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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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OPERATIONAL REPORT
HEADQUARTERS I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING
31 July 1969

1. SECTION I - SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

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<tr>
<td>Staff Judge Advocate</td>
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2. SECTION II - LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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<th>Category</th>
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<td>Logistics</td>
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<td>Other</td>
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1. Section I - SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

a. (C) General:

(1) During May, June and July 1969, United States Forces, Free World Military Forces and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam continued to conduct operations in the II CTZ. The major combat action of the report period was the Battle of Ben Het-Dak To that occurred in Northern Kontum Province during the period May - Jun 1969. In Binh Dinh Province the 173d Abn Bde continued its pacification efforts in Operation WASHINGTON GRFN. Enemy activity throughout the Corps area was generally light with the exception of Ben Het-Dak To. An adjustment of forces in the southern provinces was accomplished by placing the 2nd Squadron, 1st Cavalry OPCON to Task Force South and moving the Task Force headquarters from Da Lat to LZ Betty in the vicinity of Phu Thiet.

(2) Friendly losses for the period were 1228 KIA, 5021 WIA, and 404 MIA. Enemy losses were 6451 KIA, 548 PW's and 200 (military) Ho Chi Minh.

b. (C) Intelligence:

(1) General. Intelligence operations during the quarter ending 31 July was again directed toward supporting Allied units engaged in pacification and conventional military action. Continued improvement was noted in the collection and processing of information concerning enemy political activity and the pacification aspects of the war. Additionally, the intelligence organization furnished Allied units with the intelligence necessary to counter the Communists' Summer Offensive and the major enemy effort in the Ben Het/Dak To area. Significant steps were taken during the period to fully integrate both political/pacification intelligence and large unit intelligence.

(2) Enemy Order of Battle.

(a) Disposition of NVA, VC Main Forces and VC Local Forces is shown at Inclosure 1.

(b) Changes in Order of Battle holdings during the period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units Accepted</th>
<th>Confirmed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28th NVA Regiment</td>
<td>1400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th NVA Regiment</td>
<td>1705</td>
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</table>

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1 FFORCEV for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969, RGS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

K-394, NVA Artillery Battalion Probable 750
(K-34 Artillery Bn and K-39 NVA Bn combined)

D-251 Mobile Battalion Possible 300

2 Units Removed:
200C Infiltration Battalion Possible 230
5th NVA Division Headquarters Confirmed 700
406th Sapper Battalion Probable 75

Changes in Subordination: It is believed that the 5th NVA Division Headquarters has been dissolved and that the 10th NVA Regiment, 95th Artillery Battalion, 407th Sapper Battalion and the 30th Main Force Battalion are now subordinate to Southern Sub-Region Headquarters, Military Region 5.

(3) Significant Enemy Tactics and Techniques. The communists initiated their Summer Offensive on 8 May. The initial high point was generally Corps wide and occurred on 11-12 May. Thereafter the offensive was characterized by brief flurries of apparently uncoordinated enemy activity, except in Kontum Province. In the Ben Het/Dak To area the enemy massed a near divisional size force and engaged in protracted combat operations for nearly two months. It is believed that this action had the dual objective of drawing off allied forces from priority pacification areas, and destroying confidence in ARVN's combat capabilities. Throughout the rest of the Corps the enemy mounted sporadic attacks, primarily against pacification entities and RF/PF units. Significant was the month long burst of activity in the normally dormant area of southern 11 Corps. This sudden increase in initiative was coupled with the introduction of 107mm rockets into Binh Thuan and Tuyen Duc Provinces. This same weapon appeared in the Coastal provinces and was employed in an 8 July attack on installations at Cam Vung Bay. Enemy troops withdrew from the Kontum area during the last week in June, and July saw a virtual stand down by major enemy units. Of significance is an apparent shift in enemy organization for combat. Reports have indicated the formation of Task Force units, which should provide the enemy with greater flexibility to conduct attacks. The enemy has been noted increasing the use of small teams to attack medium sized targets; for example, employing a platoon to probe company and at times battalion positions. This tactic would be ideal for use by a task force, attempting to infiltrate sappers under cover of artillery attacks. If a significant breach in the defenses was obtained, infantry elements could be used to exploit the initial success.

(4) Enemy Losses and Strengths.

(a) Enemy losses during the period (DOW is 35% of KIA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>DOW</th>
<th>RW</th>
<th>SVN Casualties (Military)</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>G/S</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>2884</td>
<td>1002</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>1080</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>2388</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>673</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>1499</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>33</td>
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(b) Enemy strengths at the beginning and end of the quarter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 February 1969</th>
<th>30 April 1969</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NVA</td>
<td>11,345</td>
<td>12,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 May 1969</td>
<td>10,310</td>
<td>10,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LF/MF</td>
<td>5,275</td>
<td>4,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrilla</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>10,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>14,300</td>
<td>17,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>54,230</td>
<td>43,735</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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The increase in enemy strength during the period is directly attributable to the arrival of two new regiments (the 10th and 28th NVA Regiments) in II Corps.

(c) Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities and Probable Courses of Action.

1 In Kontum Province the enemy has, perhaps, the greatest and most varied set of capabilities within the II CTZ. He can conduct standoff attacks or combination standoff/sapper attacks against US/Allied installations and Kontum City, employing mortars of up to 120mm, 75mm recoilless rifle and rockets of up to 122mm. 85mm/100mm/105mm artillery may be employed against installations near the Cambodian border. He may conduct ground attacks against friendly installations in up to multi-regimental strength with division level support in the vicinity of Dak To and Ben Het, and he may interdict Highways QL 16N and 512, as well as other friendly LOC. The enemy can restrict friendly air activity with fire from small arms, automatic weapons, 12.7mm, 14.5mm and 37mm anti-aircraft weapons, and he has a limited armor threat in the vicinity of Ben Het.

2 Pleiku Province is also confronted with a variety of enemy capabilities to include: selective attacks on Pleiku City, Plei Djereng, Plei Me, Plei Meng, Duc Binh, Kha Ao, and Cao Lao, and all main areas in up to multi-battalion strength, supported by mortar, rocket and recoilless rifle fire; attack Pleiku City, US/ARVN bases, CIDO Camps, district headquarters and resettlement areas using 82mm mortar, recoilless rifle and 122mm/140mm rocket fire and sappers; set ambushes along QL 15C and QL 14, supported by 75mm recoilless rifle and 60mm/82mm mortar fire; attack LOCs 509, TL6C, TL37, TL7C and TL 7B with VC elements using antitank grenades, recoilless rifle and mortar fire. The possibility of a limited armor and artillery capability exists in the vicinity of Duc Co.

3 In Daklac Province the enemy is capable of attacking the district headquarters of Buon Ho and Lao Thi, and isolated hamlets in up to reinforced battalion strength. He can conduct ambushes and harassing activities along Highways QL 14 and QL 21 and attack Ban Me Thout City with a multi-battalion force employing 75mm recoilless rifle, 60mm/82mm/120mm mortars and 122mm rockets.

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AVFA-GC-07  15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, I FFORCVM for Quarterly
Period Ending 31 July 1969, BCS GFOR-65 (R1) (U)

4. In Quang Duc Province the enemy can conduct attacks by fire and
   ground attacks against Gia Nghia, Duc Lap, Than Co and Bu Prang.

5. In Lam Dong Province the enemy has the ability to conduct attacks
   by fire on Allied installations and hamlet defenses in up to battalion
   strength and continue attempts to interdict QL 20.

6. In Tuyen Duc province the enemy, employing 82mm mortars and 107mm
   rockets, can conduct standoff and sapper attacks on GVN and US instal-
   lations and ground attacks on these targets in up to battalion strength.

7. In Khanh Hoa Province the enemy can conduct attacks by fire on
   Allied installations and hamlet defenses in up to battalion strength,
   continue attempts to interdict QL 11, and attack Phan Rang Air Base with
   107mm/140mm rockets.

8. In Binh Thuan Province the enemy is able to conduct attacks by fire,
   employing 82mm mortars and 107mm rockets, and strike hamlet de-
   fenses and Allied installations in up to battalion strength.

9. In Khanh Hoa Province the enemy can conduct sapper/swimmer attacks
   and standoff attacks with 82mm mortars and 140mm rockets against Allied
   installations in the Cam Ranh Bay and Kha Trang areas. He can also con-
   duct company-size attacks against lightly populated areas.

10. In Phu Yen Province the enemy is capable of attacking population
    centers and allied installations in multi-battalion strength. The enemy
    can conduct terrorist and sapper activities and standoff attacks against
    friendly controlled areas and restrict movement along LOCs.

11. In Phu Yen Province the enemy is capable of conducting company-
    size attacks against Cheo Bao and district headquarters.

12. In Binh Dinh Province the enemy has the capability to attack
    the population centers, US/GVN/ROKA installations and units in multi-
    battalion strength, and can restrict movement on Highways QL 7 and QL 19
    by employing ambushes and mines or conducting standoff attacks and raids
    against friendly convoys and installations on and along those routes.
    The enemy is capable of conducting sapper and terrorist activities against
    friendly installations along the seacoast.

13. The enemy can employ chemical agents, using various delivery
    systems, during any attack.

14. The enemy can withdraw forces to base areas and sanctuaries for
    replacements, resupply and retraining.

15. The enemy can continue disruption of the GVN nation-building
    effort by assassinations, kidnapping and other terrorist acts.

16. The enemy is capable of entering outlying villages without
    opposition or as a result of minor contact to conduct propaganda lectures,
    recruit personnel, impress civilians as laborers/porters and to obtain
    provisions and information.

17. The enemy can establish limited political entities, i.e., People's
    Revolutionary Committees in contested and VC controlled areas.

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18. The enemy has the ability to reinforce with reserves located in sanctuaries in the Cambodian, Laotian, I CTZ and II CTZ border areas. Some enemy units which are currently active in I CTZ and III CTZ could be expected to redeploy to II CTZ, if the enemy shifts his area of interest to II CTZ. Size of reserves or reinforcements in sanctuaries is not known.

19. The enemy is capable of employing combinations of the above capabilities.

(b) Vulnerabilities:

(1) Enemy supply areas are generally insecure, rendering supply caches vulnerable to friendly search and destroy operations.

(2) The enemy has limited logistical support and cannot conduct extended offensive operations, unless he is near sanctuary areas.

(3) He is vulnerable to superior Allied fire-power when he masses near an objective and during withdrawal from the same.

(4) Low morale exists in many units owing to food shortages, sickness, heavy losses and continuing defeats. Thus the enemy is susceptible to friendly psychological operations.

(5) Enemy reliance on local civilians as a labor source makes larger operations vulnerable to friendly intelligence efforts.

(c) Probable Courses of Action:

1. The enemy's most probable course of action in the next quarter is to mount another corps wide offensive. It is probable that this offensive will be initiated in the early to mid-August time frame after the July standdown. Following previous tactics it is expected that the enemy will pose a major threat in the Highlands in an attempt to draw Allied forces from the Coastal area. There are indications that the enemy may spread his forces to several Highland areas as opposed to his normal massive threat in the Tri-Border area. The most likely second area is Ben Me Thuot. In the coming offensive it is believed that the Communists will take more aggressive action along the populated coast. Increased sapper, terrorist and stand-off attacks against Allied installations in metropolitan areas are considered a definite possibility. Employment of the to date relatively idle enemy regiments in Binh Dinh and Phu Yen Provinces against pacification and suburban targets is likely.

2. In Kontum Province, local forces are expected to carry the offensive effort while major NVA units refit and resupply for another offensive. Mining of the LOCs and harassing incidents, as well as increased antipacification actions will constitute the bulk of enemy activity. As yet there are few indications of any NVA offensive in Kontum, though major units are thought to be in the Tri-Border area and can deploy rapidly.

3. In Pleiku Province, enemy activity is expected to continue at a relatively low level with attacks by fire and harassing incidents predominant. Province LF units will carry the offensive until the 4th NVA Regiment and cooperating units are ready to begin combat operations again in the Plei Anloc-Pleiku area.
In Daklak Province, LF units are expected to continue with harassing and anti-pacification activity. The K394 Battalion is expected to conduct operations against Ban Me Thuot and Lac Thien as in the past.

In Phu Binh Province, there has been very light enemy action, and the same types and level of activity is anticipated unless enemy forces are augmented. Mining, attacks by fire against district headquarters and general harassment of pacification efforts is expected to constitute enemy activity.

In Quang Duc Province, it is anticipated that Local Force units will maintain a low level of activity unless NVA units infiltrate the area. The K394 Artillery Battalion appears to be targeted against Ban Me Thuot though it bases its operations from the Daklak-Quang Duc border. No change is expected in current enemy targeting unless some new and more lucrative target, such as increased friendly use of QL 14 or LTL 88, appears.

In Lam Dong Province the enemy will probably continue to limit ground operations to units of platoon to company strength and to launch standoff attacks against RF/PF units, GVN district headquarters, ARVN and US installations, particularly around Baoloc and Di Linh.

In Ninh Thuan Province enemy forces can be expected to conduct ground attacks in squad to platoon strength and to utilize standoff attacks against GVN and US installations employing rockets and mortars. Local Force units can be expected to continue mining and sabotage activity. Enemy objectives will probably continue to be RF/PF forces and Allied installations in the Phan Rang area, particularly around Phan Rang Air Base.

While the enemy is capable of multi-battalion attacks in Binh Thuan Province, he is more likely to conduct platoon and company-size attacks. RF/PF units, district headquarters and isolated ARVN and US forces remain prime targets for limited ground operations, and standoff attacks, particularly in Thien Diao and Ninh Thuan Districts.

In Tuyen Duc Province the enemy is likely to conduct ground attacks against RF/PF and lightly defended hamlets and emphasize rocket and mortar attacks against Allied installations particularly around Dalat.

In Binh Dinh Province, the probable course of enemy action will be to continue harassing attacks and terrorist activities against allied installations and populated centers. There is, however, the possibility that the enemy has completed his resupply and refitting and is capable of more aggressive attacks.

In Phu Yen Province the 10th Regiment may attempt to mount an attack in the Tuy Hoa Basin Area in the near future. However, the enemy will probably continue harassing activity and small scale isolated ground probes and attacks by fire as they regroup.
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AVFS-III-DT 15 August 1969


1. In Khanh Hoa Province attacks by fire and possibly a sapper attack in the Cam Ranh Bay or Nha Trang area are the most probable courses of action by the enemy.


(a) Changes in Sources, Agencies, and Techniques. During the quarter the I FFORC&V G2 Operations division was reorganized to meet shifting requirements for intelligence analysis. The new organization places emphasis on analysis of local level intelligence required in pacification operations. It is structured to provide additional support to the district and province organizations as well as the Field Force and other military commanders. A communications system for the rapid reporting of incidents and dissemination of intelligence will be instituted during the next quarter. No sacrifice of intelligence capabilities directed toward major enemy units has occurred. Rather, intelligence on all enemy entities has been integrated to provide a continuous picture of the enemy situation in the corps.

(b) G2 Air:

1. During the quarter the G2 Air continued to make available a OV-1 Mohawk aircraft from the 225th Surveillance Airplane Company to the 4th Infantry Division, 173d Brigade and Task Force South. One aircraft is assigned daily to the 4th Infantry Division while the 173d Brigade and Task Force South receive one aircraft every other day.

2. Comments from the participants in this program have been very favorable and it continues to be one of the most responsive photographic systems available in II CTZ. During the last part of the quarter an additional OV-1 aircraft was allocated to support requirements of the Senior Province Advisor in Quang Duc Province. The aircraft reports every other day to the Gia Nghia airstrip.

3. During the last half of the quarter the program was hampered by the large number of missions cancelled or aborted due to unfavorable weather encountered during the monsoon period.

2. During the reporting period the 225th Surveillance Airplane Company continued to provide SLAR coverage along the border areas in accordance with the MACV Recce Plan requirements. In flight reports were made to supported units and readout of imagery was passed to G2 Air and FSOS I FFORC&V.

3. During the last month of the reporting period, HQ Task Force South was relocated and the Infra-Red Ground Sensor Terminal Team which supports that headquarters is in the process of relocating in order to continue support.

4. The preponderance of aerial reconnaissance and surveillance assets were concentrated along known or suspected infiltration routes. A close and continuous watch is kept on road and trail complexes for any indication of use or repair and improvement of these routes. Extensive reconnaissance and surveillance was also devoted to areas selected by the G2 for intensive reconnaissance efforts. During the last
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AVFA-GG-OT 16 August 1969


Month of the reporting period eight intensive reconnaissance areas were being covered. These areas were covered by OV-1 Mohawk and both slick and infrared sensors; photo coverage was requested from the Air Force. Visual reconnaissance was provided by U-1s based in the province containing the area.

During the latter part of July plans were formulated by G2 Air and action was taken to plan a Reconnaissance Working Conference in early August. G2/S2 Air representatives from the major subordinate elements of I FFORCEN plus representatives from II Corps and ROK FFORCMV are expected to attend. The major objective of the conference will be to present a thorough orientation on the aerial surveillance and reconnaissance program in I FFORCEN and to familiarize G2/S2 Air personnel with the assets available to them and recommendations on how they may best be utilized. Discussions of problem areas will be encouraged and recommendations solicited as to how to make the present system more responsive and effective.

During the period 1 May through 31 July a total of 6,830 VFR sorties were flown with an average of 42 OV-1 aircraft. The VR missions resulted in a total of 509 airstrikes, 252 artillery missions and 589 ground actions in II CZ. In addition 202 VR sorties were flown with OV-1 aircraft. The OV-1 aircraft flew 113 photo, 5,831 infrared and 225 visual targets during the reporting period. The Air Force flew 332 infrared and photo targets in 155 sorties. The results of the completed missions were furnished the commanders concerned.

(c) G2 Collection. During the period 1 May - 31 July 1969 all captured weapons and material was processed and evacuated through 262 channels. During the period, 1st Air teams screened and classified 336 documents, and as a result of these interrogations a total of 115 documents were produced and distributed. Captured documents were reviewed and 34 feet of documents were forwarded to COMC for further utilization. 1st Air teams translated a total of 103 enemy documents.

(d) Detachment D, 1st BN (AIS). During the period 1 May 1969 through 31 July 1969, Detachment D, 1st BN (AIS) interpreted 1,505 photographs (575,532 prints) and prepared 2 reports which contained 1,277 items of significance. The reproduction section processed 183,993 feet of paper to meet the requirement of 384 reproduction requests. The delivery section flew 63 sorties in support of all Free World Air Forces in II CTZ, transporting 10,360 pounds of cargo. Hand-held photographic missions continued to receive emphasis within the Detachment's overall operation. It flew 117 hand-held missions resulting in 337 developed prints. During the period, the Detachment D, 1st BN (AIS) conducted two hand-held photographic courses at Khe Sahn, one course at Kontun and supervised one course at Pleiku. These courses resulted in the training of 29 US Army and 14 US Air Force and ROK personnel.

(e) 55th MI Detachment (Corps). For the period 1 May 1969 through 31 July 1969, the 55th Military Intelligence Detachment, imagery interpretation section, received 485 in-country missions and processed 420. In addition, 4 French Leave Missions were processed. The total of 56 Special Photographic Interpretation Reports were submitted, the following was accomplished by this section...

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AVFA-3C-0T
15 August 1969
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1 FFORCEV for Quarterly
Period ending 31 July 1969, RGS CSFOR-65 (E1) (U)

1. Partially completed three area studies covering approximately
4,375 square kilometers. Work continues on these areas.

2. Interpreted numerous missions covering the NVA road network and
border area, and provided current information on these areas to the
G2 Air, DASC Alpha and 64th Engineers Detachment (T).

3. Maintained updated master plates covering the 11 Corps Tactical
Zone in support of the 64th Engineer Det (T).

4. Constructed mosaics for requestors.

5. Briefed six visitors during the last quarter.

(T) Company C (Ranger), 75th Infantry. During the reporting period,
Company C (Ranger), 75th Infantry conducted operations in five separate
areas. Throughout the reporting period, from two to four platoons
have been available to the 173d Airborne Brigade to support pacifi-
cation efforts in northern Binh Dinh Province. From 30 April through
6 May 1969, one platoon conducted operations in support of the 4th Inf-
fantry Division in the La Drang Valley to detect enemy movement along
this infiltration route. From 17 May through 28 May, two platoons, un-
der 1 FFORCEV control, conducted operations in the To Hop/Ba Can
area in support of the 9th ROK Infantry Division. From 5 to 15 July,
two platoons conducted divisionary and intelligence operations in
support of the Capital ROK Infantry Division in the HUB area. From 21
to 31 July, two platoons supported Task Force South with operations
targeted against known enemy base areas in Binh Thuan Province.

(T') The 64th Engineer Detachment. During the quarter the de-
tachment accomplished the following tasks:

1. Compiled and overprinted forty (40) 1:100,000 scale map sheets
with infiltration routes throughout II CTZ. Distribution on this
study was completed during the period.

2. Updated and overprinted seventy four (74) 1:50,000 scale map
sheets with tactical data information throughout II CTZ. Dis-
tribution on this portion of the project has been completed. Work
is continuing on updating and overprinting the remaining seventy two
(72) map sheets and distribution will be initiated upon completion of
the overprinting.

3. Continued to produce terrain studies in anticipation of future
tactical operations.

4. Work was initiated on a terrain study of the area surrounding
the city of Djalat. This study was requested by the senior advisor at
the National Military Academy of Vietnam for use as a training aid in
terrain instruction in the curriculum. One liaison visit has been made
to the academy and the project is 50% complete as of the end of the re-
porting period.

5. Work was completed on a II CTZ briefing map. This map con-
ists of 11 1:250,000 map sheets which when assembled will be 45" x 96".

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The overprint shows province names and boundaries, cities and CIDG camps, and prominent land features. Also on this map is an easy guide for locating 1:50,000 scale map sheets.

6 During the period indicated, the third edition of the yearly updated lines of Communication Study was completed. This study consists of nine 1:250,000 map sheets. Each overprinted map sheet has the location and bridge number of bridges and road condition of highways in the 1st CTZ. Bridge designation and other pertinent information is displayed graphically on the reverse of each sheet.

7 Collection of aerial and ground photographic coverage of major 1st CTZ road bridges was completed during this reporting period.

(h) Detachment 31, 5th Weather Squadron. During this period the following types of weather support were furnished to agencies and units in 1st CTZ:

1 1st FORCENV: Forecasting, Staff Support, Climatological Support and Mobile Observation Teams.

2 5th Infantry Division: Forecasting, Staff Support, Observing and Climatological Support.

3 An Khe: Observations and forecasts as required.

4 Dutral (Cam Ly airfield): Observations and forecasts as required.

5 English Air: Observations and forecasts as required.

6 Phan Thiet: Observations and forecasts.

7 Task Force South: Forecasting and Climatological Support.

(e) Deviations from Current Intelligence Doctrine: None

(9) Recommendations of New Techniques and Changes in Doctrine and/or Organization: None.

(10) Weather.

(a) General. The southwest monsoon set in over 1st Corps during May and continued through July giving generally cloudy and wet weather to the interior and fairly good weather to the coastal area.

(b) Coastal. From 1 May through 20 May light southerly flow dominated the 1st CTZ giving generally fair skies with a few thunderstorms over the mountains near the coast in the late afternoon and evening. A few of these storms would move off of the mountains occasionally and drop about one inch of rain over the populated areas. This gave an average rainfall total by 20 May of around 2 inches on the northern half of the coast to very little rainfall in the Phan Rang area. With the onset of
the Southwest Monsoon about 21 May generally fair skies continued over the coastal area with an occasional increase in afternoon thunderstorm activity when strong surges in the southwest monsoon occurred. Most of the significant surges were associated with cyclonic disturbances in the South China Sea such as Typhoon Tess and lesser systems and lasted for two to four days. During these periods the skies were partly cloudy to cloudy with scattered late afternoon and evening rainshowers and thunderstorms. General monthly rainfall totals along the coast at reporting stations were from two to five inches.

(c) Interior. Before the onset of the southwest monsoon, the skies in the interior were generally partly cloudy with fog in the morning and scattered to few afternoon and evening thunderstorms. The thunderstorms, which were concentrated in the southern highlands and the southern slopes of the northern highlands, contained an average of one inch of rainfall in each storm. After 21 May the southwest monsoon had firmly set in and the skies in the interior became mostly cloudy with occasional periods in the late afternoon and evening of partly cloudy conditions. Frequently visibilities were reduced in the late night and early morning to less than one mile in fog, rain, and drizzle. Few rainshowers and thunderstorms also occurred during the afternoon and evening hours. The only significant variation in this pattern occurred when cyclonic disturbances formed in the South China Sea. Generally speaking when they were south of Tuy Hoa the weather deteriorated rapidly to conditions of continued cloudiness with rain, drizzle and fog almost all day as well as heavy afternoon rainshowers. Rainfall dramatically increased during this time period in the LZ Oasis to Pleiku area with LZ Oasis receiving nearly 20 inches in May, nearly 14 inches in June and over 36 inches of rainfall in July. Camp Enari received almost 9 inches in May, over 10 inches in June and over 27 inches of rainfall in July. These were the heaviest rainfalls recorded and the rest of the interior received from 5 to 10 inches each month.

(d) Effects on Operations. There were 292 TAG sorties cancelled due to weather and 2749 reconnaissance sorties cancelled due to weather during the period. No other effects are known.

c. (C) Operations and Training Activities.

(i) Plans: During the reporting period, one OPLAN, one LOI and five Studies were published. In addition, one Senior Commanders' Conference was held.

(a) Plans: OPLAN 69-69, concerned with Post Hostilities Planning in II CTZ was published on 3 Jul 69. Further discussion of the OPLAN is precluded by the classification of this report.

(b) LOI's: LOI 9-69 (SINGLE WAR CONCEPT) was published on 8 Jun 69. Further discussion of this LOI is precluded by the classification of this report.
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(c) Combined Campaign Plan: The Quarterly Summary of Progress Report toward achievement of the CCP goals was submitted to MACV on 14 Jul 69. The formal quarterly Review will be presented during the next quarter.

(d) Studies:

1. There were two force disposition studies completed during this quarter concerning ARVN and US forces respectively. Further discussion of these studies is precluded by the classification of this report.

2. There were two studies conducted concerning the CIDG Camps at BEN HET and DAK FAI respectively. Further discussions of these studies is precluded by the classification of this report.

3. There was one study conducted concerning requirements to open Highway QL 14 from DAN ME THAY to DUC LAP and QL 8B from DUC LAP to GIA NGHIA on a permanent basis. The study resulted in this headquarters providing specific guidance to DBA II Corps to accomplish the task.

(2) Summary of Ground Operations:

(a) Western Highlands Operations - May: Operations in the Highlands were centered in the Ben Het - Dak To area. A buildup of allied forces in the 24th STZ began on 6 May with the formation of TF Lien headquartered at Dak To. The Operation (DAN QUYI LN 38A) expanded to include as many as 9 maneuver battalions. Standoff attacks against allied forces, installations, lines of communication and the civilian population increased in regularity and intensity. Numerous combat assaults were conducted followed by search and clear operations to exploit the success of ARO light strikes.

1. US Operations: On 3 May 40 km NW of Plei de at AR74220, 3d Platoon, A Trp, 2d Sqdn, 1st Cav engaged an unknown size enemy force with small arms and automatic weapons fire. Tactical Air power and gunships supported the contact. Results were one friendly wounded and six enemy killed. On 3 May 8 km NW of Plei Me at ZA243079, B Co 1st Bn, 35th Inf found a cache of 5 and one-half tons of rice and 1500 pounds of corn which was extracted. This unit found a second cache of 6700 pounds of rice 8 km NW of Plei Me at ZA180880 on 4 May. Again on 5 May this unit discovered several more caches totalling 15,000 pounds of rice and 250 pounds of corn 5 km NW of Plei Me which was extracted to Phu Nhon Dist. On 6 May 20 km NW of Plei Me elements of 1st Bn 14th Inf discovered a rice cache of 6,000 pounds which was extracted. On the same day 20 km SSW of Pleiku City 4th Inf Hq at L59, Oasis received indirect fire and small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force. Spooky and artillery supported this contact which resulted in 1 friendly killed, 22 wounded with 52 enemy killed and 1 prisoner. 12 small arms, four crew served weapons and one Chinese radio captured. On 10 May 22 km SSW of Plei Me 4th Inf Hq at L4 Oasis received indirect fire and small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 friendly killed, 25 wounded and 3 missing with 45 enemy killed. A Hawk Radar unit was destroyed by a direct hit. On 10 May one km SE of Dak To, the 15th Light Equipment Company received six rounds of indirect fire and a sapper attack. Results were eight friendly wounded and six enemy killed. On 11 May 25 km SSW of...
Flei Ho D Troop, 1st Sqn 10th Cav engaged 40 NVA with gunships and artillery fire resulting in 20 enemy killed. Again on 11 May, 18 km East of Dac Co D/Troop, 1st Sqn, 10th Cav observed 40-50 enemy in bunkers. Gunships, tactical air and artillery strikes resulted in 37 enemy killed. Again on 12 May 5 km NW Plei Mrong, 4th elements of the 3d Bn 8th Inf were engaged by an enemy battalion. Gunships and artillery supported. Results were 9 friendly KIA and 23 WIA with 10 enemy KIA. On 12 May, 7 km East Plei Mrong, elements of the 2nd Bn, 8th Inf received 20 rounds of B40 fire. Artillery and Spooky supported. Results were 3 friendly killed, three wounded, 1 APC destroyed, with 19 enemy killed. On 13 May A Btry 1st Bn, 92d Arty (US) at FSB 1 located in Dak To received 19 rounds of 122mm rockets. Artillery fired on suspected enemy locations. On 14 May 7 km north of Plei Mrong B Co, 2nd Bn, 35th Inf received B40 rocket and small arms fire. Spooky and artillery supported the contact which resulted in 16 enemy KIA. On 15 May 25 km SW of Camp Enari at ZA03323, C Co, 1st Bn, 35th Inf found 15 NVA bodies estimated to have been killed by air strikes 2 months previously. Again on 15 May 6 km SW of Tan Canh at ZB097190 A Troop 7 Sqn 17th Air Cav found 6 enemy bodies and engaged and killed one in the same area. Results were 7 enemy KIA.

On 17 May 9 km south of Kontum City at AR780780 B Co, 3d Bn, 8thInf engaged 10 NVA resulting in 7 enemy KIA with no friendly losses. Again on 17 May 8 km NE of Plei Mrong at ZA165761 an aircraft from 2d Sqn 1st Cav observed 3-5 enemy. C Troop 2d Sqn, 1st Cav reacted and engaged a company size/enemy force resulting in 2 friendly KIA, 5 WIA and 40 enemy KIA. On 18 May 20 km SW of KONTUM City at ZA093748 an APC from C Troop 2nd Sqn 1st Cav hit a mine and received ground fire. Results were 4 friendly WIA and 7 enemy KIA. On 21 May 21 km NW PLEIKU City at ZA075514 A Troop, 1st Sqn 10th Cav received B40 rocket and small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force. B Co 3d Bn 12th Inf and D Troop, 1st Sqn, 10th Cav reacted. Results were 8 friendly WIA and 9 enemy KIA. On 24 May 16 km west of PLEIKU at ZA072517 D Troop, 1st Sqn, 10th Cav aircraft observed a number of enemy in a tree line. A Troop 1st Sqn, 10th Cav, in a sweep of the area, engaged an unknown size enemy force in bunkers. Gunships, artillery and air strikes supported the contact which resulted in 39 enemy killed without a friendly loss. On 25 May 13 km south of PLEIKU at ZA068548, D Troop, 1st Sqn, 10th Cav found 25 enemy bodies. On 26 May 20 km NW of PLEIKU at ZA060515 elements of 1st Sqn 10th Cav found 17 enemy bodies in graves estimated to be 3 days old. On 27 May 8 km NE of PLEIKU at ZA125767, elements of 1st Bn, 12th Inf received B40 rockets and small arms fire. Artillery and tactical air strikes supported. Results were 7 friendly KIA and 15 WIA. On 28 May 9 km W of PLEIKU at ZA125769 D Co 1st Bn, 12th Inf engaged an unknown number of VC. Sweep of the area revealed 33 enemy KIA. Again on 28 May 299th Engr at DAK TO vicinity of ZB05215 received 11 rounds of 122mm rocket fire resulting in 8 friendly KIA and 18 WIA. On 31 May 18 km SW of Kontum at ZA097761 B Co, 1st Bn, 12th Inf engaged

10 NVA. Gunships and artillery supported the contact. D Troop 1st Sqdn 10th Cav reacted as contact continued. Tactical air strikes were employed. Results were 10 friendly KIA, 21 WIA and 88 enemy KIA.

2. ARVN Operations: On 8 May 6 km SSW of Dak To, 4th Bn, 42d ARVN Inf was attacked by an unknown size enemy force with mortar and small arms fire. Gunships supported. Results were 5 friendly KIA and 14 WIA with 10 enemy KIA. On 9 May 6 km SSW of Dak To 4th Bn, 42d ARVN Inf engaged an unknown size enemy force. Tactical air strikes, gunships and artillery supported the contact which resulted in 2 friendly killed and 7 enemy killed. On 10 May 6 km west of Ben Het 1st Bn, 42d ARVN Inf was engaged by an estimated NVA battalion. Tactical air, artillery and gunships supported the action. Results were 3 friendly killed and 16 wounded. On 12 May 7 km SSW of Dak To the 22d Ranger Bn received mortar and small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy. Gunships and artillery supported. Results were 2 friendly wounded and 22 enemy killed. On 12 May, 4 km SSW of Ben Het, 3d Bn, 42d Inf received 3 rounds of 60mm mortar fire. Tactical air strikes and artillery supported. Results were 13 friendly KIA, 7 WIA and 8 small arms lost with 30 enemy KIA. On 13 May 8 km SE of Dak To elements from 2d Bn, 42d ARVN Inf made contact with an unknown size enemy force resulting in 4 friendly KIA, 12 WIA one missing and 4 small arms lost with 5 enemy killed. On 14 May 3 km NW of Ben Het the 23d Rgr Bn was in sporadic contact and received unknown type and number of incoming rounds. Artillery and tactical air strikes supported. Results were 2 friendly killed 22 wounded (2 US) and 1 small weapon lost. On 15 May 9 km south of Dak To (2) at TB996131, 4th Bn, 42d ARVN Inf received 12 rounds of 82mm mortar. US and ARVN artillery supported. Results were one friendly KIA, 12 WIA, one MIA and one weapon lost with 13 enemy KIA. On 17 May 12 km SE of Dak To at TB993141 the 23rd Rgr Bn received an unknown number of B40 rockets and small arms fire. Artillery, spooky and headhunter aircraft supported. A sweep of the area revealed 1 friendly wounded and 74 enemy killed with 1 small arm captured. On 18 May 10 km SE of Dak To at ZB931761 elements of the 4th Bn 477 ARVN Inf in Dien Binh Village received 20 rounds of unknown type mortar followed by a ground attack. Results were 2 friendly KIA and 10 WIA with 4 enemy KIA and 1 small arm and 1 crew served weapon captured. On 20 May 8 km SW of Dak To at TB901155 the 22nd Ranger Bn engaged an estimated enemy company. Gunships, artillery and tactical air strikes supported the contact which resulted in 10 friendly KIA (8 ARVN, 2 US), 50 WIA (48 ARVN 2 US) and 9 small arms lost with 36 enemy KIA and 5 crew served weapons captured. On 21 May 8 km SSW of Dak To at TB9992141 2nd Bn, 42d ARVN Inf was engaged by an unknown size enemy force. ARVN and US artillery supported. Results were 2 friendly KIA and 22 WIA with 17 enemy KIA. On 23 May 10 km SW of Dak To at TB903147 the 22nd Ranger Bn was attacked by an unknown size enemy force. Artillery and tactical air strikes supported the contact which resulted in 6 friendly killed, 47 wounded and five MIA with 146 enemy KIA and 2 small arms and 1 crew served weapon captured. On 23 May 17 km SW of
Dak To at YB997129, 400 and 404 Scout Troops engaged an unknown size enemy force in bunkers. Resulting in 1 friendly wounded and 3 enemy killed with 1 prisoner, 5 small arms and 2 crew served weapons captured. On 26 May 11 km SW of Dak To at YB913149 the 23rd Angr Bn received mortar and small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force. Gunships and artillery supported. Results were 11 friendly killed, 39 wounded with 2 radios lost and 26 enemy KIA with 6 small arms and 1 crew served weapons captured. The 11th Angr Bn reacted to the contact and suffered 10 KIA and 16 WIA. In a later contact the same area inflicting losses of 15 enemy killed. A further sweep of the area revealed total results of 11 friendly killed, 30 wounded with 3 small arms lost and 262 enemy KIA with 4 small arms and 1 crew served weapons captured. On 29 May 12 km SSW of Ben Hoi in the vicinity of YB9075 the 11th and 23rd Angr Bn and 1st Bn, 2nd Inf and 3rd Bn 42nd ARVN Inf had a series of related contacts with a large enemy force. Gunships, artillery, Tactical Air Strikes and Shadow supported the contact. Total results are 7 friendly killed (ARVN), 136 wounded (130 ARVN, 6 US) 77 missing (ARVN) and 309 enemy killed.

