throughout the month of July some limited participations by popular and regional forces took place. The aggregate strength of the indigenous forces participating in combined ambushes on a given night seldom exceeded three squads.

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Div for period 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969. (U)

Concept of Operations: Each rifle company normally conducted 4 to
6 platoon size ambushes per night. These were generally point ambushes of
opportunity with the mission of destroying the enemy. Ambush locations were
recommended by the Company Commander. Coverage of known and suspected routes
of movement, both land and waterway, rocket launch sites, cache sites, and
all available intelligence, were considered when selecting ambush locations.
Standard patrolling and ambush techniques were used. Emphasis was placed
on having alternate means of communication and use of night observation
devices. Frequently, infantry ambushes were employed in conjunction with
mechanized and riverine patrols and ambushes.

Airmobile Operations: Throughout the reporting period the Battalion
made exhaustive use of all airmobile assets. During the last month and a half
of the period, the battalion received a portion of the airmobile company
due to other priority brigade operations.

Missions:

(1) 13-14 May 1969

(2) Missions: Heliborne assault by one rifle company into AN SON (Center
of mass XT815095). RIF and search to north destroying all bunkers, tunnels,
and booby traps.

(3) Binh Duong Province

(4) LTC Irons

(5) Forces involved: C/2-505, Recon 2-505, 1 PLAT D/2-505, 28th RAG,
C/307th Engineers.

(6) Concept of Operations: 1 Rifle company combat assault and sweep to
north. 1 rifle platoon and recon platoon block to north and east. RAG
boats screen western flank along Saigon River.

(1) 2-3 June 1969

(2) Mission: 1 rifle company combat assault into AN SON COM (XT815096),
sweep to NE destroying bunkers and tunnels during advance.

(3) Binh Duong Province

(4) LTC Irons
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(5) Forces: Companies A, B, C 2-505, Recon 2-505, 26th RAG, 3-17 Cavalry, 167, 265, 794 R.F. Companies.

(6) Concept of Operations: 1 US rifle company conduct heliborne assault into AN SON, sweep SW destroying bunkers and tunnels enroute. 1 US company make beach landing and establish blocking force. 3 R.F. companies block to east, RAG blockade Saigon River. 1 US company screen on west bank of Saigon River. Recon 2-505 reaction force, artillery prep and multiple TAC Air Strikes prior to insertion. Results were: 31 VC KIA, 4 POW's, 1 Chieu Hoi, 3 B-40 rockets, 1 RPG-2 launcher, 3 K54 pistols, 6 AK-47s, 1 .45 pistol captured.

(2) Mission: 2 Companies inserted by helicopter, AN PHU DONG COM (XT670005), RIF to west destroying bunkers and tunnels, locate possible enemy assembly areas and caches.

(3) CIA DINH

(4) LTC Keenan

(5) Forces: Companies A, D, 2-505, Recon 2-505, 1 platoon 3-17 Cavalry, 128th Assault Helicopter Company, National Police Contingent, PSYOPS Team, 2 squads C-307th Engineers, 2 Scout Dog Teams, 1 Company ARVN Rangers and 1 PF Company.

(6) Concept of Operations: 2 US rifle companies inserted by helicopter, RIF to west with 1 company Rangers and 1 company PF blocking to west, RAG boats blocking on river. Rifle companies leave behind ambushes. Recon platoon inserted at nightfall by boat to establish ambushes.

4 SNATCH OPERATIONS:

a The 2-505th Infantry participated in six snatch operations during the reporting period.

b The total results of these operations were: 6 VC KIA, 1 PW, 37 detainees, 1 RPG-2 launcher CIA, 2 AK-47 CIA, and 1 AK-47 magazine CIA.

5 VILLAGE CORDON AND SEARCHES:

a Reference FRAGO 2-69 (GUESS WHO), Map, Saigon 1/50,000, Sheet 6330 IV.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for period 1 May to 31 July 1969. (U)

1. 9-11 May 1969
2. Mission: Cordon and Search of Village Tan Thanh Dong (XT753114)
3. BINH DUONG Province
4. LTC Irons

5. Forces: A/2-505, B/2-505, Recon 2-505, C/4-12/199, D/4-12/199, 1 platoon C/307th Engineer, CRIP 2/34 Armor, A/2-34 Armor (-), 1 B/17 Cavalry, 3 IPW Teams 518 MID, 82d H.P. Squad, HV Mortar platoon, 1 USAF Flare-ship, 1 PSYOPS Aircraft, 1 PSYOPS Field Team. Vietnamese forces: National Police Contingent, 168, 312, 774 RF Companies from Binh Duong Province.


Reference FRAGO 8-69 (BAYONET) Map, Saigon 1/50,000 Sheet 6330 IV

26 June 1969

8. BINH TONG Province
9. LTC Keenan

10. Forces: A/2-505, 1 platoon B/2-505, 1 platoon D/2-505 2 Sniper Teams, Recon 2-505, 1 squad C/307th Engineer, 4.2 platoon.

All cordon elements move to area of cordon by ACAV and truck, move into position on foot. RAG boats screen on Saigon River. Recon platoon conduct snatch operations, National Police and District Forces assisted by Engineers, search village.

Reference FRAGO 10-69 (COLD DAWN) Map, Saigon 1/50,000 Sheet 6330 IV

7-8 July 1969

11. Mission: Conduct RIF through village of TAN THANH DONG, COM (XT733114)
12. BINH DUONG Province

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 3d Bde, 82d ABN DIV for the period 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969. (U)

4 LTC Keenan

5 Forces: A, B 2-505, Recon 2-505, 1 platoon B/1-17, 2 squads 307th Engineer, 3d Bde CHIC, 1 RF platoon, 1 RF company, National Police Contingent.

6 Concept of Operations: Two US rifle companies conduct CA at dawn, landing near northern part of village. The first company conducts rapid RIF from north to south. The second company follows 1st company with National Police conducting detailed house to house search checking ID cards. Cavalry platoon established roadblock and screen southern portion of village.

4 Reference FRAGO 5-69 (SACRAMENTO BEE) Map, Saigon 1/50,000 Sheet 6330 IV
1 7-8 June 1969
2 Mission: Hoc Mon District conduct search of hamlet, COM (XT750G-4), US Forces provide cordon forces.
3 GIA DINH Province
4 LTC Irons/MAJ Hoa
5 Forces: A/2-505 (-), 1 platoon C/2-505, Recon 2-505, 1 platoon B/1-17 Cavalry, 1 squad Engineers, 3d Bde CHIC.

6 US Forces establish cordon around hamlet enabling Vietnamese Forces to conduct search. Supervise operation of CHIC.

4 Reference FRAGO 7-69 (CHARGER II) Map, Saigon 1/50,000 Sheet 6330 IV
1 18-19 June 1969
2 Cordon and search of village COM (XT767127)
3 BINH DUONG Province
4 LTC Keenan
5 Forces:

(a) 1 platoon A, B/2-505, C/2-505, Recon 2-505, 1 company (-) 2/34 Armor, 1 platoon B/17 Cavalry.

(b) 4 PF platoon under control of BINH DUONG Province Chief.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of the 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for the period 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969. (U)


6. AIRMOBILE "POPPER" MISSIONS: During the period 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969, the Battalion conducted frequent "Popper" missions. Although a rifle platoon or the reconnaissance platoon often combined with national police and 4 of an airborne company (ABC) for such missions, the availability of the ABC limited the frequency of these operations. To make up for the reduced number of "popper" operations flown with organic forces and normal attachments, the battalion frequently employed an Aero-Rifle Platoon from Group B 3/17 Cavalry.

a. 1 May 1969 - 31 July 1969

b. Conduct "quick reaction" airmobile operations to find and destroy the enemy and supplies.

c. AD's Leather, Gnome, and Snoopy, in GIA DINH, RINH DUONG and KAU KENIA Provinces.

d. LTC Irons (to 15 June) - LTC Keenan (16 June - 31 July)

e. (1) One Aero-Rifle platoon B/3-17 Cavalry

f. National Police from the appropriate Provinces

g. Concept of Operations: Aerial surveillance of a suspected area is maintained by a Hunter-Killer Team (1 OH-6 W/Hurricane and one Cobra gunship) and the OH-5 aircraft. Random insertions are made by the two OH-1's carrying National Police and Cavalrymen on various targets (suspected personnel, weapons, vehicles, or suspect cache areas). In the event of significant contact, additional organic troops are inserted utilising the OH-1's.

g. During the reported period, "popper" operations utilizing the Aero-Rifle Platoon were conducted on the following dates:

May 5, 7, 11, 20, 21, 22, 26, 29 and 30.

June 2, 3, 5, 7, 29

July 1, 16

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7. WATERCRAFT OPERATIONS: Because of the many rivers, streams and canals within Z/55th M, the Battalion made extensive use of watercraft and available Vietnamese (RAO, RF Boats), and the US Navy (PB) waterborne elements. This was especially true when the menawas make cross-country movement by foot increasingly difficult. The watercraft were used in the waterborne RIF's and searched along canals i.e., RACH TRA COM (XT/65088), transport patrols to the vicinity of ambush locations; establish blocking and screening forces for land operations; waterborne RIF's and establish amphibious ambuses along major waterways i.e., Saigon River. The principal type craft used were RAO, PB, LCM, Ski Barges and Engineer Boats.

8. MAJOR ATTACHMENTS/DETACHMENTS DURING REPORTING PERIOD.

Attachments: 1 May 31 July - 1 Platoon B/1-17 Cavalry
1 May-15 May - C/4-12, D/4-12, B/3-7, 199th LIB

Detachments: 15 June-6 July - 1 company OPCON to 1/505 Infantry in AO Pineapple

1 May - 31 July - 1 platoon OPCON 2/321 Arty at Fire Base Copperhead for FB security.
25 May - 31 May - 1 platoon OPCON B/1-17 Cavalry for Bde reaction force
6 July - 31 July - 1 platoon OPCON B/1-17 Cavalry for Bde reaction force.

