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**AD NUMBER**

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AGO D/A ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980; AGO D/A ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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AVDC-AF-O

18 August 1969


TO: See Distribution

1. Section 1. Significant Activities

   a. Elements of the 3d Battalion (Abn) 506th Infantry were involved in combat, combined, and pacification operations during the reporting period.

   b. Task Force 3-506 participated in the following operations during the reporting period:

      (1) Pacification and Fire-Off Operations (Unnamed): 1 May - 31 July 1969

      (2) Small Unit Operations: (Unnamed): 1 July - 31 July 1969


   c. Mission:

      (1) Conduct search and destroy/reconnaissance-in-force operations against VC/VNA forces in Dinh Thuan Province.

      (2) Conduct pacification operations in Thien Gia District.

      (3) Support Revolutionary Development within the assigned AO in conjunction with Dinh Thuan Province.

      (4) Conduct combined operations with the 44th ARVN Regiment and SF/FF companies in and around Thien Gia District.

   d. Location: Dinh Thuan Province.

   e. Reporting Officer: LSG James M. Reiter

   f. Task Organization: Inclusion #1

   g. After Action Report on Pacification: Inclusion #2

2. Significant Activities:

   a. On 1 May at 1200hrs, activity, ENO14272, 3/B/3-506 Infantry and Prov Plal 1-625 were engaged by 15 VU at 75 meters. Artillery was employed in support. Fleet fox were friendly-1 VI, 1 Ely - 1 VI FL. On 2 May, at 1200hrs, activity ENO12717, the 2/3-506 Infantry found a bunker complex consisting of 11 bunkers 3'-0" x 8'-0" x 9'-0" with 5' of overhead cover, 2 hoochies, 10'-0" x 12'-0" x 8'-0", 1 table and chair, and an animal cage. An air strike was employed, destroying 4 bunkers and 2 hoochies, and damaging 3 other bunkers. On 13 May, SF/FF Team 53 found 10 bunkers 3'-0" x 4'-0" x 10'-0", with 3' of overhead cover, while sweeping an area vicinity ENO19877. At 1200hrs, activity ENO19877, Recon Team 53 found 600 m. by 400 m. Inclusion.
three 105mm rounds and 3 bunkers 10' x 10' x 4' with 21 assorted rounds. The 105mm rounds and 21 assorted rounds were destroyed with the bunkers, At 1715H, 2/3-506 Infantry engaged and destroyed 2 VC nearby AN336247.

The 3/3-506 Infantry was engaged at the contact area. While conducting a sweep they engaged and killed 1 VC. Continuing the sweep, they found 5 more VC KIA which has been killed by the 2/3-506 Infantry. One 105mm round, 1 tracer bullet, 4 small arms, with 60mm and U.S. C-4. Medical supplies and some ammunition. At 0900H, vicinity AN345542, 2/3-506 Infantry engaged and killed 1 VC machine gun and 2 VC small arms. Engagement and guns were employed in support. The guns were engaged ground fire sustaining several hits. There were no friendly casualties while 1 VC was KIA. At 0530H, vicinity AN33101, 1/3-506 Infantry engaged and killed 1 VC in support. The guns were employed in support. Results were: Friendly - 1 VC KIA; Enemy - 5 VC KIA. The kills were accredited as follows: 2 - 3-506 Infantry, and 3 - 2/3-506 Infantry. The 2/3-506 Infantry, while on a clearing operation, employed 2 VC, 1 PPS 54, Chinese SMG, 1 Chinese flag, and assorted documents. The results were: Extracted to LZ Battery for interrogation.

On 15 May, at 0053H, vicinity AN404445, LZ Battery received an estimated fifteen 81mm mortar rounds. Counter mortar and artillery fire were fired in support. Results were: Friendly - 2 KIA, 2 WIA; Enemy - unknown. On 17 May, at 0700H, vicinity AN341344, 2/3-506 Infantry engaged and killed 1 VC in support. The VCs were engaged with 81mm mortars, grenades, and automatic weapons. The 2/3-506 Infantry engaged automatic weapons, claymore mines, grenades, and artillery. 2/3-506 Infantry engaged and killed 2 VC, 1 WIA, and 3 VC in support. Results were: Friendly - 2 WIA; Enemy - unknown. On 19 May, at 0900H, vicinity AN341344, 1/3-506 Infantry engaged and killed 10 bunkers 3' x 3' x 10' with 107mm mortars, 1 VC Claymore mine, and 1 Chinese grenade. All was destroyed. At 1215H, vicinity AN336247, 2/3-506 Infantry engaged 10 VC with small arms, 2 VC returned fire and fled to the north. Results were: Friendly - 1 WIA; Enemy - 2 VC KIA and 2 AK-47's and assorted documents CCA. On 22 May, at 1200H, vicinity AN773525, 1/3-506 engaged 15 - 20 VC with small arms fire. Artillery was employed in support. Results were: Friendly - Negative; Enemy - 1 VC KIA and 1 SKS CCA. On 23 May, at 2110H, vicinity AN85167, 1/3-506 Infantry engaged 10 VC with small arms and claymore mines. Results were: Friendly - Negative; Enemy - 1 VC KIA and 1 SKS CCA. On 30 May, at 0140H, vicinity AN952167, 1/3-506 Infantry, while in their night defensive position, received small arms fire and B-60 rockets from an estimated 10 VC. Fire was returned with small arms and 81mm mortar fire. Results were: Friendly - 2 WIA; Enemy - 1 VC KIA.