2. RF/PF Operations: On 17 May 30 km SE of Ban Me Thuot the 377th RF Co received a number of 60 mm mortar fire resulting in 5 friendly killed (3 RF, 2 PF), 6 wounded (5 RF, 1 PF) and 5 missing (PF). On 20 May 1 km South of Plei Koa at AN754626 the 957th RF Co received 7 rounds of 82 mm mortar. ARVN artillery supported. Friendly losses were 20 wounded (13 RF, 7 CIV). On 21 May 35 km SE of Ban de Thoat at AP754733 the 650, 660 and 680 RF Co's and the 8th and 24th PF Plt's received an unknown number of 60 mm mortar rounds, 10 rounds of 84-40 rockets and small arms fire from an estimated VC company. ARVN artillery supported. Friendly losses were 1 RF killed and 9 RF wounded. On 25 May Plei Yen Hamlet at 2413856 defended by the 37th PF Plt was attacked by an unknown size enemy force. The 146th RF Co reacted while artillery supported. Results were 2 friendly killed (1 FF, 1 CIV) and 7 wounded (5 PF, 2 SDSF) with 9 enemy killed and 5 small arms and 1 crew served weapons captured. On 24 May 3 km North of Ban Canh at 2B 094246, the 39th PF Plt at Dak Chu Village received indirect and small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force which resulted in 7 civilians killed, 4 civilians wounded and 1 enemy killed. On 29 May 6 km NE of Dak To at ZB076253 the 70th PF Plt in Dak Ling Hamlet received ground fire from an unknown size enemy force. Results were 6 killed (2PF, 2 SDSF, 2 CIV) and 4 wounded (2 PF, 2 CIV) and 6 small arms lost.

3. CIDG Operations: On 10 May 5 km south of Ben Hoi, Plateau GI CIDG Company received an indirect fire attack resulting in two friendly KIA, 17 WIA and two MIA and 7 small arms lost. On 13 May 6 km west of Plei Koa, a CIDG Company was attacked by an unknown size enemy company. Gunships and artillery supported. Results were 1 friendly KIA and 10 WIA with 8 enemy KIA. Again on 13 May approximately 13 km SE of Dak To, Kon Hoiing Village received 12 rounds of mortar fire and small arms fire. Spooky and artillery supported. Friendly losses
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were 7 killed (6 LV, 1 US) and 32 wounded (CIV). The 241 G6F Co
engaged one enemy platoon dug in 2.0 km SW of Ben Het on 15 May. Re-
sults were 2 friendly killed, 4 wounded and 15 enemy killed. On 26 May
8 km SW of Quang Tri at AP855669, the 241 G6F Co engaged an estimated
VC squad. Tactical air strikes and gunships supported the contact
which resulted in 1 friendly KIA and 5 enemy KIA with 2 small arms cap-
tured. On 21 May, 11 km NE of Phu Me at AP800890, the 241 G6F Co ob-
served and engaged approximately 10 enemy armed with AK-47 and 100
rocket Launchers. Gunships and tactical air strikes supported the
contact which resulted in 50 enemy killed. On 24 May 15 km S of Ben
Het at Y88751709 the 5th Co received an unknown number of 120m
mortar rounds followed by a ground attack from an unknown size enemy
force. Artillery and gunships supported. Results were 7 friendly
killed (2 US), 60 wounded (3 US) and 5 missing. On 22 May 16 km S
Ben Het near Y887510 a column of the 1st EFbn was engaged by an
unknown size enemy force. Gunships and artillery supported. Results
were 9 friendly killed (8 CIDG), 63 friendly wounded (7 US, 1 Australian,
55 CIDG) 15 missing (20 US, 13 CIDG) 22 small arms, 10 crew served
weapons and 19 radios captured. On 23 May 4 km
S of Ben Het at Y891770, a G6F Co outpost was attacked by an
unknown size enemy force. Results were 3 KIA (2 US, 1 ARVN), 8 WIA
(3 US, 2 ARVN, 1 CIDG) and 24 MIA (3 US, 2 ARVN, 19 CIDG) and 15
enemy KIA, 1 POW and 4 small arms captured.

(b) BINH DNH Operations - Apr. The primary effort continued
on pacification support operations, while tactical operations con-
tinued to emphasize small unit actions. KFPIF relieved from static
defense missions were able to actively participate in pacification
programs. PSYOPS and civic actions by the ROK forces resulted in
332 weapons collected during the month of Apr.

1 US Operations: On 9 May, 1.2 km NE of Phu Ky, elements from
1st BN, 40th SFG tripped a booby-trapped hand grenade, followed
by small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force. Results were
7 friendly wounded and 2 enemy KIA and 1 POW captured. On 22 May,
1.5 km NE of an A-10, elements of a Co, 1st BN, 6th INF engaged an un-
known number of enemy resulting in 6 enemy killed. On 16 May, 10 km
NE of An Ky at AO500591, D Co, 1st BN, 6th INF engaged an estimated
enemy company in bunkers. A platoon of the 1st BN, 69th Armor
reinforced. Artillery, gunships and air strikes supported the action.
Friendly losses were 1 killed and 3 wounded while the enemy suffered
30 NVA killed. On 23 May, SW of LZ ELPHIN at H997986, the 241 G6F,
2nd BN, 503d INF received a heavy ground probe from an unknown size
enemy force resulting in 1 friendly KIA and 9 WIA. On 26 May, 6 km
SW of LZ KIM at H998766, an A-10 from a Co, 1st BN (6th INF) 100th
INF was hit by a command detonated 155 artillery round on Hwy 09. APC
was a total loss as a result of fire. There were 8 friendly wounded.

2 ROK Operations: On 2 May, 6 km south of An Ky at H961564,
the 241 G6F, Cav 1st Bn, Ogot, engaged five VC, killing all five and cap-
turing three small arms without friendly loss. On 3 May, 25 km SW of
Qui Nhon at H870999, the 12th Co, Cav 1st Bn, Ogot, engaged an unknown
number of enemy in contacts resulting in 15 enemy killed without a
friendly loss. On 5 May, 5 km SW of Tuy To, the 1st Co, 1st BN, 6th INF
engaged and killed 5 VC and captured 1 Sa without friendly loss.
on 7 May, 11 km South of Binh Khe, the 4th Co of Cav ROK Regt reported a successful ambush resulting in 5 enemy killed and 3 small arms captured. There were no friendly losses. On 12 May, 5 km SW of Binh Khe at BR779185, 4th Co, Cav ROK Regt made contact with an unknown size enemy force resulting in friendly losses of 5 KIA and 9 MIA. Seven companies of 3d BN, Cav ROK Regt and 2nd BN, 1st ROK Regt were moved into the area of contact. Forces were extracted on 13 May with total results for the action of 8 friendly killed and 15 wounded. Enemy losses were 32 killed and 1 FM captured. On 26 May, 20 km SW of Binh Khe, at BR769242, 9 ROK Div Special Forces Team engaged and killed 7 enemy and captured 2 small arms.

AVN Operations: On 9 May, 6 km north of Bong Son a 4 ton truck from the 926th AVN Regt detonated an unknown type mine resulting in 1 friendly killed and 7 wounded. The truck was destroyed. On 11 May, 1 km south of Phu My, Headquarters 1st AVN Regt received 4 small arms charges delivered by unknown type mortar. Artillery fired on suspected enemy location. Results were 14 friendly KIA. On 12 May, 18 km east of An Khe, an AVN convoy traveling on Highway 19 from Qui Nhon to An Khe was ambushed by 400 VC. Results were 1 friendly KIA, 4 KIA and 3 MIA. One wrecker, ten 2 1/2 ton trucks, two 4 ton trucks and one 3/4 ton truck were damaged extensively. There were 7 enemy killed.

RF/PF Operations: On 8 May, 1 km SW of Bong Son, elements of the 300 RF Co ambushed an estimated enemy squad resulting in 5 enemy KIA and 3 small arms captured without friendly losses. On 12 May, 5 km SW of Bong Son, the 776th RF Co ambushed an estimated enemy company. Small arms fire was extended. Results were two friendly killed and ten wounded. On 14 May, 4 km NW of An Khe the 7th, 8th and 19thth PF Platoons and 4th Platoon of 113 were attacked by an unknown size enemy force. Results were 3 friendly killed (PF), 11 wounded (2 US, 9 PF) and 4 small arms lost. On 12 May, 1 km south of Binh Khe, the 116 PF Platoon while guarding a bridge on May 19 was attacked by a sapper squad who used mortars and atoll charges to destroy the bridge. Friendly losses were 6 KIA and 4 WIA. On 15 May, 4 km NE of Tuy Phuoc at BR065305, the 167 PF Platoon was engaged by an estimated VC platoon who employed small arms and B-40 rockets. The 713rd RF Co reacted while US Artillery supported. Friendly results were 10 killed (7 RF, 2 PSDF, 1 Civ) and 27 wounded (6 RF, 2 PSDF, 19 Civ). On 17 May, 8 km NE of Phu Cat at BR945583, the 208th PF Platoon was ambushed by an unknown size enemy force resulting in 3 friendly killed and 7 wounded with 3 small arms and 1 radio lost. On 19 May, 13 km NE of Phu My, Dinh Lieu Hamlet was attacked by an unknown size enemy force. Two squads of 1st BN, 5th Inf (Mech) reacted artillery supported. Friendly results were 6 killed (1 Civ, 5 PSDF), 3 wounded (1 US, 2 PSDF, 2 Civ) with 10 small arms lost. On 22 May, 22 km SW of Bong Son at BR779185, the 963 RF Co engaged an estimated VC platoon resulting in 5 enemy KIA and 1 small arm captured. Again on 22 May, 9 km SW of Bong Son at BR791850, the 983 RF Co engaged an unknown size enemy force killing 5 enemy and capturing 1 small arm. On 26 May, 3 km South of Vinh Thanh at BR679570, 119 PF Platoon and PSDF received 3 rounds of 42mm mortar. AVN Artillery and mortars supported. Friendly results were 3 killed (2 Civ, 1 PSDF), 18 wounded (6 Civ, 12 PSDF).

Other Operations: On 8 May, 12 km North of Bong Son, two VC fired 1,670 rounds into a group of civilians resulting in 11 civilian wounded. On 12 May, the city of Phu My was attacked by unknown size enemy force using 60mm mortar, B-40 rockets, grenades, atoll charges and small arms fire. The 944th RF Co reacted carving the VC to flee to the north. Results were 11 friendly killed (10 Civ and 1 RF), 20 wounded (19 Civ, 1 RF) and 4 small arms lost. Eighty-seven homes were destroyed and 1 school house was damaged. There were 2 enemy killed.
On 14 May, 17 km North of Dong Son, 5 VC assaulted the Thaiham Chau Hamlet and killed 20 VC, resulting in 3 friendly wounded and 10 killed. On 19 May, 5 km North of Phu Cat at 0143 LST, 40 VC attempted a 17 km west attack, but were stopped by 175th Division and 28th ROK Regt. On 25 May, 9 km South of Phu My at 0140 LST, 3 VC attacked 175th Division and 28th ROK Regt. Again on 12 June, a second 5 km attack was mounted, resulting in 20 enemy killed and captured.

On 12 June, 5 km South of Phu My at 1645 LST, 10 VC assaulted Ban Cam, 15 VC were engaged, resulting in 4 small arms and 2 crew served weapons captured. On 12 June, 17 km South of Dong Son, 10 VC engaged and killed 5 VC and captured 3 small arms. On 28 June, 3 km South of Phu My at 1815 LST, 10 VC assaulted Ban Cam, resulting in 20 enemy killed and captured.

On 21 June, 21 km North of Phu My at 1645 LST, 10 VC assaulted Phu Nam, resulting in 5 enemy killed and 2 small arms captured. On 17 July, 21 km North of Phu My at 1645 LST, 10 VC assaulted Phu Nam, resulting in 5 enemy killed and 2 small arms captured. On 17 July, 21 km North of Phu My at 1645 LST, 10 VC assaulted Phu Nam, resulting in 5 enemy killed and 2 small arms captured.

On 17 July, 21 km North of Phu My at 1645 LST, 10 VC assaulted Phu Nam, resulting in 5 enemy killed and 2 small arms captured. On 17 July, 21 km North of Phu My at 1645 LST, 10 VC assaulted Phu Nam, resulting in 5 enemy killed and 2 small arms captured. On 17 July, 21 km North of Phu My at 1645 LST, 10 VC assaulted Phu Nam, resulting in 5 enemy killed and 2 small arms captured.
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3 4th Army Operations. On 5 July, 5 km west of Tuy Hoa elements of the 30th Bn, 4th Bn, ARVN Bn engaged an enemy squad resulting in 5 enemy killed and 2 small arms captured without friendly loss. On 11 May, 30 km SW of Chu Lao, Hau Tuc District HQ was attacked by an enemy company. DJICO supported against the attack. Results were 8 ARVN killed and 16 ARVN, 2 small arms, 2 Killed. On 14 May, 10 km S of Hau Hoa, an estimated enemy platoon engaged an AVN Bn and elements of the 17th ARVN Provost Guards Co received 1 round of small arms fire from an estimated enemy company. AVN losses were 5 killed and 5 wounded and 5 small arms lost.

3 A/F Operations. On 14 May, 140 km NE of Phan Thiet the Sector Intelligence Platoon was engaged by an unknown size enemy force. Results were 5 enemy killed and 1 small arm captured. On 15 May, 170 km SW of Nha Trang the 71st FP Platoon was attacked by an estimated enemy squad. Results were 5 friendly killed (1 ARVN, 1 AVN, 1 WIA, 1 AVN). On 14 May, 10th FP Platoon engaged by an estimated enemy platoon 15 km west of Nha Trang. Results were 4 friendly FF wounded and 5 enemy killed and 4 small arms captured. On 17 May, 5 km south of Minh Hoa at KM 356730 the 47th FP Platoon engaged 6 VC, ARVN artillery and mortar supported. Results were 5 enemy killed and 2 small arms and 1 crew served weapon captured. On 16 May, 7 km NE of Minh Hoa at KM 686854, 197 ARVN Co and 16th Arm Co 22 were attacked by two estimated enemy platoon. Shadow, Spc-Ky and gunships supported the contact. Results were 3 friendly killed (2 ARVN, 1 AVN), 13 wounded (1 FF, 1 ARVN WIA, 1 AVN sailor) and 6 enemy killed and 1 prisoner, 6 small arms and 1 crew served weapon captured. On 20 May, 7 km west of Tuy Haо at KM 356754, 195 ARVN Co and 16th Arm 7 engaged an estimated enemy company. Friendly results were only 2 wounded while the enemy suffered 9 KIA. On 30 May a two km west of Tuy Haо at KM 354350, 946 ARVN Co outpost received small arms fire from 2 estimated enemy platoons. Elements from 9 Co, 16th Arm, 4th ARVN and 1 FF Plt engaged and killed 6 VC and captured 4 small arms.

3 Other Operations: On 6 May in the Yen province, 6 km west of Dong Tre a train struck a mine causing 50% damage to the engine, destroying 30 feet of track and damaging 4 cars. 2 Civilians were injured in the wreck. On 6 May in Khan Hoa province a train hit an unknown type explosive resulting in light damage to the engine and three cars which were derailed. On 12 May an unknown size enemy force entered Hu Zay Hamlet 7 km SW of Phan Rang and destroyed the village headquarters, ARVN artillery fired in support. Results were 9 civilians KIA and 1 civilian WIA. On 16 May, 31 km SE of Tuy Haо at KM 35620 168, a VN train from Nha Trang to Tuy Haо hit a pressure type mine resulting in the engine and 5 cars being derailed. The 5 cars and 60 meters of track were destroyed. On 18 May, a terrorist threw a hand grenade into a theater in Nha Trang and resulting in 5 friendly killed and 24 wounded.

(d) Southern Provinces Operations - May: Allied forces continued operations in support of pacification throughout May. The use of small unit patrols (Cobra Teams) has maintained constant pressure on the enemy forces and insured greater security for the populace and RD teams near pacification villages and hamlets.

3 US Operations: On 14 May, 13 km north of Phan Thiet, 6 Troop, 7th Squadron, 1st ARVN Cav engaged 5 VC with gunships. Elements of B Co, 3rd Bn 506th ARVN Bn (amb) were inserted into the contact area, confirmed the 5 killed and made contact with and killed one additional VC. On 14 May, 3rd Co, 503d
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3d Inf and 6 Arty, 5th Bn, 31st Arty at Camp Hon in Buoc Loc - 160 rounds of 60mm mortar fire. ARVN artillery supported. Loses were 1 friendly killed, 17 wounded (4 US, 15 ARVN).

2. ARVN Operations: On 12 May, 6 km south of Song Hau the 44th ARVN took contact with NVA and 250 rounds of 60mm mortar fire. ARVN artillery supported. Results were 3 friendly killed and 17 wounded while the enemy lost 36 killed and 3 WIA. 9 small arms and 5 crew served weapons captured. On 22 May, 10 km SSE of Song Hau, 22RPF 8th ARVN Co on Hwy 1 was engaged by an unknown size enemy force who used small arms fire, 840 rockets and mortars. A gunship supporting the contact was shot down but crew and aircraft were extracted without injuries. Results were 6 friendly killed (ARVN) and 13 wounded (ARVN) while the enemy losses were 7 killed and 1 SA captured.

3. RF/PF Operations: On 5 May, 15 km west of Phan Thiet, the 1/27th RF Co and 705 RF Co found a booby trapped ammunition can outside the company commanders' office. The can exploded when the soldiers attempted to open it resulting in 2 friendly killed and 20 wounded. On 11 May 23 km north of Phan Thiet, a company from 232 RF Co engaged an estimated enemy platoon. ARVN artillery supported the action. Results were 3 enemy killed and 2 small arms captured. On 12 May, 8 km west of Song Hau the 238th RF Co engaged an estimated enemy battalion. Gunships and artillery supported the contact. Results were 3 friendly killed (2 Civ, 1 RF) and 4 wounded (2 Civ, 2 RF) and 8 enemy killed, 2 WIA and 3 small arms captured. Again on 12 May, 5 km north of Phan Thiet, 20 RF platoon and 1 squad of RF/PF engaged an estimated VC Company. Artillery supported. Results were 2 friendly killed (1 RF, 1 RF) and 13 wounded (9 RF, 4 RF, 4 Civ) and 1 friendly killed (FF) and 4 enemy killed with 2 small arms captured. On 13 May, 20 km SSE of DALAT, 305th RF Co and the 24th RF platoon were attacked by 2 VC companies using 60 and 81mm mortars and small arms fire. Artillery, gunships and Shadow supported the contact. Results were 6 friendly killed, 4 wounded and 4 civilians missing. Enemy losses were 13 killed and 1 WIA and 2 small arms captured. On 26 May, 10 km NW of Phan Thiet at AN739128, the 785th and 230th RF Co's attacked an estimated enemy company. ARVN and US artillery supported the action. Friendly losses were 10 killed, 6 wounded and 8 small arms and 2 crew served weapons lost.

4. Other Operations: On 17 May, Song Mau received 80 rounds of unknown type mortar fire. Snook supported the action. Results were 2 killed (Civ), 12 wounded (8 Civ, 4 ARVN, 2 Civ). On 6 May 25 km east of Duc Lap, the 2d U.S. BP initiated contact with an estimated NVA company resulting in 3 friendly killed, 36 wounded and 1 missing.

a. WESTERN HIGHLAND Operations. Tactical operations in the Highlands remained concentrated in the Ben Het - Dak To area. There were significant casualties at the beginning of the month when the enemy moved in close to Ben Het and elected to stand and fight. Activity in this area subsided during the last week of June. Isolated incidents and standoff attacks continued. Two battalions of the 53rd ARVN Regiment joined TF Lien in the Dak To area to conduct offensive operations. The 1st Bn, 53rd ARVN from Darlac Province replaced by 2nd Bn 35th Inf (US) which assumed the mission of road security of Highway 21 east of M'Ko. Pacification support operations continue in Pleiku and Darlac Provinces through the efforts of the 3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div and the 4th ARVN Regiment.

US Operations: On 1 June, 11 km NE Plei He at EN780180, Plei He RF Co observed and engaged, approximately 100 enemy with AK's and RPG's. Gunships and air strikes supported the contact which resulted in 50 enemy killed. On 3 June a platoon of 10 km SSE Ben Het at EN819152, element of a Troop 7th Bn 17th Cav spotted several enemy carrying AK's. Gunships and air strikes

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supported the contact which resulted in enemy 6 killed. On 5 June 15 km NW of Kontum at ZA14760 D Co 1st BN, 12th Inf observed and engaged 4 individuals near position and later received small arms fire and B40 rockets on all sides of perimeter. Gunships and artillery supported the contact which continued throughout the day. Results were 10 friendly killed and 35 wounded with 33 enemy killed. On 7 June approximately 5 km SW Dak To II at YB95625, 299th Engn (US) nine sweep team was engaged by unknown size enemy force. 1st Sqdn 5 ACAV and 2nd BN 42d ARVN Inf reacted. Gunships, dusters and ARVN Artillery supported. Results were 4 friendly killed (3 US, 1 ARVN), 9 wounded (8 US, 1 ARVN) and 2 enemy killed. On 9 June 5 km W Plei Miong at ZA14712 B Co, 24 BN 55th Inf engaged 3 NVA with small arms fire. A sweep of area revealed 13 bodies and 2 small arms. Reconnaissance elements of the 2d BN, 55th Inf round 6 enemy bodies in graves approximately 3 km NE Plei Miong at ZA14709. Again on 9 June approximately 6 km S Kontum at ZA235826, 584 Engn (US) received 15 rounds 122 rocket and unknown number of 82 mortar rounds. Artillery supported. Results were 4 friendly killed, 7 wounded (4 US, 3 CIDG).

At 110035H 18 km NW Plei Me at AR859144 A Company, 1st BN, 14 Inf observed individuals through starlight scope approaching the perimeter. Individuals were engaged as they approached the perimeter. Results were 6 enemy killed. On 111200H 15 km N Pleiku at ZA194657 a 4th Inf Div resupply convoy from Pleiku to Dak To was attacked by unknown size enemy unit using mortar, small arms fire and B40 rockets from both sides of QL-14N. A Co 2d BN, 8th Inf reacted. Gunships and artillery supported. Results were 1 friendly killed, 3 wounded, 2 trucks damaged, 1 LGH destroyed and 42 enemy killed with 4 small arms captured. On 112230 10 km SE Pleiku at AR939130 Recon element 1st BN, 8th Inf ambushed and killed 7 individuals. Between 110700 - 112400H Ben Het CIDG Camp received 14 rounds of recoilless rifle, 45 rounds of 85mm artillery, 17 rounds of 81mm mortar, 1 round of 122mm mortar, 3 rounds unknown size recoilless rifle and 3 rounds unknown artillery. There was sporadic sniper fire throughout the day. Results were 13 friendly wounded (11 US, 1 ARVN, 1 CIDG). At 120105H 25 km SE Pleiku at AR888156 a Civil Action Team from 3 BN 8th Inf at Plei Djarel Village received ground attack by estimated 3 platoons of VC. D troop, 7th Sqdn 17th Air Cav reaction force arrived at 0332H. Results were 4 friendly killed, 7 wounded and 3 enemy killed with 2 small arms captured. On 121410H 12 km SW Polei Kien at YB919065 2 gunships from 52d CAS observed estimated VC Company. Gunships expended. Artillery and Air strikes supported. Results were 20 enemy killed.

At 121620H 3 km NW Ben Het CIDG Camp at YB679055 5 CC ship from A Troop, 7th Sqdn, 17th Cav received ground fire, gunships expended on numerous bunkers resulting in 19 enemy killed. At 131110H 90 km E Pleiku at BR242953 LG Action, pump station and convoy in that area received small arms and B40 fire. Gunships in support received heavy fire. C Co 1st BN, 8th Inf engaged estimated enemy platoon. Gunships, artillery and Tactical Air strikes supported the contact which resulted in 11 friendly wounded (6 US, 5 ROK Civ), 2 trucks destroyed, 7 trucks damaged, and 3 enemy killed, 1 prisoner, 1 small arm captured. On 161410, Gunships were employed at Ben Het vic YB604225 against an unknown number enemy. Results were 6 enemy killed. Again at 181515H 9 km SW Ben Het vic YB9119, element of A Troop, 7th Sqdn, 17th Cav observed unknown number of enemy along a trail. Gunships expended resulting in 30 enemy killed. On 211155H 4 km ESE of Ben Het at YB902449 A Troop, 7th Sqdn, 17th Cav observed and engaged 10-15 NVA crossing a river. Gunships supported. Results were 6 enemy killed. On 211204H 4 km ESE of Ben Het at YB907225, A Troop 7th Sqdn, 17th Cav spotted a bunker complex and directed air strikes on it. Results were 9 enemy killed. On 21
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1 FFRCLV for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFCR-65 (RT) (U)

241100H 32 km SE of Pleiku via BB0220 D Troop, 2 Sqdn, 1st Cav reacted to a Snoopy report of suspected NVA locations. Airships and Air Stripes supported. D Troop, 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav reacted at 241200H. Results were 27 enemy killed. On 231630H, 1 km NE of Ben Het at YB768265 a reaction force to aid a mine sweeping team from 299th Engr who were in contact was engaged by unknown size enemy force 4 km W of Dak Mot Bridge resulting in 2 friendly killed and 12 wounded (all US). Between 251145H in the East and South of Ben Het via YB9024 A Troop, 7th Sqdn, 17th Air Cav engaged an unknown size enemy force in a series of 7 contacts, resulting in 58 enemy killed and 1 crew served weapon destroyed.

2 ARVN Operations: On 2 June 12 km SE Tan Canh at ZB153150, 5d ACAV received small arms and B40 rocket. Results were 3 friendly killed, 2 wounded, 2 APC damaged (1 heavy, 1 light) and 10 enemy killed with 2 small arms and 2 crew served weapons captured. On 5 June approximately 11 km SE Ben Het at YB928159 element 2 Bn 47th ARVN Inf received rocket and small arms fire. Results were 1 friendly killed, 21 wounded and 2 enemy killed with 2 small arms and 2 crew served weapons captured. On 6 June 14 km SW Tan Canh at YB96166 elements of 3d Bn 47th ARVN Inf received unknown number of mixed mortar rounds, resulting in 20 friendly wounded (5 US, 17 ARVN). Ben Het at Y1863255 received 111 rounds of indirect fire resulting in 1 friendly killed (Ori), 20 wounded (17 ARVN, 3 CIDG). On 6 June approximately 7 km S Dak To at YB899174, 4th Bn 42d ARVN Inf was engaged by an unknown size enemy force. Results were 9 friendly killed, 0 wounded and 52 enemy killed. On 9 June 12 km S Ben Me Thuot at AB899913 element 1st Bn, 47th ARVN Inf made contact with estimated enemy company. Artillery and Spooky supported. Results were 9 friendly killed, 10 wounded with 5 small arms, 1 BCO-10 radio lost and 2 enemy killed with 1 small arm captured. Again on 9 June approximately 8 km SW Dak To at YB810260, 5d ACAV mine sweeping team, 1st Co, 2d Bn, 42d ARVN Inf, 2 đủters of 1st Bn 92d Artillery and elements of 299th Engr were engaged by estimated enemy platoon using small arms, automatic weapons fire and B40 as they were proceeding to repair a cut in the road. Artillery, Air strikes and gunships supported. Results were 5 friendly wounded and 21 enemy killed with 6 small arms and 2 crew served weapons captured. On 120520H 4 km N Pleiku at AR775520, the 2d Ranger Group received ground fire from an estimated enemy platoon. A 2d Ranger Grp unit in a sweep at 0445H was engaged by 2 enemy platoons. Mortar supported. Results were 4 friendly wounded and 5 enemy killed and 1 small arm and 2 crew served weapons captured. On 130600H 6 km SE Ben Het at YB923228 2d Co, 2d Bn, 47th ARVN Inf was attacked by estimated enemy platoon. A 2d Ranger Grp unit in a sweep at 0445H was engaged by 2 enemy platoons. Mortar supported. Results were 4 friendly wounded and 5 enemy killed and 1 small arm and 2 crew served weapons captured. On 151250H 4 km W Pleiku at AR775520, the 2d Ranger Group received ground fire from an estimated enemy platoon. A 2d Ranger Grp unit in a sweep at 0445H was engaged by 2 enemy platoons. Mortar supported. Results were 4 friendly wounded and 5 enemy killed and 1 small arm and 2 crew served weapons captured. On 171200H 4 km E Ben Het at YB922521, 2d Bn, 42d ARVN Inf engaged an unknown size enemy force. Gunships supported. Results were 2 friendly killed, 3 wounded and 6 enemy killed with 1 small arm and 1 crew served weapon captured. On 181200H 4 km E Ben Het at YB142000 element of 3d ACAV and 2d Bn, 42d ARVN Inf made contact with unknown size enemy force, resulting in 1 friendly killed and 5
wounded and 9 enemy killed with 2 small arms and 1 crew served weapon captured. On 191500H 5 km E Ben Het at YB919257 element 1st Bn, 42d ARVN Inf made contact with estimated enemy platoon. Artillery and gunships supported. Results were 3 friendly killed, 3 wounded and 37 enemy killed, 1 prisoner, 5 small arms, 2 crew served weapons captured. On 200955H 4 km E Ben Het at YB927556, 1 tank from 1st Troop, 14th ACAV hit an unknown type mine. 1st Bn, 42d ARVN Inf accompanying 1st Troop, 14th ACAV simultaneously received small arms fire. Artillery and Air strikes supported. Results were 10 friendly killed (ARVN), 19 wounded (1 US, 18 ARVN). On 211730H 4 km SE of Ben Het at YB917229, 1st Co 2d Bn 47th ARVN Inf received 20 rounds of 82mm mortar and 10 rounds B40 rockets. Results were 10 friendly wounded (1 missing) and 1 crew served weapon destroyed. On 220305 3 km N of Kontum City at ZA220915 the 746th and 748th RF Co's on bridge security received 20 rounds of 82mm mortar followed by ground attack by an estimated enemy company, 3d ACAV and an RF Company from Kontum reacted. Artillery, mortar and Spooky supported. Results were 1 friendly killed, 11 wounded, 22 enemy killed, 4 small arms, 2 crew served weapons captured. On 230250d 6 km SE of Ben Het at YB924227 2d Bn 47th ARVN Inf received 45 rounds mixed indirect fire. Spooky and artillery fired in support. Results were 1 friendly killed, 11 wounded, 22 enemy killed, 4 small arms, 2 crew served weapons captured. On 230914H 10km W of Tam Canh at YB928658 2d Bn 47th ARVN Inf and 1 company from 4th Bn, 42d ARVN Inf were attacked by unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 friendly killed and 24 wounded. On 241115H 4 km E Ben Het at YB906858 2d Bn, 42d ARVN Inf was engaged by unknown size enemy force. Gunships and Tactical air strikes supported. Results were 5 friendly killed, 5 wounded and 30 enemy killed. Between 090500H - 101430H 14 km E of Ben Het at YB910254 3d BN 53d ARVN Inf found a company size and a battalion size base camp and 12 NVA bodies estimated to be 3 weeks old.

RF/PF Operations: On 5 June approximately 13 km SE Dak To at ZB126160, 55, 56, 57 & 65 TF platoons and 1 platoon 3d ACAV in Kon Horing Village received small arms fire, B40 rocket and mortar fire from unknown number of enemy. Artillery supported. Results were 1 friendly killed (1 PF, 3 Civ); 22 wounded (4 PF, 18 Civ); and 2 enemy killed with 1 crew served weapon captured. On 062300H June 2 km NE Lao Thien vic AP962714, 69d PF Plt received 82mm mortar and small arms fired from an estimated 2 enemy platoons, resulting in 6 friendly killed, 4 wounded, 1 missing. At 100445 5 km N Tam Canh at ZB064271, 88 PF Plt in Tu Hong Hamlet was attacked by an unknown size enemy force using small arms fire, B40 rockets and 60mm mortar fire. 104 RF Co and 59 PF Plt reacted. Artillery and gunships supported. Sporadic fire continued until 0900. Results were 2 friendly killed, 10 wounded (7 PF, 3 Civ), 1 missing and 2 small arms lost. On 230650H 4 km NE Lao Thien at AP970804 101 PF Platoon as security force in Buon Ja Hamlet reported 5 rounds of 82mm mortar incoming. Results were 4 friendly killed (3 Civ, 1 PF) and 16 wounded (15 Civ, 1 PF).
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1 FFK'RCEV for Quarterly Period ending 31 July 1969, RG5 CSF-OH-65 (R1) (U)

On 200001 - 202300 Ben Het at YB8725 received 36 rounds of indirect fire, resulting in 1 friendly killed (CIDG), 17 wounded (4 CIDG, 3 ARVN). Between 210001 - 212200H Ben Het CIDG Camp at YB8725 received 73 rounds of incoming. Results were 11 friendly wounded (4 CIDG, 7 Civ). On 250001H Ben Het received 4 rounds of 82mm mortar. At 0310 North Hill was attacked by an 8 man sapper team. At 0500 the camp received 7 rounds 82mm mortar and 5 rounds unknown size recoilless rifle fire. 0930 W sector North Hill received small arms fire and 12 enemy were observed near the perimeter wire. Results were 2 friendly killed (1 US, 1 CIDG), 7 wounded (6 US, 1 CIDG) and 14 enemy killed. Between 220001 - 234001H, Ben Het CIDG Camp at YB86526 received 73 rounds of incoming. Results were 11 friendly killed (4 CIDG, 7 Civ). On 250003H Ben Het received 4 rounds of 82mm mortar. At 0900 the camp received 7 rounds 82mm mortar and 3 rounds unknown size recoilless rifle fire. 0930 W sector North Hill received small arms fire and 12 enemy were observed near the perimeter wire. Results were 2 friendly killed (1 US, 1 CIDG), 7 wounded (6 US, 1 CIDG) and 14 enemy killed. Between 230001 - 234001H, Ben Het received 196 rounds of incoming. Results were 2 friendly killed (US), 26 wounded (7 US, 9 CIDG, 16 US). On 261430, 6 km SE Tieu Atar at ZV053585, the Tieu Atar CSF element engaged an estimated enemy platoon. Results were 0 enemy killed.