9. TRAINING

9a. General: All training in the Battalion was conducted according to a master training program. Emphasis was placed on fulfilling mandatory training requirements, weapons training, night firing, counter sapper training, familiarization with night observing devices, first aid, water safety, personal hygiene and physical fitness. Maintenance training was also conducted on a regular basis. Subjects included in the training program were:

Physical Conditioning
Command Information
Civil Affairs
Character Guidance
Prevention of Heat Injury

Weapons, small arms and crew-served weapons

Field Sanitation
Internal Defense (Perimeter Defense)
Military Justice

Weapons, water and Vehicle Safety
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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 3d Bn, 82d Abn Div
for period 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969, (U)

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Counter Ambush Drill

Counter Ambush Drill

Supply Economy

Supply Economy

Codes of Conduct

Codes of Conduct

Map Reading

Map Reading

b. Due to personnel turnover and a lack of sufficient seasoned non-commissioned officers, it was necessary to conduct extensive training in ambush techniques. The majority of this training was conducted by the companies based on doctrinal material published by the Battalion and Brigade. During the period 15 to 25 May a battalion level mobile training team (MIT) presented classes on ambushes techniques to each platoon in the Battalion. Subjects given special emphasis included; selection and reconnaissance sites; moving from intermediate to final positions, establishing local security and early warning procedures, placement of tripflares and claymore mines, basic formations, radio and pyrotechnic signals, and employment of snipers and starlight scopes.

g. The Battalion formed a battalion level 81mm Mortar Platoons assigned to Company E. The platoon consisted of 31 men; one Lieutenant and 6, 81mm Mortars. Training was begun in mid July and by the close of the reporting period the platoon had attained a level of proficiency wherein it was able to fire close indirect fire for committed units. The training generally followed the ATP for 81mm mortar platoons in an Infantry Company. The weapons platoon members were cross-trained on the M2 Recoilless Rifle, 90mm Recoilless Rifle and Flamethrower.

d. Selected members of the Battalion attended the following Brigade and non-Brigade schools:

(1) Brigade Sniper School

(2) Brigade Keener Ski-Barge Operator School

(3) Brigade Radar Operations School (OJT)

(4) 8th Division Sniper School

(5) USAF 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM) Radio Operation Company (AN/URC-106)

e. Informal on-the-job training (OJT) was carried on continually in the Battalion to insure an adequate number of specialists in such fields as, radio operators, drivers, cooks, switchboard operators, clerks, etc.

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SUBJECT:  Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 34 Bde, 82d Abn Div
for period 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969.  (U)

1.  1st Battalion, 506th Infantry
   (a) 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry

2.  Map References:
   (a) AO HERCULES (2 May - 26 May):  Operation "Dirty Devil".  MAPS:
       1:50,000 Sheets Hieu Thien 6331 II and Ben Cat 6331 III.
   (b) AO DETROIT (25 May - 25 Jun):  MAPS:  1:50,000 Sheet Saigon 6330 IV.
   (c) AO SACREDHEART (15 June - 7 July):  Operation "Wet Devil".  MAPS:  1:50,000
       Sheets Dihn Hoa 6330 I, Tan An 6330 II, Saigon 6330 IV, Can Gio 6330 III.
   (d) AO DETROIT (7 July - 31 July):  MAPS:  1:50,000 Sheet Saigon 6330 IV.

3.  Attached as Tabs to this enclosure are overlays showing AO's for the
    reporting period:

   TAB A - AO HERCULES (2 May - 26 May)
   TAB B - AO DETROIT (25 May - 25 Jun) (15 Jun - 7 Jul) (7 Jul - 31 Jul) unt, HQ DA
   TAB C - AO SACREDHEART (15 Jun - 7 Jul)


   1.  Reporting Period:  1 May - 31 July 1969

   (1)  Date operations started and ended:
        (a) 2 May 69 - 29 May 69 - AO HERCULES (Operation Dirty Devil)
        (b) 29 May - 14 Jun 69 - AO DETROIT
        (c) 15 Jun - 7 Jul 69 - AO HERCULES - 1,505 (-) (Operation Wet Devil)
            15 Jun - 7 Jul 69 - AO DETROIT Task Force Dirty Devil
        (d) 7 Jul 69 - 31 Jul 69 - AO DETROIT

   (2)  Mission of 1,505 during the operation:
        (a)  Combat search and destroy operations in AO HERCULES
        (b)  Conduct detailed searches and extensive night ambushes in AO DETROIT,
            (c)  Conduct dispersed operations in AO SACREDHEART.
            (d)  Conduct detailed searches and extensive night ambushes in AO DETROIT.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div
for period 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969. (U)

(2) Location - Province (See Tabs A, B, and C)

(a) Nha Ngia, Ninh Thuan - AO HERCULES
(b) Gia Dinh - AO DETROIT
(c) Nha Ngia, Le Van, Gia Dinh - AO SWORDFISH

Gia Dinh - AO DETROIT

(a) Gia Dinh - AO DETROIT

(b) Name of Commander:

(a) LTC Paul B. Lumsford - 1-508

(b) MAJ Thomas S. Myrick - Task Force Dry Devil.

(5) Forces involved.

(a) U.S. Forces:

Operation Dirty Devil - 1-508 Rn CP, 3 rifle companies
1-508 Inf.
Operation Wet Devil - 1-508 Rn CP, 1 Co OPCOM from 1-505 and 2-505,
1 Co 1-505, HHC (-) & F Co (-)/2-505.
Task Force Dry Devil - TP CP. 3 rifle Co's 1-505, HHC(-) and F Co (-)/1-505.
1-505 Inf.

(b) Other Forces:

Operation Dirty Devil - AO DETROIT - 55th RF BN.
Operation Wet Devil - 55th RF BN, 60th ARVN.
Task Force Dry Devil - 53d RF BN.
AO DETROIT - 53d RF BN.

(6) Concept of the Operations: On 1 May 69 the 1-508 Inf was relieved of
responsibility for AO DETROIT and placed OPCOM to 2/25 Inf Div. The concept
of the operation was the 1-505(-) to move by air and land to FSB PATTON (DT593217)
and initiate search and destroy operations in AO HERCULES, a known enemy laser
area and infiltration route. One company of the 1-505 remained in AO DETROIT
OPCON 1-505 Inf.

On 2 May 69 the 1-505(-) moved by CH-47 helicopter to FSB PATTON. All support
elements moved to FSB PATTON by convoy. Companies C and D on order moved into
AO HERCULES and began conducting reconnaissance in force operations. Company
A provided FSB security and Company B remained in AO DETROIT OPCOM 1-505 Inf.
The Battalion CP was located at FSB PATTON.
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Operations in AO HERCULES were characterized by company RIF's, NDP's, ambushes on suspected enemy infiltration routes and combat air assaults. The operation terminated at 1200 hours, 24 May 69 when responsibility for the area of operation was reassumed by the 2/25 Inf. On that date the 1-508 (-) returned to its assigned area of operation in the 3rd Bde, 82nd Abn Div area of operation. Return movement was conducted overland by convoy and by CH-47 helicopter.

Upon return to AO DETROIT the 1-508 resumed operations in the AO and security of FSB HARDCORE (XS754936) and FSB STEPHANIE (XS763906). Operations were characterized by detail searches, extensive night ambushes and joint RIF's and cordon and search operations with the 53rd RF Bn. The Bn CP was located at FSB HARDCORE.

On 15 Jun 69, the 1-508 Inf assumed responsibility of AO SWORDFISH in addition to AO DETROIT. The concept of operation was the 1-508(-) to move by air and land to FSB CLAUDETTE (XS666925), FSB BARBARA (XS575856), and PB KATHY (XS627887) and commence denial operations and stay-behind ambushes in AO SWORDFISH, a known enemy cache area and infiltration route. Elements of the 1-508 (-) moved by UH1D helicopter to FSB BARBARA, PB KATHY, and into the AO. The Bn CP and support elements moved overland by convoy to FSB CLAUDETTE. Co B/1-508 moved to FSB BARBARA with 2 platoons operating in the AO, Co C(-) 1-505 had security of FSB CLAUDETTE and PB KATHY, and Co D(-) 2-505 had 2 Platoons operating in the AO. Companies A, C and D/1-508 remained operational in AO DETROIT under the command of Task Force Dry Devil. The task force CP was located at FSB HARDCORE.

Operations in AO SWORDFISH by the 1-508 (-) were characterized by combat air assaults, airmobile checkpoints, Popper Missions, amphibious insertions and extractions by River Patrol Boats (PBR) and Ski Barges, stay-behind sampan ambushes, company and platoon size RIF's. Operations in AO DETROIT by Task Force Dry Devil consisted of detail searches, extensive night ambushes and combined operations with the 53rd RF Bn.

The operation terminated at 1300 hrs, 7 Jul 69, when responsibility for AO SWORDFISH was assumed by the 1-503 Inf. On that date the 1-508 (-) returned to its assigned area of operation (AO DETROIT) in the 3rd Bde, 82nd Abn Div area of operations. Return movement was conducted by UH1D helicopter and overland convoy. The Bn CP was located at FSB HARDCORE.

Upon being relieved of responsibility for AO SWORDFISH the 1-508 Inf resumed operations in AO DETROIT, the operations consisting of detail searches, extensive night ambushes, and combined operations with the 53rd RF Bn.

5. Tactics and Techniques:

5a. Tactics and techniques used in Operation Dirty Devil in AO HERCULES:

(1) 60mm, 81mm and 105mm rounds suspended in trees - usually command detonated, were common VC booby traps employed in the Hobo Wood area.
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(2) A large number of frag grenades, both US and Chinese P2 type, with trip wire were also common to the Hobo Wood area.