b. On 3 June, at 1300H, vicinity AN352223, 2/3-506 Infantry engaged 4 VC with small arms fire. Results were: 2 VC KIA and 1 WIA, and 1 VC in support. Results were: Friendly - 6 VC KIA and 1 AK-47 CCA. On 3 June, at 0025H, vicinity AN932167, 1/3-506 Infantry, in their night defensive position, received an estimated twelve 81mm mortar rounds. Counter mortar and artillery fire was fired in support. Results were: Friendly - 2 KIA, 2 WIA; Enemy - unknown. On 5 June, at 1000H, vicinity AN341344, 2/3-506 Infantry engaged 3 VC with small arms fire. Results were: Friendly - Negative; Enemy - 1 VC KIA and 1 SKS CCA. On 6 June, at 0042H, vicinity AN928174, 1/3-506 Infantry engaged 12 VC with small arms fire. Results were: Friendly - Negative; Enemy - 1 VC KIA and 1 AK-47 CCA. On 6 June, at 0432H, vicinity AN928174, 1/3-506 Infantry, in their night defensive position, received an estimated five 81mm mortar rounds and 3-40 rockets, land mines and small arms fire. The company returned fire also engaging artillery and guns. Results were: Friendly - 1 US KIA, 1 VN RF KIA, 2 US WIA, 7 VN WIA; Enemy - 3 VC KIA, 3 suspects detained, and 1 B-60 rocket launcher, 14 Chinese grenades and 3-40 rockets CCA. On 6 June, vicinity AN401260, 2/3-506 Infantry engaged 10 VC with small arms fire. Results were: Friendly - 1 VC KIA and 1 AK-47 CCA. On 6 June, at 0602H, vicinity AN903069, LZ Battery received an estimated six to eight 107mm rocket rounds. Counter mortar and artillery fire was employed in support. Results were: Friendly - 3 KIA, 2 SKS, and 1 US-47 aircraft, 1 building, 1 3/4 ton truck, 1 FM-47 radio, 1 M40 Generator, and 3 sets bunkers destroyed while 3 buildings were damaged. At 1000H, vicinity AN791-096 234th RF Company, while conducting a sweep of a suspected VC mortar position.

2. **CONFIDENTIAL**
found 2 VC KIA and 2 AK-47's. On 3 June, at 2100, vicinity AM881247, 2/4/3-506th Infantry engaged 1 VC with small arms fire. Results were: Friendly - Negative; Enemy - 1 VC KIA. At 2100, vicinity AM891717, 1/4/3-506th Infantry in their night defensive position, engaged 9 - 10 VC with claymore mines and hand grenades. Results were: Friendly - Negative; Enemy - 7 VC KIA. A mortar fired illumination in support. Results were: Friendly - 1 VC WIA; Heavy - unknown. On 9 June, at 0205, vicinity AM904207, 1/3/3-506th Infantry in night defensive position, engaged 1 VC with claymore mines. Results were: Friendly - Negative; Enemy - 1 VC KIA. At 0700, vicinity AM899777, 1/4/3-506th Infantry, while conducting a sweep of the previous night's contact area, found 1 AK-47, 3 Claymore grenades, 1 B-40 rocket booster, 1 rucksack, and some food and clothing.

At 15 June, at 1905, vicinity AM977129, 2/3-506th, while in an ambush position, received small arms fire from the 164 RF Co resulting in 1 33 KIA, 1 VN Interpreter KIA and 1 K.C. Carson Scout KIA. At 14 June, at 1000, vicinity AM941465, Rosen Team 46, 3-506th Infantry, engaged 3 VC with claymore mines. Results were: Friendly - Negative; Enemy - 3 VC KIA and 2 VCI. At 2300, vicinity 820 rounds AK ammunition, 1 rucksack with cooking utensils, 2 pistol belts with canteens and caps and assorted documents CIA, At 2000, vicinity AM666220, 2/4/3-506th Infantry in their night defensive position, made contact with an estimated 15 VC employing small arms, X-79 and 8ichen mortar. Results were: 3 US KIA, 3 VN WIA; Enemy - 1 VC KIA. On 16 June, at 1130, vicinity AM932230, 1/4/3-506th Infantry, engaged with small arms fire, 2/3-506th, while in their night defensive position, received 2 VC with claymore mines, Results were: Friendly - Negative; Enemy - 2 VC KIA, 1 VC suspect, 1 AK-47, 1 VC suspect, 1 guisette, cooking utensils, and assorted documents CIA. All found in the area were 15 bunkers with sleeping positions which were destroyed. At 1625, vicinity AM933329, a helicopter from the 192nd Assault Helicopter Company received ground fire from an unknown force. The command and control helicopter, 3-506th Infantry, while checking out the contact area, also received ground fire. Results: 2 US slightly KIA; Enemy - unknown. On 16 June, at 0215, vicinity AM792677, LZ Battery CP received an estimated twenty-two 82mm mortar rounds. Countermortar and artillery fire was fired in support. Results were: Friendly - 1 3/4 ton truck and 1 water trailer destroyed, and 2 buildings damaged; Enemy - unknown. On 20 June, vicinity AM931132, 1/5/3-506th Infantry found 10 bunkers 4' x 4' x 6', with two feet of overhead cover. The bunkers contained cooking utensils and assorted ammunition which was destroyed. At 2125, vicinity AM891117, 1/3-506th Infantry in their night defensive position, received 2 VC with claymore mines. Results were: Friendly - Negative; Enemy - 2 VC KIA and 1 AK-47 CIA. On 21 June, at 1130, vicinity AM789177, 3/3-506th Infantry found a bunker complex containing 1 rucksack, clothing, cooking utensils, medical supplies, 20 pounds of rice and assorted documents. All but the documents were destroyed. At 1300, vicinity AM977137, 1/3-506th Infantry destroyed a booby trapped VC claymore mine. Results: 2 VC killed by claymore. On 25 June, vicinity AM932117, 1/3-506th Infantry, while on a sweep, activated an unknown type booby trap. Results: Friendly - 3 VC KIA; Enemy - unknown. On 5 July, at 1510, vicinity AM952355, 1/3-506th found 1 82mm howitzer tube and breech block. Both were destroyed. On 6 July, at 1830, vicinity AM972137, 1/3-506th Infantry found 1 grave containing 1 VC KIA. The body was estimated to be 10 days old. On 7 July, at 0015, vicinity AM932117, 1/3-506th Infantry, engaged an estimated VC squad with small arms and X-79 fire. Results were: Friendly - Negative; Enemy - 1 VC KIA and 1
Russian Sniper Rifle, with scope, 2 sets of LBS and assorted documents CIA.  

