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AGDA (M) (29 Oct 69) FOR \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam,

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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## 1. SECTION I - SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2g 91</td>
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1. Section I - SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

a. (C) General:

(1) During May, June and July 1969, United States Forces, Free World Military Forces and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam continued to conduct operations in the III CTZ. The major combat action of the report period was the Battle of Ben Het - Dak To that occurred in Northern Kontum Province during the period 5 May - 25 Jun 1969. In Binh Dinh Province the 173d Abn Bde continued its pacification efforts in Operation WASHINGTON GRFN. Enemy activity throughout the Corps area was generally light with the exception of Ben Het - Dak To. An adjustment of forces in the southern provinces was accomplished by placing the 2nd Squadron, 1st Cavalry OPCON to Task Force South and moving the Task Force headquarters from Dalet to LZ Betty in the vicinity of Phan Thiet.

(2) Friendly losses for the period were 1,228 KIA, 5,021 WIA, and 1,444 MIA. Enemy losses were 6,451 KIA, 5,468 PW's and 200 (military) Ho Chi Chanhs.

b. (C) Intelligence:

(1) General. Intelligence operations during the quarter ending 31 July was again directed toward supporting Allied units engaged in pacification and conventional military action. Continued improvement was noted in the collection and processing of information concerning enemy political activity and the pacification aspects of the war. Additionally, the intelligence organization furnished Allied units with the intelligence necessary to counter the Communists' Summer Offensive and the major enemy effort in the Ben Het/Dak To area. Significant steps were taken during the period to fully integrate both political/pacification intelligence and large unit intelligence.

(2) Enemy Order of Battle.

(a) Disposition of NVA, VC Main Forces and VC Local Forces is shown at Inclosure 1.

(b) Changes in Order of Battle holdings during the period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units Accepted</th>
<th>Confirmed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28th NVA Regiment</td>
<td>1400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th NVA Regiment</td>
<td>1705</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AVFA-QU-OT


K-394 NVA Artillery Battalion Probable 750
(K-34 Artillery Bn and K-39 NVA Bn combined)

D-251 Mobile Battalion Possible 300

2 Units Removed:
200C Infiltration Battalion Possible 230

5th NVA Division Headquarters Confirmed 700

406th Sapper Battalion Probable 75

(3) Significant Enemy Tactics and Techniques. The communists initiated their Summer Offensive on 8 May. The initial high point was generally Corps wide and occurred on 11 - 12 May. Thereafter the offensive was characterized by brief flurries of apparently uncoordinated enemy activity, except in Kontum Province. In the Ban Het/Dak To area the enemy massed a near divisional size force and engaged in protracted combat operations for nearly two months. It is believed that this action had the dual objective of drawing off Allied forces from priority pacification areas, and destroying confidence in ARVN's combat capabilities. Throughout the rest of the Corps the enemy mounted sporadic attacks, primarily against pacification entities and RF/PF units. Significant was the month long burst of activity in the normally dormant III Corps. This sudden increase in initiative was coupled with the introduction of 107mm rockets into Binh Thuan and Tuyen Quang Provinces. This same weapon appeared in the Coastal province and was employed in an 8 July attack on installations at Cam Ranh Bay. Enemy troops withdrew from the Kontum area during the last week in June, and July saw a virtual stand down by major enemy units. Of significance is an apparent shift in enemy organization for combat. Reports have indicated the formation of task forces. The enemy has been noted increasing the use of small teams to attack medium sized targets; for example, employing a platoon to probe company and at times battalion positions. This tactic would be ideal for use by a task force, attempting to infiltrate sappers under cover of artillery attacks. If a significant breach in the defenses was obtained, infantry elements could be used to exploit the initial success.

(4) Enemy Losses and Strengths.

(a) Enemy losses during the period (DOW is 35% of KIA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>DOW</th>
<th>RF</th>
<th>H&amp;I</th>
<th>Okalh (military)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>2864</td>
<td>1002</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>1080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>2388</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>1599</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>643</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(b) Enemy strength at the beginning and end of the quarter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 February 1969</th>
<th>30 April 1969</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NVA</td>
<td>11,345</td>
<td>12,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LF/MF</td>
<td>10,310</td>
<td>10,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin</td>
<td>5,275</td>
<td>4,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrilla</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>10,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>14,320</td>
<td>17,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>54,230</strong></td>
<td><strong>50,230</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The increase in enemy strength during the period is directly attributable to the arrival of two new regiments (the 10th and 28th NVA Regiments) in II Corps.

(5) Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities and Probable Courses of Action.

(a) Capabilities:

1. In Kontum Province the enemy has, perhaps, the greatest and most varied set of capabilities within the II CTZ. He can conduct standoff attacks or combination standoff/sapper attacks against US/Allied installations and Kontum City, employing mortars of up to 120mm, 75mm recoilless rifles and rockets of up to 122mm. 85mm/100mm/105mm artillery may be employed against installations near the Cambodian border. He may conduct ground attacks against friendly installations in up to multi-regimental strength with division level support in the vicinity of Dak To and Ben Het, and he may interdict Highways QL 14N and 512, as well as other friendly LOC. The enemy can restrict friendly air activity with fire from small arms, automatic weapons, 12.7mm, 14.5mm and 37mm anti-aircraft weapons, and he has a limited armor threat in the vicinity of Ben Het.

2. Pleiku Province is also confronted with a variety of enemy capabilities to include: selective attacks on Pleiku City, Plei Djereng, Plei Me, Plei Krông, Duoc Co CIDO Camps or Kep Băng, Than An and Le Trung in multi-battalion strength, supported by mortar, rocket and recoilless rifle fire; attack Pleiku City, US/ARVN bases, CIDO Camps, district headquarters and resettlement areas using 82mm mortar, recoilless rifle and 122mm/140mm rocket fire and sappers; set ambushes along QL 15M and QL 14, supported by 75mm recoilless rifle and 60mm/82mm mortar fire; attack LOCs 509, TL6C, 437, TL7C and LZL 7B with VC elements using antitank grenades, recoilless rifle and mortar fire. The possibility of a limited armor and artillery capability exists in the vicinity of Duc Co.

3. In Daklak Province the enemy is capable of attacking the district headquarters of Buon Ho and Lao Thien and isolated hamlets in up to reinforced battalion strength. He can conduct ambushes and harassing activities along Highways QL 14 and QL 21 and attack Ban Me Thuot City with a multi-battalion force employing 75mm recoilless rifle, 60mm/82mm/120mm mortars and 122mm rockets.

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In Quang Duc Province the enemy can conduct attacks by fire and ground attacks against Gia Nghia, Duc Lap, Khoi Co and Bu Prang.

In Lam Dong Province the enemy has the ability to conduct attacks by fire on Allied installations and hamlet defenses in up to battalion strength and continue attempts to interdict QL 20.

In Tuyen Duc Province the enemy, employing 82mm mortars and 107mm rockets, can conduct standoff and sapper attacks on GVN and US installations and ground attacks on these targets in up to battalion strength.

In Ninh Thuan Province the enemy can conduct attacks by fire on Allied installations and hamlet defenses in up to battalion strength, continue attempts to interdict QL 11, and attack Phan Rang Air Base with 107mm/140mm rockets.

In Binh Thuan Province the enemy is able to conduct attacks by fire, employing 82mm mortars and 107mm rockets, and strike hamlet defenses and Allied installations in up to battalion strength.

In Khanh Hoa Province the enemy can conduct company-size attacks against Cheo Reo and district headquarters.

In Binh Dinh Province the enemy has the capability to attack the population centers, US/GVN/ROKA installations and units in multi-battalion strength, and can restrict movement on Highways QL 1 and QL 19 by employing ambushes and mines or conducting standoff attacks and raids against friendly convoys and installations on and along those routes. The enemy is capable of conducting sapper and terrorist activities against friendly installations along the seacoast.

The enemy can employ chemical agents, using various delivery systems, during any attack.

The enemy can withdraw forces to base areas and sanctuaries for replacements, resupply and retraining.

The enemy can continue disruption of the GVN nation-building effort by assassinations, kidnapping and other terrorist acts.

The enemy is capable of entering outlying villages without opposition or as a result of minor contact to conduct propaganda lectures, recruit personnel, impress civilians as laborers/porters and to obtain provisions and information.

The enemy can establish limited political entities, i.e., People's Revolutionary Committees in contested and VC controlled areas.
The enemy has the ability to reinforce with reserves located in sanctuaries in the Cambodian, Laotian, I CTZ and II CTZ border areas. Some enemy units which are currently active in I CTZ and III CTZ could be expected to redeploy to II CTZ, if the enemy shifts his area of interest to II CTZ. Size of reserves or reinforcements in sanctuaries is not known.

The enemy is capable of employing combinations of the above capabilities.

(b) Vulnerabilities:

1 Enemy supply areas are generally insecure, rendering supply caches vulnerable to friendly search and destroy operations.

2 The enemy has limited logistical support and cannot conduct extended offensive operations, unless he is near sanctuary areas.

3 He is vulnerable to superior Allied fire-power when he masses near an objective and during withdrawal from the same.

4 Low morale exists in many units owing to food shortages, sickness, heavy losses and continuing defeats. Thus the enemy is susceptible to friendly psychological operations.

5 Enemy reliance on local civilians as a labor source makes larger operations vulnerable to friendly intelligence efforts.

(c) Probable Courses of Action:

1 The enemy's most probable course of action in the next quarter is to mount another corps wide offensive. It is probable that this offensive will be initiated in the early to mid-August time frame after the July standdown. Following previous tactics it is expected that the enemy will pose a major threat in the Highlands in an attempt to draw Allied forces from the Coastal area. There are indications that the enemy may spread his forces to several Highland areas as opposed to his normal massive threat in the Tri-Border area. The most likely second area is Ben Ho Thuot. In the coming offensive it is believed that the Communists will take more aggressive action along the populous coast. Increased sapper, terrorist and stand-off attacks against Allied installations in metropolitan areas are considered a definite possibility. Employment of the to date relatively idle enemy regiments in Binh Dinh and Phu Yen Provinces against pacification and suburban targets is likely.

2 In Kontum Province, local forces are expected to carry the offensive effort while major NVA units refit and resupply for another offensive. Mining of the LOCs and harassing incidents, as well as increased antipacification actions will constitute the bulk of enemy activity. As yet there are few indications of any NVA offensive in Kontum, though major units are thought to be in the Tri-Border area and can deploy rapidly.

3 In Pleiku Province, enemy activity is expected to continue at a relatively low level with attacks by fire and harassing incidents predominant. Province LF units will carry the offensive until the 4th NVA Regiment and cooperating units are ready to begin combat operations again in the Plei An Gia-Pleiku area.
In Daklak Province, LF units are expected to continue with harassment and anti-pacification activity. The K394 Battalion is expected to conduct operations against Ban Me Thuot and Lac Thien as in the past.

In Phu Bon Province, there has been very light enemy action, and the same types and level of activity is anticipated unless enemy forces are augmented. Mining, attacks by fire against district headquarters and general harassment of pacification efforts is expected to constitute enemy activity.

In Quang Duc Province, it is anticipated that Local Force units will maintain a low level of activity unless NVA units infiltrate the area. The K394 Artillery Battalion appears to be targeted against Ban Me Thuot though it bases its operations from the Daklak-Quang Duc border. No change is expected in current enemy targeting unless some new and more lucrative target, such as increased friendly use of QL 14 or LTL 6B, appears.

In Lam Dong Province the enemy will probably continue to limit ground operations to units of platoon to company strength and to launch standoff attacks against RF/PF units, GVN district headquarters, ARVN and US installations, particularly around Bao Loc and Di Linh.

In Ninh Thuan Province enemy forces can be expected to conduct ground attacks in squad to platoon strength and to utilize standoff attacks against GVN and US installations employing rockets and mortars. Local Force units can be expected to continue mining and sabotage activity. Enemy objective will probably continue to be RF/PF forces and Allied installations in the Phan Rang area, particularly around Phan Rang Air Base.

While the enemy is capable of multi-battalion attacks in Binh Chuan Province, he is more likely to conduct platoon and company-size attacks. RF/PF units, district headquarters and isolated ARVN and US forces remain prime targets for limited ground operations, and standoff attacks, particularly in Thien Giao and Kien Thuan Districts.

In Tuyen Duc Province the enemy is likely to conduct ground attacks against RF/PF and lightly defended hamlets and emphasize rocket and mortar attacks against Allied installations particularly around Dalat.

In Binh Dinh Province, the probable course of enemy action will be to continue harassing attacks and terrorist activities against allied installations and populated centers. There is, however, the possibility that the enemy has completed his resupply and refitting and is capable of more aggressive attacks.

In Phu Yen Province the 10th Regiment may attempt to mount an attack in the Tuy Hoa Basin Area in the near future. However, the enemy will probably continue harassing activity and small scale isolated ground probes and attacks by fire as they regroup.

In Khanh Hoa Province attacks by fire and possibly a sapper attack in the Cam Ranh Bay or Nha Trang area are the most probable courses of action by the enemy.


(a) Changes in Sources, Agencies, and Techniques. During the quarter the 1 FFORC&V G2 Operations division was reorganized to meet shifting requirements for intelligence analysis. The new organization places increased emphasis on analysis of low level intelligence required in pacification operations. It is structured to provide additional support to the district and province organizations as well as the Field Force and other military commanders. A communications system for the rapid reporting of incidents and dissemination of intelligence will be instituted during the next quarter. No sacrifice of intelligence capabilities directed toward major enemy units has occurred. Rather, intelligence on all enemy entities has been integrated to provide a continuous picture of the enemy situation in the corps.

(b) G2 Air:

1. During the quarter the G2 Air continued to make available a OV-1 Mohawk aircraft from the 225th Surveillance Airplane Company to the 4th Infantry Division, 173d Brigade and Task Force South. One aircraft is flown daily to the 4th Infantry Division while the 173d Brigade and Task Force South receive one aircraft every other day.

2. Comments from the participants in this program have been very favorable and it continues to be one of the most responsive photographic systems available in II CTZ. During the last part of the quarter an additional OV-1 aircraft was allocated to support requirements of the senior province advisor in Quang Duc Province. The aircraft reports every other day to the Gia Ngia airstrip.

3. During the last half of the quarter the program was hampered by the large number of missions cancelled or aborted due to unfavorable weather encountered during the monsoon period.

4. During the reporting period the 225th Surveillance Airplane Company continued to provide SLAR coverage along the border areas in accordance with the MACV Recce Plan requirements. In-flight reports were made to supported units and readout of imagery was passed to G2 Air and FS(i, FFOECEV.

5. During the last month of the reporting period HQ Task Force South was relocated and the Infra-Red Ground Sensor Terminal Team which supports that headquarters is in the process of relocating in order to continue support.

6. The preponderance of aerial reconnaissance and surveillance assets were concentrated along known or suspected infiltration routes. A close and continuous watch is kept on road and trail complexes for any indication of use or repair and improvement of these routes. Extensive reconnaissance and surveillance was also devoted to areas selected by the G2 for intensive reconnaissance efforts. During the last
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During the latter part of July plans were formulated by G2 Air and action was taken to plan a Reconnaissance Working Conference in early August. G2/S2 Air representatives from the major subordinate elements of I FFORCEN plus representatives from II Corps and ROK FFORCEN are expected to attend. The major objective of the conference will be to present a thorough orientation on the aerial surveillance and reconnaissance, program in I FFORCEN and to familiarize G2/S2 Air personnel with the assets available to them and recommendations on how they may best be utilized. Discussions of problem areas will be encouraged and recommendations solicited as to how to make the present system more responsive and effective.

During the period 1 May through 31 July a total of 6,330 Vn sorties were flown with an average of 42 OV-1 aircraft. The VR missions resulted in a total of 509 air strikes, 252 artillery missions and 589 ground actions in I FFORCEN. In addition 202 VR sorties were flown with OV-1 aircraft. The OV-1 aircraft flew 115 photo, 5,831 infra-red and 255 smoke missions during the reporting period. The Air Force flew 3334 infra-red and photo targets in 1554 sorties. The results of the completed missions were furnished the Commanders concerned.

During the period 1 May - 31 July 1969 all captured weapons and matériel was processed and evacuated through IFFORCEN channels. During the period, 240 teams were processed and classified 323 documents, and as a result of these interrogations a total of 115 weapons and mux were produced and distributed. Captured documents were secured and 36,000 feet of documents were forwarded to CDAO for further action. IFFORCEN teams translated a total of 103 enemy documents.

Detachment D, 1st Div (En) (d). During the period 1 May 1969 through 31 July 1969, Detachment D, 1st Div (En) (d) interpreted 1,905 photographs objectives (477,532 prints) and prepared 2 reports which contained 1,217 items of significance. The reproduction section processed 183,913 feet of paper to meet the requirement of 384 reproduction requests. The delivery section flew 63 sorties in support of all Free World Air Forces in I FFORCEN, transporting 10,360 pounds of cargo. Hand-held photographic missions continued to receive emphasis within the Detachment's overall operation. It flew 57 hand-held missions resulting in 337 developed prints. During the period, Detachment D, 1st Div (En) (d) conducted two hand-held photographic courses at Nha Trang, one course at Kontum and supervised one course at Pleiku. These courses resulted in the training of 29 US Army and 14 Air Force personnel.

55th MI Detachment (Corps). For the period 1 May 1969 through 31 July 1969, the 55th Military Intelligence Detachment, Language Interpretation Section, received 485 in-country missions and processed 420. In addition, 5 French Leave Missions were processed. A total of 56 Special Photo Interpretation Reports were submitted, the following was accomplished by this section.

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SUBJ: Operational Report of Headquarters, I FFORC EV for Quarterly Period ending 31 July 1969, RG5 CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

1. Partially completed three area studies covering approximately 4,375 square kilometers. Work continues on these areas.

2. Interpreted numerous missions covering the NVA road network and border area, and provided current information on these areas to the G2 Air, DASC Alpha and 64th Engineers Detachment (R).

3. Maintained updated master plates covering the II Corps Tactical Zone in support of the 64th Engineer Det (R).

4. Constructed mosaics for requestors.

5. Briefed six visitors during the last quarter.

(f) Company C (Ranger), 75th Infantry. During the reporting period, Company C (Ranger), 75th Infantry conducted operations in five separate areas. Throughout the reporting period, from two to four platoons have been available to the 173d Airborne Brigade to support pacification efforts in northern Binh Dinh Province. From 30 April through 6 May 1969, one platoon conducted operations in support of the 6h Infantry Division in the la Drang Valley to detect enemy movement along this infiltration route. From 17 May through 28 May, two platoons, under I FFORC EV control, conducted operations in the To Hop/Ba Can area in support of the 9th ROK Infantry Division. From 5 to 15 July, two platoons conducted divisionary and intelligence operations in support of the Capital ROK Infantry Division in the HUB area. From 21 to 31 July, two platoons supported Task Force South with operations targeted against known enemy base areas in Binh Than Province.

(2) The 64th Engineer Detachment. During the quarter the detachment accomplished the following tasks:

1. Compiled and overprinted forty (40) 1:100,000 scale map sheets with infiltration routes throughout II CTZ. Distribution on this study was completed during the period.

2. Updated and overprinted seventy four (74) 1:50,000 scale map sheets with tactical data information throughout II CTZ. Distribution on this portion of the project has been completed. Work is continuing on updating and overprinting the remaining seventy two (72) map sheets and distribution will be initiated upon completion of the overprinting.

3. Continued to produce terrain studies in anticipation of future tactical operations.

4. Work was initiated on a terrain study of the area surrounding the city of Djalat. This study was requested by the senior advisor at the National Military Academy of Vietnam for use as a training aid in terrain instruction in the curriculum. One liaison visit has been made to the Academy and the project is 50% complete as of the end of the reporting period.

5. Work was completed on a II CTZ briefing map. This map consists of 11 1:250,000 map sheets which when assembled will be 45" x 96".

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1 FORCEN for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

The overprint shows province names and boundaries, cities and CIDG camps, and prominent land features. Also on this map is an easy guide for locating 1:50,000 scale map sheets.

6 During the period indicated, the third edition of the yearly updated lines of Communication Study was completed. This study consists of nine 1:250,000 map sheets. Each overprinted map sheet has the location and bridge number of bridges and road condition of highways in the 11 CTZ. Bridge designation and other pertinent information is displayed graphically on the reverse of each sheet.

7 Collection of aerial and ground photographic coverage of major 11 CTZ road bridges was completed during this reporting period.

(h) Detachment 31, 5th Weather Squadron. During this period the following types of weather support were furnished to agencies and units in 11 CTZ:

1 1 FORCEN: Forecasting, Staff Support, Climatological Support and Mobile Observation Teams.

2 5th Infantry Division: Forecasting, Staff Support, Observing and Climatological Support.

3 An Khe: Observations and forecasts as required.

4 Juliet (Cam Ly airfield): Observations and forecasts as required.

5 English Ai: Observations and forecasts as required.

6 Phan Thiet Ai: Observations and forecasts.

7 Task Force South: Forecasting and Climatological Support.

(e) Deviations from current Intelligence Doctrine: None

(9) Recommendations for New Techniques and Changes in Doctrine and/or Organization: None.

(10) Weather.

(a) General. The southwest monsoon set in over II Corps during May and continued through July giving generally cloudy and wet weather to the interior and fairly good weather to the coastal area.

(b) Coastal. From 1 May through 20 May light southerly flow dominated the II CTZ giving generally fair skies with a few thunderstorms over the mountains near the coast in the late afternoon and evening. A few of these storms would move off of the mountains occasionally and drop about one inch of rain over the populated areas. This gave an average rainfall total by 20 May of around 2 inches on the northern half of the coast to very little rainfall in the Phan Rang area. With the onset of
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The Southwest Monsoon about 21 May generally fair skies continued over the coastal area with an occasional increase in afternoon thunderstorm activity when strong surges in the southwest monsoon occurred. Most of the significant surges were associated with cyclonic disturbances in the South China Sea such as Typhoon Tess and lesser systems and lasted for two to four days. During these periods the skies were partly cloudy to cloudy with scattered late afternoon and evening rainshowers and thunderstorms. General monthly rainfall totals along the coast at reporting stations were from two to five inches.

(c) Interior. Before the onset of the southwest monsoon, the skies in the interior were generally partly cloudy with fog in the morning and scattered to few afternoon and evening thunderstorms. The thunderstorms, which were concentrated in the southern highlands and the southern slopes of the northern highlands, contained an average of one inch of rainfall in each storm. After 21 May the southwest monsoon had firmly set in and the skies in the interior became mostly cloudy with occasional periods in the late afternoon and evening of partly cloudy conditions. Frequently visibilities were reduced in the late night and early morning to less than one mile in fog, rain, and drizzle. Few rainshowers and thunderstorms also occurred during the afternoon and evening hours. The only significant variation in this pattern occurred when cyclonic disturbances formed in the South China Sea. Generally speaking when they were south of Tuy Hoa the weather deteriorated rapidly to conditions of continued cloudiness with rain, drizzle and fog almost all day as well as heavy afternoon rainshowers. Rainfall dramatically increased during this time period in the LZ Oasis to Pleiku area with LZ Oasis receiving nearly 20 inches in May, nearly 14 inches in June and over 36 inches of rainfall in July. Camp Enari received almost 9 inches in May, over 10 inches in June and over 27 inches of rainfall in July. These were the heaviest rainfalls recorded and the rest of the interior received from 5 to 10 inches each month.

(d) Effects on Operations. There were 292 TAG sorties cancelled due to weather and 2749 reconnaissance sorties cancelled due to weather during the period. No other effects are known.

c. (C) Operations and Training Activities.

(1) Plans: During the reporting period, one OPLAN, one LOI and five Studies were published. In addition, one Senior Commanders' Conference was held.

(a) Plans: OPLAN 69-69, concerned with Post hostilities Planning in II CTZ was published on 3 Jul 69. Further discussion of the OPLAN is precluded by the classification of this report.

(b) LOI's: LOI 9-69 (SIMULAT WAR CONCEPT) was published on 8 Jun 69. Further discussion of this LOI is precluded by the classification of this report.

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(c) Combined Campaign Plan: The Quarterly Summary of Progress Report toward achievement of the CCP goals was submitted to MACV on 14 Jul 69. The formal quarterly Review will be presented during the next quarter.

(d) Studies:

1. There were two force disposition studies completed during this quarter concerning AIVN and US forces respectively. Further discussion of these studies is precluded by the classification of this report.

2. There were two studies conducted concerning the CIDG Camps at BEN HET and DAK FAI respectively. Further discussions of these studies is precluded by the classification of this report.

3. There was one study conducted concerning requirements to open Highway QL 14 from DAN ME THUOT to DUC LAP and QL 8B from DUC LAP to QIA NOHIA on a permanent basis. The study resulted in this headquarters providing specific guidance to DSA II Corps to accomplish the task.

(e) Summary of Ground Operations:

(a) Western Highlands Operations - May: Operations in the Highlands were centered in the Ben Het - Dak To area. A buildup of allied forces in the 24th STZ began on 6 May with the formation of TF Lien Headquartered at Dak To. The Operation (DAN QUYI 38A) expanded to include as many as 9 maneuver battalions. Standoff attacks against allied forces, installations, lines of communication and the civilian population increased in regularity and intensity. Numerous combat assaults were conducted followed by search and clear operations to exploit the success of allied light strikes.

1. US Operations: On 3 May 40 km NW of Plei Me at AR074220, 3d Platoon, A Trp, 2d Sqdn, 1st Cav engaged an unknown size enemy force with small arms and automatic weapons fire. Tactical Air power and gunships supported the contact. Results were one friendly wounded and six enemy killed. On 3 May 6 km ENE of Plei Me at ZA2432, 6 Co 1st Bn, 39th Inf found a cache of 5 and one-half tons of rice and 1500 pounds of corn which was extracted. This unit found a second cache of 6700 pounds of rice 8 km N of Plei Me at ZA180880 on 4 May. Again on 5 May this unit discovered several more caches totalling 15,000 pounds of rice and 250 pounds of corn which was extracted. On 6 May 5 km North of Plei Me elements of 1st Bn 14th Inf discovered a rice cache of 6,000 pounds which was extracted. On the same day 20 km SSW of Pleiku City 4th Inf Hq at ZA120880 received indirect fire and small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force. Spooky and artillery supported the contact which resulted in 3 friendly killed and 33 wounded with 52 enemy killed and 7 prisoner, 12 small arms, four crew served weapons and one Chicom radio captured. On 10 May 12 km W of Pleiku City 6th Inf Hq at ZA120880 received indirect fire and small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force resulting in 11 friendly killed, 25 wounded and 3 missing with 45 enemy killed. A Hawk Radar unit was destroyed by a direct hit. On 10 May one km NE of Dak To, the 15th Light Equipment Company received six rounds of indirect fire and a sapper attack. Results were eight friendly wounded and six enemy killed. On 11 May 25 km SSW
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Flei Mo D Troop, 1st Sqdn 10th Cav engaged 40 NVA with gunships and artillery fire resulting in 20 enemy killed. Again on 11 May, 18 km East of Dac Co D/Troop, 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav observed 40-50 enemy in bunkers. Gunships, tactical air and artillery strikes resulted in 37 enemy killed. Again on 15 May 5 km NW Plei Mrong, 10th Cav elements of the 3d Bn 8th Inf were engaged by an enemy battalion. Gunships and artillery supported. Results were 9 friendly KIA and 23 WIA with 10 enemy KIA. On 12 May, 7 km East Plei Mrong, elements of the 2nd Bn, 8th Inf received 20 rounds of B40 fire. Artillery and Spooky supported. Results were 3 friendly killed, three wounded, 1 APC destroyed, with 19 enemy killed. On 13 May A Btry 1st Bn, 92d Arty (US) at FSB 1 located in Dak To received 19 rounds of 122mm rockets. Artillery fired on suspected enemy locations. On 14 May 6 km north of Plei Mrong B Co, 2nd Bn, 35th Inf received B40 rocket and small arms fire. Spooky and artillery supported the contact which resulted in 16 enemy KIA. On 15 May 25 km SW of Camp Enari at ZA033233, C Co, 1st Bn, 35th Inf found 15 NVA bodies estimated to have been killed by air strikes 2 months previously. Again on 15 May 6 km SW of Tan Canh at ZBO97190 A Troop 7 Sqdn 17th Air Cav found 6 enemy bodies and engaged and killed one in the same area. Results were 7 enemy KIA.

On 17 May 9 km south of Kontum City at AR780780 B Co, 3d Bn, 8th Inf engaged 10 NVA resulting in 7 enemy KIA with no friendly losses. Again on 17 May 8 km N of Plei Mrong at ZA165761 an aircraft from 2d Sqdn 1st Cav observed 3-5 enemy. C Troop 2d Sqdn, 1st Cav reacted and engaged a company size/unknown force resulting in 2 friendly KIA, 5 WIA and 40 enemy KIA. On 18 May 20 km SW of Kontum City at ZA093748 an APC from C Troop 2nd Sqdn 1st Cav hit a mine and received ground fire. Results were 4 friendly WIA and 7 enemy KIA. On 21 May 21 km NW Pleiku City at ZA075514 A Troop, 1st Sqdn 10th Cav received B40 rocket and small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force. B Co 3d Bn 12th Inf and D Troop, 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav reacted. Results were 8 friendly WIA and 9 enemy KIA. On 24 May 16 km west of Pleiku at ZA073517 D Troop, 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav aircraft observed a number of enemy in a tree line. A Troop 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav, in a sweep of the area, engaged an unknown size enemy force in bunkers. Gunships, artillery and air strikes supported the contact which resulted in 39 enemy killed without a friendly loss. On 25 May 13 km south of Plei Mrong at ZA068548, D Troop, 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav found 25 enemy bodies. On 26 May 20 km NW of Pleiku at ZA060515 elements from 1st Sqdn 10th Cav found 17 enemy bodies in graves estimated to be 3 days old. On 27 May 8 km NE of Plei Mrong at ZA125767, elements of 1st Bn, 12th Inf received B40 rockets and small arms fire. Artillery and tactical air strikes supported. Results were 7 friendly KIA and 15 WIA. On 28 May 9 km N of Plei Mrong at ZA125769 D Co 1st Bn, 12th Inf engaged an unknown number of VC. Sweep of the area revealed 33 enemy KIA. Again on 28 May 299th Engr at Dak To vicinity of ZBO05215 received 11 rounds of 122mm rocket fire resulting in 8 friendly KIA and 18 WIA.

On 31 May 18 km SW of Kontum at ZA097761 B Co, 1st Bn, 12th Inf engaged
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10 NVA. Gunships and artillery supported the contact. D Troop 1st
Sqdn 10th Cav reacted as contact continued. Tactical air strikes were
employed. Results were 10 friendly KIA, 21 WIA and 88 enemy KIA.

2. ARVN Operations: On 8 May 6 km SSW of Dak To, 42d
ARVN Inf was attacked by an unknown size enemy force with mortar and
small arms fire. Gunships supported. Results were 5 friendly KIA
and 14 WIA with 10 enemy KIA. On 9 May 6 km SSW of Dak To 4th Bn,
42d ARVN Inf engaged an unknown size enemy force. Tactical air
strikes, gunships and artillery supported the contact which resulted
in 2 friendly killed and 7 enemy killed. On 10 May 6 km west of Ben
Hai 1st Bn, 42d ARVN Inf was engaged by an estimated NVA battalion.
Tactical air, artillery and gunships supported the action. Re-
results were 3 friendly killed and 16 wounded. On 12 May 7 km SSW Dak
To the 22d Ranger Bn received mortar and small arms fire from an un-
known number of enemy. Gunships and artillery supported. Results
were 2 friendly wounded and 22 enemy killed. On 12 May, 4 km SSM of
Ben Hai, 3d Bn, 42d Inf received 3 rounds of 60mm mortar fire. Tac-
tical air strikes and artillery supported. Results were 13 friendly
KIA, 7 WIA and 8 small arms lost with 30 enemy KIA. On 13 May 8 km
SE Dak To elements from 2d Bn, 42d ARVN Inf made contact with an
unknown size enemy force resulting in 4 friendly KIA, 12 WIA one
missing and 4 small arms lost with 5 enemy killed. On 14 May 3 km
NW of Ben Hai the 23d Engr Bn was in sporadic contact and received
unknown type and number of incoming rounds. Artillery and tactical
air strikes supported. Results were 2 friendly killed 22 wounded
(2 US) and 1 small weapon lost. On 15 May 9 km south of Dak To (2)
at YB996131, 4th Bn 42d ARVN Inf received 12 rounds of 82mm mortar.
US and ARVN artillery supported. Results were one friendly KIA,
12 WIA, one MIA and one weapon lost with 13 enemy KIA. On 17 May 12 km
SE of Dak To at YB933141 the 23rd Ranger Bn received an unknown number
of 60mm rockets and small arms fire. Artillery, spooky and head-
hunter aircraft supported. A sweep of the area revealed 1 friendly
wounded and 74 enemy killed with 1 small arm captured. On 18 May 10
km SE of Dak To at ZB993176 elements of the 4th Bn 47 ARVN Inf in
Dien Bien Village received 20 rounds of unknown type mortar followed
by a ground attack. Results were 2 friendly KIA and 22 WIA with 4
enemy KIA and 1 small arm and 1 crew served weapon captured. On 20 May
8 km SW of Dak To at YB901155 the 22nd Ranger Bn engaged an estimated
enemy company. Gunships, artillery and tactical air strikes supported
the contact which resulted in 10 friendly KIA (8 ARVN, 2 US), 50 WIA
(48 ARVN 2 US) and 9 small arms lost with 36 enemy KIA and 1 crew
served weapons captured. On 21 May 8 km SW of Dak To at YB992140 2nd
Bn 42d ARVN Inf was engaged by an unknown size enemy force. ARVN
and US artillery supported. Results were 2 friendly KIA and 22 WIA with
17 enemy KIA. On 23 May 10 km SW of Dak To at YB903147 the 22nd
Ranger Bn was attacked by an unknown size enemy force. Artillery and
tactical air strikes supported the contact which resulted in 6
friendly killed, 47 wounded and five MIA with 146 enemy KIA and 2
small arms and 1 crew served weapon captured. On 23 May 17 km SW of
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Dak To at YB977129, 40J and 41G Scout Troops engaged an unknown size enemy force in bunkers. Resulting in 7 friendly wounded and 3 enemy killed with 1 prisoner, 5 small arms and 2 crew served weapons captured. On 26 May 11 km SW of Dak To at YB913149 the 23rd Angr Bn received mortar and small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force. Gunships and artillery supported. Results were 11 friendly killed, 22 wounded with 2 radios lost and 26 enemy KIA with 6 small arms and 2 crew served weapons captured. On 29 May 12 km SSW of Ben Het in the vicinity of YB9075 the 11th and 23rd Angr Bn and 1st BN, 2nd Inf, and 3rd BN 42nd ARVN Inf had a series of related contacts with a large enemy force. Gunships, artillery, Tactical Air Strikes and Shadow supported the contact. Total results are 7 friendly killed (ARVN), 136 wounded (130 ARVN, 6 US) 77 missing (ARVN) and 309 enemy killed.