(3) Effective use of snipers and shadow techniques. VC will walk on your flank and tail you.

(a) Counter measures employed:

(b) 3-mm points:

(c) Otsa trail

(d) Replay point 50-150 meters in front of platoon, depending on terrain.

(e) Perimeter always swept at dusk and dawn. Must conduct stand to. No minute had no practical value.

(f) M-197's were employed as mortar from Co CP for H & I.

(g) Always dig in — two man positions, 50% alert minimum.

(h) M-60 tripods and flak jackets set up for night issues, brought in with night packet by logistics helicopter.

(i) Prior to moving out, DT's were plotted along route of march. Some rounds were fired in while moving, that way it was possible to have rounds on a sniper in seconds.

(j) Do not move through ets in rice paddy dikes, especially those made by mechanised units for passage of APC's. Such ets were often mined.

(b) Period 26 May - 7 Jul 69 (27 Day Devil) - AO DETROIT.

(c) Period 7 Jul - 31 Jul 69 (1-500) - AO DETROIT.

(d) Extensive night ambushes, 6 - 9 ambushes per rifle company.

(e) Detailed search of grids or sections of grids.

(f) Maximum utilisation of starlight scopes.

(g) Use of probing rods.

(h) Navigating canals and swamps with air boats.

(i) Combined IET's and blocking positions with the Regional Forces.

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(1) Proper coordination of night ambushes with Regional and Popular Forces.
(2) Extensive small unit tactics utilized.
(3) Period 15 Jun - 7 Jul 69 - 1-508 (-) - AO SWORDFISH
(4) Units traveled cross corridor; traveling paralleled with hedgerows and
canals left unit subject to ambush by hostile forces.
(5) Insertions and extractions with River Patrol Boats (RPB), Ski Barges,
and sampans.
(6) Maximum use of air mobile companies for relocation of troops, Popular
Missions, and air mobile checkpoints.
(7) Due to the inundated nature of the terrain, movement overland was only
2000 meters per day.
(8) Troops were in water most of the time. Time during daylight hours
was allotted for drying out.
(9) To save bladed and flight time all resupply was lifted from FSB Claudette.
(10) Extra ropes and snap links should be issued due to numerous stream and
canal crossings.
(11) Check the banks and the beds of canals, VC WC usually used them for
hiding caches.
(12) Training (Note: * indicates mandatory training):
(a) Brigade or higher headquarters training conducted during the reporting
period:
(1) Sniper Training - 9th Inf Div (3 personnel) July 69.
(2) Night firing of M-16 with starlight scope - 3/82 (10 personnel) June 69.
(3) Air boat and Ski Barge operating and maintenance - 3/82 (10 personnel)
June 69.
(4) Generator operator and mechanic course - 3/82, May 69.

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SUBJ.: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 3d Bde, 52d Arm Div
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(b.) Company and Battalion taught subjects during the period 1 May-31 July 1969.

o(1) Command Information (Subjects).

(a) Medical Benefits
(b) Whosever You're Ready
(c) Redshod Fure - Military Air Travel
(d) Protect Your Health
(e) Customs, Laws and You
(f) Returning to CONUS
(g) Making Your Pay Work For You
(h) The Enemy You Face
(i) POW's and You,
(j) Weapons Control in Secure Areas
(k) Soldiers Armed Against Comm
(l) G.I. Benefits
(m) Your Extensions
(n) Path to a Commission

o(2) Character Guidance (Subject).

(o) Venereal Disease
(p) Clean Speech
(q) Marriage Makeup

o(3) Armed Forces Censorship

o(4) SNAFU

o(5) Weapons Firing (Zero and Familiarization)

(o) Training Team

o(7) Safeguarding Defense Information

(o) Civil Affairs

(o) Crow Refresher - Riot Control Masks

(10) Counter Sapper Training

(11) Mighty Mite, Flame Thrower, CS CS Launcher

(o) Company and Battalion taught training during period 1 Jun - 30 Jun 69:

o(1) Command Information (Subject)
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(a) Defense against Enemy Propaganda.
(b) International Communism.
(c) Aggression from the North.
(d) Blue Print for Aggression.
(e) Serving Your Country Overseas.
(f) History of South Vietnam.
(g) How to get war trophies home.
(h) Protect Your Health.
(i) The Red Cross.
(j) Heroes of Vietnam.
(l) Deadly Games.
(m) Warrant Officer Program.
(n) No! Ambassador.
(o) Minority Groups.
(p) Your Reserve Obligation.
(q) Character Guidance (Subject).
(r) Right.
(s) Clean Speech.
(t) Weapons Firing (Zero and Familiarization).
(u) Armed Forces Censorship.
(v) Civil Affairs.
(w) Safety Training.
(x) Survival, Escape and Evasion.
(y) Field Sanitation.
(z) M-16 Firing with Starlight Scope Mounted.
(a) Code of Conduct.
(b) Geneva Convention.
(c) Mighty Mike, Flamethrower, 85 C3 Launcher.

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(4) Company and Battalion Taught Subjects - Period 1 Jul - 31 Jul 69:

*(1)* Command Information (Subjects).

(a) Facts About the U.S.
(b) Selling America.
(c) True Patriotism.
(d) A Soldier's Career.
(e) Marijuana Means Trouble,
(f) Deadly Games.
(g) Getting Along in Vietnam.
(h) Making Your Pay Work For You.
(i) USAF Direct Commission Program.
(j) Legal Assistance for You.
(l) Lifesaving Tips Your Friend the M-16.
(m) Promotion Re-evaluation.
(n) Enlisted Promotion System.

*(2)* Character Guidance (Subjects).

(a) Heritage.
(b) Marriage.

*(3)* CBR (Flamethrower, Mighty Mite, 86 G3 Launcher).

(a) Combat in Built-Up Areas.
(b) Stability Operations.

*(4)* Armed Forces Censorship.

(5) Supply Economy.

*(6)* Civil Affairs, Vietnam and Relations with the Vietnamese.

*(7)* Small Arms Familiarization.

(8) Range Estimation at Night.

*(11)* Survival, Escape and Evasion.
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(d) 3d Battalion, 32d Artillery.

1. (c) Combat Operations.

a. Operation Toan Thang (Phase III) continued throughout the period.

b. The Battalion mission remained as direct support to the Brigade and Battery C, 3rd Battalion, 197th Artillery remain in general support to the Brigade.

c. Units located at fire support bases Copperhead, Harrison, Hardcore and All American are all in Gia Dinh Province. Units occupying fire support base Barbers were in Long An Province.

d. LTC John R. Martin remained in command of the Battalion for the entire reporting period.

e. Concept of operations: The Battalion operated within the general guidelines described as characteristics of the standard direct support mission. During this period, one infantry battalion and one artillery battery were moved to an AO outside of the basic Brigade AO. The battery location was accessible by air and water only. Rotation of units between the external and basic AO was on a monthly basis and to provide some continuity, this Battalion offset the battery rotation by two weeks from the infantry battalion rotation schedule. Liaison personnel remained with their assigned infantry battalion as did the forward observers. The "habitual association" was felt to be less important than maintaining continuity of operations.

f. Location of units:

HIB 2/321-Camp Copperhead (XY806026).

A Btry 2/321-1 May to 13 June, FSB All American (XY765005); 13 June to 13 July, FSB Harrison (XY736055); 13 July to current date, FSB Barbers (XY777855).

B Btry 2/321-1 May to 15 June FSB Harrison; 15 June to 13 July, FSB Barbers; 13 July to current date, FSB Harrison.

C Btry 2/321-1 May to 24 May, FSB Patten (XY580215); 24 May to 1 Aug, FSB hardcore (XY784937)

C Btry 3/197-FSB Copperhead.

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2. (G) Tactics and Techniques.
   a. On 15 June, this Battalion assumed responsibility for FSB Barbara (X357785L). It had previously been occupied by a unit with M101 howitzers. The area was extremely wet due to low elevation, monsoon weather and poor drainage. The M101 howitzers were fired sitting on the soil and the unit had had problems with howitzers sinking into the mud. Prior to occupation by this Battalion, Brigade engineers constructed heavy wooden platforms with protruding steel pipes on which the M102 base plate was lowered. These platforms provided an exceptionally stable platform and the howitzers were kept out of the mire.

   b. Due to the terrain and current monsoon rains, the majority of the missions fired are fired using fuses and time fuze. Observation has shown that effect obtained with point detonating fuse is minimal to non-existent.

3. (U) Training.

   During the period the following specialised training was conducted.

   a. Gunner’s test - A six week period of battery level training was directed. At the end of this period, a Battalion test team tested all batteries. Personnel tested were PFC’s and SP4’s who are performing duties as Gunners, Assistant Gunners and in two cases, Chiefs of Sections. A very low percentage of candidates received passing scores. Possible reasons for this are: inexperience, shortage of NCO’s in grade E5 and E6 which necessitates placing untrained personnel in critical positions and also prompts a base of established knowledge to build around, mission requirements and maintenance time occupy periods needed for training.

   b. Driver’s training - A permanent weekly school at Battalion level has been established to qualify new personnel in 1½, 3½ and 5½ ton vehicles and covering operations, maintenance, records, safety and road signs. Personnel completing the courses are licenced. A large portion of incoming personnel are not licenced in CONUS which makes the course necessary. Personnel arriving with licences are oriented on Vietnamese road signs and local maintenance problems and recertified to drive. Traffic accidents and maintenance problems have decreased since this training was initiated.

   c. Generator training - Seven three day schools were conducted at Battalion level during this period. Students were generator operators and maintenance personnel. Operations, maintenance, repair and records were covered in great detail. A marked improvement in generator deadline rate resulted.
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d. Extensive training has been initiated and will continue over next 30 to 45
days in the area of forward observers, fire direction center and liaison section
procedures and techniques. Emphasis is being placed on refresher training in areas
which are not frequently used but in which proficiency must be maintained.