On 10 July, at 2345H, vicinity AB533182, 1/3-3/506th Infantry, in their night defensive position, received small arms fire, 1 840 rocket, and 3 81mm mortar rounds of unknown type. Small arms and 81mm mortar fire was employed. Results were: Friendly - 1 KIA, 3 WIA; Enemy - unknown. On 11 July, at 2450H, vicinity AN867-29, 2/4/3-506th Infantry, in their night defensive position, received small arms and automatic weapons fire and 1 840 rocket round. Results were: Friendly - 2 VN males KIA, 3 VN round WIa; Enemy - unknown. One medical supply bag with blood on it and 1 VC scarf with emblem CIA.  

On 13 July, at 1645H, vicinity AN85228, 1/3-3/506th Infantry, engaged 4 VC with small arms fire, 2/1 Cav gunships were employed in support. Results were: Friendly - negative; Enemy - 1 VC KIA and 1 AK-47, 1 N-2 carbines, 145 cal pistol, 1 840 rocket launcher with 2 rounds, 4 C4 grenades, assorted documents and medical supplies CIA. At 1835H, vicinity AD33828, 1/3-3/506th Infantry activated a booby trapped 175mm round resulting in 1 US KIA and 7 US WIA. At 1915H, vicinity AB99230, 2/4/3-506th Infantry, activated an unknown type booby trap resulting in 1 US WIA. At 2350H, vicinity AB644187, 2/3-3/506th Infantry, received small arms fire and an estimated 2 840 rockets. Small arms and 81mm mortar fire was employed. Results were: Friendly - 2 WIA (11th HQT); Enemy - unknown. On 14 July, at 1630H, vicinity AN292240, CF/4/3-506th Infantry, engaged 3 VC with small arms fire. US artillery was fired in support. Results were: Friendly - negative; Enemy - 1 VC KIA and 1 AK-47 and 1 set of LBS CIA.  

On 17 July, at 0720H, vicinity AB812181, 2/2/3-506th Infantry, while on a night operation, found 1 VC killed by mortar fire. On 18 July, at 0733H, vicinity AN443312, CGBA Team 35 sighted and waged 4 VC with small arms fire. Results were: Friendly - 2 WIA and 1 N-2 Carbine and 4 rucksacks with 7 gallons of water in each CIA. At 0955E, vicinity EN003245, 1/8/3-506th Infantry, received three 60mm mortar rounds. Results were: Friendly - 1 KIA, 2 WIA; Enemy - Unknown. At 2300H, vicinity AB54490, 1/3-3/506th Infantry, while in their night defensive position, received small arms fire and a 840 rocket round from an estimated VC squad. Artillery and gunships were employed in support. Results were: Friendly - 1 RP WIA; Enemy - 1 VC KIA and 1 AK-47 and 1 set of LBS CIA.  

On 21 July, at 1600H, vicinity EN060202, 1/3-506th Infantry, found a base camp containing papers, 55-gallon drums, books on tactics, tools, pots, and pans, 7 to 10 chickens, 55 lizards, and approximately 3,000 punji stakes. All but the books and papers were destroyed. At 0220H, vicinity EN055632, CGBA Team 34 sighted 6 VC, 2/1 Cav gunships were employed in support. Results were: Friendly - negative; Enemy - 1 VC KIA. On 21 July, at 1600H, vicinity EN055632, 2/3-506th Infantry, engaged 2 VC with small arms fire, a sweep of the area revealed 5 bunkers and a 6-year-old girl, who was unconscious, and returned to Ld CQ. Found in the camp were: 1 N-2 KIA, 9 sets of clothes, 10 gallons of water, 5 rucksacks, and some bandages. All was destroyed except the LBS and rucksacks which were returned to Ld CQ. At 27 July, at 1600H, vicinity EN122270, 2/2/3-506th Infantry, engaged 6 VC with small arms fire. Results were: Friendly - negative; Enemy - 1 VC KIA and 1 SME with 100 rounds of ammunition, 70 rounds N-3 ammunition, 1 rucksack, and assorted documents CIA.