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received a mortar attack resulting in 6 friendly killed (2 Us, 1 ARVN, 3 Civ), 18 wounded (3 Us, 10 ARVN, 5 Civ). On 110030H 2 km NE Lao Thien at AP961761 an estimated enemy platoon attacked Buon Dak Hamlet using small arms and automatic weapons fire. PSDF defended. Results were 2 friendly killed (PSDF), 9 wounded (6 Civ, 2 PSDF, 1 RF). On 131620H 9 km NE Lao Thein at AP995835, Trung Son Team 19 3/4 ton truck detonated an anti-tank mine in a stream bed. Results were 2 friendly killed and 8 wounded. On 170105H 22 km NW Kontum at ZB161045 an unknown size enemy force entered Kon Trang Money Village and fired unknown number of B40 rounds at Village Council House and school. PF engaged enemy as they exited village. 105 RF Company reacted with negative results. Results were 6 friendly killed (2 RF, 2 RD, 2 Civ), 3 wounded (1 RD, 2 Civ), 1 missing civilian and 5 small arms lost.

(f) Binh Dinh Province Operations - Junes There have been no major force movements or changes to the plan of operation to support the intensified pacification program within Binh Dinh Province. The 173d Abn Bde, 40th and 41st ARVN Regt's continue pacification support operations in the northern 4 districts. The 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div continued pacification support operations and security of Hwy 19 from Le Trun Village to An Khe pass in An Khe and the northern half of Binh Khe Districts. The Cav and 1st ROK Regts conducted search and clear operations (Bee Ho 23) west of Phu My against elements of the 18th NVA Regt between 7 June and 21 June. Combined operations continued to prove their value as cooperation between the occupying forces in support of pacification increased.

1. US Operations: On 2 Jun 10 km S of Phu Cat vic BR806498, 10th Co, 1st ROK Regt in a series of three contacts engaged an unknown number of enemy resulting in 3 friendly killed and 1 wounded with 12 enemy killed and 5 small arms captured. On 5 Jun 7 km NE of LZ English at BR962086, Hawk Tm 21 from the 2d Bn, 503d Abn Inf found a tunnel, while investigating a mine was detonated killing 1 National Policeman and 1 US and wounding 14 US. On 8 June approximately 3 km NE An Khe at BR518647 killed. Results were 3 friendly killed and 1 wounded with 12 enemy killed. On 8 June approximately 10 km NE An Khe at BR555503, Co C, 1st Bn, 8th Inf engaged an unknown size enemy force with small arms fire, artillery support. Results were 1 friendly killed and 4 wounded and 5 enemy killed. On 170005, 3 km S of An Khe at BR879011, LZ English received sapper attack which employed hand grenades, satchel charges, 40 rockets, and M79 fire at the chopper pad, Officers quarters and around the perimeter. Results were 6 friendly wounded, 1 UH-1H destroyed, 1 UH-1H heavily damaged, 1 UH-1H lightly damaged.

2. ROK Operations: On 7 June approximately 11 km WSW Phu Ny at BR791642, 2d Co, 1st ROK Regt engaged an enemy force in 3 natural caves resulting in 7 enemy killed and 3 small arms captured. On 8 June approximately 14 km W of Phu Cat at BR797764, 1st Co, 1st ROK Regt engaged and killed 12 VC and captured 6 small arms. Approximately 14 km WSW Phu Ny at BR769639 on 8 June, 4 Co 1st ROK Regt engaged and killed 12 VC. Approximately 11 km WNW Phu Cat at BR776006 on 8 June 7th Co 1st ROK Regt engaged and killed 6 VC. On 9 June 10 km NE Phu Cat at BR791598, 12th Co, 1st ROK Regt engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 2 friendly wounded and 9 enemy killed with 6 small arms captured. Again on 8 June approximately 17 km NW Phu Cat at BR77617, 5, 6 and 7th Co's, 1st ROK Regt made sporadic contact with an
unknown size enemy forces. Results were 9 enemy killed and 4 small arms captured, 5 km SW of Binh Khe vicinity of BR64400 in a series of 7 contacts throughout the day of 9 June, the Cav ROK Regt reported 11 friendly killed, 6 wounded, 1 APC damaged and 11 enemy killed with 6 small arms captured. On 100955H 15 km SW Phu Ky at BR169250 the 26th ROK Regt reported 3 contacts with results of 9 enemy killed and 4 small arms captured. On 120300H 5 km NW Qui Nhon, 4 CRID SP Tm engaged 10 VC, killed 7 and captured 2 small arms. On 131500H 10 km SW Phu Ky at BR707601 12th Co Cav ROK Regt reported 3 contacts with unknown number of enemy resulting in 12 enemy killed and 5 small arms captured. On 151810H 11 km SW Phu Cat at BR791473, 8th Co Cav ROK Regt engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 8 enemy killed and 3 small arms captured. Between 0540 and 1500H 15 km W of Phu My vicinity BR7868, 1st ROK Regt engaged unknown number of enemy in 6 company size contacts resulting in 20 enemy killed and 9 small arms captured. Between 162050H and 171400H 13 km W of Phu My vicinity BR7868 the 1st ROK Regt engaged an unknown size enemy force in 7 company size contacts resulting in 34 enemy killed, 1 prisoner, 13 small arms and 1 crew served weapon captured. On 191913H 7 km NW Phu Cat at BR844576, Recon Co 1st ROK Regt engaged an unknown size VC force. Results were 6 enemy killed. Between the hours of 260530 and 251215 in six separate contacts within Phu Cat and An Hinh Districts, elements of the 1st ROK Regt killed 17 enemy, captured 4 prisoners and 13 small arms. On 271540, 3 km NW Phu Cat at BR952528, elements of the 9th Co, 1st ROK Regt engaged and killed 5 enemy and captured 3 small arms.

3. RF/PF Operations: 9 km W Ba Gi at BR913344 190th RF Co and RD Tm 24 were attacked by an estimated enemy company using small arms, hand grenades and B40 rockets. Spooky and Moonshine supported. Results were 4 friendly killed (1 RP, 3 RD), 7 wounded (5 RF, 2 RD), and 3 small arms lost. On 9 June approximately 6 km NW of An Hinh AP BR853545, 185 RP Co was engaged by an estimated enemy company. Artillery supported. Results were 15 enemy killed, 1 prisoner and 4 small arms captured. 10 km W An Hinh at BR877326 185 RF Co and M49 Tm 49 ambushed an enemy company. Spooky and Moonshine supported. Results were 4 friendly wounded and 10 enemy killed. At 141200, 10 km N of Qui Nhon at BR92359, 400 RF Co engaged 1 sampan as it attempted to land. Spooky supported. Results were 6 enemy killed and 4 small arms captured. On 150615H 10 km SE HOAI AB at BR644737 the 911 RF Co engaged an estimated enemy platoon which was on station. Artillery support. Results were 5 enemy killed and 2 small arms captured. On 102530H 10 km NW Phu Cat at BR844582, 21B PF platoon and FUB were attacked at Thi Ai PHU Hamlet by an unknown size enemy force using small arms and automatic weapons. Results were 17 friendly killed (11 RF, 6 FUB), 3 wounded (2 RF, 1 FUB), 17 small arms and 1 WP-1 radio lost. On 191545H 20 km NW An Hinh at BR393266 the 225 RP hit in night location received ground probe by an unknown size enemy force. Results were 4 friendly killed and 8 wounded. On 200400H 12 km NN Bong Son at BR769349, 980 RF Co in night location received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated enemy platoon. Mortar supported. Results were 7 enemy killed and 2 small arms captured.

4. Other Operations: On 7 June 8 km N of Bong Son at BR880065 an unknown number of VC attacked Huong Du #2 Hamlet and abducted 14 civilians. On 9 June approximately 3 km NW of Phu Cat at BR877318, Lambretta detonated an unknown type mine on QL-1 resulting in 1 civilian killed and 16 civilians wounded. On 111515H in Qui Nhon City at OR083229, a terrorist threw a satchel charge into the Ngoc Huang Bar, resulting in 1 friendly killed (1 RF, 2 Civ) and 21 wounded (11 RF, 17 Civ). On 12055, Camp...

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Radcliff at An Khe (BR066467) received 18 rds of 82mm mortar, 8 which fell in the 5th SF Group National Training Center. Results were 1 friendly killed and 12 wounded (all QDs), 7 vehicles and 7 buildings slightly damaged. At 14000H, the Refugee Camp and 218 RP Co at An Nhơn via BR96455 received 20 rounds of 82mm mortar. Artillery, gunships and spooky supported. Results were 19 friendly civilians killed and 55 civilians wounded. On 141500H, 14 km NW of Phu Cat at GRO95440, Hùng My Refugee Camp received an unknown number and type of mortar fire. US and ROK artillery supported. Results were 1 civilian killed and 12 civilians wounded. At 170025H, the Refugee Camp and 218 RP Co at An Nhơn vic BR961356 received 20 rounds of 82mm mortar. Artillery, gunships and spooky supported. Results were 19 friendly civilians killed and 55 civilians wounded. On 141500H, 14 km NW of Phu Cat Airbase in the vicinity of BR98944 received 12 rounds of 82mm mortar. ROK artillery supported. Results were 1 friendly killed and 18 wounded (US). At 240030H, US and ROK artillery supported. Results were 1 friendly killed and 8 wounded. At 141500H, 10 km NW of Dinh Khe at BR616563, Vinh Thanh GSP Co was engaged by an unknown size enemy force. Artillery supported. Results were 2 friendly killed and 6 wounded with 4 enemy killed and 1 small arm and 1 crew served weapon captured.

Coastal Provinces - June: Four ROK Regts (26th, 28th, 29th and 50th) and the 47th ARVN Regt (-) continued to conduct tactical operations and support pacification operations throughout the month. The 29th and 50th Regts conducted search and clear operation (BAEK MA 10) west of Cam Ranh between 4 June and 20 June against the 401 and 407 Sniper Rn's and 95 Artillery. Other friendly operations were designed to keep constant pressure on the enemy through the use of small unit actions in support of pacification.

1. ROK Operations. On 6 June Phan Rang Airbase at BN7987 received an estimated 30 rounds of 82mm mortar and 6 107mm rockets. Spooky and artillery supported. Results were 12 friendly wounded (3 US, 1 LS Civ, 8 NV Civ), 1 B57 lightly damaged, 1 1/4 ton truck damaged, 1 oxygen trailer damaged and 2 buildings damaged. On 7 June Phan Rang Airbase at BN765875 received 3 rounds 107mm rockets. Results were 2 US killed and 8 US wounded.

2. ROK Operations. On 3 June 20 km S Tuy Hoa at GQ142278, 1st Co, 28th ROK Regt engaged an unknown number enemy during search operations, resulting in 6 enemy killed and 2 small arms captured. 35 km NW Cam Ranh Bay at BQ740306, 24th ROK Regt reported contacts with unknown number of enemy resulting in 1 friendly killed, 3 wounded with 10 enemy killed and 1 small arm captured. On 5 June, 25 km W Cam Ranh Bay at BQ755356, 10th Co 29th ROK Regt ambushed 1 enemy squads. Results were 8 enemy killed and 3 small arms captured. Approximately 32 km SW Trung Dung at BQ750316, 11th Co, 29th ROK Regt reported 5 enemy killed. On 101555H, 26 km W Cam Ranh Bay at BQ795606, Recon Co 29th ROK Regt reported two contacts with an unknown size enemy force, resulting in 7 enemy killed and 3 small arms captured. Approximately 25 km SW Tuy Hoa at GQ101300, 3rd Co 28th ROK Regt ambushed an unknown size VC unit, resulting in 7 enemy killed and 7 small arms captured. On 121240H, 30 km SW Tuy Hoa at BQ956260, 9th Co, 28th ROK Regt made contact with an unknown size enemy force during small unit operations. Results were 16 enemy killed and 8 small arms captured. On 120020H, 35 km NW Cam Ranh Bay at BQ697230, 3rd Co of 9th ROK Div reported 5 enemy killed. On 151400H, 30 km W Cam Ranh Bay at BQ715510, 12th Co, 29th ROK Regt reported contact with unknown number of enemy. Results were 12 enemy killed, 3 crew served weapons captured. On 121540H, 40 km W Phan Rang at BQ781915 PM Co, 50th ROK Regt engaged an unknown size enemy force during search operations in a cave. Results were 5 enemy killed and 2 small arms captured. 25 km WSW of Cam Ranh Bay at BQ715305, the 11th Co, 29th Regt found a weapon cache containing 5 140mm launchers. Between 140835H - 141350H, 30 km NW Cam Ranh Bay at BQ71513 Co's of the 29th ROK Regt reported 12 enemy killed, 1 prisoner, 2 small arms, 5 crew served weapons (including 2 75mm RR) and 2 Chinese radios captured. On 140830H 25 km NW Phan Rang at BQ657240 7th Co, 28th ROK Regt engaged and killed 5
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, I FFORCEN for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July RCS CPAM-65 (R1) (U)

1. ARVN Operations: On 101556H 10 km SW Tuy Hoa at Q006545 51 platoon of the Prov Tank Co was engaged by unknown size enemy force. 2d Co, 1st BN, 47th ARVN Inf reinforced. Results were 4 friendly killed (2 US, 2 ARVN), 11 wounded (9 ARVN, 2 US).

2. RF/RF Operations: On 8 June 25 km W of Tuy Hoa, at Q0008454 at 1130H 994 RF Company was attacked by estimated enemy company resulting in 3 friendly killed and 2 friendly wounded. At 1300H 19 km W of Tuy Hoa 994 Company and Company D 16th Armor were again attacked by estimated enemy company. RF artillery, gunships and Tactical Air strikes supported. Total results both contacts were 9 friendly killed, 2 wounded, 2 small arms lost and 1 enemy killed with 1 prisoner and 1 small arm captured. On 9 June approximately 6 km SW Tuy Hoa at Q0098459 964 RF Co made contact with an estimated 2 enemy companies. Results were 1 FF killed, 7 RF wounded, and 4 enemy killed with 3 small arms and 1 crew served weapon captured. Approximately 5 km W Tuy Hoa at Q009465 211 RF Co Group Headquarters received 15 rounds 82mm mortar and a ground attack by an estimated enemy squad. Artillery supported. Results were 5 friendly killed, 2 small arms lost and 4 enemy killed, 5 small arms and 1 crew served weapon captured. On 151000H 11 km SW Phan Rang at MN597530 168 RF Company engaged 1 company of VC. Artillery and Spooky supported. Results were 4 friendly killed, 12 wounded, and 1 enemy killed. On 201300H 7 km SW Tuy Hoa at Q0004560, 157th RF Co, 22 RF Co Platoon and RD VPM 75 engaged 1 NW platoon. Mortar supported. Results were 1 friendly killed and 6 enemy killed.

3. Other Operations: On 5 June 30 km NW Cheo Keo at B0062156 element of NSF Recon Company made contact with estimated VC platoon. Results were 1 friendly killed (NSF), 2 wounded (1 US, 1 NSF), and 7 enemy killed with 2 small arms captured. On 8 June approximately 20 km NNE Minh Hoa at B0040795 NSF reported an unknown size enemy force entered Ton Phu hamlet, killed 1 male and abducted 12 females.

(2) Southern Provinces - June: Pacification continues to receive increased emphasis throughout the area of operations. One battalion of the 53d Regt was deployed to the Ben Neit area. One Company of the 3d Bn 503d Abn Inf moved to Di Linh to provide the security normally provided by that battalion. The 2d Sqdn, 1st Cav was deployed to Binh Thuan Province to conduct pacification and security operations along Hwy 1 between Vung Tau and the 11/111 Corps border. The 2d Bn, 503d Abn Inf presently has 6 combined action teams of less than platoon size working on a semi-permanent basis in hamlets in the vic of 220875. These teams have had significant results in proving the effectiveness of RF. Numerous projects have been completed which have improved the hamlets standard of living.

1. RF operations: On 170150L 52 km NW Phan Thiet at B004559 elements of U Troop, 2d Sqdn, 1st Cav received an unknown number of mortar rounds, 300 rockets and small arms fire from an enemy force on the west side of WIL.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st FECRF for Quarter
Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFCR-65 (R1) (D)

Elements of 1 Tp recontacted. Tactical Air strikes, gunships, and artillery
supported. Results were 3 friendly killed, 3 wounded and 57 enemy killed
with 1 small arm captured. On 240910H 11 km ESE Hao Loc at 271537S, Recon
element 3d Bn, 503d Abn Inf engaged an estimated VC squad, gunships and
artillery supported. Co C, 3d Bn, 503d Abn Inf reacted. Results were 6
enemy killed and 5 small arms captured.

2. ARVN Operations: On 6 June approximately 3 km NW Song Mao at BN253466
1st Bn, 44th ARVN Inf made contact with unknown number of enemy. Results were
2 friendly killed and 15 wounded, with 1 57mm recoilless rifle lost and 10
enemy killed and 1 small arm captured. On 222402H 7 km NW Phan Thiet at AN817602
element 3d Bn, 44th ARVN Inf and FSB Sherry received small arm fire from an
estimated enemy platoon. Fire was returned resulting in 5 enemy killed. On
271215 at BN305380, elements of the 2d Bn, 44th ARVN Inf and 2d Troop, 8th
ARVN AAVV in convoy were engaged by an estimated enemy company. Results
were 2 ARVN wounded and 8 enemy killed with 1 small arm and 1 crew served
weapon captured.

3. RF/PF Operations: On 6 June approximately 10 km N Phan Thiet at
AN652125 23d RF Co made contact with 1 VC platoon. Artillery supported. Results were
2 friendly killed, 1 wounded and 45 enemy killed with 2 small arms
and 1 crew served weapon captured. Again on 6 June approximately 1 km
SW of Dao Trung at BN149999, 153d RF Co was engaged by an estimated 2 enemy
platoons using small arms fire, 840 rockets, mortar and automatic charges.
Artillery supported. Results were 11 friendly wounded with 1 small arm and 1
crew served weapon lost. On 112400 20 km W Vinh Ngheia at YU75278, 10th
FF plt was engaged by an unknown number of enemy using small arms and 2
rounds of 60mm mortar. 125th RF Co reacted with negative results. Results
were 2 killed and 8 wounded (all civilians). On 120840 18 km E Song Mao at
BN471359, 6th RF plt and NTC Team 80 engaged an estimated 2 VC platoons.
A Troop, 2d Sqdn, 1st Cav reacted. Gunships supported. Results were 3
friendly killed (1 US, 2 PF) 8 wounded (4 US, 4 PF), 1 1/4 ton truck destroyed,
1 1/4 ton truck damaged and 4 small arm killed with 4 small arms and 1 crew
served weapon captured. On 140130 11 km W of Phan Thiet at AR275056 TD 20
and 001700 11th RF Co received an estimated 200 rounds of unknown typo mortar
fire. 3d Co, 5d Bn, 44th ARVN Inf and 785th RF Co reacted with negative
results or contact. Artillery supported. Results were 7 friendly killed
(5 RF, 2 RD) and 6 wounded (5 RF, 1 RD), 7 missing, (2 RF, 5 RD) with 15
small arms and 2 PRC-10 lost. On 190220 14 km N Phan Thiet at AN872086,
92d, 3d and 34th RF plts and a Trung Son team on defense of Hao An Hamlet
received ground attack from unknown size enemy force. Artillery supported.
Results were 1 FF killed, 17 wounded (5 RD, 5 PRC, 11 Civilians). On
190214/30 8 km NE Phan Thiet at AN902167, 64th RF Co engaged an unknown
number of enemy using small arms automatic weapons and mortar fire.
Mortar fire and artillery supported. Results were 1 friendly killed, 1
wounded and 9 enemy killed with 1 small arm captured. On 190315H 17 km 3
Dalat at BP190004G, the 47th FF plt at Quang Diep outpost was attacked by
an unknown number of enemy using mortar fire followed by a ground attack.
Artillery supported. Results were 6 friendly killed, 5 wounded and 7 small arms
and 1 PRC-10 radio lost.

4. Other Operations: On 6 June approximately 21 km SSW Dalat at BP153007,
A/5-26 Artillery and 577th Engr at Dao Trung HQ and Le van Khai Airfield received
an unknown number of B40 rockets followed by a ground attack. Results were 9
friendly killed (6 RF, 3 Civ) 28 wounded (18 Civ, 10 RF) with 1 crew served
weapon lost and 1 enemy killed. On 102400H 10 km NE Phan Thiet at AN903165
an unknown size enemy force entered Hao Than and Hoa Bang Hamlets and ab-
ducted 16 ARVN nomines. On 122354N 1 km NW of Gia Ngheia at YU934295, Ngheia
Binh Hamlet received 30 rounds of 82mm mortar and numerous B40 rounds.
Mortar and artillery supported. Results were 8 friendly killed (7 PRC, 1 Civ hamlet
chief) and 1 wounded (PSDF).

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1) WESTERN HIGHLAND Operations - July: Tactical operations in the Highlands subsided with the close of the Ben Het - Dak To campaign. Bomb damage assessment and area sweeps completed the police of the battlefield. Two battalions each of the 47th and 53rd Regts operating in this area were returned to the 22d and 23d DTA's. The 1st Bn, 53rd Regt assumed the road security mission on Highway 21 East of Ban Me Thuot thereby releasing the 2d Bn, 35th Inf (US) for employment in Pleiku Province. The 3d Bn, 12th Inf (US) deployed to Gia Dinh Province OPCON to 1st Bde.

1. US Operations: On 020735H July 12 km NW of Pleiku at ZA129513, B Co 1st Bn 35th Inf received 60 rounds of 60 and 82mm mortar and automatic weapons fire. Artillery supported. Results were 2 friendly KIA and 12 WIA. B Co, 1st Bn 35th Inf on 171030H July, 15 km NW Pleiku at ZA075573 engaged 10 enemy. Gunships and artillery supported the contact which resulted in 6 enemy killed and 1 small arms captured. On 280920H July, 30 km NW Pleiku at ZA073700, C Troop, 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav received fire from unknown size enemy force. Artillery supported. Results were 1 friendly wounded and 6 enemy killed with 2 small arms and 1 crew served weapons captured.

2. ARVN Operations: On 031000H July, 4 km S of Ben Het at YB865221 elements of the 3d Bn 53d ARVN Inf found a base camp with 100 bunkers and 21 bodies in fresh graves. On 051000H July, 4 km SW of Ben Het at AB839282 elements of the 1st Bn, 53d ARVN Inf found 10 enemy bodies. On 241115H July, 13 km NW Kontum City, at ZB180005, a truck in a 1st Bn 42d ARVN Inf convoy detonated a mine on QL14, resulting in 26 friendly wounded. On 251345H July, 11 km NNW Ben Het, at 150941D, elements of the 3d Bn 45th ARVN Inf engaged an estimated enemy platoon. Artillery supported. Results were 1 friendly killed and 6 enemy killed with 2 small arms captured. On 290700H July, 17 km NW Buon Ho at BR142433, 45th Rcn Co ARVN received small arms and mortar fire from an unknown size enemy force. Artillery and gunships supported. Results were 3友好 killed, 13 wounded with 12 small arms and 1 PRC25 radio lost. On 310120H July, 14 km NW Buon Ho at BR174007, 3 Co 4th Bn 4th ARVN Inf received 25 rds of 82mm mortar. Artillery supported. Results were 11 friendly WIA.

2. RF/PF Operations: On 160515H July, 11 km SSW Tan Canh, at ZD087125, Dak Kong Peng Village was attacked by an estimated enemy company. Reaction force entered village with negative contact. Results were 1 friendly KIA (5 PF, 6 RF) and 16 wounded (10 PF, 4 RF, 2 US) with 14 enemy killed and 1 small arms and 1 crew served weapon captured.

1. CIDG Operations: On 251015H July, 10 km SE Lac Thien at BF0004, Gunships supporting insertion of CIDG eln from AN WOC, received heavy ground fire. Gunships ended. Results were 5 enemy killed. On 261300H July, 16 km SE Duc Lac at BR043401, elements of the 3d JSPp BN ambushed an ANW platoon, resulting in 3 enemy killed and 4 small arms captured.

2. Other Operations: On 031100H 16 km N of Buon Ho at BR755356 PRU engaged 10 VC. Results were 1 KIA killed and 6 enemy killed.

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1. Binh Dinh Operations - July: The Provisional Tank Company of the 173d Abn Bde deployed to Binh Dinh to conduct pacification operations and road and bridge security in Phu My District. The 4th NSF Bn, OPCON to the 173d Abn Bde conducted search and clear operations in Hoai My and Tam Quan Districts. Significant bomb damage of 55 enemy killed was assessed to ARC Light strikes NNE of An Khe on 25 July in reaction to increased enemy activity in that area.

2. US Operations: On 211045H, July, 22 km north of An Khe at BR514671, 17th Cav received small arms fire. Gunships supported. Results were 6 enemy killed. On 211100H, 18 km NW An Khe at BR116022, Hawkeye Aircraft observed an unknown number of enemy in the open and directed artillery fire resulting in 10 enemy killed. On 250705H, July, 29 km NNE of An Khe at BR524698 an aircraft from A Troop, 7th Sqdn, 17th Cav confirmed 25 enemy killed as a result of ARC Light Strikes. On 250740H, July, 28 km NNN An Khe, at BR502671, an aircraft from A Troop, 7th Sqdn, 17th Cav observed and engaged 6 VC in the open resulting in 6 enemy killed. On 251400H July 29 km NNE of An Khe at BR525680 A Troop, 7th Sqdn and 3 patrols found 30 enemy killed by ARC Light strikes.

3. ROK Operations: On 010350H, July, 18 km NW Phu Cat at BR838578 11th Co Ist ROK Regt ambushed and killed 7 enemy and captured 3 small arms. Between 040150 - 041055H July, in the vicinity of Binh Khe BR 8540 the Cav ROK Regt in a series of 5 contacts reported 10 enemy killed and 7 small arms captured. On 080255H July, 3 km SSW of HAMMOND Airfield at BR915547 12th Co Ist ROK Regt killed 6 en and captured 5 SA. Between 100500H and 101210H July, 13 km NW Phu Cat vic BR817574, 11 Co Ist ROK Regt had four enemy contacts with unknown size enemy forces resulting in 1 friendly killed and 12 enemy killed with 3 prisoners, and 11 small arms captured. On 110450H July, 10 km SE Binh Khe at BR613333, 5 Co-Cav ROK Regt engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 6 enemy killed with 4 small arms captured. On 231210H July, 9 km NW Qui Nhon, at BR383077, 4th Co, 1st Regt engaged and killed 6 enemy and captured 4 small arms. On 230810H July, 12 km SW Phu My, at BR813579, 11 Co Ist ROK Regt ambushed and killed 7 enemy and captured 3 small arms. On 231725H 8 km NW HAMMOND Airfield at BR905570, 10 Co, 1st ROK Regt had two contacts resulting in 20 enemy killed and 16 small arms captured. On 240410H July, 10 km SE Phu My, at BR841591 11th Co, 1st ROK Regt engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 40 enemy killed and 7 small arms captured. On 251210H July, 7 km NW HAMMOND Airfield, 12th Co, 1st ROK Regt had 2 contacts resulting in 14 enemy killed and 7 small arms captured. On 260700H, 15 km SW Phu My at BR800560 10th Co Ist ROK Regt in two contacts engaged and killed 5 enemy and captured 3 small arms. On 271620H July, 12 km N Qui Nhon at CR10350, 4th Co, 1st ROK Regt in two contacts engaged and killed 10 enemy and captured 6 small arms. On 311300H

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of headquarters, 1 FFORCGV for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969, EDS OSFCH-65 (RI) (U)

July, 22 km SW Qui Nhon at BR928057, 9th Co, Cav ROK Reg engaged an unknown size enemy force. Results were 6 enemy killed and 2 small arms captured. On 310955H, 23 km SW Qui Nhon at BR921050, 12th Co, Cav ROK Reg engaged and killed 6 enemy and captured 2 small arms.

On 310815H, 9 km ESE Van Canh at ER921356, 10th Co, Cay ROK Reg had two contacts resulting in 11 enemy killed and 5 small arms captured. On 310900H, 7 km ESE Van Canh at BR9205, 12th Co, Cav Regt had two contacts resulting in 11 enemy killed and 5 small arms captured.

2. RF/PF Operations July: On 021500H 1 km SE of Tam Quan at BS905085, 132 RF Co detonated a 155 mm booby trap. Results were 5 friendly killed and 3 wounded and 3 small arms lost. On 060930H July, 3 km E of Dong Son at BR90947, 971 RF Co 21 Ton truck in convoy was hit by a command detonated mine resulting in 16 friendly KIA. Between 080745 and 081000, 12 km NE Dong Son vic of BS910085, 217 RF Co received small arms fire from an estimated VC squad and detonated 2 booby traps. Results were 13 friendly wounded. On 191120H July 3 km N Vinh Thanh at BR663545, 1 platoon of 199 RF Co ambushed a VC platoon. Results were 1 friendly killed and 12 enemy killed with 5 small arms captured. On 281900H, 8 km NE Dong Son, at BS915004, 23d PF Platoon, RD Team 92 and PSDF elements engaged an enemy platoon resulting in 5 enemy killed and 2 small arms captured. On 281450H July, 4 km WNW An Nhon at BR912395, 23d PF Platoon was attacked by an unknown size enemy force. A Co, 2d BN, 503d Abn Inf and elements of the 40th Regt reacted with negative results. Artillery/Mortar and Gunships supported. Results were 2 friendly killed and 10 wounded.

(k) Coastal Provinces Operations - July: Friendly units continued tactical operations and pacification support operations throughout the month. Two battalions of the 47th Regt returned to Tuy Hoa to resume operations in support of pacification. The 26th ROK Regt with a battalion each of the 1st Regiment and the Cav Regt (HUB SAN JIN) and the 28th Regt (60, 606, 605) conducted coordinated search and clear operations northwest of Tuy Hoa against the 10th NVA Regiment, 7 July thru 21 July. Results of both operations were 338 enemy killed with 114 small arms and three crew served weapons captured with only twelve friendly killed and 53 wounded.

US Operations: On 070115H July 32 km SW An Khe at BR168192, D/3-8 and C/6-29 received 4 rounds B40 rocket, 8 rounds unknown size RR, followed by a ground attack from an unknown size enemy force using satchel charges. Mortar and Spooky supported. Results were 3 friendly killed and 4 wounded with 11 enemy killed. In Phu Ten Province on 081400H 14 km MSW of Dong An at BR773736, 1 US LRP reported 6 enemy killed, 4 prisoners, 1 small arms captured. In Khanh Hoa Province on 132015H, 6 km west Nha Trang, at BP965535, Team 124/A/502 (USSF) engaged an estimated enemy platoon with small arms automatic weapons fire. Spooky supported. Results were 10 enemy killed and 7 small arms captured.

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2 ARVN Operations: On 140230H 8 km WSW Tuy Hoa at QG083431, 2/4-47 engaged an estimated enemy platoon. Artillery and mortar supported. Results were 8 enemy killed and 1 small arms captured. In Phu Yen Province on 261045H, 10 km NW Tuy Hoa at QG118572, an individual from the 1st Bn, 27th ARVN Inf tripped an unknown number of mines connected in series along a trail. Results were 3 friendly killed (ARVN), 20 wounded (ARVN), 3 small arms and 1 radio destroyed.

3 ROK Operations: On 021515H 14 km SW of Ninh Hoa at BP90.675 11th Co 30th ROK Regt engaged an enemy squad. Results were 20 enemy killed with 7 small arms captured. On 081420 - 081455, 25 km NW of Tuy Hoa at BC98555, 12th Co Cav ROK Regt engaged an unknown size enemy force. Results were 8 enemy killed with 2 small arms captured. On 091020H 25 km NW of Tuy Hoa at BC98555 2 Co 26th ROK Regt engaged an unknown number of enemy in a cave. Results were 10 enemy killed and 5 small arms captured. Between 091130H and 091340H 13 km SSE of Dong Tre at BC93567 5th of the 1st ROK Regt engaged an unknown number of enemy in 3 company size contacts. Results were 13 enemy killed with 5 small arms captured. Between 100905H and 101720H, 26 km SE Tuy Hoa vic BR927555 elements of the 26th ROK (ROK) engaged four unknown size enemy forces. Results were 25 enemy killed with 15 small arms captured. On 130820H, 12 km NW Tuy Hoa at QG050519, 6 Co, 28th ROK Regt engaged an unknown size enemy force. Results were 6 enemy killed with 2 small arms captured. On 131110H, 10 km SW Dong Son at BC943507, 8 Co, 1st ROK (ROK) engaged an unknown size enemy force. Results were 6 enemy killed with 3 small arms captured. On 140840H, 8 km NW Tuy Hoa at QG094516, 9 Co, 29th ROK engaged an estimated VC squad. Results were 7 enemy killed, 4 small arms captured. Between 140815H and 141350H, 20 km SW Tuy Hoa, vic BR926628, 3 Co's from the 26th ROK (ROK) had 5 friendly initiated engagements with enemy squad size elements. Results were 17 enemy killed, 8 small arms, 1 crew served weapon, 1 PK-10 radio captured. On 160840, 10 km SW Tuy Hoa, at QG062607, 1 Co 28th ROK ROK engaged unknown size enemy force. Results were 11 enemy killed and 3 small arms captured. On 161025H, 27 km NW Tuy Hoa at BC993558, Recon Co 26th ROK engaged an unknown size enemy force. Results were 15 enemy killed and 9 small arms captured. On 180700H, 10 km South Tuy An at QG078598, 2 Co, 28th ROK ROK engaged an unknown size enemy force. Results were 6 enemy killed, and 2 small arms captured. On 181430H, 24 km NW Tuy Hoa at BC934132, 6 Co 1 Regt ROK engaged unknown size enemy force. Results were 11 enemy killed, and 4 small arms. On 180700H, 8 km South Tuy An, at QG1058, 1st Bn 28th ROK ROK had 3 contacts. Results were 15 enemy killed and 4 small arms captured. On 181430H, 17 km SSE Dong Tre at BC96553, 2 Bn 1st Regt ROK had 2 contacts. Results were 15 enemy killed and 5 small arms captured. On 181430H 11 km NW Tuy Hoa at BC9445 2d Bn 28th ROK ROK had 5 contacts. Results were 2 friendly wounded (ROK) and 9 enemy killed, with 3 small arms captured. On 190740H 15 km South Dong An at BC964657, 10 Co 26th ROK ROK engaged unknown size enemy force. Results were 8 enemy killed.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1 FFORCEV for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

4 RF/PF Operations: On 052130H 3 km South Dong Xuan at K2992759 the 987th RF Company was attacked by an estimated 2 enemy platoons. Results were 3 friendly killed and 11 wounded with enemy unknown. On 110120H, 10 km North of Tuy Hoa at O245565, the 709th RF Company (-) 27th PF Battalion was engaged by an unknown size enemy force. Artillery and gunships supported. Results were 14 friendly killed (3 US, 9 RF, 2 PD) 20 wounded (RF) and 12 weapons lost, 3 weapons and radio destroyed with 11 enemy killed and 4 small arms captured.