4. (C) Organization.

2nd Battalion, 321st Artillery is organized as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>MISSION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BHB 2/321</td>
<td>DE 3/62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/2/321</td>
<td>Priority of fires - 1/505 Infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/2/341</td>
<td>Priority of fires - 2/505 Infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/2/341</td>
<td>Priority of fires - 1/506 Infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/3/197</td>
<td>DE 3/62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. (C) Enemy killed by artillery during the period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENTRY</th>
<th>NO. KIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) (C) Troop B, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry.

1. Organization: Troop B, 1/17 Cavalry was organized under the 17-570 MTOS.
   In addition one infantry platoon from either 1/505 Inf or 2/505 Inf has been
   continuously OPCON from the close of the last reporting period until 25 July.
   Three line platoons consisting of nine ACAV's each, and the CP group composed of
   three ACAV's have been the primary combat elements of the troop.

2. Activities: During this reporting period, B Troop has performed a variety
   of missions to include mounted and dismounted reconnaissance in force and searches,
   engineer security and tunnel clearing, cordons and searches, fire base security,
   convoy escorts, reserve control points, reaction missions in support of the infantry
   battalions, and night ambushes, both mounted and dismounted. The Troop has been
   responsible for the security of the Thong Tay Hoi Bridge (2378 x 967) from 15 June
   to 25 July.

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3. Significant Actions:

a. 2d Plat, D Troop, acted as reaction force at XT701115 to A Co, 2/505 Inf, 022330 May. Results: 3 VC KIA, 1 VC POW, 2 AK-47's captured. (OPCON 2/505)

b. 2d Plat, B Troop, with C Co, 307th Engr, at XT675085, 031500 May discovered a cache of 150 B-40 rockets, 120 75mm RR rounds, 30 60mm mortar rounds, and approximately 50 lbs of TNT. (OPCON 2/505)

c. 3d Plat, B Troop, 051445 May, at XT663098, discovered a cache of 200 .51 caliber rounds, 4000 .30 caliber rounds, 5000 7.62mm AK-47 rounds.

d. HQ ACAV's escorting a 1/508 convoy in the vicinity of FSB Patton, 231500 May, lost one ACAV destroyed by a 20 lb VC mine. Results: one ACAV destroyed, 5 US WIA (minor) (OP CON 1/508)

e. 3d Plat, B Troop, while on a night defensive position with B Co, 1/505, engaged a group of 5 VC, 262130 May at XT711028. Results: 2 VC KIA, 1 VC POW, 1 B-40 launcher and 2 AK-50's captured. (OPCON 1/505)

f. 2d Plat, B Troop, reacted to A Co, 2/505 snatch operation and was ambushed on the way to the infantry position, 102330 July, at XT700014. Results: 2 US KHA, 5 WHA (3 minor), 1 ACAV destroyed. Enemy: 5 VC KIA, 1 B-40 launcher and 2 AK-47's captured. (OPCON 2/505) Two days later Cu Chi PF's captured 4 VC who had been seriously wounded in the same action.

g. 1st Plat, B Troop, with C Co, 2/505, on a reconnaissance in force, 271330 July, at XT660085, engaged VC in canal line. Results: 1 VC KIA, 1 VC POW. (OPCON 2/505)

h. Several small medical caches, small amounts of small arms ammunition, and 2 SKS rifles (partially destroyed) have been found during the reporting period while on dismounted operations.

(f) (C) The 52d Chemical Detachment continued its mission of providing special chemical operations support to the Brigade.

1. Defoliation operations were conducted to reduce enemy ambush sites and avenues of approach, increase fields of fire and improve radar effectiveness. A summary of the defoliation missions conducted is as follows.

(a) Aerial Defoliation (UH-1D aircraft with Agavenco aerial spray apparatus)
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(1) Vio AO Chute (RT790100): 7 missions, 29 sorties, 1375 gal agent Orange, 960 gal agent Blue, total area: 2750 acres (only roadway, waterways, trails and treelines received primary consideration)

(2) Hoc Han Bridge and canal (RT725073 to RT700052): 2 missions, 6 sorties, 250 gal agent Blue, total area: approx 85 acres.

(2) FSB Barber (RT581856) and FSB Kathy (RT623886): 1 mission, 4 sorties, 150 gal agent Orange.

(b) Ground or Water Based Defoliation (Power-Driven Decontaminating Apparatus or salvage pumps on wheeled vehicles or LCH)

(2) Rach Tra Canal (RT767054 to RT610777): approx 23 acres.

(2) "C Island" (RT775066): 1 acre.

(3) Box Bridge (RT763997): approx 8 acres

(4) FSB All Americans (RT748005): approx 8 acres

(5) Phu Loi Post Perimeter (RT55160): approx 75 acres

(6) FSB Hardcore (RT52937): approx 30% of 7 acres

2. Airborne Personnel Detector (Sniffer) missions were conducted to provide information on enemy troops, locations and activities for the S2 collection plan. A total of 33 missions were scheduled with 25 completed for a flight time of 45 hours.

3. Riot Control Agents were employed in conjunction with sniffer missions and in support of ground operations. A total of 22 non-persistent CS munitions (K158) were used in 5 sorties and 800 lbs of persistent CS-1 were dropped via RT639925 on 20 June.

4. Miscellaneous: Assistance in Special search and denial operations was provided the 2/505th Inf on 28 July. During the reporting period, technical inspections of chemical equipment for turn in were performed for the following items: 230 protective masks, 177 mask carriers, 106 decontaminating apparatus, and 33 chemical agent detector kits. The 52d Chemical Detachment ammunition storage area was transferred from Tan Son Nhat to Phu Loi Post starting on 16 June and completed on 22 June.

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2. GBR training conducted during the period included the following:

a. During the period 20 May through 5 June, instruction on the construction, emplacement, and maintenance of flame field expedients was conducted at the defense sectors on Phu Loi Post. Approximately 35 persons received the instruction.

b. A class on the operation, maintenance and employment of the M501-7 portable flamethrower was conducted at the Nha Nang Bridge on 20 June. The class culminated with the demonstration of the flamethrower using thickened fuel. Approximately 60 persons received the training.

g. (C) During the reporting period the Brigade conducted training in accordance with USARV Reg 350-1. Special training was conducted by mobile training teams on night firing proficiency, use of the starlight scope AN/FVS-2, and countermeasures techniques. An airbase maintenance school and operator/maintenance course for NCOs were conducted by the 82d Support Battalion. Joint radar training was conducted with AN/TPS-2 radar operators from CMD Signal Company. During this training a total of 62 AN/TPS-2 radar operators received instruction aimed toward improving their proficiency in acquiring and identifying radar targets. During the reporting period the first class of snipers was trained in the 3/82 5-11er School. Fourteen men were graduated as qualified snipers from this course. Additional classes have not been scheduled pending the arrival of sniper equipment. Eight men from the Brigade were qualified as snipers at the 9th Infantry Division Sniper School. Nineteen men were trained at the United States Army Training Facility, 1st Signal Brigade. Personnel attending these courses received training on radar and radio operation and maintenance. Eleven men from Company O, 75th Infantry (Ranger), graduated from the 5th SFG Bocdo School at Nha Trang.

e. Logistics, Transportation, and Engineer Operations:

(1) (C) During this period the Support Battalion continued to provide supply, maintenance, medical services and miscellaneous services for all assigned and attached elements of the Brigade. The Forward Support Battalion at Tan Son Nhat has continued to provide support maintenance of automotive, track, engineering and miscellaneous equipment. In addition the FSE has continued to provide the forward material services to the Brigade maneuver Battalions and other forward elements.

(2) (C) Organisation for Supports:

a. The 82d Support Battalion is organised under the following MTUs:

(1) Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, MTU 29-2464 PAO 1/68

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(2) Company A (Administration) NYOE 12-197 PAC 4/68
(3) Company B (Medical) NYOE 8-197 PAC 1/68
(4) Company C (Maintenance and Supply) NYOE 29-2/7 PAC 2/68
(3) (C) Material Services:

(a) Class I: During this reporting period the following quantities of items
were issued to supported customers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEMS</th>
<th>POUNDAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perishables</td>
<td>683,727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Perishables</td>
<td>2,166,444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-Rations</td>
<td>534,665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sundries</td>
<td>50,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LKPS</td>
<td>2,186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,924,139 lbs (757 Tons)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Class II: Most items of this category (clothing, individual equipment,
tentage, hand tools) are received, stored, and issued by ESC. The issue of clothing
to replacements at the Brigade Supply Service Stock and to the Brigade units
continued at significant levels during the three month period. A total of 1,285
sq. tropical fatigue coats and 6,183 sq. fatigue trousers was issued. These
figures, however, are less than those issues reported in the last
report. A lower level of replacement turnover is the reason for this decrease.

During this period the FSH continued to maintain a stock of fast moving ex-
pandable items for use by the Brigade units in the Tan Son Nhut area. Due to
large demand these same items, including all mess hall expandable supplies and various batteries, were doubled. Data on the number of batteries distributed includes those distributed at the Phu Loi area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BATTERY</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
<th>MISS MARK - PAPER AND PLASTIC</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BA 50</td>
<td>136,752ea</td>
<td>PLATES (CTN)</td>
<td>1361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA 62</td>
<td>1,774ea</td>
<td>CUPS (CTN)</td>
<td>728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA 50</td>
<td>1,703ea</td>
<td>KNIFE (CTN)</td>
<td>572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA 366</td>
<td>1,702ea</td>
<td>FORK (CTN)</td>
<td>593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA 200</td>
<td>1,857ea</td>
<td>SPOON (CTN)</td>
<td>587</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(c) Class III: POL products are received from depot, stored at the FSE and issued to using units in bulk, package products, vehicle re-fuel station and through mobile re-fuel (21 Ton Tractors) for delivery on site. Gasoline and diesel fuels are the major items of issue. Bulk quantities issued during this period are cited below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>NOGAS</th>
<th>DF #2</th>
<th>FSH#4 (AVN)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>30,400</td>
<td>22,900</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>33,600</td>
<td>24,200</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July (1-22)</td>
<td>30,200</td>
<td>19,200</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL (Gal)</td>
<td>124,200</td>
<td>66,300</td>
<td>1700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Class IV: During this period greater control over construction within the Brigade was attained by routing all proposed construction through the Brigade S-4 for final approval. No issues of construction material were made unless items were a part of a project that had S-4 approval. Most projects have been temporarily halted because construction lumber has become a USARV controlled item and Brigade stocks of this item are at a zero balance. A very limited supply of construction materials are stocked at the FSE in the form of a Push-Package (Project Jump) for a battalion stand contingency operation. Other supplies are requested by the customers through the FSE against BSO stocks. The BSO ships the supplies to the customer through the FSE. Most of these materials are used for the construction of fire bases.