Overall results for this reporting period were:

A. KILL COUNT:
- 3 KIA in 06 WIA (16 Medevac, 30 Minor)

B. WOUNDED COUNT:
- 14 WIA

C. EQUIPMENT LOST (Friendly):
- 7 LN-2 Carbine
- 7 FM-14
- 2 Bell CH-46
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12 August 1969


1. CAPTURED:
   (1) 26 small arms
   (2) 2 High Rocket Launchers
   (3) 13 B-40 rockets
   (4) 3 Projector torpedoes
   (5) 1 ton of rice
   (6) 710 small arms rounds
   (7) 7 Grenades

2. DESTROYED:
   2 .5" mortar rounds
   1 - 105 Howitzer tube and block

3. Intelligence Summary:
   a. Enemy Disposition: During the reporting period Military Region 6 Headquarters elements remained in the vicinity of the Minh Thuy, Long Dong, Minh Thuong Borders. The 452 LF Bn remained in its normal operational area in the vicinity of Lo To Mountain (vic. W7526) throughout the period. The 610 MP Bn spent most of the period north of Song Mao between Ha On Tang (BM8523) and Long Tri (BM4550). The 186 MP Bn was reported to be operating primarily in the Le Hong Phong (vic. BM1030) and at times moved north of QLJ (BM9468). The 210 NVB Bn remains widely dispersed and has not been identified at one specific location. It is believed, based on agent reports, that some elements of this battalion moved back into the province and are operating north of Tuan Giao District. The Local Force Companies and the Village Guerrilla Units remained in their normal operating areas with no significant change in operations, strength, or equipment.

   b. Enemy Disposition at the End of Reporting Periods:
      452 LF Bn
      610 MP Bn
      186 KP 2n
      210 NVB Bn
      48 LF Bn
      C-1
      C-2
      C-3
      180 LF Co
      130 LF Co

4. Enemy Activities:
   a. During the period there were few contacts where units were identified.

   b. Elements of the 186 KP Bn were identified in combat along QLJ (vic. W7523) on 17 June. The contact was in the form of an enemy initiated ambush involving 2/4/Navs. The tactics used were typical of those used previously by the 186 MP Bn. A Red Group who rallied after the contact identified the unit in the contact to be the 186 MP Bn supported by elements of the 210 NVB Bn.

   c. All other identifiable contacts were with KP elements indicating that the Main Force elements remained in their base camp areas rebuilding and resupplying.

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1. CAPTURED:
   (1) 26 small arms
   (2) 2 120mm Rocket Launchers
   (3) 13 Rock sacks
   (4) 3 Pigeon core seapods
   (5) 1 ton of rice
   (6) 710 small arms rounds
   (7) 7 Grenades

2. DESTROYED:
   2 12.5cm mortar rounds
   1 - 105 Howitzer tube and block

3. Intelligence Summary:
   a. Enemy Disposition: During the reporting period Military Region 6 Headquarters elements remained in the vicinity of the Nhinh Thuy, Lam Dong, Hinh Thuan Borders. The 182 LF Bn remained in its normal operational area in the vicinity of Lo To Mountain (vic AN752) throughout the period. The 840 LF Bn spent most of the period north of Cong Nao between Kei Co Tyang (2M138) and Dac Tri (2M150). The 186 MP Bn was reported to be operating primarily in the Le Hong Phong (vic BN103) and at times moved north of VC (BN049). The 240 NVN Bn remains widely dispersed and has not been identified at any specific location. It is believed, based on agent reports, that some elements of this battalion moved back into the province and are operating north of Thien Giang District. The Local Force Companies and the Village Guerrilla Units remained in their normal operating areas with no significant change in operations, strength, or equipment.

   b. Enemy Disposition at the End of Reporting Period:

   b - 3 LF Bn
   b - 2 LF Bn
   b - 3 LF Bn
   240 NVH Bn
   481 LF Bn
   C - 1
   C - 2
   C - 3
   480 LF Co
   430 LF Co

4. Enemy Activities:
   a. During the period there were few contacts where units were identified.

   b. Elements of the 186 LF Bn were identified in contact along 04 (vic AN752) on 17 June. The contact was in the form of an enemy initiated ambush involving 2/1/0km. The tactics used were typical of those used previously by the 186 LF Bn. A Hot Chac who rallied after the contact identified the unit in the contact to be the 186 LF Bn supported by elements of the 240 NVH Bn.

   c. All other identifiable contacts were with LF elements indicating that the Main Force elements remained in their base camp areas rebuilding and resupplying.
5. Significant Intelligence Activity:

a. During the month of May, June and July contact with enemy forces was light. Enemy units in the Task Force 3-56 withdrew to secret base areas in mountain areas to recover from losses suffered during the Tet Offensive in February. Reexamination of documents and interrogation of PAVN and Ho Chi Minh units indicate that enemy units have been directed by MR-6 to break down into squad size elements for the purpose of conducting harassing attacks against US/JVN outposts and pacified areas. During the reporting period few confirmed contacts with Main Force units were made.

b. During the month of May, TF 3-56 experienced light contact with the enemy.

c. During the month of June, TF 3-56 continued operations primarily concerned with pacification. As a result, few contacts were made with the enemy; however, intelligence sources indicated the VC were having an increasingly difficult task of obtaining food and supplies. Joint US/JVN operations resulted in considerable disruption of the VC Infrastructure through the use of cordon and search operations.

d. The month of July was the most active period with respect to VC attacks. Surges were very active during this period although no units of the 3-56th Infantry were attacked. Standoff mortar attacks increased sharply during this period, as of 13 July pacification by US forces in Binh Thuan Province was de-emphasized. More US offensive operations were conducted to increase pressure on enemy forces in outlying areas, thereby relieving the population centers of enemy pressure. The effects of these operations were notable as standoff attacks ceased. The VC offensive, anticipated to occur around 20 July, did not materialize. During the month of July sizable amounts of rice and food supplies were captured and/or destroyed. Ho Chi Minh reported the VC to be suffering from lack of food supplies. There was also a marked increase in the number of Ho Chi Minh who rallied during this period.

Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commanders Observation, Evaluation, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel: None

b. Operations: Operating with smaller than platoon size elements.

1. OBSERVATION: Personnel should be broken down into units smaller than platoon size when operating in the lowlands of Binh Thuan Province.