5 Other Operations: On 190820H 6 km SW Tuy Hoa at O214666, a mine was detonated in a market place in Long Tuong Hamlet. Results were 3 friendly killed (Civil), 21 wounded (12 Civ, 7 RF, 2 NP).

(1) Southern Provinces - July: In an attempt to continue pacification gains and in reaction to increased enemy activity, TF South and the 23rd Light Infantry Group displaced to Phan Thiet and employed the 3d Battalion 503d Airborne Infantry in Binh Thuan Province. The 3d Battalion 53rd ARVN Infantry returned to Lam Dong Province to conduct pacification support operations in the Bao Loc Area.

1 US Operations: On 070150H 19 km SSW Song Mao Village, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry, and 5th Battalion 27th Artillery (US) located at Long Song Farm Compound vicinity of BN162462 received a sapper attack from an unknown size enemy force employing mortar and B40 rockets and satchel charges. Gunships, artillery and Spooky supported, results were 6 friendly killed (US), 28 wounded (27 US, 1 ARVN); 62-1 ammo bunker, 1 M548 Ammo carrier, 4 APCs destroyed; enemy had 8 killed, 1 prisoner, 4 crew served weapons and 2 small arms captured. On 111927 and 112118H, 7 km North Phan Thiet at AN 811161, FSB Sherry (5-22 Artillery) received 15 rounds and 5 rounds respectively of 82mm mortar. Artillery and mortar supported. Results were 12 friendly wounded (US). In Binh Thuan Province on 201615H, 20 km North Phan Thiet at AN925305, 4 Co, 3d Battalion 503d Airborne Infantry received an estimated enemy squad. Artillery supported. Results were 6 friendly killed, 1 detained, and 5 small arms captured.

2 RF/PF Operations: On 010125H 4 km SW Song Mao Village at BN262412, 445 RF Company in Thin My hamlet received an unknown number of 60mm mortar rounds and small arms fire. Shadow supported. 118 and 968 RF Cots reacted and conducted sweep operations. Results were 4 friendly killed, 8 wounded and 1 missing (all RF). On 052300H 24 km SSE of Dalat at BN018665, 605th RF Company was engaged by an unknown enemy who used small arms, B40 rocket and 60mm mortar fire. Artillery and Spooky supported. Results were 6 friendly killed (1 RF, 5 Civilians) 8 wounded (1 RF, 7 Civilians) and enemy unknown. On 110315H, 9 km West Duc Trong at BF44031, 266th RF Company at Kontum Phat Hamlet was engaged by an unknown size enemy force. Artillery and Spooky supported. Results were 6 friendly killed (1 RF, 5 Civilians) 8 wounded (1 RF, 7 Civilians) and enemy unknown. On 111125H, 13 km SW Dalat at BF095155, the 215th and 951st RF Companies and 2 armored cars reacted to the 266th RF Company contact and were attacked by estimated 2 enemy companies. 1st Co, 2-53d ARVN Infantry moving behind the convoy was engaged by an estimated enemy squad. Results were 10 friendly RF wounded; 8 enemy were killed, 2 prisoners, 6 small arms captured and 1 crew served weapon captured.

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(m) Friendly casualty figures May, June and July.

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<td>164</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>1645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPNS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**JULY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>US</th>
<th>ROK</th>
<th>ARVN</th>
<th>RF/PF</th>
<th>CIDG</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>1078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPNS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Organization and Training Activities:

(a) All units that were assigned or under the operational control of this headquarters as of 31 July 1969 are listed at Inol 3.

(b) The command relationship among II Corps, ROKFY-PC, I FFORCEV and major US units within II CTZ is at Inol 4.

(c) The following units were assigned/attached to I FFORCEV during the period.

1. 272d FA Det (Radar) assigned by USARY GO 1657, 10 May 1969.
2. 270th FA Det (Radar) attached by USARY GO 2291, 27 June 1969.

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2. 313th Radio Research Battalion attached by USARV GO 2432, 6 July 1969.

(d) Manpower Authorizations:

1. 1st Bn (MG), 41st Arty (AIR) was reorganized under MTOE 44-580, FAC 1/68 by USARPAC GO 292, 11 April 1969.

2. 5th Bn (8"/175mm) (SP) 22d Arty was reorganized under MTOE 6-430G, FAC 2/69 by USARPAC GO 416, 28 May 1969.

3. 5th Bn (105mm) 27th Arty was reorganized under MTOE 6-406G, FAC 2/68 by USARPAC GO 347, 30 April 1969.

4. 41st and 52d Arty Gp were reorganized under MTOE 6-401G, FAC 1/68 by USARPAC GO 448, 5 June 1969.

5. 2d Bn (105mm) (T) 17th Arty was reorganized under MTOE 6-406G, FAC 2/68 by USARPAC GO 347, 30 April 1969.

6. 1st Bn (155mm) (T) 92d Arty was reorganized under MTOE 6-426G, FAC 1/69 by USARPAC GO 459, 6 June 1969.

7. 3d Bn (105mm) (SP) 6th Arty was reorganized under MTOE 6-466G, FAC 1/68 by USARPAC GO 458, 6 June 1969.

8. 66th Engr Det (Terrain) was reorganized under MTOE 5-500G, FAC 3/68 by USARPAC GO 435, 3 June 1969.

9. 1st Bn (Mch.) 50th Inf was reorganized under MTOE 7-46G, FAC 1/69 by USARPAC GO 460, 4 June 1969.

10. 54th Sig Bn (Corps) was reorganized under MTOE 11-16G, FAC 2/69 by USARPAC GO 447, 5 June 1969.

11. 167th Sig Co (JU) was reorganized under MTOE 11-377G, FAC 1/69 by USARPAC GO 329, 24 April 1969.

(e) Research and Development (R&D) Activities: Requests for information on R&D items from USARV and activities monitored by this headquarters. There were no requests for ENSURE (Expedited Non-Standard Urgent Requirements for Equipment) items received from assigned, attached or OPOON units. No ENSURE requests were submitted to USARV from HQ, I FFORCEV.

(f) Training: Assigned and attached units, less artillery groups and battalions, are inspected semi-annually by a representative of the O&M Section, who is a member of the Inspector General's Team.

(g) Doctrine: The "Tactical Notes" publication is gaining additional readers each month. Distribution is now 1700 copies monthly. The monthly Tactical Notes are attached as inclosures to this O&M.

1. Tactical Notes for May 1969 (Inclosure 5)
2. Tactical Notes for June 1969 (Inclosure 6)
3. Tactical Notes for July 1969 (Inclosure 7),

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(b) ARVN Improvement: The 6th Bn, 84th Arty (155 Towed) continued the turnover of equipment to the 45th ARVN Arty Bn. The equipment transfer and personnel training is being accomplished in a successful manner which can be attributed to the close cooperation and coordination between ARVN and US troops. The first ARVN firing battery to receive US equipment became operational in July 1969. The 45th ARVN Arty Bn will be completely operational by mid-August 1969.

(a) Herbicide operations during this reporting period have included both crop and defoliation missions. Unfavorable weather conditions throughout the II CTZ have resulted in the cancellation of 42% of the sorties scheduled.

1. The results of US Air Force UC-123 missions are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Sortie Flown</th>
<th>Hectares Defoliated (est)</th>
<th>N/T Crops Destroyed (est)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Binh Dinh</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>6860</td>
<td>3648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binh Thuan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darlac</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>5760</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khanh Hoa</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kontum</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lam Dong</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minh Thuan</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>3120</td>
<td>2304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Bon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Yen</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>10,836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleiku</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quang Duc</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuyen Duc</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>215</strong></td>
<td><strong>17,040</strong></td>
<td><strong>17,868</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Units in II CTZ are continuing to use UH-1 and CH-47 helicopters and truck based power spray apparatus to spray small areas not conducive to spray by UC-123 aircraft. The results of helicopter spray operations are as follows:
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AVPM-GC-OT 15 August 1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Hectares Defoliated (est)</th>
<th>MT Crops Destroyed (est)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ, I FORCEN</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROKPV-FC</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Inf Div</td>
<td>1424</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA, II Corps</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173d Abn Bde</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bn (Abn) 506th Inf</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>611</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 2099 611

(b) Riot control agents (RCA) are being employed in both offensive and defensive operations. On 28 May the 4th Inf Div employed six and 16 drums of CS, respectively, to contaminate known 85mm positions at YB 7762 18 and YB 763156. On 3 Jun the 173d Abn Bde observed 3-5 individuals hiding in rocks and caves via BS 845140 located 13 km NW of LZ English. When aircraft fire failed to bring them out, six E-158’s were employed; driving the VC from their positions. Gunships engaged and resulted in 3 VC/NVA KIA (Bn). A 23 Jun mission (173d Abn Bde) at BS 747035 resulted in secondary explosions. On 24 Jun, at BR 025227, while working with the 4th Inf Div, a Snoopy gunship observed an estimated 25 NVA in the open; Cobra gunships and CS (eight XM-15) were employed and resulted in 13 NVA and 2 VC KIA (confirmed by 1/10 Cav sweep of the area). On 7 Jul, at YA 948464, 4th Inf Div fired one XM-15 on a suspected enemy location; follow-up of Cobra gunships resulted in 4 VC KIA. The 173d Abn Bde has employed air strikes delivering BLU 52 A/B GS2 bombs to harass the enemy and make it difficult for him to continue farming activities in the An Loa Valley. Use was made in a terrain restriction program in the Dak To - Ben Het area between 29 May and 3 Jul; a total of 192 drums of CS and 54 Air Force BLU 52 munitions were used.

(c) Personnel detectors operating within the II CTZ are providing a continual source of reliable information concerning enemy locations. In most instances, CS, gunships, TAC air or artillery fire were employed against the locations of the heavy readings. All readings were submitted to the appropriate G2/S2 for evaluation.

1. The summary of personnel detector operations in II CTZ is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>APD Missions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ROKPV-FC</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Inf Div</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173d Abn Bde</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bn (Abn) 506th Inf</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1 CFFORCEV for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969 RCS GF0965 (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>AFM Missions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3d Bn (Abn) 503d Inf</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23d ARVN Div Advisory Tm</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDC Nha Trang</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>543</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. The XM3 personnel detector is now in use in 4th Inf Div, 173d Abn Bde, 3d Bn (Abn) 503d Inf, 3d Bn (Abn) 506th Inf and 22d and 23d ARVN Div Advisory Team operations. Those XM3's and prototype XM3's which are operational, provide a backup for the XM3 in some of these units and give a personnel detector capability to elements not having XM3's (CAF and 9th ROK Div and 24th STZ Advisory Team).

2. On 6 May, the 173d Abn Bde called an air strike on heavy readings in vic 195951, resulting in a secondary explosion.

(a) The enemy continued to use RCA on a small scale during offensive operations. There have been two reported enemy initiated actions during which the enemy used riot control agents. On 11 Jun, vic YB 8725, Ben Het CIDG camp received five 82mm mortar GS rounds. On 22 Jun, the 660th RF Co, Lac Thien Dist HQ and Lac Thien Dist Advisory Team (AP 9573) received a standoff attack including 2 rounds of 82mm mortar GS; GS was ineffective. The rounds apparently detonated in trees inside the compound. Fragments from the GS round could not be found. Slight CS odor persisted approximately 45 minutes to 1 hr.

(b) G3 Air Operations.

(a) There were a total of 7519 tactical air sorties (5549 pre-planned and 1970 immediate) averaging 82.6 sorties per day. These sorties were flown in the following target categories:

1. Troops in Contact (TIC) - 659
2. Confirmed Enemy Location (CEL) - 2166
3. Acquired Enemy Location (AEL) - 1379
4. Suspected Enemy Location (SEL) - 2130
5. Fixed Target Destruction (FTD) - 214
6. Troop Assault Preparation (TAP) - 214
7. Landing Zone Clearing (LZC) - 387

(b) Of the total sorties flown this quarter, 3396 were in support of US/PWAF operations in I CTZ with the following results:

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>SORTIES/DAY</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4TH INF DIV</td>
<td>1654</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>64 KIA, 5 KBA, 65 secondary explosions, 62 secondary fires, 220 bunkers destroyed, 111 structures destroyed, 2 bridges destroyed, 1 ammo cache destroyed, 1 gun position destroyed, 2 bridges destroyed, 5 foxholes destroyed, 3 tunnels destroyed, 8 trail cuts, and 70 meters of trench destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF SOUTH</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8 KIA, 3 secondary explosions, 4 secondary fires, 56 bunkers destroyed, 7 structures destroyed, 1 camp site destroyed, 1 sleeping platform destroyed, and 10 feet of trench destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173D ABN DIV</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1 KIA, 27 KBA, 10 secondary explosions, 5 secondary fires, 17 bunkers destroyed, 5 structures destroyed, 1 foxholes destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9TH ROK DIV</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13 KIA, 10 KBA, 20 secondary explosions, 29 secondary fires, 1 active gun position, 16 bunkers destroyed, 35 structures destroyed, 35 caves destroyed, 5 foxholes destroyed, 3 crop fields destroyed, and 55 meters of trench destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP ROK DIV</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22 KIA, 1 KBA, 47 secondary explosions, 68 secondary fires, 18 bunkers destroyed, 6 structures destroyed, 6 caves destroyed, 4 trail cuts, and 130 meters of trench destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I FFORCEN &amp; OTHERS</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(Includes 7th Air Force Special Interdiction sorties) 2 secondary explosions, 17 secondary fires, 18 road cuts and 27 road craters.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the period there were 3923 tactical air sorties flown in support of GVN operations in II CTZ. Of the total, 2231 sorties were flown in support of ARVN, 1424 sorties flown in support Provincial Forces and 248 sorties flown in support of CIDG units. The following results were obtained: 210 KIA, 45 KBA, 300 secondary explosions, 501 secondary fires, 350 structures destroyed, 194 structures damaged, 5 active gun positions destroyed, 1837 bunkers destroyed, 204 bunkers damaged, 47 pack train units destroyed, 204 foxholes destroyed, 7 bridges destroyed, 47 caves destroyed, 387 meters of trench destroyed, 6 rice fields destroyed, 350 meters of trail destroyed, 19 occupied gun positions destroyed, 24 occupied gun positions destroyed, 3 small arms ammunition caches destroyed, 1 food cache destroyed, 13 sampans destroyed, 11 spider holes destroyed, 1 windmill destroyed, 200 feet of pipeline destroyed, 2" road cuts and 15 trail cuts.
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15 August 1969


(6) (C) Army Aviation Operations

(a) The major objective in employing the tactical aviation assets available to I LFRCEV remains as stated in operational reports.

1. Provide air mobility to combat elements of FWM&F in II CTZ.

2. Provide aviation support to the Province Senior Advisors and CO/RGs personnel in II CTZ for C&S, administrative missions and resupply.

(b) Resources available from 17th CAG are:

1. Assault helicopter assets (UH-1H "slicks");

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>SUPPORT MISSION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10th Combat Aviation Battalion</td>
<td>GS Southern Coastal, GS Southern Highlands and Task Force South, Recondo, 5th SFG(A), 23d ARVN Div, 9th ROK Inf Div, MACVSO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48th AHC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>924 AHC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155th AHC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>192d AHC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>281st AHC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52d Combat Aviation Battalion</td>
<td>GS Northern Highlands; Prairie Fire; 4th Inf Div; 24th STZ; Highway Coordinator; Company B, 5th SFG(A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57th AHC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119th AHC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170th AHC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>189th AHC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>268th Combat Aviation Battalion</td>
<td>GS Northern Coastal; 175th Abn Bde, 24th ROK Inf Div, 22d ARVN Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61st AHC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129th AHC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134th AHC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. The 335th AHC remains OPCON to SA IV Corps as stated in last report.

3. The 7/17th Air Cav Sqdn remains assigned to 17th CAG OPCON to I LFRCEV and further OPCON to the 4th Inf Div, and is stationed at Camp Enari II CTZ. B Troop 7/17th Cav was released from OPCON to Task Force South on 5 Jul 69 and returned to Camp Enari and 4th Inf Div control. C Troop 7/17th Cav remains OPCON to 175th Abn Bde and is located at Lane AAF, An Son.
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4. Heavy helicopter assets:

- COMPANY: 335th HHC
  - BATTALION: 268th CAB
  - SUPPORT MISSION: GS II CTZ

5. Assault support helicopter assets (CH-47 "Hook"):

- COMPANY: 179th ASOC
  - BATTALION: 52d CAB
  - SUPPORT MISSION: GS 4th Inf Div

- COMPANY: 268th ASOC
  - BATTALION: 268th CAB
  - SUPPORT MISSION: GS Central Coastal

- COMPANY: 269th ASOC
  - BATTALION: 268th CAB
  - SUPPORT MISSION: GS Northern Coastal

- COMPANY: 245d ASOC
  - BATTALION: 10th CAB
  - SUPPORT MISSION: GS Southern Coastal

6. Armed helicopter companies:

- COMPANY: 26th Avn Co (R)
  - BATTALION: 268th CAB
  - SUPPORT MISSION: GS II CTZ

- COMPANY: 361st Avn Co (F)
  - BATTALION: 52d CAB
  - SUPPORT MISSION: GS II CTZ

7. The 183d, 185th, 203d and 219th Reconnaissance Airplane Companies support the visual reconnaissance program and provide GS throughout II CTZ.

8. The 225th Surveillance Airplane Company is employed throughout II CTZ in aerial surveillance role

(c) Major accomplishments:

1. Airmobile assets were provided to the following US operations for the periods indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>SUPPORTED UNIT</th>
<th>DURATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WAYNE GRAY</td>
<td>1st Bde, 4th Inf Div</td>
<td>1 Mar - 14 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAYNE JAVELIN</td>
<td>1st Bde, 4th Inf Div</td>
<td>13 Apr - present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUHMAH PANTHER</td>
<td>2nd Bde, 4th Inf Div</td>
<td>1 Feb - 21 Jun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUHMAH TIGER</td>
<td>2nd Bde, 4th Inf Div</td>
<td>22 Apr - present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREENE THUNDER II</td>
<td>3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div</td>
<td>1 Mar - 2 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREENE ORANGE</td>
<td>3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div</td>
<td>14 Apr - 27 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREENE ORANGE II</td>
<td>3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div</td>
<td>2 May - 5 May</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Operational Report of Headquarters, I FFk'IlCiV for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CHOR-65 (R1) (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Supported Unit</th>
<th>Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GREENE HURRICANE</td>
<td>3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div</td>
<td>19 Mar - 14 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREENE TYPHOON</td>
<td>3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div</td>
<td>14 Apr - 1 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREENE QUEEN</td>
<td>3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div</td>
<td>25 Apr - 6 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREENE TYPHOON II</td>
<td>3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div</td>
<td>5 May - 21 Jun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREENE QUEEN III</td>
<td>3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div</td>
<td>5 May - present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREENE BASALT</td>
<td>3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div</td>
<td>16 May - 21 Jun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREENE GALLOP</td>
<td>3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div</td>
<td>2 Jun - present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREENE AK</td>
<td>3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div</td>
<td>5 May - present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DANGY GREEN III</td>
<td>173d Abn Bde</td>
<td>21 Jun - present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANDY THAIL II</td>
<td>173d Abn Bde</td>
<td>15 Apr - 15 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASHINGTON GREENS</td>
<td>173d Abn Bde</td>
<td>15 Apr - present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HANCOCK KNIGHT</td>
<td>TF South</td>
<td>3 Apr - 7 Apr</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. ROKA Forces were allocated (on a daily basis) one AHC per division. In addition, average CH-47 allocations were 3 daily to CRID and 7 daily to ROK Division. Exceptionally large allocations were provided to ROKA Force for the following operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Supported Unit</th>
<th>Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DONG HO 7</td>
<td>1st &amp; 5th Bn, 50th Regt</td>
<td>9 May - 20 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAK JAE 2-7</td>
<td>2d Bn, 29th Regt</td>
<td>10 May - 18 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BANG MA 10</td>
<td>28th Regt, 29th Regt</td>
<td>4 Jun - 20 Jun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEE HO 23</td>
<td>1st Regt, 3d Bn, Cav Regt &amp; 1st Bn, 26th Regt</td>
<td>7 Jun - 21 Jun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAJ JAN JIN 9</td>
<td>29th Regt, 2d Bn, 1st Regt &amp; 3d Bn, Cav Regt</td>
<td>7 Jul - present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DO LAG BEE 13</td>
<td>28th Regt</td>
<td>7 Jul - present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. ARVN Forces in II CTZ received two AHC on a daily basis to support their air mobile operations. During the reporting period, aviation assets provided 24th ARVN STZ for Operations: WKB, YJYH, 36-41 and JHBT Thirty 1 rose from a daily allocation of 6 slicks, 2 gunships to 14 slicks, 6 gunships and 1 hook daily.

4. Air mobile assets were provided the following special operations as directed by MACV: Prairie Fire, Jules House, Project Delta, Recono School.

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Operational Report of Headquarters, I FFORCEV for quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

2. Airmobile assets were provided to the following units or agencies on a general support basis:

I FFORCEV Staff
21st Signal Group
16th Bng Bde
Cam Ranh Bay Spt Cmd
IPFW Artillery

IDC - Nha Trang
MACV Engr
US Navy Spt Fac
100th Log Cmd (ROK)
Qui Nhon Spt Cmd

II ALC (ARVN)
V ALC (ARVN)
CORDS - PSYOPS
MAGV

(c) Logistics Activities.

(1) Supply:

(a) The overall supply of troop requirements continues to be satisfactory. There are no significant shortages of supplies and equipment which significantly impair the operational capability of the command.

(b) Emphasis was continued on the identification and retrograde of excess supplies and equipment during the quarter. A total of $2.7 million dollars in excess has been identified and retrograded to 1st Log Cmd since this program was initiated in January 1969.

(c) The shortage of 1/4 ton vehicles due to the caiability of ARVN eased somewhat during the quarter as limited assets became available.

(d) There are 20 items under ARN control at the end of the quarter, an increase of 6 items over last quarter. The items under ARN control are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DODIC</th>
<th>ITEM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C256</td>
<td>CTG, 61mm HE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C445</td>
<td>CTG, 105mm HE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C468</td>
<td>CTG, 105mm GS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C705</td>
<td>CTG, 4.2&quot; HE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D544</td>
<td>Proj, 155mm HE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D572</td>
<td>Proj, 175mm HE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D690</td>
<td>Proj, 8&quot; HE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F497</td>
<td>Fuze Burster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G911</td>
<td>Grenade, Offensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H459</td>
<td>2.75&quot; Rocket, Fleckette</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H489</td>
<td>2.75&quot; Rocket, LT, HE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H490</td>
<td>2.75&quot; Rocket, LT, HE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H534</td>
<td>2.75&quot; Rocket, LT, HE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L307</td>
<td>Signal, WS Cluster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L312</td>
<td>Signal, WS Parachute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M4032</td>
<td>Charge, TNT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M131</td>
<td>Cap, blasting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M456</td>
<td>Cord, Detonating</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) TRANSPORTATION:

(a) Air: The discussion of air movements will include routine and emergency airlift requirements and use of G7A dedicated aircraft.

1. The volume of airlift operations throughout II CTZ has continued its decreasing trend during the current quarter. The total movement of routine cargo from depots to forward areas has increased, but the total increase was in highway and sea moves.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>AIR (S/T)</th>
<th>SEA (S/T)</th>
<th>HWY (S/T)</th>
<th>TOTAL (S/T)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>29,950</td>
<td>39,727</td>
<td>70,257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>7,844</td>
<td>26,527</td>
<td>34,276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>7,330</td>
<td>25,117</td>
<td>32,537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>795</td>
<td>45,104</td>
<td>91,191</td>
<td>137,070</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. A small increase was noted in the number of emergency airlift missions flown during this quarter, (38 missions and 170 sorties). The emergency aerial resupply of Ben Het by air-drop accounted for the majority of these missions (21 missions and 97 sorties).

(3) EMERGENCY AIRLIFT (1968 - 1969):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>C-130*</th>
<th>C-123*</th>
<th>C-7A*</th>
<th>PAX</th>
<th>S/T Cargo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug-Oct</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>5,011</td>
<td>2,079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov-Jan</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3,199</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb-Apr</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6,736</td>
<td>1,309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May-Jul</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2,161</td>
<td>411</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sorties
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AVFA-OG-CT 15 August 1969
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, I FFORCEV for Quarterly
Period Ending 31 July 1969 RG8 GSFP-65 (R1) (U)

1. I FFORCEV dedicated C-7A aircraft movements remained at a relatively
constant level.

Dedicated C-7A Airlift (1968 - 1969):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>Pax</th>
<th>S/T Cargo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug-Oct</td>
<td>6,321</td>
<td>50,144</td>
<td>3,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov-Jan</td>
<td>6,106</td>
<td>45,984</td>
<td>2,958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb-Apr</td>
<td>6,100</td>
<td>41,502</td>
<td>3,019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May-Jul</td>
<td>6,220</td>
<td>35,707</td>
<td>3,248</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Highways: The major highways in I CTZ remained open throughout
this quarter, with high volume of convoy traffic noted. Convoy operations
were not significantly hindered by the 84 highway ambush and mining inci-
dents reported involving regulated highways within I CTZ. US and ARVN
convoys were conducted from Cam Ranh Bay to Phan Thiet during this quarter.
A minimum of 2 convoys per month are planned in support of the Phan Thiet
area.

(c) Water: The only forward area being supplied by water in I CTZ is
Phan Thiet. This operation is constantly hindered by shifting sandbars,
changing tides and the physical condition of the unloading ramp. The B.D.L.
Page is still able to utilise the ramp, but all LST's must be beached for
off-loading.

(d) Rail: The railroad operating in I CTZ increased it's tonnage
output by over 50% during the report period. The increase reflects move-
ment of supplies plus larger movements of rock from various quarries for
highway construction.

Rail Movements (May-Jul 69):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ORB</th>
<th>GMH</th>
<th>Total S/T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>25,182</td>
<td>19,572</td>
<td>44,754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>25,160</td>
<td>8,254</td>
<td>33,414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>25,140</td>
<td>6,840</td>
<td>31,990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>75,482</td>
<td>34,676</td>
<td>110,158</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Maintenances: During the reporting period, the I FFORCEV CMO
Team conducted twenty-one inspections. Twenty units were rated satis-
factory and one unit was rated unsatisfactory. Overall, the results of
these inspections showed a significant improvement over last quarters
results. However, of the two major portions of the inspection, Maintenance
Management and Operations remained the lowest. Repair Parts Supply,
TAERS and Safety were the problem areas. In the materiel portion of the
inspection, Tactical and Support Vehicles and Weapons scored the lowest.

(a) Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support.

(i) Office of Development Operations

(a) Agriculture

1. Provincial reports indicate large plantings of TN-8/5 this quarter. The coastal provinces expect to reach their quota of 13,000 hectares, and some hope to exceed them. A wide range of problems are plaguing the highland provinces. Late and low amounts of rainfall have delayed both paddy and broadcast plantings. Movement of fertilizer and pesticides into insecure areas has reduced plantings in Darlac. In Quang Duc Province the Agricultural Service Chief recently returned from military service and there are hopes of getting programs underway.

2. The use of fertilizer has depended upon its availability and cost. Farmers are prone to use only a part of the total recommended application to the rice crop when the cost of fertilizer, in their thinking, is too high. Extension Cadre are clarifying these points in their farm meetings. Urea has been in good supply but mixed fertilizer was short for a limited time. Distribution remains a problem, however, it has been greatly improved this quarter. The Central Farmers Association has increased shipping to Nha Trang for distribution to farm organizations and private dealers. Warehouse storage is a problem and the Region I and II Farm Organization Advisor is attempting to resolve it. Private enterprise is exhibiting more interest in fertilizer and other farm commodities. One businessman has recently contracted with the Agriculture Development Bank for use of a large warehouse for receiving, storage and distribution of most farm commodities.

3. The selection of cooperator-demonstrators for the 1969 swine production program is continuing. Six of the twelve unit cooperators have been selected. The cooperators will receive training in breeding, feeding and animal management. Protein production is gaining in popularity as more people are realizing profits associated with raising chicken and swine. Import of chickens for broiler production and use of vaccines have helped to increase the protein meat supply since early 1969. Pilot demonstrations have generated interest on the part of others to get into protein production projects. Interest is growing in raising chickens for egg production. This will increase the supply of eggs and extend the use of high breed stock to maintain higher production per unit.

4. A military survey team reported to Binh Dinh Province in April to start survey of the Song Con Irrigation project. Security has slowed work by the team. War damage to the Ben Bap Dam in Khan, Hoa has been repaired and the structure is now supplying water to 1000 hectares of rice land. The North and South Canals of the Phu Yen irrigation system required extensive repair due to use and artillery damage. The An Thuan dam, Binh Dinh, is 85 percent complete. The Thai Phien dam, Tuyen Duc, is reported 100 percent complete but still has some defects, causing delays in acceptance until the defects are repaired according to advisory recommendations. Temporary acceptance was made 85% of the Sooi Dau irrigation dam, Khanh Hoa. This VN $12,000,000 dam will improve water supply for an additional 2000 hectares of rice land.

(b) Education

1. Planning and coordination were made for the upcoming adult education workshop scheduled to be held in Nha Trang during the first week of August. Materials for this workshop were received and stored. The adult literacy workshop planning, started in the first quarter, resulted in considerable activity during May, June and July. Five-day workshops were held in Tuyen Duc, Dairei, Minh Thuan, Binh Thuan, Phu Bon, Binh Dinh and Phu Loc Provinces. Plans have been made for workshops in Quang Duc and Kontum.

2. The secondary education survey was finished in late April. Copies of it were sent to Chief, Secondary Education Division in USAID/Education, Saigon and to the NLD Advisors in the provinces. This survey must be kept current if it is to retain its value; it represents complete information on the secondary schools in Region II and is probably the only instrument of its kind in Vietnam.

3. On 7-8 May secondary Education officials from the Directorate in Saigon, USAID Secondary Education Advisors and II CTZ Education Branch staff members visited secondary schools in Nha Trang, Dalat, and Man Me Thuot. The purpose was to inspect science laboratories furnished by USAID five years ago and to discuss tentative plans for a series of science workshops for II CTZ. Between 3-5 July, an advisor was in Saigon to attend the closing ceremonies for the Faculty of Pedagogy workshop for natural science teachers. At that time further definitive plans were made for science workshops scheduled to be held in Dalat periodically in the months ahead. Final plans for the first workshop, scheduled for physics and chemistry teachers to be held during the third week in August, were made between 7-9 July in Dalat with University of Dalat officials.

4. During May and June word was received from Saigon that approval had been granted for the following secondary schools to receive construction commodities: Bo De, Nha Trang; Tri Duc, Dalat; Vinh Xung, Khanh Hoa and Dien Khanh Semi-Public School, Khanh Hoa. Numerous other schools are expected to be granted approval to receive construction commodities in the months ahead.

5. The new agricultural high school in Minh Thuan Province was visited in late May and was found to be operating fairly well. Many improvements are needed; recommendations were made to province officials for assistance in obtaining electricity, tools, furniture and materials.

6. Again, substantial progress was made on completing the dormitories for the Qui Nhon Normal School. The dormitories, to house a total of 800 students, are now 95% completed. The advisor to the normal school has recently insisted on modifying some of the original construction plans for the school and dormitories; this matter remains to be resolved.

7. No significant change in enrollment figures occurred in May, June or July.
Subject: Operational Report of Headquarters, I FFORCEV for quarterly Period ending 31 July 1969, ROG CSFIR-65 (R1) (U)

Refugee Division

1. The second quarter of 1969 has seen important advancements under the Ministry of Health, Social Welfare and Relief in programs of refugee relief, care of war victims, resettlement, and assistance in return to hamlet. In most provinces real efforts have been made in upgrading refugee resettlement sites to the level of functioning hamlets with roads, schools, water supply, health facilities, village and hamlet elections, people self-defense forces and self-support economic projects. At this point they are normalized as GVN hamlets. CORDS Advisors have played a progressive and creative role in all areas showing outstanding development. Civic action by ARVN, U.S., and Free World Forces have made extensive contributions to engineering, construction and commodity distribution projects. Voluntary agencies and organizations have continued to make outstanding contributions in health, commodity distribution, education and child care. Over 100 institutions such as leprosariums, boarding schools, old folks homes, orphanages and day care centers for the children of working parents assist in meeting the social welfare needs of people.

2. Up to the end of the quarter the Ministry had allocated 84,172,610 SVN in Temporary Relief (Imprest) Funds of which 30,688,490 SVN was spent as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Temporary Relief Payments</td>
<td>23,596,220 SVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster and War Victim Payments</td>
<td>6,591,455 SVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day Labor and Camp Chief Payments</td>
<td>1,994,800 SVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous and others</td>
<td>6,306,015 SVN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For resettlement and return to hamlet 217,106,867 SVN was allocated and 204,471,102 SVN expended in the following ways:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Housing Allowances</td>
<td>12,912,000 SVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice and Salt Allowances</td>
<td>16,004,259 SVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and Voc. Training</td>
<td>3,522,814 SVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>13,500 SVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3,994,529 SVN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

New refugees amounted to 2,240 in the quarter and the total refugees in and out-of-camp decreased from 426,726 to 360,950, a reduction of 65,766.

3. Although pacification has been proceeding more rapidly in the coastal lowlands among predominantly Vietnamese villagers, resettlement in places has proceeded under the obstacle of enemy harassment in the mountain provinces. The Quang Duc Social Welfare office and warehouse were completely destroyed by VC attack during June. The most notable movements back to hamlet occurred in Binh Dinh and Phu Yen. Smaller returns were registered in Khanh Hoa, Binh Thuan, and Darlac with a total return to hamlet of 52,694. GVN assistance to the returnees lagged in Binh Dinh and Phu Yen; increased advisory attention at all level is being devoted to improving performance in these provinces.
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4. The initiation of a data processing card record system for the large number of out-of-camp refugees in Binh Dinh is outstanding. The Ministry has authorized the use of the printout lists for making payments and commodity distributions. Work which would have taken two years or more to process 164, 850 refugee registrants has now been done within a few months. The system is also producing a number of other advantages such as revealing thousands of duplicate registrations and producing name lists for return to newly secured hamlets. As a modernizing tool for relief administration it has definite national possibilities. A simpler filing system using colored tabs for in-camp permanent refugee registration files has been introduced in two provinces and projected for others in conjunction with in-service training for Vietnamese Service Staffs.

(d) Self Help

1. The Village Self Development program continues to gain momentum; 907 of the 999 villages in the 495 areas are now listed in the VSD program. The majority of these villages are in phase V of the selection and implementation of projects phase of the program.

2. As of 31 July there were 1,612 category IA projects (costing under 50,000 VND each) approved. Of this number 205 have been started and 85 are reported complete. Seven provinces and two cities reported a total of 463 category IB projects (costing between 50,000 and 150,000 VND each) approved as of 31 July 1969. Five of these are underway with no completions reported. Five provinces have proposed and received approval for 136 category II projects (costing over 150,000 VND each). One of these projects has been completed.