The following issues were made on fast moving fortification items that are stocked at the FSE and the Phu Loi Base Camp.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>U/I</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barbed wire</td>
<td>RL</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8' Engineer Stakes</td>
<td>EA</td>
<td>4,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5' Engineer Stakes</td>
<td>EA</td>
<td>688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3' Engineer Stakes</td>
<td>EA</td>
<td>2,664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concertina wire</td>
<td>CL</td>
<td>2,319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandbags</td>
<td>HD</td>
<td>4,467 (446,700 ea)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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(a) Class V: The Brigade ammunition office has processed the following number of issues and/or turn-in's:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of issues</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of excess turn-in's</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of salvage turn-in's</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of unreserviceable turn-in</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(f) Class VII: The Brigade has continued to receive substantial quantities of TOE major and items. The receipts of significance were:

1. 13 ea Trucks, Utility 1 Ton M131A1
2. 4 ea Compressors, Reciprocating 3 ½ CFM
3. 73 ea Antenna Group RC-292
4. 43 ea Night Vision Sights AN/PVS-3
5. 9 ea Telephone Sets TA-1/FT
6. 235 ea Loudspeakers LS-454/""
7. 36 ea Flamethrowers, Portable
8. 50 ea Detectors Sets, Mine
9. 7 ea Generator Sets 5kw and over
10. 24 ea Generator Sets 5kw and under

The Commander's Critical Items List has continued to be an effective tool in the receipt of mission essential critical items needed by units of the Brigade. During the reporting period a total of 35 items were reported. A total of 16 of the items have been received already and up to date status is known on all the items not yet received.

(g) Class VIII: Medical supplies received directly from the depot are issued directly to the FSE Hospital and Battalion Medical Platoons. Approximately 85% of the items requested by customers are stocked in sufficient quantities for immediate issue. Quantities of the faster moving items issued during this period are cited below.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Leatherneck Dismantled of 3d Bde, 82d Abs Div
for period 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969. (C)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>Stry. Surge. (lbs)</th>
<th>Pept Powder (cans)</th>
<th>Tetracycline (bottles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAY</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>1,440</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUNE</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>1,528</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JULY</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>1,586</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>92,000</td>
<td>5,052</td>
<td>624</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Problem Areas:

(1) At the present time requiring refrigeration cannot be stored in the medical supply area.

(2) This problem is the result of inadequate power output from the self help electrical wiring project for the supply building.

(3) Refrigerated items are now being stored in the Class I refrigerators. This makes it more difficult to issue and secure such items.

(k) Class II: Direct exchange repair parts are provided the battalion maintenance sections by the FSE Technical Supply Section the Battalion Maintenance PLL's are replenished through the FSE supply section by the Technical Supply Section of the Support Battalion. Presently the FSE carries 89 line items of repair parts 39 of which are direct exchange items.

(1) Services:

2. Laundry: This service is provided the Brigade on contract through the Saigon Support Command and through individual local hire of laundry maids. Since the service is provided through two separate sources, statistical data of real value cannot be provided brigade-wide. Of the average 125 personnel assigned to the FSE approximately 65 utilize the contract laundry and adding the hospital and dental laundry the average monthly expenditures has been $550.00.

2. Baths: Presently three bath units are being operated for the Brigade. One is provided in the trains area, a second is provided at a fire base of the 1/50th Infantry and a third is provided to a fire base of the 1/505th Infantry.

2. Water Supply: Approximately 10 to 12 thousand gallons of water are provided the FSE and other Brigade elements daily. This is in addition to the water supplied the battalions by organic water tankers.

4. Graves Registration: Due to the close proximity of the FSE Mortuary Depot only personal effects are processed through the FSE. During this period 32 cases of personal effects were processed which included 13 in May, 7 in June and 12 in July.

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§. Miscellaneous Services:

(a) Map Supply: Thirty-five (35) Map items are
at the FSE. The Map Supply Section issued
1,830 maps to the Brigade during this period.

(b) Captured Enemy Equipment: Captured items of equipment are turned over
to the FSE by the Brigade. No items have been turned into USAF during this period.
Explosive items are released to USAF EOD personnel immediately.

(b) Transportation: Requirements for this period were mainly hauling equip-
ment from depot to BSO, FSE and battalion forward areas. The provisional Truck
Platoon is administered by C Company, 82d Support Battalion and the provided back-
up support by the 48th Transportation Group. Total short tons moved during this
period was 2,450.

(b) Maintenance: (C) Direct support maintenance is provided to the Brigade by
Company C, 82d Support Battalion. Organizational maintenance is the responsi-

This status represents work received and accomplished at both the main shop and
at the FSE.

(a) Maintenance Problems:

1. The engine for the M1341 caused considerable difficulty due to unknown
faults apparently during engine rebuild or overhaul. The cylinder head gasket
blew after 12 to 36 hours of operation.

2. Nine engines were replaced during this period of which 5 were defective;
all had the same defect- blown head gaskets.

1. The AMC representative was contacted and came to check some of the defective
engines. It was related that this problem existed Company wise. The Technical Rep-
resentative referred the problem to the Saigon Army Depot for a possible solution.
(6) **Technical Supply:** Pertinent data for this period is cited below:

- a. Requests received: 7,028
- b. ASL issues: 2,720
- c. Total requests received: 5,513
- d. Total replenishment requests: 2,807
- e. Total transactions: 23,557
- f. ASL lines: 1,345
- g. Fringe lines: 6,012
- h. Demand satisfaction: 49%
- i. Demand accommodation: 78%

**Problem Area:** Tech Supply had a critical need for more adequate storage area. Primarily a warehouse for small repair parts.

**Solution:** Tech Supply has obtained a warehouse building which is 50'x20', with 10' interior height. It was obtained through the self help program. This building is presently under construction.

(7) (C) **Engineer:** During the reported period, each Infantry Battalion was supported by a minimum of one OPCON Engineer Squad. This support was increased to a maximum of one OPCON Engineer Platoon as required. All other Brigade units were supported on a mission basis.

(a) **Combat Engineer Support to the Infantry**

1. Mine detector Teams
2. Demolition Teams
(b) **Fire Base/Patrol Base Support**

1. Tactical Bunker Construction
2. Marshall Construction
2. Road Construction and Repair
2. Helipad Construction
5. Delivery of Sandbag Fill
6. Overhead Cover for Surveillance Radar
7. Observation Towers
8. General Earthwork and Drainage.
2. Water Purification Units at FSB's Harrison, Patton, Claudette, Barbara and Chris
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(c) Red Ball Support

1. General's Mess Improvements
2. S-1 Office Improvements
3. Bunker for 58th Signal Company
4. TOC Improvements
5. General Improvement of Grounds and Perimeter Defenses

(d) Pnu Loi Support

1. Sand and Gravel Transport
2. Construction of Brigade Stand-Down area (16-16x32 buildings on concrete slabs).

General Support

(e) Improvements to Road Net

(f) Trains Area Support

1. Grease Bank Construction for 2/505 Infantry
2. Ammunition Construction for 1/505 Infantry
3. Water Tower Construction for 2/505 Infantry
4. General Earthwork and Road, Hardstand, and Drainage Improvements

(g) Civic Action Projects

1. Repair of Schoolhouse Roof (Vinh Loc)
2. Earthwork (Vinh Tinh)
3. Leveling of 25 Acres of Damaged Rice Paddy Vicinity Fire Support Base All American

(h) Special Projects


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2. Construction of a Floating Dock for Watercraft at the Cau Bong Bridge.

2. Construction of a 16 x 24 Southeast Asia Hut, one crane rack, and three helipads for WAC GAC.

(h) Special Operations

1. A Protective Minefield of Unknown Origin was cleared at FSB Bartars. Approximately 55 M-16 Bounding Mines were destroyed.

In Support of 1/508 Infantry, 7 km of Route 7A were cleared daily for 23 days. The following mines were found:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>FIRING SYSTEM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Chicom TNT</td>
<td>Pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>105mm Unit</td>
<td>Pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>105mm Unit</td>
<td>Electric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Unknown Loose Explosive</td>
<td>Pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>M-79 Round</td>
<td>Electric</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Land Clearing/Tunnel Clearing Operations in M Snoppy, Began 19 Jan 69, were completed during the reporting period. Final results are:

1. Area Cleared: 2,136 Acres

2. Tunnels Destroyed: 53,727 Meters

2. Material Captured:

(a) 5.56mm Rounds - 108
(b) 5.56mm Fuses - 10
(c) 81mm Mortar Rounds - 10
(d) 60mm Mortar Rounds - 33
(e) Mortar Fuses - 22 canes
(f) 75mm Recoiless Rifle Rounds - 114
(g) 51 Caliber Rounds - 200
(h) 50mm Rounds - 4,000
(i) 4.2cm Mortar Rounds - 5,000
(j) M-60 Rounds - 1 Box
(k) M-16 Rounds - 2 Boxes, 2 Magazines
(l) 4.2 Mortar Rounds - 1
(m) 155mm Rounds - 1
(n) 105mm Rounds - 1

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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Bn, 52d Abn Div
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(o) Land Mines - 2
(p) BET - 1
(q) AK-50 Rifles - 2
(r) M-1 Rifle - 1
(s) Thompson Submachinegun - 1
(t) M-16 Bipod - 1
(u) TNT - 3 cases
(v) Miscellaneous items of US clothing and equipment - 17

4. POW's - 2

f. (C) Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs: During the reporting period psychological operations were carried out using leaflet drops, loudspeaker missions (ground and aerial), leaflet distribution, face to face discussions, and the displaying of posters. Brigade psychological operations were primarily supported by the 6th Psyop Battalion. The original HE Team (audio and visual capabilities) was supplemented with an HB Team (audio capabilities) and an additional vehicle. Psychological operations within the brigade are now conducted by one officer, 2 NCOs, one EM and an ARVN interpreter and all CPCON from the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion.