2. RF/PF Operations: On 17 May 30 km SE of Ben Me Thuot the 377th RF Co received an unknown number of 60 mm mortar fire resulting in 5 friendly killed (2 RF, 3 PF), 6 wounded (5 RF, 1 PF) and 5 missing (PF). On 20 May 1 km South of Pleiku City at 24755662 the 957th RF Co received 7 rounds of 82 mm mortar. ARVN artillery supported. Friendly losses were 20 wounded (13 RF, 7 CiV). On 21 May 35 km NE of Ban De Thout at AP934733 the 650, 660 and 680 RF Co's and the 9th and 24th PF Plts received an unknown number of 60 mm mortar rounds, 10 rounds of 81mm rockets and small arms fire from an estimated VC company. ARVN artillery supported. Friendly losses were 1 RF killed and 9 RF wounded. On 23 May Plei K'Hamlet at 2A138856 defended by the 39th PF Plt was attacked by an unknown size enemy force. The 145 RF Co reacted while artillery supported. Results were 2 friendly killed (1 RF, 1 CiV) and 7 wounded (2 RF, 5 PF) with 9 enemy killed and 5 small arms and 1 crew served weapons captured. On 26 May 3 km North of Tan Chinh at ZB054246, the 69th PF Plt at Dak Chu Village received indirect and small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force which resulted in 7 civilians killed, 4 civilians wounded and 1 enemy killed. On 29 May 6 km NE of Dak To at ZB076253 the 70th PF Plt at Dak Ling Village received ground fire from an unknown size enemy force. Results were 6 killed (2PF, 2 ViSF, 2 CiV) and 4 wounded (2 ViSF, 2 CiV) and 6 small arms lost.

4. CIG Operations: On 10 May 10 km south of Ben Het, Plateau GI CIG Company received an indirect fire attack resulting in two friendly KIA, 17 WIA and two MIA and 7 small arms lost. On 13 May, 6 km west of Plei Krong, a CSF Company was attacked by an unknown size enemy company. Gunships and artillery supported. Results were 1 friendly KIA and 10 WIA with 8 enemy KIA. Again on 13 May approximately 13 km SE of Dak To, Kon Horing Village received 12 rounds of mortar fire and small arms fire. Spooky and artillery supported. Friendly losses...
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were 7 killed (6 US, 1 FF) and 22 wounded (civ). The 241st CSF Co
engaged an enemy platoon dug in 20 km SW of Ben Het on 13 May. Re-
sults were 2 friendly killed, 4 wounded and 18 enemy killed. On 24 May
8 km SS of Qui Nhon at AB856665, an 1st CSF Co engaged an estimated
VC squad. Tactical air strikes and gunships supported the contact
which resulted in 1 friendly WIA and 5 enemy killed with 2 small arms cap-
tured. On 31 May, 11 km NE of Phu Me at AB833600, an 1st CSF Co ob-
served and engaged approximately 10 enemy armed with AKs and 100
rocket launchers. Gunships and tactical air strikes supported the
contact which resulted in 50 enemy killed. On 21 May 15 km S of Ben
Het at YB897910 the 3rd CSF BN received an unknown number of 25mm
mortar rounds followed by a ground attack from an unknown size enemy
force. Artillery and gunships supported. Results were 7 friendly
killed (6 US) 60 wounded (3 US) and 5 missing. On 22 May 16 km S
from Ben Het near AB879100 elements of the 1st CSF BN were engaged by an
unknown size enemy force. Gunships and artillery supported. Results
were 9 friendly killed (6 US, 1 Australian, S5 CIDG) 15 missing (6 US, 13 CIDG) 2 small arms, 10 crew served
weapons and 19 radios captured. On 25 May 4 km
SW of Ben Het at YB891277, a CSF Co outpost was attacked by an
unknown size enemy force. Results were 9 KIA (1 US, 3 ARVN, 5 CIDG) and 24 WIA (3 US, 2 ARVN, 19 CIDG) and 15 enemy KIA, 1 POW and 4
small arms captured.

(b) BIHN Dinh Operations - May. The primary effort continued
on pacification support operations, while tactical operations con-
tinued to emphasize small unit actions. KFPIF relieved from static
defense missions were also actively participating in pacification
programs. PSYOPS and civic actions by the ROK forces resulted in
322 weapons collected during the month of May.

1 US Operations: On 9 May, 12 km NE of the Ky, elements from
1st BN, 5th Inf tripped a booby-trapped hand grenade, followed
by small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force. Results were
7 friendly wounded and 2 enemy KIA and 1 POW captured. On 12 May,
5 km NE of an a/c, elements of a Co, 1st BN, 6th Inf engaged an
unknown number of enemy resulting in 6 enemy killed. On 16 May, 10 km
NE of An Khe at AB550691, D Co, 1st BN, 8th Inf engaged an estimated
enemy company in bunkers. A platoon of the 1st BN, 69th Armor
reinforced. Artillery, gunships and air strikes supported the action.
Friendly losses were 1 killed and 3 wounded while the enemy suffered
30 NVA killed. On 25 May, 6 km SW LZ ENGLISH at BK915986, D Co, 2d
BN, 503d Inf received a heavy ground probe from an unknown size
enemy force resulting in 1 friendly KIA and 9 WIA. On 26 May, 6 km
SW of LZ ENGLISH at BK998676 an APC from a Co, 1st BN, 60th Inf
was hit by a command detonated 155 artillery round on Hwy 55. APC
was a total loss as a result of fire. There were 8 friendly wounded.

2 ROK Operations: On 2 May, 6 km south of Jinh Thau at BB611524,
the 1st Co, Cav 5 platoons engaged five VC, killing all five and cap-
turing three small arms without friendly loss. On 2 May, 25 km SS of
Qui Nhon at 167089, the 12th Co, Cav 5 platoons engaged an unknown
number of enemy in contacts resulting in 11 enemy killed without a
friendly loss. On 5 May, 5 km SW Phu Cat, the 1st Co, 1st platoon engaged and killed 5 VC and captured 1 Saigon without friendly loss.
on 7 May, 11 km South of Binh Khe, the 4th Co of Cav ROK Regt reacted a successful ambush resulting in 3 enemy killed and 3 small arms captured. There were no friendly losses. On 13 May, 5 km SW of Binh Khe at BR771815, 4th Co, 4th RF Co reacted with an estimated enemy squad resulting in 5 KIA and 9 WIA. Seven companies of 3d Bn, Cav ROK Regt and 2nd Bn, 1st ROK Regt were moved into the area of contact. Forces were extracted on 16 May with total results for the action of 8 friendly killed and 15 wounded. Enemy losses were 32 killed and 1 WIA captured. On 26 May, 20 km S of Binh Khe, at BR769242, 9 ROK Div Special Forces Team engaged and killed 7 enemy and captured 2 small arms.

2. ARVN Operations: On 9 May, 6 km north of Bong Son a 4 ton truck from 3d Co, 41st ARVN Regt detonated an unknown type mine resulting in 1 friendly killed and 7 wounded. The truck was destroyed.

On 17 May, 1 km south of Phu My, Headquarters 41st ARVN Regt received an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 friendly killed and 7 wounded. The truck was destroyed.

On 12 May, 4 km north of Binh Khe, a PSDF 29th PF Platoon was engaged by an unknown size enemy squad resulting in 1 friendly killed and 4 wounded. On 13 May, 12 km SW of Binh Khe, 2nd Co, 267th PF Platoon engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 friendly killed and 4 wounded. On 14 May, an estimated VC platoon was engaged with an estimated VC squad resulting in 1 friendly killed and 15 wounded. On 15 May, 2 km S of Binh Khe, 733rd RF Co engaged an estimated VC platoon resulting in 1 friendly killed and 4 wounded. On 16 May, 1 km E of Binh Khe, 116th PF Platoon engaged an estimated VC platoon resulting in 1 friendly killed and 7 wounded. On 18 May, a PSDF 29th PF Platoon was engaged by an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 friendly killed and 4 wounded. On 19 May, an estimated VC platoon was engaged by an estimated VC squad resulting in 3 friendly killed and 7 wounded. The truck was destroyed.

3. RF/PF Operations: On 8 May, 1 km SW of Bong Son, elements of the 406th RF Co engaged an estimated enemy squad resulting in 5 enemy KIA and 3 small arms captured without friendly loss. On 12 May, 5 km SW of Bong Son, the 246th RF Co engaged an estimated enemy company. Small arms fire was exchanged. Results were 2 friendly killed and 10 wounded. On 14 May, an estimated VC platoon resulting in 1 friendly killed and 3 wounded. On 16 May, 1 km NW of An Nhon the 74th, 86th and 190th PF Platoons and 2nd Platoon 113 were attacked by an unknown size enemy force resulting in 3 friendly killed (PF), 11 wounded (2 RI, 9 PF) and 4 small arms lost. On 18 May, 2 km SW of Binh Khe, a PSDF 29th PF Platoon was engaged by an estimated VC platoon resulting in 1 friendly killed (PF), 2 wounded (RI) and 4 small arms lost. On 19 May, 11 km SW of Binh Khe, 2nd Co, 29th PF Platoon engaged by an estimated VC platoon resulting in 1 friendly killed (PF), 2 wounded (RI) and 4 small arms lost. On 20 May, 2 km SW of Binh Khe, a PSDF 29th PF Platoon was engaged by an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 friendly killed (PF), 2 wounded (RI) and 4 small arms lost. On 23 May, 2 km SW of Binh Khe, a PSDF 29th PF Platoon engaged by an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 friendly killed (PF), 2 wounded (RI) and 4 small arms lost. On 26 May, 1 km SW of Cao Thanh at BR619570, 119 PF Platoon and PSDF received 3 rounds of 42mm mortar. ARVN Artillery and mortars supported. Results were 3 friendly killed (2 Civ, 1 PSDF), 18 wounded (6 Civ, 12 PSDF).
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After the operational report of headquarters, the 26th ROK Div reported a series of operations usually maintaining three to four large scale operations and approximately 200 small unit operations throughout the month. Pacification efforts continue in all provinces while the enemy continued his standoff and terrorist attacks.

1. US Operations: On 23 Aug, 19 km south of Phu Rang at 175°01'46"S, 166°34'15"W, 17th Cav engaged 10 - 15 VC with helicopters. Ground units were inserted. Gunships and tactical airstrikes supported the contact. Results were 1 friendly wounded and 1 enemy killed, 2 small arms and 2 crew-served weapons captured.

2. ROK Operations: On 5 May, 19 km south of Phu Rang, a 25th ROK Div reported the contact with unknown number of enemy resulting in 3 enemy killed and 3 small arms captured. On 17 May, 19 km south of Phu Rang, a 28th ROK Div reported the contact with unknown number of enemy resulting in 5 enemy killed and 2 small arms captured. Again on 8 May, 19 km south of Phu Rang, a 5th Co, 28th ROK Div reported the contact with unknown number of enemy resulting in 5 enemy killed and 3 small arms captured. On 9 May, 19 km south of Phu Rang, a 5th Co, 28th ROK Div reported the contact with unknown number of enemy resulting in 5 enemy killed and 4 small arms captured. On 9 May, 19 km south of Phu Rang, a 5th Co, 28th ROK Div reported the contact with unknown number of enemy resulting in 5 enemy killed and 4 small arms captured. On 11 May, 19 km south of Phu Rang, a 5th Co, 28th ROK Div reported the contact with unknown number of enemy resulting in 5 enemy killed and 12 small arms captured. On 13 May, 19 km south of Phu Rang, a 5th Co, 28th ROK Div reported the contact with unknown number of enemy resulting in 5 enemy killed and 10 small arms captured. On 14 May, 19 km south of Phu Rang, a 5th Co, 28th ROK Div reported the contact with unknown number of enemy resulting in 5 enemy killed and 10 small arms captured. On 16 May, 19 km south of Phu Rang, a 5th Co, 28th ROK Div reported the contact with unknown number of enemy resulting in 5 enemy killed and 10 small arms captured. On 17 May, 19 km south of Phu Rang, a 5th Co, 28th ROK Div reported the contact with unknown number of enemy resulting in 5 enemy killed and 10 small arms captured. On 18 May, 19 km south of Phu Rang, a 5th Co, 28th ROK Div reported the contact with unknown number of enemy resulting in 5 enemy killed and 10 small arms captured. On 19 May, 19 km south of Phu Rang, a 5th Co, 28th ROK Div reported the contact with unknown number of enemy resulting in 5 enemy killed and 10 small arms captured. On 20 May, 19 km south of Phu Rang, a 5th Co, 28th ROK Div reported the contact with unknown number of enemy resulting in 5 enemy killed and 10 small arms captured. On 21 May, 19 km south of Phu Rang, a 5th Co, 28th ROK Div reported the contact with unknown number of enemy resulting in 5 enemy killed and 10 small arms captured. On 22 May, 19 km south of Phu Rang, a 5th Co, 28th ROK Div reported the contact with unknown number of enemy resulting in 5 enemy killed and 10 small arms captured. On 23 May, 19 km south of Phu Rang, a 5th Co, 28th ROK Div reported the contact with unknown number of enemy resulting in 5 enemy killed and 10 small arms captured. On 24 May, 19 km south of Phu Rang, a 5th Co, 28th ROK Div reported the contact with unknown number of enemy resulting in 5 enemy killed and 10 small arms captured. On 25 May, 19 km south of Phu Rang, a 5th Co, 28th ROK Div reported the contact with unknown number of enemy resulting in 5 enemy killed and 10 small arms captured. On 26 May, 19 km south of Phu Rang, a 5th Co, 28th ROK Div reported the contact with unknown number of enemy resulting in 5 enemy killed and 10 small arms captured. On 27 May, 19 km south of Phu Rang, a 5th Co, 28th ROK Div reported the contact with unknown number of enemy resulting in 5 enemy killed and 10 small arms captured. On 28 May, 19 km south of Phu Rang, a 5th Co, 28th ROK Div reported the contact with unknown number of enemy resulting in 5 enemy killed and 10 small arms captured. On 29 May, 19 km south of Phu Rang, a 5th Co, 28th ROK Div reported the contact with unknown number of enemy resulting in 5 enemy killed and 10 small arms captured. On 30 May, 19 km south of Phu Rang, a 5th Co, 28th ROK Div reported the contact with unknown number of enemy resulting in 5 enemy killed and 10 small arms captured. On 31 May, 19 km south of Phu Rang, a 5th Co, 28th ROK Div reported the contact with unknown number of enemy resulting in 5 enemy killed and 10 small arms captured.
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1. A2W Operations. On 5 May, 5 km west of Tuy Hoa, elements of the 17th PF platoon were engaged by an enemy unit consisting of 2 estimated enemy squad consisting of 25 small arms and 1 crew served weapon. Results were 9 friendly KIA, 8 friendly wounded, and 1 friendly killed. On 6 May, 2 km north of Phan Thiet, an enemy unit consisting of 16 small arms and 1 crew served weapon was engaged. Results were 7 enemy KIA, 10 enemy wounded, and 1 friendly wounded.

2. A2F Operations. On 10 May, 2 km south of Phan Thiet, an enemy unit consisting of 25 small arms was encountered. Results were 2 friendly KIA, 5 friendly wounded, and 1 friendly killed. On 11 May, 10 km north of Phan Thiet, an enemy unit consisting of 10 small arms and 1 crew served weapon was engaged. Results were 3 friendly KIA, 7 friendly wounded, and 1 friendly killed.

3. Other Operations. On 30 May, a train struck a mine causing 50% damage to the engine and 4 cars. 2 Civilians were injured in the wreck. On 7 May in Khanh Hoa Province a train hit an unknown type of mine resulting in light damage to the engine and 3 cars which were derailed.

4. US Operations. On 14 May, 13 km north of Phan Thiet, 8th Troop, 7th Squadron, 17th CAB engaged 5 VC with gunships. Elements of B Co, 3rd BN 506th AAB were inserted into the contact area, confirmed 5 KIA and made contact with and killed 1 additional VC. On 14 May, 3rd BN, 503rd
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Abn Inf and 8 arty, 5th Bn, 31st Arty at Camp Hock in Bao Loc regt, 10 - 50 rounds of 60mm mortar fire. US artillery supported. Losses were 1 friendly killed, 7 wounded (4 US, 15 ARVN).

2 ARVN Operations: On 12 May, 6 km south of Song Hau the 44th ARVN battalion and elements of 27th Co, 8th ARVN Cav engaged contact with an enemy company. Gunships and artillery supported the contact. Results were 2 friendly killed and 17 wounded while the enemy lost 36 killed and 30 wounded, 9 small arms and 5 crew served weapons captured. On 22 May, 10 km SSE of Song Hau at BM419, 4th Co, 8th ARVN Cav engaged on May 1 was engaged by an unknown size enemy force who used small arms fire, 840 rockets and mortars. A gunship supporting the contact was shot down but crew and aircraft were extracted without injuries. Results were 7 friendly killed (ARVN) and 13 wounded (ARVN) while the enemy losses were 7 killed and 1 SA captured. On 26 May, 9 km NW Song Hau at BM654, the 2nd Co, 2nd Bn 44 ARVN Regt engaged and fired 2 claymore mines. A sweep of the area revealed 5 enemy killed and 4 small arms captured.

3 RF/PF Operations: On 5 May, 15 km west of Phan Thiet, the 127th RF Co and 305th RF Co found a booby trapped ammunition can outside the company command center. The can exploded when the soldiers attempted to open it resulting in 2 friendly killed and 20 wounded. On 11 May 23 km north of Phan Thiet, the Co platoon from 232nd RF Co engaged an estimated enemy platoon. ARVN artillery supported. Results were 3 enemy killed and 2 small arms captured. On 12 May, 8 km west of Song Hau the 238th RF Co engaged an estimated enemy battalion. Gunships and artillery supported the contact. Results were 3 friendly killed (2 Civ, 1 RF), 4 wounded (2 Civ, 2 RF) and 8 enemy killed, 2 FN and 3 small arms captured. Again on 12 May, 9 km north of Phan Thiet, 2d Platoon and 1 squad of RF/PF engaged an estimated Co company. Artillery supported. Results were 2 friendly killed (1 FF, 1 RF), 13 wounded (9 FF, 4 RF, 1 Civ) missing, 1 friendly killed and 4 enemy killed with 2 small arms captured. On 15 May, 20 km SSE of Dalat, 300th RF Co and the 24th RF platoon were attacked by 2 VC companies using 500 and 85mm mortars. Small arms fire. Artillery, gunships, andShadow supported the contact. Results were 2 friendly killed, 4 wounded and 5 civilians missing. Enemy losses were 13 killed and 1 FN and 2 small arms captured. On 28 May, 10 km NW of Phan Thiet at A739412, the 785th and 234th RF Co's attacked an estimated enemy company ARVN and US artillery supported the action. Friendly losses were 10 killed, 6 wounded and 8 small arms and 2 crew served weapons lost.

4 Other Operations: On 17 May, Song Mao received 80 rounds of unknown type mortar fire. Snooky supported the action. Losses were 2 killed (Civ), 12 wounded (4 US, 6 ARVN, 2 Civ). On 6 May 25 km east of Duc Lap, the 2d RF Bn initiated contact with an estimated NVA company resulting in 3 friendly killed, 5 wounded and 1 missing.

(a) WESTERN HIGHLAND Operations. Tactical operations in the Highlands remained concentrated in the Ben Het - Dak To area. There were significant contacts at the beginning of the month when the enemy moved in close to Ben Het and elected to stand and fight. Activity in this area subsided during the last week of June. Isolated incidents and standoff attacks continued. Two battalions of the 53rd ARVN Regt joined TF Lien in the Dak To area to conduct offensive operations. The 1st Bn, 53rd ARVN from Darlac Province was replaced by 2nd Bn 35th Inf (US) which assumed the mission of road security of Highway 21 east of DMZ. Pacification support operations continue in Pleiku and Darlac Provinces through the efforts of the 3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div and the 45th ARVN Regt.

5 US Operations: On 1 June, 11 km NE Plei He at A780150, Plei He RF Co observed and engaged approximately 100 enemy with AK47 and R40's. Gunships and air strikes supported the contact which resulted in 50 enemy killed. On 3 June a patrol of 10 km SSE Ben Het at Y891862, element of a Troop 7th Bn 17th Civ spotted several enemy carrying AK47's. Gunships and air strikes

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supported the contact which resulted in enemy 6 killed. On 5 June 13 km SW of Kontum at ZA147860 B Co 1st Bn, 12th Inf observed and engaged 4 individuals near position and later received small arms fire and B40 rockets on all sides of perimeter. Gunships and artillery supported the contact which continued throughout the day. Results were 10 friendly killed and 35 wounded with 33 enemy killed. On 7 June approximately 3 km NW Dak To II at YB9562, 299th Engr (US) mine sweep team was engaged by unknown size enemy force. 1st Sqdn 5 ACAV and 2nd Bn 42d ARVN Inf reacted. Gunships, dusters and ARVN artillery supported. Results were 4 friendly killed (3 US, 1 ARVN), 9 wounded (8 US, 1 ARVN) and 2 enemy killed. On 9 June 5 km W Plei Meong at ZA141712 B Co, 24 Bn 55th Inf engaged 3 NVA with small arms fire. A sweep of area revealed 13 bodies and 2 small arms. Reconnaissance elements of the 2d Bn, 55th Inf round 6 enemy bodies in graves approximately 3 km NE Plei Meong at ZA147709. Again on 9 June approximately 6 km S Kontum at ZA235826, 564 Engr (US) received 15 rounds 122 rocket and unknown number of 82 mortar rounds. Artillery supported. Results were 4 friendly killed, 7 wounded (4 US, 3 CIDG). At 110035H 15 km NE Plei Me at AR69444 A Company, 1st Bn, 14 Inf observed individuals through starlight scope approaching the perimeter. Individuals were engaged as they approached the perimeter. Results were 6 enemy killed. On 111230H 15 km N Pleiku at ZA946657 a 4th Inf Div resupply convoy from Pleiku to Dak To was attacked by unknown size enemy unit using mortar, small arms fire and B40 rockets from both sides of QL-14N. A Co 2d Bn, 8th Inf reacted. Gunships and artillery supported. Results were 1 friendly killed, 3 wounded, 2 trucks damaged, 1 LCH destroyed and 42 enemy killed with 4 small arms captured. On 11230 10 km SE Pleiku at AR993830 Recon element 1st Bn, 8th Inf ambushed and killed 7 individuals. Between 110700 - 112400H Ben Het CIDG Camp received 14 rounds of recoilless rifle, 43 rounds of 81mm mortar, 17 rounds of 81mm mortar, 1 round of 122mm mortar, 3 rounds of 81mm mortar, 1 round of 122mm mortar, 3 rounds unknown size recoilless rifle and 3 rounds unknown artillery. There was sporadic sniper fire throughout the day. Results were 13 friendly wounded (11 US, 1 ARVN, 1 CIDG). At 120505H 23 km SE Pleiku at AR888258 a Civil Action Team from 5 BN 8th Inf at Plei Djarel Village received ground attack by estimated 3 platoons of VC. D troop, 7th Sqdn 17th Air Cav reaction force arrived at 0352H. Results were 4 friendly killed, 7 wounded and 3 enemy killed with 2 small arms captured. On 121410H 12 km SW Polei Kien at YB916065 2 gunships from 52d CAS observed estimated VC Company. Gunships expended. Artillery and Air strikes supported. Results were 20 enemy killed. On 121620H 3 km SW Ben Het CIDG Camp at YB678205 C Co ship from A Troop, 7th Sqdn, 17th Cav received ground fire, gunships expended on numerous bunkers resulting in 19 enemy killed. At 131116H 50 km S Pleiku at BR242935 LZ Action, pump station and convoy in that area received small arms and B40 fire. Gunships in support received heavy fire. C Co 1st Bn, 8th Inf engaged estimated enemy platoon. Gunships, artillery and Tactical Air strikes supported the contact which resulted in 11 friendly wounded (6 US, 5 ROK Civ), 2 trucks destroyed, 7 trucks damaged, and 2 enemy killed, 1 prisoner, 1 small arm captured. On 161456, Gunships were employed at Ben Het vic YB60225 against an unknown number enemy. Results were 6 enemy killed. Again at 161515H 9 km SW Ben Het vic YB919, element of A Troop, 7th Sqdn, 17th Cav observed number of enemy along a trail. Gunships expended resulting in 30 enemy killed. On 211515H 4 km ESE of Ben Het at Y890249 A Troop, 7th Sqdn, 17th Cav observed and engaged 10-15 NVA crossing a river. Gunships supported. Results were 6 enemy killed. On 211230H 4 km ESE of Ben Het at Y890249, A Troop 7th Sqdn, 17th Cav spotted a bunker complex and directed air strikes on it. Results were 9 enemy killed. On
241100H 32 km SE of Pleiku via B2022 D Troop, 2 Sqdn, 1st Cav reacted to a Snoopy report of suspected NVA locations. Gunships and Air Strikes supported. D Troop, 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav reacted at 241200H. Results were 27 enemy killed. On 231630H, 1 km SE of Ben Het at YB76265 a reaction force to aid a mine sweeping team from 299th Engr who were in contact was engaged by unknown size enemy force 4 km W of Dak To Bridge resulting in 2 friendly killed and 12 wounded (all US). Between 251145H in the East and South of Ben Het via YB9024 A Troop, 7th Sqdn, 17th Air Cav engaged an unknown size enemy force in a series of 7 contacts, resulting in 58 enemy killed and 1 crew served weapon destroyed.

2 ARVN Operations: On 2 June 12 km SE Tan Canh at ZB153150, 5d ACAV received small arms and B40 rockets. Results were 3 friendly killed, 2 wounded, 2 APC damaged (1 heavy, 1 light) and 10 enemy killed with 2 small arms and 2 crew served weapons captured. On 5 June approximately 11 km SE Ben Het at YB928159 element 2 Bn 47th ARVN Inf received 80 and small arms fire. Results were 1 friendly killed, 21 wounded and 14 enemy killed with 2 small arms and 2 crew served weapons captured. On 6 June 14 km SW Tan Canh at YB96166 elements of 3d Bn 47th ARVN Inf received unknown number of mixed mortar rounds, resulting in 20 friendly wounded (5 US, 17 ARVN). Ben Het at Y165255 received 111 rounds of indirect fire resulting in 1 friendly killed (Viv), 20 wounded (17 ARVN, 3 CIDG). On 8 June approximately 7 km S Dak To at YB909174, 4th Bn 42d ARVN Inf was engaged by an unknown size enemy force. Results were 9 friendly killed, 0 wounded and 52 enemy killed. On 9 June 12 km S Ben Me Thuot at AR699913 element 1st Bn, 43d ARVN Inf made contact with estimated enemy company. Artillery and Spooky supported. Results were 6 friendly killed, 10 wounded with 5 small arms, 1 HMG-10 radio lost and 2 enemy killed with 1 small arm captured. Again on 9 June approximately 8 km SW Dak To at YB910260, 5d ACAV mine sweeping team, 1st Co, 2d Bn, 42d ARVN Inf, 2usters of 1st Bn 92d Artillery and elements of 299th Engr were engaged by estimated enemy platoon using small arms, automatic weapons fire and B40 as they were proceeding to repair a cut in the road. Artillery, Air strikes and gunships supported. Results were 5 friendly wounded and 21 enemy killed with 6 small arms and 2 crew served weapons captured. On 120515H 4 km N Pleiku at AR775520, the 2d Ranger Group received ground fire from an estimated enemy platoon. A 2d Ranger Gp unit in a sweep at 0445H was engaged by 2 enemy platoons. Mortar supported. Results were 4 friendly wounded and 5 enemy killed and 1 small arms and 2 crew served weapons captured. On 190600H 6 km SE Ben Het at YB925228 2d Co, 2d Bn, 47th ARVN Inf was attacked by estimated enemy company. Artillery supported. Results were 2 friendly wounded and 16 enemy killed with 2 small arms and 2 crew served weapons captured. In the same vicinity at 151255H 2d Co, 2d Bn, 47th ARVN Inf again came under attack from 2 platoons. Artillery and gunships supported. Results were 6 friendly wounded and 7 enemy killed, 2 prisoners, 2 small arms and 1 crew served weapon captured. On 151415H 8 km NW Dak To at YB926251, 2d Bn, 42d ARVN Inf engaged an unknown size enemy force. Gunships supported. Results were 2 friendly killed, 3 wounded and 8 enemy killed with 1 small arm and 1 crew served weapon captured. On 161020H 4 km E Ben Het at YB142600 element of 3d ACAV and 2d Bn, 42d ARVN Inf made contact with unknown size enemy force, resulting in 1 friendly killed and 5
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wounded and 9 enemy killed with 2 small arms and 1 crew served weapon captured. On 191500H 5 km E Ben Hat at YB912957 element 1st Bn, 42d ARVN Inf made contact with estimated enemy platoon. Artillery and gunships supported. Results were 3 friendly killed, 3 wounded and 37 enemy killed, 1 prisoner, 5 small arms, 2 crew served weapons captured. On 200955H 4 km E Ben Hat at YB927556, 1 tank from 1st Troop, 14th ACAV hit an unknown type mine. 1st Bn, 42d ARVN Inf accompanying 1st Troop, 14th ACAV simultaneously received small arms fire. Artillery and Air strikes supported. Results were 10 friendly killed (ARVN); 19 wounded (1 US, 18 ARVN). On 211730H 4 km SE of Ben Hat at YB917229, 1st Co 2d Bn 47th ARVN Inf received 20 rounds of 82mm mortar and 10 rounds B40 rockets. Results were 10 friendly wounded missing and 1 crew served weapon destroyed. On 220305H 3 km N of Kontum City at ZA22015 the 746 and 748 RF Co's on bridge security received 20 rounds of 82mm mortar followed by ground attack by an estimated enemy company. 3d ACAV and an RF Company from Kontum reacted. Artillery, mortar and Spooky supported. Results were 10 friendly killed (9 RF, 1 Civ), 11 wounded (3 RF, 8 Civ), 4 small arms and 1 crew served weapon damaged and 1 enemy killed. On 230250H 6 km SE of Ben Hat at YB924227 2d Bn 47th ARVN Inf received 45 rounds mixed indirect fire. Spooky and artillery fired in support. Results were 1 friendly killed, 11 wounded, and 22 enemy killed, 4 small arms, 2 crew served weapons captured. On 230914H 10km W of Tam Canh at YB928257, 2d Co, 3d Bn, 47th ARVN Inf and 1 company from 4th Bn, 42d ARVN Inf were attacked by unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 friendly killed and 24 wounded. On 241115H 4 km E Ben Hat at YB908268 2d Bn, 42d ARVN Inf was engaged by unknown size enemy company. Gunships and Tactical air strikes supported. Results were 3 friendly killed, 5 wounded and 30 enemy killed. Between 250950H - 301430H 14 km E of Ben Hat at YB91254 3d Bn 53d ARVN Inf found a company size and a battalion size base camp and 12 NVA bodies estimated to be 3 weeks old.

RF/PF Operations: On 5 June approximately 13 km SE Dak To at ZB126160, 55, 56, 57 & 65 PF platoons and 1 platoon 3d ACAV in Kon Horing Village received small arms fire, B40 rocket and mortar fire from unknown number of enemy. Artillery supported. Results were 1 friendly killed (1 PF, 3 Civ); 22 wounded (4 PF, 18 Civ); and 2 enemy killed with 1 crew served weapon captured. On 062300H June 2 km NE Lao Thien vic AP926714, 49d PF Plt received 82mm mortar and small arms fired from an estimated 2 enemy platoons, resulting in 6 friendly killed, 4 wounded, 1 missing. At 100445H 5 km N Tam Canh at ZB064271, 88 PF Plt in Tu Long Hamlet was attacked by an unknown size enemy force using small arms fire, B40 rockets and 60mm mortar fire. 104 RF Co and 59 PF Plt reacted. Artillery and gunships supported. sporadic fire continued until 0900. Results were 2 friendly killed, 10 wounded (7 PF, 3 Civ), 1 missing and 2 small arms lost. On 200650H 4 km NE Lao Thien at AP978734 101 PF Platoon as security force in Ben Lo Hamlet reported 5 rounds 82mm mortar incoming. Results were 4 friendly killed (3 Civ, 1 PF) and 16 wounded (15 Civ, 1 PF).

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4 CIDG Operations: On 7 June approximately 5 km NE Le Thien at AQ877016, SF Team 840 received 12 rounds of 82mm mortar and 4 rounds of 107mm rocket, resulting in 1 friendly killed (CIDG), 9 wounded (6 US, 3 CIDG), 4 buildings damaged, 1 jeep and 1 generator destroyed. On 9 June Ben Het CIDG Camp received 182 rounds of mixed indirect fire resulting in 10 friendly wounded (4 US, 4 CIDG). Ben Het CIDG Camp between 11300H -11400H received 107 rounds of indirect fire. Results were 1 friendly killed (CIDG) and 14 wounded (9 US, 4 CIDG, 1 ARVN). From 150800 - 151150 Ben Het CIDG Camp (YB863255) received 67 rounds of mixed indirect fire. Gunships and artillery supported. Results were 1 friendly killed and 11 wounded (8 CIDG, 1 ARVN, 2 US). On 161413H 2 km SSE Ben Het, SF Team 2-15 in Buon Dieu Village received 12 rounds of 82mm mortar. At 0950 North Hill was attacked by an estimated enemy platoon. Results were 5 friendly killed and 8 wounded (4 US, 4 CIDG) with 5 enemy killed, 1 prisoner, 4 small arms and 2 crew served weapons captured. On 191140H 15 km W Pleiku at YA70430 a 2 1/2 ton truck carrying element of Plei Djereng CIDG Co was hit by a command detonated mine and received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force. Results were 4 friendly killed and 8 wounded (4 US, 4 CIDG). On 201001 - 202300 Ben Het at YA87725 received 36 rounds of incoming indirect fire. Artillery supported. Results were 3 friendly killed (CIDG), 17 wounded (14 CIDG, 3 ARVN). Between 210001 - 212200H Ben Het CIDG Camp (YB865254) received 101 rounds of incoming. Artillery supported. Results were 5 friendly killed (2 CIDG, 1 US, 2 ARVN); 23 wounded (11 US, 3 CIDG, 6 Civ dependents, 3 ARVN), 1 tank and 1 ammunition bunker destroyed. Between 220001 - 222400H Ben Het CIDG Camp at YB865255 received 73 rounds of incoming. Results were 11 friendly killed (4 CIDG, 7 Civ). On 230030H Ben Het vic of YB8725 received 4 round of 82mm mortar. At 0310 North Hill was attacked by an 8 man sapper team. At 0500 the camp received 7 rounds 82mm mortar and 3 rounds unknown size recoilless rifle fire. 0930 W sector North Hill received small arms fire and 12 enemy were observed near the perimeter wire. Results were 2 friendly killed (1 US, 1 CIDG) 7 wounded (6 US, 1 CIDG) and 14 enemy killed. Between 230001 - 232400H, Ben Het CIDG Camp (YB865255) received 156 rounds of incoming. Results were 2 friendly killed (US), 26 wounded (1 USP, 9 CIDG, 16 US). On 261430, 6 km NE Tieu Atar at ZV03585, the Tieu Atar SF Co engaged an unknown enemy platoon. Results were 0 friendly killed. On 300001 - 302200H Ben Het received 7 rounds of 82mm mortar.