2. EVALUATION: During the month of July the platoons of the 3-56th Infantry were employed differently than they had been in the past. Little contact was made during the reporting period using company and platoon size elements. The VC can detect the movement of large elements and would hide or move out of the path of the approaching units. It was decided to use smaller than platoon size elements for concerted ambush operations. The platoons in the battalion were divided into two elements and each of the elements remained sufficiently close to aid one another if a major contact developed. Since operating in this new configuration, the platoons have succeeded in sighting and engaging many more VC elements than in the past. By going into this type of operation, it is felt the battalion is keeping the VC on the run by thoroughly covering a larger area.

3. RECOMMENDATION: That if the VC do not intend to operate in large forces but remain in from 5 to 10-man elements, it is much more effective to operate in smaller than platoon size forces; however, it must be emphasized that each element must be capable of moving to the support of the other if needed.

c. Training: Proper Training within Separate Battalions.

1. OBSERVATION: There should be a proper Training Program within the
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3-506 Infantry in order to attain and maintain the number of qualified snipers that are needed in the battalion.

2. EVALUATION: It has been found that the number of allocations given to the 3-506 Infantry to send qualified marksmen to a Sniper Training School is not sufficient to meet the demands of the battalion. A large part of the battalion area is made up of terrain and vegetation that permits snipers to be very effectively utilized. It is also anticipated that by employing school-trained snipers as instructors, a very effective and efficient Sniper Training Program can be set up within the battalion. This battalion is currently in the process of setting up such a program. At present the battalion, utilizing all quotas allocated, has only nine qualified snipers. The battalion is authorized 24 snipers, but to provide depth it intends to train and maintain a minimum of 30 snipers. Two snipers in each rifle platoon, six in the Reconnaissance Platoon, and six in reserves to be used when the tactical situation requires more snipers to be employed.

3. RECOMMENDATION: That separate battalions which, because of the separate status, location, or mission, do not have the opportunity to send qualified personnel to a Sniper Training School, establish a school within their battalion, utilizing school-trained snipers as instructors.

- Intelligence: None
- Logistics: None
- Organisation: None
- Other: None

JAMES R. BOWERS
LTC, Infantry
Commanding
TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHCC-DSF, APO 96375

1. (U) This headquarters has evaluated subject report and concurs.
2. (C) The following comments are submitted:
   a. Reference para 3b: This headquarters held the following locations for indicated units as of 31 July 69:

<table>
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<tr>
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<td>BN3848</td>
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   b. Reference Section II para C1: Concur with evaluation in that 3/506th Inf received only 2 quotas per month for sniper training with the 9th Inf Div prior to its redeployment. Arrangements have been made for the 3/506th Inf to resume sniper training with the 101st Abn Div. Concur with the recommendation that battalion level sniper training be conducted. Reports received by this headquarters from 3/506th Inf indicate that the unit is presently short some items of sniper equipment but requisitions were submitted on 8 July 69. Upon receipt of this equipment sniper training conducted by the battalion will be possible.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Frederick E. Holland
1LT AGO, ASST AG

Copy Furn:
1 - TF South
1 - 3/506th Inf
2 - AGSFOR, DA
AVHGC-DST (18 Aug 69) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 3d Battalion (Abn), 506th Infantry for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 5 OCT 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96556

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, 3d Battalion, (Airborne) 506th Infantry.

2. (C) Reference item concerning "Sniper Training within Separate Battalions", section II, page 6, paragraph 2c; nonconcur. The establishment of an effective sniper program is dependent on qualified sniper instructors, adequate training facilities, and an expert gunsmith. The expense incurred in the procurement of sniper weapons and the shortage of qualified instructors will not permit the establishment of a sniper school below division level. This headquarters has initiated a request to DA for the establishment of a sniper instructor training course to meet the growing requirements in Vietnam.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Og furnish:
3/506th Inf
1 FPF

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GPOV-DT (18 Aug 69) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 3d Battalion (Airborne), 506th Infantry for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSPOR-63 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 17 OCT 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C.P. O'SHON
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
SUBJECT: TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION

1. The Task Organization of Task Force 3-506th Infantry at the beginning of the reporting period was as shown below:

   a. HHC, 3-506th Infantry
   b. Co A, 3-506th Infantry
   c. Co B, 3-506th Infantry
   d. Co C, 3-506th Infantry
   e. Co D, 3-506th Infantry
   f. Co E, 3-506th Infantry
      (1) Recon Platoon
      (2) 4.2" Mortar Platoon
      (3) 81mm Mortar Platoon
   g. 1 squad HHC, 326th Engineers (attached)
   h. Btry D, 2-320th Artillery
SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report

1. Area and Identity and/or Type of Operation:
   Pacification and Fire-off Operations.

2. Dates of Operation:
   27 April - 30 June 1969

3. Location of Operation:
   Thian Gioi District, Binh Thuan Province, RVN (AO SHERIDAN)

4. Command and Control Headquarters:
   Task Force South

5. Reporting Officer:
   LTC Howard A. Jones, Commanding Officer, 3d Bn (Abn), 506th Inf (Airborne)

6. Task Organization:
   3d Abn (Abn), 506th Inf, 101st Abn Div
   3/320th Artillery (DS)
   Thian Gioi Sub-sector
   1st Regional Force Company
   201 Regional Force Company
   203 Regional Force Company

7. Supporting Forces:
   6 Bty, 5-22 arty (DS)
   5 Bty, 5-27 arty (DS)
   A Bty, 5-27 Arty (DS)
   USAF, FAC Air
   172nd AB (FA) (-) (DS)
   Binh Thuan Sector
   Thian Gioi Fire Support Base
   3rd FGC (N) Bn
   Vietnamese Information Service (VIB)
   Vietnamese Pay-Mar
   Binh Thuan Province National Civil (Hoi Center
   Revolutionary Development Cadre