3. Livestock and poultry distribution projects account for more than 50% of all projects selected by the villages.

(e) Logistics. Construction of 11 of the 15 Provincial Maintenance Shops programmed for II Q1S has progressed to a point where shops can be placed on an operational basis. Construction contracts for the remaining two shops (Dai Loc and Quang Due) have been awarded. It is expected that actual construction of these shops will have begun prior to the end of July 1969. In conjunction with the above, the training of Vietnamese personnel to staff these shops has been completed in Phu Bon. Training is currently in progress in 8 other shops and is scheduled to begin in the remaining two (Phu Ten and Tuyen Duc) on 1 August 1969.

(f) Public Health Division.

1. From January 3, 1969 to April 30, 1969, most of the Health Education Assistants were in Saigon for training designed to upgrade their professional capabilities. In order to take advantage of this training and to continue the advancement of health educators, the Regional Health Education Advisors are again visiting all the provinces and assisting their counterparts to plan and implement health education program in "Sanitary Malaria; Dalian Control; National Plague Program; Personal Hygiene, etc." The advisors have also assisted their counterparts in
planning and arranging for a regional health educators' meeting. There is a noticeable increase in health educators' activities and effectiveness during the past quarter.

2. The Regional Nurse Advisor again re-evaluated nursing personnel and programs in Region II. Emphasis will continue to be placed upon utilization of nursing personnel in an advisory role where the Vietnamese have expressed interest in the program. As a conclusion of the recent re-evaluation which showed areas where a lack of host country interest existed, three general duty nurse advisors have been or will be shifted. Public health activities have increased in Khanh Hoa Province as a direct result of the advisory efforts of the Public Health Nurse Advisor.

3. The placing of the Malaria Control Program under the Rural Health Chief seems to have caused a regression in the activities of the program. At the Regional Malaria Meeting in Qui Nhon, it was decided to ask the GVN/MSH to restore the Malaria Control Program to its former status. There has been a general increase in the number of clinically-diagnosed cases of malaria during this quarter. With the present difficulty in obtaining and having slides read, the region has not been able to confirm as many which should overcome this difficulty.

4. Some progress in joint utilization of medical facilities between GVN/MSH and DOD have been made during this quarter. Presently, joint utilization is in effect in Gia Nghia. The province hospitals in Phu Bon and Phu Yen are making progress toward joint utilization. Phu Bon and Phu Yen Provinces are in the second phase of the joint utilization program.

5. During the past quarter there was a large rotation of MILPHAP personnel. MILPHAP team No. 1 (U.S. Navy team) was rotated in total. A new MACV/USAID Joint Directive #1-69 was received. The directive does not alter the MILPHAP teams' mission or operation.

6. There has been some slight improvement in garbage and waste disposal this quarter due to added effort on the part of the KOPREK team and Regional Sanitarian. Garbage trucks have been received by Binh Dinh, Pleiku Khanh Hoa, Binh Thuan, Tuyen Duc and Cam Ranh. These trucks when operational will greatly aid in garbage and waste disposal.

7. Even though there was a reduction of TCN workers during the previous quarter, the medical logistical supply system continued to operate effectively. The regional warehouse, on the average, shipped over 80 tons of medical supplies per month. The shipping of this tonnage involves the processing of over 1,053 line items per month. The need for increased warehouse space has become more noticeable during this period.
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4. The general opinion among PSAs is that the program will improve once the problems inherent with the changeover are resolved.

5. Phase II, or the Accelerated Pacification Campaign - 1969, began on 1 July 1969. RD/STH Cadre groups began moving into their Phase II target villages in June and are currently in the process of becoming settled and beginning their work.

(2) Office of Territorial Forces.

(a) Regional and Popular Forces.

1. Since 1 May 1969 several improvements affecting Territorial Forces advisory effort, equipment and force structure have occurred.

2. JGS response to request for additional RF/PF units for II CTZ resulted in the following increase of PF platoons above and beyond the 1969 CY authorization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Binh Dinh</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lam Dong</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuyen Duc</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binh Thuan</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minh Thuan</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalac</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Bon</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khanh Hoa</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Yen</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kontum</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleiku</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the 125 additional PF platoons, 69 have been recruited and 21 have entered training centers. All units are expected to enter training centers by November 1969. II CTZ is presently authorized 1328 PF Platoons of which 1203 are operational. JGS also authorized 4 additional RF companies for II CTZ which increased the number of authorized RF units to 359. On 30 June 1969 three CIDG Camps, Vinh Thanh in Binh Dinh Province, Buon Blech in Phu Bon Province and Dong Tre in Phu Yen Province converted to form 13 RF companies. There are currently 355 RF companies deployed.

3. One additional RF/PF Group Headquarters has been authorized by JGS to fulfill the command and control requirements of the Dalac Province FULRO units. This unusual authorization was based on ethnic requirements rather than military, but is expected to contribute significantly to the political affiliation of the FULRO people towards the Government of Vietnam. II CTZ is presently authorized 55 RF/PF Group Headquarters and all are operational.

4. A major revision in the distribution of Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT) occurred as a result of a study on the deployment and utilization of teams. Three MATs were moved from Khanh Hoa Province and one team was transferred from Minh Thuan. The recipient provinces were Binh Dinh (3) and Pleiku.

5. Significant advancement toward achieving established goals in equipment modernization of RF/PF units took place during this quarter. The current goal for M-16 rifle issue is 100% by November 1969. As of 31 July 1969 a total of 32,896 M-16 rifles had been issued to II Corps RF units. This is 65.6% of the authorized number and an increase of 34.7% for the end of the last reporting period. PF units have received a total of 16,215 M-16s; 37.3% of the authorized M-16s have been issued. 73.3% of the authorized PRC-25s have been issued and indications are that 100% issue will be attained by the end of August. PF units will not receive AN/PRC-25 radios in significant quantities until all RF units have received their authorized number of radios. PF units continue to utilize AN/PRC-10s in lieu of AN/PRC-25s. Figures reflected above do not reflect reports from Binh Dinh and Minh Thuan Provinces for July 1969.

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The PSDF program continues to gain momentum and develop stature in the overall national defense and pacification effort. Intensified recruitment programs yielded a total of 98,895 members organized during the period, boosting the total II Corps strength to 272,590, 10% of the year-end goal as of 25 July 1969. Training, although lagging behind the organizing pace, has made significant strides toward attaining assigned goals and upgrading the effectiveness of the forces. Particularly noteworthy were the progressive training programs implemented in Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Pleiku, Lam Dong and Kontum, where the use of training centers, mobile training teams employed at village and hamlet level, and extensive use of NVAF in PSDF training, has proven most effective in the development of these programs. The training status now stands at 163,075 or 76% of the goal. Also with respect to training, 96 new cadre members began the PSDF training course at the National Training Center at Vung Tau on 14 July 1969 bringing the total of school trained cadre members to 146 of the authorized 247. Armament of PSDF members has progressed extremely well through the first phase of the 1969 campaign. 62,574 weapons are now in the hands of PSDF members (80% of goal) of which 17,608 were issued during the period covered by this report. The revised goal of 78,660 reflects an increase of 6,086 weapons which also improves our over-all armed to trained ratio from 1:4 to 1:5.

Three major changes took place in the program during the quarter:

a. The MOI has expanded the program to include women, youth from age 13, and males to age 55 on a volunteer basis.

b. All goals for the 1969 program were revised as follows: organized down from 354,600 to 260,477; trained down from 267,200 to 224,245; armed up from 71,924 to 78,660.

c. The basic load for all PSDF weapons was increased in response to frequent complaints of insufficient quantities of ammunition during engagements. Authorizations are now equivalent to other NVAF.

During the past four months some assessment of the effectiveness of the program has been made possible by collecting data from the TOG incident reports, police reports and PSDF spot reports. During this period there were 319 enemy initiated ground attacks on villages and hamlets. PSDF was directly involved in 131 or 41% of these. Results: friendly 96 KIA, 168 WIA, 158 MIA or abducted; enemy 41 KIA, 2 CIA.

Office of PSYOP, Chieu Hoi and Civic Action

New tactical concepts and force deployments by allied forces have enhanced civic action by providing maximum security to villages and hamlets. The most notable example of this strategy has occurred in Binh Dinh Province which contains the majority of the II Corps population. The 173d Abn Bde has collocated battalion CP's with each district headquarters which allows for maximum communication and
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Coordination. Squad size troop units have been deployed in security missions in the vicinity of villages and hamlets. Additionally, one brigade from the 4th Infantry Division deployed from Pleiku Province to Binh Dinh (An Khe). This move freed additional 173d Abn Bde units to participate in pacification support missions.

2. The recent lull in combat activity has allowed tactical units to participate in civic action to an unprecedented degree. The 173d Abn Bde actively supports 19 schools, 12 orphanages, five hospitals/ dispensaries, and three refugee centers.

3. The LZ English Health School and Dispensary was organized by the 173d Abn Bde in October 1968. Since that time, eight classes have graduated totaling 125 students. The school teaches Vietnamese the basic rudiments of medicine and sanitation. Graduates return to their hamlets and villages as health workers, health advisors, or work in local dispensaries. The dispensary treats approximately 900 patients per month at LZ English.

4. Increased security in the 173d TAOR has had a dramatic impact on the people. The fishing village of Thien Chanh in Tam Quan District had 42 people residing there on 15 April. The majority of the populace had moved away due to VC pressure. The fishermen were forced to use their sampans for transporting VC supplies in addition to giving up part of their fish to the enemy. For the past two months, US forces and national police have escorted the sampans to their fishing grounds each morning and returned with them each evening. As a result of this security, confidence has returned to the villagers. Today a fishing fleet, consisting of over 300 persons, fishes unmolested and over 1500 people have returned to the hamlet. In another case, the hamlet of My Duc in Binh Nhon District was totally deserted on 15 April. Due to increased security in the area, and a demonstrated confidence in the GVN, nearly 500 persons have moved back. Additionally, several hundred former residents have come to the village to work on their homes and farm their fields. It is believed they will return when their homes are repaired.

5. Operating in the Western Highlands, the 4th Inf Div has been active in civic action. The division sponsors 20 schools, 10 hospitals, one leper colony, and three orphanages. The division has 12 resident civic action teams deployed in consolidated hamlets. These teams work with the people, conduct MEDCAPs, give instructions on sanitation, first aid, and basic engineering (construction) skills. These teams have recently incorporated ARVN soldiers and are teaching them civic action skills and techniques on an OJT basis. Through the MEDCAP program, division medical personnel have treated nearly 250,000 people during the period.

6. ROK support of civic action has been on the upswing. Particularly noteworthy projects are the building of a large cultural center in Qui Nhon (Binh Dinh Province) and the rebuilding of an irrigation canal in Xieu Xuong District, Phu Yen Province. The cultural center is being built from funds supplied by USAID, VIS, and a sponsoring village in Korea. The irrigation canal south of Tuy Hoa is a major project involving rebuilding of the canal and strengthening of the banks. An access road is being built adjacent to the canal. The entire project covers 9.5 kilometers.
Emphasis on promoting ARVN civic action is finally bearing fruit and command emphasis on the progress is being applied. A three week ARVN Civil Affairs Course has been instituted in Pleiku. Since 21 June, two courses have been held and 74 students have graduated. After the first course, fourteen ARVN NCO CA team leaders joined CA teams of the 4th Inf Div, which are deployed in villages. It is hoped that the ARVN/GVN image will thus be projected into these villages. The remaining graduates are returning to their units to form CA teams. The 2d Bde of the 4th Inf Div is also promoting ARVN civic action. Paired-off with the 3d Bn, 42d ARVN Regt, the brigade financed the construction of a school in Vo Lan in Kontum Province. Though construction has been delayed several times due to tactical considerations, ARVN troops are now completing the project. Maximum publicity will be afforded this accomplishment which should bolster the GVN prestige in the area.

One of the primary goals of the Military Civil Affairs Division has been to get all civic action within the provinces fully coordinated. As a result of this emphasis there are presently six provinces that have CA Coordination Centers. The center in Phu Yen Province offers a good example. The coordinating center was formed on 1 May 1969 at a meeting attended by US, ROK, and Vietnamese ST representatives. A platoon from the 41st CA Co located at province headquarters coordinates all civic actions in the province, establishes priorities, and assigns tasks. This has resulted in a great saving of materials and avoids duplication of effort. It is also causing civic action to be moved out into the districts where heretofore it was practically non-existent.

The 1969 Self-Help program differs in some respects from that of previous years. The 1969 program is more of a "people's program" and has much greater appeal to the people. Projects must reflect the need, desire and will of the people. A good example of self-help is occurring in Son Hoa District in Phu Yen Province. The people requested that a bridge be build at Cung Son. The bridge would facilitate commerce and stimulate the economy at Cung Son. US forces agreed to supply the materials only if the people would do the actual construction. The Vietnamese agreed to do this. Civic pride has been generated to the extent that 150 laborers per day are now working on the bridge free of charge. Completion of the 287 foot span is expected in early August.

The Military Support of Pacification Fund (MSPF/AIK) monthly ceiling for II CTZ was reduced on 1 June 1969 from 10,400,000 $VN to 6,240,000 $VN per month. On 1 July 1969 the fund was increased by 1,427,600 $VN to support the new program 12 for Phoenix, raising the II CTZ ceiling to 7,667,000 $VN per month. Expenditures not supporting the 1969 pacification guidelines were discovered during this period and extensive efforts have been made by this office to reverse this trend and place emphasis on the program that supports the pacification guidelines. During this period only 75% of the money allocated was utilized. Of that amount approximately 34% was spent on the priority programs and about 50% was spent on construction under the Public Works Program. It is expected that the reduced monthly ceiling and the efforts mentioned above will reverse this trend during the next quarter and bring expenditures in line with the guidelines of pacification.
2. The US/FFMAF Civic Action and PSYOP Fund ceiling for 1 FFORCNV has been raised from 100,000 $VN to 300,000 $VN. This additional money will be used to supplement funds of US tactical units as required and to finance those US tactical units not having funds for civic action.

10. Due to the increasing emphasis on Civic Action in the II CTZ, a four day Civic Action Orientation Course has been organized at 1 FFORCNV-CORDS. The course is intensive in nature and is designed to orient personnel engaged in civic action/civil affairs with the many facets of their work. Students are drawn from both US tactical units and advisory teams. The Commanding Officer, 41st Civil Affairs Company has overall responsibility for the course with instructor support provided by 1 FFORCNV-CORDS. The first course began on 2 July 1969 and the second course begins on 17 September 1969. The course includes 25 separate subjects, a field trip and a seminar.

(b) Military PSYOP.

1. Aerial PSYOP activities during the second quarter, CY 1969 included the dissemination of over 611,000,000 leaflets and 12,944 loudspeaker hours. Ground loudspeaker hours during the period totaled 2,565 hours. ARVN and ROV operations included the hand dissemination of over 6,000,000 leaflets and 4,340 loudspeaker hours. The 8th PSYOP Bn printed 40,707,117 leaflets, 778,064 newspapers and 1,073,650 posters, booklets, and handbills. (Incl 8-9-70).

2. Major PSYOP Campaigns conducted during the quarter were the GVN Nationwide Rewards Program, the Xuan Que Huong Campaign, and Nguyen Trai II. The Xuan Que Huong Campaign commenced on 7 Feb 69 and terminated on 31 May 69. Extensive PSYOP support was given this Chieu Hoi Campaign. During the campaign 1,797 Hoi Chanh rallied to the GVN which is the highest number of ralliers for a four month period since early 1967. More than 2,000,000 leaflets, handbills and posters have been disseminated in support of the GVN Nationwide Rewards Program. An evaluation of the program during the month of May indicated that added emphasis should be given this campaign. Military PSYOP Division prepared a letter to PSAs and commanders of OPCON units directing command attention be given PSYOP activities to ensure that information concerning the benefits of the program are disseminated to the widest possible audience. The letter also stressed hand-to-hand distribution of PSYOP materials and face-to-face communication. The Regional PSYOP Coordinating Center, Nha Trang developed two special loudspeaker tapes, one for ground dissemination and one for aerial dissemination to promote the program. These tapes were developed in Vietnamese, Khmer, Jarai, Bahnar, and M'Kon. PSYOP support of the Voluntary Informant Program continued during the reporting period. The results of the program for the month of May and June indicated a marked increase in the number of bits of information reported throughout the CTZ. Provincial M1/PSYOP advisors solicited the assistance of Provincial agencies (ROF, RD CAMRE, APTs) to assist in the dissemination of PSYOP material during their operations throughout the province. The 8th PSYOP Bn began production of materials centered around information collection themes (Previous media had emphasized the collection of materials.) The Nguyen Trai II Campaign is a GVN sponsored program that supports the Chieu Hoi Program. The program was launched on 15 June and will run through 15 September. The 8th PSYOP Bn will furnish printing support at the request of GVN agencies. To assist in the effort
PSYOP aircraft support is also available at the request of GVN agencies. Implementing instructions have been dispatched to province teams and OPCON units directing the utilization of all available PSYOP assets to support Nguyen Trai.

2. The operation of the Regional PSYOP Coordinating Center (RPCC) at Nha Trang continued with great success during the quarter. The control of the three nation PSYOP assets through the RPCC has resulted in a very efficient operation in the Coastal Region. The ROK PSYOP/CA Company in Nha Trang has shown a marked increase of printing production in support of the 1L CTZ during the reporting period. The Vietnamese Air Force has allocated two aircraft per day to the 11 CTZ to support air operations. One of these flies out of Pleiku and the other out of Nha Trang. The aircraft (U-17) is presently being used mainly in loudspeaker operations, leaflets are disseminated on a limited basis.

4. Radio Pleiku began programming at reduced power (15 KW) during the month of May. The station operates daily from 0530 to 1800 hours and 1830 to 2400 hours. Reports reveal excellent coverage in the immediate Pleiku area. A defective part in the transmitter prevents continuous operation at full power (50 KW). The part is presently being fabricated at the manufacturing company in CONUS and is scheduled to arrive in Vietnam NLT 1 Oct 69. Estimated time for the station to resume full power operations is 15 Oct 69.

5. Production of PSYOP materials in Montagnard dialects continued at a satisfactory level during the quarter. In addition, the Pleiku Radio station began daily broadcasts in the Jarai dialect on 1 June. The Jarai broadcasts are conducted from 0730 to 1800 hours each day. Efforts are presently being made to expand the programming to include other Montagnard dialects. Extensive efforts have been made to obtain films dubbed in Montagnard dialects through JUSPAO channels. JUSPAO reported that twenty five films will be dubbed in four Montagnard dialects (Jarai, Rhade, Bahnar, M'nong). The first four films will be distributed to H&K field teams on or about 1 Aug 69. Subsequent distribution will be continued at the rate of three films per month until all twenty five films have been completed.

(c) Psychological Operations. (Civilian)

1. After a long absence of any friendly radio broadcasts in the provinces of Kontum, Binh Dinh, Pleiku, Phu Bon and Phu Yen, broadcasts were started on 23 April 1969 utilizing Blue Eagle capabilities. These broadcasts are in Vietnamese daily from 1900 to 2200 hours on 990 kHz. Broadcasts are retransmitted from Saigon and the programs have been well received. There are shortcomings in the programs that they are not specifically oriented toward local situations and conditions. No broadcasts are in the Montagnard dialects over the Blue Eagle system which limits the suitability of programs to only that part of the population speaking Vietnamese. Additionally, the military POLWAR station in Pleiku was put back in operation during the latter part of May 1969. This station is broadcasting programs in the Bahnar dialect and orients its programs toward the local population. The Australian Government has agreed to provide the necessary parts to repair the 50 KW station in Ben Me Thuot destroyed during TET 1968. This project should be completed in the next quarter.
2. Village and hamlet elections were conducted during the first four Sundays in June with little interference from enemy forces. The Ministry of Information assumed a greater role than in the previous quarter in production and distribution of election and publicity materials. VIS in the provinces actively supported these elections and results have been publicized in province newspapers.

3. The recruitment and training of village and hamlet information cadres has encountered difficulties during the period. Binh Dinh, Pleiku and Ninh Thuan provinces initiated training programs for these cadres and were progressing quite well. In June, problems began to arise in the program as a result of lack of defined responsibilities on the part of the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Information towards these cadres. A training program was to be conducted in Vung Tau starting in June. This was suspended because of incomplete planning for the course. This program is now scheduled to begin 28 July. Additionally, the responsibilities for providing pay to these cadres has not been clearly defined and many have not been paid during the months of May and June. The Ministry of Information has been charged with the responsibility of correcting this situation. Payrolls have been submitted and payments should follow shortly.

4. VIS personnel at province level and district still are reluctant to get out into the field to supervise and conduct face-to-face operations. This has been a continuing problem but is showing some improvement. This may be attributed to the increased security resulting from the redistribution of military forces and the greater support these forces are providing to pacification and development in the provinces.

4. CHIEN HOI program.

1. (U) From a high of over 400 Ho Chi Minh in March and April, the Chieu Hoi rate dropped to around 200 a month in May, June, and July. Part of the decrease was a seasonal fluctuation caused by the fact that June and July were rice planting months. Another major reason was political developments. The prospect and influence of American troop withdrawals and President Thieu's offer to allow VC to participate in elections apparently gave the VC renewed hope that they will share power and thus their motivation to rally decreased. Finally the sustained lull in military activity provided few strong battlefield reasons for enemy to rally.

2. (C) The number of APT's increased from 735 to 769. Three provinces held month-long APT training courses and five provinces began to employ APT's in platoon strength on operations. The VC seriously penetrated the APT's in Minh Thuan. An investigation of this penetration produced recommendations which were implemented in all II Corps provinces to preclude similar incidents.

3. (U) The Chieu Hoi Service finished four more district reception centers bringing the number completed to twenty. In Binh Thuan construction of the new center began and the improvement of the road to its location was completed. The Khanh Hoa Chieu Hoi Service finished its new administration and interrogation building. Phu Yen began the construction of its new center. Kontum, Binh Dinh, Pleiku, and Dalac made minor improvements in their facilities.
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Period ending 31 July 1969, RCS GPOR-65 (R1) (U)

(U) After the distribution of the 1969 vocational training funds, the number of Ho Chi Chanh and dependents enrolled in vocational training courses increased from about 25 in April to over 200 in July. Although nearly all Ho Chi Chanh received political indoctrination, this phase of the program still suffered from lack of qualified instructors. Despite advisory efforts, the National Police have not waved any of the documentation necessary for Ho Chi Chanh to obtain permanent ID cards and, consequently, the large backlog of unissued permanent ID cards persisted. During this quarter, the Chieu Hoi Service followed up approximately 4000 ex-Ho Chi Chanh out of the 25,000 living in II Corps.

(4) Phung Hoang: The PHOENIX Program continued to make progress during the May-July report period. Gains in the program centered on the gradual development of a broader data base, and the continuance of operations against the VCI. During the May-June period, 629 VCI were neutralized, along with 637 VC/NVA, 321 guerrillas and 1042 support personnel. At the quarterly PHOENIX Coordinators Conference on 9 July, the conversion of PHOENIX local national employees to the GPO-VOS system was discussed. This particular area has become of great concern, as many employees are having difficulty fulfilling mobilization law requirements (i.e., draft deferments and discharge documentation). Also discussed was the TOC-BIDOC relationship; the consensus of opinion was that the TOC and BIDOC should remain separate entities. ROKA interest in the PHUNG HOANG program has been rejuvenated. This rejuvenation will probably result in more accurate reporting of VCI neutralizations by ROKA units. Arrangements have been made for two ROKA officers to attend the Vung Tau PHOENIX school in August 1969. It is hoped this training will prove beneficial in eventually improving ROKA participation in the PHOENIX program. Province PHOENIX personnel began to receive Province Security Committee minutes for the first time. Although only a limited number of these reports have been received so far, there are indications that very few of the VCI reported apprehended on the "My Name" reports are actually sentenced to prison. During the reporting period efforts were made toward a site selection and detailed planning for the II Corps PHUNG HOANG school. The Mobile Training Team completed its training schedule in II Corps, with the exception of Quang Duc Province. The team was well received in Khanh Hoa, Tuyen Duc, Darlac and Phu Yen Provinces, where it was considered to have done an effective job. In Binh Dinh and Ninh Thuan Provinces the team performed unsatisfactorily. Briefings of ARVN tactical units by the team have thus far been unsuccessful in soliciting increased ARVN support for PHUNG HOANG operations.

(5) Office of Management Support.
(a) The Material Support Branch of the Office of Management Support was organized on 1 June 1969. This organization was the result of a recommendation made by an ad hoc committee formed on 15 April 1969 with representatives from IFFV G4, and Engineer, CORDS, DSA 11 Corps, and 1st Logistical Command. The objective of this committee was to insure that adequate logistical support for MAGCORDS Province, District, and MAT Advisory Teams in II Corps was provided. The resultant recommendations were approved by the OS, IFFV thus causing the transfer of positions from DSA 11 Corps to MAGCORDS for the formation of the Material Support Branch.
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(a) The mission of this branch as the action agency of MACORDS/1 FFORCEN is to assure adequate logistical management and support of MACORDS Advisory Teams. This includes, but is not limited to, matters pertaining to supply, maintenance, and services. The following responsibilities, however, were retained by USA II Corps:

1. Monitoring the allocation of barrier materials to all advisory elements in II CTZ.
2. Controlling the allocation of RVNAP-titled military vehicle resources to all advisory elements in II CTZ.
3. Provide real estate services for all advisory elements in II CTZ.

(b) To accomplish its mission the Material Support Branch was allocated eleven positions from USA II Corps. As of the time of this report seven of these positions had been approved on the JTD and four were pending approval.

(c) During the first two months of operation, this branch was primarily concerned with internal organization. In addition, several major projects were accomplished including the submission of the Quarterly Equipment Status Report, alignment of property accounting and reporting procedures, establishing the procedures for material readiness reports, establishing and monitoring the Conex Control Reports, and assuming the responsibility for reporting on the Mobile Advisory Team and Get Well Programs under the Multi-Improvement Program.

(f) Personnel and Administration

(1) Roster of Headquarters I FFORCEN key personnel is at Incl 11.
(2) Personnel strengths of assigned, attached and OPCON units are at Incl 12.
(3) Military Personnel Management

(a) During the reporting period, the assigned strength of I FFORCEN units remained at a satisfactory level, although there were still some grade and MOS imbalances. Several critical MOS shortages, such as 15A10 (Field Artillery Basic) have been alleviated through assignment of additional personnel by USARV, reduction of authorized positions through Project Modernization and concomitant reassignment of incumbent personnel to other position vacancies. A persistent shortage of radio operators was reduced by establishing an OJT program for selected personnel who were assigned to I FFORCEN Artillery or were incoming replacements. Upon successful completion of the program, they were subsequently reclassified into the 17 career group (Combat Surveillance and Target Acquisition).

(b) Rotational humps were identified for the S/Sd MP Co, 5th Bn, 226th Arty and the 3d Bn, 6th Arty. The hump for the MP Co, which would occur in October, was relieved by infusion of personnel from the 18th MP Brigade. An exchange infusion program was conducted for the artillery battalions since their humps occur in August and September.

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(c) The 54th Inf Bn was reorganized on 10 June 1969 under a new NMC. Several new NAU have been added to the battalion authorization. Requisitions were reviewed to ensure that personnel were requisitioned for the new positions.

(d) An extensive project to identify NGUS and USAR personnel ordered to active duty with reserve component units has been conducted. The purpose of this project was to assure the speedy return of these personnel to those units prior to redeployment later in the year.

(e) The following units were assigned to this command during the reporting periods:

1. 54th Inf Det (Ground Surveillance)
2. Camp Radoliff 'Ag Sec Det (Prov)
3. 270th FA Det (Radar)
4. 272d FA Det (Radar)

(f) A unit personnel office consisting of one warrant officer and 14 EM has been created for the 2d Sqdn, 1st Cav which is to be detached from the 4th Inf Div on 1 September 1969. This unit has no TOE authorization for a UPO so it was established using current IFFORCEV assets. The UPO moved from Pleiku to Phan Rang on 26 July 1969.

(g) To assure an orderly transfer of personnel functions from the 4th Inf Div to IFFORCEV, a detailed phase-in schedule has been developed (Incl 13). It can be adjusted to permit an earlier transfer of functions, whenever possible.

(4) Awards and Decorations:

(a) During the past quarter, IFFORCEV was authorized to disapprove recommendations for award of the Distinguished Service Cross and the Legion of Merit for USARV personnel. Previously, all recommendations were sent to HQ, USARY for final action.

(b) Preparations were made for processing award recommendations for the 2d Sqdn, 1st Cav when it is detached from the 4th Inf Div on 1 September 1969.

(c) The number of awards processed was greater than that for the past quarter. The monthly average was 685, compared to 553 during the past quarter. This can be attributed to the annual summer rotation period (Incl 14, 15, 16).

(5) Rest and Recuperation:

(a) During the quarter an attempt was made to gain more equitable treatment of MAT members for R&R to Australia and Hawaii. Previous quarter's statistics disclosed that MACV personnel in II CTZ had to remain in-country two to two and half months longer than IFFORCEV personnel before they could go to these sites. A letter to COMUSMACV recommended that either MAT members be given special consideration by HQ MACV for mid-tour R&R or that R&R allocation control be decentralized to subordinate commands which could establish priorities. Both recommendations were disapproved and the
following comments were made: (1) special consideration for certain categories of personnel had traditionally been avoided and (2) centralized control of allocations allowed uniform command wide application of the criteria: first in-country, first to take R&R.

(b) Ninety-four percent of all R&R allocations were used. An average of 606 allocations were received each month (incl 17).

(c) Kuala Lumpur and Penang were removed from the list of R&R sites. A shortage of allocations for Hawaii proved to be a special problem during the latter part of the quarter because many personnel attempted to take R&R during the period their children or wives were on vacation.

(6) Administrative services;

(a) It was recognized that the present thermo-fax office copying equipment was outdated and could fail at any time. Extensive maintenance is generally required weekly. During July, a contract was given to the XEROX Corporation for rental of a Model 914 and Model 3600, which included supplies and maintenance. The Model 914 is scheduled for delivery in August and the Model 3600 will be delivered during September. This equipment will produce clearer copies, speed copying, and at a cheaper cost per copy.

(b) Detailed planning for the detachment of the 2d Sqdn, 1st Cav on 1 September 1969 has progressed quickly. The following actions have been completed:

1. Postal service is being provided by APO 96321 at Phan Rang.

2. Courier service is being provided by the 459th Sig Bn and communications support is being provided by the area communications center at Phan Rang. Other administrative functions have been matters of continuous coordination between the unit and I FFORCEV.

(7) Civilian personnel management;

(a) Civilian personnel management during the period was satisfactory in both administration and pay. Coordination was maintained throughout the quarter between the area civilian personnel office and all levels of command. During the period, the local national direct hire spaces increased from 279 to 462. The significant increase was the addition of 200 temporary spaces. The spaces were transferred from the 175th Abn Bde to HQ I FFORCEV on 2 June 1969. This temporary allocation of security guards for Camp Radcliff, An Khe, will terminate on 31 September 1969.

(b) I FFV AIK fund allocation from USA RV for 3d Qtr CY 69 (2,275, 500 SVN) was received and suballocated to units based on previous expenditure data and requirements. Funds were suballocated to units of I FFORCEV as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ I FFV Arty</td>
<td>1,500,000 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ Comdt I FFV</td>
<td>112,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54th Sig Bn</td>
<td>113,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>167th Sig Co</td>
<td>44,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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297th TG Co 89,000
41st CA Co 5,000
272d MP Co 22,000
55th MI Det 5,000
2d Sqdn, 1st Cav 220,000
Task Force South 10,000
HQ IFFV Reserve 87,500
TOTAL 2,227,500

(1) To be suballocated to assigned units by CG, IFFV Arty.

(a) Chaplain activities:

(a) Significant activities:

1. The following personnel changes took place during the quarter: Chaplain (COL) Frederick C. Hunt, Jr. replaced Chaplain (COL) Richard R. Bell as Staff Chaplain; Chaplain (IIC) James B. Ronan replaced Chaplain (IIC) Peter D. Van Dyke as Deputy Staff Chaplain; Chaplain (CPT) Howard Shapiro replaced Chaplain (CPT) Mark A. Golub as Assistant Staff Chaplain; and Chaplain (CPT) Edward A. Lesko was temporarily added to the staff.

2. II CTZ has 120 Military Chaplains and 23 ROK Chaplains.

(b) Religious services:

1. Military units in the II CTZ are being adequately covered by the Area Coverage Plan: "Areas for Coordination of Religious Activities." Under this plan all military personnel, regardless of branch of service and/or unit, receive Catholic and Protestant coverage by the appropriate chaplain assigned to that area. Responsibility for implementation of this plan rests with the commanders of the eight geographical areas.

2. Jewish coverage in the II CTZ remains adequate. Lay leaders continue to be used to organize and conduct lay services for Jewish personnel in the II CTZ. The Jewish Chaplain visits the major units on a regularly scheduled basis monthly to provide Worship Services and chaplain coverage.

1. In the Nha Trang area the following services were conducted.

(a) Sunday: 15 Protestant, 12 Catholic, 1 Episcopal, 1 Christian Science and 2 Latter Day Saints.

(b) Weekday: Friday: Jewish, Saturday: Jewish, Daily: 3 Masses. In addition there are various discussion classes and Bible study groups throughout the Nha Trang area.
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9) Military Police:

(a) Fatal Traffic Accidents: Since a message emphasizing traffic safety was dispatched by the CG on 7 May 1969 the number of deaths resulting from fatal traffic accidents has decreased significantly. A comparison of this quarter to the previous quarter reveals a decrease in the number of deaths as follows: US down from 24 to 9, ARVN down from 7 to 3 and VN civilians down from 49 to 36. The total number of injuries resulting from accidents is down from 80 to 50. The results are favorable but continued emphasis could reduce these needless deaths even lower.

(b) Serious incident reports for the reporting period number 226. Forty-four concerned fatal traffic accidents and 34 of these concerned aggravated assaults.

(c) Security Inspections of Key and Critical Installations: A FM representative on the I FFORCEV Inspection Team during the last quarter inspected 8 installations. One of the primary areas of interest was the identification and control of local national employees.

(d) Distinguished Visitor Security: During the reporting period the 272d MP Co provided security for 64 visiting Divs and flag officers or civilian equivalent personnel in addition to providing a trail vehicle for CG I FFORCEV daily.

(e) Combined Security Plan: A combined security/emergency evacuation plan was developed and coordinated with local elements of the Navy and Air Force. The security plan was tested when the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff visited. The emergency evacuation portion was not implemented.

(f) I FFORCEV Reg 190-5, Custody and Control of Firearms and Other Dangerous Weapons, was published which superseded I FFORCEV Reg 210-5, 26, Oct 67. The FM revised I FFORCEV Reg 395-5 dtd March 1969 and included it in I FFORCEV Reg 190-5, Motor Vehicle Traffic Supervision, dated 7 June 1969.

(g) Security and traffic control continue to be provided by the 272d MP Co for conferences and special events such as the Zone Coordinators and II CTZ Senior Commanders Conference, Dine-Ins, Classified Briefings attended by CG I FFORCEV and staff.

(h) RVN Rules of the Road, an informative booklet concerning traffic rules and regulations in RVN, was recently revised by the FM section. The booklet is designed to provide helpful information to vehicle operators. Copies are distributed periodically and are available in the FM Section.