The themes most often used in operations are:

a. Third Party Induce-ment (TPI)
b. Voluntary Informant Program (VIP)
c. Chieu Hoi Program
d. Rewards Program
e. Support the GVN
f. Atrocities of the VC
g. Allied forces are your friends
h. News and Music (especially during Medcaps)

Psyops accomplishments during the reporting period are as follows:

a. Air leaflet missions 18
   Leaflets dropped 526,000

b. Ground Leaflet missions 50
   Leaflets dispersed 21,470

c. Air Loudspeaker missions 11
   Hours 52

d. Ground Loudspeaker missions 101
   Hours 265

e. Audio Visual
   Hours 61

f. Newspapers distributed
   6810

g. Magazines distributed
   3185

h. Posters distributed
   5590

i. Cultural Drama Team
   3
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Besides the stated psychological operations; the HE Team was of great assistance in providing publicity for the Brigade Medcap/Dentcaps program, controlling the civilian population during cordon and search operations, providing safety information to the villages concerning nearby operations, and providing quick reaction Chieu Hoi appeals when elements of the command were in contact. The HE Team was utilized in a similar capacity in addition to showing movies in the hamlets.

In support of the Brigade psychological operations program, on request from the US Air Force, through Capital Military Assistance Command, missions were flown by C-147 aircraft and U-10. Known as "Gabby" and "Earlyword" respectively, those crafts are available to enhance the psyops effort. Additional materials were available from JUSPAO, and 4th Psyops Group.

During the reporting period all the organic equipment that is available to the Brigade was demonstrated at a commanders conference at Camp Red Ball. The 25 watt bullhorn, for use at company levels; the 250 watt backpack used by the psyops team on tactical operations such as combat assaults; the 1000 watt speaker and the Earlyword System utilizing the U-10 aircraft were all demonstrated.

During this reporting period an Armed Propaganda Team for Gia Dinh Province Chieu Hoi Center became OPCON to the Brigade. Utilized on Medcaps and Dentcaps to spread information throughout the hamlet concerning Third Party Inducement, Voluntary Informant, and Chieu Hoi Program, the AIT gathered considerable information concerning the VC and VCI in certain areas. In addition, they were utilized in the area around Camp Red Ball to check whatever grievances the people of An Khun Village might have.

The reporting period saw increased cooperation between Psyops elements of S-5 and the Counterintelligence section of the 518th MID concerning the programs mentioned above. Continued cooperation should enhance the success of the TFI and VIP programs in the AO.

Seventeen soliation payments totaling $6,866 were made as consolation to persons injured or suffering loss due to accidents involving the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division.

g. (C) Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support: During the reporting period civil operations continued in the original area of operations of Tan Binh, Go Vap and Hoc Mon. Continued support of the hamlet officials, GVW and support in the form of aid to the villages (Medcaps, Dentcaps, sanitary facilities improvement, road improvement, commodity distribution, agricultural programs etc.) resulted in the upgrading of the original area of operations to the desired minimum level of security and pacification. As of the 30 June Hamlet Evaluation System, the hamlets of Tan Binh, Go Vap and Hoc Mon had a Hamlet Evaluation System rating of "C" or better.

Extensions to the original area of operations placed the 3/82 Pacification program into 5 additional districts and 3 additional provinces to include Dinh Chanh District, Gia Dinh Province; Phu Hoa District, Binh Duong Province; Cu Chi and Duc Hoa Districts in Hau Nghia Province and Ben Lom District in Long An Province. In these areas, with several cordon and search operations, Medcaps, Dentscape, psyops coverage and intelligence elements were at a maximum. The area of operations is approximately 32 km in length.

During the reporting period the Vinh Loc Village area pacification plan was incorporated into the Model Pacification Study to include background, military efforts in the area, psyops coverage and civic action. The Model Pacification Plan graphically describes the concept, planning and implementation responsible for bringing the "E" rated hamlets to a HES rating of "C" within a short period of time. The Model Pacification Plan was briefed to the following:

Commanding General, II Field Force
Commanding General, Capital Military Assistance Command
Commanding General, Capital Military District (Vietnamese)
Deputy Commanding General, Capital Military District (Vietnamese)
Deputy Commanding General, United States Military Assistance Command Staff
C-5, United States Army, Vietnam
Commanding Officer, 1st SOTP Group
Joint United States Public Affairs Office

With help from the aid station at Camp Red Ball, a medical advisory team has been working daily in An Nhun Village, surrounding Camp Red Ball. They have been working with much success at two aid stations and one maternity clinic with noticeable improvements noted.

An agricultural improvement program has been established by 2/321 Artillery S-5. As part of an overall agricultural improvement program originating at province level (Gia Dinh), the Artillery is attempting to upgrade the rural economy by diversification of crops. Sixteen different seeds have been introduced to several farmers in the Hoc Hon District. Along with the seeds, the Battalion S-5 has distributed fertilizer, lime and a weekly program for destroying pests like bugs. This is a pilot program, but with continued success the program will grow in size.

A combined Bde/Br 3-5 effort was initiated during the reporting period. Each Saturday morning a different group of school students from within the AO were treated to a trip to the Saigon Zoo. With cooperation from the US Air Force, in the form of a bus driver, about 15 youngsters a week were given their first opportunity to see the Saigon Zoo and for many the first opportunity to see Saigon.
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After lunch at the Zoo, the bus returns to their hamlet schoolhouse by way
of the Presidential palace, the American Embassy and the Saigon docks. In quali-
tative being a big hit with the young people, it neutralises VC propaganda which
claims Saigon is in ruins.

A total of 103 Medcaps treating 16,016 patients were held in the 40 in-
cluding ensembles during the reporting period. In conjunction with these,
tere were 25 Dentcaps treating 1,221 patients. These Dentcaps were held by
either the Us Air Force Dental Team from Tan Son Nhut Air Base or by a team
from the 36th Medical Detachment.

In coordination with civic action projects the following material and com-
modities were distributed during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cement</td>
<td>1,074 lb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tin sheets</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber</td>
<td>36 lb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paint</td>
<td>36 gal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Briefs</td>
<td>3,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sand</td>
<td>39 ft²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culverts</td>
<td>12 rolls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wire</td>
<td>21 MG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement pillars</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gravel</td>
<td>21 MG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer stakes</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lime</td>
<td>4,000 lb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertiliser</td>
<td>2,000 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeds</td>
<td>200 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>4,000 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sand Bags</td>
<td>280 rolls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health items</td>
<td>600 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>300 lbs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

h. (c) Communications:

(i) During the reporting period 1 May - 31 July 1969, the 58th Signal
Company and communications elements of subordinate battalions maintained the
following Brigade operational and administrative communications systems:

(a) VHF Radio Relay Systems:

(i) 12 Channel radio relay systems provide sole-user telephone "hotlines" for VC operational traffic, dedicated teletypewriter circuits for command and
control traffic, and common-user telephone trunks for administrative between
CMAG, the Brigade Main Command Post at Camp Red Ball and the Brigade Rear Base
Camp at Phu Loi Post.

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(2) 4-channel radio relay systems provide TOC to TOC hotlines, artillery coordination hotlines, and common-user telephone trunks between the Brigade Main CP and the fire support bases of the subordinate infantry battalions and artillery battalion. An additional system provides access for each of the infantry battalion rear areas and the Forward Support Element of the Support Battalion at Tan Son Nhut into the Brigade telephone system.

(b) FM Radio Nets: The Brigade operates a Brigade Command Net, a Brigade Secure Net, and a Brigade Surveillance Net primarily for tactical operational traffic and enters the CMAC Command and Secure Nets.

(c) Radioteletypewriter Net: The Brigade maintains an AN/SSB RTT net including all its subordinate battalions. Though normally passing only limited intelligence traffic, the net has proved invaluable for maintaining administrative and casualty reporting traffic with battalions operating temporarily under a different headquarters at extended ranges from Brigade.

(2) Additional communications support provided from outside the Brigade consists primarily of base camp communications.

(a) At Camp Red Ball the 69th Signal Battalion provides 16 dial lines into MACV Dial Telephone Exchange and 3 trunks from the Brigade Chippewa Main switchboard to MACV, providing access to the area system. At Tan Son Nhut, the Air force provides six dial lines from the Brigade Trains area to the Tan Son Nhut Dial Exchange.

(b) At Chu Loi Post, Company B/442, 36th Signal Battalion, provides post signal functions including a manual telephone exchange with access to the Corps area network and over-the-counter communications center service with access into the world-wide communications center network.

(c) CMAC provides a radioteletypewriter set AN/GRC-162 at Camp Red Ball for entry into the CMAC RTT net.

(d) The 69th Signal Battalion and the 40th Signal Battalion provided telephone pole installation support to the Brigade for specific projects like the Vinh Loc Signal civic action project.