5 Other Operations: On 7 June 5 km NE Le Thien at AQ87749, 101 RF, PSDF Trung Son Team 49 and MATS Team 2-15 in Buon Dieu Village were attacked by estimated enemy company. 650 & 640 RF Companies reacted. Mortar, artillery and gunships supported. Results were 8 friendly killed (5 RF, 3 Civ, 1 Trung Son, 1 CIDG), 28 wounded (8 Trung Son, 7 Civ, 6 CIDG, 4 US advisors, 3 RF), 3 small arms lost and 4 enemy killed. Again on 7 June Dak To Village at ZA96035 received 15 rounds unknown type mortar. Results were 16 friendly wounded (1 RF, 15 Civ). At 070105H June, in Kontum City at AT879896, A Co 20th Bnrg

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received a mortar attack resulting in 6 friendly killed (2 US, 1 ARVN,
3 Civ), 18 wounded (5 US, 10 ARVN, 5 Civ). On 110030H 2 km NE Lao
Thien at AP861761 an estimated enemy platoon attacked Buon Dak Hamlet
using small arms and automatic weapons fire. PSDF defended. Results
were 2 friendly killed (PSDF), 9 wounded (6 Civ, 2 PSDF, 1 RF). On
150716H 3 km NE Lao Thien at AP995805, Trung Son Team 19 3/4 ton
truck detonated an anti-tank mine in a stream bed. Results were
2 friendly killed and 8 wounded. On 170105H 22 km NNW Kontum at ZB161045
an unknown size enemy force entered Ken Trang Money Village and fired
unknown number of B40 rounds at Village Council House and school. PF
engaged enemy as they exited village. 105 RF Company reacted with
negative results. Results were 6 friendly killed (2 RF, 2 RD, 2 Civ),
3 wounded (1 RD, 2 Civ), 1 missing civilian and 5 small arms lost.

Binh Dinh Province Operations - June: There have been no major
force movements or changes to the plan of operation to support the inten-
sified pacification program within Binh Dinh Province. The 173d Abn
Bde, 40th and 41st ARVN Regt's continue pacification support operations
in the northern 4 districts. The 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div continued
pacification support operations and security of Hwy 19 from Le Trung
Village to An Khe pass in An Khe and the northern half of Binh Khe
Districts. The Cav and 1st ROK Regts continued tactical operations and
pacification support operations in the southern 4 districts. The 1st
ROK Regt with one battalion each from the Cav Regt and 26 Regt conducted
search and clear operations (Bee Ho 23 west of Phu My) against elements
of the 18th NVA Regt between 7 June and 21 June. Combined operations
continued to prove their value as cooperation between the occupying
forces in support of pacification increased.

1. US Operations: On 2 Jun 10 km S of Phu Cat vic BR806498, 10th
Co, 1st ROK Regt in a series of three contacts engaged an unknown number
of enemy resulting in 3 friendly killed and 1 wounded with 12 enemy
killed and 5 small arms captured. On 5 Jun 7 km NE of LZ English at
BR962086, Hawk Tm 21 from the 2d Bn, 503d Abn Inf found a tunnel,
while investigating, a mine was detonated killing 1 National Policeman
and 1 US and wounding 14 US. On 8 June approximately 3 km NE An Khe
at BR931847 killed. Results were 1 Cav-friendly killed (2 RF, 2 RD, 2 Civ),
3 wounded (1 RD, 2 Civ), 1 missing civilian and 5 small arms lost.

2. ROK Operations: On 7 June approximately 11 km WSW Phu My at
BR791642, 2d Co, 1st ROK Regt engaged an enemy force in 3 natural caves
resulting in 7 enemy killed and 3 small arms captured. On 8 June
approximately 14 km NW of Phu Cat at BR787928, 1st Co, 1st ROK Regt
engaged and killed 12 VC and captured 6 small arms. Approximately 14
km NW Phu My at BR769939 on 8 June, 4 Co 1st ROK Regt engaged and killed
12 VC. Approximately 11 km WNW Phan Dang Airfield at BR776606 on 8 June
7th Co 1st ROK Regt engaged and killed 6 VC. On 9 June 10 km NE Phu
Cat at BR791598, 12th Co, 1st ROK Regt engaged an unknown size enemy
force resulting in 2 friendly wounded and 9 enemy killed with 6 small
arms captured. Again on 8 June approximately 17 km NW Phu Cat at
BR776617, 5, 6 and 7th Co's, 1st ROK Regt made sporadic contact with an

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unknown size enemy forces. Results were 9 enemy killed and 4 small arms captured, 5 km NW of Binh Khe in a series of 6 contacts throughout the day of 9 June, the Cav ROK Regt reported 11 friendly killed, 6 wounded, 1 APC damaged and 7 enemy killed with six small arms captured. On 100530H 15 km SW of Phu My at BR169250 the 26th ROK Regt reported 5 contacts with results of 9 enemy killed and 4 small arms captured. On 120030H 5 km SW Qui Nhon, 4 CRD SP Tm engaged 10 VC, killed 7 and captured 2 small arms. On 101500H 10 km SW of Phu My at BR076001 12th Co Cav ROK Regt reported 3 contacts with unknown number of enemy resulting in 12 enemy killed and 5 small arms captured. On 151800H 11 km NW of Phu Cat at BR794175, 8th Co Cav ROK Regt ambushed an unknown size VC force resulting in 8 enemy killed and 3 small arms captured. Between 0540 and 150010H 15 km W of Phu My vicinity BR7666, 1st ROK Regt engaged unknown number of enemy in 6 company size contacts resulting in 20 enemy killed and 9 small arms captured. Between 160030H and 171500H 15 km W of Phu My vicinity BR7666 the 1st ROK Regt engaged an unknown size enemy force in 3 company size contacts resulting in 34 enemy killed, 1 prisoner, 13 small arms and 1 crew served weapon captured. On 191930H 7 km NW of Phu Cat at BR844576, Recon Co 1st ROK Regt ambushed an unknown size VC force. Results were 6 enemy killed. Between the hours of 260530 and 261215 in six separate contacts within Pnu Cat and An Nhon Districts, elements of the 1st ROK Regt killed 17 enemy, captured 4 prisoners and 13 small arms. On 151300H 3 km NW of Phu Cat at BR952528, elements of the 9th Co, 1st ROK Regt engaged and killed 5 enemy and captured 3 small arms.

3. RF/PF Operations: 9 km W Ba Gi at BR913364 190th RF Co and RD Tm 24 were attacked by an estimated enemy company using small arms, hand grenades and B40 rockets. Spooky and Moonshine supported. Results were 4 friendly killed (1 RF, 3 RD), 7 wounded (5 RF, 2 RD), and 3 small arms lost. On 9 June approximately 6 km SW of An Nhon RF BR895345, 185 RF Co was engaged by an estimated enemy company. Artillery support. Results were 15 enemy killed, 1 prisoner and 4 small arms captured. 10 km W An Nhon at BR877356 105 RF Co and M48 Tm 42 ambushed an enemy company. Spooky and Moonshine supported. Results were 1 friendly wounded and 10 enemy killed. At 141230, 10 km S of Qui Nhon at BR892539, 400 RF Co engaged 1 sampan as it attempted to land. Spooky supported. Results were 6 enemy killed and 4 small arms captured. On 150515H 10 km SE RCAC Al at BR804177 the 911 RF Co engaged an unknown size enemy force in a single contact resulting in 17 enemy killed and 13 small arms captured. On 102500H 10 km NS Phu Cat at BR844982, 208 RF platoon and FSB were attacked at Thong Hai Hamlet by an unknown size enemy force using small arms and automatic weapons. Results were 17 friendly killed (11 RF, 6 FSB), 3 wounded (2 RF, 1 FSB), 17 small arms and 1 WP-1 radio lost. On 191935H 20 km SW An Nhon at BR892566 the 2/5 RF platoon in night location received ground probe by an unknown size enemy force. Results were four friendly killed and 3 wounded. On 200400H 12 km S of Long Son at BR769449, 980 RF Co in night location received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated enemy platoon. Nortar supported. Results were 7 enemy killed and 2 small arms captured.

4. Other Operations: On 7 June 8 km N of Bong Son at BR800065 an unknown number of VC attacked Phung Du #2 Hamlet and abducted 14 PJs. On 9 June approximately 3 km W of Phu Cat at BR892318, Lambretta detonated an unknown type mine on QL-1 resulting in 1 civilian killed and 16 civilians wounded. On 111515H in Qui Nhon City at BR089239, a terrorist threw a satchel charge into the Ngoc Huong Bar, resulting in 3 friendly killed (1 US, 2 Civ) and 21 wounded (4 US, 17 Civ). On 122035, Camp
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Radcliff at An Khe (BR466467) received 18 rds of 32mm mortar, 8 which fell in the 5th SF Group National Training Center. Results were 1 friendly killed and 12 wounded (all QDQ), 7 vehicles and 7 buildings slightly damaged. At 1400 15 August 1969, the Refugee Camp and 218 RF Co at An Phu via BR961556 received 20 rounds of 82mm mortar. Artillery, gunships and spooky supported. Results were 1 civilian killed and 12 civilians wounded. On 172355H, Phu Cat Airbase in the vicinity of BR894444 received 12 rounds of 82mm mortar. Results were 1 friendly killed and 10 wounded (US). At 2200 17 August 1969, 16 km NW of Dinh Khe at BR616563 Vinh Thanh GSP Co was engaged by an unknown size enemy force. Artillery supported. Results were 2 friendly killed and 6 wounded with 4 enemy killed and 1 small arm and 1 crew served weapon captured.

(e) Coastal Provinces - June: Four ROK Regts (26th, 28th, 29th and 50th) and the 47th ARVN Regt (-) continued to conduct tactical operations and support pacification operations throughout the month. The 29th and 30th Regts conducted search and clear operation (BAEK MA 10) west of Cam Ranh between 4 June and 20 June against the 401 and 407 Support Rn's and 95 Arty Rn. Other friendly operations were designed to keep constant pressure on the enemy through the use of small unit actions in support of pacification.

1. US Operations. On 6 June Phan Rang Airbase at BN7987 received an estimated 30 rounds of 82mm mortar and 6 107mm rockets. Spooky and artillery supported. Results were 12 friendly wounded (3 US, 1 LS Civ, 8 NV Civ), 1 B57 lightly damaged, 1 1/4 ton truck damaged, 1 oxygen trailer damaged and 2 buildings damaged. On 7 June Phan Rang Airbase at BN65875 received 3 rounds of 107mm rockets. Results were 2 US killed and 8 US wounded.

2. ROK Operations. On 3 June 20 km S Tuy Hoa at QG142278 1st Co, 26th ROK Regt engaged an unknown number enemy during search operations, resulting in 6 enemy killed and 2 small arms captured. 35 km NW Cam Ranh Bay at BP740300 2d Co, 29th ROK Regt reported contacts with unknown number of enemy resulting in 1 friendly killed, 3 wounded with 10 enemy killed and 1 small arm captured. On 5 June, 25 km W Cam Ranh Bay at BP755356 10th Co 29th ROK Regt ambushed by 1 enemy squad. Results were 6 enemy killed and 3 small arms captured. Approximately 52 km SW Trung Dung at BP750314, 11th Co, 29th ROK Regt reported 5 enemy killed. On 101355H, 26 km W Cam Ranh Bay at BP739206, Recon Co 29th ROK Regt reported two contacts with an unknown size enemy force, resulting in 9 enemy killed, 3 small arms captured. On 110001H 17 km SW Tuy Hoa at QG101300, 3d Co 28th ROK Regt ambushed by an unknown size VC unit, resulting in 7 enemy killed and 3 small arms captured. On 112440H, 30 km SW Tuy Hoa at B4956260, 9th Co, 28th ROK Regt made contact with an unknown size enemy force during small unit operations. Results were 16 enemy killed and 8 small arms captured. On 120030H 35 km NW Cam Ranh Bay at BP607238, SF Team of 9th ROK Div reported 5 enemy killed. On 151430H 30 km W Cam Ranh Bay at BF715310, 12th Co, 29th ROK Regt reported contact with unknown number of enemy. Results were 12 enemy killed, 3 crew served weapons captured. On 121540H 50 km N Phan Rang at BP781995 3d Co, 50th ROK Regt engaged an unknown size enemy force during search operations in a cave. Results were 5 enemy killed and 2 small arms captured. 25 km SW of Cam Ranh Bay at BF715305 the 11th Co, 29th Regt found a weapon cache containing 5 140mm launchers. Between 140855H -141350H 30 km NW Cam Ranh Bay at BF71313 3 Co's of the 29th ROK Regt reported 12 enemy killed, 1 prisoner, 2 small arms, 5 crew served weapons (including 2 75mm RR) and 2 Chinese radios captured. On 140700H 35 km NW Phan Rang at BP657240 7th Co, 28th ROK Regt engaged and killed 5
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, I FORCER for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July RCS CSPPN-65 (R1) (U)

enemy. Between 14J00H - 14J02H 56 km NW Phan Rang vic BP3716, 30th ROK Rgt engaged an unknown size enemy force in 6 company size contacts, resulting in 26 enemy killed and 12 small arms captured. On 16J00H 25 km NW Cam Ranh Bay vic BP95134 element of the 29th ROK Rgt engaged an unknown number of enemy in 2 company size contacts, resulting in 2 friendly wounded and 6 enemy killed with 2 small arms captured. On 23J00H 17 km W of Tuy Hoe at 04185353 3 Co 28th ROK Rgt ambushed an unknown size enemy force. Results were 8 enemy killed, 2 small arms and 1 crew served weapon captured. On 25J00H 13 km 3 of Tuy Hoe at 02171550 the 1st Co, 28th ROK Rgt engaged and killed 6 enemy and captured 2 small arms. On 26J00H 3 km W of Tuy Hoe at 04187530 elements of the 28th ROK Rgt left to provide fire support for an estimated enemy force. Results were 4 friendly killed (2 US, 2 ARVN), 11 wounded (9 ARVN, 2 US).

1. ARVN Operations: On 10J00H 10 km SW Tuy Hoe at 04054345 1 platoon of the Prov Tank Co was engaged by unknown size enemy force. 2d Co, 1st Bn, 47th ARVN Inf reinforced. Results were 4 friendly killed (2 US, 2 ARVN), 11 wounded (9 ARVN, 2 US).

2. HP/PF Operations: On 8 June 25 km W of Tuy Hoe vic 04024354 at 1100H 994 HP Company was attacked by estimated enemy company resulting in 5 friendly killed and 2 friendly wounded. At 1300H 19 km W of Tuy Hoe 994 Company and Company D 16th Armor were again attacked by estimated enemy company. 155 HP Company reacted. VN artillery, gunships and Tactical Air strikes supported. Total results both contacts were 9 friendly killed, 2 wounded, 2 small arms lost and 1 enemy killed with 1 prisoner and 1 small arm captured. On 9 June approximately 6 km SW Tuy Hoe at 04098439 964 HP Co made contact with an estimated 2 enemy companies. Results were 1 FF killed, 1 HP wounded, and 4 enemy killed with 3 small arms and 1 crew served weapon captured. Approximately 5 km W Tuy Hoe at 0409465 211 HP Co Group Headquarters received 15 rounds 82mm mortar and a ground attack by an estimated enemy squad. Artillery supported. Results were 5 friendly killed, 2 small arms lost and 4 enemy killed, 3 small arms and 1 crew served weapon captured. At 1500H 11 km SW Phan Rang at 16095750 168 HP Company engaged 1 company of VC. Artillery and Spooky supported. Results were 4 friendly killed, 12 wounded, and 1 enemy killed. On 20J00H 7 km NW of Tuy Hoe at 04104260, 157th HP Co, 22 RP Co Platoon and RD VQn 75 engaged 1 WA platoon. Mortar supported. Results were 1 friendly killed and 6 enemy killed.

3. Other Operations: On 5 June 30 km NW Chao Keo at BCO24176 element of HP Recon Company made contact with estimated VC platoon. Results were 1 friendly killed (MSP), 2 wounded (1 US, 1 MSP), and 7 enemy killed with 2 small arms captured. On 8 June approximately 20 km NNE Ninh Hoa at 14010795 FDF reported an unknown size enemy force entered Thom Phu hamlet, killed 1 male and abducted 12 females.

(2) Southern Provinces - June: Pacification continues to receive increased emphasis throughout the area of operations. One battalion of the 52d Rgt was deployed to the Ben Het area. One Company of the 3d Bn 5054 Inf moved to Di Linh to provide the security normally provided by that battalion. The 2d Sqdn, 1st Cav was deployed to Binh Thuan Province to conduct pacification and security operations along Hwy 1 between An Khe and the III/IV Corps border. The 5d Bn, 5054 Inf presently has 6 combined action teams of less than platoon size working on a semi-permanent basis in hamlets in the vic of 220975. These teams have had significant results in proving the effectiveness of HP. Numerous projects have been completed which have improved the hamlets standard of living. These combined action teams are making great strides in the pacification of the local populace and development of these villages into self-sufficient communities.

1. HP Operations: On 17J0100 12 km N of Phan Thiet at 18043589 elements of 3 Troop, 2d Sqdn, 1st Cav received an unknown number of mortar rounds, 82mm rockets and small arms fire from an enemy force on the west side of N1.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1 PF/FORV for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS GSFP-65-65 (R1) (D)

Elements of 3 Trp reacted. Tactical Air strikes, gunships, and artillery supported. Results were 3 friendly killed, 5 wounded and 17 enemy killed with 1 small arm captured. On 240740H 11 km E RN Nao Loc at 271737S, Recon element 3d Bn, 503d ABn Inf engaged an estimated VC squad, gunships and artillery supported. Co C, 3d Bn, 503d Inf retracted. Results were 6 enemy killed and 5 small arms captured.

2. ARVN Operations. On 6 June approximately 3 km NW Song Mao at BN253465 1st Bn, 44th ARVN Inf made contact with unknown number of enemy. Results were 5 friendly killed and 15 wounded, with 1 57mm recoilless rifle lost and 10 enemy killed and 1 small arm captured. On 222142H 7 km NE Phan Thiet at AN161762 element 3d Bn, 44th ARVN Inf and FSBD Sherry received small arms fire from an estimated enemy platoon. Fire was returned resulting in 5 enemy killed. On 271215 at BN303583, elements of the 2d Bn, 44th ARVN Inf and 2d Troop, 8th ARVN ACAV in convoy were engaged by an estimated enemy company. Results were 2 ARVN wounded and 8 enemy killed with 1 small arm and 1 crew served weapon captured.

3. RF/PF Operations. On 6 June approximately 10 km N Phan Thiet at AN852142 23rd RF Co made contact with 1 VC platoon. Artillery supported. Results were 1 friendly killed, 2 wounded and 10 enemy killed with 2 small arms and 1 crew served weapon captured. Again on 6 June approximately 1 km SW of Duc Trung at BM199993, 153d RF Co was engaged by an estimated 2 enemy platoons using small arms fire, 840 rockets, mortar and nail shell charges. Artillery supported. Results were 11 friendly wounded with 1 small arm and 1 crew served weapon lost. On 112400 20 km W Vin Nghia at YU755278, 10th FF plt was engaged by an unknown number of enemy using small arms and 2 rounds of 60mm mortar. 125th RF Co reacted with negative results. Results were 2 killed and 6 wounded (all civilians). On 120940 18 km E Song Mao at BM077593, 6th FF plt and NCT Team 50 engaged an estimated 2 VC platoons. A Troop, 2d Sqdn, 1st Cav reacted. Gunships supported. Results were 3 friendly killed (1 US, 2 FF) 8 wounded (4 US, 4 FF), 1/4 ton truck destroyed, 1 1/4 ton truck damaged, 1 2 ton truck killed with 4 small arms and 1 crew served weapon captured. On 140130 11 km W of Phan Thiet at AR275085 RD Tm 2 and 1087th RF Co received an estimated 200 rounds of unknown type mortar fire. 3d Co, 3d Bn, 44th ARVN Inf and 785th RF Co reacted with negative results or contact. Artillery supported. Results were 7 friendly killed (5 RF, 2 RD) and 6 wounded (5 RF, 1 RD), 7 missing, (2 RF, 5 RD) with 15 small arms and 2 PRC-10 lost. On 180230 14 km N Phan Thiet at AR873248, 92d, 3d, 34th FF plts and a Trung Son team on defense of Hao An Hamlet received ground attack from unknown size enemy force. Artillery supported. Results were 1 FW killed, 17 wounded (3 RD, 5 FSBD, 11 Civilians). On 102144H 8 km NE Phan Thiet at AR902167, 164th RF Co was engaged by an unknown number of enemy using small arms automatic weapons and mortar fire. Mortar fire and artillery supported. Results were 1 friendly killed, 1 wounded and 9 enemy killed with 1 small arm captured. On 190000 17 km 3 Dalat at BP1950045, the 47th FF plt at Quang Hiep outpost was attacked by an unknown number of enemy using mortar fire followed by a ground attack. Artillery supported. Results were 6 friendly killed, 5 wounded and 7 small arms and 1 PRC-10 radio lost.

4. Other Operations. On 6 June approximately 21 km SSW Dalat at BP153007, A/5-20 Artillery and 577th Bn at Duc Trung Hqs and Lanh Kanh Airfield received an unknown number of B40 rockets followed by a ground attack. Results were 9 friendly killed (6 RF, 3 Civ) 28 wounded (18 Civ, 10 RF) with 1 crew served weapon lost and 1 enemy captured. On 102400H 10 km NE Phan Thiet at AR903165 an unknown size enemy force entered Hao Than and Hoa Bang Hamlets and abducted 16 ARVN nominees. On 12325H 1 km NW of Vin Nghia at YU934295, Nghia Binh Hamlet received 30 rounds of 82mm mortar and numerous B40 rounds. Mortar and artillery supported. Results were 8 friendly killed (7 FSBD, 1 Civ hamlet chief) and 1 wounded (PSDF).
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USTRAN: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1 PL ure Force for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969 RN 1235C (RI) (U)

1) WESTERN HIGHLAND Operations - July: Tactical operations in the Highlands subsided with the close of the Ben Het - Dak To campaign. Bomb damage assessment and area sweeps completed the police of the battlefield, two battalions each of the 47th and 53rd Regts operating in this area were returned to the 22d and 23d DA's. The 1st Bn, 53rd Regt assumed the road security mission on Highway 21 East of Ban Me Thuot thereby releasing the 2d Bn, 35th Inf (US) for employment in Pleiku Province. The 3d Bn, 12th Inf (US) deployed to Phinh Binh Province OPCON to 1st Bde.

1. US Operations: On 020735H July 12 km NW of Pleiku at ZA149513, B Co 1st Bn 35th Inf received 60 rounds of 60 and 82mm mortar and automatic weapons fire. Artillery supported. Results were 2 friendly KIA and 12 WIA. B Co, 1st Bn 35th Inf on 171030H July, 15 km NW Pleiku at ZA073573 engaged 10 enemy. Gunships and artillery supported the contact which resulted in 6 enemy killed and 1 small arms captured. On 280920H July, 30 km NW Pleiku at ZA073700, C Troop, 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav received fire from unknown size enemy force. Artillery supported. Results were 1 friendly wounded and 6 enemy killed with 2 small arms and 1 crew served weapons captured.

2. ARVN Operations: On 031000H July, 4 km S of Ben Het at ZB852421 elements of the 3d Bn 53d ARVN Inf found a base camp with 100 bunkers and 21 bodies in fresh graves. On 051000H July 4 km SW of Ben Het at ZA839262 elements of the 1st Bn, 53d ARVN Inf found 10 enemy bodies. On 241135H July 13 km NW Kontum City, at ZB180005, a truck in a 1st Bn ARVN Convoy detonated a mine on QL14 resulting in 26 friendly wounded. On 251345H July, 11 km NW Ban De Tran, at ZO834400, elements of the 3d Bn 45th ARVN Inf engaged an estimated enemy platoon. Artillery supported. Results were 1 friendly killed and 6 enemy killed with 2 small arms captured. On 290700H July, 17 km NW Buon Ho at ZB142433, 45th Rec Co ARVN received small arms and mortar fire from an unknown size enemy force. Artillery and gunships supported. Results were 3 friendly wounded, 13 wounded with 12 small arms and 1 PRG25 radio lost. On 310120H July, 14 km N of Buon Ho at ZB172507, 3 Co 4th Bn 4th ARVN Inf received 25 rds of 82mm mortar. Artillery supported. Results were 11 friendly WIA.

3. RF/PF Operations: On 160515H July, 11 km SSE Tan Canh, at ZB087125, Dak Kong Peng Village was attacked by an estimated enemy company. Reaction force entered village with negative contact. Results were 1 friendly KIA (2 RF, 1 PF) and 16 wounded (10 PF, 4 RF, 2 US) with 14 enemy killed and 1 small arms and 1 crew served weapon captured.

4. CIQG Operations: On 251015H July, 10 km S of La Thien at ZB006406, Gunships supporting insertion of CIQG vln from AN WAC received heavy ground fire. Gunships engaged. Results were 5 enemy killed. On 261300H July, 18 km S of Duc Lap at ZB004601, elements of the 3d JSP Inf ambushed an NVA platoon, resulting in 3 enemy killed and 4 small arms captured.

5. Other Operations: On 031100H 16 km N of Buon Ho at ZB755356 PRU engaged 10 VC. Results were 1 KIA killed and 6 enemy killed.

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AVFA-OC-CT 15 August 1969


(j) Binh Dinh Operations - July: The Provisional Tank Company of the 173d Abn Bde deployed to Binh Dinh to conduct pacification operations and road and bridge security in Phu My District. The 4th NSF Bn, OPN to the 173d Abn Bde conducted search and clear operations in Hoai Phu and Tam Quan Districts. Significant bomb damage of 55 enemy killed was assessed to ARC Light strikes NNE of An Khe on 25 July in reaction to increased enemy activity in that area.

1. US Operations: On 210445H, July, 22 km north of An Khe at BR514671, 17th Cav received small arms fire. Gunships supported. Results were 6 enemy killed. On 211100H, 18 km NW An Khe at BR486022, Hawkeye Aircraft observed an unknown number of enemy in the open and directed artillery fire resulting in 10 enemy killed. On 250705H, July, 29 km NNE of An Khe at BR524698 an aircraft from A Troop, 7th Sqdn, 17th Cav confirmed 25 enemy killed as a result of ARC Light Strikes. On 250700H, July, 28 km NNE An Khe, at BR502671, an aircraft from A Troop, 7th Sqdn, 17th Cav observed and engaged 6 VC in the open resulting in 6 enemy killed. On 251400H July 29 km NNE of An Khe at BR525680 A Troop 7th Sqdn and 3 patrols found 30 enemy killed by ARC Light strikes.

2. ROK Operations: On 010350H, July, 18 km NW Phu Cat at BR838578 11th Co Ist ROK Regt ambushed and killed 7 enemy and captured 3 small arms. Between 040050 - 041050H July, in the vicinity of Thanh Khe BR6540 the Cav ROK Regt in a series of 5 contacts reported 19 enemy killed and 15 small arms captured. On 261255H July, 3 km SSE of HAMMOND Airfield at BR915547 12th Co 1st ROK Regt killed 6 en and captured 5 SA. Between 100700H and 101200H July, 13 km NW Phu Cat vic BR737574, 11 Co-1 ROK Regt had four enemy contacts with unknown size enemy forces resulting in 1 friendly killed and 12 enemy killed with 3 prisoners, and 11 small arms captured. On 110450H July, 10 km SE Binh Khe at BR613333, 5 Co-Cav ROK Regt engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 6 enemy killed with 4 small arms captured. On 211410 July, 9 km NW Qui Nhon, at BR636307, 4th Co, 1st Regt engaged and killed 6 enemy and captured 4 small arms. On 230810H July, 12 km SW Phu My, at BR813575, 11 Co 1 ROK Regt ambushed 7 enemy and killed them as well as capturing 3 small arms. On 231750H 8 km N of HAMMOND Airfield at BR800570, 10 Co, 1st ROK Regt had two contacts resulting in 20 enemy killed and 14 small arms captured. On 240110H July, 10 km SE Phu My, at BR813575, 11 Co 1 ROK Regt ambushed 7 enemy and killed them as well as capturing 3 small arms. On 241730H July, 7 km NW HAMMOND Airfield at BR800570, 4th Co, 1st ROK Regt had two contacts resulting in 10 enemy killed and 7 small arms captured. On 240110H July, 10 km SE Phu My, at BR813575, 11 Co 1st ROK Regt engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 10 enemy killed and 7 small arms captured. On 250700H July, 7 km NW HAMMOND Airfield, at BR800570, 12th Co, 1st ROK Regt had 2 contacts resulting in 14 enemy killed and 7 small arms captured. On 260700H, 15 km SW Phu My at BR800560 10th Co 1st ROK Regt ambushed an unknown size enemy force resulting in 7 enemy KIA and 5 small arms captured. On 261100H July, 17 km N Qui Nhon at BR983576, 1st Co, 1st Regt engaged 3 enemy in a cave. Results were 5 enemy killed and 3 small arms captured. On 281600H July, 12 km N Qui Nhon at CR105351, 4th Co - 1st ROK Regt in two contacts engaged and killed 10 enemy and captured 6 small arms. On 311300H
July, 22 km SW Qui Nhon at BR928057, 89 Co, Cav ROK Reg engaged an unknown size enemy force. Results were 6 enemy killed and 2 small arms captured. On 310995H, 23 km SW Qui Nhon at BR921050, 12th Co, Cav ROK Reg engaged and killed 6 enemy and captured 2 small arms.

310815H, 9 km ESE Van Canh at ER9203, 10th Co, Cav ROK Regt had two contacts resulting in 6 enemy killed and 2 small arms captured.

July, 22 km SW Qui Nhon at BR928057, 89 Co, Cav ROK Reg engaged an unknown size enemy force. Results were 6 enemy killed and 2 small arms captured. On 310995H, 23 km SW Qui Nhon at BR921050, 12th Co, Cav ROK Reg engaged and killed 6 enemy and captured 2 small arms. On 310815H, 9 km ESE Van Canh at ER9203, 10th Co, Cav ROK Regt had two contacts resulting in 6 enemy killed and 2 small arms captured.

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310815H, 9 km ESE Van Canh at ER9203, 10th Co, Cav ROK Regt had two contacts resulting in 6 enemy killed and 2 small arms captured.

2. RF/PF Operations July: On 021500H 1 km SE of Tam Quan at BS905085, 132 RF Co detonated a 155 mm booby trap. Results were 5 friendly killed and 3 wounded and 3 small arms lost. On 040930H July, 3 km E of Bong Son at BR909047, 971 RF Co 21 Ton truck in con- voy was hit by a command detonated mine resulting in 15 friendly KIA. Between 0800 and 081000 12 km NE Bong Son vic of BS910085, 217 RF Co received small arms fire from an estimated VC squad and detonated 2 booby traps. Results were 13 friendly wounded. On 191020H July, 3 km S Vinh Thanh at BR693050, 1 platoon of 199 RF Co engaged a VC platoon. Results were 1 friendly wounded and 12 enemy killed with 5 small arms captured. On 241700H, 8 km NE Bong Son, at BS915004, 23d PF platoon, RD Team 92 and PSDF elements engaged an enemy platoon resulting in 5 enemy killed and 2 small arms captured. On 261450H July, 4 km NW An Nhon at BR912937, 87, 88 PF Plto of 199 RF Co engaged 13 VC in a cave. Results were 1 friendly killed and 10 enemy killed with 3 prisoners and 6 small arms captured.

(j) Coastal Provinces Operations - July: Friendly units continued tactical operations and pacification support operations throughout the month. Two battalions of the 71st Regt returned to Tuy Hoa to resume operations in support of pacification. The 26th ROK Regt with a battalion each of the 1st Regiment and the Cav Regt conducted coordinated search and clear operations northwest of Tuy Hoa against the 10th NVA Regiment, 7 July thru 21 July. Results of both operations were 338 enemy killed with 114 small arms and 3 crew served weapons captured with only twelve friendly killed and 53 wounded.

1 US Operations: On 070145H July 32 km SW An Khe at BR168192, 3/3-8 and 3/6-29 received 4 rounds B40 rocket, 8 rounds unknown size RR, followed by a ground attack from an unknown size enemy force using satchel charges. Mortar and Spooky supported. Results were 1 friendly killed and 4 wounded with 11 enemy killed. In Phu Tho Province on 081410H 14 km N W of Dong An at BR773736, 1 US LRRP reported 6 enemy killed, 4 prisoners, 1 small arms captured. In Khanh Hoa Province on 132010H, 6 km west Nha Trang, at BR965535, Team 12th/4/502 (USAF) engaged an estimated enemy platoon with small arms and automatic weapons fire. Spooky supported. Results were 10 enemy killed and 7 small arms captured.
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AVFA-GC-OT 15 August 1969
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, I FORCSV for Quarterly
Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

2 ARVN Operations: On 140230H 8 km WSW Tuy Hoa at CQ083431, 2/4-47
engaged an estimated enemy platoon. Artillery and mortar supported. Re-
sults were 8 enemy killed and 1 small arms captured. In Phu Yen Province
on 260410H, 10 km NW Tuy Hoa at CQ110572, an individual from
the 1st Bn, 47th ARVN Inf tripped an unknown number of mines connected
in series along a trail. Results were 3 friendly killed (ARVN), 20
wounded (ARVN), 3 small arms and 1 radio destroyed.

2 ROK Operations: On 021515H 14 km SW of Ninh Hoa at BP90675
11th Co 30th ROK Regt engaged 2 enemy. Results were 20 enemy killed
with 7 small arms captured. On 081420 - 081455, 25 km NW of Tuy
Hoa at BQ93655, 12th Co Cav ROK Regt engaged an unknown size enemy
force. Results were 8 enemy killed with 2 small arms captured. On
091020H 25 km NW of Tuy Hoa at BQ93555 2 Co 26th ROK Regt engaged
an unknown number of enemy in a cave. Results were 10 enemy killed
and 5 small arms captured. Between 091130H and 091340H 13 km SSW
of Dong Tre at BQ93567 1st Co the 1st ROK Regt engaged an unknown
number of enemy in 3 company size contact. Results were 13 enemy killed
with 5 small arms captured. Between 100905H and 101720H, 26 km SE
Tuy Hoa vic BQ92757 elements of the 26th ROK 1st ROG engaged four un-
known size enemy forces. Results were 25 enemy killed with 15 small
arms captured. On 130820H, 12 km NW Tuy Hoa at CQ05019, 6 Co, 28th
ROK Regt engaged an unknown size enemy force. Results were 6 enemy killed
with 2 small arms captured. On 131110H, 10 km SW Long Son at
BQ942637, 8 Co, 1st REG (ROK) engaged an unknown size enemy force.
Results were 6 enemy killed with 3 small arms captured. On 140340H,
8 km NW Tuy Hoa at CQ09416, 9 Co, 29th Regt (ROK) engaged an es-
timated VC squad. Results were 7 enemy killed, 4 small arms captured.
Between 140815H and 141350H, 20 km SW Tuy Hoa, vic BR924628, 3 Co's
from the 26th Regt (ROK) engaged five enemy initiated engagements with
enemy squad size elements. Results were 17 enemy killed, 8 small
arms, 5 crew served weapon, 1 SCR-10 radio captured. On 160840,
10 km NW Tuy Hoa, at CQ062607, 1 Co 28th Regt ROK engaged unknown size
enemy force. Results were 11 enemy killed and 3 small arms captured.
On 161025H, 27 km NW Tuy Hoa at BQ93559, Recon Co 26th Regt ROK en-
gaged an unknown size enemy force. Results were 15 enemy killed and
9 small arms captured. On 180700H, 10 km South Tuy An at CQ108598,
2 Co, 28th Regt ROK engaged an unknown size enemy force. Results were
6 enemy killed, and 2 small arms captured. On 181630H, 24 km NW Tuy
Hoa at BQ941532, 1 Co 1st Regt ROK engaged unknown size enemy force.
Results were 11 enemy killed, and 4 small arms. On 180700H, 8 km South
Tuy An, at CQ1058, 1st Bn 28th Regt ROK had 3 contacts. Results were
15 enemy killed and 4 small arms captured. On 181630H, 17 km SSE Dong
Tre at BQ93553, 2 Bn 1st Regt ROK had 2 contacts. Results were 15 enemy killed
and 5 small arms captured. On 181630H, 11 km SE Tuy Hoa at
CQ0445 2d Bn 28th Regt ROK had 5 contacts. Results were 2 friendly
wounded (ROK) and 9 enemy killed, with 3 small arms captured. On
190940H 15 km South Dong An at BQ94157, 10 Co 26th Regt ROK engaged
unknown size enemy force. Results were 8 enemy killed.

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AVFA-DC-OT
15 August 1969


4 RF/PF Operations: On 052130H 3 km South Dong Xuan at BN292759 the 98th RF Co was attacked by an estimated 2 enemy platoons. Results were 3 friendly killed and 11 wounded with enemy unknown. On 110120H, 10 km North of Tuy Hoa at O245565, the 739th RF Co (-) 27th PF Bt and NAP 71-57 were engaged by an unknown size enemy force. Artillery and gunships supported. Results were 14 friendly killed (3 US, 9 RF, 2 PD) 20 wounded (RF) and 12 weapons lost, 3 weapons and radio destroyed with 11 enemy killed and 4 small arms captured.

5 Other Operations: On 190220H 6 km SW Tuy Hoa at O210666, a mine was detonated in a market place in Long Tuong Hamlet. Results were 3 friendly killed (Civ), 21 wounded (12 Civ, 7 RF, 2 NP).

(1) Southern Provinces - July: In an attempt to continue pacification gains and in reaction to increased enemy activity, TF South and the 23rd Inf Lt CP displaced to Phan Thiet and employed the 3d BN 503d Abn Inf in Binh Thuan Province. The 3d BN, 53rd ARVN Inf returned to Lam Dong Province to conduct pacification support operations in the Bao Loc Area.

1 US Operations: On 070150H 19 km SSW Song Mao B Trp, 2d Sqdn, 1st Cav, and 5th BN 27th Artillery (US) located at Long Song NuV Compound vicinity of BN162362 received a sapper attack from an unknown size enemy force employing mortar and B40 rockets and satchel charges. Gunships, artillery and Spooky supported, results were 6 friendly killed (US), 28 wounded (27 US, 1 ARVN); B/2-1 comms bunker, 1 M548 Ammo carrier, 4 APC destroyed; enemy had 6 killed, 1 prisoner, 6 crew served weapons and 2 small arms captured. On 111927 and 112118H, 7 km North Phan Thiet at AN 811161, FSB Sherry (3-22 Artillery) received 15 rounds and 5 rounds respectively, of 82mm mortar. Artillery and mortar supported. Results were 12 friendly wounded (US). In Binh Thuan Province on 101615H, 20 km North Phan Thiet at AN825305, A Co, 3d BN, 503d Abn Inf engaged an estimated enemy squad. Artillery supported. Results were 6 enemy killed, 1 detained, and 5 small arms captured.

2 RF/PF Operations: On 010125H 4 km SW of Song Mao at BN262412, 445 RF Co in Thin Ky hamlet received an unknown number of 60mm mortar rounds and small arms fire. Shadow supported. 118 and 908 RF Co's reacted and conducted sweep operations. Results were 4 friendly killed, 8 wounded and 1 missing (RF). On 052300H 24 km SSW of Dalat at BNM08998, 605th RF Co was engaged by an unknown enemy who used small arms, B40 rocket and 60mm mortar. Artillery and Spooky supported. Results were 6 friendly killed (RF), 6 wounded (RF, 3 Civilians) and enemy unknown. On 110315H, 9 km West Duc Trong at BFO4031, 266th RF Co at Kontum Phat Hamlet was engaged by an unknown size enemy force. Artillery and Spooky supported. Results were 6 friendly killed (1 RF, 5 Civilians) 8 wounded (1 RF, 7 Civilians) and enemy unknown. On 111125H, 13 km SW Dalat at BFO95155, the 215th and 951st RF Co's and 2 armored cars reacted to the 266th RF Co contact and were attacked by estimated 2 enemy companies. 1st Co, 2-53d ARVN Inf moving behind the convoy was engaged by an estimated enemy squad. Results were 10 friendly RF wounded; 8 enemy were killed, 2 prisoners, 3 small arms captured and 1 crew served weapon captured.
### Operational Report of Headquarters, I FFORCEV for quarterly Period ending 31 July 1969 ROS C6F(R-65 (R1) (U)

#### (a) Friendly casualty figures May, June and July.

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<td>69</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPNs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>US</th>
<th>ROK</th>
<th>ARVN</th>
<th>RF/PP</th>
<th>CIDG</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JULY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>1078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPNs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Organization and Training Activities:

(a) All units that were assigned or under the operational control of this headquarters as of 31 July 1969 are listed at Inol 3.

(b) The command relationship among II Corps, ROKV-FC, I FFORCEV and major US units within II CTZ is at Inol 4.

(c) The following units were assigned/attached to I FFORCEV during the period.

1. 272d FA Det (Radar) assigned by USARV GO 1657, 10 May 1969.
2. 270th FA Det (Radar) attached by USARV GO 2291, 27 June 1969.
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2. 313th Radio Research Battalion attached by USARV GO 2432, 6 July 1969.

(d) Manpower Authorizations:

1. 2d Bn (155mm) 8th Arty (M) was reorganized under MT08 6-584, PAC 1/69 by USARV GO 291, 14 April 1969.

2. 5th Bn (8"/175mm) (SF) 22d Arty was reorganized under MT08 6-1306, PAC 2/69 by USARV GO 414, 28 May 1969.

3. 6th Bn (105mm) 27th Arty was reorganized under MT08 6-4086, PAC 2/69 by USARV GO 347, 30 April 1969.

4. 41st and 52d Arty Gp were reorganized under MT08 6-401G, PAC 1/69 by USARPAC GO 48, 5 June 1969.

5. 2d Bn (105mm) (T) 17th Arty was reorganized under MT08 6-4066, PAC 2/69 by USARPAC GO 347, 30 April 1969.

6. 5th Bn (155mm) (T) 92d Arty was reorganized under MT08 6-4266, PAC 1/69 by USARPAC GO 459, 6 June 1969.

7. 3d Bn (105mm) (SP) 6th Arty was reorganized under MT08 6-4666, PAC 1/69 by USARPAC GO 458, 6 June 1969.

8. 64th Engr Det (Terrain) was reorganized under MT08 5-500G, PAC 3/69 by USARPAC GO 435, 3 June 1969.

9. 1st Bn (Mech.) 50th Inf was reorganized under MT08 7-166, PAC 1/69 by USARPAC GO 460, 4 June 1969.

10. 167th Sig Bn (Corps) was reorganized under MT08 11-166, PAC 2/69 by USARPAC GO 447, 5 June 1969.

11. 167th Sig Co (Hq) was reorganized under MT08 11-377G, PAC 1/69 by USARPAC GO 329, 24 April 1969.

(e) Research and Development (R&D) Activities: Requests for information on R&D items from USARV and activities monitored by this headquarters. There were no requests for ENSURE (Expediting Non-Standard Urgent Requirements for Equipment) items received from assigned, attached or OPCON units. No ENSURE requests were submitted to USARV from HQ, I FORCENW.

(f) Training: Assigned and attached units, less artillery groups and battalions, are inspected semi-annually by a representative of the O&M Section, who is a member of the Inspector General's Team.

(g) Doctrine: The "Tactical Notes" publication is gaining additional readers each month. Distribution is now 1200 copies monthly. The monthly Tactical Notes are attached as inclosures to this OML.

1. Tactical Notes for May 1969 (Inclosure 5)
2. Tactical Notes for June 1969 (Inclosure 6)
3. Tactical Notes for July 1969 (Inclosure 7),

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(h) ARVN Improvement: The 6th Bn, 84th Arty (155 Towed) continued the turnover of equipment to the 45th ARVN Arty Bn. The equipment transfer and personnel training is being accomplished in a successful manner which can be attributed to the close cooperation and coordination between ARVN and US troops. The first ARVN firing battery to receive US equipment became operational in July 1969. The 45th ARVN Arty Bn will be completely operational by mid-August 1969.

(a) Herbicide operations during this reporting period have included both crop and defoliation missions. Unfavorable weather conditions throughout the II CTZ have resulted in the cancellation of 42% of the sorties scheduled.

1. The results of US Air Force UC-123 missions are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Sortie Flown</th>
<th>Hectares Defoliated (est)</th>
<th>N/T Crops Destroyed (est)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Binh Dinh</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>6860</td>
<td>3648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binh Thuan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darlac</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>5760</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khanh Hoa</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kontum</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lam Dong</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minh Thuan</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>3120</td>
<td>2304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Bon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Yen</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>10,836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleiku</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quang Duc</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuyen Duc</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>17,040</td>
<td>17,868</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Units in II CTZ are continuing to use UH-1 and CH-47 helicopters and truck based power spray apparatus to spray small areas not conducive to spray by UC-123 aircraft. The results of helicopter spray operations are as follows:

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Hectares Defoliated (est.)</th>
<th>N/T Crops Destroyed (est.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ, I FFORCEW</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROKFV-FC</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Inf Div</td>
<td>1424</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA, II Corps</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173d Abn Bde</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bn (Abn) 506th Inf</td>
<td>_0</td>
<td>_0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2099</td>
<td>611</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Riot control agents (RCA) are being employed in both offensive and defensive operations. On 28 May the 4th Inf Div employed six and 18 drums of CS, respectively, to contaminate known 85mm positions at YB 7766 18 and YB 763156. On 3 Jun the 173d Abn Bde observed 3-5 individuals hiding in rocks and caves via BS 045140 located 13 km NW of LZ English. When aircraft fire failed to bring them out, six B-158’s were employed, driving the VC from their positions. Gunships engaged and resulted in 3 VC/NVA KIA (RO). A 23 Jun mission (173d Abn Bde) at BS 747035 resulted in secondary explosions. On 24 Jun, at BR 025227, while working with the 4th Inf Div, a Snoopy gunship observed an estimated 25 NVA in the open; Cobra gunships and CS (eight XM-15) were employed and resulted in 13 NVA and 2 VC KIA (confirmed by 1/10 Cav sweep of the area). On 7 Jul, at YA 945464, 4th Inf Div fired one XM-15 on a suspected enemy location; follow-up of Cobra gunships resulted in 4 VC KIA. The 173d Abn Bde has employed air strikes delivering BLU 52 A/B CS2 bombs to harass the enemy and make it difficult for him to continue farming activities in the An Loa Valley. CS2 was used in a terrain restriction program in the Dak To–Ben het area between 29 May and 3 Jul; a total of 192 drums of CS and 54 Air Force BLU 52 munitions were used.

(c) Personnel detectors operating within the II CTZ are providing a continual source of reliable information concerning enemy locations. In most instances, CS, gunships, TAC air or artillery fire were employed against the locations of the heavy readings. All readings were submitted to the appropriate 02/S2 for evaluation.

1. The summary of personnel detector operations in II CTZ is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>APD Missions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ROKFV-FC</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Inf Div</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173d Abn Bde</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bn (Abn) 506th Inf</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>AFO Missions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3d Bn (Abn) 503d Inf</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23d ARVN Div Advisory Ta</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDC Nha Trang</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>543</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. The XM3 personnel detector is now in use in 4th Inf Div, 173d Abn Bde, 3d Bn (Abn) 503d Inf, 3d Bn (Abn) 506th Inf and 22d and 23d ARVN Div Advisory Team operations. Those XM3's and prototype XM3's which are operational, provide a backup for the XM3 in some of these units and give a personnel detector capability to elements not having XM3's (CAF and 9th ROK Dive and 24th STZ Advisory Team).

2. On 6 May, the 173d Abn Bde called an air strike on heavy readings in vic BR 495951, resulting in a secondary explosion.

(a) The enemy continued to use RCA on a small scale during offensive operations. There have been two reported enemy initiated actions during which the enemy used riot control agents. On 11 Jun, vic TB 8725, Ben Het CIDG camp received five 82mm mortar CS rounds. On 22 Jun, the 660th RF Co, Lac Thien Dist Hq and Lac Thien Dist Advisory Team (AP 9753) received a standoff attack including 2 rounds of 82mm mortar CS; CS was ineffective. The rounds apparently detonated in trees inside the compound. Fragments from the 85 round could not be found. Slight CS odor persisted approximately 45 minutes to 1 hr.

(b) G3 Air Operations.

(a) There were a total of 7519 tactical air sorties (5549 pre-planned and 1970 immediate) averaging 82.6 sorties per day. These sorties were flown in the following target categories:

1. Troops in Contact (TIC) - 659
2. Confirmed Enemy Location (CEL) - 2166
3. Acquired Enemy Location (AEL) - 1379
4. Suspected Enemy Location (SEL) - 2430
5. Fixed Target Destruction (FTD) - 214
6. Troop Assault Preparation (TAP) - 284
7. Landing Zone Clearing (LZC) - 387

(b) Of the total sorties flown this quarter, 3596 were in support of US/PAF operations in II CTZ with the following results:

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>SORTIES/DAY</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4TH INF DIV</td>
<td>1654</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>64 KIA, 5 KBA, 65 secondary explosions, 62 secondary fires, 220 bunkers destroyed, 111 structures destroyed, 2 bridges destroyed, 1 ammo cache destroyed, 1 gun position destroyed, 2 bridges destroyed, 5 foxholes destroyed, 3 tunnels destroyed, 8 trail cuts, and 70 meters of trench destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF SOUTH</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8 KIA, 3 secondary explosions, 4 secondary fires, 56 bunkers destroyed, 7 structures destroyed, 1 camp site destroyed, 1 sleeping platform destroyed, and 10 feet of trench destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173D ABN BDE</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1 KIA, 27 KBA, 10 secondary explosions, 5 secondary fires, 17 bunkers destroyed, 5 structures destroyed, 5 foxholes destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9TH ROK DIV</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13 KIA, 10 KBA, 20 secondary explosions, 29 secondary fires, 1 active gun position, 16 bunkers destroyed, 35 structures destroyed, 35 caves destroyed, 5 foxholes destroyed, 3 crop fields destroyed, and 35 meters of trench destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAP ROK DIV</td>
<td>91C</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22 KIA, 1 KBA, 47 secondary explosions, 60 secondary fires, 18 bunkers destroyed, 6 caves destroyed, 4 trail cuts, and 150 meters of trench destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I FFORCEV &amp; OTHERS</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(Includes 7th Air Force Special Interdiction sorties) 2 secondary explosions, 17 secondary fires, 18 road cuts and 27 road craters.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) During the period there were 3923 tactical air sorties flown in support of GVN operations in II CTZ. Of the total, 2231 sorties were flown in support of ARVN, 1424 sorties flown in support Provincial Forces and 248 sorties flown in support of CIDG units. The following results were obtained: 210 KIA, 45 KBA, 300 secondary explosions, 501 secondary fires, 390 structures destroyed, 194 structures damaged, 3 active gun positions destroyed, 1837 bunkers destroyed, 204 bunkers damaged, 47 pack train units destroyed, 204 foxholes destroyed, 7 bridges destroyed, 47 caves destroyed, 307 meters of trench destroyed, 6 rice fields destroyed, 350 meters of trail destroyed, 19 occupied gun positions destroyed, 2 occupied gun positions destroyed, 3 small arms ammunition caches destroyed, 1 food cache destroyed, 13 sampans destroyed, 11 spider holes destroyed, 1 windmill destroyed, 200 feet of pipeline destroyed, 2 road cuts and 15 trail cuts.
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(6) (C) Army Aviation Operations

(a) The major objective in employing the tactical aviation assets available to I FFCRCEV remains as stated in operational reports.

1. Provide air mobility to combat elements of FWM&F in II CTZ.

2. Provide aviation support to the Province Senior Advisors and CCRDS personnel in II CTZ for C&C, administrative missions and resupply.

(b) Resources available from 17th CAG are:

1. Assault helicopter assets (UH-1H "Slicks"): UNIT		SUPPORT MISSION

| 10th Combat Aviation Battalion | GS Southern Coastal, GS Southern Highlands and Task Force South, Recondo, 5th SFG(A), 23d ARVN Div, 9th ROK Inf Div, MACVSC.
| 48th AHC | 92d AHC | 155th AHC | 192d AHC | 281st AHC |
| 52d Combat Aviation Battalion | GS Northern Highlands; Prairie Fire; 4th Inf Div; 24th STZ; Highway Coordinator; Company B, 5th SFG(A) |
| 57th AHC | 119th AHC |
| 170th AHC | 189th AHC |
| 268th Combat Aviation Battalion | GS Northern Coastal; 173d Abn Bde, Cap ROK Inf Div, 22d ARVN Div |
| 61st AHC | 129th AHC |
| 129th AHC | 134th AHC |

2. The 335th AHC remains OPCON to SA IV Corps as stated in last report.

1. The 7/17th Air Cav Sqdn remains assigned to 17th CAG OPCON to I FFCRCEV and further OPCON to the 4th Inf Div, and is stationed at Camp Enari II CTZ. B Troop 7/17th Cav was released from OPCON to Task Force South on 5 Jul 69 and returned to Camp Enari and 4th Inf Div control. C Troop 7/17th Cav remains OPCON to 173d Abn Bde and is located at Lane AAF, An Son.

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4. Heavy helicopter assets:

| COMPANY | BATTALION | SUPPORT MISSION |
|---------|-----------|----------------|-------------|
| 355th HHC | 268th CAB | GS II CTZ |

5. Assault support helicopter assets (CH-47 "Hook"):  

| COMPANY | BATTALION | SUPPORT MISSION |
|---------|-----------|----------------|-------------|
| 179th ASHC | 52d CAB | GS 4th Inf Div |
| 180th ASHC | 268th CAB | GS Central Coastal |
| 196th ASHC | 268th CAB | GS Northern Coastal |
| 243d ASHC | 10th CAB | GS Southern Coastal |

6. Armed helicopter companies:

| COMPANY | BATTALION | SUPPORT MISSION |
|---------|-----------|----------------|-------------|
| 238th Avn Co (R) | 268th CAB | GS II CTZ |
| 361st Avn Co (F) | 52d CAB | GS II CTZ |

7. The 183rd, 185th, 203rd and 219th Reconnaissance Airplane Companies support the visual reconnaissance program and provide GS throughout II CTZ.

8. The 225th Surveillance Airplane Company is employed throughout II CTZ in aerial surveillance.

(c) Major accomplishments:

1. Airmobile assets were provided to the following US operations for the periods indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>SUPPORTED UNIT</th>
<th>DURATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WAYNE GRAY</td>
<td>1st Bde, 4th Inf Div</td>
<td>1 Mar - 14 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAYNE JAVELIN</td>
<td>1st Bde, 4th Inf Div</td>
<td>13 Apr - present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUTNAM PANTHER</td>
<td>2nd Bde, 4th Inf Div</td>
<td>1 Feb - 21 Jun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUTNAM TIGER</td>
<td>2nd Bde, 4th Inf Div</td>
<td>22 Apr - present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREENE THUNDER II</td>
<td>3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div</td>
<td>1 Mar - 2 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREENE ORANGE</td>
<td>3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div</td>
<td>14 Apr - 27 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREENE ORANGE II</td>
<td>3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div</td>
<td>2 May - 5 May</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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## Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st FFk'IlCiV

### Period ending 31 July 1969, RCS CMOR-65 (RF) (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>SUPPORTED UNIT</th>
<th>DURATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GREENE HURRICANE</td>
<td>3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div</td>
<td>19 Mar - 14 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREENE TYPHOON</td>
<td>3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div</td>
<td>14 Apr - 1 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREENE QUEEN</td>
<td>3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div</td>
<td>25 Apr - 6 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREENE TYPHOON II</td>
<td>3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div</td>
<td>5 May - 21 Jun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREENE CRADDO III</td>
<td>3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div</td>
<td>5 May - present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREENE BASALT</td>
<td>3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div</td>
<td>16 May - 21 Jun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREENE GALLOP</td>
<td>3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div</td>
<td>2 Jun - present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREENE AX</td>
<td>3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div</td>
<td>21 Jun - present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DANGY GRENF III</td>
<td>173d Abn Bde</td>
<td>25 Mar - 15 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANNY TWALL II</td>
<td>173d Abn Bde</td>
<td>8 Feb - 15 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASHINGTON GREENE</td>
<td>173d Abn Bde</td>
<td>15 Apr - present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HANCOCK KNIGHT</td>
<td>TF South</td>
<td>3 Apr - 7 Apr</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. ROKA Forces were allocated (on a daily basis) one AHC per division. In addition, average OH-47 allocations were 3 daily to CRID and 1 daily to 5th ROK Division. Exceptionally large allocations were provided to ROKA Forces for the following operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>SUPPORTED UNIT</th>
<th>DURATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DONG HO 7</td>
<td>1st &amp; 5th BN, 30th Regt</td>
<td>9 May - 20 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAK JAE 2-7</td>
<td>2nd BN, 29th Regt</td>
<td>10 May - 18 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BARK NA 10</td>
<td>28th Regt, 29th Regt</td>
<td>4 Jun - 20 Jun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEG HO 21</td>
<td>1st Regt, 3rd BN, Cav Regt, 1st BN, 26th Regt</td>
<td>7 Jun - 21 Jun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAJ JAN JIN 9</td>
<td>29th Regt, 2nd BN, 1st Regt &amp; 3rd BN, Cav Regt</td>
<td>7 Jul - present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DO LAK BK 13</td>
<td>28th Regt</td>
<td>7 Jul - present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. ARVN Forces in II CTZ received two AHC on a daily basis to support their airmobile operations. During the reporting period, aviation assets provided 24th ARVN CTZ for Operations: MACV全域旅游 and joint Task 1 rose from a daily allocation of 6 slicks, 2 guns to 14 slicks, 6 guns and 1 hook daily.

4. Airmobile assets were provided the following special operations as directed by MACV: Prairie Fire, Jules House, Project Delta, Recondo School.
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2. Airmobile assets were provided to the following units or agencies on a general support basis:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit or Agency</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 FFKCRV Staff</td>
<td>IBC - Nha Trang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st Signal Group</td>
<td>MACV Engr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th Bde</td>
<td>US Navy Spt Fac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay Spt Cmd</td>
<td>100th Log Cmd (ROK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFFV Arty</td>
<td>Qui Nhon Spt Cmd</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2d. (c) Logistics Activities.

(1) Supply:

(a) The overall supply of troop requirements continues to be satisfactory. There are no significant shortages of supplies and equipment which significantly impair the operational capability of the command.

(b) Emphasis was continued on the identification and retrograde of excess supplies and equipment during the quarter. A total of $2.7 million dollars in excess has been identified and retrograded to 1st Log Cmd since this program was initiated in January 1969.

(c) The shortage of 1/4 ton vehicles due to the transfer to ARVN eased somewhat during the quarter as limited assets became available.

(d) There are 20 items under ASR control at the end of the quarter, an increase of 6 items over last quarter. The items under ASR control are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DODIC</th>
<th>ITEM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C256</td>
<td>61mm HE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C445</td>
<td>105mm HE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C468</td>
<td>105mm CS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C705</td>
<td>4.2&quot; HE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D544</td>
<td>155mm HE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D572</td>
<td>175mm HE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D680</td>
<td>8&quot; HE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F497</td>
<td>Fuze Burster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G911</td>
<td>Grenade, Offensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H459</td>
<td>2.75&quot; Rocket, Fleckette</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ITEMS

H47 2.75” Rocket, HVY, HE
H489 2.75” Rocket, LT, HE
H490 2.75” Rocket, LT, HB
H534 2.75” Rocket, HVY, HE
L307 Signal, WS Cluster
L312 Signal, WS Parachute
M432 Charge, TNT
M131 Cap, Blasting
M456 Cord, Detonating

TRANSPORTATION

(a) Air: The discussion of air movements will include routine and emergency airlift requirements and use of C7A dedicated aircraft.

1. The volume of airlift operations throughout II CTZ has continued its decreasing trend during the current quarter. The total movement of routine cargo from depots to forward areas has increased, but the total increase was in highway and sea moves.

Supply Movements from Depots to Forward Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Air (S/T)</th>
<th>Sea (S/T)</th>
<th>Highway (S/T)</th>
<th>Total (S/T)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>29,950</td>
<td>39,727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>7,844</td>
<td>26,527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>7,330</td>
<td>25,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>795</td>
<td>45,104</td>
<td>91,191</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. A small increase was noted in the number of emergency airlift missions flown during this quarter, (38 missions and 170 sorties). The emergency aerial resupply of Ben Hat by air drop accompanied for the majority of these missions (21 missions and 97 sorties).

Emergency Airlift (1968 - 1969):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>C-130*</th>
<th>C-123*</th>
<th>C-7A*</th>
<th>Pax</th>
<th>S/T Cargo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug-Oct</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>5,011</td>
<td>2,079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov-Jan</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3,199</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb-Apr</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6,736</td>
<td>1,309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May-Jul</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2,461</td>
<td>411</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1. I FFGCSEV dedicated C-7A aircraft movements remained at a relatively constant level.

Dedicated C-7A Airlift (1968 - 1969):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>PAX</th>
<th>S/T Cargo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug-Oct</td>
<td>6,321</td>
<td>50,144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov-Jan</td>
<td>6,106</td>
<td>45,984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb-Apr</td>
<td>6,100</td>
<td>41,502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May-Jul</td>
<td>6,220</td>
<td>35,707</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Highways: The major highways in II CTZ remained open throughout this quarter, with high volume of convoy traffic noted. Convoy operations were not significantly hindered by the 84 highway ambush and mining incidents reported involving regulated highways within II CTZ. US and ARVN convoys were conducted from Cam Ranh Bay to Phan Thiet during this quarter. A minimum of 3 convoys per month are planned in support of the Phan Thiet area.

(c) Water: The only forward area being supplied by water in II CTZ is Phan Thiet. This operation is constantly hindered by shifting sandbars, changing tides and the physical condition of the unloading ramp. The B.D.L. Page is still able to utilise the ramp but all LST's must be beached for off-loading.

(d) Rail: The railroad operating in II CTZ increased it's tonnage output by over 50% during the report period. The increase reflects movement of supplies plus larger movements of rock from various quarries for highway construction.

Rail Movements (May-Jul 69):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORB</th>
<th>OWH</th>
<th>Total S/T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>25,162</td>
<td>19,572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>25,160</td>
<td>8,254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>25,140</td>
<td>6,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>75,482</td>
<td>34,676</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Maintenance: During the reporting period, the I FFGCSEV CMMI Team conducted twenty-one inspections. Twenty units were rated satisfactory and one unit was rated unsatisfactory. Overall, the results of these inspections showed a significant improvement over last quarters results. However, of the two major portions of the inspection, Maintenance Management and Operations remained the lowest. Repair Parts Supply, TARES and Safety were the problem areas. In the matériel portion of the inspection, Tactical and Support Vehicles and Weapons scored the lowest.
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15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, I FORGEV for Quarterly
Period Ending 31 July 1969 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

1. (c) Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support.

(a) Office of Development Operations

(a) Agriculture

1. Provincial reports indicate large plantings of TN-8/5 this
quarter. The coastal provinces expect to reach their quota of 13,000
hectares, and some hope to exceed them. A wide range of problems are
plaguing the highland provinces. Late and low amounts of rainfall
have delayed both paddy and broadcast plantings. Movement of fer-
tilizer and pesticides into insecure areas has reduced plantings in
Darlac. In Quang Duc Province the Agricultural Service Chief recent-
ly returned from military service and there are hopes of getting
programs underway.

2. The use of fertilizer has depended upon its availability and
cost. Farmers are prone to use only a part of the total recommended
application to the rice crop when the cost of fertilizer, in their
thinking, is too high. Extension Cadre are clarifying these points
in their farm meetings. Urea has been in good supply but mixed fer-
tilizer was short for a limited time. Distribution remains a prob-
lem, however, it has been greatly improved this quarter. The Central
Farmers Association has increased shipping to Nha Trang for distribu-
tion to farm organizations and private dealers. Warehouse storage is
a problem and the Region I and II Farm Organization Advisor is at-
tempting to resolve it. Private enterprise is exhibiting more in-
terest in fertilizer and other farm commodities. One businessman
has recently contracted with the Agriculture Development Bank for
use of a large warehouse for receiving, storage and distribution of
most farm commodities.

3. The selection of cooperator-demonstrators for the 1969 swine
production program is continuing. Six of the twelve unit cooperators
have been selected. The cooperators will receive training in breed-
ing, feeding and disease management. Protein production is gaining in
popularity as more people are realizing profits associated with raising
chicken and swine. Import of chickens for broiler production and
use of vaccines have helped to increase the protein meat supply since
early 1969. Pilot demonstrations have generated interest on the part
of others to get into protein production projects. Interest is grow-
ing in raising chickens for egg production. This will increase the
supply of eggs and extend the use of high breed stock to maintain
higher production per unit.

4. A military survey team reported to Binh Dinh Province in April
to start survey of the Song Con Irrigation project. Security has
allowed work by the team. War damage to the Ben Bap Dam in Kham, Hoa
has been repaired and the structure is now supplying water to 1000
hectares of rice land. The North and South Canals of the Phu Yen
irrigation system required extensive repair due to use and artillery
damage. The An Thuan dam, Binh Dinh, is 85 percent complete. The
Thai Phien dam, Buyer Duc, is reported 100 percent complete but
still has some defects, causing delay in acceptance until the defects
are repaired according to advisory recommendations. Temporary accept-
ance was made in June 85 of the Suoi Dau irrigation dam, Khanh Hoa.
This VN $16,000,000 dam will improve water supply for an additional
2000 hectares of rice land.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, I FFORCEV for Quarterly
Period Ending 31 July 1969, RGS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(b) Education

1. Planning and coordination were made for the upcoming adult education workshop scheduled to be held in Nha Trang during the first week of August. Materials for this workshop were received and stored. The adult literacy workshop planning, started in the first quarter, resulted in considerable activity during May, June, and July. Five-day workshops were held in Tuyen Duc, Binh Duong, Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan, Phu Bon, Binh Dinh and Pleiku Provinces. Plans have been made for workshops in Quang Duc and Kontum.

2. The secondary education survey was finished in late April. Copies of it were sent to Chief, Secondary Education Division in USAID/Education, Saigon and to the NLD Advisors in the provinces. This survey must be kept current if it is to retain its value; it represents complete information on the secondary schools in Region II and is probably the only instrument of its kind in Vietnam.

3. On 7-8 May secondary Education officials from the Directorate in Saigon, USAID Secondary Education Advisors and II CTZ Education Branch staff members visited secondary schools in Nha Trang, Dalat, and Man Me Thuot. The purpose was to inspect science laboratories furnished by USAID five years ago and to discuss tentative plans for a series of science workshops for II CTZ. Between 3-5 July, an advisor was in Saigon to attend the closing ceremonies for the Faculty of Pedagogy workshop for natural science teachers. At that time further definitive plans were made for science workshops scheduled to be held in Dalat periodically in the months ahead. Final plans for the first workshop, scheduled for physics and chemistry teachers to be held during the third week in August, were made between 7-9 July in Dalat with University of Dalat officials.

4. During May and June word was received from Saigon that approval had been granted for the following secondary schools to receive construction commodities: Bo De, Nha Trang; Tri Duc, Dalat; Vinh Xuong, Khanh Hoa and Dien Khanh Semi-Public School, Khanh Hoa. Numerous other schools are expected to be granted approval to receive construction commodities in the months ahead.

5. The new agricultural high school in Ninh Thuan Province was visited in late May and was found to be operating fairly well. Many improvements are needed; recommendations were made to province officials for assistance in obtaining electricity, tools, furniture and materials.

6. Again, substantial progress was made on completing the dormitories for the Qui Nhon Normal School. The dormitories, to house a total of 800 students, are now 95% completed. The advisor to the normal school has recently insisted on modifying some of the original construction plans for the school and dormitories; this matter remains to be resolved.

7. No significant change in enrollment figures occurred in May, June or July.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, I FFORCEV for quarterly Period ending 31 July 1969, ROE CSFR-65 (R1) (U)

(c) Refugee Division

1. The second quarter of 1969 has seen important advancements under the Ministry of Health, Social Welfare and Relief in programs of refugee relief, care of war victims, resettlement, and assistance in return to hamlet. In most provinces real efforts have been made in upgrading refugee resettlement sites to the level of functioning hamlets with roads, schools, water supply, health facilities, village and hamlet elections, people self-defense forces and self-support economic projects. At this point they are normalized as GVN hamlets. CORDS Advisors have played a progressive and creative role in all areas showing outstanding development. Civic action by ARVN, U.S., and Free World Forces have made extensive contributions to engineering, construction and commodity distribution projects. Voluntary agencies and organizations have continued to make outstanding contributions in health, commodity distribution, education and child care. Over 100 institutions such as leprosariums, boarding schools, old folks homes, orphanages and day care centers for the children of working parents assist in meeting the social welfare needs of people.

2. Up to the end of the quarter the Ministry had allocated 84,172,600 $VN in Temporary Relief (Imprest) Funds of which 30,488,490 $VN was spent as follows:

| Temporary Relief Payments          | 23,596,220 $VN |
| Disaster and War Victim Payments   | 6,591,455 $VN  |
| Day Labor and Camp Chief Payments  | 1,994,000 $VN  |
| Miscellaneous and others          | 6,906,015 $VN  |

For resettlement and return to hamlet 217,106,867 $VN was allocated and 28,447,102 $VN expended in the following ways:

| Housing Allowances                | 12,912,000 $VN |
| Rice and Salt Allowances          | 18,004,259 $VN |
| Education and Voc. Training       | 3,522,814 $VN  |
| Health                            | 15,500 $VN     |
| Others                            | 3,994,529 $VN  |

New refugees amounted to 2,240 in the quarter and the total refugees in and out-of-camp decreased from 426,726 to 360,950, a reduction of 65,766.

3. Although pacification has been proceeding more rapidly in the coastal lowlands among predominantly Vietnamese villagers, resettlement in place has proceeded under the obstacle of enemy harassment in the mountain provinces. The Quang Due Social Welfare office and warehouse were completely destroyed by VC attack during June. The most notable movements back to hamlet occurred in Binh Dinh and Phu Yen. Smaller returns were registered in Khanh Hoe, Binh Thuan, and Barlac with a total return to hamlet of 52,694. GVN assistance to the returnees lagged in Binh Dinh and Phu Yen; increased advisory attention at all levels is being devoted to improving performance in these provinces.

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4. The initiation of a data processing card record system for the large number of out-of-camp refugees in Binh Dinh is outstanding. The Ministry has authorized the use of the printout lists for making payments and commodity distributions. Work which would have taken two years or more to process 164,810 refugee registrants has now been done within a few months. The system is also producing a number of other advantages such as revealing thousands of duplicate registrations and producing name lists for return to newly secured hamlets. As a modernizing tool for relief administration it has definite national possibilities. A simpler filing system using colored tabs for in-camp permanent refugee registration files has been introduced in two provinces and projected for others in conjunction with in-service training for Vietnamese Service Staffs.

(c) Self Help

1. The Village Self Development program continues to gain momentum; 517 of the 593 villages in the CORDS area are now listed in the VSDF program. The majority of these villages are now in phase V of the selection and implementation of projects stage of the program.

2. As of 31 July there were 1,612 category IA projects (costing under 50,000 $VN each) approved. Of this number 205 have been started and 85 are reported complete. Seven provinces and two cities reported a total of 463 category IB projects (costing between 50,000 and 150,000 $VN each) approved as of 31 July 1969. Five of these are underway with no completions reported. Five provinces have proposed and received approval for 136 category II projects (costing over 150,000 $VN each). One of these projects has been completed.

3. Livestock and poultry distribution projects account for more than 50% of all projects selected by the villages.

(g) Logistics. Construction of 11 of the 15 Provincial Maintenance Shops programmed for II CMS has progressed to a point where shops can be placed on an operational basis. Construction contracts for the remaining two shops (Darlac and Quang Due) have been awarded. It is expected that actual construction of these shops will have begun prior to the end of July 1969. In conjunction with the above, the training of Vietnamese personnel to staff these shops has been completed in Phu Binh. Training is currently in progress in 8 other shops and is scheduled to begin in the remaining two (Phu yen and Tuyen Duc) on 1 August 1969.

(f) Public Health Division.

1. From January 3, 1969 to April 30, 1969, most of the Health Education Assistants were in Saigon for training designed to upgrade their professional capabilities. In order to take advantage of this training and to continue the advancement of health educators, the Regional Health Education Advisors are again visiting all the provinces and assisting their counterparts to plan and implement health education program in "Sanitary Housing; Malaria Control; National Plague Programs; Personal hygiene; etc." The advisors have also assisted their counterparts in
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planning and arranging for a regional health educators' meeting. There is a noticeable increase in health educators's activities and effectiveness during the past quarter.

2. The Regional Nurse Advisor again re-evaluated nursing personnel and programs in Region II. Emphasis will continue to be placed upon utilization of nursing personnel in an advisory role where the Vietnamese have expressed interest in the program. As a conclusion of the recent re-evaluation which showed areas where a lack of host country interest existed, three general duty nurse advisors have been or will be shifted. Public health activities have increased in Khanh Hoa Province as a direct result of the advisory efforts of the Public Health Nurse Advisor.

3. The placing of the Malaria Control Program under the Rural Health Chief seems to have caused a regression in the activities of the program. At the Regional Malaria Meeting in Qui Nhon, it was decided to ask the GVN/MOH to restore the Malaria Control Program to its former status. There has been a general increase in the number of clinically-diagnosed cases of malaria during this quarter. With the present difficulty in obtaining and having slides read, the region has not been able to confirm as many which should overcome this difficulty.

4. Some progress in joint utilization of medical facilities between GVN/MOH and DOD have been made during this quarter. Presently, joint utilization is in effect in Gia Nghia. The province hospitals in Phu Bon and Phu Yen are making progress toward joint utilization. Phu Bon and Phu Yen Provinces are in the second phase of the joint utilization program.

5. During the past quarter there was a large rotation of MILPHAP personnel. MILPHAP team No. 1 (U.S. Navy team) was rotated in total. A new MACV/USAID Joint Directive #1-69 was received. The directive does not alter the MILPHAP teams’ mission or operation.

6. There has been some slight improvement in garbage and waste disposal this quarter due to added effort on the part of the KOPREK team and Regional Sanitarian. Garbage trucks have been received by Binh Dinh, Pleiku Khanh Hoa, Binh Thuan, Tuyen Duc and Cam Bang. These trucks when operational will greatly aid in garbage and waste disposal.

7. Even though there was a reduction of TCN workers during the previous quarter, the medical logistical supply system continued to operate effectively. The regional warehouse, on the average, shipped over 80 tons of medical supplies per month. The shipping of this tonnage involves the processing of over 1,053 line items per month. The need for increased warehouse space has become more noticeable during this period.
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1. There are 371 of an authorized 392 RD Cadre Groups operating in I CTZ. The suspension of recruitment of RD Cadre, which was reported last quarter, was terminated, and an area restrictive alternativeCadre nomenclature each province to recruit at a rate equal to the previous month's attainment rate. This will enable groups to maintain their current operating strength, but the goal of 392 groups will not be reached. This is not considered a critical problem in view of the fact that good leadership within the program is limited. The mediocrity in the area of cadre discipline during the quarter was an indication that more emphasis should be placed on quality rather than quantity.

2. There are 81 Son Then RD Cadre Groups operating in I CTZ. The number of Son Then RD Cadre groups in Kontum Province was reduced from 11 to 7, largely because of a persistent problem with absenteeism among the groups which were disbanded. The dismissal of those cadre who had been found to be AWOL on several occasions was somewhat of a problem in the RDA officials insisted on retaining a considerable number of the delinquent cadre for manning the remaining groups. It was ultimately decided that this solution was acceptable, and the situation is now resolved. Khanh Hoa Province was authorized additional Son Then Groups, and Pleiku was authorized 3 additional groups, bringing their totals respectively to four and seven groups. These groups have already been recruited and are in the process of being equipped and trained. At the request of the RDA Barac an additional Son Then Group has recently been authorized. As the number of groups authorized for the entire I CTZ area remains static, it was necessary to reduce the groups authorized for Binh Dinh from four to three. The Province Chief and the RDA in Binh Dinh concurred with this reduction.

3. On 1 July 1969, support and management of the RD/STRO Cadre program became the responsibility of the RDA. The general opinion among RDA is that the program will improve once the problems inherent with the changeover are resolved.

4. During the quarter literacy workshops were conducted in Binh Dinh, Tuyen Duc, Pleiku and Phu Ben. Representatives from RD/STRO Groups were taught basic teaching principles to use upon return to their assigned village.

5. Phase II, or the Accelerated Pacification Campaign - 1969. began on 1 July 1969. RD/STRO Cadre groups began moving into their Phase II target villages in June and are currently in the process of becoming settled and beginning their work.

(2) Office of Territorial Forces.

(a) Regional and Popular Forces.

1. Since 1 May 1969, several improvements affecting Territorial Forces advisory effort, equipment and force structure have occurred.

2. JGS response to request for additional RF/PF units for II CTZ resulted in the following increase of PF platoons above and beyond the 1969 CY authorization:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>PF Platoons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Binh Dinh</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lam Dong</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuyen Duc</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binh Thuan</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minh Thuan</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darlac</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Bon</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khanh Hoa</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Yen</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kontum</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleiku</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the 125 additional PF platoons, 69 have been recruited and 21 have entered training centers. All units are expected to enter training centers by November 1969. II CTZ is presently authorized 1328 PF Platoons of which 1203 are operational. JGS also authorized 4 additional RF companies for II CTZ which increased the number of authorized RF units to 359. On 30 June 1969, three CIDG Camps, Vinh Thanh in Binh Dinh Province, Buon Blech in Phu Bon Province and Dong Tre in Phu Yen Province converted to form 13 RF companies. There are currently 355 RF companies deployed.

3. One additional RF/PF Group Headquarters has been authorized by JGS to fulfill the command and control requirements of the Darlac Province FULRO units. This unusual authorization was based on ethnic requirements rather than military, but is expected to contribute significantly to the political affiliation of the FULRO people towards the Government of Vietnam. II CTZ is presently authorized 55 RF/PF Group Headquarters and all are operational.

4. A major revision in the distribution of Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT) occurred as a result of a study on the deployment and utilization of teams. Three MATs were moved from Khanh Hoa Province and one team was transferred from Minh Thuan. The recipient provinces were Binh Dinh (3) and Pleiku.

5. Significant advancement toward achieving established goals in equipment modernization of RF/PF units took place during this quarter. The current goal for M-16 rifle issue is 100% by November 1969. As of 31 July 1969, a total of 32,896 M-16 rifles had been issued to II Corps RF units. This is 65.6% of the authorized number and an increase of 34.7% for the end of the last reporting period. PF units have received a total of 16,215 M-16s; 37.5% of the authorized M-16s have been issued. 73.3% of the authorized PRC-25s have been issued and indications are that 100% issue will be attained by the end of August. PF units will not receive AN/PRC-25 radios in significant quantities until all RF units have received their authorized number of radios. PF units continue to utilize AN/PRC-10s in lieu of AN/PRC-25s. Figures reflected above do not reflect reports from Binh Dinh and Minh Thuan Provinces for July 1969.

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The PSDF program continues to gather momentum and develop stature in the over-all national defense and pacification effort. Intensified recruitment programs yielded a total of 98,895 members organized during the period, boosting the total II Corps strength to 272,590 -- 10% of the year-end goal as of 25 July 1969. Training, although lagging behind the organizing pace, has made significant strides toward attaining assigned goals and upgrading the effectiveness of the forces. Particularly noteworthy were the progressive training programs implemented in Bình Định, Phú Yên, Pleiku, Lâm Đồng and Kontum, where the use of training centers, mobile training teams employed at village and hamlet level, and extensive use of FWAP in PSDF training, has proven most effective in the development of these programs. The training status now stands at 169,875 or 76% of the goal. Also with respect to training, 96 new cadre members began the PSDF training course at the National Training Center at Vung Tau on 14 July 1969 bringing the total of school trained cadre members to 146 of the authorized 247. Armament of PSDF members has progressed extremely well through the first phase of the 1969 campaign. 62,574 weapons are now in the hands of PSDF members (60% of goal) of which 17,608 were issued during the period covered by this report. The revised goal of 78,660 reflects an increase of 6,756 weapons which also improves our over-all armed to trained ratio from 1:4 to 1:5.

Three major changes took place in the program during the quarter:

a. The MOI has expanded the program to include women, youth from age 13, and males to age 55 on a volunteer basis.

b. All goals for the 1969 program were revised as follows: organized down from 354,000 to 260,477; trained down from 267,200 to 224,245; armed up from 71,924 to 78,660.

c. The basic load for all PSDF weapons was increased in response to frequent complaints of insufficient quantities of ammunition during engagements. Authorizations are now equivalent to other NVAF.

During the past four months some assessment of the effectiveness of the program has been made possible by collecting data from the TOG incident reports, police reports and PSDF spot reports. During this period there were 319 enemy initiated ground attacks on villages and hamlets. PSDF was directly involved in 131 or 41%. Results: friendly 96 KIA, 168 WIA, 158 MIA or abducted; enemy 41 KIA, 2 CIA.

Office of PROFO, Chieu Hoi and Civic Action

Civic Action

1. Enemy activity had virtually no effect on civic action in II Corps during the period. New tactical concepts and force deployments by allied forces have enhanced civic action by providing maximum security to villages and hamlets. The most notable example of this strategy has occurred in Bình Định Province which contains the majority of the II Corps population. The 173d Abn Bde has collocated battalion CPs with each district headquarters which allows for maximum communication and
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coordinetion. Squad-size troop units have been deployed in security missions in the vicinity of villages and hamlets. Additionally, one brigade from the 4th Infantry Division deployed from Pleiku Province to Binh Dinh (An Khe). This move freed additional 173d Abn Bde units to participate in pacification support missions.

2. The recent lull in combat activity has allowed tactical units to participate in civic action to an unprecedented degree. The 173d Abn Bde actively supports 19 schools, 12 orphanages, five hospital/dispensaries, and three refugee centers.

a. The LZ English Health School and Dispensary was organized by the 173d Abn Bde in October 1968. Since that time, eight classes have graduated totalling 125 students. The school teaches Vietnamese the basic rudiments of medicine and sanitation. Graduates return to their hamlets and villages as health workers, health advisors, or work in local dispensaries. The dispensary treats approximately 900 patients per month at LZ English.

3. Increased security in the 173d TAOR has had a dramatic impact on the people. The fishing village of Thien Chanh in Tam Quan District had 42 people residing there on 15 April. The majority of the populace had moved away due to VC pressure. The fishermen were forced to use their sampans for transporting VC supplies in addition to giving up part of their fish to the enemy. For the past two months, US forces and national police have escorted the sampans to their fishing grounds each morning and returned with them each evening. As a result of this security, confidence has returned to the villagers. Today a fishing fleet, consisting of over 300 persons, fishes unmolested and over 1500 people have returned to the hamlet. In another case, the hamlet of My Duc in Hoi Nhon District was totally deserted on 15 April. Due to increased security in the area, and a demonstrated confidence in the GVN, nearly 500 persons have moved back. Additionally, several hundred former residents have come to the village to work on their homes and farm their fields. It is believed they will return when their homes are repaired.

b. Operating in the Western Highlands, the 4th Inf Div has been active in civic action. The division sponsors 20 schools, 10 hospitals, one leper colony, and three orphanages. The division has 12 resident civic action teams deployed in consolidated hamlets. These teams work with the people, conduct MEDCAPS, give instructions on sanitation, first aid, and basic engineering (construction) skills. These teams have recently incorporated ARVN soldiers and are teaching them civic action skills and techniques on an OJT basis. Through the MEDCAP program, division medical personnel have treated nearly 250,000 people during the period.

3. ROK support of civic action has been on the upswing. Particularly noteworthy projects are the building of a large cultural center in Qui Nhon (Binh Dinh Province) and the rebuilding of an irrigation canal in An Hoa. The irrigation canal south of Tuy Hoa is a major project involving rebuilding of the canal and strengthening of the banks. An access road is being built adjacent to the canal. The entire project covers 9.5 kilometers.
Emphasis on promoting ARVN civic action is finally bearing fruit and command emphasis on the progress is being applied. A three week ARVN Civil Affairs Course has been instituted in Pleiku. Since 21 June, two courses have been held and 74 students have graduated. After the first course, fourteen ARVN NCO CA team leaders joined CA teams of the 4th Inf Div, which are deployed in villages. It is hoped that the ARVN/GVN image will thus be projected into these villages. The remaining graduates are returning to their units to form CA teams. The 2d Bde of the 4th Inf Div is also promoting ARVN civic action. Paired-off with the 3d Bn, 42d ARVN Regt, the brigade financed the construction of a school in Vo Lam in Kontum Province. Though construction has been delayed several times due to tactical considerations, ARVN troops are now completing the project. Maximum publicity will be afforded this accomplishment which should bolster the GVN prestige in the area.

One of the primary goals of the Military Civil Affairs Division has been to get all civic action within the provinces fully coordinated. As a result of this emphasis there are presently six provinces that have CA Coordination Centers. The center in Phu Yen Province offers a good example. The coordinating center was formed on 1 May 1969 at a meeting attended by US, ROK, and Vietnamese S5 representatives. A platoon from the 41st CA Co located at province headquarters coordinates all civic actions in the province, establishes priorities, and assigns tasks. This has resulted in a great saving of materials and avoids duplication of effort. It is also causing civic action to be moved out into the districts where heretofore it was practically non-existent.

The 1969 Self-Help program differs in some respects from that of previous years. The 1969 program is more of a "people's program" and has much greater appeal to the people. Projects must reflect the need, desire and will of the people. A good example of self-help is occurring in Son Hoa District in Phu Yen Province. The people requested that a bridge be build at Cung Son. The bridge would facilitate commerce and stimulate the economy at Cung Son. US forces agreed to supply the materials only if the people would do the actual construction. The Vietnamese agreed to do this. Civic pride has been generated to the extent that 150 laborers per day are now working on the bridge free of charge. Completion of the 287 foot span is expected in early August.

The Military Support of Pacification Fund (MSPF/AlK) monthly ceiling for II CTZ was reduced on 1 June 1969 from 10,400,000 $VN to 6,240,000 $VN per month. On 1 July 1969 the fund was increased to 1,427,000 $VN to support the new program 12 for Phoenix, raising the II CTZ ceiling to 7,667,000 $VN per month. Expenditures not supporting the 1969 pacification guidelines were discovered during this period and extensive efforts have been made by this office to reverse this trend and place emphasis on the program that supports the pacification guidelines. During this period only 75% of the money allocated was utilized. Of that amount approximately 34% was spent on the priority programs and about 50% was spent on construction under the Public Works Program. It is expected that the reduced monthly ceiling and the efforts mentioned above will reverse this trend during the next quarter and bring expenditures in line with the guidelines of pacification.
The US/PMAP Civic Action and PSYWAR Fund ceiling for 1st FFORVN has been raised from 100,000 $VN to 300,000 $VN. This additional money will be used to supplement funds of US tactical units as required and to finance those US tactical units not having funds for civic action.

Due to the increasing emphasis on Civic Action in the I CTZ, a four-day Civic Action Orientation Course has been organized at 1st FFORVN-CORDS. The course is intensive in nature and is designed to orient personnel engaged in civic action/civil affairs with the many facets of their work. Students are drawn from both US tactical units and advisory teams. The Commanding Officer, 41st Civil Affairs Company has overall responsibility for the course with instructor support provided by 1st FFORVN-CORDS. The first course began on 2 July 1969 and the second course begins on 17 September 1969. The course includes 25 separate subjects, a field trip and a seminar.

(b) Military PSYOP.

1. Aerial PSYOP activities during the second quarter, CY 1969 included the dissemination of over 611,000,000 leaflets and 1246 loudspeaker hours. Ground loudspeaker hours during the period totaled 2565 hours. ARVN and ROK operations included the hand dissemination of over 6,000,000 leaflets and 4340 loudspeaker hours. The 8th PSYOP Bn printed 40,707,117 leaflets, 770,064 newspapers and 1,070,650 posters, booklets, and handbills. (Incl 8-9-10).

2. Major PSYOP Campaigns conducted during the quarter were the GVN Nationwide Rewards Campaign, the Xuan Que Huong Campaign, the Voluntary Informant Program, and Nguyen Trai II. The Xuan Que Huong Campaign commenced on 7 Feb 69 and terminated on 31 May 69. Extensive PSYOP support was given this Chieu Hoi Campaign. During the campaign 1173 Hoi Chanh rallied to the GVN which is the highest number of ralliers for a four month period since early 1967. More than 2,000,000 leaflets, handbills and posters have been disseminated in support of the GVN Nationwide Rewards Program. An evaluation of the program during the month of May indicated that added emphasis should be given this campaign. Military PSYOP Division prepared a letter to PSAs and commanders of OPCON units directing command attention be given PSYOP activities to insure that information concerning the benefits of the program are disseminated to the widest possible audience. The letter also stressed hand-to-hand distribution of PSYOP materials and face-to-face communication. The Regional PSYOP Coordinating Center, Nha Trang developed two special loudspeaker tapes, one for ground dissemination and one for aerial dissemination to promote the program. These tapes were developed in Vietnamese, Khmer, Cham, and Kinh. PSYOP support of the Voluntary Informant Program continued during the reporting period. The results of the program for the month of May and June indicated a marked increase in the number of bits of information reported throughout the CTZ. Provincial MIL/PSYOP advisors solicited the assistance of Provincial agencies (MIL/PSYOP, R E, APTs) to assist in the dissemination of PSYOP material during their operations throughout the province. The 8th PSYOP Bn began production of materials centered around information collection themes (Previous media had emphasized the collection of materials). The Nguyen Trai II Campaign is a GVN sponsored program that supports the Chieu Hoi Program. The program was launched on 15 June and will run through 15 September. The 8th PSYOP Bn will furnish printing support at the request of GVN agencies. To assist in the effort...
PSYOP aircraft support is also available at the request of GVN agencies. Implementing instructions have been dispatched to province teams and OPCON units directing the utilization of all available PSYOP assets to support Nguyen Trai 11.

2. The operation of the Regional PSYOP Coordinating Center (RPCC) at Nha Trang continued with great success during the quarter. The control of the three nation PSYOP assets through the RPCC has resulted in a very efficient operation in the Coastal Region. The ROK PSYOP/CA Company in Nha Trang has shown a marked increase of printing production in support of the 11/LPGC during the reporting period. The Vietnamese Air Force has allocated two aircraft per day to the 11 CTZ to support air operations. One of these flies out of Pleiku and the other out of Nha Trang. The aircraft (U-17) is presently being used mainly in loudspeaker operations, leaflets are disseminated on a limited basis.

4. Radio Pleiku began programming at reduced power (15 KW) during the month of May. The station operates daily from 0530 to 1800 hours and 1830 to 2400 hours. Reports reveal excellent coverage in the immediate Pleiku area. A defective part in the transmitter prevents continuous operation at full power (50 KW). The part is presently being fabricated at the manufacturing company in CONUS and is scheduled to arrive in Vietnam NLT Oct 69. Estimated time for the station to resume full power operations is 15 Oct 69.

5. Production of PSYOP materials in Montagnard dialects continued at a satisfactory level during the quarter. In addition, the Pleiku Radio station began daily broadcasts in the Jarai dialect on 1 June. The Jarai broadcasts are conducted from 0730 to 0800 hours and from 1830 to 1930 hours each day. Efforts are presently being made to expand the programming to include other Montagnard dialects. Extensive efforts have been made to obtain films dubbed in Montagnard dialects through JUSPAO channels. JUSPAO reported that twenty five films will be dubbed in four Montagnard dialects (Jarai, Rhade, Bahnar, M'nong). The first four films will be distributed to H&K field teams on or about 1 Aug 69. Subsequent distribution will be continued at the rate of three films per month until all twenty five films have been completed.

(c) Psychological Operations (Civilian)

1. After a long absence of any friendly radio broadcasts in the provinces of Kontum, Binh Dinh, Pleiku, Phu Bon and Phu Yen, broadcasts were started on 25 April 1969 utilizing Blue Eagle capabilities. These broadcasts are in Vietnamese daily from 1900 to 2200 hours on 990 kc. Broadcasts are retransmitted from Saigon and the programs have been well received. There are shortcomings in the programs in that they are not specifically oriented toward local situations and conditions. No broadcasts are in the Montagnard dialects over the Blue Eagle system which limits the suitability of programs to only that part of the population speaking Vietnamese. Additionally, the military POLWAR station in Pleiku was put back in operation during the latter part of May 1969. This station is now broadcasting programs in the Bahnar dialect and directs its programs toward the local population. The Australian Government has agreed to provide the necessary parts to repair the 50 KW station in Ban Me Thuot destroyed during TET 1968. This project should be completed in the next quarter.
2. Village and hamlet elections were conducted during the first four Sundays in June with little interference from enemy forces. The Ministry of Information assumed a greater role than in the previous quarter in production and distribution of election and publicity materials. VIS in the provinces actively supported these elections and results have been publicized in province newspapers.

3. The recruitment and training of village and hamlet information cadres has encountered difficulties during the period. Binh Dinh, Pleiku and Ninh Thuan provinces initiated training programs for these cadres and were progressing quite well. In June, problems began to arise in the program as a result of lack of defined responsibilities on the part of the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Information towards these cadres. A training program was to be conducted in Vung Tau starting in June. This was suspended because of incomplete planning for the course. This program is now scheduled to begin 28 July. Additionally, the responsibilities for providing pay to these cadres has not been clearly defined and many have not been paid during the months of May and June. The Ministry of Information has been charged with the responsibility of correcting this situation. Payrolls have been submitted and payments should follow shortly.

4. VIS personnel at province level and district still are reluctant to get out into the field to supervise and conduct face-to-face operations. This has been a continuing problem but is showing some improvement. This may be attributed to the increased security resulting from the redistribution of military forces and the greater support these forces are providing to pacification and development in the provinces.

5. From a high of over 400 Hoi Chanh in March and April, the Chieu Hoi rate dropped to around 200 a month in May, June, and July. Part of the decrease was a seasonal fluctuation caused by the fact that June and July were rice planting months. Another major reason was political developments. The prospect and influence of American troop withdrawals and President Thieu's offer to allow VC to participate in elections apparently gave the VC renewed hope that they will share power and thus their motivation to rally decreased. Finally the sustained lull in military activity provided few strong battlefield reasons for enemy to rally.

6. The number of APT's increased from 735 to 769. Three provinces held month-long APT training courses and five provinces began to employ APT's in platoon strength on operations. The VC seriously penetrated the APT's in Minh Thuan. An investigation of this penetration produced recommendations which were implemented in all II Corps provinces to preclude similar incidents.

7. The Chieu Hoi Service finished four more district reception centers bringing the number completed to twenty. In Binh Thuan construction of the new center began and the improvement of the road to its location was completed. The Khanh Hoa Chieu Hoi Service finished its new administration and interrogation building. Phu Yen began the construction of its new center. Kontum, Binh Dinh, Pleiku, and Daklac made minor improvements in their facilities.
AV'A-GC-OT 15 August, 1969

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(U) After the distribution of the 1969 vocational training funds, the number of Hoi Chanh and dependents enrolled in vocational training courses increased from about 25 in April to over 200 in July. Although nearly all Hoi Chanh received political indoctrination, this phase of the program still suffered from lack of qualified instructors. Despite advisory efforts, the National Police have not waved any of the documentation necessary for Hoi Chanh to obtain permanent ID cards and, consequently, the large backlog of unissued permanent ID cards persisted. During this quarter, the Chieu Hoi Service followed up approximately 4000 ex-Hoi Chanh out of the 25,000 living in 11 Corps.

(4) Phung Hoang: The PHOENIX Program continued to make progress during the May-July reporting period. Gains in the program centered on the gradual development of a broader data base, and the continuation of operations against the VCI. During the May-June period, 629 VCI were neutralized, along with 637 VC/NVA, 321 guerrillas and 1042 support personnel. At the quarterly PHOENIX Coordinators Conference on 9 July, the conversion of PHOENIX local national employees to the GPO-DOD system was discussed. This particular area has become of great concern, as many employees are having difficulty fulfilling mobilization law requirements (i.e., draft deferments and discharge documentation). Also discussed was the TOC-DODG relationship; the consensus of opinion was that the TOC and DODG should remain separate entities. ROKA interest in the PHUNG HOANG program has been rejuvenated. This rejuvenation will probably result in more accurate reporting of VCI neutralizations by ROKA units. Arrangements have been made for two ROKA officers to attend the Vung Tau PHOENIX school in August 1969. It is hoped this training will prove beneficial in eventually improving ROKA participation in the PHOENIX program. Province PHOENIX personnel began to receive Province Security Committee minutes for the first time. Although only a limited number of these reports have been received so far, there are indications that very few of the VCI reported apprehended on the "By Name" reports are actually sentenced to prison. During the reporting period efforts were made toward a site selection and detailed planning for the II Corps PHUNG HOANG school. The Mobile Training Team completed its training schedule in II Corps, with the exception of Quang Duc Province. The team was well received in Khanh Hoa, Tuyen Duc, Darlac and Phu Yen Provinces, where it was considered to have done an effective job. In Binh Dinh and Ninh Thuan Provinces the team performed unsatisfactorily. Briefings of ARVN tactical units by the team have thus far been unsuccessful in soliciting increased ARVN support for PHUNG HOANG operations.

(5) Office of Management Support.

(a) The Material Support Branch of the Office of Management Support was organized on 1 June 1969. This organization was the result of a recommendation made by an ad hoc committee formed on 15 April 1969 with representatives from IFFV G4, and Engineer, CORDS, DSA 11 Corps, and 1st Logistical Command. The objective of this committee was to insure that adequate logistical support for MAGCORDS Province, District, and MAT Advisory Teams in 11 Corps was provided. The resultant recommendations were approved by the G3, IFFV thus causing the transfer of positions from DSA 11 Corps to MAGCORDS for the formation of the Material Support Branch.
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(b) The mission of this branch as the action agency of MACCORDS/1 FFORCEV is to assure adequate logistical management and support of MACCORDS Advisory Teams. This includes, but is not limited to, matters pertaining to supply, maintenance, and services. The following responsibilities, however, were retained by USA II Corps:

1. Monitoring the allocation of barrier materials to all advisory elements in II CTZ.
2. Controlling the allocation of RVNAF-titled military vehicle resources to all advisory elements in II CTZ.
3. Provide real estate services for all advisory elements in II CTZ.

(c) To accomplish its mission the Material Support Branch was allocated eleven positions from USA II Corps. As of the time of this report seven of these positions had been approved on the JTD and four were pending approval.

(d) During the first two months of operation, this branch was primarily concerned with internal organization. In addition, several major projects were accomplished including the submission of the Quarterly MACCORDS Equipment Status Report, alignment of property accounting and reporting procedures, establishing the procedures for material readiness reports, establishing and monitoring the Conex Control Reports, and assuming the responsibility for reporting on the Mobile Advisory Team and Get Well Programs under the Multi-Improvement Program.

6. (c) Personnel and Administration

1. Roster of Headquarters I FFORCEV key personnel is at Incl 11.

2. Personnel strengths of assigned, attached and OPCON units are at Incl 12.

3. Military Personnel Management:

(a) During the reporting period, the assigned strength of I FFORCEV units remained at a satisfactory level, although there were still some grade and MOS imbalances. Several critical MOS shortages, such as 15A10 (Field Artillery Basic) have been alleviated through assignment of additional personnel by USARV, reduction of authorized positions through Project Modernization and concomitant reassignment of incumbent personnel to other position vacancies. A persistent shortage of radar operators was reduced by establishing an OJT program for selected personnel who were assigned to I FFORCEV Artillery or were incoming replacements. Upon successful completion of the program, they were subsequently reclassified into the 17 career group (Combat Surveillance and Target Acquisition).

(b) Rotational humps were identified for the 272d MP Co, 5th Bn, 22c Art and the 3d Bn, 6th Art. The hump for the MP Co, which would occur in October, was relieved by infusion of personnel from the 18th MP Brigade. An exchange infusion program was conducted for the artillery battalions since their humps occur in August and September.

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(c) The 54th Inf Bn was reorganized on 10 June 1969 under a new MAT. Several new NAGs have been added to the battalion authorization. Requisitions were reviewed to ensure that personnel were requisitioned for the new positions.

(d) An extensive project to identify NAG and USAR personnel ordered to active duty with reserve component units has been conducted. The purpose of this project was to ensure the speedy return of these personnel to these units prior to redeployment later in the year.

(e) The following units were assigned to this command during the reporting periods:

1. 54th Inf Det (Ground Surveillance)
2. Camp Radoliff 'he Sec Det (Prov)
3. 270th FA Det (Radar)
4. 272d FA Det (Radar)

(f) A unit personnel office consisting of one warrant officer and 14 EM has been created for the 2d Sqdn, 1st Cav which is to be detached from the 4th Inf Div on 1 September 1969. This unit has no TOE authorization for a UPO so it was established using current I FFORCEV assets. The UPO moved from Pleiku to Phan Rang on 26 July 1969.

(g) To assure an orderly transfer of personnel functions from the 4th Inf Div to I FFORCEV, a detailed phase-in schedule has been developed (Incl 13). It can be adjusted to permit an earlier transfer of functions whenever possible.

(4) Awards and Decorations:

(a) During the past quarter, I FFORCEV was authorized to disapprove recommendations for award of the Distinguished Service Cross and the Legion of Merit for USARV personnel. Previously, all recommendations were sent to HQ, USARV for final action.

(b) Preparations were made for processing award recommendations for the 2d Sqdn, 1st Cav when it is detached from the 4th Inf Div on 1 September 1969.

(c) The number of awards processed was greater than that for the past quarter. The monthly average was 685, compared to 553 during the past quarter. This can be attributed to the annual summer rotation period (Incl 14, 15, 16).

(5) Rest and Recuperation:

(a) During the quarter an attempt was made to gain more equitable treatment of MAT members for R&R to Australia and Hawaii. Previous quarter's statistics disclosed that MACV personnel in II CTZ had to remain in-country two to two and half months longer than I FFORCEV personnel before they could go to these sites. A letter to COMUSMACV recommended that either MAT members be given special consideration by HQ MACV for mid-tour R&R or that R&R allocation control be decentralized to subordinate commands which could establish priorities. Both recommendations were disapproved and the
following comments were made: (1) special consideration for certain categories of personnel had traditionally been avoided and (2) centralized control of allocations allowed uniform command wide application of the criteria: first in-country, first to take R&R.

(b) Ninety-four percent of all R&R allocations were used. An average of 606 allocations were received each month (incl 17).

(c) Kuala Lumpur and Penang were removed from the list of R&R sites. A shortage of allocations for Hawaii proved to be a special problem during the latter part of the quarter because many personnel attempted to take R&R during the period their children or wives were on vacation.

(e) Administrative services:

(a) It was recognized that the present thermo-fax office copying equipment was outdated and could fail at any time. Extensive maintenance is generally required weekly. During July, a contract was given to the XEROX Corporation for rental of a Model 914 and Model 3600, which included supplies and maintenance. The Model 914 is scheduled for delivery in August and the Model 3600 will be delivered during September. This equipment will produce clearer copies, speed copying, and at a cheaper cost per copy.

(b) Detailed planning for the detachment of the 2d Sqdn, 1st Cav on 1 September 1969 has progressed quickly. The following actions have been completed:

1. Postal service is being provided by APO 96321 at Phan Rang.
2. Courier service is being provided by the 459th Sig Bn and communications support is being provided by the area communications center at Phan Rang. Other administrative functions have been matters of continuous coordination between the unit and I FFORCEV.

(f) Civilian personnel management:

(a) Civilian personnel management during the period was satisfactory in both administration and pay. Coordination was maintained throughout the quarter between the area civilian personnel office and all levels of command. During the period, the local national direct hire spaces increased from 279 to 402. The significant increase was the addition of 200 temporary spaces. The spaces were transferred from the 175th Abn Bde to HQ I FFORCEV on 2 June 1969. This temporary allocation of security guards for Camp Radcliff, An Khe, will terminate on 31 September 1969.

(b) IFFV AIF fund allocation from USA RV for 3d Qtr CY 69 (2,275,500 SVN) was received and suballocated to units based on previous expenditure data and requirements. Funds were suballocated to units of I FFORCEV as follows:

<table>
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<th>Unit</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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<tr>
<td>HQ IFFV Arty</td>
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<td>HQ Comdt IFFV</td>
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<td>54th Sig Bn</td>
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<td>167th Sig Co</td>
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AVFA-00-07
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1 FFORCEV for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969, RSO 8-FFOR-65 (R1) (U)

297th TC Co 89,000
41st CA Co 5,000
272d MP Co 22,000
55th MI Det 5,000
2d Sqdn, 1st Cav 220,000
Task Force South 10,000
HQ IFFV Reserve 87,500
TOTAL 2,227,500

(1) To be suballocated to assigned units by CG, IFFV Arty.

(a) Chaplain activities:

(1) Significant activities:

1. The following personnel changes took place during the quarter: Chaplain (COL) Frederick O. Hunt, Jr. replaced Chaplain (COL) Richard R. Bell as Staff Chaplain; Chaplain (IIC) James B. Ronan replaced Chaplain (IIC) Peter D. Van Dyke as Deputy Staff Chaplain; Chaplain (CPT) Howard Shapiro replaced Chaplain (CPT) Mark A. Golub as Assistant Staff Chaplain; and Chaplain (CPT) Edward A. Lesko was temporarily added to the staff.

2. II CTZ has 120 Military Chaplains and 23 ROK Chaplains.

(b) Religious services:

1. Military units in the II CTZ are being adequately covered by the Area Coverage Plan: "Areas for Coordination of Religious Activities." Under this plan all military personnel, regardless of branch of service and/or unit, receive Catholic and Protestant coverage by the appropriate chaplain assigned to that area. Responsibility for implementation of this plan rests with the commanders of the eight geographical areas.

2. Jewish coverage in the II CTZ remains adequate. Lay leaders continue to be used to organize and conduct lay services for Jewish personnel in the II CTZ. The Jewish Chaplain visits the major units on a regularly scheduled basis monthly to provide Worship Services and chaplain coverage.

3. In the Nha Trang area the following services were conducted.

(a) Sundays: 13 Protestant, 12 Catholic, 1 Episcopal, 1 Christian Science and 2 Latter Day Saints.

(b) Weekdays: Friday: Jewish, Saturday: Jewish, Daily: 3 Masses. In addition there are various discussion classes and Bible study groups throughout the Nha Trang area.
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9. Military Police:

(a) Fatal Traffic Accidents: Since a message emphasizing traffic safety was dispatched by the CG on 7 May 1969 the number of deaths resulting from fatal traffic accidents has decreased significantly. A comparison of this quarter to the previous quarter reveals a decrease in the number of deaths as follows: US down from 24 to 9, ARVN down from 7 to 3 and VN civilians down from 49 to 38. The total number of injuries resulting from accidents is down from 80 to 50. The results are favorable but continued emphasis could reduce these needless deaths even lower.

(b) Serious incident reports for the reporting period number 226. Forty-four concerned fatal traffic accidents and 34 of these concerned aggravated assaults.

(c) Security Inspections of Key and Critical Installations: A PM representative on the I FFORGEV Inspection Team during the last quarter inspected 8 installations. One of the primary areas of interest was the identification and control of local national employees.

(d) Distinguished Visitor Security: During the reporting period the 272d MP Co provided security for 64 visiting DVs and flag officers or civilian equivalent personnel in addition to providing a trail vehicle for CG I FFORCEV daily.

(e) Combined Security Plan: A combined security/emergency evacuation plan was developed and coordinated with local elements of the Navy and Air Force. The security plan was tested when the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff visited. The emergency evacuation portion was not implemented.

(f) I FFORCEV Reg 190-3, Custody and Control of Firearms and Other Dangerous Weapons, was published which superseded I FFORCEV Reg 210-5, 26 Oct 67. The PM revised I FFORGEV Reg 385-3 dtd March 1969 and included it in I FFORCEV Reg 190-3, Motor Vehicle Traffic Supervision, dated 7 June 1969.

(g) Security and traffic control continue to be provided by the 272d MP Co for conferences and special events such as the Zone Coordinators and II CTZ Senior Commanders Conference, Dine-Ins, Classified Briefings attended by CG I FFORCEV and staff.

(h) RVN Rules of the Road, an informative booklet concerning traffic rules and regulations in RVN, was recently revised by the PM section. The booklet is designed to provide helpful information to vehicle operators. Copies are distributed periodically and are available in the PM Section.

(i) Prisoner of War:

(a) Enemy captured during the period:

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<tr>
<th>Type</th>
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<th>WO</th>
<th>MN</th>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>173d Abn Bde</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Task Force South</td>
<td>19</td>
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(2) To reduce the II CTZ FW Camp population to an acceptable level, a total of 243 PWs were evacuated to Bien Hoa. (200 PWs from Pleiku and 43 PWs from Phu Tai). As of 12 July 1969 the population of Phu Quoc was 13,000 with emergency conditions set at 25,000.

(10) Medical:

(a) General health of the command remains good. Units have maintained their malaria rates below those of last year. The 173d Abn Bde deserved special commendation. Although in a highly endemic area, the Brigade's rate has been no higher than the total USARV rate for all types of Army personnel.

(b) The transition from two supporting medical groups in II CTZ to one group was accomplished with no deficiencies in medical support. The 43d Med Gp with headquarters in Nha Trang now controls all supporting units and installations in the zone. The 70th Med Bn Headquarters in Qui Nhon acts as a subordinate control headquarters for the group in northern II CTZ.

(c) The 91st Evac Hospital at Tuy Hoa was closed and the units moved to I CTZ. Primary medical support to US personnel in that area is now provided by an Air Force dispensary. The major impact of the hospital closure was on the support of Vietnamese nationals but the resulting support is at least the equivalent of that available in other areas of the country.

(4) A helicopter ambulance detachment of 6 aircraft was lost thru movement to I CTZ during this period. Residual resources have been redistributed with no significant deleterious effects on dust-off capability in the zone.

(e) The 17th Fld Hospital at An Khe was closed and reassigned to the mission of operating the POW hospital via Qui Nhon. It was replaced at An Khe by a general dispensary unit and daily fixed wing flights to the 71st Evac Hospital in Qui Nhon have been established for the movement of routine patients from An Khe and LZ English who require hospitalization or specialty consultation.

(11) Morale and Services:

(a) The G1 continued to monitor the officer and enlisted open messes in the II CTZ. As of the end of the reporting period 37 accounts in the II CTZ have either been eliminated or consolidated. This is a result of a program initiated by USARV, and endorsed by MACV, in an attempt to bring the entire club system under closer management. A study, with the assistance of G1 USARV, is underway to determine the total number of messes in II CTZ that should be consolidated. This is a continuing project.

(b) During the reporting period a relocation of US personnel from leased facilities in Nha Trang to US constructed billets in Camp McDermott was initiated. This relocation will return 70 leases to their owners and

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results in an annual savings of $512,024 (US). As of the end of the reporting period the savings realized is $130,260 (US).

STATUS TO DATE:

**PHASE I EM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commence</td>
<td>10 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete</td>
<td>15 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM spaces available Camp McDermott</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM to be relocated</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM relocated to date</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM pending relocation</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM spaces available upon completion</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PHASE II OFFICERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commence</td>
<td>20 August</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete</td>
<td>20 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer Spaces available Camp McDermott</td>
<td>760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers to be relocated</td>
<td>707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers relocated to date</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers pending relocation</td>
<td>707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer spaces available upon completion</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PHASE II - Female**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EWQ spaces available</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females to be relocated</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females relocated to date</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females pending relocation</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EWQ spaces available upon completion</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(12) Safety and Accident Prevention:

(a) The I PFCRCEV Safety Program was reviewed for the fourth quarter FY 69 and statistics are included at Inc 18 and 19. Both the Army Motor Vehicle rate and the personal injury rate increased during the quarter. The Army Motor Vehicle rate remains within the USARV expectancy rate but the personal injury rate exceeds it slightly. The same is true of the cumulative rates for fiscal year 1969.
The I FFORCEV Regulation 365-1 is still under revision and will be published in the near future.

A Certificate of Safety has been designed and purchased. These certificates will be used for both individual and unit safety awards.

USARV Weapons Safety Month (June) was highly successful. There was only one accidental gunshot wound in I FFORCEV assigned and attached units.

Effective 1 July, the Safety Division assumed the responsibility for analyzing and coding all accident reports DA Form 285 submitted by assigned and attached units.

ARVN Replacement and Strength Reporting System:

During the recent battle of Ben Het, 24 April - 28 June, certain deficiencies with the ARVN personnel system, especially strength reporting and replacement flow, were brought to the attention of this headquarters. Strength reports were untimely and inaccurate during the entire battle. The strength of the 424th Regiment and 23rd Ranger Group fell far below the minimum operational strength of 450 personnel per battalion. Replacements did not arrive in significant numbers until the battle was almost a month in progress. No officers and few NCO replacements were received by committed units. These and other problem areas have been sufficiently documented in previous studies and memoranda, and do not meet a detailed discussion in the scope of this report. Recommendations for improvement of ARVN strength reporting system and the ARVN replacement system have been made to MACV-JGS.

Most significant among the studies and recommendations was the study of Transfer of Responsibility of 24th STZ conducted by this headquarters and forwarded to MACV on 24 June. This study covered all ARVN aspects of the Ben Het operation during period 3 May - 5 June, during what eventually came to be known as the battle of Ben Het - Dak To. Conclusions in the area of personnel management arrived at in the study were that the ARVN replacement system was both unresponsive and untimely and that the system did not supply replacements to offset immediate and heavy battle casualties or casualties sustained during prolonged combat operations.

An attendant problem was the acquisition of accurate strength, casualty and replacement data for use by this headquarters. All confirmed data was obtained from the file of the II Corps QG, the QD 22 reports, and the 5-day casualty reports. This information was obtained for I FFORCEV by the AG and QG advisors (Team 21) at Hqs, II Corps. Due to the lateness of reports arriving at II Corps (3 - 5 days after report period) and no well established procedure for supplying this headquarters with ARVN personnel data, this information was consistently outdated and many times incomplete. Procedures to improve this reporting scheme have been established between I FFORCEV and USA II Corps in the eventuality that another situation similar to Ben Het develops.
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August 1969

(14) ARVN Interpreters:

(a) At the end of this reporting period the total authorized strength of ARVN interpreters with US elements in II CTZ was 823 and the assigned strength was 781 which represents 94% fill of all authorizations. Authorizations are occasionally changed as mission requirements change. The 173d Abn Bde increased its authorization from 40 to 98 during the past 6 month period due to mission requirements of the pacification program in northern II CTZ. The 55th MI Detachment is presently having its authorization reduced from 19 to 12 due to reassessment of mission requirements and this unit's capability to support its interpreters. Detailed status is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>ASBD</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>II Corps Adv Op</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>*518 *Includes 424 assigned to CORDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ, I FFORCEV</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55th MI Det</td>
<td>*19</td>
<td>21 *Authorization will be reduced to 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41st CA Co</td>
<td>*3</td>
<td>3 *Authorization increased from 2 to 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I FFORCEV</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Inf Div</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173d Abn Bde</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A shortage of interpreters exists in HQ I FFORCEV, but this shortage has had minimal impact on mission accomplishment.

(b) A recent problem area was interpreter strength reporting to USAHV. A message, unclas 63424, dated 23 May 1969, subjects ARVN Interpreter Strength Report, was dispatched to all II CTZ USAHV units authorized ARVN Interpreters. This message outlined certain discrepancies such as incorrect, incomplete and late reporting found in the monthly USAHV interpreter reports. All addressees were advised to submit accurate and timely reports.

(c) In an effort to improve the reporting system and better monitor the II CTZ interpreter system, I FFORCEV dispatched a message, unclas B-4591, subjects ARVN Interpreter Strength Report, to all II CTZ USAHV units requesting this headquarters be made information addressee, beginning in August, on the monthly report submitted to USAHV.

(d) I FFORCEV is Zone Coordinator for the ARVN Interpreter Program in II CTZ. The ARVN Affairs and CORDS Officer is project officer for the program.
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g. (C) Artillery.

(1) Intelligence: Hostile artillery attacks during the period reached an apex on 11-12 May when the enemy conducted 73 attacks and expended 1167 rounds in conjunction with the beginning phase of the Summer Offensive. Enemy activity continued at a high level during the month with the majority of the activity concentrated in the Dak To - Ben Het area of the Dan Quyen - Hines AO. The enemy's intense artillery activity continued into June, concentrating on the same area. The last two weeks of June saw the enemy mass his artillery activity entirely on Ben Het in hopes of isolating the camp and eventually overrunning it. This tactic failing, the enemy withdrew from the area at the end of June and has remained absent throughout July. During the period 8 May - 30 June, the enemy conducted 353 attacks and expended 4765 rounds against Dak To - Ben Het. Overall activity decreased considerably during the month of July, with the reported new offensive never materializing. The first two weeks of July observed increased standoff activity in the Phan Thiet area of Binh Thuan Province which accounted for over 25% of the attacks with II CTZ during the month. The lack of activity during July can probably be attributed to the inability of the enemy to maintain a continuous flow of supplies and ammunition to units located throughout II CTZ.

(2) Operations:

(a) During the reporting period, artillery units with IFFORUEV continued support of ARVN, ROK, US, RF/PF, RD Teams and USSF/GID's forces in II CTZ. I FFORCEV Artillery units continued support of I FFORCEV maneuver forces in providing maximum participation in pacification, fire planning, and artillery protection for the greatest number of villages and hamlets in the II CTZ. B Btry, 3d Bn, 6th Arty was permanently attached to 5th Bn, 27th Arty in order to provide additional light artillery support to TF South.

(b) Areas of responsibilities remained unchanged with the groups continuing to operate in their AO's. For command and control purposes, C/7/15 was attached temporarily to 3/6 Arty (-).

(3) Fire Support Coordination Element.

(a) Naval Gunfire support for II CTZ was provided by an average of two ships each day. The following is a summary of naval gunfire support:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
<th>TARGETS</th>
<th>ROUNDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>405</td>
<td>2,133</td>
<td>25,817</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) During the reporting period, a daily average of 68 immediate reaction and hangfire targets were developed; of which, a daily average of 47 were fire. The following is a summary of targets developed and fired:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEVELOPED</th>
<th>HANGFIRE</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5294</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIRED:</td>
<td>3703</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(c) During the quarter, I FFORCEN HQ issued a daily average of 9 175mm gun suppressions for AROLIGHTS.

(d) The area harassment program, established 1 March 69, has been developed into a working application of the principle of war-economy of force. Critical evaluation of intelligence, knowledge of enemy habits and effective employment of available firepower resources have harassed the enemy in his base camp areas and sanctuaries. Currently the program monitors 13 areas, of which 7 are being targeted. It had been noticed that the enemy moved to the maximum range limits of artillery and naval guns seeking new secure areas. As intelligence provides his position, airstrikes are directed against his forces serving to effectively disperse his forces, to prevent enemy build up for the attack and to deny him the sanctuaries needed to conduct training, resupply, and command activities. As Intelligence indicates enemy activity moving out of a defined area of harassment, the area is moved to encompass the new area of enemy activity. Every five days the entire program is reevaluated to select new priorities of engagement and to consider proposals for relocation of areas. The following is the Fire Support Summary: May - 31 July 69:

A/C SORTIES

122

KOS FORCEN [BH65]

467,200

(e) A total of 215 AROLIGHT targets were struck with 1051 aircraft during the quarter. The following is a summary of province support by type of AROLIGHT:

**PRIMARY AROLIGHTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Binh Dinh</td>
<td>6 53</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binh Thanh</td>
<td>4 24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khanh Hoa</td>
<td>1 6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kontum</td>
<td>142 772</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleiku</td>
<td>18 91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SECONDARY AROLIGHTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Binh Dinh</td>
<td>19 55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kontum</td>
<td>23 68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleiku</td>
<td>2 44 2 125</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(f) Three new AWCC areas have been established in II CTZ bringing the total to 23 operational areas. Two working conferences were held at Headquarters MACV by direction of the Joint Air Operations Group. Attendees were charged with the responsibility of revising MACV Directive 95-13. A working group will be assembled at II FFORCEN to include Army and Air Force personnel from US, ARVN, and ROK forces. The purpose of this group will be to study and reevaluate the present II Corps system, exchange an understanding of geographical and tactical consideration peculiar to allied operations throughout II Corps, and to discuss the proposed directive in an attempt to anticipate problem areas and develop solutions prior to publication of the directive by MACV.

(4) RVNAF Assistance Programs

(a) RVNAF assistance programs continued to show progress during the reporting period. Survey control has been extended to most ARVN artillery positions and advances have been made in the transmission of meteorological messages to ARVN artillery units. Consequently an increase in the use of MET plus HE corrections by ARVN artillery has been noted.

(b) Increased emphasis has been placed on artillery assistance to RP/PF units, RE Teams, and FSBP. Field grade artillery commanders have been assigned specific districts in which to implement artillery assistance. Current goals are to review and strengthen all territorial force fire plans, to increase the level of trained forward observers and to generate more fire missions from territorial force units.

(c) As a part of the accelerated Phase II plan for RVNAF Improvement and Modernization, 6th Bn, 84th Artillery has been scheduled for turnover to the ARVN 25th Arty Bn. Approval of the turnover was granted by MACV on 2 April 1969. Btry C completed turnover on 15 June and 14 July, respectively.

(5) Artillery Organization, II CTZ

(a) Non-divisional

I Field Force Vietnam Artillery

270th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
272d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (AW) (SP)
Battery B, 29th Artillery (SFL)
Battery E, 41st Artillery (MG)
6th Battalion, 32d Artillery (175/8 inch SP)

Headquarters Battery, 8th Battalion, 26th Artillery (TAB)
54th Infantry Detachment (Radar Ground Surveillance)
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27th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
237th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
241st Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
242d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
243d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
244th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
245th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
246th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
253d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
254th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
255th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
256th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)

41st Artillery Group
7th Battalion, 13th Artillery (105mm T)
7th Battalion, 15th Artillery (-C Btry) (175mm/8inch SP)
6th Battalion, 84th Artillery (155mm T)

52d Artillery Group
3d Battalion, 6th Artillery (105mm SP) (-B Btry, 105 SP) (with C/7/15, 175mm/8inch SP temporarily attached)
6th Battalion, 14th Artillery (175mm/8inch SP)
2d Battalion, 17th Artillery (-C Btry, 155mm T)
1st Battalion, 92d Artillery (155mm T)

I FFORCEV Provisional Artillery Group
5th Battalion, 22d Artillery (175/8inch SP)
5th Battalion, 27th Artillery (105mm T) (Attached B/3/6, 105mm SP)

(b) Divisional, Brigade and Separate Battalion

4th Infantry Division Artillery
2d Battalion, 9th Artillery (105mm T)
5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (155mm/8inch SP)

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st Foong of Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

6th Battalion, 29th Artillery (105mm T)

4th Battalion, 42d Artillery (105mm T)

173d Airborne Brigade (Separate)

3d Battalion, 319th Artillery (105mm T)

3d Battalion, 506th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division

Battery D, 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery (105mm T)

6) Artillery Strength: The following table reflects artillery tube strength by caliber for ARVN, ROK, US and USSF/CIDG Artillery units in II CTZ at the end of the reporting period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>105mm</th>
<th>155mm</th>
<th>8 Inch</th>
<th>175mm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US Divisional</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK Divisional</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Force Artillery</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARVN Artillery</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Forces (CIDG)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>604</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(7) Ammunition statistics for US Force Artillery during the reporting period.

(a) Ammunition expenditure by target category:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGET CATEGORY</th>
<th>MAY ROUNDS</th>
<th>MAY MISSIONS</th>
<th>JUNE ROUNDS</th>
<th>JUNE MISSIONS</th>
<th>JULY ROUNDS</th>
<th>JULY MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONFIRMED</td>
<td>26,049</td>
<td>1,159</td>
<td>20,512</td>
<td>978</td>
<td>12,968</td>
<td>642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACQUIRED</td>
<td>31,027</td>
<td>5,579</td>
<td>38,964</td>
<td>6,123</td>
<td>32,001</td>
<td>7,582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COUNTERBATTERY</td>
<td>8,820</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>16,772</td>
<td>1,086</td>
<td>3,929</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREPARATION</td>
<td>14,492</td>
<td>942</td>
<td>12,421</td>
<td>1,026</td>
<td>8,195</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERDICTION</td>
<td>16,403</td>
<td>6,451</td>
<td>21,808</td>
<td>7,227</td>
<td>15,152</td>
<td>5,813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPECIAL PURPOSE</td>
<td>16,713</td>
<td>1,937</td>
<td>12,357</td>
<td>1,647</td>
<td>11,393</td>
<td>1,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>1,323</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>1,027</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>1,176</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>114,827</td>
<td>16,689</td>
<td>123,861</td>
<td>18,238</td>
<td>84,814</td>
<td>16,631</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(b) Ammunition expenditures by caliber:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>CALIBER</th>
<th>ROUNDS</th>
<th>% TOTAL</th>
<th>RDS/TUBE/DAY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>57,929</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>155mm</td>
<td>31,399</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8inch</td>
<td>14,812</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>175mm</td>
<td>10,467</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sub Total</td>
<td>14,827</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>26*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>61,365</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>155mm</td>
<td>37,649</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8inch</td>
<td>15,081</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>175mm</td>
<td>9,766</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sub Total</td>
<td>123,861</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>28*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>51,600</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>155mm</td>
<td>13,885</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8inch</td>
<td>19,924</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>175mm</td>
<td>8,405</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sub Total</td>
<td>84,814</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>19*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAND TOTAL</td>
<td>323,502</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Prorated Average

h. (c) Signal Operations:

(1) During the past quarter, emphasis has been placed by the Signal Officer on upgrading the quality of communications provided to tactical units in the II CTZ.

(2) A project is underway to provide communications from each of the 54 districts in II CTZ to I FFORCEV Headquarters/Tactical Operations Center (TOC)/Tactical Intelligence Operations Center (TIOC). In order to establish a direct link from District to I FFORCEV Headquarters with a direct circuit to Typhoon TOC. This facility will be utilized for responsive and accurate intelligence gathering and dissemination in support of revolutionary development, pacification and tactical operations.
C I DE if IAL AVFA-GC-OT 15 August 1969


(3) Headquarters, Task Force South relocated from vic of Dalat to vic of Phan Thiet. Command and control communications was provided by the 54th Sig Bn during the move by establishing a 12 channel radio system from Song Mao to Phan Thiet. The communications posture was upgraded by establishing an additional 12 channel radio system from Song Mao to Thien Giao and from Thien Giao to Phan Thiet. A relay was installed in the original system to increase the reliability and improve circuit quality.

(4) The Nha Trang Tandem Switching Center was activated during July by the 1st Signal Bde providing all major posts in II CTZ with direct dial capability to all major US Military installations in Vietnam and Thailand.

(5) Installation and activation of an AUTOSEVOCOM terminal servicing Hq, I FFORCEV was accomplished, enabling secure voice transmission to be made to major Commands in the World-wide system.

(6) Other activities during the past quarter include the installation of a temporary 12 channel VHF system from Ninh Hoa to Dong Ba Thin in support of 9th ROK Division operation (BAa MA-10) and the installation of a 17 channel VHF system between LZ North English and Tam Quan in support of 1/3d Abn Bde. A 12 channel VHF system was installed from Dragon Mountain to Dak To in support of 52d Arty Bp.

(7) The 54th Signal Battalion continues to provide command and control communications between HQ, I FFORCEV and subordinate elements.

i. (C) Engineer

(1) During this period the engineer section continued efforts in planning, coordinating and monitoring of engineer activities in II CTZ and maintained close liaison with engineer units by frequent field trips. Major staff projects during this quarter included:

(a) MIP Program III-6, I FFORCEV Highway Improvement Program (Engr/G-3): The joint action between this section and the 64th Engr Det (Terrain) of accumulating and cataloging ground and aerial photographs of all bridges on main LOC’s has been assumed completely by the 64th Engr Det (T).

(b) MIP Program III-5, I FFORCEV Airfield Improvement and Maintenance Program (Engr/G-4): An update of airfield maintenance standards was prepared and an information letter sent to DSA II Corps, Sub-zone coordinators, Senior Advisor’s of ARVN Divisions, CO 5th SFGA and individual airfield commanders. This document included current maintenance deficiencies and responsibilities. The intent of the letter was to have those deficiencies corrected that were within the capability of the airfield commander NLT mid-September.

(c) Annex J (Engr) to II CTZ Combined Campaign Plan was rewritten again during this quarter to reflect changes of priorities for the remainder of 1969.

(d) As directed by MACV, a joint area development board meeting was conducted at this headquarters by the engineer section to establish
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a quarterly Integrated Priority List of Contract Construction for the central area for all U.S. services. The purpose of this list is to establish guidance for OICC in developing work schedules and allocating resources of the CAF contractor for the current quarter and planning for the next quarter. This board meeting will continue to be a quarterly function conducted by I FFORGEV Engineer Section.

(2) Support of Tactical Operations

(a) DAN AB/SHERIDAN

1. Construction of Phan Thiet City Bridges: B/116th Engineer Company continued construction of a timber pile bent bridge which was completed 5 July 1969, well ahead of schedule. This 300' class 52 bridge contributes significantly to mobility of armored forces in Binh Thuan Province.

2. Revetments at LZ Betty: Construction of 35 helicopter revetments for B/7/17th Cav Sqdn was begun 1 May and completed 20 Jun by B/116th Engr Co.

3. Support of 2/1st Cav Sqdn: The decision in May to redeploy the 2/1st Cav Sqdn to Binh Thuan Province imposed significant engineer support requirements. The 589th Engr Bn and Co "B" of the 116th Engr Bn rendered engineer support consisting of maintenance of QL-1 to class 52 capability, construction of MER, technical assistance in building of field fortifications and the operation of water points.

4. Song Nho Refuel/Rearm Point: The 589th Engr Bn began construction of these berms in late July for completion in the next quarter.

5. Co "B" of the 116th Engr Bn conducted minesweeps as required throughout the period on QL-1 and MFL-CH.

6. The 577th Engr Bn completed redeployment in May from Phu Yen Province to Tuyen Du Province. This shift increased engineer support to TF South as well as augmenting the LOG program in the area.

7. Support of LZ Sandy and LZ Sherry: SEA Huts began during the last quarter were completed. A well was drilled at LZ Sherry and drilling was initiated at LZ Sandy.

8. Support of 3/319th Arty at Hao Loc: On 7 June the 116th Engr Bn completed construction of six howitzer positions and berms and provided technical assistance for construction of field fortifications.

(b) DAN KVYEN/HINES

1. Daily minesweeps were performed by 20th Engr Bn on QL-14 between Pleiku and Tan Canh and as required along Rt 512 by the 299th Engr Bn.

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2. The 20th Engr Bn cleared and upgraded the An Khe ASP during this period, completing the task on 5 June.

3. Chain link fence was placed around each POL tank at An Khe for protection against B-40 rocket attacks.

4. Four revetments for modified U-21's were constructed at An Khe Airfield by "C" Company of the 20th Engr Bn and completed on 20 May.

5. An observation tower on Artillery Hill was completed on 13 May by the 20th Engr Bn.

6. The 20th Engr Bn provided operational support to U.S. Artillery at Ben Het during this quarter. Support involved construction of gun pads and maintenance of internal road net. The 937th Engr Gp also provided bulldozers to accomplish clearing where possible outside the Ben Het perimeter up to 300 meters.

7. Modification of the generator shed to permit easy removal of the generators and reveting of diesel fuel storage was accomplished at the Psyop Radio Station (Yellowbird) in Pleiku.

8. A counter mortar radar tower was completed at Camp Radcliffe on 21 Jul as part of the 4th Inf Div. program of perimeter security improvement.

9. Units of the 937th Engr Gp constructed guard towers and chain link standoff fences around the POL tanks at Pleiku to improve the security posture of this facility.

10. The 20th Engr Bn and elements of the 584th Engr Co (LE) performed repairs on the MARY LOU ASP increasing the berms and improving drainage.

11. The rearming points at Camp Holloway were prepared and completed on 7 June.

12. Williams Bailey Bridge at An Khe is being upgraded to class 70 by additions of Bailey panels. It is 95% complete at the close of this reporting period and will be complete one day after receipt of materials necessary for overhead bracing supports.

(a) WASHINGTON-GREEN:

1. A Classic Artillery fire base has been constructed at LZ English with technical and equipment assistance by the 899th Engr Bn (cbr) and self-help labor from the occupying U.S. unit. The project is 95% complete at the end of this quarter and remaining work is to be completed by ARVN engineers when fire base is turned over to ARVN forces.
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2. The 299th Engr Bn has continued upgrading of route 3A in Binh Dinh Province. Project consists of placing and compacting fill, grading and widening, improvement of drainage structure and application of a soil-cement surface for approximately 10 Km. EDC is 31 Aug 69.

3. A 300' pile bridge has been started to cross the Kum Song River in Hoai An District. During this period preliminary site reconnaissance was conducted, design completed and materials requisitioned. This will be a Class 28 bridge with an EDC of 1 Oct 69 being built as an operational support mission by direction of GQ, I FFORCEV.

4. QUI NEN AREA:

1. Five miles of POL pipeline from An Khe east were buried and tested by the 20th Engr Bn and completed on 24 July.

2. The 84th Engr Bn is burying POL pipeline from Vung Ro Bay to Tay Hoa. This project was reported 95% complete at the end of this report period with an EDC of 25 Aug.

3. Revetments for the dial central facility at Phu Tai were commenced on 6 Jun 69 with an EDC to be announced.

5. Airfield Upgrading and Repair

(a) An Khe (38478447): One platoon of the 20th Engr Bn continues to work on the south taxiway which failed due to excessive traffic and is upgrading the parallel taxiway. No EDC has been determined but it is anticipated this project will be completed within the next quarter.

(b) Ben Het (3972522): This airfield was extensively damaged by enemy shelling during the siege of May and June. Repairs were made by the 299th Engr Bn in July sufficient to open the field to type I C-7A operational status.

(c) Cheo Reo (BQ233818): This airfield was opened to C-130 aircraft in May but sustained considerable damage during a C-130 airlift operation in the same month. Extensive deterioration of the subgrade due to supersaturation caused the field to be closed for extensive repair. Repairs accomplished during this reporting period lead to the conclusion that only major construction after the monsoon can restore this airfield to C-130 capability. During the latter part of July action was initiated to repair this field to type II C-7A and Air Vietnam capability during the current monsoon season and reserve major reconstruction until the approaching construction season. A decision on this proposal is anticipated in the early part of the next quarter.

(d) Duo Lap (YU875275): On 1 June 1969, 70th Engr Bn again initiated repair of T-17 membrane surfacing at Duo Lap airfield. Extreme overage of T-17 material at this airfield renders this repair uneconomical. Repair continued thru the end of the period, with progress hampered by seasonal monsoons.

(e) Dak Seang (YB895406): The 20th Engr Bn completed pot hole repair and penepriming of this field in July.

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(f) Dux Xuyen (AP882478): Repair of Dux Xuyen airfield was initiated by the 70th Engr Bn on 1 May 69. Scope of repair includes placement of 8" sand-cement subbase and surfacing with M611 matting over 450' of runway. Construction continued throughout the period. Progress was severely impaired by dead line of Airmobile Engineer Equipment and heavy seasonal monsoons.

(g) Gia Nghia (YU925289): At Gia Nghia airfield the 577th Engr Bn supported resurfacing of the runway by providing an asphalt distributor and operators. Shaping and compaction of runway was performed by Ministry of Public Works, GVN.

(h) Song Mao (BN264456): On 20 July 1969 the 589th Engr Bn initiated placement of anti-skid compound on Song Mao airfield. Job completion was accomplished in three days.

(i) Maintenance of Airfields: Continuing maintenance was performed during the period on M611 matting and subbase at Phan Thiet and Bao Loc Airfields. Repairs included grading and stabilization of shoulders, replacement and welding of matting sections damaged by enemy fire on aircraft traffic, and stabilization of subbase.

(j) Dust Suppressions: Penetrone or other asphalt cutback was applied extensively at Ban Me Thuot East and Phan Thiet airfields by the 70th Engr Bn and the 116th Engr Bn respectively. On 1 Jul 69 this mission at Phan Thiet was taken over by USAEC when PA&E obtained equipment necessary to accomplish the job.

(4) Land Clearing Operations:

(a) A total of 6606 acres were cleared in the 35th Engr Gp AD along QL-19, QL-20, QL-21A and area clearing in Binh Thuan Prov.

(b) A total of 6806 acres were cleared within the 957th Engr Gp AD along QL-14A and QL-6-B.

(5) Route Upgrading in II CTZ:

(a) Within the seven (7) southern provinces of II CTZ composing the 35th Engr Gp AD the following was accomplished during this report period:

1. Paved 72.00 km MACV roads.
2. Construction of 6.35 km of all weather road.
3. Placed 1262.9 meters of culvert.
4. Installation of 160.64 meters of bridging.
5. Normal maintenance of 175 km of LO's.
6. Maintenance of 48 culverts, 23 bridges and 29 bypasses within the AD.

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Within the five (5) northern provinces of CTZ constituting the AO of the 957th Engr Gp the following work was performed:

1. Paving of 21.66 km MAGY standard road.
2. Construction of 13.95 km of all weather roads.
3. Placement of 169.0 meters of new culvert.
4. Construction of 500 meters of various type bridging.
5. Normal maintenance of 62.47 km of roads.
6. Maintenance and repair of 85 culverts, 21 bridges and eight bypasses.

Miscellaneous Engineer Actions:

(a) Counter-mortar Radar Site, Dong Ba Thin: Counter-mortar radar site, begun during the last period, was completed by the 589th Engr Bn on 9 May 1969. Scope of project included bunkers for the radar and the control center, two SEA Huts, guard tower, and a berm.

(b) Command Operations Center, Cam Ranh Bay: Construction was begun 11 May 1969 on a command operations center for USA Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay. Construction is by the 589th Engr Bn. Project is a reinforced concrete bunker below grade.

(c) Support of Military Assistance Team II-36: A project to upgrade facilities for MAT II-36, Lac Ngiep, began during the last period, was completed on 8 May 1969. This project included a living/fighting bunker, latrine, shower, mortar pit and helipad.

(d) Ammo Supply Point, Dalat/Cam Ly: Construction of a 9-cell ammo supply point, begun during the last period, was completed 16 July 1969. Construction was accomplished by the 577th Engr Bn.

(e) LST Ramp, Phan Thiet: Construction of an earth-filled timber LST ramp was begun during the last period by the 116th Engr Bn. Virtually complete by 31 May 1969, the ramp was severely damaged by impact from an LST. Redesign is underway and repair will be undertaken in the next period.

(f) Clearing Fire Support Base, 5/22d Arty: During the period 10 thru 15 July the 70th Engr Bn cleared and otherwise supported construction of a FSB for the 5/22d Arty via 2000/1685.

(g) Relocation of Fire Support Base, Duong Truong: During this period the 577th Engr Bn completed relocation of the 5/22d Arty FSB at Duong Truong. Project included provision of technical assistance.

(h) I FFORCEV Arty Hq Nha Trang: The I FFORCEV Arty Hq building, nearly complete at the close of the last period, was completed on 16 May 1969. The outstanding workmanship of this facility makes it a noteworthy headquarters.

(i) Pier Protection, Ben Thach Bridge (QL-1-'239): Provision for standoff protection for piers of the Ben Thach Bridge was completed 15 May 1969 by the 577th Engr Bn. This project was initiated in February 1969.

(j) Support of Signal Sites: Between 1 and 6 May the 864th Engr Bn cleared areas around Hon Tre Island Signal Site. This clearing was preparatory to installation of Unattended Intrusion Detection Devices. Similar support was undertaken 14 July 1969 by the 577th Engr Bn at Long Bien Mt Signal Site. This latter project involves construction of erosion control structures near installed UIDD.

(x) Support of 45th ARVN Regiment: On 11 July 1969 the 70th Engr Bn began technical assistance to the ARVN 45th Regt in their construction of a Fire Base south of Ban Me Thuot. Construction continued thru the end of the period.

(l) Helicopter Pads, Binh Thuan Province: In support of the Province Senior Advisor, Binh Thuan Province, helicopter pads were constructed at Hoi Long District (by 116th Engr Bn) and at Hoa Da District (by 589th Engr Bn). These were completed on 12 July and 7 July respectively.

(m) Rehabilitation of Helipads: During the period, rehabilitation of helicopter revetments was undertaken at Nha Trang, Ban Me Thuot, and Bao Loc. 15 each L-shaped revetments at Nha Trang were converted to parallel revetments between 9 June 1969 and 6 July 1969. 5 each revetments were similarly converted at Ban Me Thuot between 9 June 1969 and 13 June 1969. Construction of 10 each revetments continues at Bao Loc by the 116th Engr Bn. Rehabilitation of hover lanes at Dong Ba Thin was initiated 11 July 1969 by the 864th Engr Bn. Upon completion of this portion of the project, 10 each revetments will be converted at Dong Ba Thin.

(n) SEA Hut Constructions: Extensive technical assistance was rendered for construction of SEA Huts at various locations: At the Logistic Support Activity, Bao Loc; at Ban Me Thuot for the 5/22d Arty; at the Logistics Support Activity, Binh Thuan; at the Logistics Support Activity, Dalat; and for the 1/568th Medical Platoon at Bao Loc.

(o) Song Song Eiffel Bridges: During this quarter agreement was reached between the 937th Engr Gp and the Qui Nhon MPW Engineer for MPW to redeck this bridge with materials obtained by the 937th Engr Gp. Materials were ordered during this period and redecking is expected to be completed prior to 1 Oct 69.

(p) Binh Dinh Province: A request was received in June from the PSA listing 41 separate roads and bridges and land clearing desired to be accomplished prior to 31 Oct 69 in conjunction with the pacification program. An evaluation by ground and air reconnaissance was conducted by this Bn in late June and early July and is presently being staffed and coordinated as part of the II Corps Secondary Road and Bridge Program.

(q) During July 1969 interim plumbing repairs and improvements were directed and accomplished at the MACV Team Areas at Tam Quan and Hoi An Districts pending arrival of civilian contractors as part of the MACV get well program.

r. Bong Song RR Bridge: During July the 18th Engr Bde made preparations and ordered materials to redeck the Bong Song RR Bridge which is presently being used for vehicular traffic connecting QL-1 across the Bong Song River. The present decking is deteriorating due to dry rot and the repairs will be completed prior to the coastal monsoon season within the next quarter.

(j) (U) Information Office

(i) Representatives of the Information Office provided coverage for numerous awards and promotion ceremonies as well as for special events during the period, including:

(a) Presentation of Legion of Merit to Col Gossett-11 May 1969
(b) Presentation of Legion of Merit to Col Gillispie-20 May 1969
(c) Presentation of Legion of Merit to LTC Teehan-22 May 1969
(d) Presentation of Legion of Merit to LTC Kent-28 May 1969
(e) Presentation of Legion of Merit to LTC Wiles-28 May 1969
(f) Presentation of Legion of Merit to SSM Runyan-31 May 1969
(g) Presentation of Legion of Merit to Col Stedham-1 June 1969
(h) Presentation of Legion of Merit to Col Rusty-12 June 1969
(i) Presentation of Legion of Merit to Col Perley-16 June 1969
(j) Presentation of Legion of Merit to Col Ewing-22 June 1969
(k) Presentation of Legion of Merit to Col Bell-23 June 1969
(l) Presentation of Legion of Merit to LTC Fred-23 June 1969
(m) Presentation of Legion of Merit to Col Rogers-1 July 1969
(n) Presentation of Legion of Merit to LTC Vandyke-2 July 1969
(o) Presentation of Legion of Merit to LTC Bellnap-2 July 1969
(p) Presentation of Legion of Merit to Col Mitro-3 July 1969
(q) Presentation of Legion of Merit to Col Hervey-4 July 1969
(r) Presentation of Legion of Merit to Col McClellan-6 July 1969
(s) Presentation of Legion of Merit to Col Legg-10 July 1969
(t) Presentation of Legion of Merit to LTC Metcalf-12 July 1969

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Presentation of Legion of Merit to LTC Atkinson-19 July 1969
Presentation of Legion of Merit to LTC Palmer-19 July 1969
Presentation of Legion of Merit to LTC Sherblom-20 July 1969
Presentation of Legion of Merit to BG Timothy-25 July 1969
Presentation of Legion of Merit to LTC Heitzke-28 July 1969
Photographic coverage was provided for numerous distinguished visitors to include:
- LT Gen Michael S. Davidson, DGUSARPAC, on 12 July 1969.

The following media representative was granted a G2/G3 briefing during the period covered by the report:
- Patrick Luminello, Stars and Stripes - 14 May 1969.

Command Information Initial Orientation Briefing for personnel newly assigned to I FFORCEV were conducted each month.

The 5th PID under the supervision of the IO, I FFORCEV published and distributed its "Morning News" on a daily basis, and a bi-weekly summation of news in II CTZ, the "WRAP UP". The 5th PID also produced a weekly 15 minute radio program, the "Feature Page" and a 15 minute TV program, the "Armed Forces News Spotlight" every two weeks. The I FFORCEV magazine, the "TYPHOON" was published in May, June and July. Capt John Gray and Capt Randolph Brock departed for CONUS on 8 July and 15 July 1969 respectively. 1Lt Larry J. Myers was assigned to the 5th PID on 18 July 1969.

The 11th PID continued to provide transportation, escort, billets and other aid to correspondents and visiting information personnel, handling 455 during the period covered. Maj Robert Goodfellow, L/C Pleiku Press Camp, departed for CONUS on 30 May 1969. 1Lt James L. Scrivner was assigned to the Pleiku Press Camp on 12 May 1969. Maj Raphael E. Eynard assumed command of the 11th PID on 26 June 1969 and Maj Charles W. Whitley, former commander, was reassigned to the Information Office, I FFORCEV as the Assistant Information Officer.
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(k) (b) Inspector General Activities:

(1) During the period 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969 108 Inspector General
Action Requests were received. Broken down by major category these are:

(a) Requests for assistance 68
(b) Justified complaints 11
(c) Unjustified complaints 29

Over 90% of these action requests continue to be "walk-in" or direct com-
plaints to the IG during command inspections. The only detectable trend
is one that has persisted for several months, namely delay in receipt of
reassignment orders. This matter has been reported to USAV IG both
through IG channels and by letter from CG IFFV to DCG, USAV, as well as
to the IG, Department of the Army, on 26 April 1969 while he visited this
headquarters. Otherwise there is no indication of irregularities or wide-
spread problems which could be detrimental to the efficiency or reputation
of the command.

(2) Command inspections of the following units were conducted on the
dates indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC, I FFORCEV</td>
<td>2 May 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 92d Arty</td>
<td>12 May 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Bn, 15th Arty</td>
<td>26 May 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Bn, 22d Arty</td>
<td>9 Jun 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Bn, 13th Arty</td>
<td>23 Jun 1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>3rd Bn, 6th Arty</td>
<td>7 Jul 1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>HHB, 41st Arty Gp</td>
<td>21 Jul 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuyen Duc Prov</td>
<td>6 May 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can Binh Prov</td>
<td>9 May 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Da Lat Prov</td>
<td>13 May 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleiku Prov</td>
<td>20 May 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Yen Prov</td>
<td>5 Jun 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quang Duc Prov</td>
<td>15 Jul 1969</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) During the period security inspections were conducted at the
following installations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INSTALLATIONS</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phan Rang</td>
<td>15-16 May 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
<td>19-21 May 1969</td>
</tr>
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</table>

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<table>
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<tr>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td>4 Jun 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuy Hoa</td>
<td>9-10 Jun 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleiku</td>
<td>16-17 Jun 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nha Trang</td>
<td>23 Jun 1969</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) All units inspected were rated satisfactory on a scale of satisfactory/unsatisfactory only. Results of security inspections were published by the G-3 Security Division.

(5) Memorandum, subjects Rights of Military Personnel to Present Complaints was published and distributed on 1 July 1969 to all assigned and attached units.

(6) The following acting IG's were appointed during the period due to DEROS, reassignment, etc.:
   (a) LTC Dudley Coleman Adv Tm #28 (Phu Yen Prov)
   (b) MAJ Wilford C. James 54th Eng BN

(7) There were five investigation/inquiries conducted during the period:
   (a) Allegations of lack of support and security. WAT 11-36
   (b) Deficiencies in service of Modern Service Company, a contract laundry for W units in the Nha Trang Cam Ranh Bay area
   (c) Logistics and property accountability, An Tu Duc Dispensary (An Khe).
   (d) Release of operational information to the press during the Ben Het operation.
   (e) Extent of and major contributory factors to Nha Trang blackmarket. Investigation continues and further reports are contemplated.

(8) Notification of the USARPAC Special Inspection scheduled for 15-20 Sep 69 has been disseminated and required documents forwarded to USARPAC IG.

1. (U) Staff Judge Advocate Activities:

(1) There were 3 trials by General Courts-Martial convened by the Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, during the quarter compared to 2 cases the previous quarter. 21 special courts-martial and 60 summary courts-martial were reviewed for legal sufficiency. This reflects a decrease of 25 special and 24 summary courts-martial over the previous quarter. Also during this period there were 1723 Article 15's reviewed as compared with 1858 for the previous period.

(2) 24 claims of Army Personnel for loss of, or damage to, personal property incident to service were adjudicated and paid, compared to 65 the previous quarter. The claims totaling $8,407.32 were approved for payment in the total amount of $6,795.13.

(3) 16 claims of Vietnamese nationals for personal injury or property damage were processed by this office.

(4) The legal assistance office provided advice and assistance on civil matters to 612 individuals during the quarter compared to 573 in the previous quarter.

(5) Military justice clients numbered 167 during this quarter.

m. (U) Command Analysis and Programs (CAP) Activities. During the period 1 May - 31 July 1969 the Office of the Special Assistant, Command Analysis and Programs continued to promote assistance to Headquarters, I FFORCEV in analysis of organization, functions and operations and in management improvement techniques. The Office of Command Analysis and Programs assisted in the following during the period of the report:

(1) Completed the development of the I FFORCEV Tactical Operations Center (TOC) Automated Spot Report System. The system assists the G2 and G3 staff sections in the analysis of friendly and enemy activities and in compiling statistical data.

(2) The programming of the Army Aviation Gunship Ordnance Expenditure Analysis System was completed during the period and the system was turned over to the 17th Combat Aviation Group for implementation.

(3) The I FFORCEV Regulation on the Cost Reduction Program was revised by CAP and published.

(4) A detailed and comprehensive study of the US combat support furnished AEF during the period 24 April - 22 May in the 24th Special Tactical Zone was completed. This study was eventually used as an inclosure to a report to COMUSMACV.

(5) A study on the performance of the II Corps Regional Forces/Popular Forces was completed.
OPERATIONAL REPORT OF HEADQUARTERS, I FFORCIV FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 31 JULY 1969, RCS OSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

SECTION II - LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. (U) PERSONNEL:

   (1) Refugee Processing:

   (a) OBSERVATION: In Binh Dinh Province automated handling of the 184,830 out-of-camp refugee registrations accomplished in a few months what was calculated to normally take more than two years by manual office handling. Using local Qui Nhon Support Command data processing facilities with key punch operators working in their spare time and local students working part-time, information was extracted from 35,000 family survey records and placed on data processing cards. The information extracted, concerning residence, hamlet of origin, date of refuge, family members, head of family, I.D. card with data and place of issue and desires of the refugees as to returning home, has been programmed through the processing machines to give the required information in both English and Vietnamese.

   (b) EVALUATION: Data processing for the handling of mass registrations of people has thus been proven to have a very practical application. The Ministry has accepted the use of the machine made lists for payments to refugees. The system developed can be adapted locally to any Province that has available data processing equipment. It is understood that all LOG COMMANDS, such as ANSAC, have similar equipment. CORDS has informed its Refugee Officers throughout II CTZ of the Binh Dinh system. Ambassador Colby and Gen Abrams have taken steps to call the Binh Dinh experience to the attention of other regions.

   (c) RECOMMENDATION: That data processing be used to handle refugee files.

b. (C) OPERATIONS:

   (1) Fire Support for Logistical Aircraft:

   (a) OBSERVATION: Caribou aircraft resupplying Ben Het at the height of the siege were taking many hits from ground fire. Planes were being damaged badly and pilots wounded. The system in existence at this time was defensive in nature, i.e. Spad escorts only firing when fired on. It was decided to support resupply efforts with a coordinated program of offensive action incorporating Army artillery and air.

   (b) EVALUATION: A coordinated group of suppressive fires including Army artillery were employed in the following manner:

   1. TOT-20 minutes: F-4s with napalm strike North and East of Ben Het. Artillery begins suppressive fires South of the road.

   2. TOT-3 minutes: F-4s off target. Spad aircraft drop smoke and CBU ordnance on both sides of the Caribou run in heading forming a corridor. On the return pass, the Spads fire 20mm and 7.62 suppressive fires along the same corridors. Artillery fire continues.

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15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational report of Headquarters, 174THCB for Quarterly Period ending 31 July 1969, RDC UNICOR-65 (K) (U)

2. TOT: Caribou drop; Spads continue their suppressive fires to protect Caribous during recovery. Artillery fire continues.

4. TOT: All supporting fires lifted.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Coordinated positive offensive type fire suppression can be used effectively to provide the necessary protection for aircraft in a hostile environment.

2. PSYOP Reaction Force

(a) OBSERVATION: PSYOP to exploit VC/NVA tactical failures and acts of terrorism against innocent civilians and PSYOP to exploit allied tactical successes are very effective if conducted during an operation, or as soon as possible after the enemy psychological vulnerability has been discovered.

(b) EVALUATION: Experience has shown that too much lag time exists before an enemy psychological vulnerability is exploited. This is particularly true of the time taken to conduct face-to-face operations at the location of an enemy act of terrorism or atrocity against innocent civilians. A PSYOP reaction force consisting of assets and personnel from each Province PSYOP Coordinating Center (PCC) should be formed to eliminate this problem. An adequate SOP should be written in each province to facilitate reaction on a twenty-four hour basis. Equipment for the reaction force should include, as a minimum, loudspeakers, tape recorder with blank and prerecorded tapes, camera with film and necessary provisions for transportation to all points in each province. The MSQ-85 Audio-Van should be the primary PSYOP vehicle when possible.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That each province form a PSYOP reaction force consisting of personnel and equipment from the province PCC. An adequate SOP should be written in each province to facilitate twenty-four hour operation.

3. Study on Performance of the 11 Corps Regional Forces/Popular Forces.

(a) OBSERVATION: Performance of the RF/PF units in 11 Corps is significantly below that of comparable units in the other Corps. Kill ratios and small arms captured/lost ratios were the principal measures used for comparison.

(b) EVALUATION: From analysis of performance data and advisor ratings as presented in the Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES) report, it was concluded that in-place training lies at the heart of the RF/PF problem. Units receiving six or more hours of in-place training per week performed significantly better than those units receiving little or no weekly in-place training. Analysis further revealed that the amount of in-place training received by RF/PF units in 11 Corps is appreciably less than the amount received by RF/PF
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-OC-OT 15 August 1969

units in other Corps.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That increased emphasis be placed on RF/PF unit training. A temporary reduction in the number of RF/PF unit operations may be necessary to facilitate added training. If need be, such temporary reductions in operations should be accepted.

NOTE: Lessons Learned BEN BET - DAK TO have previously been published by MACV J3/05.

c. (U) TRAINING: None.

d. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

(i) Collection of Illegal Weapons.

(a) OBSERVATION: Some Vietnamese individuals have illegal weapons in their possession; but they are reluctant to report these to authorities for fear of adverse consequences.

(b) EVALUATION: The ROKA has initiated a campaign to collect these weapons and has achieved significant results. Two cases can be considered in which weapons are illegally possessed by the populace. In the first case well meaning individuals simply happen to acquire a weapon and have had no opportunity to report it. The second case is those people who have been hiding weapons for various reasons. In either case it is obvious that individuals willing to turn the weapons in may be afraid of being questioned or punished. In view of the implications, no questioning, no punishment and secrecy of the individual source of weapons were considered by the ROKA to be an essential requirement to motivate the people and create a voluntary response. A reward was also considered desirable. Since rice was a rationed item, it was offered: 5 bags for small arms and 10 bags for crew served weapons. Two trial campaigns by the 1st ROK Regt., Tiger Division have resulted in 57 individual weapons being turned in. The campaigns were publicized through hamlets and village chiefs.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That other units conduct similar campaigns, not only to collect illegal weapons, but also to publicize the VIP reward system.

(2) Big Mack Intelligence Report.

(a) OBSERVATION: MACV Order of Battle Summary, Volume II, which contains numerical data on VCI and guerrilla strengths, is issued approximately two and a half months after the reporting period.

(b) EVALUATION: Such a lag in reporting precludes a continuous and accurate estimate of the enemy situation and prevents accurate projections. The BIG MACK Intelligence Collection Program, which consists of an extensive series of reports on VCI and guerrilla forces, is available at Force level approximately 10 - 15 days after the reporting period. This data is not, however, adjusted or "smoothed" for estimate errors.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The BIG MACK Intelligence Report should be utilized as the basis for current intelligence estimates, and the MACV Order of Battle Summary should be utilized as an official update.

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a. (U) LOGISTICS:

(1) Pilferage of JPF Fuel.

(a) OBSERVATION: Disaster with JPF jet fuel. Two disastrous fires in Vietnamese hamlets in Binh Dinh Province occurred during July both relating to the theft and misuse of JPF fuel. In Dap Da hamlet a hand grenade accidentally set fire to fuel being used for cooking purposes. Five houses were destroyed leaving twenty-five persons homeless. In the hamlets of An Ngai and Hoai Cu, fuel, reportedly being drained from a U.S. pipeline, was ignited destroying sixty houses and leaving 250 persons homeless.

(b) EVALUATION: In conjunction with actions to prevent theft of JPF from pipelines, officials should warn the people of the risks of using this fuel.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the dangers of using JPF fuel for any home use be widely publicized.

2. That District and Province officials be urged to take necessary actions to reduce pipeline pilferage.

f. (U) ORGANIZATION: None.

g. (U) OTHER: None

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

DAVID L. LEDDA
Coranal, ACC
Adjutant General

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AVHGC-DST (15 Aug 69) 1st Ind


HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 12 Sep 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-D*, APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. (U) Reference item concerning "Refugee Processing," section II, page 88, paragraph a(1); concur. The use of data processing machines can greatly reduce the administrative delay in assembling and collating information related to refugee registrations. Province Senior Advisors are advised to coordinate with US commands having an ADP capability to determine their ability to support such programs.

   b. (U) Reference item concerning "PSYOP Reaction Force," section II, page 89, paragraph b(2); concur. A quick reaction PSYOP capability allows exploitation of short term target vulnerabilities. Provincial PSYOP Coordination Centers should be prepared to react to these opportunities with appropriate personnel and equipment.

   c. (C) Reference item concerning "Collection of Illegal Weapons," section II, page 90, paragraph d(1); concur. The idea of offering a reward to individuals for the turn-in of unauthorized weapons, in most cases, is a sufficient indicator that no questioning nor punishment will follow. A similar program could be implemented in other areas utilizing, as rewards, those items that are in short supply or difficult for the local populace to obtain. This is also a step forward in establishing rapport with the villagers and enhancing the VIP program. This information will be included in the forthcoming USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons report which is disseminated to all subordinate organizations. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

   d. (C) Reference item concerning "Big Mack Intelligence Report," section II, page 90, paragraph d(2); concur. The Big Mack Intelligence Collection Program provides a timely account of VCI and guerrilla forces. The Big Mack Intelligence Reports would greatly assist in maintaining a continuous and accurate estimate of the enemy situation. This information will be included in the forthcoming USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons
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AVHCC-DST (15 Aug 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, I FFORCEV for Quarterly
Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

report which is disseminated to all subordinate organizations. No action
by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

e. (U) Reference item concerning "Pilferage of JP4 Fuel," section 11,
page 91, paragraph e(1); concur. The following actions have been taken or
are being taken in an effort to reduce pipeline pilferage:

(1) Radio and leaflets have been used to warn of the dangers associated
with POL products.

(2) Letters have been sent to the Province Chief of Binh Dinh and
Pho Yen Provinces requesting their assistance.

(3) The pipeline has been buried in areas with a history of high
pilferage incidents.

(4) Assistance of the RVN MP's has been requested.

(5) Assistance of both US and RVN tactical units has been requested.

(6) Helicopters are assigned to patrol the pipeline.

(7) "Shadow" aircraft (AC-119) over-fly the pipeline when on missions
in the area.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cy furn:
I FFV

C J Wilson
Lt, Art.
Assistant Adjutant General

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GPOP-DT (31 Jul 69) 2d Ind
HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 18 OCT 69
TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310
This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.
FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. I. SHORT
CMT, AGC
Asst AG

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<td>USAV GO 192, 5 Apr 69</td>
<td>Attached HQ, 1 FFORCEN Arty</td>
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<td>41st Arty Group</td>
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<td>52d Arty Group</td>
<td>USAV GO 2077, 6 May 67</td>
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<td>6th Arty Group</td>
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<td>6th Arty (155mm) (7) 26th Arty</td>
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<td>Str B (MG), 41st Arty (AD)</td>
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<td>241st FA Det (Radar)</td>
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<td>Attached HQ, 1 FFORCEN Arty</td>
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**HEADQUARTERS I FFORCEN TASK ORGANIZATION**

_INCL 3_

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_DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS_

_DOD DIR 5200.10_

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<td>USARV GO 2005, 26 Oct 66</td>
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<td>USARV GO 571, 10 Apr 66</td>
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<td>USARV GO 2432, 6 Jul 69</td>
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HEADQUARTERS I FFORCEN TASK ORGANIZATION

OPPTN UNITS

4th Inf Div
173d Abn Bde (Sep)
II Corps US Army Advisory Gp
17th Combat Aviation Gp
7th Sqdn, 17th Air Cav

3d Bn (AM) 506th Inf
(1st Bde, 101st Abn Div (AM))

8th PSYOPS Bn
Co B, 5th SPG
201st Avn Co (Corps)

AUTHORITY

USARV OPLAN 78-66 (OP ROBIN)
MACV msg (S) MACPAC 05002, 171835Z Feb 68, Unit Deployment (U)

MACV msg (S) MACCOG 05002, 171835Z Feb 68, Unit Deployment (U)

MACV msg (S) MACCOG 116892, 231133Z May 67, Reinforcement of II CTZ (U)

MACV LOI 1-66 dtd 29 Mar 66 paragraph 5 (S)

MACV LOI 1-66 dtd 29 Mar 66 Task Organization

USARV msg (C) AVHOG 0 31527 110846Z Jan 68, Assignment Status of 201st Avn Co (Corps) and 7/17th Air Cav Sqdn (U)

MACV msg (S) MACCOG 01603, 151110Z Jan 68 byrd AO (U)

MACV 1tr (POUO) MACCP dtd 6 Dec 66, Employment of the US Army 6th PSYOPS Battalion (Tactical)

MACV LOI 1-66 dtd 19 Mar 66 paragraph 5 (S)

MACV msg (S) MACPAC 02553, 211235Z Jan 67, OPMN of USASF Team in II CTZ (U)

USARV msg (C) AVHOG-O 31527, 110846Z Jan 68, Assignment Status of 201st Avn Co (Corps) and 7/17th Air Cav Sqdn (U)

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* COBRA TEAMS

* CONVOY ESCORT AND SECURITY

MAY 1969

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

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PURPOSE

In producing TACTICAL NOTES, I FFORCE V Headquarters compiles and highlights in each edition up to date, helpful hints from the counter insurgency battlefields in II Corps Tactical Zone. Study them. Put them to use. Pass them along to others.

Contributions from commanders of all assigned and OPCON units, as well as other organizations receiving the NOTES, including advisors with ARVN units and liaison officers with ROK units, are highly desired and solicited. Pertinent details of "tactical lessons learned" should be recorded as they happen. All contributions submitted should reach this headquarters by the fifteenth of each month.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ARTHUR B. PUSEY, Jr.
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.
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(C) Flak Suppression and Countermortar Fires During Helicopter Resupply. Often when a helicopter attempts to take off or land on a firebase the enemy will deliver intense mortar and recoilless rifle fire against the aircraft. This tactic can threaten the preservation of the fire base if it is dependent on air resupply. In order to overcome this threat, flak suppression and counterbattery programs must be planned around all fire bases. Experience has shown that the firing of such programs will suppress enemy fire for a period sufficient to permit resupply. Aircraft approach routes must be arranged so that interruption of firing is held to a minimum.

IFORCEV Arty
Target Location by Triangulation. Triangulation can be an effective means of identifying enemy firing positions so that the enemy may be taken under fire. The use of a flash base in determining the location of flat trajectory weapons is one method that has proven successful in the Dak To area. Three observation posts, each equipped with an aiming circle, were positioned on hill top fire bases approximately seven kilometers apart. Their positions were plotted on a 1:25,000 firing chart at the artillery battalion command post. Training was conducted by firing illumination rounds and recording the azimuths to the burst reported by each OP. In each case, the reported azimuths intersected very near the illumination grid fired. During actual enemy gunfire attacks, muzzle flashes could not be observed directly, but azimuths were measured at the center of the momentary illumination haze which appeared over the mask when the enemy weapons were fired. When plotted on the chart, the azimuth lines from the OP's intersected and formed a small triangle, the center of which fixed the enemy gun position grid with sufficient accuracy to permit effective zone and sweep counterbattery fire. The flash base, together with timely counterbattery fire, was able to suppress enemy gunfire attacks. Triangulation can also be established by using compasses, sound direction or any other means of determining the direction from which the enemy fires are coming.
Artillery in Support of Small Unit Reconnaissance.

Small unit operations because of their widely dispersed nature, create unique artillery support problems. Difficulty in obtaining current and accurate locations of small unit reconnaissance teams has been experienced when the small unit reconnaissance TOC was not collocated with the artillery FDC. In order to provide rapid close support to these teams it was determined essential that the artillery commander have a liaison NCO from the reconnaissance unit with whom he can directly coordinate fire support. Additionally, when combined raids are executed the small unit reconnaissance team should establish a TAC CP with the artillery element so that fire support coordination necessary for accurate and responsive fires can be expeditiously accomplished.

173d Abn Bde
(C) **Identification of VCI Personalities.** Past experience has shown that Montagnard villagers have been reluctant to point out VCI personalities located in their home villages. Agents have learned that small children (age group 10-15) can provide a wealth of information as to VCI activities. Past operations have revealed that children will relate names of individuals in their village who contribute in any manner to enemy activities. When in support of cordon and search operations, one agent team should be instructed to gain the confidence of the children and to exploit all information obtainable.

4th Inf Div
Liaison in Local Hamlets. On 18 April, the 3d Battalion, 503d Infantry, placed squads in 6 hamlets to work with and to assist PF platoons and RD cadre. Having troops working closely with these GVN assets at the grassroots level provided an excellent added intelligence source. Almost immediately the members of both PF and RD teams began reporting valuable information on enemy activity to the US squads in the hamlets. The reports obtained and the activity observed by the troops were passed immediately to the battalion, which in turn was able to react in anticipation of enemy activity. Experience indicates that the same information forwarded through normal channels would have taken considerably longer to reach the battalion and would very likely have precluded effective reaction by the battalion.

173d Abn Bde/TF South
(C) Hand Grenade Night Interdiction Program. On firebases where there is a steep slope that the enemy could approach with sappers, a hand grenade interdiction program has proven highly effective. Guards along the perimeter throw hand grenades down the steep slope at predetermined times. The program should be supervised by a noncommissioned officer.

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(C) Convoy Escort and Security. A study has been conducted to determine the relative crew protection by trucks and armored personnel carriers when used as lead vehicles. The study showed that a truck as the lead vehicle with mounted machine gun and radio and APCs interspersed in the convoy, is the best combination because the truck, if hit by a B-40 rocket or a mine, takes fewer casualties. Three explanations are offered for this imbalance of casualties.

(a) APC carries more personnel; Therefore a greater number of personnel are vulnerable.

(b) The crew of an APC is much closer to a mine explosion than are personnel in a truck. The stand-off provided by the higher truck cab provides a greater degree of safety.

(c) In the case of B-40 rocket incidents, the truck cab presents a much smaller target than does the APC, and is subject to considerably less spalling and shrapnel effect when hit by a rocket. 4th Inf Div
USEFUL TACTICAL HINTS

(6) Use of APCs to Insert Stay-Behind Forces. Armored personnel carriers offer an effective means of inserting ambushes and patrols. The personnel who are to be placed in position are concealed inside the APC. The crew of the APC rides on the outside of the vehicle. The APC moves into a densely vegetated area and the stay-behind force dismounts. When the carrier emerges from the dense vegetation, the same number of personnel are riding on the outside. There is nothing to indicate to the enemy that forces have been left behind.

4th Inf Div
Use of CS Munitions to Detect Concealed Enemy Forces.

The detection of concealed enemy troops and their locations in the jungle or heavily vegetated terrain by aerial observers is difficult at best and consequently many enemy locations go undetected. Enemy troops are well trained in the art of concealment and effectively counter visual detection by strict movement discipline when any type of aircraft is overhead. To enhance our detection capabilities under these circumstances, the technique of employing CS munitions has been found to be effective in causing the enemy to expose their positions. In the employment of this technique E158 CS cannisters are dropped in the target area by a command and control ship, or preferably by a lead gunship, forcing the enemy to move and disclose their location. The following support aircraft or gunship is spaced far enough behind the lead ship so that he is in position to detect and report the movement or deliver accurate fire on the exposed target. Prior planning is a must in the employment of this technique and care must be taken to ensure that friendly forces are either upwind from the target area or equipped with protective masks. Close coordination with the ground commander is imperative and in many cases the friendly ground forces can be immediately employed to eliminate the enemy force.

G3 Advisor, II CTZ
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(U) Cobra Teams. Cobra Teams (Combined ARVN-American reconnaissance teams) have met with a high degree of success in terms of enemy kills and intelligence gathered. These combined teams consist of 14 heavily armed LRP trained personnel, (normally eight ARVN and six U.S.). These personnel come from the U.S. reconnaissance platoons and the ARVN reconnaissance companies. The Cobra Team is inserted by helicopter, vehicle, foot or boat into suspected enemy areas or base camps. The team is heavily armed and specially trained in artillery adjustment, employment of gunships, and tactical air in addition to receiving instruction on LRP techniques. This special training and the concept of reinforcing as opposed to extracting gives the Cobra Team staying power and has paid dividends in enemy kills and equipment captured. The combined aspect of the team offers immediate identification of the enemy units or quick determination of the importance of captured documents and material. Documents captured by Cobra Teams have revealed members of the VCI within hamlets and villages as well as commo-liaison agents for NVA, VC MF/LF units, and guerrilla elements. The Cobra Team concept adds professionalism as well as detailed knowledge of the area and the enemy. The mutual exchange of operating techniques and awarding combat decorations to both ARVN and U.S. Cobra Team members has contributed to the combat effectiveness of the ARVN and the U.S. soldier. This concept has
served to convince ARVN leaders that the ARVN soldier can operate independently if well led, supported, and provided with adequate communications.

(C) False Insertion of Recon Teams. Recently, prior to the insertion of a Recon Team, a false insertion was conducted in an attempt to deceive the enemy as to the location of the actual LZ. Gunships prepared the false LZ, and, following this, the insertion ship touched down momentarily before insertion of the team at the actual LZ, located approximately one (1) km away. Upon actual insertion the team moved a short distance and established an OP. Remaining in the same general area for three days, the team had no sightings. Upon moving approximately two (2) km further away from the false LZ, they had three enemy sightings and captured one (1) NVA soldier. Upon interrogation, the PW stated that his unit had observed the initial (false) insertion and were told to avoid the surrounding area for a radius of approximately two (2) km. When he was captured he did not suspect that the Americans were in the area. False insertions are an effective means of deception when inserting small units; however, it must be recognised that the enemy will give a wide berth to any area they believe to have an insertion site. Recon Teams must move a considerable distance from any real or false insertion area to obtain best results.

173d Abn Bde
(C) Enemy Evaluation of US Artillery and Tactical Air. A recent POW interrogation report produced the following enemy evaluation of US artillery fires and tactical air strikes. The POW stated that the NVA were not afraid of US artillery because they fire on round at a time until fires have been adjusted on an exact target. By the time the artillery is adjusted, the enemy has taken cover underground. However, the NVA are afraid of ARVN artillery fires because they fire first round barrages which catch the enemy unprepared. Likewise the POW stated that the enemy are not afraid of tactical air strikes. The aircraft will shoot at or bomb only one position at a time and will continue to engage that single target without deviation. The NVA simply move a short distance away from the target and watch the attack. Artillery attacks can be improved through the use of CS mix with HE and by firing first round concentrations when the target can be positively identified and safety requirements permit. Tactical air strikes may be more effective if the requesting unit and/or FAC not only specify one point target but also request secondary coverage of nearby coordinates of suspected enemy locations (SEL) when safety requirements permit and aircraft are available.

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1/7
(U) Radio Procedures. To further simplify the procedures contained in ACP 125 and reduce transmission time, the following procedure is authorized for use at the discretion of commanders concerned.

a. Radio operators make normal initial contact using call signs and authenticate when required, for the remainder of the series of transmissions only the prowords (over) or (out) need be used.

b. The congested 30-75.95 MHz FM band in Vietnam dictates that all radio transmissions be as short and concise as possible. The above procedure will assist in achieving this. Commanders are requested to take the initiative in preventing indiscriminate use of radios.

IFFN Sig0
(C) An Old Ambush Tactic Becomes Effective. When moving into ambush positions, units are often observed and consequently by-passed by the Viet Cong. One unit decided to vary the pattern, it moved into an ambush position at dusk as usual. However, knowing that they were being observed and having made a previous reconnaissance of the general area, they deployed to an alternate ambush site after darkness and subsequently made a successful contact with the enemy. This selection and occupation of alternate ambush positions after dark is often overlooked due to the reluctance of many commanders to move troops at night. This tactic, however, can yield highly significant results.

SA, 23d Div
A recent study was conducted by HQ, IFFV on ambushes conducted in the II CTZ. The study considered the results of 122 triggered ambushes during the period 1 January to 16 February 1969. It was found that only 57% of ambushes resulted in enemy casualties of 10 or greater. The basic fundamentals of successful ambushes are \textit{surprise}, \textit{coordinated fires} and \textit{control}.

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{Surprise} depends on the formulation of a carefully prepared plan based on recent, reliable intelligence. Personnel responsible for establishing an ambush must be given sufficient time for planning. A prior reconnaissance of the ambush site should be made by key personnel. If possible rehearsals should be conducted prior to the operation. Every man in the ambush party must understand exactly what his particular mission is to be.

\item \textit{Coordinated fires} must be achieved to inflict maximum casualties on the enemy. Maximum use should be made of area fire weapons such as claymore mines and hand grenades. These weapons will provide a high initial volume of fire and shock action that will disrupt the enemy reaction. The use of such weapons will also deceive the enemy as to the location of the ambush party. Small arms fire must be kept low, especially at night, as there is a tendency for troops to fire high at night.
\end{enumerate}
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c. CONTROL is the third key factor in successful ambushes. The ambush must be triggered by one man. The majority of the enemy force must be in the killing zone when the ambush is sprung. Any premature firing will alert the enemy and allow him to escape maximum damage.

The foregoing factors are nothing more than basic doctrine, but how well do your men know and practice the fundamentals? Every leader responsible for conducting an ambush should ask himself the following questions:

1. How much time does the ambush party have to prepare for the ambush?

2. Was an inspection of the ambush party conducted prior to their departure?

3. How closely is their preparation supervised?

4. Does every man in the ambush party know what his job is?

Units should train in ambush techniques when the situation permits. A valuable method of training is the post action critique. It only takes a short period of time, but it can reinforce successful methods as well as identify problem areas. Night firing training should be conducted periodically during stand downs.

The ambush is one of the primary offensive weapons available to our forces. Continued emphasis and training on ambush operations is essential to maintain the effectiveness of the highly versatile operation.

G3 I FFORCE
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(C) Command Detonated Booby-Traps. The following ambush has been developed. A ring main of detonating cord is placed out along the kill zone. The grenades are placed at 4-meter intervals along the kill zone, linked to ring main with detonating cord and primed with detonating cord in the fuse-well. Claymores are placed at the ends of the kill zone facing in, primed and linked to the ring main by detonating cord. Trip flares are placed at 10-meter intervals along the ambush with the spring loaded trip wire strung over the detonating cord. The grenades are detonated by a claymore firing device and electric blasting cap, giving very effective fragmentation over the entire kill zone and illuminating it at the same time. Personnel who trigger this ambush position themselves where they can observe the kill zone, but remain far enough away to prevent receiving grenade fragments. Small unit patrols can be highly successful in the employment of this type of ambush, however, all members must be familiar with proper demolition techniques to assure their own safety and to achieve maximum effectiveness from the ambush (see Inclosure 1).

TF South
ENEMY TACTICS

(C) **Enemy Use of Claymore Mines.** During a sweep of a bunker complex in April 1969, elements of the 4th Infantry Division discovered that the enemy had employed claymore-type mines approximately five feet above the ground in trees. The mines were either electrically command detonated or rigged to be detonated by trip wires.

4th Inf Div

(C) **False Walls.** A common Viet Cong tactic is to build structures with double walls. The spaces between the inner and outer walls are used to hide supplies and in some instances, are large enough to hide personnel. During search and clear operations, insure that the walls of structures are included in the overall search plan. After insuring that the structure is not booby-trapped, a quick and easy way to determine if there is a double wall is by thumping the wall for hollow sounds. If a double wall is found, special precautions must be taken for the Viet Cong often booby-trap hidden supplies.

G3 Advisor, II CTZ
Air Warnings. Demolitions and ground-to-air fires are as great a hazard to aircraft safety as artillery fires, mortar fires, and fires of other high trajectory weapons. The 4th Infantry Division requires the posting of warnings to aircraft for demolitions operations and for areas where ground-to-air fires have been received in the past 24 hours. These warnings insure aircraft safety by allowing aircraft to bypass danger areas. 4th Inf Div
USING ENEMY KNOWLEDGE

(c) KCS for Training of Regional Force/Popular Force. The 35th KVSF section, in conjunction with the H3 Training section has employed a Kit Carson Scout for the training of RF/PF personnel. The individual was an NVA recon sergeant for 6 years and attended officers school just prior to his Chieu Hoi. He is well versed in NVA/VC tactics and weapons and is instructing classes in both. In addition, when he becomes more fluent in English, he will instruct the same classes to U.S. replacements. The NVA Kit Carson Scout is also used in interrogating Ho Chi Minh and prisoners of war. The presence of a fellow countryman and soldier has two effects. First, it assures the Ho Chi Minh or PW that he will not be killed and can find a friend. Second, in the event that the Ho Chi Minh or PW is trying to trick or lie, the Kit Carson Scout may catch the lie which is not obvious to the U.S. or NVA interrogator.

Another use of this Ho Chi Minh is in the KCS recruiting program. He accompanies the KCS recruiter to the Chieu Hoi center and is present during interviews to assist in evaluating the worth of KCS candidates.

4th Inf Div
(U) Rice Extraction. Extraction of a large cache of rice is a difficult and time-consuming process if only UH-1 helicopters are utilized. A more efficient method of extraction is to use a CONEX container lifted to the cache site by CH-47 helicopter. The CONEX container is loaded with rice and hauled out by CH-47. This method reduces sorties and permits more efficient use of other air assets. 173d Abn Bde
(U) **Fire Base Water Resupply.** When occupying a mountain top fire base, all water must be airlifted to the base. The large amount of water needed in a tropical climate makes the resupply of water a constant problem. Often, sufficient water containers, such as water trailers, are not available and scarcity of aircraft limit the back haul sorties which are necessary to refill the containers. The use of medium or heavy artillery propellant cannisters for the transport of NON-POTABLE water can ease the problem. Large numbers of these watertight cannisters can be lifted, either internally or externally, by CH-47 aircraft, thereby reducing the need for constant backhaul of water containers for refill.
Tracker Dog Team Operations. In a recent operation a tracker team and tracker dog were employed to search for a downed F4D aircraft pilot. The team arrived at the crash site and noticed the heavy smell of JP4 in the area. This caused the dog to lose his ability to smell or effectively track in the area, thus making the team ineffective. If a CTT is to be used in the future for similar search and rescue missions the dogs should be kept out of the crash site in order to preserve the dogs sense of smell and his ability to track.

TF South
(U) **Firing Positions as Observation Posts.** On platoon size artillery raids, the howitzers are usually emplaced on a prominent hilltop to facilitate defense of the position. This type of position also provides an excellent observation post. Proper utilization of the fire base as an OP can provide significant intelligence data and additional artillery targets. Binoculars, BC Scopes, and Starlight Scopes should be brought with the raiding unit and employed by as many personnel as practical. Suspected enemy trails and supply routes that can be observed from the firing position should be seeded with trip flares and other warning devices in order to provide some excellent targets. When the devices are activated, precomputed data will permit placing rapid, accurate fire on the individuals who tripped the devices.

173d Abn Bde
(C) **Company Reconnaissance Unit.** One squad of a rifle company is given special training in reconnaissance techniques. The squad operates as far as one kilometer forward of the company. For example, when a company moves to a night location, the squad is dispatched several hours in advance to the night location to secure it. This procedure provides the company with ample warning if enemy elements are in the area. If the squad makes contact, it holds or withdraws to a location from which the company can engage the enemy. This element must have sufficient equipment to sustain itself for at least three days. 

4th Inf Div

(C) **Keeping Listening Posts Alert.** It is important that every effort be made to keep listening posts alert at night. Communication must be maintained with the listening post at all times. One method is to have the listening post reply to radio calls by breaking squelch. An alternate means is telephone communication. If telephone communication is not available, twine may be employed using a tug and yank system. One end of the twine is tied on the hand of a member of the listening post. The other end is tied on the hand of a guard on the perimeter. Periodic tugging on the twine keeps both parties awake and alert. 

4th Inf Div
**TACTICAL NOTES**

**I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM**

**IN THIS ISSUE**

* INTEGRATION OF KIT CARSON SCOUTS AND SCOUT DOGS

* USE OF CS TO BREAK CONTACT

* LRRP INSERTIONS

* NIGHT MEDEVAC

**JULY 1969**


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PURPOSE

In producing TACTICAL NOTES, I FFORCENV Headquarters compiles and highlights in each edition up-to-date helpful hints from the counterinsurgency battlefields in II Corps Tactical Zone. Study them. Put them to use. Pass them along to others.

Contributions from commanders of all assigned and OPCON units, as well as other organizations receiving the NOTES, including advisors with ARVN units and liaison officers with ROK units, are highly desired and solicited. Pertinent details of "tactical lessons learned" should be recorded as they happen. All contributions submitted should reach this headquarters, by the fifteenth of each month.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DANIEL L. LEDDA
Colonel, AGO
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

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Relocation of Weapons Positions. The enemy attempts to sketch former weapons positions, bunkers and wire of abandoned fire bases. An enemy document captured by one of the battalions showed a detailed, to scale, sketch of one of the fire bases near POLUM KIENG. The sketch showed exact positions of all bunkers, LZ's and wire. The sketch contained arrows showing directions of attack into the firebase. Writing on the sketch indicated that the fire base was at that time vacant, but it is clear that it was being observed in the event of US or ARVN reoccupation. This gives us documented intelligence that our vacant fire bases are being closely observed, studied and reconnoitered, with enemy plans for future attacks being made. Upon reoccupation of a fire base, the location of weapons positions, bunkers and other defensive positions should be changed in so far as it is practical in order to reduce enemy intelligence of our positions.

4th Inf Div
(C) Expediting Delivery of Defensive Fires. AhVN artillery units often occupy the same positions for extended periods. Delivery of preplanned fires in defense of the position can be greatly expedited by preparing ammunition with pre-cut fuses. This should be done with beehive and H& rounds to achieve detonation at various ranges in direct fire and for illumination rounds which should be set to illuminate likely areas of approach into the position. Rapid identification of these pre-set rounds can be facilitated by printing the fuse setting on the ogive of the projectile with a bright, colored paint. DSA, li CTU, SA 22d DTA.

(C) Clearing Impact Areas for Movement of Friendly Troops. Unexploded "firecracker" artillery ammunition poses a threat to friendly forces that may subsequently move through the impact area. This hazard may be reduced by firing H& artillery rounds into the impact area prior to conducting friendly operations in the vicinity, in order to detonate any duds or tree hanging rounds which could endanger friendly troops moving through the area. DSA, IICTL, SA 24th STZ.
Use of Scout Dogs During Cordon and Search Operations.

To maximize the effectiveness of the scout dogs while searching villages a few simple guidelines should be observed.

1. Work downwind.
2. Have the patrol remove all inhabitants from the houses and place them downwind.
3. Check all houses with the dog to discover if any enemy are hidden between double walls or in tunnels under houses.
4. Check surrounding areas for underground hideouts or caches of weapons.
5. Check along canals, rice paddies, rivers, or lakes for possible hideouts along the banks.
6. Check carefully around pig stys, cattle pens and hay stacks as possible hiding places for caches of weapons and ammunition.

4th Inf Div
(C) Tank-Mounted Mine Roller. The tank-mounted mine roller has proven itself many times over in conducting rapid, efficient sweeps of roads in the AO. The Engineer battalion maintains this unit to answer requests from tactical units which require additional mine sweeping capability. Its effectiveness has been specifically established on roads in this AO.

4th Inf Div

(C) Field Expedient Short Whip Antenna. A substitute whip antenna can be fabricated from existing materials with little maintenance support and provide approximately the same range capabilities as the manufactured short whip antenna. Unit signal personnel fabricated a short whip antenna with the use of metal banding straps from C ration containers and sandbags. The metal straps were cut at the appropriate lengths required. Three straps were cut at a length of 2 feet each. The remaining three sections were cut approximately 7 inches shorter than the previous section. These sections were braided together, with the help of the maintenance support personnel, by using a soldering iron and tying together the section with wire. The rubber connector and the antenna adapter must still be used. The fabricated antenna then sticks into the end of the rubberized connector. Although the banding straps did not permit as much flexibility as the manufactured antenna, they did act as an adequate substitute.

4th Inf Div
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(C) Employment of Kit Carson Scouts. Some units have a Mountain Kit Carson Scout attached. This individual speaks Vietnamese as well as most dialects of Montagnard. In addition, the KCS received military and political training in North Vietnam. When showing movies which are mostly all spoken in Vietnamese in a Montagnard village, the KCS interprets what is being said and speaks over a loudspeaker. In addition, while changing rolls during and after a propaganda film, the KCS relates his experiences to the people and encourages them to try to influence their Viet friends to Chieu Hoi or surrender. The KCS also explains the 3d Party program and the VIP Program. The composite HQ/HH has met with tremendous success and outstanding reception and has had a record number of VIP participants due to this means of advertising the program.

(C) Integration of Kit Carson Scouts and Scout Dogs. The continued use of Kit Carson Scouts and Scout Dogs can provide excellent search and destroy results. It has been found that employing the Kit Carson Scouts together with scout dogs for small unit patrols enhances the ability of the patrol to perform its mission. The advantage of the Kit Carson Scout knowledge of the terrain coupled with the scout dog's capability to provide sufficient warnings of enemy approach or ambush is an effective combination. Kit Carson Scouts and Scout Dogs should be employed with small unit patrols as often as possible.
(C) Conservation of Barrier Materials. With barrier materials (concertina, stakes, sandbags, etc.) continuing to be critical items, units have instituted procedures and methods that attempt to conserve on the use of these materials. Barrier materials of all types are retrograded, where possible. Some units have made it SOP for each man to carry ten or more sandbags which will be filled, used, emptied, moved to another firebase and used again until expended. Besides this being good supply economy this allows units to construct overhead covers for foxholes immediately upon occupation of the new location without placing an excessive burden on their resupply lines.

4th Inf Div

(C) Use of CS to break Contact. Employment of CS gas is a very effective means for a small unit to break contact with a superior force. A favorite NVA tactic is to engage a numerically inferior US force. To counter this tactic, small US forces are instructed to deliver a heavy volume of fire and then attempt to break contact as quickly as possible. Often a small unit has difficulty in breaking the contact. The use of CS grenades can be effective in breaking contact in such a situation. In addition to disorganizing and confusing the enemy, the gas also provides a partial smoke screen which can mask the withdrawal of the US element. Also effective in this role is the WP grenade.

4th Inf Div
Target Location. Targets acquired recently by TPS-25 radar have been brought under the mass fire of a Combined Artillery and Air Force Team. When a reading is obtained on the TPS-25 radar the artillery immediately reacts with fire. The fire support coordinator informs the air-liaison team of the location of the contact. If a Shadow aircraft is available it is diverted to the area. A final round of illumination is fired by the artillery. This gives the Shadow aircraft the location of the contact and provides illumination for an initial visual reconnaissance of the area. If a target is produced the Shadow then utilizes its devices to develop the contact. This has resulted in numerous secondary explosions that would not have otherwise been obtained.

Task Force South

Integrating Operations. A II Corps unit working in support of a Pacification Program is currently utilizing a unique method of integrating operations with Popular Forces. The unit has directed intensive effort into the Combined Action Team concept. This is a US unit of less than platoon size which operates, day and night, with a PF platoon. The impact of the Combined Action Team concept on our national effort and goals is profound. Combined operations are being conducted, RVNAF forces are being improved, security for pacification is being increased, health conditions are being improved and agricultural output is being increased. The concerned villages are fast becoming independent, hard-working communities. The Combined Action Team concept can have the same highly successful results when employed elsewhere.
LRRP’s in Pacification Operations. Quite often the value of LRRP teams is overlooked in pacification operations. When employed in their basic mission of gathering intelligence concerning enemy troop concentrations and movement they can be an invaluable asset. In pacification operations friendly forces are usually fragmented into squad and platoon sized units. Swift reaction to an enemy threat depends largely on timely warning which will allow for the concentration of friendly forces to eliminate them. One ARVN division realizing the importance of LRRPs in the pacification program has augmented their regimental reconnaissance companies with LRRP teams from the division recon company. The regiments have also formed additional patrol elements from assigned personnel who have received LRRP training but have not completed the LRRP certification course. These additional teams provide coverage in each regimental AO and consequently a more effective early warning system.

DSn, II CTZ LRRP Advisor
(C) LRRP Insertions. The essence of LRRP operations is stealth, yet some units have been known to prep an LZ with artillery prior to making a LRRP insertion. This only serves to alert the enemy to an impending insertion and direct them to its location. Security could be effectively provided by having gunships or Tac Air hold in an orbit pattern beyond sight of the LZ, yet close enough to provide immediate fire support if required. Additional security is available by means of preplanned artillery fire that can be delivered on call if contact is made.  

DSA, II CTZ, LRRP Advisor

(C) VC Tactic Against LRRP's. LRRP teams have noted the enemy employment of new tactics. First, LRRP teams when discovered by hostile civilians, have been encircled by the civilians who then proceeded to beat on sticks revealing the LRRP team's position. Shortly after the drumming stopped, the LRRP team would make contact with the enemy force. Secondly, LRRP teams have noted that they have been observed and then followed by children. When the children disappeared, the LRRP team would make contact shortly thereafter. Thirdly, LRRP teams have noted the enemy employing new search techniques against them once their presence is discovered. The enemy has searched in a file formation utilizing a 10 man unit separated into two man teams moving 25 feet apart.  

4th Inf Div
ENEMY TACTICS

(C) Change in Unit Organization. During attack by fire against allied installations a significant change in enemy organization was noted. Recent contacts have indicated that infantry units have received direct support from artillery and sapper elements. Captured documents further indicate that the enemy is attaching artillery and sapper elements to their infantry units providing them with a greater capability, flexibility and mobility.

4th Inf Div
(C) **Night Medevac.** Night medevacs are a fairly common occurrence, yet units still experience difficulty in coordinating the pickup. Most often the problem is simply one of providing illumination for the LZ. In one such situation an infantry unit engaged a small enemy force and took casualties. During the contact they had expended their illumination flares. The medevac ship was on station ready to make the pickup twenty-three minutes after the request for a "dust-off" had been submitted. However, the pickup was delayed an additional twenty to twenty-five minutes due primarily to a lack of illumination. This problem could be solved by having the medevac helicopter carry illumination flares or by sending a second aircraft to drop the flares while the pickup is being made.

DSA, II CTZ, SA 22d DTA
(G) **KBAR/Vampire Flights.** Flight operations called KBAR or Vampire are presently being utilized in IV Corps. These flights consist of a platoon (4) of gunships, a CGC ship, and at least 5 troop carrying helicopters. The KBAR package is made available to provinces on request, to support planned operations in reaction to reliable intelligence of a perishable nature. The Vampire package is employed primarily in night reaction missions with the requesting unit being required to provide a company size unit at a pickup zone. This provides a reaction force with the remainder of the company as reserve should reinforcement be necessary. The Vampire flight is also employed for KBAR type operations, to support normal daytime operations in support of divisions or provinces, to reinforce successful contacts or in an air cavalry role. On a given day the KBAR assets are assigned missions for the following morning and afternoon; the package assigned to the mission based on the lowest priorities of intelligence is designated the Vampire package. This package remains on standby during the night, and if no need arises for its deployment it is employed the following day in its assigned KBAR missions. If the flight is committed during the night, its KBAR missions the following day are cancelled. This concept is recommended for consideration by subordinate units for use in reaction type missions.
Increased Use of External Loads (UH-1). During the calendar year 1968 several helicopters were damaged or totally destroyed while trying to land in unsuitable landing zones or from trying to hover over the trees and kick out supplies to ground troops that did not have time to prepare suitable landing zones. There has been a marked decrease in this type of accident with the increased use of sling loads for resupplying units in areas without suitable landing zones. 4th Inf Div
(C) Marking Landing Zones. Intelligence information acquired during recent operations indicates that VC/NVA units have been instructed to take likely LZ's under indirect fire as soon as smoke is observed in the vicinity of the landing zone. This immediate reaction to the anticipated landing of the helicopters allows the first rounds to impact while the aircraft is on the ground. To counter this enemy tactic some ARVN units are using signal mirrors and marker panels to mark the LZ's. These two devices are effective marking procedures and they are less likely than smoke to alert the enemy to friendly locations and incoming helicopters.

DSA, II CTZ, SA 24th STZ
(C) Combat Helicopter Operations.

a. A CINPAC Security Team reported the following possible sources of enemy prior knowledge:

(1) Air reconnaissance of a LZ has been documented by numerous NW's as one of the indicators used by the VC/NVA to forewarn an impending operation.

(2) In some areas commanders are required to fly to planning and coordination conferences held immediately prior (24-48 hours) to an operation. This influx of numerous helicopters, all bearing distinctive organizational markings, could provide tip-off not only that an operation is being planned, but also what organizations will participate as well as in what TAOR.

(3) Survey revealed that employment of stereotyped insertion techniques, such as artillery preparation and early arrival of command and control helicopters over LZ's, compromise missions.

(4) Use of static nicknames and suffixes in lieu of tactical call signs, e.g. Blackjack 6 for CO, Blackjack 3 for Operations Officer, etc., aid the enemy in maintaining continuity on specific units and key individuals. This practice greatly enhances the enemy's capability to be forewarned of rotary wing operations.

(5) The extensive employment of unit base radio nets for in flight control of their organic aircraft can provide
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a lucrative source of foreknowledge/forewarning to the enemy.

Helicopters check in and out with the base radio net for every sortie. Net control is by the Operations Duty Officer of the parent command. All transmissions are in the clear; coordination information which may include fire base locations, frequencies to contact, duration of mission, etc., is passed freely between aircraft and home base to facilitate in-flight shifting of assets.

b. Do not give "Charlie" useful information.

I FFORCEV G3

(C) Use of a Double Point. Because of the thick vegetation and rugged terrain of the Central Highlands, moving troops are vulnerable to ambush. Units have begun using a double point element - an extra precaution against ambushes. The point elements move by alternate bounds, one covering while the other moves ahead to the next vantage point. Thus, an element is always in position to return fire should the lead element discover a kill zone.

4th Inf Div
IN THIS ISSUE

* HANDLING OF GRENADES
* VC HABITS
* FINDING SMALL ENEMY UNITS
* PREMATURE DETONATION OF 122 MM ROCKETS

JUNE 1969
Purpose:

In producing TACTICAL NOTES, I FFORCEV Headquarters compiles and highlights in each edition up to date, helpful hints from the counter insurgency battlefields in II Corps Tactical Zone. Study them. Put them to use. Pass them along to others.

Contributions from commanders of all assigned and OPOON units, as well as other organizations receiving the NOTES, including advisors with ARVN units and liaison officers with ROK units, are highly desired and solicited. Pertinent details of "tactical lessons learned" should be recorded as they happen. All contributions submitted should reach this headquarters by the fifteenth of each month.

For the commander:

Daniel L. Ledda
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

Distribution:

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(U) Collocation of 105mm Section's with an 8"/175mm Unit.

A heavy battery not mutually supported by artillery cannot deliver counterfire fast enough with a sufficient volume to suppress enemy mortar attacks. The 105mm section can deliver rapid counterfire while the heavies are employed firing blocking fires for reaction forces deployed to counter ground probes. Additionally, the 105mm provides an excellent self-illumination and Beehive capability.

The fire direction of the 105mm is manual and poses no difficulties for the organic FDC. Consideration should be given to the attachment of a 105mm howitzer section to a heavy battery whenever it is positioned outside of friendly artillery range.

I FORCES Artillery
(U) Meteorological Support of Artillery Raids. Artillery units which must deploy to areas in which accurate METRO data cannot be obtained should utilize a visual METRO Team. Where organic assets are not available, a request for visual METRO support should be submitted to the appropriate general support artillery unit. While data obtained from the visual section cannot equal that from an electronic section, experience has proven that the first round data is greatly improved by the application of visual MET corrections.

I FFORCEN Artillery

(C) Firecracker for Close-In Defense. Red Thrust (artillery raid) positions are usually outside of the range of D3 artillery, and sometimes outside of all supporting artillery. Close fire support is especially critical during a raid because of the limited fire power available for the defensive position. It has been noted by the Brigade's D3 artillery that close support can be provided by infantry mortars, if available. If mortars are not available, targets that are below minimum quadrant elevation for H3 ammunition can be effectively attacked by utilizing a short fuze setting on Firecracker ammunition.

173d Abn Bde
Continuous Reconnaissance for Artillery Units. In many areas of the Central Highlands, villagers have been evacuated from their homes and resettled in consolidated villages. Many of these villagers return to their old homesites, especially at times when food is in short supply, or disease appears in the consolidated villages. Homes may be rebuilt at the old village sites or at new locations altogether. Some new villages are located in heavily wooded areas and are difficult to detect by aerial observation. Friendly maneuver elements operating in or firing into previously abandoned areas should conduct frequent detailed visual reconnaissance to insure villages have not been reoccupied or new villages constructed. If villages are detected, insure that the artillery liaison officer and the agency responsible for granting political clearances are informed immediately of these village locations. This practice will help eliminate artillery incidents and preclude maneuver elements from inadvertently directing ground fire into friendly village locations.

4th Inf Div
Interior Defense. Sapper infiltrators may succeed in penetrating a perimeter under cover of the initial mortar barrage. Men seeking shelter in bunkers under the shock of the first rounds of incoming mortar fire tend to ignore local defense of bunkers and tents. Sappers take advantage of initial disorganization to throw satchel charges and to fire small arms into shelter bunkers. All troops should be advised not to "play ostrich" when occupying shelter bunkers. Interior guards must be posted at the entrances to the bunkers and near Tactical Operations Centers. Prepared foxholes or bunker'd guard posts are recommended within interior areas and near perimeter bunkers.

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PROTECT YOURSELF
Use of Trip Flares. Several recent incidents within 4th Division Area of Operations emphasize the need for immediate improvement in the use of trip flares. During an attack on a U.S. firebase, the enemy completely neutralized all trip flares along their routes of entry and exit. The sappers penetrated the perimeter without being detected.

1. Common VC/NVA techniques used to neutralize trip flares follow:
   a. Replacing safety clip in trip flare.
   b. Slipping a bamboo sheath over the top of flare, which prevents movement of the arming lever.
   c. Using wire or twine, tying off the arming lever so that it cannot move.
   d. Cutting the trip wire close to the flare, if the pull-pin arming method was used to arm the flare.
   e. Slipping nails, wire, or bamboo slivers into safety-clip holes.

2. The following techniques for employing trip flares have proven successful, and if used, will increase their effectiveness:
   a. Check trip flares daily. This is most important. A quick glance will not do the job. Each trip flare must be
thoroughly inspected to detect tampering and insure proper functioning.

(b) Flares must not be placed in a straight line around the perimeter. They should be emplaced in an irregular manner to confuse the enemy as to their location.

(g) Flares employed outside the tactical wire must be removed each morning and replaced in a different area each evening. Also employ flares in different locations inside the perimeter.

(d) Trip wires should be strung at varying heights, i.e., ground level, waist level, and neck level; and at varying angles to the trip flare.

(e) Place trip flares where the enemy does not expect them, such as unlikely approaches or at a distance beyond the perimeter.

(f) Use some trip flares in pairs, connecting them with one trip wire. The enemy may disarm one, but not discover the other.

(g) Secure trip flares at ground level within the tactical wire, conceal them, and attach short trip wires to the tactical wire. Any disturbance of the wire should activate the flare.

(h) Keep the number of engineer stake mounted flares to a minimum. They are easy to spot. Once the enemy knows
where the flare is, he can disarm it.

(i) Use the trigger arming device, not just the pull pin. The trigger device will activate with either pull or pressure release. A 50-50 mix of pull and trigger device is recommended.

(3) Techniques outlined above are by no means all inclusive. Use your own imagination in employing trip flares. Remember to check them, conceal them, and put them in unexpected places. 4th Inf Div

(C) Bunker Silhouette. Bunkers built throughout II Corps, with some exceptions, are built above ground level. Although this sometimes is necessary to provide for better fields of fire and observation, their high silhouette also affords enemy sappers a very lucrative target. A smaller number of these bunkers strategically located, and augmented with a larger number of lower silhouetted bunkers placed along the outer perimeter, will not only provide for mutual protection, but offer a smaller target for enemy B40 rockets and other similar weapons.

DSA, II CTZ, G3 Advisor
(C) **Deception with Antennas.** The platoon leader of a mechanized platoon has two antennas on his command armored personnel carrier. One mechanized unit has been obtaining unserviceable antennas to provide all personnel carriers and scout jeeps with two antennas so that the enemy cannot detect the command track.

4th Inf Div

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(C) **Premature Detonation of 122mm Rockets.** During recent intense firing of 122mm rockets against Dak To it was found that a standoff screen, P3P or chain link barrier normally used around and on top of bunkers, will prematurely detonate 122mm rockets. This has proven to be a tremendous advantage in protection against rockets set for instantaneous or delayed action detonation. In an actual hit against a standoff screen position 4 feet from a bunker the 122 rocket detonated upon contact with the screen. The result was immediate detonation with some fragments and the rocket motor passing through the screen resulting in minor damage to the bunker and slight injury to personnel. Investigation revealed that the screen caused the rocket to detonate, thus preventing a direct hit on the bunker and minimizing damage and casualties.

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Finding Small Enemy Units. Armored cavalry troops often have difficulty in locating small enemy units. The enemy is warned of the cavalry's presence by the noise and dust created by the tracked vehicles. On two separate occasions, an ARVN ACAV troop swept through their AO with negative contact. On both operations they ran into terrain barriers which forced them to circle back and cross the original route of maneuver. In each case, enemy troops were caught in the open, less than 20 meters from the route that the unit had used to move into the area. The enemy, assuming that the threat had passed, was completely surprised when the APC's reappeared. This tactic of doubling back and crossing the route of march in an assault formation is now being employed as a standard tactic in this unit.

DSA, II CTZ, G3 Advisor
Maintenance of Fire Superiority During Attacks on Fortified Positions. A common Viet Cong tactic when occupying well fortified positions, during an attack by armored units, is to remain in their positions until the armored vehicles have stopped within the objective area. When attacking such a position, the assaulting armor vehicles are normally deployed in a line formation for maximum firepower to the front. The crew served weapons fire continuously during the assaulting phase and intermittently during the consolidation phase. The Viet Cong thus wait in their positions until the friendly crew served weapons have expended their ammunition on the suppressive fires during the assault and the crews are in the process of reloading. During this vulnerable period the Viet Cong attack with anti-tank weapons at a very short range. This problem can be solved by attacking, using fire and movement to hit the front and flank of the position simultaneously rather than launching a frontal assault with all vehicles firing suppressive fires. This causes the enemy to defend in two directions, thus preventing him from concentrating his fire. The attacking force can then gain fire superiority without firing continuously and expending their ammunition during the assault phase of the attack. After the objective has been seized, at least one vehicle in each platoon is then designated to cover the consolidation force and to attack any position which has not been eliminated.

DS3, II CTZ, SA 22d Div
Route and LZ Reconnaissance by LRRP. LRRP's are being used extensively to gather information concerning enemy units. However, LRRP's can and should be used more often to conduct route reconnaissance for mechanized forces prior to their entry into an AO. Too often, information concerning terrain and trafficability must be obtained through aerial reconnaissance which usually indicates to the enemy that an operation will soon be conducted in the area. The LRRP's can also be used to warn the main body of ambushes and keep them informed of the location and deployment of the enemy during the operation. Pathfinder teams, augmented by LRRP's can perform this same function in airmobile operations by checking out landing zones prior to the assault and, if the enemy poses no immediate threat to the assault group then the artillery preparation can be omitted, thus gaining some element of surprise on entering the AO.

DSA, II CTZ, G3 Advisor
Determining Direction of Fire from Unlocated Source.

Often when a friendly position comes under mortar and/or rocket attack only one or two people of the unit have the launch site under observation. The immediate tendency of most personnel is to open fire in all directions. Also, invariably everyone in the area will attempt to transmit on the radio making it very difficult to establish communications with the person or persons who have visual contact with the enemy position. Fire control is necessary. Prior instruction should be given to all friendly elements that only those positions which can observe enemy locations should open fire. The first act of the commander should be to request that all units which have observed the enemy positions report all pertinent information to him. By following this procedure much confusion is eliminated, and a quick and accurate fire can be placed on the enemy positions.

173d Abn Bde
(C) VC Patterns. 3/503d Abn Inf nas, in the past, given RF/PF locations a wide berth to prevent contact between friendly units. However, recent experience has shown that the VC knowingly operate within RF/PF AO's and sometimes very close to RF/PF outposts. Some VC units are deriving security by establishing base camps or conducting operations close to static RF/PF posts. Allied operations should not avoid RF/PF posts on the assumption that the surrounding area will be free of VC. TF South
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(C) VC Habits. Since April, elements of TF 3/506th have been conducting pair-off operations with RF/PF units in conjunction with revolutionary development projects in and around villages and hamlets. At night, ambushes are conducted in the outlying areas. During this period several observations have been made of VC habits. Local guerrillas have established the pattern of living in the hamlets at night. The guerrillas normally enter the village in groups of two and three and leave prior to first light. Although the VC are accustomed to moving along trails at night, they are not experienced in night combat when unexpectedly engaged by US/ARVN forces. On many occasions, the VC are very nonchalant, traveling almost exclusively on trails. When engaged at night, VC tend to become disorganized, panic and flee. The presence of friendly forces has not precluded the VC from attempting to enter villages at night; however, once they are aware that US/ARVN units are in the area, they shift from using the major trails.

TF South
Change in Enemy Artillery Tactics. During attacks by fire against allied installations in the early part of May 1969, significant changes were noted in the enemy's tactics in that many suspected firing locations were much closer to the target than had been previously observed. The enemy, in the past, has quite often fired 122mm rockets from maximum ranges (approximately 11 kilometers) but has recently been observed firing from ranges of 3,000 to 4,000 meters. This observation was also noted in the firing of mortars. Mortar firing positions (82mm) were reported within 1,000 meters of targets. This points out the necessity for increasing close-in security through patrolling and observation posts. 4th Inf Div
Helicopter Adjustment. When armed helicopters have been employed in support of a unit in contact it has been noted that improper adjustment procedures have hampered rapid employment. Commanders and small unit leaders who employ armed helicopters in support of combat operations should be familiar with the correct procedures for directing the aircraft. It has been noted in recent enemy contacts that vital time was lost while control personnel on the ground attempted to explain to the pilots of the supporting aircraft where the enemy and friendly positions were located. S3 staff sections should coordinate with aviation units and organize classes for commanders and small unit leaders on armed helicopter employment to be given during periods of stand down or preparation for future operations. Small unit leaders should become familiar with USARV Regulation 95-26 and also be afforded the opportunity to fly in an armed helicopter to more fully understand what the pilot needs to know to engage enemy targets and to better understand the capabilities and limitations of the aircraft.

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TF South
Booby Trap Reminder. The curious American is a collector of war souvenirs. A popular souvenir is the VC flag. On several occasions, a heavily Viet Cong infested coffee plantation had a Viet Cong flag displayed over a wooden arch at the entrance. Two operations were conducted in this area and on each one, the Viet Cong flag was hauled down. On the third trip into the area at a later date, five friendly troops were wounded, one seriously, when an attempt was made to remove the Viet Cong flag. A wire attached to the wooden arch and flag detonated a grenade in a nearby tree. Troops must be continually cautioned against souvenir collecting and to consider them to be booby trapped. Souvenir items such as flags, should not be touched under any circumstances until it has definitely been determined that it is safe to handle.

DSA, II CTZ, G3 Advisor
Handling of Grenades. Several accidents have occurred when personnel attempted to correct the slippage of the striker pivot pin on the M26 hand grenade. This pin, located just forward of the safety pin, is force fitted into the fuze assembly during production and held in position by the snugness of the fit. However, it has recently been observed that several striker pivot pins have worked their way partly out of the fuze assembly. If this occurs, a possibility exists that the travel of the striker will be affected sufficiently that the striker may not contact the cap when released and the grenade will fail to detonate. Accordingly, all grenades should be visually inspected before any operation and at frequent intervals during operations to insure the striker pivot pin is correctly seated. If the pin is discovered to be improperly seated (protrudes from the fuze assembly) the grenade should be destroyed in place as soon as possible. Under NO circumstances will personnel attempt to reseat the pin, as any tampering may allow sufficient clearance for the striker to fall, resulting in an inaudible initiation of the firing train and subsequent unexpected detonation.

173d Abn Bde
Accidental Discharge of M-60 Machine Guns. When the M-60 Machine Gun is carried with ammunition loaded it is not uncommon for the safety lever to be on the fire position either through neglect or contact with dense jungle foliage. Accidental discharges have been known to occur when the trigger is struck by brush or the gunner's equipment. Regardless, the weapon must be loaded if it is to be capable of being put into action or engage the fleeing targets common to guerrilla warfare. To remedy this danger, the gun can be carried in the "half cock" position. The bolt is pulled back and the chamber is inspected to insure that the weapon is clear. The feed tray cover is then closed. The bolt is eased forward so that it is no longer in the firing position. The ammunition is then fed into the weapon until it clicks into place. The weapon cannot be fired accidentally, but can be put into action simply by pulling the bolt to the rear and placing the selector in the fire position.
Effectiveness of Persistent CS. Persistent CS has been effectively employed to restrict the enemy's use of terrain, assembly areas, and lines of communication. Persistent CS-2 was employed on 28 March 1969 to contaminate seven abandoned villages to prevent re-entry by unprotected personnel. Caution is required when returning to areas of CS operations. On 1 June 1969 a UH-1 helicopter touched down in a contaminated area and was forced to reposition upwind a considerable distance away when it was discovered the agent was still active even after several heavy rains. This incident illustrates the persistency of CS and the need for a record of all persistent drops to be maintained at brigade level to insure troop insertions are not delayed in the process because of failure of pilots or crews to carry protective masks.

Infantry Units Test Firing Weapons. Infantry units have been test firing their automatic weapons from the primary, alternate and secondary positions. This effectively denies the enemy knowledge of the number of weapons actually positioned on the defense perimeter. Test firing automatic weapons from more than one position gives the appearance of a stronger perimeter.

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(C) Preplanned Fires. A simple reminder of common tactics is sometimes necessary to combat the enemy. During a recent heavy contact with NVA units in Kontum Province, the enemy attempted to move within the aircraft minimum safe distance zone to avoid an air strike. Preplanned use of Claymore mine, M-72 Anti-Tank Rocket and the M-79 Grenade was instrumental in causing a large number of kills while repulsing the attack. All troops should be reminded to make maximum use of preplanned organic fires within the minimum safe distance zones in order to counter enemy "hugging" tactics.

DSA, II CTZ, SA 24th STZ
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, I Field Force Vietnam

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May 69 to 31 July 69.

CG, I Field Force Vietnam

15 August 1969

N/A

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