1) Prisoner of War:

(a) Enemy captured during the period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Prisoner</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFF</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>WO</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>MN</td>
<td>19</td>
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(2) To reduce the II CTZ PW Camp population to an acceptable level, a total of 243 PWs were evacuated to Bien Hoa. (200 PWs from Pleiku and 43 PWs from Phu Tai). As of 12 July 1969 the population of Phu Quoc was 13,600 with emergency conditions set at 25,000.

(10) Medical:

(a) General health of the command remains good. Units have maintained their malaria rates below those of last year. The 173d Abn Bde deserved special commendation. Although in a highly endemic area, the Brigade's rate has been no higher than the total USARV rate for all types of Army personnel.

(b) The transition from two supporting medical groups in II CTZ to one group was accomplished with no deficiencies in medical support. The 45d Med Gp with headquarters in Nha Trang now controls all supporting units and installations in the zone. The 70th Med Bn Headquarters in Qui Nhơn acts as a subordinate control headquarters for the group in northern II CTZ.

(c) The 91st Evac Hospital at Tuy Hoa was closed and the units moved to I CTZ. Primary medical support to US personnel in that area is now provided by an Air Force dispensary. The major impact of the hospital closure was on the support of Vietnamese nationals but the resulting support is at least the equivalent of that available in other areas of the country.

(d) A helicopter ambulance detachment of 6 aircraft was lost thru movement to I CTZ during this period. Residual resources have been redistributed with no significant deleterious effects on dust-off capability in the zone.

(e) The 17th Fld Hospital at An Khe was closed and reassigned to the mission of operating the POW hospital via Qui Nhơn. It was replaced at An Khe by a general dispensary unit and daily fixed wing flights to the 71st Evac Hospital in Qui Nhơn have been established for the movement of routine patients from An Khe and LZ English who require hospitalization or specialty consultation.

(11) Morale and Services:

(a) The G1 continued to monitor the officer and enlisted open messes in the II CTZ. As of the end of the reporting period 37 accounts in the II CTZ have either been eliminated or consolidated. This is a result of a program initiated by USARV, and endorsed by MACV, in an attempt to bring the entire club system under closer management. A study, with the assistance of G1 USARV, is underway to determine the total number of messes in II CTZ that should be consolidated. This is a continuing project.

(b) During the reporting period a relocation of US personnel from leased facilities in Nha Trang to US constructed billets in Camp McDermott was initiated. This relocation will return 70 leases to their owners and

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results in an annual savings of $512,024 (US). As of the end of the reporting period the savings realized is $130,260 (US).

STATUS TO DATE:

PHASE I EM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commence</td>
<td>10 June</td>
<td>Complete 15 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM spaces available Camp McDermott</td>
<td>368</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM to be relocated</td>
<td>186</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM relocated to date</td>
<td>125</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM pending relocation</td>
<td>63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM spaces available upon completion</td>
<td>180</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PHASE II OFFICERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commence</td>
<td>20 August</td>
<td>Complete 20 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer Spaces available Camp McDermott</td>
<td>760</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers to be relocated</td>
<td>707</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers relocated to date</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers pending relocation</td>
<td>707</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer spaces available upon completion</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PHASE II - Female

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BWQ spaces available</td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females to be relocated</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females relocated to date</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females pending relocation</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BWQ spaces available upon completion</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(12) Safety and Accident Prevention

(a) The I FFORCEV Safety Program was reviewed for the fourth quarter FY 69 and statistics are included at Incl 18 and 19. Both the Army Motor Vehicle rate and the personal injury rate increased during the quarter. The Army Motor Vehicle rate remains within the USARV expectancy rate but the personal injury rate exceeds it slightly. The same is true of the cumulative rates for fiscal year 1969.

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(b) The I FFORCEN Regulation 385-1 is still under revision and will be published in the near future.

(c) A Certificate of Safety has been designed and purchased. These certificates will be used for both individual and unit safety awards.

(d) USARV Weapons Safety Month (June) was highly successful. There was only one accidental gunshot wound in I FFORCEN assigned and attached units.

(e) Effective 1 July, the Safety Division assumed the responsibility for analyzing and coding all accident reports DA Form 285 submitted by assigned and attached units.

1) ARVN Replacement and Strength Reporting System:

(a) During the recent battle of Ben Het, 24 April - 28 June, certain deficiencies in the ARVN personnel system, especially strength reporting and replacement flow, were brought to the attention of this headquarters. Strength reports were untimely and inaccurate during the entire battle. The strength of the 424th Regiment and 2nd Ranger Group fell far below the minimum operational strength of 450 personnel per battalion. Replacements did not arrive in significant numbers until the battle was almost a month in progress. No officers and few NCO replacements were received by committed units. These and other problem areas have been sufficiently documented in previous studies and memoranda, and do not merit a detailed discussion in the scope of this report. Recommendations for improvement of ARVN strength reporting system and the ARVN replacement system have been made to MACV-JGS.

(b) Most significant among the studies and recommendations was the study of Transfer of Responsibility of 24th STZ conducted by this headquarters and forwarded to MACV on 24 June. This study covered all ARVN aspects of the Ben Het operation during period 5 May - 5 June, during what eventually came to be known as the battle of Ben Het - Dak To. Conclusions in the area of personnel management arrived at in the study were that the ARVN replacement system was both unresponsive and untimely and that the system did not supply replacements to offset immediate and heavy battle casualties or casualties sustained during prolonged combat operations.

(c) An attendant problem was the acquisition of accurate strength, casualty and replacement data for use by this headquarters. All confirmed data was obtained from the file of the II Corps G1, the QD 22 reports, and the 5-day casualty reports. This information was obtained for I FFORCEN by the AG and G1 advisors (Team 21) at Hqs, II Corps. Due to the lateness of reports arriving at II Corps (3 - 5 days after report period) and no well established procedure for supplying this headquarters with ARVN personnel data, this information was consistently outdated and many times incomplete. Procedures to improve this reporting schema have been established between I FFORCEN and USA II Corps in the eventuality that another situation similar to Ben Het develops.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, I FFORCEV for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969, RGS 05POM 05 (R1) (U)

(14) ARVN Interpreters:

(a) At the end of this reporting period the total authorized strength of ARVN interpreters with US elements in II CTZ was 823 and the assigned strength was 781 which represents 96% fill of all authorizations. Authorizations are occasionally changed as mission requirements change. The 173d Abn Bde increased its authorization from 40 to 98 during the past 6 month period due to mission requirements of the pacification program in northern II CTZ. The 55th MI Detachment is presently having its authorization reduced from 19 to 12 due to reassessment of mission requirements and this unit's capability to support its interpreters. Detailed status is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>ASBD</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>II Corps Adv Op (Includes CORDS)</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>*518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ, I FFORCEV (Includes CORDS)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55th MI Det</td>
<td>*19</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41st CA Co</td>
<td>*3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I FFORCEV</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Inf Bn</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173d Abn</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A shortage of interpreters exists in HQ I FFORCEV, but this shortage has had minimal impact on mission accomplishment.

(b) A recent problem area was interpreter strength reporting to USAV. A message, unclas 63424, dated 25 May 1969, subjects ARVN Interpreter Strength Report, was dispatched to all II CTZ USAV units authorized ARVN Interpreters. This message outlined certain discrepancies such as incorrect, incomplete and late reporting found in the monthly USAV interpreter reports. All addressees were advised to submit accurate and timely reports.

(c) In an effort to improve the reporting system and better monitor the II CTZ interpreter system, HQ I FFORCEV dispatched a message, unclas B-459, subjects ARVN Interpreter Strength Report, to all II CTZ USAV units requesting this headquarters be made information addressee, beginning in August, on the monthly report submitted to USAV.

(d) I FFORCEV is Zone Coordinator for the ARVN Interpreter Program in II CTZ. The ARVN Affairs and CORDS Officer is project officer for the program.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1 FFORCENV for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS GSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

b. (C) Artillery.

(1) Intelligence: Hostile artillery attacks during the period reached a high point on 11-12 May when the enemy conducted 73 attacks and expended 1167 rounds in conjunction with the beginning phase of the Summer Offensive. Enemy activity continued at a high level during the month with the majority of the activity concentrated in the Dak To - Ben Het area of the DAN QUYES - HINKS AO. The enemy's intense artillery activity continued into June, concentrating on the same area. The last two weeks of June saw the enemy mass his artillery activity entirely on Ben Het in hopes of isolating the camp and eventually overrunning it. This tactic failing, the enemy withdrew from the area at the end of June and has remained absent throughout July. During the period 11 May - 30 June, the enemy conducted 353 attacks and expended 4765 rounds against Dak To - Ben Het. Overall activity decreased considerably during the month of July, with the reported new offensive never materializing. The first two weeks of July observed increased standoff activity in the Phan Thiet area of Binh Thuan Province which accounted for over 25% of the attacks with II CTZ during the month. The lack of activity during July can probably be attributed to the inability of the enemy to maintain a continuous flow of supplies and ammunition to units located throughout II CTZ.

(2) Operations:

(a) During the reporting period, artillery units with 1 FFORCENV continued support of ARVN, ROK, US, RF/PF, RD Teams and USSF/GIDY forces in II CTZ. 1 FFORCENV Artillery units continued support of 1 FFORCENV maneuver forces in providing maximum participation in pacification, fire planning, and artillery protection for the greatest number of villages and hamlets in the II CTZ. B Btry, 3d Bn, 6th Arty was permanently attached to 5th Bn, 27th Arty in order to provide additional light artillery support to TF South.

(b) Areas of responsibilities remained unchanged with the groups continuing to operate in their AO's. For command and control purposes, C/7/15 was attached temporarily to 3/6 Arty (-).

(3) Fire Support Coordination Element.

(a) Naval Gunfire support for II CTZ was provided by an average of two ships each day. The following is a summary of naval gunfire support:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
<th>TARGETS</th>
<th>ROUNDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>405</td>
<td>2,133</td>
<td>25,817</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) During the reporting period, a daily average of 68 immediate reaction and hangfire targets were developed; of which, a daily average of 47 were fire. The following is a summary of targets developed and fired:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMMEDIATE REACTION</th>
<th>HANGFIRE</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEVELOPED:</td>
<td>5294</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIRED:</td>
<td>3703</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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15 August 1969
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1 FROGKEY for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969, ROS GSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(c) During the quarter, 1 FROGKEY FSCE issued a daily average of 9 175mm gun suppressions for ARCLIGHTS.

(d) The area harassment program, established 1 March 69, has been developed into a working application of the principle of war-economy of force. Critical evaluation of intelligence, knowledge of enemy habits and effective employment of available firepower resources have harassed the enemy in his base camp areas and sanctuaries. Currently the program monitors 13 areas, of which 7 are being targeted. It had been noticed that the enemy moved to the maximum range limits of artillery and naval guns seeking new secure areas. As intelligence provides his position, airstrikes are directed against his forces serving to effectively disperse his forces, to prevent enemy build up for the attack and to deny him the sanctuaries needed to conduct training, resupply, and command activities. As Intelligence indicates enemy activity moving out of a defined area of harassment, the area is moved to encompass the new area of enemy activity. Every five days the entire program is reevaluated to select new priorities of engagement and to consider proposals for relocation of areas. The following is the Fire Support Summary: May - 31 July 69:

A/C SORTIES SPooky/shadow (IN) 467,200
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(e) A total of 215 ARCLIGHT targets were struck with 1051 aircraft during the quarter. The following is a summary of province support by type of ARCLIGHT:

PRIMARy ARCLIGHTS

PROVINCE TARGETS AIRCRAFT
Binh Dinh 6 33
Binh Thanh 4 24
Khanh Hoa 1 6
Kontum 142 772
Pleiku 19 91

SECONDARY ARCLIGHTS

PROVINCE TARGETS AIRCRAFT
Binh Dinh 19 55
Kontum 23 68
Pleiku 2 2

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Three new AWCC areas have been established in II CTZ bringing the total to 23 operational areas. Two working conferences were held at Headquarters MACV by direction of the Joint Air Operations Group. Attendees were charged with the responsibility of revising MACV Directive 95-13. A working group will be assembled at I FFORCIV to include Army and Air Force personnel from US, ARVN, and ROK forces. The purpose of this group will be to study and reevaluate the present II Corps system, exchange an understanding of geographical and tactical consideration peculiar to allied operations throughout II Corps, and to discuss the proposed directive in an attempt to anticipate problems areas and develop solutions prior to publication of the directive by MACV.

RVNAF Assistance Programs

(a) RVNAF assistance programs continued to show progress during the reporting period. Survey control has been extended to most ARVN artillery positions and advances have been made in the transmission of meteorological messages to ARVN artillery units. Consequently an increase in the use of MET plus HE corrections by ARVN artillery has been noted.

(b) Increased emphasis has been placed on artillery assistance to RP/PF units, RD Teams, and PSSP. Field grade artillery commanders have been assigned specific districts in which to implement artillery assistance. Current goals are to review and strengthen all territorial force fire plans, to increase the level of trained forward observers and to generate more fire missions from territorial force units.

(c) As a part of the accelerated Phase II plan for RVNAF Improvement and Modernization, 6th Bn, 84th Arty has been scheduled for turnover to the ARVN 45th Arty Bn. Approval of the turnover was granted by MACV on 2 April 1969. Btry C completed turnover on 15 June and 14 July, respectively.

Artillery Organization, II CTZ

(a) Non-divisional

1 Field Force Vietnam Artillery

- 270th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
- 272d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
- 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (AW) (SP)
- Battery B, 297th Artillery (SLT)
- Battery E, 41st Artillery (MG)
- 6th Battalion, 32d Artillery (175/8 inch SP)

Headquarters Battery, 8th Battalion, 26th Artillery (TAB)

54th Infantry Detachment (Radar Ground Surveillance)
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77th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
237th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
241st Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
242d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
243d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
244th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
253d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
254th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
255th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
256th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)

41st Artillery Group
7th Battalion, 13th Artillery (105mm T)
7th Battalion, 15th Artillery (-C Btry) (175mm/8in SP)
6th Battalion, 84th Artillery (155mm T)

52d Artillery Group
3rd Battalion, 6th Artillery (105mm SP) (-B Btry, 105 SP) (with 6/7/15, 175mm/8in SP temporarily attached)
6th Battalion, 14th Artillery (175mm/8in SP)
2nd Battalion, 17th Artillery (-C Btry, 155mm T)
1st Battalion, 92d Artillery (155mm T)

I FFORCEV Provisional Artillery Group
5th Battalion, 22d Artillery (175/8in SP)
5th Battalion, 27th Artillery (105mm T) (Attached B/3/6, 105mm SP)

(b) Divisional, Brigade and Separate Battalion

4th Infantry Division Artillery
2d Battalion, 9th Artillery (105mm T)
5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (155mm/8in SP)

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6th Battalion, 29th Artillery (105mm T)
4th Battalion, 42d Artillery (105mm T)
173d Airborne Brigade (Separate)
3d Battalion, 319th Artillery (105mm T)
3d Battalion, 506th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division
Battery D, 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery (105mm T)

(6) Artillery Strength: The following table reflects artillery tube strength by caliber for ARVN, ROK, US and USSF/CIDG Artillery units in I I CTZ at the end of the reporting period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>105mm</th>
<th>155mm</th>
<th>8 inch</th>
<th>175mm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US Divisional</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK Divisional</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Force Artillery</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARVN Artillery</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Forces (CIDG)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>604</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(7) Ammunition statistics for US Force Artillery during the reporting period.

(a) Ammunition expenditure by target category:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGET CATEGORY</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROUNDS</td>
<td>MISSIONS</td>
<td>ROUNDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONFIRMED</td>
<td>26,049</td>
<td>1,159</td>
<td>20,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACQUIRED</td>
<td>31,027</td>
<td>5,579</td>
<td>38,964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COUNTERBATTERY</td>
<td>8,820</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>16,772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREPARATION</td>
<td>14,419</td>
<td>942</td>
<td>12,421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERDICATION</td>
<td>16,403</td>
<td>6,451</td>
<td>21,808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPECIAL PURPOSE</td>
<td>16,713</td>
<td>1,937</td>
<td>12,357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>1,332</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>1,027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>114,827</td>
<td>16,689</td>
<td>123,861</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(b) Ammunition expenditures by caliber:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>CALIBER</th>
<th>ROUNDS</th>
<th>% TOTAL</th>
<th>RDS/TUBE/DAY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>57,929</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>155mm</td>
<td>31,399</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8inch</td>
<td>14,812</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>175mm</td>
<td>10,687</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>14,827</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>26*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>61,365</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>155mm</td>
<td>37,649</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8inch</td>
<td>15,081</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>175mm</td>
<td>9,766</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>123,861</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>28*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>51,600</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>155mm</td>
<td>13,885</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8inch</td>
<td>19,924</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>175mm</td>
<td>8,405</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>84,814</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>19*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAND TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>323,502</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Prorated Average

h. (c) Signal Operations:

(1) During the past quarter, emphasis has been placed by the Signal Officer on upgrading the quality of communications provided to tactical units in the II CTZ.

(2) A project is underway to provide communications from each of the 54 districts in II CTZ to I FFORCEV Headquarters Tactical Operations Center (TOC)/Tactical Intelligence Operations Center (TIOC). In order to establish a direct link from District to I FFORCEV Headquarters with a direct circuit to Typhoon TOC. This facility will be utilized for responsive and accurate intelligence gathering and dissemination in support of revolutionary development, pacification and tactical operations.

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(3) Headquarters, Task Force South relocated from vic of Dalat to vic of Phan Thiet. Command and control communications was provided by the 54th Sig Bn during the move by establishing a 12 channel radio system from Song Mao to Phan Thiet. The communications posture was upgraded by establishing an additional 12 channel radio system from Song Mao to Thien Dao and from Thien Dao to Phan Thiet. A relay was installed in the original system to increase the reliability and improve circuit quality.

(4) The Nha Trang Tandem Switching Center was activated during July by the 1st Signal Bde providing all major posts in II CTZ with direct dial capability to all major US Military installations in Vietnam and Thailand.

(5) Installation and activation of an AUTOSEVOCOM terminal servicing Hq, I FFORCEV was accomplished, enabling secure voice transmission to be made to major Commands in the World-wide system.

(6) Other activities during the past quarter include the installation of a temporary 12 channel VHF system from Minh Hoa to Dong Ba Thin in support of 9th ROK Division operation (BAa MA-10) and the installation of a 12 channel VHF system between LZ North English and Tam Quan in support of 1/3d Abn Bde. A 12 channel VHF system was installed from Dragon Mountain to Dak To in support of 52d Arty Gp.

(7) The 54th Signal Battalion continues to provide command and control communications between Hq, I FFORCEV and subordinate elements.

1. (C) Engineer

(1) During this period the engineer section continued efforts in planning, coordinating and monitoring of engineer activities in II CTZ and maintained close liaison with engineer units by frequent field trips. Major staff projects during this quarter included:

(a) MIP Program III-6, I FFORCEV Highway Improvement Program (Engr/0-3): The joint action between this section and the 64th Engr Det (Terrain) of accumulating and cataloging ground and aerial photographs of all bridges on main LOC's has been assumed completely by the 64th Engr Det (T).

(b) MIP Program III-5, I FFORCEV Airfield Improvement and Maintenance Program (Engr/0-4): An update of airfield maintenance standards was prepared and an information letter sent to DSA II Corps, Sub-zone coordinators, Senior Advisor's of ARVN Divisions, CO 5th SFGA and individual airfield commanders. This document included current maintenance deficiencies and responsibilities. The intent of the letter was to have those deficiencies corrected that were within the capability of the airfield commander NLT mid-September.

(c) Annex J (Engr) to II CTZ Combined Campaign Plan was rewritten again during this quarter to reflect changes of priorities for the remainder of 1969.

(d) As directed by MACV, a joint area development board meeting was conducted at this headquarters by the engineer section to establish
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A quarterly Integrated Priority List of Contract Construction for the central area for all U.S. services. The purpose of this list is to establish guidance for OICC in developing work schedules and allocating resources of the GPAF contractor for the current quarter and planning for the next quarter. This board meeting will continue to be a quarterly function conducted by I FFORCEV Engineer Section.

(2) Support of Tactical Operations

(a) DAN AIR/SHERIDAN

1. Construction of Phan Thiet City Bridges: B/116th Engineer Company continued construction of a timber pile bent bridge which was completed 5 July 1969, well ahead of schedule. This 300' class 52 bridge contributes significantly to mobility of armored forces in Binh Thuan Province.

2. Revetments at LZ Betty: Construction of 35 helicopter revetments for B/7/17th Cav Sqdn was began 1 May and completed 20 Jun by B/116th Engr Co.

3. Support of 2/1st Cav Sqdn: The decision in May to redeploy the 2/1st Cav Sqdn to Binh Thuan Province imposed significant engineer support requirements. The 589th Engr Bn and Co "B" of the 116th Engr Bn rendered engineer support consisting of maintenance of QL-1 to class 52 capability, construction of MER, technical assistance in building of field fortifications and the operation of water points.

4. Song Mao Refuel/Rearm Points: The 589th Engr Bn began construction of these berms in late July for completion in the next quarter.

5. Co "B" of the 116th Engr Bn conducted mine sweeps as required throughout the period on QL-1 and NLF-GB.

6. The 577th Engr Bn completed redeployment in May from Phu Yen Province to Tuyen Du Province. This shift increased engineer support to TF South as well as augmenting the LOG program in the area.

7. Support of LZ Sandy and LZ Sherry: SEA Huts began during the last quarter were completed. A well was drilled at LZ Sherry and drilling was initiated at LZ Sandy.

8. Support of 3/319th Arty at Hao Lo: On 7 June the 116th Engr Bn completed construction of six howitzer positions and berms and provided technical assistance for construction of field fortifications.

(b) DAN OYEN/HIRES

1. Daily mine sweeps were performed by 20th Engr Bn on QL-14 between Pleiku and Tan Canh and as required along Rt 512 by the 299th Engr Bn.

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The 20th Engr Bn cleared and upgraded the An Khe ASP during this period, completing the task on 5 June.

2. Chain link fence was placed around each POL tank at An Khe for protection against B-40 rocket attacks.

3. Four revetments for modified U-21's were constructed at An Khe Airfield by "C" Company of the 20th Engr Bn and completed on 20 May.

4. An observation tower on Artillery Hill was completed on 13 May by the 20th Engr Bn.

5. The 20th Engr Bn provided operational support to U.S. Artillery at Ben Het during this quarter. Support involved construction of gun pads and maintenance of internal road net. The 937th Engr Gp also provided bulldozers to accomplish clearing where possible outside the Ben Het perimeter up to 300 meters.

6. Modification of the generator shed to permit easy removal of the generators and reveting of diesel fuel storage was accomplished at the Psyop Radio Station (Yellowbird) in Pleiku.

7. A counter mortar radar tower was completed at Camp Radcliffe on 21 Jul as part of the 4th Inf Div. program of perimeter security improvement.

8. Units of the 937th Engr Gp constructed guard towers and chain link standoff fences around the POL tanks at Pleiku to improve the security posture of this facility.

9. The 20th Engr Bn and elements of the 504th Engr Co (LE) performed repairs on the MARY LOU ASP increasing the berm and improving drainage.

10. The rearming points at Camp Holloway were peneprimed and completed on 7 June.

11. Williams Bailey Bridge at An Khe is being upgraded to class 70 by additions of Bailey panels. It is 85% complete at the close of this reporting period and will be complete one day after receipt of materials necessary for overhead bracing supports.

(a) WASHINGTON-GREEN:

1. A Classic Artillery fire base has been constructed at LZ English with technical and equipment assistance by the 599th Engr Bn (cpc) and self-help labor from the occupying U.S. unit. The project is 97% complete at the end of this quarter and remaining work is to be completed by ARVN engineers when fire base is turned over to ARVN forces.
2. The 299th Engr Bn has continued upgrading of route 3A in Binh Dinh Province. Project consists of placing and compacting fill, grading and widening, improvement of drainage structure and application of a soil-cement surface for approximately 10 km. EDC is 31 Aug 69.

3. A 300' pile bridge has been started to cross the Kum Song River in Hoai An District. During this period preliminary site reconnaissance was conducted, design completed and materials requisitioned. This will be a class 28 bridge with an EDC of 1 Oct 69 being built as an operational support mission by direction of CG, I FFORCEV.

3. Qui Nhon Area:

1. Five miles of FOL pipeline from An Khe east were buried and tested by the 20th Engr Bn and completed on 24 July.

2. The 84th Engr Bn is burying FOL pipeline from Vung Ro Bay to Tuy Hoa. This project was reported 35% complete at the end of this report period with an EDC of 25 Aug.

3. Revetments for the dial central facility at Phu Tai were commenced on 6 Jun 69 with an EDC to be announced.

(3) Airfield Upgrading and Repair

(a) An Khe (88A78447): One platoon of the 20th Engr Bn continues to work on the south taxiway which failed due to excessive traffic and is upgrading the parallel taxiway. No EDC has been determined but it is anticipated this project will be completed within the next quarter.

(b) Ben Het (YB87252): This airfield was extensively damaged by enemy shelling during the siege of May and June. Repairs were made by the 299th Engr Bn in July sufficient to open the field to type I C-7A operational status.

(c) Cheo Reo (BQ233818): This airfield was opened to O-130 aircraft in May but sustained considerable damage during a C-130 airlift operation in the same month. Extensive deterioration of the subgrade due to supersaturation caused the field to be closed for extensive repair. Repairs accomplished during this reporting period lead to the conclusion that only major construction after the monsoon can restore this airfield to C-130 capability. During the latter part of July action was initiated to repair this field to type II C-7A and Air Vietnam capability during the current monsoon season and reserve major reconstruction until the approaching construction season. A decision on this proposal is anticipated in the early part of the next quarter.

(d) Due Lap (YB819725): On 1 June 1969, 70th Engr Bn again initiated repair of T-17 membrane surfacing at Due Lap airfield. Extensive overage of T-17 material at this airfield renders its repair uneconomical. Repair continued thru the end of the period, with progress hampered by seasonal monsoons.

(e) Dak Seang (YB95406): The 20th Engr Bn completed pot hole repair and penepriming of this field in July.
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(f) Dux Xuyen (AP82478): Repair of Dux Xuyen airfield was initiated by the 70th Engr Bn on 1 May 69. Scope of repair includes placement of 8" sand-cement subbase and surfacing with M81 matting over 450' of runway. Construction continued throughout the period. Progress was severely impaired by dead line of Airmobile Engineer Equipment and heavy seasonal monsoons.

(g) Gia Nghia (YU925289): At Gia Nghia airfield the 577th Engr Bn supported resurfacing of the runway by providing an asphalt distributor and operators. Shaping and compaction of runway was performed by Ministry of Public Works, GVN.

(h) Song Mao (BN264456): On 20 July 1969 the 589th Engr Bn initiated placement of anti-skid compound on Song Mao airfield. Job completion was accomplished in three days.

(i) Maintenance of Airfields: Continuing maintenance was performed during the period on M81 matting and subbase at Phan Thiet and Bao Loc Airfields. Repairs included grading and stabilization of shoulders, replacement and welding of matting sections damaged by enemy fire on aircraft traffic, and stabilization of subbase.

(j) Dust Suppression: Penetron or other asphalt cutback was applied extensively at Ban Me Thuot East and Phan Thiet airfields by the 70th Engr Bn and the 116th Engr Bn respectively. On 1 Jul 69 this mission at Phan Thiet was taken over by USAEC when EMA obtained equipment necessary to accomplish the job.

(4) Land Clearing Operations:

(a) A total of 6606 acres were cleared in the 35th Engr Gp AD along QL-19, QL-20, QL-21A and area clearing in Binh Thuan Prov. 3.

(b) A total of 6896 acres were cleared within the 357th Engr Gp AD along QL-14S and QL 6-B.

(5) Route Upgrading in II CTZ:

(a) Within the seven (7) southern provinces of II CTZ composing the 35th Engr Gp AD the following was accomplished during this report period:

1. Paved 72.00 km MACV roads.
2. Construction of 6.35 km of all weather road.
3. Placed 1262.9 meters of culvert.
4. Installation of 160.64 meters of bridging.
5. Normal maintenance of 175 km of LOC's.
6. Maintenance of 48 culverts, 23 bridges and 29 bypasses within the AD.
Within the five (5) northern provinces of I Corps constituting the AO of the 957th Engr Gp the following work was performed:

1. Paving of 21.68 km MACK standard road.
2. Construction of 13.95 km of all weather roads.
3. Placement of 169.0 meters of new culvert.
4. Construction of 500 meters of various type bridging.
5. Normal maintenance of 62.47 km of roads.
6. Maintenance and repair of 85 culverts, 21 bridges and eight bypasses.

Miscellaneous Engineer Actions:

(a) Counter-martar Radar Site, Dong Ba Thin: Countermartar radar site, begun during the last period, was completed by the 589th Engr Bn on 9 May 1969. Scope of project included bunkers for the radar and the control center, two EMA Huts, guard tower, and a berm.

(b) Command Operations Center, Cam Ranh Bay: Construction was begun 11 May 1969 on a command operations center for USA Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay. Construction is by the 589th Engr Bn. Project is a reinforced concrete bunker below grade.

(c) Support of Military Assistance Team II-36: A project to upgrade facilities for MAT II-36, Lac Ngiep, begun during the last period, was completed on 8 May 1969. This project included a living/fighting bunker, latrine, shower, mortar pit and helipad.

(d) Amo Supply Point, Dalat/Cam Ly: Construction of a 9-cell ammo supply point, begun during the last period, was completed 16 July 1969. Construction was accomplished by the 577th Engr Bn.

(e) LST Ramp, Phan Thiet: Construction of an earth-filled timber LST ramp was begun during the last period by the 116th Engr Bn. Virtually complete by 31 May 1969, the ramp was severely damaged by impact from an LST. Redesign is underway and repair will be undertaken in the next period.

(f) Clearing Fire Support Base, 5/22d Arty: During the period 10 thru 15 July the 70th Engr Bn cleared and otherwise supported construction of a FSB for the 5/22d Arty via 20001685.

(g) Relocation of Fire Support Base, Duong Truong: During this period the 577th Engr Bn completed relocation of the 5/22d Arty FSB at Duong Truong. Project included provision of technical assistance.

(h) I PFCGEV Arty Hq Nha Trang: The I PFCGEV Arty Hq building, nearly complete at the close of the last period, was completed on 16 May 1969. The outstanding workmanship of this facility makes it a noteworthy headquarters.
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(1) Pier Protection, Ban Tach Brg (QL-1-239): Provision for standoff protection for piers of the Ban Tach Bridge was completed 15 May 1969 by the 577th Engr Bn. This project was initiated in February 1969.

(2) Support of Signal Sites: Between 1 and 8 May the 864th Engr Bn cleared areas around Hon Tre Island Signal Site. This clearing was preparatory to installation of Unattended Infrarad Detection Devices. Similar support was undertaken 14 July 1969 by the 577th Engr Bn at Long Binh Mt Signal Site. This latter project involves construction of erosion control structures near installed UIDD.

(3) Support of ARVN Regiments: On 11 July 1969 the 70th Engr Bn began technical assistance to the ARVN 43th Regt in their construction of a Fire Base south of Ban Me Thuot. Construction continued thru the end of the period.

(4) Helicopter Pads, Binh Thuan Province: In support of the Province Senior Advisor, Binh Thuan Province, helicopter pads were constructed at Hai Long District (by 116th Engr Bn) and at Hoa Da District (by 589th Engr Bn). These were completed on 12 July and 7 July respectively.

(5) Rehabilitation of Helipads: During the period, rehabilitation of helicopter revetments was undertaken at Nha Trang, Ban Me Thuot, and Bao Loc. 15 each L-shaped revetments at Nha Trang were converted to parallel revetments between 9 June 1969 and 8 July 1969. 5 each revetments were similarly converted at Ban Me Thuot between 9 June 1969 and 13 June 1969. Construction of 10 each revetments continues at Bao Loc by the 116th Engr Bn. Rehabilitation of hover lanes at Dong Ba Thin was initiated 11 July 1969 by the 864th Engr Bn. Upon completion of this portion of the project, 10 each revetments will be converted at Dong Ba Thin.

(6) SEA Hut Constructions: Extensive technical assistance was rendered for construction of SEA Huts at various locations: At the Logistic Support Activity, Bao Loc; at Ban Me Thuot for the 5/22d Arty; at the Logistie Support Activity, Ban Me Thuot; at the Logistics Support Activity, Da Lat; and for the 1/56th Medical Platoon at Bao Loc.

(7) Bong Song Eiffel Bridges: During this quarter agreement was reached between the 937th Engr Gp and the Qui Nhon RMY Engineer for MFW to redeck this bridge with materials obtained by the 937th Engr Gp. Materials were ordered during this period and redecking is expected to be completed prior to 1 Oct 69.

(8) Binh Dinh Province: A request was received in June from the PSA listing 41 separate roads and bridges and land clearing desired to be accomplished prior to 31 Oct 69 in conjunction with the pacification program. An evaluation by ground and air reconnaissance was conducted by this Bn in late June and early July and is presently being staffed and coordinated as part of the II Corps Secondary Road and Bridge Program.

(9) During July 1969 interim plumbing repairs and improvements were directed and accomplished at the MACV Team Areas at Tam Quan and Hon An Districts pending arrival of civilian contractors as part of the MACV heliport program.

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r. Bong Song RR Bridge: During July the 16th Engr Bde made preparations and ordered materials to redeck the Bong Song RR Bridge which is presently being used for vehicular traffic connecting QL-1 across the Bong Song River. The present decking is deteriorating due to dry rot and the repairs will be completed prior to the coastal monsoon season within the next quarter.

(i) (U) Information Office

(j) Representatives of the Information Office provided coverage for numerous awards and promotion ceremonies as well as for special events during the period, including:

(a) Presentation of Legion of Merit to Col Gossett-11 May 1969
(b) Presentation of Legion of Merit to Col Gillispie-20 May 1969
(c) Presentation of Legion of Merit to LTC Teehan-22 May 1969
(d) Presentation of Legion of Merit to LTC Kent-28 May 1969
(e) Presentation of Legion of Merit to LTC Wiles-28 May 1969
(f) Presentation of Legion of Merit to SSM Runyan-31 May 1969
(g) Presentation of Legion of Merit to Col Stedham-1 June 1969
(h) Presentation of Legion of Merit to Col Bushy-12 June 1969
(i) Presentation of Legion of Merit to Col Perley-16 June 1969
(j) Presentation of Legion of Merit to LTC Ewing-22 June 1969
(k) Presentation of Legion of Merit to Col Bell-23 June 1969
(l) Presentation of Legion of Merit to LTC Fred-23 June 1969
(m) Presentation of Legion of Merit to Col Rogers-1 July 1969
(n) Presentation of Legion of Merit to LTC Vandyke-2 July 1969
(o) Presentation of Legion of Merit to LTC Belknap-2 July 1969
(p) Presentation of Legion of Merit to Col Nitro-3 July 1969
(q) Presentation of Legion of Merit to Col Hervey-4 July 1969
(r) Presentation of Legion of Merit to Col McClellan-6 July 1969
(s) Presentation of Legion of Merit to Col Legg-10 July 1969
(t) Presentation of Legion of Merit to LTC Metcalf-12 July 1969
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AVFA-GU-OT
15 August 1969

(a) Presentation of Legion of Merit to LTC Atkinson-19 July 1969
(v) Presentation of Legion of Merit to LTC Palmer-19 July 1969
(w) Presentation of Legion of Merit to LTC Sherblom-20 July 1969
(x) Presentation of Legion of Merit to BG Timothy-25 July 1969
(y) Presentation of Legion of Merit to LTC Heitzke-28 July 1969
(z) Photographic coverage was provided for numerous distinguished visitors to include:
(b) LT Gen Arthur S. Collins, GCS FORCEN Development, on 19 May 1969.
(a) LT Gen Frank T. Mildren, Deputy Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, on 29 May 1969.
(e) LT Gen Michael S. Davidson, DCSN USARPAC, on 12 July 1969.
(f) Gen Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff and Admiral John S. McCain Jr., Commander in Chief Pacific on 18 July 1969.