(3) The Brigade MARS Station, established on 1 April 1969 and operated by the 58th Signal Company, completed the following numbers of MARS calls during the reporting period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>CALLS COMPLETED</th>
<th>RED CROSS PRIORITY CALLS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1. During the reporting period the Public Information Office accomplished
   the following activities:

   (1) Hometown news released: 646
   (2) Photographs with caption released: 16
   (3) Features/news stories: 55
   (4) Processed film: 118
   (5) Photographs processed/distributed: 204
   (6) Radio Broadcasts: 0
   (7) Number of national news media representatives escorted: 7

2. (C) Inspector General

   (1) The Inspector General coordinated with the following units which have
       received their Command Readiness Inspection: C/307 Engr, 1/506 Inf, 2/321 Arty,
       1/505 Inf, 1/75 Engr, HHC, 3d Bde, 518 MI Det, and 62d Spt Bn. The inspection
       team consisted of the principal staff of the S-1 through S-5 and Brigade Signal,
       Chemical, and Surgeon special staff sections. The Deputy Brigade Commander was
       the head of the inspection team.

   (2) Fifteen investigations were conducted by this office. Eight requests
       for assistance were received and completed. The majority of the complaints re-
       ceived have been found to be unjustified.

   (3) On 5 July 1969, the Acting Inspector General presented a 50 minute
       orientation to a new Replacement Training class on the agencies available in
       the Brigade to assist them with their problems and the policies of the Commanding
       General.

3. (C) Staff Judge Advocate: During the reporting period the following Staff
   Judge Advocate activities were accomplished:

   1. Total Persons Punished: 327
      (a) E-4 and below: 23
      (b) E-5 and above: 80
      (c) Commissioned: 0

   2. Personnel who were offered and refused to accept nonjudicial punishment under Article 15, UCMJ: 7

   3. Actions favorable to persons, i.e. suspension of sentence: 6

   4. Actions unfavorable to persons, i.e. vacation of suspension: 2

   5. Total number of appeals: 6

   6. Summary Courts: 9
### SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abs Hvy for period 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969: (U)

#### 7. Special Courts:
- **23**

#### 8. Legal Assistance:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF ASSISTANCE</th>
<th>INTERVIEW</th>
<th>INSTRUMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship, Immigration, Passports</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power of Attorney</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Relations and Paternity</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Property - Automobiles etc</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Property - Sale, Leases, etc</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Finances, Debts, Insurance, etc</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wills and Estates</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL:** 63 50
2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commanders Observation, Evaluation, and Recommendations.

   a. Personnel, None.

   b. Operations.

   (1) Kit Carson Scouts.

   (a) OBSERVATION: In AO HERCULES the Kit Carson Scout proved to be an invaluable asset.

   (b) EVALUATION: The ability of the Kit Carson scouts to read the terrain for information concerning enemy mines/booby traps and tunnels and their ability to gain information from the local population assisted greatly in making Operation Dirty Devil a success.

   (c) RECOMMENDATION: More Kit Carson Scouts should be attached to company size units. A desirable number of Kit Carson per company would be 10. This number would allow the company to have at least two per platoon and two retained with the company CP. For purposes of companionship, Kit Carson Scouts should whenever possible be employed in pairs.

   (2) Fighting in built up Areas.

   (a) OBSERVATION: In the built up areas in AO HERCULES all of the houses were connected by tunnels and had extremely well built bunkers on the interior of the houses.

   (b) EVALUATION: The enemy would fire upon friendly forces from one area in the village. Once his location was pinpointed he would rapidly move to another section of the village by way of these tunnels. At this time he would place fire upon the flanks and rear of the friendly forces.

   (c) RECOMMENDATION: When fighting in built up areas, maximum use should be made of medium and heavy artillery with delayed action fuses. If TAC Air is utilised, 750 lb high drag bombs should be used against the bunkers and tunnels. Troops searching the area must move extremely slow and must search several buildings concurrently. Flamethrowers should be retained at the FSE where units can use them to clear buildings and bunkers.

   (3) S-3 TOC and S-2 TOC Communications:

   (a) OBSERVATION: In AO HERCULES there was a continuous flow of traffic on the tactical sets and a sufficient amount on the intelligence nets to warrant a S-3 and S-2 TOC.
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(b) EVALUATION: Due to the steady flow of traffic on the operations nets, it became extremely difficult to transmit or receive intelligence information that might affect immediate or pending operations. During this period the 1-508 used an intelligence net and was able to reduce the amount of non-operational traffic over the Battalion command net and to transmit traffic concerning intelligence to higher headquarters with no delay.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the Bn S-2 set up and maintain an intelligence net (S-2 TOC) to higher headquarters so that all intelligence traffic will be transmitted over this net and not tie up the command net.

(4) Use of Ranger Teams

(a) OBSERVATION: The 1-508 gained valuable information concerning enemy movement from the ranger teams.

(b) EVALUATION: In AO HERCULUS it was discovered that the best technique for clandestine insertions of Ranger Teams into surveillance sites was via attachment to TOE units. By doing this the 1-508 obtained valuable information and the Ranger Teams killed 4 VC/NVA (VC).

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Ranger Teams should be attached to a company sized element by resupply helicopter. The element will then fly into the desired area of operation for the Ranger Teams and will drop them off at a suitable position, then the company or platoon will continue with its normal mission.

(5) Overland Troop Movement in AO SWORDFISH.

(a) OBSERVATION: Due to the inundated nature of the terrain in AO SWORDFISH overland movement was difficult.

(b) EVALUATION: Two thousand meters per day was the maximum distance rifle companies could be expected to move. Beyond that troops became exhausted, both physically and mentally. The physical condition of personnel had to be given more than the usual amount of consideration.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When possible, unit commanders should plan daily operations that do not cover more than 2 kilometers. For more distant and extended operations, helicopters, river patrol boats (PRB) and ski barges are a necessity. When preparing for operations in areas such as AO SWORDFISH personnel must be briefed thoroughly on the type of terrain to expect and also be told to carry as light a load as possible. Mission essential items (i.e., demolition equipment) should be kept on hand at the FSE helipad.
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(6) Navy River Patrol Boats (PRB)

(a) OBSERVATION: In areas adjacent to the Van Cu Long and Ben Luc Rivers, Navy river patrol boats (PRB) provided an excellent means of transportation.

(b) EVALUATION: Navy River Patrol Boats (PRB) provided an excellent highly responsive means for moving and re-locating troop elements and for the clandestine insertions and extractions of sampan ambush teams. The river patrol boats and infantry troops complimented each other, the boats transported the troop elements and the troops conducted denial operations, preventing hostile forces the chance to ambush the patrol boats.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Any unit operating vicinity of the Van Cu Long and/or the Ben Luc Rivers should effect staff coordination with River Div Hqs located at Ben Luc. Brigade level JSTs should be exchanged with the River Div Hqs at Ben Luc to insure continued and close communications and coordination.

(7) Airmobile Combat Assaults and Checkpoints and Topper Missions.

(a) OBSERVATION: In order to conduct proper operations against hard intelligence or swiftly relocate troop elements, helicopters are necessity in inundated areas.

(b) EVALUATION: Due to the inundated nature of the terrain and since the objective of the battalion was to conduct denial operations, helicopters became of necessity the primary means of transport. When air assets were available they proved to be invaluable. Besides having troops airlifted to new objectives swiftly, having experienced and efficient gunships were a definite asset to cover operations and to spot and mark enemy personnel and positions.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When units are working in inundated areas the minimum amount of airmobile assets should be made available in order to conduct effective combat operations. So that all airmobile operations may be conducted efficiently and with minimum loss of life, unit commanders should brief all element leaders on the procedures and methods for setting up pickup and landing zones (ie: configurations, marking chalks, speed of loading and unloading helicopters).

(8) Sampan Operation.

(a) OBSERVATION: Sampans were used for quiet and efficient insertions of daylight patrols and night ambushes.

(b) EVALUATION: Since there were numerous canals suited for movement by sampans, some units found them to be useful to cover a great deal of ground effectively with the minimum amount of time. A type of waterborne Eagle Flight was possible. Three to four men were able to move in one sampan, five to six sampans were used together to provide needed security and an adequate size force.
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(c) RECOMMENDATION: Battalion size elements should have at their disposal
when operating in areas such as AO SWORDFISH at least ten sampans. They
will be used by companies when leaders deem the tactical situation permits. Personnel
using these sampans should have adequate communications, be strong swimmers and
be familiar with life saving techniques.

(9) Night Firing of M-16 Rifle.

(a) OBSERVATION: In a combat situation, through questioning of troops,
few personnel have ever fired their weapons at night.

(b) EVALUATION: It has been proved that individuals have a tendency to fire
high during the hours of darkness while on ambush.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all personnel, regardless of time in country, be
allowed to fire their weapons at night, while the company is on a stand-down at
the firebase. It will be done on the battalion firing range and would be the
ideal time to conduct night firing training.

(10) Joint US/ARVN Cordon and Search Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: There is a tendency for ARVN units to select too large
of an area for cordon and search operations.

(b) EVALUATION: Areas selected by ARVN units were too large to be adequately
searched for the number of troops employed. It has been found to be better to
over-cordon and have excess search troops, than not to have enough.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Extensive planning and coordination should be conducted
prior to a joint US/ARVN cordon and search operation. In many instances the cor-
don area will have to be reduced to permit a successful operation.

(11) PHYSICAL FITNESS

(a) OBSERVATION: Personnel assigned duty at a semi-permanent firebase should
maintain a high degree of physical combat proficiency.

(b) EVALUATION: The various staff personnel assigned duty at a semi-permanent
firebase; i.e., T.O.C., Communications, Medical, Cooks, and Supply personnel; be-
cause of the nature of their particular jobs, have a need for an effective physical
training program in order to maintain a high degree of physical combat proficiency.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: A physical training program incorporating Army Drill I
should be organized for the above mentioned personnel. The number of repetitions
of each exercise can be increased as desired up to 12. Army Drill I should be fol-
lowed by a run up to a distance of one mile or 10 minutes. It is recommended that
the program be organized and supervised by Officers and NCO's. Period for physical
training should be planned so that all those personnel working in shifts can be
given an opportunity to participate.
AERIAL-AC

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(12) AERO-Rifle Platoon

(a) OBSERVATION: The AERO-Rifle Platoon may be employed in an economy of force role.

(b) EVALUATION: The composition and rapid response time of the AERO-Rifle Platoon makes it well suited for an economy of force mission. The AERO-Rifle Platoon, consisting of 1 CAC, 1 Hunter-Killer Team and 2 lift ships with personnel, could be deployed against the enemy either in a blocking position or in a limited objective attack. After the initial insertion elements, organic to the battalion could be inserted, utilizing the two troop helicopters.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: In addition to Eagle Flights the AERO-Rifle Platoon should be available for use in the economy force mission against small localized enemy forces.

(13) Use of Riot Control Agent CS (Tear Gas)

(a) OBSERVATION: Riot control munitions should be used more extensively, where possible, to exploit tactically the ability to temporarily disable unprotected enemy troops or “flush” them from concealed or fortified positions.

(b) EVALUATION: All Brigade tactical units are currently equipped with the XM28 lightweight riot control agent mask. When non-persistent riot control munitions are used, such as the K158 (aerial) or E8 (ground), the CS concentration usually dissipates within 10 minutes after employment. Riot control agent CS may temporarily disable unprotected hostile troops, suppress their fires, “flush” them out of concealed positions, and reduce their ability to maneuver. Riot control munitions are especially useful when the exact location of enemy troops is unknown, in dense vegetation, or in conjunction with sensor readings, as one munition (K158) will initially cover an area of approximately 6500 square meters. However, these munitions should not be employed in close proximity to densely populated areas, as the civilians may experience extreme discomfort. As a guideline, on a warm day (lapse condition) riot control munitions should not be employed within 2 kilometers of friendly villages (downwind of target area); on cool, overcast days (neutral conditions) the minimum distance should be at least twice this.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: Riot control munitions should be used more extensively where weather or terrain permitting, to reduce enemy observation, fire and movement or “flush” from concealed positions, especially in support of sensor readings or when enemy location is uncertain.

(14) Use of antiplant agents in firebase/perimeter defoliation.

(a) OBSERVATION: Defoliants or the chemicals used to defoliate vegetation in RVN, are in extremely short supply and insufficient quantities are on hand for defoliation of all areas within firebases and base camps.

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(b) EVALUATION: Defoliants should be used on the vegetation in areas inaccessible for removal by methods such as cutting or burning. These may be areas within barbed wire aprons or contain uncharted minefields, etc. In areas readily accessible, where cutting or burning may not be used for removal of vegetation, a mixture of JP-4 and diesel fuel (one to one ratio) is almost as effective as the defoliants. Hand pumps, such as a 2½ gallon hand pump fire extinguisher should be used. Do NOT use any type of power-driven machinery to disperse the JP-4/diesel mixture, as it is extremely flammable and any sparks may cause the mixture to ignite violently.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Defoliants should be used for vegetation removal primarily where access to the area is restricted by barbed wire entanglements, minefields, etc. In areas which are accessible, vegetation may be removed by cutting, burning or application of a JP-4/diesel mixture using a hand pump sprayer.

c. Training. None.
d. Intelligence. None.
e. Logistics. None.
f. Organisation. None.
g. Other.

(1) AN/GRC-163 Usage.

(a) OBSERVATION: The first AN/GRC-163 system was established during this period and an evaluation of system performance follows. As new AN/GRC-163 equipment is issued the Brigade, it will be used to replace existing AN/GRC-112 systems.

(b) EVALUATION:

1. A 5-km AN/GRC-163 system was activated to replace an existing AN/GRC-112 system between the Brigade CP and Brigade Trains.

2. The new system operated with much greater reliability than the AN/GRC-112 system. The quality of the AN/GRC-160 Radio and AN/TCG-3 (AN/GRC-112) is somewhat better (lower noise, better frequency response) than the RT-52, R-442 and AN/TCG-70 (AN/GRC-163) when properly aligned. However, this is more than compensated by higher component reliability in the AN/GRC-163 and the fact that the AN/GRC-163 is almost completely "operator proof".

3. It was noted that the Narrow-Band Filter, FL-19501 (Narrow Band) can be used in place of the Wide-Band Filter in the R-442 without degrading the voice capability. The teletype mode was not tested under this condition.
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div
for period 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969. (U)

The repair of the AN/TCC-70 is extremely difficult when a failure does occur. One AN/TCC-70 has been deadlined approximately 60 days and another over 90 days due to the difficulty of obtaining parts. This equipment was evidently introduced without sufficient depot support available.

The weight of the antenna head is too great for the mast normally used with the AN/ARC-163. Erection is extremely difficult.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Parts supply problems for the AN/TCC-70 should be resolved as soon as possible.

2. Heavier mast sections or a lighter antenna head is required for the antenna.

(2) Nestor Key Change.

OBSERVATIONS: In July, II Field Force established a common Nestor Key List for all units operating within the III Corps Tactical Zone. In order to maintain compatibility, key changes must occur simultaneously in all units. The time chosen was midnight, local time.

EVALUATION: From a tactical point of view, midnight is the least desirable time for a key change, in that the maximum number of enemy contacts occur from 2200-0200. In addition, where several units share the same keygun, moving between areas at night to change key settings is both inconvenient and dangerous.

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that the daily Nestor Key change occur at 0600H.

(3) LOH Radio Problems.

OBSERVATION: During heavy rains, the LOH FM radios (AN/ARC-51) have proven extremely vulnerable to water damage.

EVALUATION:

1. The LOH does not have the weather protection enjoyed by the Husy and is quite susceptible to leaks during heavy weather.

2. Rain will follow antenna, control and handset cables into the radio compartment, shorting connectors and making the radio inoperative.

3. Local efforts to protect cables have met with only limited success.

RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that steps be taken to improve the water proofing of the AN/ARC-51 radio.
AVBK-AC


(4) Radios in Ambush Sites.

(a) OBSERVATIONS: In assaulting US ambush sites, VC-NVA units often direct initial fire against the unit radio/radio operator.

(b) EVALUATION: In two US ambushes that made heavy contact during the reporting period, the enemy located the position of the unit's radio prior to initiating their assault. The initial fire then took out the radio, radio operator and ambush leader. The radio's position may well have been located from the 10' whip antenna.

(c) RECOMMENDATION:
1. The 3-foot whip antenna should be used wherever terrain and distance permit.

2. Sufficient AN/GRA-39 remotes should be provided to separate the platoon leader from his radio at each ambush site.

(5) Signal Civic Action

(a) OBSERVATION: A number of civic action projects in the communications area could be conducted at a minimal cost to the government if a source for minor items of Signal equipment were available.

(b) EVALUATION:
1. An inter-hamlet telephone system was established by this Brigade for the village of VI'H Loc. Expendable items such as telephone poles and wire were obtained with no difficulty, but telephones and a manual switchboard were unobtainable through either normal logistics channels or through Civic Action Agencies.

2. The return in security and economic development for the limited system already installed has been enormous. However, no expansion of this system is possible without additional equipment.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: Non-expendable items of military equipment should be available through normal supply channels for use to Civic Action projects. Approval of these projects at Division or Separate Brigade level should be sufficient authority to requisition.
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for the Period 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report—Lessons Learned of the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for the period ending 31 July 1969, with the following comment: Reference paragraph 2g(2). The current crypto period for the four separate Corps—Zones' Joint SEA Ground Tactical Keylists was established in order to be compatible with that of other common keylists being utilised. Recently, this headquarters queried II FFORCEN OPCON units as to the optimum time for changing the key setting and received various recommendations. This matter will be discussed with representatives of OPCON units at a NSSTOR conference to be conducted at this headquarters on 29 September 1969 with a view toward arriving at an optimum time for the changeover. Subsequently, the matter will be discussed at a MACV NSSTOR conference to be conducted in the near future.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

B.G. MACDONALD
ILI, AGC
Asst AG
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO San Francisco 96375

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. (U) Reference item concerning "Kit Carson Scouts", section II, page 51, paragraph 2b(1); concur. Each major unit establishes a basis for the employment of Kit Carson Scouts (KCS). This headquarters then allocates the KCSs, within USARV space ceiling limitations, based upon the reported employment by the major unit.

   b. (C) Reference item concerning "Use of antiplant agents in firebase/perimeter defoliation", section II, page 55, paragraph 2b(14); nonconcur. Diesel oil is an acceptable defoliant. Its use as a defoliant is outlined in TM 5-630, Repairs and Utilities: Grounds Maintenance and Land Management, dated 1 May 1958. The JP4 defoliation mixture as recommended has a low flash point and is unacceptable for use from the safety standpoint.

   c. (C) Reference item concerning "LOC Radio Problems", section II, page 57, paragraph 2g(3); concur. The unit is advised to submit an EIR to insure that corrective action is properly initiated.

   d. (U) Reference item concerning "Signal Civic Action", section II, page 58, paragraph 2g(5); concur. Military equipment may assist in developing an area, however no mechanical system should be installed if it cannot be maintained technically and economically by the people subsequent to the US unit's departure from the area. Prior to the installation of a system of this nature, the Province Senior Advisor should be consulted and his approval obtained.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON  
LT, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10
GPOF-DT (18 Aug 69) 3d Inf

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division
for Period Ending 31 July 1969, LCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 17 Oct 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as endorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

D. A. TUCKER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May 69 to 31 July 69.

CO, 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division

8 August 1969

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N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

UNCLASSIFIED