8. Intelligence:
   At the initiation of TF 3-506 pacification operations the enemy disperion within the TAG 3 was as follows:
   (1) The 132 LF Bn had not been identified since contact vicinity AN 787/175 on Mar 69. A FM captured in this contact stated that the unit at that time consisted of 130 personnel due to heavy losses suffered in February. Elements of the 132 LF Bn continued to infiltrate the Triangle Area to receive supplies from VC and guerrilla elements operating along Highway 63. Information was also obtained from several NVA troops who returned to local guerrilla elements to the OVN in order to avoid induction into the 132 LF Bn.
   (2) The 430 LF Co continued to operate vicinity AN 6319 with an estimated strength of 30 personnel. The 430 LF Co 130 personnel on 27 May 69 as a combined ambush position of C Co, 3-506th Infantry and the 300 LF Co engaged elements of the LF Co which were acting as security for a propaganda element operating in the vicinity of Phan Lam (X), vicinity AN 6319.

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(3) The 150 LF Co, with an estimated strength of 35 personnel, initially operated in the northern section of the Le Hong Phong, vicinity AN 9021; however, once pacification efforts were directed against Toa Hoa (V), vicinity AN 9017, the unit deployed into the southern portion of the Le Hong Phong, vicinity AN 9315. In conjunction with local guerrilla elements, the 150 LF Co continually harassed friendly elements in Toa Hoa and Hon Vinh Villages. In the early morning of 16 June 69, the 150 LF Co divided its two platoons with one entering Toa Hoa (V), vicinity AN 90205, and the other entering Toa Hoa (V). Both VC elements were engaged by friendly ambush positions. Documents taken off of VC KIA identified the 150 LF Co in both instances. 

(4) In the vicinity of Tien Giao District HQs, the most active guerrilla element throughout the reporting period was the Hon Pham (V) guerrillas with a reported strength of 25 personnel. Along Hoy Bu, the Hon Chinh (V) guerrillas, and associated VCI cadre, continued to be the main suppliers for the 162 LF En and the 150 LF Co. The guerrilla platoon of Hon Chinh was estimated at 35 strong with the VCI active elements estimated at 60 personnel. Various hamlet Arrow Action Teams operated throughout the pacification area of operations with an average team strength of 15 personnel. Primarily a propaganda war, the AAA were virtually eliminated within Phase I hamlets of the Province RD program as the basic necessity to operate overtly was denied to them by combined ambush positions within and around the target areas.

b. Jordan and search operations which were conducted initially within the target areas were aimed at eliminating VCI. Coordination was conducted daily with Tien Giao DDoa by some of the 3-S08 Ht which was attached to the Battalion Light CP 1 acted at Tien Giao District HQs. Jointly produced blacklists resulted in the capture of 9 VCI while actual combat operations resulted in the identification of 3 VC KIA from Toa Hoa (V). The Voluntary Informant Program produced no significant results during Phase I. This lack of success was basically due to the fact that VC sympathizers erected fear among the populace by threatening any individual who gave information to the US or RF soldiers.

c. Documents taken from 3 VC KIA by Reconnaissance Team 66, vicinity AN 9016, on 18 Jun 69, correlated with documents captured by 1/2A Ccr, on 12 Jun 69, indicated a warning statement for the enemy elements within Binh Thuan Province. This mission called for closer coordination between Main Force, Local Forces, and guerrilla elements, along with the initiation of "guerrilla warfare" against VCI pacification efforts. It appeared that the enemy Main Force element had broken up into small elements to operate with Local Force Company. As Phase I of Pacification Operations came to a close, it was evident that the enemy had broken up into mostly platoon size elements to conduct harassing activities while selectively choosing his targets for large scale assaults.

9. Mission

The mission of TF 1-306 was to support the Revolutionary Development Program of Binh Thuan Province.

10. Concept of Operations:
TF 1-306 pacification operations employed the dual concept of securing the populace within the target hamlets while upgrading the RF/FF elements by conducting small unit pair-off operations in and around the hamlets. Initially a target hamlet would be subjected to a cordon and search operation, with US and RF units cordoning the hamlet, while the Tien Giao National Police Field Force (NFpF) platoon and Police Special Branch (PSB) personnel searched the hamlet and questioned the people. RF and US Psychological Warfare Teams, Civil Rel Teams, and Medics Teams would then operate within the hamlet continuously. Once it was deemed appropriate the cordon would be withdrawn and pair-off operations would commence. This concept called for RF/US squad for squad and platoon for platoon ambush and screening operations, consisting of combined ambush positions within and on the periphery of the hamlet. Once satisfactory results had been achieved by this type of operation and the establishment of the hamlet defenses had been accomplished, the final stage of direct protection within the hamlet was left solely to the RF/FF elements with US elements then being able to conduct screening operations along the 70 infiltration routes outside of the hamlet.

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Thus with direct and indirect security was provided to the people within the hamlets along with the RD endro who would then be able to operate on a 24 hour basis.

11. Execution:

On 27 Apr 69, A Company (-), TF 3-506 was inserted into Thin Gio District, Tho Hung Village, vicinity AS 066272, as common combined pacification operations with the 300 RF Company. The A Company CP was established with the 300 RF Company CP in an outpost centered within Tho Hung (7). Ambush positions were immediately established with one US squad and one RF squad. On 30 Apr 69, a conference at Binh Thuan Province Headquarters was held for the purpose of coordinating pacification operations to determine target villages and hamlets, and to establish areas of operation. Attendees at this conference were:

- CO, 23 Infantry Division (ARVN)
- CO, Task Force South
- CO, Task Force 3-506
- CO, 23 Infantry Division (ARVN)
- Province Chief, Binh Thuan Province
- CO, 300 RF Company
- 1st, 2nd Infantry Division (ARVN)
- 60, 61st ARVN Regiment
- 61st ARVN Regiment

It was decided that TF 3-506 would establish a Light Command Post at Thin Gio District Headquarters. Priority for TF 3-506 pacification efforts were Hoa Tet (h), vicinity AS 060170, and Hoa Dong (h), vicinity AS 060175. Prior coordination with the Thin Gio District Chief and Senior District Advisor by CO, TF 3-506 resulted in pacification operations directed against the following hamlets:

- Tan Hung (1) AS075217
- Tan Hung (2) AS080217
- An Phe AS066215
- Van Gio AS066230
- Tan Thuan AS086245
- Lam Bon AS087120

It was mutually agreed on 30 Apr 69, that the Binh Thuan Province Chief would release the following units to the direct command of the Thin Gio District Chief:

- 1st RF Company
- 2nd RF Company
- 1st RF Company
- 2nd RF Company
- 1st RF Company
- 2nd RF Company

An order published on 7 May 69 by Province Headquarters directed pacification operations in the hamlets of Hoa Dien (AS006220), Hoa Thanh (AS00625), and Binh Linh (AS086185). Although these target areas had not been previously coordinated and agreed upon, TF 3-506 integrated Hoa Dien and Hoa Thanh hamlets into Phase 1 pacification efforts. Due to the lack of available forces and the slow progress of pacification, the hamlet of Binh Linh was postponed until Phase II.

a. TF 3-506 deployed a Light CP to Thin Gio District Headquarters on 7 May 69 to assist pacification operations and coordinate with ARVN District officials and US advisors. On 2 May 69, two US mortars and crews were attached to Company A, to provide fire support and illumination for combined operations.

b. On 28-30th May 1969, Companies B and C, TF 3-506 commenced a combined operation with the 203 and 164 RF Companies by conducting a cordon and search of Thin Gio Village (Hoa Tam & Binh Dang Hamlets). Twenty-seven VC suspects were detained by TF 3-506 from Thin Gio. Four of these suspects were classified as Active VC sympathizers. Medical, Civil Action, and psychological operations were conducted in conjunction with the cordon and search operations.
The cordon around the village was maintained for three days with the 161st TF Company and 3d Platoon, 203rd RF Company, conducting screening operations to the east. On 20 May, 203rd RF Company conducted searching operations to the east of the village and the houses and relatives of native VC. Once the cordon was withdrawn, Company D linked with the 161st TF Company and began to search for the VC who entered the native village.

On 20 May, 203rd RF Company inserted two platoons to support Company D and begin to search for the VC. On 20 May, 203rd RF Company conducted searching operations to the east of the village.

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1. Situation: The operation against Company A, TF 3-506 on 2 Jun 69. The platoon was divided into three squads, with each squad operating in conjunction with the Popular Force (PF) platoons for three separate hamlets along Hwy 88. Two or three times weekly a US/PF element would patrol throughout the hamlet. Initially this tactic was with little enemy resistance other than sniper fire, however, on 14 Jun 69 at 2030 hours, vicinity A4 556220, one such combined patrol was engaged by an estimated 15 VC consisting in 3 US WIA, 3 PF WIA, 1 M-16 carbine, M16. VC X3A and 4-1 captured. Since the combined patrol concept went into operation within the three hamlets, no other terrorist incidents of activity were noted during Phase 1.

3. Enemy activity detected by combined US/PF and US/PF elements primarily consisted of small scale actions with brief exchanges of fire. Sniper fire and enemy movement was a nightly occurrence throughout all three target areas. Psychological operations within the Phase I hamlets were directed to the mothers and wives of known VC as a means of inducing the relatives of the VC to convince the VC to rally to the GVN. Leaflet drops were made over the target hamlets emphasizing the Voluntary Disarmament Program. R1 cadre operations were directed at convincing the people that the GVN was in their hamlets to stay and that self-rule and self-determination by the people themselves would be guaranteed. This practice was delivered on the 12th and 15th of June 1969 with local hamlet and village elections were held within the target hamlets.

12. Results:

Friendly - US KIA 2
US WIA 7
PF KIA 3
PF WIA 2
PF X3A 0
PF X3A 3

Enemy - VC KIA 29
VC WIA 5

Upms CIA = 2 AK-47, 4 B-40, 1 M79-G3 GWG,
1 Chicom 7.62mm pistol, 2 SKS,
1 M-1

VCX KIA 3
VCX WIA 9

Red Chambers 7
Kilo = 1 B-40 (Dept), 4 B-40 rods, 19 Chicom Grenades,
1 US claymore, 9 US steel pots, 1 Chinese flag,
13 rice sacks, 2,000 lbs of rice, 67 lbs of documents.

13. Administrative Matters:

Logistics:

(2) While TF 3-506 Companies were operating on Phase I operations the resupply cycle of three days usually consisted of the following items:

VC Claymore mines
- 6
- Fragmentation grenades
12
- MK-2 grenades
900 rounds 5.56mm ammunition
1000 rounds 7.62mm ammunition
30 hand grenades
2 cases M-79 ammunition

(3) The LCM 500mm mortar tubes in support of 1st Platoon (4) and 2nd Platoon (4) were used as follows:

- 120 rounds HE
- 125 2.50 illumination
- 30 rounds WP
Expenditure of small arms ammunition during Phase I pacification operations was as follows:

2,637 rounds 63
626 rounds illumination
165 rounds 76

(2) The 3-506 supported the 309, 16th, and 283 RF Companies on a regular basis. Normal resupply for these elements through Vietnamese channels was totally insufficient and rendered them practically incapable of accomplishing their mission. Once construction had been completed on Viet Cong positions, supplies such as ammunition, claymore mines, grenades, were furnished to the defending units. Total supplies furnished these RF and PF elements during Phase I of pacification operations were as follows:

120 claymore mines
10 c. and 79 ammunition
10 c. and 50 cal ammunition
700 fragmentation grenades
50 five gallon water jugs
30 rolls of concertina wire
5 rolls of barbed wire
10 platoons
600 canteens
9,700 sandbags

b. Patrols:

Search missions were conducted in conjunction with each unit operations and occasionally at other times in the target hamlets. Treatment of hamlets residents was conducted on a daily basis by the medics assigned to each of the Companies. Search operations continued in support of RF and PF elements, as well as civilians, injured by VC terrorists. These WVI personnel were extended the same consideration and afforded the same response as that received by US forces.

13. Special Equipment and Techniques: Not applicable

15. Command and Control:

a. The pairing off of RF units with our Companies is the only way that the RF will be upgraded and supported and should continue.

(1) While the Province Chief gave the District Chief the mission of pacifying and assigned 5 Companies to the task, he placed additional missions on the target units making them ineffective for pacification and clearing, static defense of outposts. Therefore, only 1 platoon of each company was actively executed during Phase I.

b. Checkboarding the hamlet at night with RF can be extremely effective. This method divides the hamlet into sectors for 3 men with claymores and grenades and small arms. Once in position they absolutely do not move. Since a hamlet has been boarded, the men in each “square” shoot at anything in their square. This can be successfully done with strict discipline by the soldiers and eliminates small group infiltration.

c. A greater need for interpreters exists and must be available especially when American units are working with RF platoons.

d. RF troops must also accompany each patrolled RF Company for dailyarrison of operations and site selection of ambush positions.

16. Technical Posture-

a. District Chiefs should be allotted, directly under his control, necessary forces to accomplish his mission in direct proportion to his population within his District and the strength of enemy forces oppos-
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b. Details:

Recon missions were conducted in conjunction with pfun operations and periodically at other times in the target hamlets. Treatment of hamlet residents was conducted in a daily basis by the medical staff in all of the Companies. Hospital operations continued in areas 16 and 17 elements, as well as civilians, injured by VC terrorist. (2) Of the personnel were extended the area of hospital area and offered the same response that received by US forces.

14. Special Equipment and Techniques: Not applicable

15. Commander's Analysis:

b. Checking the hamlet at night with RF can be extremely effective. The RF should divide the hamlet into sectors for 3 men with slingshots and grenades and small arms. One in position they absolutely do not move. If the enemy has been injured, the men in each "square" at least engaging in their squares. This can be successfully done with strict discipline by the soldiers and eliminates small group infiltration.

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b. It was noted that when provided the proper support, NVA forces would actively engage the enemy and participate in virtually any mission. All elements, however, still faced many problems and complications by US forces. It is recommended that combined operations between NVA and US elements be initiated by breaking down NVA efforts to operate in ambush positions in the vicinity of their hamlets as well as the concept of nightly patrolling within the hamlet. Initially, this combined operation should be conducted and supervised by US elements could be withdrawn.

c. On May 6 1969, as the cordon around Tuy Hoa (V) was being withdrawn and combined ambush operations were about to be initiated, it was determined that construction of the defensive positions within the village was necessary. The US, T7 3-506, was informed by the 55, Minh Thanh Province, after inspecting as to the defensive plan for Tuy Hoa (V), that there was a plan in existence at that time. It would have been more effective if concrete results could have been demonstrated to the population of Tuy Hoa (V) immediately. Before such operations were carried out, detailed plans for each step of the entire operation should be formulated.

d. Initially, great difficulty was encountered in the positioning of the RF elements. The concept of static defensive positions inside the hamlet actually resulted in RF supporting and protecting themselves rather than the people. Once the RF moved into an area, pacification is worthless unless the people can be protected. Constructions should be constructed as to be contiguous with the hamlet or village. In addition, house positions on the periphery of the hamlet should be employed as well as patrols through the hamlet which do not follow a pattern. Roving ambushes, using three or for different locations within the hamlet each night without establishing a pattern should also be used.

e. Difficulty was also encountered in obtaining the nightly ambush locations of separate Vietnamese elements on a timely basis. District Advisors must impress upon District Officials the necessity of requiring these locations as soon as possible. In addition, these locations must be secure. District Officials must insure that separate Vietnamese elements are in positions that have been pre-planned.

f. The most difficult problem encountered by T7 3-506 during pacification was the lack of communications. Intercommunications are an absolute necessity, especially when squad size ambush operations are conducted with RF/FP units. Due to the small size of a combined ambush position it is imperative that each individual be aware of the mission and identity of his element as well as other ambush locations. Each individual must be able to call to members of his ambush in case of separation or contact with the enemy. The problem of communications also extends to the need of sufficient radios to support numerous ambush locations.

g. Without adequate support the RF/FP cannot function. These I PAC efforts were impeded and delayed by the lack of equipment supplied by RVN to the District. In addition, supplies that were supposed to have been put aside for the target hamlets and villages to be used when required for the construction of defensive positions within and around the hamlets were reportedly non-existent. These supplies which eventually went their way down to the individual RF/FP soldier in the rural areas were minimal. It should be noted that while supplies
were nonexistent for the villages of Tan Hiep, Tuy Hoa, and Hoa Vien which total a population of 2,200, the construction of a wire barricade has been started around the western portion of the city of Phan Thiet.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JOHN V. GALLIPOLI
Major, Infantry
S-3
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 3d Battalion, 506th Infantry

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May 69 to 31 July 69.

CO, 3d Battalion, 506th Infantry