(g) The following media representative was granted a G2/G3 briefing during the period covered by the report:
(a) Patrick Luminello, Stars and Stripes - 14 May 1969.

(h) Command Information Initial Orientation Briefing for personnel newly assigned to I FORCEN were conducted each month.

(i) The 5th PID under the supervision of the IO, I FORCEN published and distributed its "Morning News" on a daily basis, and a bi-weekly summation of news in II CTZ, the "WRAP UP". The 5th PID also produced a weekly 15 minute radio program, the "Feature Page" and a 15 minute TV program, the "Armed Forces News Spotlight" every two weeks. The I FORCEN magazine, the "TYPHON" was published in May, June and July. CPT John Gray and CPT Randolph Brock departed for CONUS on 8 July and 15 July 1969 respectively. 1LT Larry J. Myers was assigned to the 5th PID on 18 July 1969.

(j) The 11th PID continued to provide transportation, escort, billets and other aid to correspondents and visiting information personnel, handling 445 during the period covered. MAJ Robert Goodfellow, CO Plevik Press Camp, departed for CONUS on 30 May 1969. 1LT James L. Scriver was assigned to the Plevik Press Camp on 19 May 1969. MAJ Raphael E. Eynard assumed command of the 11th PID on 26 June 1969 and MAJ Charles W. Whitley, former commander, was reassigned to the Information Office, I FORCEN as the Assistant Information Officer.

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(k) Inspector General Activities:

(1) During the period 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969 108 Inspector General Action Requests were received. Broken down by major category these are:

(a) Requests for assistance 68
(b) Justified complaints 11
(c) Unjustified complaints 29

Over 90% of these action requests continue to be "walk-in" or direct complaints to the IG during command inspections. The only detectable trend is one that has persisted for several months, namely delay in receipt of reassignment orders. This matter has been reported to USAV IG both through IG channels and by letter from CG IFFV to DCG, USAV, as well as to the IG, Department of the Army, on 26 April 1969 while he visited this headquarters. Otherwise there is no indication or irregularities or widespread problems which could be detrimental to the efficiency or reputation of the command.

(2) Command inspections of the following units were conducted on the dates indicated:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>DATE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC, I FFORCEV</td>
<td>2 May 1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 92d Arty</td>
<td>12 May 1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>7th Bn, 15th Arty</td>
<td>26 May 1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>5th Bn, 22d Arty</td>
<td>9 Jun 1969</td>
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<td>7th Bn, 13th Arty</td>
<td>23 Jun 1969</td>
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<td>3rd Bn, 6th Arty</td>
<td>7 Jul 1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIB, 41st Arty Gp</td>
<td>21 Jul 1969</td>
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<td>Tuyen Duc Prov</td>
<td>6 May 1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gia Binh Prov</td>
<td>9 May 1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>Duc Long Prov</td>
<td>13 May 1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pleiku Prov</td>
<td>20 May 1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phu Yen Prov</td>
<td>5 Jun 1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quang Duc Prov</td>
<td>15 Jul 1969</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(3) During the period security inspections were conducted at the following installations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INSTALLATIONS</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phan Rang</td>
<td>15-16 May 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
<td>19-21 May 1969</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
AVFA-GC. Operational Report of Headquarters, I FkWhCv for quarterly period ending 31 July 1969, RCS GpFkH-65 (R1) (U)

SUBJECT:

Operational Report of Headquarters, I FkWhCv for quarterly period ending 31 July 1969, RCS GpFkH-65 (R1) (U)

INSTALLATION DATE

Cam Ranh Bay 1-4 Jun 1969
Tuy Hoa 9-10 Jun 1969
Pleiku 16-17 Jun 1969
Nha Trang 23 Jun 1969

(4) All units inspected were rated satisfactory on a scale of satisfactory/unsatisfactory only. Results of security inspections were published by the G-3 Security Division.

(5) Memorandum, subject: Rights of Military Personnel to Present Complaints was published and distributed on 1 July 1969 to all assigned and attached units.

(6) The following Acting I G's were appointed during the period due to DEROS, reassignment, etc:

(a) W C Dudley Coleman Adv Tm #28 (Phu Yen Prov)
(b) Maj Wilford C. Isner 54th Sig Bn

(7) There were five investigation/inquiries conducted during the period:

(a) Allegations of lack of support and security, WIT 11-36
(b) Deficiencies in service of Modern Service Company, a contract laundry for U. units in the Nha Trang Cam Ranh Bay area
(c) Logistics and property accountability, An Tuc Dispensary (An Khe).
(d) Release of operational information to the press during the Ben Het operation.
(e) Extent of and major contributory factors to Nha Trang blackmarket. Investigation continues and further reports are contemplated.

(8) Notification of the USARPAC Special Inspection scheduled for 15-20 Sep 69 has been disseminated and required documents forwarded to USARPAC IG.

1. (U) Staff Judge Advocate Activities:

(1) There were 3 trials by General Courts-Martial convened by the Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, during the quarter compared to 2 cases the previous quarter. 21% special courts-martial and 60% summary courts-martial were reviewed for legal sufficiency. This reflects a decrease of 25% special and 24% summary courts-martial over the previous quarter. Also during this period there were 172% Article 134's reviewed as compared with 198% for the previous period.

(2) 24 claims of Army Personnel for loss of, or damage to, personal property incident to service were adjudicated and paid, compared to 65 the previous quarter. The claims totaling $6,407.52 were approved for payment in the total amount of $6,795.13.
(3) 16 claims of Vietnamese nationals for personal injury or property damage were processed by this office.

(4) The legal assistance office provided advice and assistance on civil matters to 612 individuals during the quarter compared to 573 the previous quarter.

(5) Military justice clients numbered 167 during this quarter.

m. (U) Command Analysis and Programs (CAP) Activities. During the period 1 May - 31 July 1969 the Office of the Special Assistant, Command Analysis and Programs continued to promote assistance to Headquarters, I FFORCEV in analysis of organization, functions and operations and in management improvement techniques. The Office of Command Analysis and Programs assisted in the following during the period of the reports:

(1) Completed the development of the I FFORCEV Tactical Operations Center (TOC) Automated Spot Report System. The system assists the G2 and G3 staff sections in the analysis of friendly and enemy activities and in compiling statistical data.

(2) The programming of the Army Aviation Gunship Ordnance Expenditure Analysis System was completed during the period and the system was turned over to the 17th Combat Aviation Group for implementation.

(3) The I FFORCEV Regulation on the Cost Reduction Program was revised by CAP and published.

(4) A detailed and comprehensive study of the US combat support furnished AFSVN during the period 24 April - 22 May in the 24th Special Tactical Zone was completed. This study was eventually used as an enclosure to a report to COMUSMACV.

(5) A study on the performance of the II Corps Regional Forces/Popular Forces was completed.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-00-07
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st ForCey for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

SECTION II - LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. (U) PERSONNEL:

(1) Refugee Processing.

(a) OBSERVATION: In Binh Dinh Province automated handling of the 184,830 out-of-camp refugee registrations accomplished in a few months what was calculated to normally take more than two years by manual office handling. Using local Qui Nhon Support Command data processing facilities with key punch operators working in their spare time and local students working part-time, information was extracted from 35,000 family survey records and placed on data processing cards. The information extracted, concerning residence, hamlet of origin, date of refuge, family members, head of family, I.D. card with date and place of issue and desires of the refugees as to returning home, has been programmed through the processing machines to give the required information in both English and Vietnamese.

(b) EVALUATION: Data processing for the handling of mass registrations of people has thus been proven to have a very practical application. The Ministry has accepted the use of the machine made lists for payments to refugees. The system developed can be adapted locally to any Province that has available data processing equipment. It is understood that all LOC COMMANDS, such as ANSAC, have similar equipment. CORDS has informed its Refugee Officers throughout II CTZ of the Binh Dinh system. Ambassador Colby and Gen Abrams have taken steps to call the Binh Dinh experience to the attention of other regions.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That data processing be used to handle refugee files.

b. (C) OPERATIONS:

(1) Fire Support for Logistical Aircraft.

(a) OBSERVATION: Caribou aircraft resupplying Ben Het at the height of the seige were taking many hits from ground fire. Planes were being damaged badly and pilots wounded. The system in existence at this time was defensive in nature, i.e. Spad escorts only firing when fired on. It was decided to support resupply efforts with a coordinated program of offensive action incorporating Army artillery and air.

(b) EVALUATION: A coordinated group of suppressive fires including Army artillery were employed in the following manner:

1. TOT-20 minutes: F-4s with napalm strike North and East of Ben Het. Artillery begins suppressive fires South of the road.

2. TOT-3 minutes: F-4s off target. Spad aircraft drop smoke and CBU ordnance on both sides of the Caribou run in heading forming a corridor. On the return pass, the Spads fire 20mm and 7.62 suppressive fires along the same corridors. Artillery fire continues.
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15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational report of Headquarters, 1st Corps for Quarterly Period ending 31 July 1969, AVF-0065 (R) (U)

2. TOT: Caribou drop; Spads continue their suppressive fires to protect Caribous during recovery. Artillery fire continues.

4. TOT: All supporting fires lifted.

1. RECOMMENDATION: Coordinated positive offensive type fire suppression can be used effectively to provide the necessary protection for aircraft in a hostile environment.

2. PSYOP Reaction Force.

(a) OBSERVATION: PSYOP to exploit VC/NVA tactical failures and acts of terrorism against innocent civilian and PSYOP to exploit allied tactical successes are very effective if conducted during an operation, or as soon as possible after the enemy psychological vulnerability has been discovered.

(b) EVALUATION: Experience has shown that too much lag time exists before an enemy psychological vulnerability is exploited. This is particularly true of the time taken to conduct face-to-face operations at the location of an enemy act of terrorism or atrocity against innocent civilians. A PSYOP reaction force consisting of assets and personnel from each Province PSYOP Coordinating Center (PCC) should be formed to eliminate this problem. An adequate SOP should be written in each province to facilitate reaction on a twenty four hour basis. Equipment for the reaction force should include, as a minimum, loudspeakers, tape recorder with blank and prerecorded tapes, camera with film and necessary provisions for transportation to all points in each province. The MSQ-85 Audio-Van should be the primary PSYOP vehicle when possible. VVS, National Police, Chieu Hoi and RDC should have representatives on the PSYOP reaction force. Some provisions for security should be organic to the force utilizing APVs. Additional security, if needed, would be obtained by coordinating with the district involved. Adequate coordination should be effected with the province TOG to facilitate twenty-four hour notification. As a rule, the maximum time for preparation to move after notification should be one (1) hour.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That each province form a PSYOP reaction force consisting of personnel and equipment from the province PCC. An adequate SOP should be written in each province to facilitate twenty-four hour operation.

3. Study on Performance of the 11 Corps Regional Forces/Popular Forces.

(a) OBSERVATION: Performance of the RF/PF units in 11 Corps is significantly below that of comparable units in the other Corps. Kill ratios and small arms captured/lost ratios were the principal measures used for comparison.

(b) EVALUATION: From analysis of performance data and advisor ratings as presented in the Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES) report, it was concluded that in-place training lies at the heart of the RF/PF problem. Units receiving six or more hours of in-place training per week performed significantly better than those units receiving little or no weekly in-place training. Analysis further revealed that the amount of in-place training received by RF/PF units in 11 Corps is appreciably less than the amount received by RF/PF
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AVFA-GC-GT 15 August 1969

units in other Corps.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That increased emphasis be placed on RF/PF unit training. A temporary reduction in the number of RF/PF unit operations may be necessary to facilitate added training. If need be, such temporary reductions in operations should be accepted.

NOTE: Lessons Learned BEN BET - DAK TO have previously been published by MACV J3/03.

3. (U) TRAINING: None.

4. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

(i) Collection of Illegal Weapons.

(a) OBSERVATION: Some Vietnamese individuals have illegal weapons in their possession; but they are reluctant to report these to authorities for fear of adverse consequences.

(b) EVALUATION: The ROKA has initiated a campaign to collect these weapons and has achieved significant results. Two cases can be considered in which weapons are illegally possessed by the populace. In the first case well meaning individuals simply happen to acquire a weapon and have had no opportunity to report it. The second case is those people who have been hiding weapons for various reasons. In either case it is obvious that individuals willing to turn the weapons in may be afraid of being questioned or punished. In view of the implications, no questioning, no punishment and secrecy of the individual source of weapons were considered by the ROKA to be an essential requirement to motivate the people and create a voluntary response. A reward was also considered desirable. Since rice was a rationed item, it was offered: 5 bags for small arms and 10 bags for crew served weapons. Two trial campaigns by the 1st ROK Regt., Tiger Division have resulted in 57 individual weapons being turned in. The campaigns were publicized through hamlets and village chiefs.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That other units conduct similar campaigns, not only to collect illegal weapons, but also to publicize the VIP reward system.

2. Big Mack Intelligence Report.

(a) OBSERVATION: MACV Order of Battle Summary, Volume II, which contains numerical data on VCI and guerrilla strengths, is issued approximately two and a half months after the reporting period.

(b) EVALUATION: Such a lag in reporting precludes a continuous and accurate estimate of the enemy situation and prevents accurate projections. The BIG MACK Intelligence Collection Program, which consists of an extensive series of reports on VCI and guerrilla forces, is available at Force Force level approximately 10 - 15 days after the reporting period. This data is not, however, adjusted or "smoothed" for estimate errors.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The BIG MACK Intelligence Report should be utilized as the basis for current intelligence estimates, and the MACV Order of Battle Summary should be utilized as an official update.

a. (U) LOGISTICS:


(a) OBSERVATION: Disaster with JP4 jet fuel. Two disastrous fires in Vietnamese hamlets in Binh Dinh Province occurred during July both relating to the theft and misuse of JP4 fuel. In Dap Da hamlet a hand grenade accidentally set fire to fuel being used for cooking purposes. Five houses were destroyed leaving twenty-five persons homeless. In the hamlets of An Ngai and Hoai Gia, fuel, reportedly being drained from a U.S. pipeline, was ignited destroying sixty houses and leaving 250 persons homeless.

(b) EVALUATION: In conjunction with actions to prevent theft of JP4 from pipelines, officials should warn the people of the risks of using this fuel.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the dangers of using JP4 fuel for any home use be widely publicized.

2. That District and Province officials be urged to take necessary actions to reduce pipeline pilferage.

f. (U) ORGANIZATION: None.

g. (U) OTHER: None

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

DAVID L. LIDDLE
Corral, AGO
Adjutant General

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AVHGC-DST (15 Aug 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, I FFORCEV for Quarterly
Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 12 Sep 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-D*,
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons
Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters,
I Field Force Vietnam.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (U) Reference item concerning "Refugee Processing," section II,
page 88, paragraph a(1); concur. The use of data processing machines can
greatly reduce the administrative delay in assembling and collating information related to refugee registrations. Province Senior Advisers are advised to coordinate with US commands having an ADP capability to determine their ability to support such programs.

b. (U) Reference item concerning "PSYOP Reaction Force," section II,
page 89, paragraph b(2); concur. A quick reaction PSYOP capability allows exploitation of short term target vulnerabilities. Provincial PSYOP Coordination Centers should be prepared to react to these opportunities with appropriate personnel and equipment.

c. (C) Reference item concerning "Collection of Illegal Weapons,"
section II, page 90, paragraph d(1); concur. The idea of offering a reward to individuals for the turn-in of unauthorized weapons, in most cases, is a sufficient indicator that no questioning nor punishment will follow. A similar program could be implemented in other areas utilizing, as rewards, those items that are in short supply or difficult for the local populace to obtain. This is also a step forward in establishing rapport with the villagers and enhancing the VIP program. This information will be included in the forthcoming USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons report which is disseminated to all subordinate organizations. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

d. (C) Reference item concerning "Big Mack Intelligence Report,"
section II, page 90, paragraph d(2); concur. The Big Mack Intelligence Collection Program provides a timely account of VCI and guerrilla forces. The Big Mack Intelligence Reports would greatly assist in maintaining a continuous and accurate estimate of the enemy situation. This information will be included in the forthcoming USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons
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AVHGC-DST (15 Aug 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, I FFORCEV for Quarterly
Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

report which is disseminated to all subordinate organizations. No action
by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

e. (U) Reference item concerning "Pilferage of JP4 Fuel," section II,
page 91, paragraph e(1); concur. The following actions have been taken or
are being taken in an effort to reduce pipeline pilferage:

(1) Radio and leaflets have been used to warn of the dangers associated
with POL products.

(2) Letters have been sent to the Province Chief of Binh Dinh and
Pho Yen Provinces requesting their assistance.

(3) The pipeline has been buried in areas with a history of high
pilferage incidents.

(4) Assistance of the RVN MP's has been requested.

(5) Assistance of both US and RVN tactical units has been requested.

(6) Helicopters are assigned to patrol the pipeline.

(7) "Shadow" aircraft (AC-119) over-fly the pipeline when on missions
in the area.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

C. J. WILLSON
MIL, AAT
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
IFFV

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HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 18 OCT 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORT
CM, AGC
Asst AG
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**ATTACHED UNITS**

- 270th FA Det (Radar)
- 313th Radio Research Battalion

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HEADQUARTERS I FFORCEx TASK ORGANIZATION

OPOIN UNITS

4th Inf Div
173d Abn Bde (Sep)
II Corps US Army Advisory Gp
17th Combat Aviation Gp
7th Sqdn, 17th Air Cav
3d Bn (AM) 506th Inf
(1st Bde, 101st Abn Div (AM))
8th PSYOPS Bn
Co B, 5th SPG
201st Avn Co (Corps)

AUTHORITY

USARV OPLAN 78-66 (OP ROBIN)
MACV msg (S) MACCOG 120602, 171835Z Feb 68, Unit Deployment (U)
MACV msg (S) MACCOG 111692, 231333Z May 67, Reinforcement of I Corps (U)
MACV LOI 1-66 dtd 29 Mar 66 paragraph 5 (3)
MACV LOI 1-66 dtd 29 Mar 66 Task Organization
USARV msg (C) AVSEC 071527, 110946Z Jan 68, Assignment Status of
201st Avn Co (Corps) and 7/17th Air Cav Sqdn (U)
MACV msg (S) MACCOG 110160, 151115Z Jan 68 byrd AO (U)
MACV ltr (PUO) MACPD dtd 6 Dec 66, Employment of the US Army
6th PSYOPS Battalion (Tactical)
MACV LOI 1-66 dtd 19 Mar 66 paragraph 5 (4)
MACV msg (S) MACCOG 120255, 211235Z Jan 67, OPOIN of USASF Team in II CTZ (U)
USARV msg (C) AVHCC-O 31527, 110946Z Jan 68, Assignment Status of
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**AVIATION SUPPORT**

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* LIAISON IN LOCAL HAMLETS
* COBRA TEAMS
* CONVOY ESCORT AND SECURITY

MAY 1969

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
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PURPOSE

In producing TACTICAL NOTES, I FFORCEV Headquarters compiles and highlights in each edition up to date, helpful hints from the counter insurgency battlefields in II Corps Tactical Zone. Study them. Put them to use. Pass them along to others.

Contributions from commanders of all assigned and OPCON units, as well as other organizations receiving the NOTES, including advisors with ARVN units and liaison officers with ROK units, are highly desired and solicited. Pertinent details of "tactical lessons learned" should be recorded as they happen. All contributions submitted should reach this headquarters by the fifteenth of each month.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ARTHUR B. PUSEY, (O)
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

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(C) Flak Suppression and Countermortar Fires During Helicopter Resupply. Often when a helicopter attempts to take off or land on a firebase the enemy will deliver intense mortar and recoilless rifle fire against the aircraft. This tactic can threaten the preservation of the fire base if it is dependent on air resupply. In order to overcome this threat, flak suppression and counterbattery programs must be planned around all fire bases. Experience has shown that the firing of such programs will suppress enemy fire for a period sufficient to permit resupply. Aircraft approach routes must be arranged so that interruption of firing is held to a minimum.

I FFORCE Arty

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Target Location by Triangulation. Triangulation can be an effective means of identifying enemy firing positions so that the enemy may be taken under fire. The use of a flash base in determining the location of flat trajectory weapons is one method that has proven successful in the Dak To area. Three observation posts, each equipped with an aiming circle, were positioned on hill top fire bases approximately seven kilometers apart. Their positions were plotted on a 1:25,000 firing chart at the artillery battalion command post. Training was conducted by firing illumination rounds and recording the azimuths to the burst reported by each OP. In each case, the reported azimuths intersected very near the illumination grid fired. During actual enemy gunfire attacks, muzzle flashes could not be observed directly, but azimuths were measured at the center of the momentary illumination haze which appeared over the mask when the enemy weapons were fired. When plotted on the chart, the azimuth lines from the OP's intersected and formed a small triangle, the center of which fixed the enemy gun position grid with sufficient accuracy to permit effective zone and sweep counterbattery fire. The flash base, together with timely counterbattery fire, was able to suppress enemy gunfire attacks. Triangulation can also be established by using compasses, sound direction or any other means of determining the direction from which the enemy fires are coming.

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I FFORCEV Arty
Artillery in Support of Small Unit Reconnaissance.

Small unit operations because of their widely dispersed nature, create unique artillery support problems. Difficulty in obtaining current and accurate locations of small unit reconnaissance teams has been experienced when the small unit reconnaissance TOC was not collocated with the artillery FDC. In order to provide rapid close support to these teams it was determined essential that the artillery commander have a liaison NCO from the reconnaissance unit with whom he can directly coordinate fire support. Additionally, when combined raids are executed the small unit reconnaissance team should establish a TAC CP with the artillery element so that fire support coordination necessary for accurate and responsive fires can be expeditiously accomplished. 173d Abn Bde
(C) Identification of VCI Personalities.  Past experience has shown that Montagnard villagers have been reluctant to point out VCI personalities located in their home villages. Agents have learned that small children (age group 10-15) can provide a wealth of information as to VCI activities. Past operations have revealed that children will relate names of individuals in their village who contribute in any manner to enemy activities. When in support of cordon and search operations, one agent team should be instructed to gain the confidence of the children and to exploit all information obtainable.

4th Inf Div
Liaison in Local Hamlets. On 18 April, the 3rd Battalion, 503rd Infantry, placed squads in six hamlets to work with and to assist PF platoons and RD cadre. Having troops working closely with these GVN assets at the grassroots level provided an excellent added intelligence source. Almost immediately the members of both PF and RD teams began reporting valuable information on enemy activity to the US squads in the hamlets. The reports obtained and the activity observed by the troops were passed immediately to the battalion, which in turn was able to react in anticipation of enemy activity. Experience indicates that the same information forwarded through normal channels would have taken considerably longer to reach the battalion and would very likely have precluded effective reaction by the battalion.

173d Abn Bde/TF South
(C) Hand Grenade Night Interdiction Program. On firebases where there is a steep slope that the enemy could approach with sappers, a hand grenade interdiction program has proven highly effective. Guards along the perimeter throw hand grenades down the steep slope at predetermined times. The program should be supervised by a noncommissioned officer.

4th Inf Div
Convoy Escort and Security. A study has been conducted to determine the relative crew protection by trucks and armored personnel carriers when used as lead vehicles. The study showed that a truck as the lead vehicle with mounted machine gun and radio and APCs interspersed in the convoy, is the best combination because the truck, if hit by a B-40 rocket or a mine, takes fewer casualties. Three explanations are offered for this imbalance of casualties.

(a) APC carries more personnel; Therefore a greater number of personnel are vulnerable.

(b) The crew of an APC is much closer to a mine explosion than are personnel in a truck. The stand-off provided by the higher truck cab provides a greater degree of safety.

(c) In the case of B-40 rocket incidents, the truck cab presents a much smaller target than does the APC, and is subject to considerably less spalling and shrapnel effect when hit by a rocket. 4th Inf Div
USEFUL TACTICAL_HINTS

(0) Use of APCs to Insert Stay-Behind Forces. Armored personnel carriers offer an effective means of inserting ambushes and patrols. The personnel who are to be placed in position are concealed inside the APC. The crew of the APC rides on the outside of the vehicle. The APC moves into a densely vegetated area and the stay-behind force dismounts. When the carrier emerges from the dense vegetation, the same number of personnel are riding on the outside. There is nothing to indicate to the enemy that forces have been left behind.

4th Inf Div
Use of CS Munitions to Detect Concealed Enemy Forces.

The detection of concealed enemy troops and their locations in the jungle or heavily vegetated terrain by aerial observers is difficult at best and consequently many enemy locations go undetected. Enemy troops are well trained in the art of concealment and effectively counter visual detection by strict movement discipline when any type of aircraft is overhead. To enhance our detection capabilities under these circumstances, the technique of employing CS munitions has been found to be effective in causing the enemy to expose their positions. In the employment of this technique 158 CS cannisters are dropped in the target area by a command and control ship, or preferably by a lead gunship, forcing the enemy to move and disclose their location. The following support aircraft or gunship is spaced far enough behind the lead ship so that he is in position to detect and report the movement or deliver accurate fire on the exposed target. Prior planning is a must in the employment of this technique and care must be taken to ensure that friendly forces are either upwind from the target area or equipped with protective masks. Close coordination with the ground commander is imperative and in many cases the friendly ground forces can be immediately employed to eliminate the enemy force.

G3 Advisor, II CTZ
Cobra Teams have met with a high degree of success in terms of enemy kills and intelligence gathered. These combined teams consist of 14 heavily armed LRP trained personnel, (normally eight ARVN and six U.S.). These personnel come from the U.S. reconnaissance platoons and the ARVN reconnaissance companies. The Cobra Team is inserted by helicopter, vehicle, foot or boat into suspected enemy areas or base camps. The Team is heavily armed and specially trained in artillery adjustment, employment of gunships, and tactical air in addition to receiving instruction on LRP techniques. This special training and the concept of reinforcing as opposed to extracting gives the Cobra Team staying power and has paid dividends in enemy kills and equipment captured. The combined aspect of the team offers immediate identification of the enemy units or quick determination of the importance of captured documents and material. Documents captured by Cobra Teams have revealed members of the VCI within hamlets and villages as well as comac-liaison agents for NVA, VC MP/LF units, and guerrilla elements. The Cobra Team concept adds professionalism as well as detailed knowledge of the area and the enemy. The mutual exchange of operating techniques and awarding combat decorations to both ARVN and U.S. Cobra Team members has contributed to the combat effectiveness of the ARVN and the U.S. soldier. This concept has
served to convince ARVN leaders that the ARVN soldier can operate independently if well led, supported, and provided with adequate communications.

TF South

(c) False Insertion of Recon Teams. Recently, prior to the insertion of a Recon Team, a false insertion was conducted in an attempt to deceive the enemy as to the location of the actual LZ. Gunships prepared the false LZ, and, following this, the insertion ship touched down momentarily before insertion of the team at the actual LZ, located approximately one (1) km away. Upon actual insertion the team moved a short distance and established an OP. Remaining in the same general area for three days, the team had no sightings. Upon moving approximately two (2) km further away from the false LZ, they had three enemy sightings and captured one (1) NVA soldier. Upon interrogation, the FW stated that his unit had observed the initial (false) insertion and were told to avoid the surrounding area for a radius of approximately two (2) km. When he was captured he did not suspect that the Americans were in the area. False insertions are an effective means of deception when inserting small units; however, it must be recognised that the enemy will give a wide berth to any area they believe to have an insertion site. Recon Teams must move a considerable distance from any real or false insertion area to obtain best results.

173d Abn Bde
(C) Enemy Evaluation of US Artillery and Tactical Air. A recent POW interrogation report produced the following enemy evaluation of US artillery fires and tactical air strikes. The PW stated that the NVA were not afraid of US artillery because they fire one round at a time until fires have been adjusted on an exact target. By the time the artillery is adjusted, the enemy has taken cover under ground. However, the NVA are afraid of ARVN artillery fires because they fire first round barrages which catch the enemy unprepared. Likewise the POW stated that the enemy are not afraid of tactical air strikes. The aircraft will shoot at or bomb only one position at a time and will continue to engage that single target without deviation. The NVA simply move a short distance away from the target and watch the attack. Artillery attacks can be improved through the use of CS mix with HE and by firing first round concentrations when the target can be positively identified and safety requirements permit. Tactical air strikes may be more effective if the requesting unit and/or FAC not only specify one point target but also request secondary coverage of nearby coordinates of suspected enemy locations (SEL) when safety requirements permit and aircraft are available.

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Radio Procedures. To further simplify the procedures contained in ACP 125 and reduce transmission time, the following procedure is authorized for use at the discretion of commanders concerned.

a. Radio operators make normal initial contact using call signs and authenticate when required, for the remainder of the series of transmissions only the prowords (over) or (out) need be used.

b. The congested 30-75.95 MHz FM band in Vietnam dictates that all radio transmissions be as short and concise as possible. The above procedure will assist in achieving this. Commanders are requested to take the initiative in preventing indiscriminate use of radios.
(C) An Old Ambush Tactic Becomes Effective. When moving into ambush positions, units are often observed and consequently bypassed by the Viet Cong. One unit decided to vary the pattern; it moved into an ambush position at dusk as usual. However, knowing that they were being observed and having made a previous reconnaissance of the general area, they deployed to an alternate ambush site after darkness and subsequently made a successful contact with the enemy. This selection and occupation of alternate ambush positions after dark is often overlooked due to the reluctance of many commanders to move troops at night. This tactic, however, can yield highly significant results.  

3A, 23d Div
Ambush Reminders. A recent study was conducted by HQ, IFFV on ambushes conducted in the II CTZ. The study considered the results of 122 triggered ambushes during the period 1 January to 16 February 1969. It was found that only 57% of ambushes resulted in enemy casualties of 10% or greater. The basic fundamentals of successful ambushes are SURPRISE, COORDINATED FIRES and CONTROL.

a. SURPRISE depends on the formulation of a carefully prepared plan based on recent, reliable intelligence. Personnel responsible for establishing an ambush must be given sufficient time for planning. A prior reconnaissance of the ambush site should be made by key personnel. If possible rehearsals should be conducted prior to the operation. Every man in the ambush party must understand exactly what his particular mission is to be.

b. COORDINATED FIRES must be achieved to inflict maximum casualties on the enemy. Maximum use should be made of area fire weapons such as claymore mines and hand grenades. These weapons will provide a high initial volume of fire and shock action that will disrupt the enemy reaction. The use of such weapons will also deceive the enemy as to the location of the ambush party. Small arms fire must be kept low, especially at night, as there is a tendency for troops to fire high at night.
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c. CONTROL is the third key factor in successful ambushes. The ambush must be triggered by one man. The majority of the enemy force must be in the killing zone when the ambush is sprung. Any premature firing will alert the enemy and allow him to escape maximum damage.

The foregoing factors are nothing more than basic doctrine, but how well do your men know and practice the fundamentals? Every leader responsible for conducting an ambush should ask himself the following questions:

1. How much time does the ambush party have to prepare for the ambush?
2. Was an inspection of the ambush party conducted prior to their departure?
3. How closely is their preparation supervised?
4. Does every man in the ambush party know what his job is?

Units should train in ambush techniques when the situation permits. A valuable method of training is the post action critique. It only takes a short period of time, but it can reinforce successful methods as well as identify problem areas. Night firing training should be conducted periodically during stand downs.

The ambush is one of the primary offensive weapons available to our forces. Continued emphasis and training on ambush operations is essential to maintain the effectiveness of the highly versatile operation.

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Command Detonated Booby-Traps. The following ambush has been developed. A ring main of detonating cord is placed out along the kill zone. The grenades are placed at 4-meter intervals along the kill zone, linked to ring main with detonating cord and primed with detonating cord in the fuse-well. Claymores are placed at the ends of the kill zone facing in, primed and linked to the ring main by detonating cord. Trip flares are placed at 10-meter intervals along the ambush with the spring loaded trip wire strung over the detonating cord. The grenades are detonated by a claymore firing device and electric blasting cap, giving very effective fragmentation over the entire kill zone and illuminating it at the same time. Personnel who trigger this ambush position themselves where they can observe the kill zone, but remain far enough away to prevent receiving grenade fragments. Small unit patrols can be highly successful in the employment of this type of ambush, however, all members must be familiar with proper demolition techniques to assure their own safety and to achieve maximum effectiveness from the ambush (see Inclosure 1).

TF South
ENEMY TACTICS

(C) **Enemy Use of Claymore Mines.** During a sweep of a bunker complex in April 1969, elements of the 4th Infantry Division discovered that the enemy had employed claymore-type mines approximately five feet above the ground in trees. The mines were either electrically command detonated or rigged to be detonated by trip wires. 4th Inf Div

(C) **False Walls.** A common Viet Cong tactic is to build structures with double walls. The spaces between the inner and outer walls are used to hide supplies and in some instances, are large enough to hide personnel. During search and clear operations, insure that the walls of structures are included in the overall search plan. After insuring that the structure is not booby-trapped, a quick and easy way to determine if there is a double wall is by thumping the wall for hollow sounds. If a double wall is found, special precautions must be taken for the Viet Cong often booby-trap hidden supplies. G3 Advisor, II CTZ
(C) Air Warnings. Demolitions and ground-to-air fires are as great a hazard to aircraft safety as artillery fires, mortar fires, and fires of other high trajectory weapons. The 4th Infantry Division requires the posting of warnings to aircraft for demolitions operations and for areas where ground-to-air fires have been received in the past 24 hours. These warnings insure aircraft safety by allowing aircraft to bypass danger areas. 4th Inf Div
USING ENEMY KNOWLEDGE

(C) KCS for Training of Regional Force/Popular Force. The
15 FVCF section, in conjunction with the D3 Training section
has employed a Kit Carson Scout for the training of RF/PP per-
sonnel. The individual was an NVA recon sergeant for 5 years
and attended officers school just prior to his Chieu Hoi. He
is well versed in NVA/VC tactics and weapons and is instruc-
ting classes in both. In addition, when he becomes more
fluent in English, he will instruct the same classes to U.S.
replacements. The NVA Kit Carson Scout is also used in inter-
rogating Ho Chi Minh and prisoners of war. The presence of a
fellow countryman and soldier has two effects. First, it
assures the Ho Chi Minh or POW that he will not be killed and can
find a friend. Second, in the event that the Ho Chi Minh or POW
is trying to trick or lie, the Kit Carson Scout may catch a
lie which is not obvious to the U.S. or NVA interrogator.
Another use of this Ho Chi Minh is in the KCS recruiting program.
He accompanies the KCS recruiter to the Chieu Hoi center and
is present during interviews to assist in evaluating the worth
of KCS candidates.

4th Inf Div
(U) **Rice Extraction.** Extraction of a large cache of rice is a difficult and time-consuming process if only UH-1 helicopters are utilized. A more efficient method of extraction is to use a CONEX container lifted to the cache site by CH-47 helicopter. The CONEX container is loaded with rice and hauled out by CH-47. This method reduces sorties and permits more efficient use of other air assets. 173d Abn Bde
(U) Fire Base Water Resupply. When occupying a mountain top fire base, all water must be airlifted to the base. The large amount of water needed in a tropical climate makes the resupply of water a constant problem. Often, sufficient water containers, such as water trailers, are not available and scarcity of aircraft limit the back haul sorties which are necessary to refill the containers. The use of medium or heavy artillery propellant cannisters for the transport of NON-POTABLE water can ease the problem. Large numbers of these watertight cannisters can be lifted, either internally or externally, by CH-47 aircraft, thereby reducing the need for constant backhaul of water containers for refill. I FFORCEW Arty
(C) Tracker Dog Team Operations. In a recent operation a tracker team and tracker dog were employed to search for a downed F4D aircraft pilot. The team arrived at the crash site and noticed the heavy smell of JP4 in the area. This caused the dog to lose his ability to smell or effectively track in the area, thus making the team ineffective. If a CTT is to be used in the future for similar search and rescue missions the dogs should be kept out of the crash site in order to preserve the dogs sense of smell and his ability to track.

TF South
(U) **Firing Positions as Observation Posts.** On platoon size artillery raids, the howitzers are usually emplaced on a prominent hilltop to facilitate defense of the position. This type of position also provides an excellent observation post. Proper utilization of the fire base an an OP can provide significant intelligence data and additional artillery targets. Binoculars, BC Scopes, and Starlight Scopes should be brought with the raiding unit and employed by as many personnel as practical. Suspected enemy trails and supply routes that can be observed from the firing position should be seeded with trip flares and other warning devices in order to provide some excellent targets. When the devices are activated, precomputed data will permit placing rapid, accurate fire on the individuals who tripped the devices.

173d Abn Bde
(C) **Company Reconnaissance Unit.** One squad of a rifle company is given special training in reconnaissance techniques. The squad operates as far as one kilometer forward of the company. For example, when a company moves to a night location, the squad is dispatched several hours in advance to the night location to secure it. This procedure provides the company with ample warning if enemy elements are in the area. If the squad makes contact, it holds or withdraws to a location from which the company can engage the enemy. This element must have sufficient equipment to sustain itself for at least three days.

4th Inf Div

(C) **Keeping Listening Posts Alert.** It is important that every effort be made to keep listening posts alert at night. Communication must be maintained with the listening post at all times. One method is to have the listening post reply to radio calls by breaking squelch. An alternate means is telephone communication. If telephone communication is not available, twine may be employed using a tug and yank system. One end of the twine is tied on the hand of a member of the listening post. The other end is tied on the hand of a guard on the perimeter. Periodic tugging on the twine keeps both parties awake and alert.

4th Inf Div
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40 METER KILL ZONE

TRIP FLARE

M18 CLAYMORE

M26

DETCORD

M18 CLAYMORE

DUAL PRIMED ELECTRIC BLASTING CAP

REMARKS:
1. PLACEMENT OF GRENADES SUCH THAT MINIMUM FRAGMENTS TRAVEL TO THE REAR
2. GRENADES PRIMED WITH DETCORD IN FUSEMILL AND DETCORD CAMOUFLAGED WITH LRP RATION TAPE
3. TRIPS PLACED SO THAT LIGHT IS SHIELDED FROM THE REAR WITH WIRE STRETCHED ACROSS RING MAIN AND TRIP SPRINGS LOADED.

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TACTICAL NOTES

I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM

IN THIS ISSUE

* INTEGRATION OF KIT CARSON SCOUTS AND SCOUT DOGS
* USE OF CS TO BREAK CONTACT
* LRRP INSERTIONS
* NIGHT MEDEVAC

JULY 1969

Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Chief of Staff, Army, and Office of the Surgeon General,
PURPOSE

In producing TACTICAL NOTES, I FFORCEN headquarters compiles and highlights in each edition up-to-date helpful hints from the counterinsurgency battlefields in 11 Corps Tactical Zone. Study them. Put them to use. Pass them along to others.

Contributions from commanders of all assigned and OPCON units, as well as other organizations receiving the NOTES, including advisors with ARVN units and liaison officers with ROK units, are highly desired and solicited. Pertinent details of "tactical lessons learned" should be recorded as they happen. All contributions submitted should reach this headquarters, by the fifteenth of each month.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DANIEL L. LEDDA
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

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Relocation of Weapons Positions. The enemy attempts to sketch former weapons positions, bunkers and wire of abandoned fire bases. An enemy document captured by one of the battalions showed a detailed, to scale, sketch of one of the fire bases near POLAI KIANG. The sketch showed exact positions of all bunkers, LZ's and wire. The sketch contained arrows showing directions of attack into the firebase. Writing on the sketch indicated that the fire base was at that time vacant, but it is clear that it was being observed in the event of US or ARVN reoccupation. This gives us documented intelligence that our vacant fire bases are being closely observed, studied and reconnoitered, with enemy plans for future attacks being made. Upon reoccupation of a fire base, the location of weapons positions, bunkers and other defensive positions should be changed in so far as it is practical in order to reduce enemy intelligence of our positions.

4th Inf Div
(C) **Expediting Delivery of Defensive Fires.** AHVN artillery units often occupy the same positions for extended periods. Delivery of preplanned fires in defense of the position can be greatly expedited by preparing ammunition with pre-cut fuses. This should be done with beehive and H& rounds to achieve detonation at various ranges in direct fire and for illumination rounds which should be set to illuminate likely areas of approach into the position. Rapid identification of these pre-set rounds can be facilitated by printing the fuse setting on the ogive of the projectile with a bright, colored paint.

DSA, li CTR, SA 22d DTA

(C) **Clearing Impact Areas for Movement of Friendly Troops.** Unexploded "firecracker" artillery ammunition poses a threat to friendly forces that may subsequently move through the impact area. This hazard may be reduced by firing H& artillery rounds into the impact area prior to conducting friendly operations in the vicinity, in order to detonate any duds or tree hanging rounds which could endanger friendly troops moving through the area.

DSA, li CTR, SA 24th STZ
(C) Use of Scout Dogs During Cordon and Search Operations.

To maximize the effectiveness of the scout dogs while searching villages a few simple guidelines should be observed.

1. Work downwind.

2. Have the patrol remove all inhabitants from the houses and place them downwind.

3. Check all houses with the dog to discover if any enemy are hidden between double walls or in tunnels under houses.

4. Check surrounding areas for underground hideouts or caches of weapons.

5. Check along canals, rice paddies, rivers, or lakes for possible hideouts along the banks.

6. Check carefully around pig stys, cattle pens and hay stacks as possible hiding places for caches of weapons and ammunition.

4th Inf Div
(C) Tank-Mounted Mine Roller. The tank-mounted mine roller has proven itself many times over in conducting rapid, efficient sweeps of roads in the AO. The Engineer battalion maintains this unit to answer requests from tactical units which require additional mine sweeping capability. Its effectiveness has been specifically established on roads in this AO.

4th Inf Div

(C) Field Expedient Short Whip Antenna. A substitute whip antenna can be fabricated from existing materials with little maintenance support and provide approximately the same range capabilities as the manufactured short whip antenna. Unit signal personnel fabricated a short whip antenna with the use of metal banding straps from C ration containers and sandbags. The metal straps were cut at the appropriate lengths required. Three straps were cut at a length of 2 feet each. The remaining three sections were cut approximately 7 inches shorter than the previous section. These sections were braided together, with the help of the maintenance support personnel, by using a soldering iron and tying together the section with wire. The rubber connector and the antenna adapter must still be used. The fabricated antenna then sticks into the end of the rubberized connector. Although the banding straps did not permit as much flexibility as the manufactured antenna, they did act as an adequate substitute.

4th Inf Div
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Some units have a Mountain Kit Carson Scout attached. This individual speaks Vietnamese as well as most dialects of Montagnard. In addition, the KCS received military and political training in North Vietnam. When showing movies which are mostly all spoken in Vietnamese, in a Montagnard village, the KCS interprets what is being seen and speaks over a loudspeaker. In addition, while changing reel during and after a propaganda film, the KCS relates his experiences to the people and encourages them to try to influence their VC friends to Chieu Hoi or surrender. The KCS also explains the 3d Party program and the VIP Program. The composite H&HB has met with tremendous success and outstanding reception and has had a record number of VIP participants due to the means of advertising the program.

4th Inf Div

(C) Integration of Kit Carson Scouts and Scout Dogs. The continued use of Kit Carson Scouts and Scout Dogs can provide excellent search and destroy results. It has been found that employing the Kit Carson Scouts together with scout dogs for small unit patrols enhances the ability of the patrol to perform its mission. The advantage of the Kit Carson Scout's knowledge of the terrain coupled with the scout dog's capability to provide sufficient warnings of enemy approach or ambush is an effective combination. Kit Carson Scouts and Scout Dogs should be employed with small unit patrols as often as possible.

4th Inf Div
(C) **Conservation of Barrier Materials.** With barrier materials (concertina, stakes, sandbags, etc.) continuing to be critical items, units have instigated procedures and methods that attempt to conserve on the use of these materials. Barrier materials of all types are retrograded, where possible. Some units have made it SOP for each man to carry ten or more sandbags which will be filled, used, emptied, moved to another firebase and used again until expended. Besides this being good supply economy this allows units to construct overhead covers for foxholes immediately upon occupation of the new location without placing an excessive burden on their resupply lines.

4th Inf Div

(C) **Use of CS to break contact.** Employment of CS gas is a very effective means for a small unit to break contact with a superior force. A favorite NVA tactic is to engage a numerically inferior US force. To counter this tactic, small US forces are instructed to deliver a heavy volume of fire and then attempt to break contact as quickly as possible. Often a small unit has difficulty in breaking the contact. The use of CS grenades can be effective in breaking contact in such a situation. In addition to disorganizing and confusing the enemy, the gas also provides a partial smoke screen which can mask the withdrawal of the US element. Also effective in this role is the WP grenade.

4th Inf Div
(C) **Target Location.** Targets acquired recently by TPS-25 radar have been brought under the mass fire of a Combined Artillery and Air Force Team. When a reading is obtained on the TPS-25 Radar the artillery immediately reacts with fire. The fire support coordinator informs the air-liaison team of the location of the contact. If a Shadow aircraft is available it is diverted to the area. A final round of illumination is fired by the artillery. This gives the Shadow aircraft the location of the contact and provides illumination for an initial visual reconnaissance of the area. If a target is produced the Shadow then utilizes its devices to develop the contact. This has resulted in numerous secondary explosions that would not have otherwise been obtained.

**Task Force South**

(C) **Integrating Operations.** A 11 Corps unit working in support of a Pacification Program is currently utilizing a unique method of integrating operations with Popular Forces. The unit has directed intensive effort into the Combine Action Team concept. This is a US unit of less than platoon size which operates, day and night, with a PF platoon. The impact of the Combined Action Team concept on our national effort and goals is profound: Combined operations are being conducted, RVNAF forces are being improved, security for pacification is being increased, health conditions are being improved and agricultural output is being increased. The concerned villages are fast becoming independent, hard-working communities. The Combined Action Team concept can have the same highly successful results when employed elsewhere.
LRRP's in Pacification Operations. Quite often the value of LRRP teams is overlooked in pacification operations. When employed in their basic mission of gathering intelligence concerning enemy troop concentrations and movement they can be an invaluable asset. In pacification operations friendly forces are usually fragmented into squad and platoon sized units. Swift reaction to an enemy threat depends largely on timely warning which will allow for the concentration of friendly forces to eliminate them.

One ARVN division realizing the importance of LRRPs in the pacification program has augmented their regimental reconnaissance companies with LRRP teams from the division recon company. The regiments have also formed additional patrol elements from assigned personnel who have received LRRP training but have not completed the LRRP certification course. These additional teams provide coverage in each regimental AO and consequently a more effective early warning system.

DSn, II CTZ LRRP Advisor
(C) LRRP Insertions. The essence of LRRP operations is stealth, yet some units have been known to prep an LZ with artillery prior to making a LRRP insertion. This only serves to alert the enemy to an impending insertion and direct them to its location. Security could be effectively provided by having gunships or Tac Air hold in an orbit pattern beyond sight of the LZ, yet close enough to provide immediate fire support if required. Additional security is available by means of preplanned artillery fire that can be delivered on call if contact is made.

DSA, 11 CTZ, LRRP Advisor

(C) VC Tactic Against LRRP's. LRRP teams have noted the enemy employment of new tactics. First, LRRP teams when discovered by hostile civilians, have been encircled by the civilians who then proceeded to beat on sticks revealing the LRRP team's position. Shortly after the drumming stopped, the LRRP team would make contact with the enemy force. Secondly, LRRP teams have noted that they have been observed and then followed by children. When the children disappeared, the LRRP team would make contact shortly thereafter. Thirdly, LRRP teams have noted the enemy employing new search techniques against them once their presence is discovered. The enemy has searched in a file formation utilizing a 10 man unit separated into two man teams moving 25 feet apart.

4th Inf Div
(C) **Change in Unit Organization.** During attack by fire against allied installations a significant change in enemy organization was noted. Recent contacts have indicated that infantry units have received direct support from artillery and sapper elements. Captured documents further indicate that the enemy is attaching artillery and sapper elements to their infantry units providing them with a greater capability, flexibility and mobility.

4th Inf Div
Improving Helicopter Employment

Night medevacs are a fairly common occurrence, yet units still experience difficulty in coordinating the pickup. Most often the problem is simply one of providing illumination for the LZ. In one such situation an infantry unit engaged a small enemy force and took casualties. During the contact they had expended their illumination flares. The medevac ship was on station ready to make the pickup twenty-three minutes after the request for a "dust-off" had been submitted. However, the pickup was delayed an additional twenty to twenty-five minutes due primarily to a lack of illumination. This problem could be solved by having the medevac helicopter carry illumination flares or by sending a second aircraft to drop the flares while the pickup is being made.

DSA, II CTZ, SA 22d DTA
(G) **KBAR/Vampire Flights.** Flight operations called KBAR or Vampire are presently being utilized in IV Corps. These flights consist of a platoon (4) of gunships, a GNC ship, and at least 5 troop carrying helicopters. The KBAR package is made available to provinces on request, to support planned operations in reaction to reliable intelligence of a perishable nature. The Vampire package is employed primarily in night reaction missions with the requesting unit being required to provide a company size unit at a pickup zone. This provides a reaction force with the remainder of the company as reserve should reinforcement be necessary. The Vampire flight is also employed for KBAR type operations, to support normal daytime operations in support of divisions or provinces, to reinforce successful contacts or in an air cavalry role. On a given day the KBAR assets are assigned missions for the following morning and afternoon; the package assigned to the mission based on the lowest priorities of intelligence is designated the Vampire package. This package remains on standby during the night, and if no need arises for its deployment it is employed the following day in its assigned KBAR missions. If the flight is committed during the night, its KBAR missions the following day are cancelled. This concept is recommended for consideration by subordinate units for use in reaction type missions.

1 FORCaV G3
(C) Increased Use of External Loads (UH-1). During the calendar year 1968 several helicopters were damaged or totally destroyed while trying to land in unsuitable landing zones or from trying to hover over the trees and kick out supplies to ground troops that did not have time to prepare suitable landing zones. There has been marked decrease in this type of accident with the increased use of sling loads for resupplying units in areas without suitable landing zones. 4th Inf Div
(C) Marking Landing Zones. Intelligence information acquired during recent operations indicates that VC/NVA units have been instructed to take likely LZ's under indirect fire as soon as smoke is observed in the vicinity of the landing zone. This immediate reaction to the anticipated landing of the helicopters allows the first rounds to impact while the aircraft is on the ground. To counter this enemy tactic some ARVN units are using signal mirrors and marker panels to mark the LZ's. These two devices are effective marking procedures and they are less likely than smoke to alert the enemy to friendly locations and incoming helicopters.

DSA, II CTZ, SA 24th STZ
(C) Combat Helicopter Operations.

a. A CINPAC Security Team reported the following possible sources of enemy prior knowledge:

(1) Air reconnaissance of a LZ has been documented by numerous NV's as one of the indicators used by the VC/NVA to forewarn an impending operation.

(2) In some areas commanders are required to fly to planning and coordination conferences held immediately prior (24-48 hours) to an operation. This influx of numerous helicopters, all bearing distinctive organizational markings, could provide tip-off not only that an operation is being planned, but also what organizations will participate as well as in what TAOR.

(3) Survey revealed that employment of stereotyped insertion techniques, such as artillery preparation and early arrival of command and control helicopters over LZ's, compromise missions.

(4) Use of static nicknames and suffixes in lieu of tactical call signs, e.g. Blackjack 6 for CO, Blackjack 3 for Operations Officer, etc., aid the enemy in maintaining continuity on specific units and key individuals. This practice greatly enhances the enemy's capability to be forewarned of rotary wing operations.

(5) The extensive employment of unit base radio nets for in flight control of their organic aircraft can provide
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a lucrative source of foreknowledge/forewarning to the enemy. Helicopters check in and out with the base radio net for every sortie. Net control is by the Operations Duty Officer of the parent command. All transmissions are in the clear; coordination information which may include fire base locations, frequencies to contact, duration of mission, etc., is passed freely between aircraft and home base to facilitate in-flight shifting of assets.

b. Do not give "Charlie" useful information.

IFFORCEV G3

(C) Use of a Double Point. Because of the thick vegetation and rugged terrain of the Central Highlands, moving troops are vulnerable to ambush. Units have begun using a double point element—an extra precaution against ambushes. The point elements move by alternate bounds, one covering while the other moves ahead to the next vantage point. Thus, an element is always in position to return fire should the lead element discover a kill zone. 4th Inf Div

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TACTICAL
NOTES

I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM

IN THIS ISSUE

* HANDLING OF GRENADES
* VC HABITS
* FINDING SMALL ENEMY UNITS
* PREMATURE DETONATION OF 122 MM ROCKETS

JUNE 1969

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PURPOSE:

In producing TACTICAL NOTES, I FFORCEV Headquarters compiles and highlights in each edition up to date, helpful hints from the counter insurgency battlefields in II Corps Tactical Zone. Study them. Put them to use. Pass them along to others.

Contributions from commanders of all assigned and OPOON units, as well as other organizations receiving the NOTES, including advisors with ARVN units and liaison officers with ROK units, are highly desired and solicited. Pertinent details of "tactical lessons learned" should be recorded as they happen. All contributions submitted should reach this headquarters by the fifteenth of each month.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Daniel Ledda
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

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153 WHEN SEPARATED FROM
CLASSIFIED INCLOSURE
IMPROVING HELICOPTER EMPLOYMENT

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USEFUL REMINDERS

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Collocation of 105mm Section's with an 8"/175mm Unit. A heavy battery not mutually supported by artillery cannot deliver counterfire fast enough with a sufficient volume to suppress enemy mortar attacks. The 105mm section can deliver rapid counterfire while the heavies are employed firing blocking fires for reaction forces deployed to counter ground probes. Additionally, the 105mm provides an excellent self-illumination and Beehive capability. The fire direction of the 105mm is manual and poses no difficulties for the organic FDC. Consideration should be given to the attachment of a 105mm howitzer section to a heavy battery whenever it is positioned outside of friendly artillery range.
(U) Meteorological Support of Artillery Raids. Artillery units which must deploy to areas in which accurate METRO data cannot be obtained should utilize a visual METRO Team. Where organic assets are not available, a request for visual METRO support should be submitted to the appropriate general support artillery unit. While data obtained from the visual section cannot equal that from an electronic section, experience has proven that the first round data is greatly improved by the application of visual MET corrections.

I FORGEV Artillery

(C) Firecracker for Close-In Defense. Red Thrust (artillery raid) positions are usually outside of the range of DS artillery, and sometimes outside of all supporting artillery. Close fire support is especially critical during a raid because of the limited fire power available for the defensive position. It has been noted by the Brigade’s DS artillery that close support can be provided by infantry mortars, if available. If mortars are not available, targets that are below minimum quadrant elevation for HE ammunition can be effectively attacked by utilizing a short fuze setting on Firecracker ammunition.

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(C) Continuous Reconnaissance for Artillery Units. In many areas of the Central Highlands, villagers have been evacuated from their homes and resettled in consolidated villages. Many of these villagers return to their old homesites, especially at times when food is in short supply, or disease appears in the consolidated villages. Homes may be rebuilt at the old village sites or at new locations altogether. Some new villages are located in heavily wooded areas and are difficult to detect by aerial observation. Friendly maneuver elements operating in or firing into previously abandoned areas should conduct frequent detailed visual reconnaissance to insure villages have not been reoccupied or new villages constructed. If villages are detected, insure that the artillery liaison officer and the agency responsible for granting political clearances are informed immediately of these village locations. This practice will help eliminate artillery incidents and preclude maneuver elements from inadvertently directing ground fire into friendly village locations. 4th Inf Div
(c) Interior defense. Sapper infiltrators may succeed in penetrating a perimeter under cover of the initial mortar barrage. Men seeking shelter in bunkers under the shock of the first rounds of incoming mortar fire tend to ignore local defense of bunkers and tents. Sappers take advantage of initial disorganization to throw satchel charges and to fire small arms into shelter bunkers. All troops should be advised not to "play ostrich" when occupying shelter bunkers. Interior guards must be posted at the entrances to the bunkers and near Tactical Operations Centers. Prepared foxholes or bunkerized guard posts are recommended within interior areas and near perimeter bunkers.

4th Inf Div
Use of Trip Flares. Several recent incidents within 4th Division Area of Operations emphasize the need for immediate improvement in the use of trip flares. During an attack on a US firebase, the enemy completely neutralized all trip flares along their routes of entry and exit. The sappers penetrated the perimeter without being detected.

(1) Common VC/NVA techniques used to neutralize trip flares follow:

(a) Replacing safety clip in trip flare.
(b) Slipping a bamboo sheath over the top of trip flares, which prevents movement of the arming lever.
(c) Using wire or twine, tying off the arming lever so that it cannot move.
(d) Cutting the trip wire close to the flare, if the pull-pin arming method was used to arm the flare.
(e) Slipping nails, wire, or bamboo slivers into safety-clip holes.

(2) The following techniques for employing trip flares have proven successful, and if used, will increase their effectiveness:

(a) Check trip flares daily. This is most important. A quick glance will not do the job. Each trip flare must be
thoroughly inspected to detect tampering and insure proper functioning.

(b) Flares must not be placed in a straight line around the perimeter. They should be emplaced in an irregular manner to confuse the enemy as to their location.

(c) Flares employed outside the tactical wire must be removed each morning and replaced in a different area each evening. Also employ flares in different locations inside the perimeter.

(d) Trip wires should be strung at varying heights, i.e., ground level, waist level, and neck level; and at varying angles to the trip flare.

(e) Place trip flares where the enemy does not expect them, such as unlikely approaches or at a distance beyond the perimeter.

(f) Use some trip flares in pairs, connecting them with one trip wire. The enemy may disarm one, but not discover the other.

(g) Secure trip flares at ground level within the tactical wire, conceal them, and attach short trip wires to the tactical wire. Any disturbance of the wire should activate the flare.

(h) Keep the number of engineer stake mounted flares to a minimum. They are easy to spot. Once the enemy knows
where the flare is, he can disarm it.

(i) Use the trigger arming device, not just the pull pin. The trigger device will activate with either pull or pressure release. A 50-50 mix of pull and trigger device is recommended.

(3) Techniques outlined above are by no means all inclusive. Use your own imagination in employing trip flares. Remember to check them, conceal them, and put them in unexpected places. 4th Inf Div

(C) Bunker Silhouette. Bunkers built throughout II Corps, with some exceptions, are built above ground level. Although this sometimes is necessary to provide for better fields of fire and observation, their high silhouette also affords enemy sappers a very lucrative target. A smaller number of these bunkers strategically located, and augmented with a larger number of lower silhouetted bunkers placed along the outer perimeter, will not only provide for mutual protection, but offer a smaller target for enemy B40 rockets and other similar weapons.

DSA, II CTZ, G3 Advisor
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(C) Deception with Antennas. The platoon leader of a mechanized platoon has two antennas on his command armored personnel carrier. One mechanized unit has been obtaining unserviceable antennas to provide all personnel carriers and scout jeeps with two antennas so that the enemy cannot detect the command track.

4th Inf Div

(C) Premature Detonation of 122mm Rockets. During recent intense firing of 122mm rockets against Dak To it was found that a standoff screen, P5P or chain link barrier normally used around and on top of bunkers, will prematurely detonate 122mm rockets. This has proven to be a tremendous advantage in protection against rockets set for instantaneous or delayed action detonation. In an actual hit against a standoff screen position 4 feet from a bunker the 122 rocket detonated upon contact with the screen. The result was immediate detonation with some fragments and the rocket motor passing through the screen resulting in minor damage to the bunker and slight injury to personnel. Investigation revealed that the screen caused the rocket to detonate, thus preventing a direct hit on the bunker and minimizing damage and casualties.

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Finding Small Enemy Units. Armored cavalry troops often have difficulty in locating small enemy units. The enemy is warned of the cavalry's presence by the noise and dust created by the tracked vehicles. On two separate occasions, an ARVN ACAV troop swept through their AO with negative contact. On both operations they ran into terrain barriers which forced them to circle back and cross the original route of maneuver. In each case, enemy troops were caught in the open, less than 20 meters from the route that the unit had used to move into the area. The enemy, assuming that the threat had passed, was completely surprised when the APC's reappeared. This tactic of doubling back and crossing the route of march in an assault formation is now being employed as a standard tactic in this unit.

DSA, II CTZ, G3 Advisor
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(C) Maintenance of Fire Superiority During Attacks on Fortified Positions. A common Viet Cong tactic when occupying well fortified positions, during an attack by armored units, is to remain in their positions until the armored vehicles have stopped within the objective area. When attacking such a position, the assaulting armor vehicles are normally deployed in a line formation for maximum firepower to the front. The crew served weapons fire continuously during the assaulting phase and intermittently during the consolidation phase. The Viet Cong thus wait in their positions until the friendly crew served weapons have expended their ammunition on the suppressive fires during the assault and the crews are in the process of reloading. During this vulnerable period the Viet Cong attack with anti-tank weapons at a very short range. This problem can be solved by attacking, using fire and movement to hit the front and flank of the position simultaneously rather than launching a frontal assault with all vehicles firing suppressive fires. This causes the enemy to defend in two directions, thus preventing him from concentrating his fire. The attacking force can then gain fire superiority without firing continuously and expending their ammunition during the assault phase of the attack. After the objective has been seized, at least one vehicle in each platoon is then designated to cover the consolidation force and to attack any position which has not been eliminated.

DSA, II CTZ, SA 22d Div

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(C) Route and LZ Reconnaissance by LRRP. LRRP's are being used extensively to gather information concerning enemy units. However, LRRP's can and should be used more often to conduct route reconnaissance for mechanized forces prior to their entry into an AO. Too often, information concerning terrain and trafficability must be obtained through aerial reconnaissance which usually indicates to the enemy that an operation will soon be conducted in the area. The LRRP's can also be used to warn the main body of ambushes and keep them informed of the location and deployment of the enemy during the operation. Pathfinder teams, augmented by LRRP's can perform this same function in airmobile operations by checking out landing zones prior to the assault and, if the enemy poses no immediate threat to the assault group then the artillery preparation can be omitted, thus gaining some element of surprise on entering the AO.

DSA, II CTZ, G3 Advisor
Determining Direction of Fire from Unlocated Source.

Often when a friendly position comes under mortar and/or rocket attack only one or two people of the unit have the launch site under observation. The immediate tendency of most personnel is to open fire in all directions. Also, invariably everyone in the area will attempt to transmit on the radio making it very difficult to establish communications with the person or persons who have visual contact with the enemy position. Fire control is necessary. Prior instruction should be given to all friendly elements that only those positions which can observe enemy locations should open fire. The first act of the commander should be to request that all units which have observed the enemy positions report all pertinent information to him. By following this procedure much confusion is eliminated, and a quick and accurate fire can be placed on the enemy positions.

173d Abn Bde
(C) VC Patterns. 3/503d Abn Inf nas, in the past, given RF/PF locations a wide berth to prevent contact between friendly units. However, recent experience has shown that the VC knowingly operate within RF/PF AO's and sometimes very close to RF/PF outposts. Some VC units are deriving security by establishing base camps or conducting operations close to static RF/PF posts. Allied operations should not avoid RF/PF posts on the assumption that the surrounding area will be free of VC. TF South
VC Habits. Since April, elements of TF 3/506th have been conducting pair-off operations with RF/PF units in conjunction with revolutionary development projects in and around villages and hamlets. At night, ambushes are conducted in the outlying areas. During this period several observations have been made of VC habits. Local guerrillas have established the pattern of living in the hamlets at night. The guerrillas normally enter the village in groups of two and three and leave prior to first light. Although the VC are accustomed to moving along trails at night, they are not experienced in night combat when unexpectedly engaged by US/ARVN forces. On many occasions, the VC are very nonchalant, traveling almost exclusively on trails. When engaged at night, VC tend to become disorganized, panic and flee. The presence of friendly forces has not precluded the VC from attempting to enter villages at night; however, once they are aware that US/ARVN units are in the area, they shift from using the major trails.
Change in Enemy Artillery Tactics. During attacks by fire against allied installations in the early part of May 1969, significant changes were noted in the enemy's tactics in that many suspected firing locations were much closer to the target than had been previously observed. The enemy, in the past, has quite often fired 122mm rockets from maximum ranges (approximately 11 kilometers) but has recently been observed firing from ranges of 3,000 to 4,000 meters. This observation was also noted in the firing of mortars. Mortar firing positions (82mm) were reported within 1,000 meters of targets. This points out the necessity for increasing close-in security through patrolling and observation posts.
Helicopter Adjustment. When armed helicopters have been employed in support of a unit in contact it has been noted that improper adjustment procedures have hampered rapid employment. Commanders and small unit leaders who employ armed helicopters in support of combat operations should be familiar with the correct procedures for directing the aircraft. It has been noted in recent enemy contacts that vital time was lost while control personnel on the ground attempted to explain to the pilots of the supporting aircraft where the enemy and friendly positions were located. S3 staff sections should coordinate with aviation units and organize classes for commanders and small unit leaders on armed helicopter employment to be given during periods of stand down or preparation for future operations. Small unit leaders should become familiar with USARV Regulation 95-26 and also be afforded the opportunity to fly in an armed helicopter to more fully understand what the pilot needs to know to engage enemy targets and to better understand the capabilities and limitations of the aircraft.

TF South
(C) Booby Trap Reminder. The curious American is a collector of war souvenirs. A popular souvenir is the VC flag. On several occasions, a heavily Viet Cong infested coffee plantation had a Viet Cong flag displayed over a wooden arch at the entrance. Two operations were conducted in this area and on each one, the Viet Cong flag was hauled down. On the third trip into the area at a later date, five friendly troops were wounded, one seriously, when an attempt was made to remove the Viet Cong flag. A wire attached to the wooden arch and flag detonated a grenade in a nearby tree. Troops must be continually cautioned against souvenir collecting and to consider them to be booby trapped. Souvenir items such as flags, should not be touched under any circumstances until it has definitely been determined that it is safe to handle.

DSA, II CTZ, G3 Advisor
Handling of Grenades. Several accidents have occurred when personnel attempted to correct the slippage of the striker pivot pin on the M26 hand grenade. This pin, located just forward of the safety pin, is force fitted into the fuze assembly during production and held in position by the snugness of the fit. However, it has recently been observed that several striker pivot pins have worked their way partly out of the fuze assembly. If this occurs, a possibility exists that the travel of the striker will be affected sufficiently that the striker may not contact the cap when released and the grenade will fail to detonate. Accordingly, all grenades should be visually inspected before any operation and at frequent intervals during operations to insure the striker pivot pin is correctly seated. If the pin is discovered to be improperly seated (protrudes from the fuze assembly) the grenade should be destroyed in place as soon as possible. Under NO circumstances will personnel attempt to reseat the pin, as any tampering may allow sufficient clearance for the striker to fall, resulting in an inaudible initiation of the firing train and subsequent unexpected detonation.

173d Abn Bde
(U) **Accidental Discharge of M-60 Machine Guns.** When the M-60 Machine Gun is carried with ammunition loaded, it is not uncommon for the safety lever to be on the fire position either through neglect or contact with dense jungle foliage. Accidental discharges have been known to occur when the trigger is struck by brush or the gunner's equipment. Regardless, the weapon must be loaded if it is to be capable of being put into action or engage the fleeing targets common to guerrilla warfare. To remedy this danger, the gun can be carried in the "half cock" position. The bolt is pulled back and the chamber is inspected to insure that the weapon is clear. The feed tray cover is then closed. The bolt is eased forward so that it is no longer in the firing position. The ammunition is then fed into the weapon until it clicks into place. The weapon cannot be fired accidentally, but can be put into action simply by pulling the bolt to the rear and placing the selector in the fire position. 173d Abn Bde
Effectiveness of Persistent CS. Persistent CS has been effectively employed to restrict the enemy's use of terrain, assembly areas, and lines of communication. Persistent CS-2 was employed on 28 March 1969 to contaminate seven abandoned villages to prevent re-entry by unprotected personnel. Caution is required when returning to areas of CS operations. On 1 June 1969 a UH-1 helicopter touched down in a contaminated area and was forced to reposition upwind a considerable distance away when it was discovered the agent was still active even after several heavy rains. This incident illustrates the persistency of CS and the need for a record of all persistent drops to be maintained at brigade level to insure troop insertions are not delayed in the process because of failure of pilots or crews to carry protective masks.

Infantry Units Test Firing Weapons. Infantry units have been test firing their automatic weapons from the primary, alternate and secondary positions. This effectively denies the enemy knowledge of the number of weapons actually positioned on the defense perimeter. Test firing automatic weapons from more than one position gives the appearance of a stronger perimeter.
Preplanned Fires. A simple reminder of common tactics is sometimes necessary to combat the enemy. During a recent heavy contact with NVA units in Kontum Province, the enemy attempted to move within the aircraft minimum safe distance zone to avoid an air strike. Preplanned use of Claymore mine, M-72 Anti-Tank Rocket and the M-79 Grenade was instrumental in causing a large number of kills while repulsing the attack. All troops should be reminded to make maximum use of preplanned organic fires within the minimum safe distance zones in order to counter enemy "hugging" tactics.

DSA, II CTZ, SA 24th STZ
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, I Field Force Vietnam

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May 69 to 31 July 69.

CG, I Field Force Vietnam

15 August 1969

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

180

N/A

N/A

UNCLASSIFIED

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA

HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

Security Classification

CONFIDENTIAL

ORIGINATING ACTIVITY

(EORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)

(DESIGNATION OF THE REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION)

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP

4

REPORT TITLE

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, I Field Force Vietnam

DESCRIPTION OF REPORT (Type of report and include date)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May 69 to 31 July 69.

AUTHORITY (First name, middle initials, last name)

CC, I Field Force Vietnam

REPORT DATE

15 August 1969

TOTAL NO. OF PAGES

180

NO. OF REF.

N/A

PROJECT NO.

N/A

OTHER REPORT NO. (Any other number that may be assigned this report)

N/A

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

N/A

SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

ABSTRACT

N/A

DD FORM 1473

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification