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AGDA (N) (30 Oct 69) FOR: OT UT-603280 6 November 1969

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces Group, Ending 31 July 1969

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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3rd Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities. P.472
   a. General
   b. Intelligence
   c. Operations
   d. Plans and Organization
   e. Training
   f. Combat Developments
   g. Aviation
   h. Logistics
   i. Engineers
   j. POLWAR
   k. Personnel
   l. Medical
   m. Signal
   n. Controller

2. Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.
   a. Personnel
   b. Operations
   c. Training
   d. Intelligence
   e. Logistics
   f. Political Warfare
   g. Organizations
   h. Others

INCLUSIONS

1. Organizational Chart
2. List of Commanders and Key Personnel
3. Troop Disposition Chart
4. Ground Tactical Zone Chart
5. Operational Statistical Data
6. Visitor's Briefings
7. Record of the Presidential Unit Citation to 5th Special Forces Group
8. Ground Control Incis: May, June, July (Included in Project 1-12)
9. Incis 2 - 4, 6 - 8 wd, HQ, DA
AVGB-C 15 August 1969


TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: ATNHQ-DST, APO San Francisco 96375

Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific
ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

a. General.

(1). MISSION. The missions assigned to the 5th SF Group are as follows:
(a) To exercise command and control of subordinate detachments.
(b) To advise and assist the VNSF and support the CID program.
(c) To act as Sector/Subsector advisers as directed by CORDAV.
(d) To provide intelligence to COMUSMACV.
(e) To conduct special operations.
(f) To conduct the MACV Recondo School.

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15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSFCR-65 (RI)

(2) Organization-1 Structure. See organizational chart at inclosure 1, troop disposition lists at inclosure 3, and CTZ maps at inclosure 4.

(3) Commanders and Key Personnel. See list at inclosure 2.

(4) Situation at the Beginning of the Period. The Enemy’s “Winter-Spring” Offensive, which had consisted almost exclusively of stand-off attacks-by-fire, died out, and a new offensive was rumored in intelligence reports, supposedly to begin in late May or early June. In I CTZ major enemy units had withdrawn to base areas in order to resupply and retrain. The Communists were expected to increase their rocket and mortar attacks and even launch limited ground probes in an effort to draw attention away from their rice-gathering activities. Been ”T” (A-21) remained the most threatened camp in II CTZ since a significant number of enemy units were still concentrated in or near its TAOR. Any friendly operations in that area could expect to encounter heavy NVA opposition. In II CTZ hostile pressure continued against Corps B21 571 (A-136) and 26th (A-322). Allied operations and massive air strikes seemed to have thinned any Communist plans for larger-scale ground assaults toward SAIGON. The problem in IV CTZ was continued intelligence reports that a regular NVA division was moving down along the IV Corps border with Cambodia for possible infiltration into the Delta. While this may mean a step-up in the fighting tempo, it would also signify that local VC efforts were failing and needed an infusion of fresh outside forces.

(5) Operations. The statistical data on operations conducted during this quarter are shown at inclosure 5. Throughout the first part of the reporting period the enemy was in a resupply and regrouping posture. However, throughout the Republic, he made his presence known on several occasions. Camp SAWA HUC (A-102) in the I CTZ had received attacks-by-fire all during the quarter. In mid-May an RT/PE outpost located north of the camp was attacked and overrun. Camp Strike Force units from the camp retook the outpost, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy in the process. In II CTZ an ARVN task force operating in the TAIR around KM 4 conducted operations in order to relieve the pressure on the camp. The siege of KM 4 was finally lifted on 23 June. A CSF company from 1st RAMO G (A-111) securing FSB 6, 12 kilometers southeast of KM 4 was assaulted by an NVA force. The enemy was driven back, leaving their dead in the defensive wire. In III CTZ elements from 825th TFS (A-325) made a significant contact with a VC force 15 kilometers from the camp. Early in June, CSF company operations from GHK LON (A-333) began engaging elements of the NVA 7th Division, 8 kilometers southeast of An Lao. By keeping constant pressure on those units, the 7th Division was unable to carry out its planned assault on An Lao. In IV CTZ, elements of the 1st NSFC were still making sporadic contacts in and around HUI COTO. In mid-May contact was made with a VC platoon on the mountain itself and in late June, an NVA company was engaged a few kilometers to the southwest of the mountain.
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AVGB-C
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFGR-65 (RI)

(6) Situation at the End of the Reporting Period. The enemy continued his stand-off attacks-by-fire throughout the Republic. Overall the enemy continued to regroup and resupply, possibly in preparation for the upcoming Monsoon Offensive. In I CTZ the enemy was coming to an end of the regrouping period, but failed to launch a comprehensive attack throughout the Corps. The most threatened camps in I CTZ were NONG 711, with elements of the 93rd NVA Regiment moving through its TACR, and TMA 109G which was surrounded by elements of the 21st NVA Regiment. The enemy subjected Camp TH. NYIG to increased attacks-by-fire during the quarter, but failed to assault it with ground troops, as they had on fire support cases of the A'TL'TN Division in the same area. In II CTZ the enemy was also drawing his regrouping phase to an end. By the end of the reporting period many camps in II CTZ were being hit by attacks-by-fire. The most threatened camps in II CTZ were TMA 109G and LAC LAP. The siege of B11 NTH was finally lifted on 23 June, after receiving over 3000 rounds of mixed indirect fire, during the two month siege. Troop concentrations of two to three regiments were reported in the area west of Camp DUC LAP. By mid-August PAN ME TAK and PAN TU had both been hit by attacks-by-fire and Camp DU PLING was mortared 16 August. In III CTZ the most threatened camps were TAM NHIH and LOC NHIH. The 9th VC Division was moving in the area of TAM NHIH with increasing reports of an upcoming offensive, and the 7th VC Division was in the area of LOC NHIH with the same report; neither location was hit however. In IV CTZ the enemy operated extensively from the border areas of Cambodia, remaining in his Cambodian sanctuaries to regroup and resupply. Camp TAM RI received attacks-by-fire during this time, since the enemy was having difficulties in moving through "VC TNA.
Throughout the four TZ's the enemy seemed to be following the same pattern, with periods of resupply and regrouping seeming to be coming to a close and another offensive starting around the monsoon season is likely. 

(7) Changes in Organization:

(a) Camps DUC TRE (A-222), TAM NHIH (A-120) and LOC NHIH (A-738) were converted to RF status as of 30 June 1969.

(b) On 1 July 1969, Detachment B-22, CUN NTH, was closed and moved to CEN IAI, I CTZ. Redesignated B-11 under Company C, the detachment will be operational as of 1 August 1969.

(8) A list of VIPs who visited this headquarters during the reporting period is found at enclosure 6.

(9) Inclosure 7 contains the General Order for the award of the Presidential Unit Citation to 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne).

(10) The May, June, July 1969 issues of the Green Beret Magazine are attached as enclosure 8.

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b. Intelligence.

(1) I Corps Tactical Zone.

(a) In early May, enemy strength in I Corps was between 90,000 and 96,000 troops, of which 69,000 were combat troops. Contacts and incidents remained at a moderate level with sporadic high and low levels of enemy-initiated ground activity. At the end of July the enemy was estimated to have 86,000 men, of which 69,000 were combat troops. Throughout the period enemy forces operated with two confirmed divisions, 17-19 independent regiments, and 75-80 maneuver battalions.

(b) During the first part of May enemy activity within CIDG camp TAOR's showed a considerable increase in the form of enemy-initiated ground activity and attacks-by-fire. During the latter half of the month, enemy-initiated ground activity decreased; while attacks-by-fire remained significant. TIEN PHUOC, A-102, was the focus of activity during the month. In addition to sporadic attacks-by-fire, ranging from rocket grenades to 122mm rockets, CSF elements encountered NVA troops in fortified positions in the vicinity of the CIDG camp. On 12 May the CIDG camp at TIEN PHUOC received 87mm GS mortar rounds, 122mm rockets, and B-40 rounds. Damage to the camp was considered moderate, although there were light friendly casualties. During the early morning hours of 14 May the RF/PF outpost on Hill 211 (1.2 km NE of TIEN PHUOC) was overrun by an unknown sized NVA force. A CSF operation dispatched from TIEN PHUOC repelled the NVA force at 1030 hours the same day, killing 20 of the enemy. During the latter part of the month there was a definite enemy Order of Battle change. The 90th NVA Regiment, a new arrival in QUANG NAM Province, was integrated into order of battle holdings as being located east of THUONG DUC in the foothills overlooking the coastal lowlands. The 31st Regiment, 3rd Division was reported by intelligence and Hoi Chanh reports as being located along the northeastern boundary of THUONG DUC'S TAOR. PW reports also raised the possibility of the return of elements of the 125th Division in QUANG TRI Province after being carried as unlocated above the DMZ since the start of KHE SANH in 1968. In QUANG NAM Province a regimental-size unit, probably the 22nd Regiment, 3rd NVA Division moved north along the eastern boundary of MINH LONG'S TAOR. The 21st Regiment possibly relocated from the western boundary of HA THANH'S TAOR to an area east of the camp. Elements of the 1st Main Force Regiment, 2nd NVA Division were identified as having been involved in the attacks on HUI YEN RF outpost in QUANG TIN Province. The 31st Regiment (AXA 3rd Regiment), 2nd NVA Division was assumed to have remained in position near TIEN PHUOC. During the first part of June, enemy-initiated ground activity and attacks-by-fire decreased from the previous month. TIEN PHUOC, which has been under pressure, especially from attacks-by-fire, during the first half of the month, saw a significant decrease in enemy activity. Documents captured on 13 June 13 Kilometers southwest of TIEN PHUOC indicated that a food shortage existed in QUANG NAM Province and that an imminent large scale famine was expected. Due to this food shortage, the 2nd NVA Division was forced to redeploy from QUANG NAM to QUANG TIN Province. A PW captured on 17 June identified his
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unit as the 80th Battalion, 21st Regiment, 2nd NVA Division. This report conformed with documents captured on 3 June which indicated that only the 60th and 70th Battalions of the 21st Regiment were operating in TRA BONG's TAOR. The 80th Battalion was at the time under operational control of the 1st Regiment, 2nd NVA Division. The 31st (AKA 3rd) Regiment was reported redeploying from "THN PHUOC"s TAOR. RW reports indicated the 577th Artillery Battalion (AKA 1st Battalion 68B Artillery Regiment) was located on the northern fringe of "THN PHUOC"s TAOR. During the latter part of the month, enemy activity dropped to a moderate level. Intelligence reports indicated the enemy was conducting extensive resupply activities as a result of the loss of numerous large caches to friendly operations. During the month of July, enemy-initiated activity was at a low level; however, contacts with friendly operations did increase due to troops moving through "THN PHUOC"s TAOR. The enemy was concerned with resupply and regrouping activities. Numerous agent reports indicated battalion-sized units in "THN PHUOC"s TAOR as well as a regiment-sized unit moving from QUANG NAM Province to "THN PHUOC"s TAOR. The 8th Battalion returned to QUANG NAM Province and is currently under operational control of the 21st Regiment. During the latter part of the month, the enemy continued resupply and regrouping activities in preparation for a predicted offensive.

(c) The use of new weapons and equipment in I CTZ during the reporting period is as follows: The use of an unidentified agent was displayed against TIEN PHUOC on 12 May. An enemy document captured in "THN PHUOC" contained notes pertaining to a CS mine. This mine contains a CS chemical agent which is described as being lethal to humans and animals and destructive to crops. On 28 June, eight kilometer west of CTN LIX, a Vietnamese child turned in an 82mm mortar round containing an activated VC chemical delay fuse. It has been known for some time that the enemy has "cold" this type fuse capability, but this is the first reported instance of its employment within "THN PHUOC"s TAOR. Readouts of aerial photos continue to identify Soviet tanks, scout cars, and armored personnel carriers in Laos and North Vietnam. The Soviet PT-76 Light Amphibious Tank has not been confirmed in I CTZ since LAM "THI GIDG camp was attacked" and overrun in February 1968. However, the use of armor in future enemy attacks cannot be overlooked.

(d) At the end of the reporting period, major enemy units had withdrawn to base areas and were conducting resupply and regrouping activities. The enemy is possibly in his final phase of preparation for a coming offensive. He is capable of widespread, coordinated attacks by fire and armed attacks against population centers and military installations and limited ground attacks against CTN camps, RF/PF outposts, District Headquarters, and fire support bases. With the introduction of new enemy units into I CTZ during June, the enemy has a greater capability of conducting offensive activities. Although the enemy is capable of a corps-wide offensive, it is doubtful that such an offensive will take place. Prime targets for an offensive would be DANANG in QUANG NAM Province, TAM KY, CHU 1A1, and TIEN PHUOC in QUANG TU Province and QUANG NAM City.
CONFIDENTIAL

15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for
the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

(2) II Corps Tactical Zone.

(a) In early May, enemy strength was estimated to be 56,000 of which
34,500 were combat troops. Enemy activity for the first two months was at
a moderate-to-heavy level in northeastern II CTZ; while enemy activity
elsewhere remained at a low level. During this period the enemy centered
his activity in the BEN-IVET-DAK TO areas. At the end of July enemy activity
was at a low level throughout the CTZ. Estimated enemy strength at that
time was 56,500 troops, of which 33,500 were combat-ready.

(b) As during the previous three months, enemy activity was again centered
in the BEN IVET area. During a brief lull, the enemy deployed the
66th NVA Regiment around BEN IVET. A Hoi Chanh who ran to BEN IVET revealed
that his unit, the K25 Engineer Battalion, had the mission of conducting
divisional activity from 85mm field guns, 105mm howitzers, 82mm mortars
and recoilless rifles. Heavy ground contacts were also reported at CSF, VN
and ARVN units covering the areas south and southeast of the camp. Throughout
this period numerous 85mmmortar rounds were placed to the south, west and north
of the camp in order to stop the divisional activity from the camp and to
infiltrate and destroy. During this time ARVN and US P's released by the
enemy stated that numerous targets from vehicles were observed inside Cambodia.
The enemy, however, did not employ armor during this time as expected.
Throughout the month of June BEN IVET still received daily attacks-by-fire
to include 120mm mortars with delayed fuzes and 82mm CS rounds. Elsewhere
in the CTZ, enemy activity remained light-to-moderate. Documents captured
southeast of BEN IVET identified the K-13 NVA Artillery Battalion. This
battalion was probably responsible for the attacks-by-fire against US and ARVN
forces located at DAK TO. In the coastal regions of II CTZ, the location
of the newly formed 10th NVA Regiment was confirmed by Hoi Chanh and agent reports.
No major ground contacts with the regiment were reported. During the second
week of June DUC CO received 16 rounds of 85mm field gun fire, indicating that
the enemy did not completely center his artillery capability around BEN IVET.
Hoi Chanh and FW's identified elements of the 26th NVA Regiment, particularly
the 4th and 6th Battalions, as still operating northeast of PLEI HINH with
the mission of conducting ambushes along QL-19. Documents and FW's confirmed
the merging of the K-33 NVA Artillery Battalion with the K-39 Infantry Battalion,
forming the K-39th NVA Artillery Battalion. This was the first report of a
merger of an infantry and artillery unit in II CTZ. Throughout July enemy activity
again dropped to a low level as enemy units withdrew to base areas for
rearmament and reorganization.

(c) The only new type ordnance used by the enemy was on 10 June when
BEN IVET received 120mm mortar rounds with delayed fuzes. The delayed fuzes
enabled the rounds to penetrate to a depth of 9 to 10 feet before detonating.
The enemy continued to utilize 85mm field guns and 105mm howitzers.

CONFIDENTIAL.
ACGB-C
15 August 1969

(d) Current enemy dispositions indicate that enemy units are reorganizing and resupplying within Cambodia indicating possible offensive activity during August. From enemy movement and intelligence reports indicate the main thrust during August will be the CIDG camp at TUC/AIP. A large enemy force buildup has reportedly taken place in the NAM LAN base area, and the unit has the mission of attacking the camp. DUG CO is also threatened by enemy forces located in base areas inside Cambodia west of the camp. Elements of the 10th NVA Artillery Regiment and 66th and 28th NVA Regiments have withdrawn into Cambodia but are still within striking distance of BICNET. Other likely major targets include major population centers at PLENOW, KONTUM, K'I1I VI TRUOT and NHA TRANG.

(3) III Corps Tactical Zone:

(a) Although enemy infiltration increased slightly during the reporting period, enemy strength remained relatively the same. At the end of July the enemy was estimated to have 4,783 combat troops and 11,570 combat support troops in III CTZ. Throughout the period the enemy operated with four confirmed divisions, 22 VC and 15 NVA independent regiments, and 47 VC and 16 NVA independent battalions.

(b) Enemy activity during early May was at a low level, building to a high point around 12 May and then again decreasing. During periods of reduced offensive activity, enemy actions were characterized by attacks-by-fire, screening the movement of troops and supplies past CIDG camps. K'UEN received rocket and mortar attacks of varying intensity on nine different days during the month of May; while detachments in the B-33 area received a few light attacks-by-fire in an area which normally experiences little or no enemy activity. On 12 May a few ground probes, in addition to numerous attacks-by-fire, were conducted against friendly LZ's and fire support bases in the B-33 area. Friendly operations and LZ's in the B-33 area were the main recipient of enemy offensive activity during this period. During May, the 9th VC Infantry Division remained in the TAY NINH City area, although documents captured on 28 May indicated that the 273rd VC Regiment, 9th VC Division, had been replaced by the 88th NVA Regiment. Later in the month the 273rd Regiment was identified and located in northeastern IV Corps. Elements of the 1st NVA Division continued to be deployed in War Zone C, prepared to reinforce the 9th VC Division if needed. The 7th NVA Division remained deployed in the Fashonk area and southwestern BINH LONG Province. Agent reports throughout May indicated large numbers of enemy troops in northern BINH LONG Province. At the same time, operations from LOC NINH experienced an increase in ground contacts. No unit identifications were made during any of the contacts, and activity throughout the Corps began to decrease toward the end of the month. This decrease continued until the first of June when the enemy initiated the second phase of his Summer Campaign. The B-33 area was the scene of multi-regimental thrusts, aimed for the most part, at US fire support bases. CIDG camps in the B-33 area reported numerous attacks-by-fire. On 7 June, DUC HUE received 37 counts of 105mm mortar and 10 counts of 81mm mortar fire. In the western regions of TAY NINH Province the 950 NVA Regiment
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AVOB-C  15 August 1969
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group ( commem) for
the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

was identified in an attack against LZ Jamie on 6 June. This was the
first identification of the regiment since 6 May. On 17 June, PE SOI
received three separate attacks-by-fire as the enemy launched the high-
point of the second phase of the offensive. From this period until the
latter part of the month, CIDG camps in the B-32 area received almost
daily attacks-by-fire in an effort to restrict camp operations while
the enemy infiltrated through their TAOR's. TAY NHN City received mas-
se attacks on 18 and 21 June. In the B-33 area, activity during this
phase of the Summer Campaign consisted of mortar and rocket attacks and
a major shift in regimental areas of operations. The 77LD NVA Regiment
relieved from eastern War Zone C, while the 111st NVA Regiment, 7th
NVA Division, shifted from its base area in western NHN LONG Province
to the southeastern portion of the province. The 166th NVA Regiment,
7th NVA Division, made a minor relocation to avoid air strikes and friendly
operations. The movement of these units caused an increase in activity for
operations from CHI LH. During the period 7 - 10 June, operations from
the camp ensured the enemy in two platoons and three company-sized contacts.
On 7 June agent reports indicated that the 7th NVA Division would relocate
to central NHN LONG Province in an attempt to isolate the province and
facilitate enemy operations. Toward the end of the month the division did
relocate to the HOI QUAN ANN LC area and remained there, avoiding contact
with friendly operations until it began further relocation in early July.
With the exception of the attacks on the CIDG camp at NURNAR on 20 June,
enemy activity remained at a low level. The attack on Camp HURARD came
without any prior warning. It consisted of an attack-by-fire followed by a
ground probe by an anti-aircraft company-size unit. Although the attacking
force was not identified, it is believed to have been an element of the
166th Main Force Battalion. During early July, enemy units began to withdraw
to Cambodian and in-country base areas for resupply and retraining.
Agents began to report the next offensive starting date as 15 July, with a
highpoint to occur sometime between 20 and 23 July. The major targets were
reported TAY NHN City and NHN LONG Province. In preparation for this of-
fensive, the enemy once again infiltrated troops and supplies from the BA
THU base area resulting in Camp DUC HUR receiving several attacks-by-fire.
Camp KATUM also experienced several attacks-by-fire as elements of the 1st
NVA Division withdrew to Cambodian base areas to resupply. The other CIDG
camp which received significant enemy offensive activity during early July
was Camp LOC NHN. The increase in activity in this area is believed to be
due to movement of enemy troops past the camp to reinforce the 7th NVA Division,
and the division itself relocating from the NHN area north towards LOC
NHN. Enemy activity did not increase significantly on 15 July as agents
had reported, nor did the enemy initiate his 20 to 23 July highpoint, possi-
bly due to his inability to successfully complete logistical preparations
for the offensive. At the end of the month the 9th VC Division remained de-
ployed around TAY NHN City and was still reportedly tara-ta against the city.
The 7th NVA Division began to move from its Cambodian sanctuaries south prob-
ably to position itself to support the 9th VC Division if they attack TAY
NHN City. The 7th NVA Division continued to avoid contact in the NHN LONG

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AVGB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for

Period Ending 31 July 1969. RC: CSFOR-65 (RI)

Province area shown believed to be deploying its troops for off-

sensive activity within the province. Reports received during July

indicated LOC NHN as being targeted by the division. A 'Vo Chan' who

relocated northeast of LOC NHN on 7 July reported the division would have

tanks in reserve for their attack. Although no tanks have been sighted,

a Special Forces agent reported that the enemy had 30 tracked APC's in a

base camp along the Cambodian border northeast of LOC NHN. During July

an increase in enemy reports indicated large-size enemy forces in the

DUC PHONG - BERNARD area. Intelligence reports further indicated that

elements of the 5th VC Division were redeploying from War Zone D north

to PHUOC LONG Province. It is believed the division had difficulty in

procuring supplies in War Zone D and also suffered heavy malaria casualties

which would possibly explain their move north. Enemy activity during the

month consisted of light attacks-by-fire against CIDG camps to cover the

infiltration of troops and supplies. At this time no definite statement

can be made as to when the enemy will initiate the next offensive phase.

He might wait until the beginning weeks of August when the weather in III

CTZ worsens and makes friendly air support difficult.

(c) On 7 May at 0308 hours, Camp LATUM received six rounds of 82mm

mortar fire containing CS gas. No friendly casualties were incurred from

the gas. An agent report, dated 3 July and evaluated F-6, stated that a

300 man battalion with three tanks was deployed in the vicinity of Camp

DUC NHU (VT30LQOL). Tracked vehicles were also sighted in the same general

area during January and April of this year. Tracked vehicles have also

been reported in the LOC NHN area. On 23 May Golf IR, evaluated F-6, stated

three medium tanks were located in the vicinity of XU7385. Another Golf IR

dated 10 July and evaluated F-6, reported that an NVA base camp containing 30

tracked armored personnel carriers, believed to be Soviet made TR-50Ps,

was located in the vicinity of XU8829. This report was followed by an

agent report on 15 July, evaluated F-6, that located three enemy battalions in

the vicinity of XU8829 which were equipped with 25 armored personnel car-

riers and had the mission of liberating NHN LONG Province. In the area

of Camp BU DOP, a USSF advisor and 10 - 15 CSF sighted a twin engine aircr-

raft, yellow in color, similar to our C-7. The aircraft flew over the

camp twice coming from the north and departing in the same direction. On

7 July at 0910 hours, a source in the BU DOP area sighted an unidentified

twin-engine, black aircraft in BU DOP's airspace. A third unidentified aircr-

raft was sighted by US personnel in the BU DOP area on 21 July at 1815 hours.

The personnel observing the aircraft described it as a low-winged, twin-

engine aircraft, black in color with no visible markings. It is believed

all three aircraft were probably performing visual reconnaissance of Camp

BU DOP and the surrounding areas.

(d) The 9th VC Division remains deployed with two regiments west of

TAY NHN City and one regiment south of NHN S21. The two regiments west

of TAY NHN City have reportedly been augmented with additional troops.

The division is reportedly targeted against the city and is in a

CONFIDENTIAL
position from which a rapid advance on the city is possible. Should the division decide to attack, it would be supported in the north by elements of the 1st NVA Division and in the south by numerous independent battalions and regiments. Elements of the 7th NVA Division are believed to be deploying in BINHT LGIG Province in preparation for a reported attack on LOC NINH. Such an attack could easily be supported by additional personnel drawn from nearby base areas. Although the reports of the division having armored vehicles in reserve have not been confirmed, the possibility of their use during operations should be discounted. During the latter weeks of July, the 5th VC Division began redeployment from War Zone D into southern PHUC LGIG Province. Numerous reports were also received of large-sized enemy infiltration forces located in the DUC PHUONG-BUNARD area. DUC PHUONG has been reportedly targeted for an enemy attack.

In the past the enemy has used these threats of attack to restrict camp operations so that they could infiltrate large units through the area. However, with the presence of the 5th VC Division in the area, the possibility of an actual attack should not be discounted. At the present time no confirmed intelligence is available as to when the enemy will initiate his next offensive phase. He may possibly wait until early August when the weather in III CTZ begins to worsen, making it difficult to get air support for friendly operations.

(b) IV Corps Tactical Zone.

(a) In early May, enemy strength was estimated at 45,000 of which 10,000 were in a combat role. Enemy strength remained stable throughout the period due to the steady infiltration of replacements which offset combat losses. At present, the enemy has six confirmed regiments and 37 confirmed independent battalions with a combined estimated strength of 46,000 troops, of which 39,000 are in a combat role.

(b) Prior to 11 May, enemy activity throughout the Corps was at a low level, characterized by light attacks-by-fire and light ground probes against remote and lightly defended military installations. On 11 May, elements of CIDG Camp MA NA, (A-412) initiated contact with an NVA company. Eleven of the enemy were killed and four were captured. The interrogation of these and other NVA captured in subsequent contacts revealed that the 3rd NVA Regiment had infiltrated into the SEVEN MOUNTAINS area. This unit had originally been the 273rd Regiment, 9th VC Main Force Division, and operated in western III CTZ. In early April, the regiment received 1200 NVA replacements while it was in the NAO THU base area. At this time the unit was given the mission of infiltrating PHUOC Doc Province and supporting local VC units. Its unit designation was changed to the 3rd Regiment and during the latter part of April and May, it infiltrated into the NUI GAI - NUI SAN area. It was also during May that the 261st Main Force and the 52nd Local Force Battalions suffered heavy losses to operations of the 9th US Infantry Division, and relocated to the CHU Do area. These units later deployed to the SONG TAN area to regroup and resupply. In PHUOC Doc Province the 410th and 512th Local Force Battalions moved north to Base Area 70N to replace losses suffered to air strikes.
and friendly operations, as the 3rd Regiment infiltrated into the
SEVEN MOUNTAINS area. During the latter part of May, enemy activity
was centered in the SEVEN MOUNTAINS area around COTM camps R4 YOMT,
and CHI LANG. Both areas received ground probes and attacks-by-fire
from 82mm mortar and 107mm rockets. It was during this period that
the 107mm rocket was first used by the enemy in a combat support role
in IV CTZ. PW's, Ho Chi Chanhs, and captured documents indicated that
the enemy was having increased difficulty in recruiting personnel
throughout the northern and central portions of the Corps. These same
sources also indicated that the enemy had shifted his emphasis from
pounding control of the major population centers and conducting attacks
against large military installations to regaining control of the local
populace in the rural areas of IV CTZ. This redeployment of priorities
made ARVN training centers, RF/PF outposts, and pacification programs
primary targets for enemy activities. Although enemy activity during
June and July was again centered in the SEVEN MOUNTAINS area, there was
also an increase of activity in the MOC HOA area in northern KIEN TUYEN
Province. In CHAU DUC Province, the enemy stepped up offensive activity
against the NUI COTO area. The RF/PF outposts surrounding the mountain
and TENG Ton District towns were all the subject of ground attacks and
attacks-by-fire by up to battalion-sized enemy forces as the enemy at-
ttempted to regain control of the NUI COTO area. In the MOC HOA area, the
50th Local Force and the 267th Main Force Battalion operated from the
CHONG WEST area, and many Special Forces agency reports indicated that
NVA troops were moving into the area and that the 50th in IV CTZ were
receiving increased logistical support from the TA THU Base Area along
the III CTZ/Cambodian border. This logistical support was evidenced by
the presence of the 107mm rockets from the SEVEN MOUNTAIN area to
the eastern part of the Corps, where they were used several times in
attacks-by-fire against CIDG camps + CI CI CAI, (A-11); TA THU THUYIN,
(A-14); TA THI, (A-11); MOI HW (7-11); and the headquarters of the
9th Infantry Division at TA THU. Reports increased of battalion-sized NVA
forces moving into the CHONG WEST area, the SONG TRANG area, Base Area 75,
and along the Cambodian border west of CHAN DOC City. However, there was a
notable lack of unit identification in all regions except west of CHAU DUC
City, and there unit identifications became so numerous and contradictory
that to make a true assessment of the enemy situation was impossible. Only
one unit identification, an addition to that of the 3rd Regiment, was made
during the period of 6 July during a ground probe of TA THU THUYIN, A-11's
FOB at BINH CHAI; two NVA PW's were captured. Interrogation revealed that
these PW's belonged to the 6th NVA Worksite Battalion, which, in conjunction
with the 10th NVA Worksite Battalion, had the mission of infiltrating into
the central portion of the Corps and support operations in the KIEN GIANG
Province. These PW's were similar to those captured from the 3rd Regiment
in that they were newly infiltrated replacements with no combat experience.
The difficulty the VC were having in recruiting was evidenced by the
movement of these NVA forces into IV Corps. Although an offensive against the
border provinices was predicted for the end of July, enemy forces avoided
contact with friendly forces and consolidated their positions in base areas

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Amm) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

along the border. The 512th Local Force, 510th Local Force, 509th Local Force, 295th Main Force, and the 62nd Main Force Battalions remained in Base Area 70L. The 502nd Local Force Battalion operated northwest of CAI CAI, (A-31); the 261st Main Force Battalion in the SOWR NE area; and the 267th Main Force and the 59th Local Force Battalions operated in the CROW'S NEST area.

(c) Since the first recorded instance of an attack-by-fire utilizing 107mm rockets in IV CTZ occurred at CAI CAI on 24 April, the use of 107mm rockets became widespread throughout the border regions and central IV CTZ during May and June. Although the enemy has a 122mm rocket capability, as evidenced on 27 April during an attack on TAN VAN "RI, (A-111), there have been no further recorded instances of 122mm rockets being used in IV CTZ.

(d) Through the next three months enemy activity is expected to be sporadic. Although the enemy will concentrate his efforts at retaining control of the rural areas, he will also attempt to discredit the ARVN and GVN with attacks-by-fire against the major cities and attacks-by-fire and ground actions against RF/PF operations and pacification programs. It appears that the enemy no longer envisions a clear-cut military victory but is attempting to consolidate his influence with the local populace and gain a political victory over the GVN.
CONFIDENTIAL 15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RO# CSFOR-65 (RI)

c. Operations.

(1) 1 Corps Tactical Zone (Co C)

During the reporting period, Company C assets conducted a total of 288 company or larger, 1071 platoon, and 2663 squad-size operations. A total of 218 contacts were made with the following results: Enemy 188 KIA; 18 captured and 72 weapons captured; Friendly 20 CIDG KIA, 7 USASF, 3 VNSF, and 131 CIDG WIA. Seven weapons were lost and one CIDG is MIA. Corps NA THANH, (A-104) and M7171 LONG (A-108) also advise district chiefs and RF/PF troops in their districts. During the reporting period RF/PF units advised by USASF conducted 57 company, 95 platoon, and 320 squad-size operations. A total of 108 contacts were made with the following results: Enemy, 20 KIA and 3 SA captured; Friendly 1 KIA and 7 WIA.

The following significant contacts occurred during the reporting period:

(a) On 5 May, a CSF company operation from GIA VUC, VNSF A-107, QUANG TRI Province, engaged an estimated VC platoon 3 Km SW of GIA VUC.

(b) On 13 May, Camp TIEI PHUOC, A-102, QUANG TRI Province, received three separate attacks-by-fire, for a total of 56 mixed 122mm rockets, 82mm mortars, 75mm RR and chemical rounds. Results: Friendly - 1 CSF KIA; 1 USASF and 2 CSF WIA; one 3/4 ton truck destroyed, minor damage to TOC and mess hall building and 30% damage to the FDC building.

(c) On 14 May, an RF outpost located approximately 1500 meters north of TIEI PHUOC, A-102, was attacked and overrun. Later in the day a CSF company operation from TIEI PHUOC, A-102 retook the OP. Results: Enemy 20 NVA KIA; 5 AK 7.62's, six M16's, one 60mm mortar, one RPD M6, 33 CHTCOM grenades, one PRC -25 radio, miscellaneous documents and web gear captured.

(d) On 17 May, a VC/GV advisory team operation in the TAR of TIEI PHUOC, A-102, found 30 NVA bodies approximately two Km NE of TIEI PHUOC. The bodies were believed to be the results of air strikes directed by Det A-102 on 13 May.

(e) On 1 June, a CSF company operation from TIEI PHUOC, A-102, QUANG TRI Province, engaged 11 VC/NVA, six km SW of the camp. Results: Enemy - 11 KIA; one 7.62mm anti-aircraft round, one AK-47, one SRS, miscellaneous documents and equipment captured.

(f) On 25 June, a CSF company operation from GIA VUC, VNSF A-107, engaged an estimated VC squad nine km NW of camp. Results: Enemy - 7 KIA.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

(g) On 7 July, a CSF company operation from HA THANH, A-104, QUANG NGAI Province, engaged an unknown size enemy force four km N of the camp. Results: Friendly - three CSF KIA; one USASF and 20 CSF WIA; three CSF MIA; six weapons lost.

(h) On 20 July, a CSF company operation from VINH LONG, A-108, QUANG NGAI Province, while conducting a MDA, engaged 12 VC nine km S of camp. Results: Enemy - five KIA; miscellaneous amount of food stuffs captured.

(i) On 22 July, a CSF company operation from BA TO, A-106, QUANG NGAI Province, while in ROM position, received an unknown number of 82mm mortar rounds. Results: Friendly - 19 CSF WIA.

(j) On 22 July, a CSF combined company operation from GIA VUC, VNSF A-107, engaged an estimated VC platoon 11 km NE of camp. Results: Enemy - 4 KIA; one UMG, one SA, documents and miscellaneous equipment captured.

(k) On 12 July, a CSF company operation from HA THANH, A-104, THANG NOAI Province, ambushed a VC squad six km SW of camp. Results: Enemy - 4 KIA; two SA and 500 kilos of rice captured.

(l) On 13 July, a CSF company operation from TIPN PHUC, A-102, QUANG TIN Province, engaged an estimated VC platoon 10 km SW of camp. Results: Enemy - 4 KIA.

(m) On 13 July, a CSF reinforced platoon operation from BA TO, A-106, QUANG NGAI Province, engaged two VC ten km S of camp. Results: Enemy - 2 KIA; one AK-47 captured.

(n) On 15 July, a CSF reinforced platoon operation from VINH LONG, A-108, QUANG NGAI Province, ambushed 5 VC six km NE of camp. Results: Enemy - 5 KIA. Later the same day, the platoon again engaged an unknown size enemy force in the same area and directed artillery on the enemy, resulting in 20 VC killed by artillery.

(o) On 26 July, a MSF element operating in the TACR of Camp HA THANH, A-106, QUANG NGAI Province, ambushed 25 NVA/VC two km NW of HA THANH. Results: Enemy - four KIA.

(2) II Corps Tactical Zone (Co B)

During the reporting period, Company B assets conducted a total of 153 company or larger, 166 platoon, and 624 squad operations. 659 contacts were made with the following results: Friendly - 3 USASF, two AATTV, two VNSF and 12 CIDG KIA, 30 USASF, 3 AATTV, 11 VNSF and 580 CIDG WIA; 3 USASF and 8 CIDG MIA; 20 weapons were lost.

(a) On 5 May, a MSF company operation from the 1st Pln, 2nd MSF Cog engaged -14-

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C 15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

an NVA company 12 km SW of BEN HET, A-244, KONTUM Province. Results: Enemy - three KIA; 2 AK-47's, 2 SMG's, 1 120mm mortar, five 120mm rounds, 150 lbs of rice and miscellaneous documents captured.

(b) On 11 May, a CSF company operation from PLATSAN GI, A-111, KONTUM Province, securing FSB 6, 12 km SE of BEN HET, was assaulted by an NVA company. Results: Enemy - 25 KIA; 5 AK-47's and two RPG-2's captured; Friendly - one CSF WIA.

(c) On 13 May, the 1st Bn, 2nd MSFC, PLEIKU, engaged an estimated two NVA companies, 17 km SE of BEN HET. Results: Enemy - 18 KIA; Friendly - 3 MSF KIA, 5 WIA.

(d) On 13 May, a CSF company operation from PLIKI IVING, A-113, PLEIKU Province, engaged an NVA company, 23 km NW of PLEIKU. Results: Enemy - 3 KIA; Friendly - one CSF KIA, nine CSF and one VNSF WIA.

(e) On 21 May, 5th Battalion, 2nd MSFC, PLEIKU, received a battalion-size assault against its night defensive position 14 km S of BEN HET. Results: Enemy - 3 KIA; one French field phone, 37 hand grenades and assorted gear captured; Friendly - one USASF, one US Army FO, one VNSF, and four MSF KIA; 2 USASF, two US Army FO's and 63 MSF WIA, five TSF WIA.

(f) On 22 May, 1st Battalion, 2nd MSFC, PLEIKU, engaged an unknown size NVA force 16 km S of BEN HET, while sweeping the contact site of the 5th Battalion on 21 May. Results: Enemy - 7 KIA; Friendly - 5 MSF KIA; 2 MSF, one AATT WIA; four MSF KIA; one M-60 machine gun, one PRC-25 radio, and one M-5 medical kit lost.

(g) On 23 May, a CSF platoon operation from BEN HET, A-244, KONTUM Province, was attacked by an estimated NVA company 2 km SE of BEN HET. Results: Enemy - 13 KIA; one NVA, four AK-47's, two B-40 rocket launchers captured; Friendly - one USASF and five CSF KIA; one VNSF, 19 CSF WIA.

(h) On 24 May, the 1st Battalion, 2nd MSFC, was engaged by an unknown size NVA unit, 11 km S of BEN HET, A-244, KONTUM Province. Results: Enemy - 50 KIA; Friendly - one USASF and 12 MSF KIA; three USASF and 57 MSF WIA; one USASF and five MSF KIA; 11 small arms, seven crew served weapons, five AN/PRC-65's, 12 HT-1's and 13 medical kits lost.

(i) On 5 June, the MSF Recon Company, 2nd MSFC, PLEIKU, initiated contact with one VC Platoon, 10 km E of PLEIKU ME, A-255. Results: Enemy - 7 KIA; Friendly one MSF KIA; one MSF WIA.

(j) On 18 June, a CSF company operation from BEN HET, A-244, engaged 20 NVA one km S of BEN HET. Results: Enemy - six KIA; one NVA, four small arms, two crew served weapons captured. Friendly - four USASF and four CSF WIA.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSFCR-65 (RI)

(k) From 6 June to 13 June, Camp BEN HOE, A-2/nh, KONTUM Province, received 28 separate attacks by fire, totalling 611 rounds of mixed artillery and mortar rounds. Results: Friendly - one VNSF and two CSF KIA; one USASF and 29 CSF WIA.

(l) On 21 June, Camp BEN HOE, A-2/nh, KONTUM Province, received seven rounds of 120mm mortar fire. Results: Friendly - nine USASF, two VNSF, two CSF and one CSF WIA.

(m) On 23 June, an unknown size NVA force probed the north hill of Camp BEN HOE, A-2/nh. Results: Enemy - 14 KIA; Friendly - one CSF KIA; one IEASF and one CSF WIA.

(n) On 27 June, the 2nd Battalion, 2nd MSFC, PLEIKU, was attacked by an unknown size NVA force, one km NNW of P'97 BET, A-2/nh, KONTUM Province. Results: Enemy - five KIA; two small arms captured; Friendly - two USASF and one AATTV KIA; one USASF, one AATTV and two MSF WIA; two small arms lost.

(o) On 15 July, a CSF platoon operation from TRANching, A-502, KHANH HOA Province, initiated contact with an estimated VC platoon 8 km W of NHA TRANG. Results: Enemy - 10 KIA; seven weapons captured.

(p) On 22 July, the 243rd Company, 6th Battalion, 2nd MSFC, PLEIKU, engaged a reinforced NVA platoon 20 km NW of RONG SOY. Results: Enemy - three KIA; five AK-47's and assorted equipment captured; Friendly - one MSF KIA.

(q) On 22 July, the 3rd Battalion, 2nd MSFC, PLEIKU, located a cache 19 km SE of DUC LAP, A-239, QUANG DUC Province. Results: Enemy - one 122mm rocket launcher with eight, six cases of TM, 589 assorted mines, 123 57mm RR rounds, four B-40 rockets, 251 C4I/C40M hand grenades, 72 RGP-7 rockets, 1/8 75mm RR rounds, 75 cases of AK-47 ammunition, 520 82mm mortar rounds, and 24 120-kg bags of rice captured.

(r) On 26 July, elements of the 3rd Battalion, 2nd MSFC, PLEIKU, initiated contact with an estimated NVA platoon 16 km SE of DUC LAP, A-239, QUANG DUC Province. Results: Enemy - six KIA; four weapons captured.

(3) III Corps Tactical Zone, (Co A).

During the reporting period, Company A assets conducted a total of 770 company or larger, 1694 platoon, and 4418 squad operations. A total of 478 contacts were made with the following results: Enemy - 622 KIA, seven enemy and 171 weapons captured; Friendly - 6 USASF, 1 VNSF and 81 CIDG KIA; 14 USASF, 9 VNSF, and 151 CIDG WIA; 7 CIDG MIA; 15 weapons lost.

(a) On 3 May, a CSF company operation from MINH THANH, A-332, BINH LONG Province, engaged an estimated NVA company, 15 km SE of the camp. Results:
CONFIDENTIAL

15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

Enemy - six KIA; one small arm captured; Friendly - 2 CSF KIA.

(b) On 1 and 5 May, a CSF company operation from LOC TIP, A-325, HAU NOHIA Province, engaged the enemy in two contacts, three km SE of the camp. Results: Enemy - nine KIA; two AK-47's captured; Friendly - five CSF WIA; one CSF MIA.

(c) On 7 May, a CSF company operation from LOC TDH, A-331, BINH LONG Province, directed TAC Air and artillery on suspected enemy locations, 7 km E of the camp. Results: Enemy - 8 KIA; 1 base camp destroyed.

(d) On 14 and 15 May, a CSF company operation from 'THAI, A-332, BINH LONG Province, engaged the enemy in two contacts, eight km NW of the camp. Results: Enemy -10 KIA; one small arm captured; Friendly - one CSF WIA.

(e) On 15 May, a platoon operation from HON QUAN, B-33, BINH LONG Province, engaged an estimated enemy platoon eight km NW of the camp. Results: Enemy -10 KIA; Friendly - two CSF KIA; one USASF, one VNAF and one CSF WIA.

(f) On 20 May, a CSF operation from 'THAI, A-332, BINH LONG Province engaged an NVA platoon 20 km SW of AN LOC. Results: Enemy - 7 KIA; two small arms captured; Friendly - one CSF WIA.

(g) On 29 May, a VNAF company on Operation CSFOVIII VIII engaged an unknown VC force in LONG BINH Province, 15 km W of HAU NOHIA. Results: Enemy - six KIA; Friendly - nine VNAF WIA.

(h) On 31 May, a CSF company operation from HAU NOHIA, A-331, BINH LONG Province engaged a VC company, 15 km SSW of HAU NOHIA. Results: Enemy - 25 KIA.

(i) On 5, 8, and 10 June, a CSF company operation from CHI BINH (A-337), engaged possible elements of the 11th NVA Regiment, 6th NVA Division, approximately 8 km SE of AN LOC. Results: Enemy - 50 KIA; four small arms, 300 lbs of rice, 100 rucksacks, miscellaneous food and equipment captured; Friendly - one USASF KIA; two USASF and 11 CSF WIA.

(j) On 9 and 18 June, a CSF company operation from LONG CHON, A-334, HAU NOHIA Province, engaged possible elements of the 235th Regiment, 8th NVA Division approximately 9 km S and SW of AN LOC. Results: Enemy - 18 KIA; four RPG's and three small arms captured; Friendly - three CSF KIA, and 11 CSF WIA.

(k) On 11 June, a CSF company operation from LOC TDH, A-331, BINH LONG Province, made contact with an NVA platoon 21 km NNE of AN LOC. Results: Enemy - 700 kilo rice, 20 lbs salt, one 60mm mortar tube, one BAR, one H60 LGD, three M-1 rifles, six SIM's and five bangalore torpedoes captured; Friendly - 4 CSF WIA.

-17-

CONFIDENTIAL
AVGB-C

CONFIDENTIAL

15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

(1) On 17 June, a CSF company operation from DUC HOA, A-325, "AU NGHAI" Province, engaged an estimated reinforced VC platoon 20 km S of DUC HOA. Results: Enemy - eight KIA; six WIA; three AK-47's captured.

(m) On 20 June, camp DUC HOA, A-325, "AU NGHAI" Province, was attacked by an estimated two companies of NVA/VC 20 km S of DUC HOA. Results: Enemy - 22 KIA, four RPG's and four AK-47's captured; Friendly - 10 CSF KIA; three USASF and 24 CSF WIA.

(n) On 28 June, the 2nd Battalion, 3rd MSFC, located a large cache 40 km N of XIAM LOI, containing five small arms, three crew served weapons and a large amount of explosives and ammunition.

(o) On 12 July, a CSF local security operation from BATAAN, VNSF A-136, "DEUREN" Province, made contact with a reinforced NVA company 17 km SW of TAY NHIEU CITY. Results: Enemy - 10 KIA; two small arms captured along with two crew-served weapons and miscellaneous documents.

(q) On 29 July, a reinforced company operation from TRA GAN, A-326, "AU NGHIA" Province, engaged an NVA company 10 km N of XIAM LOI. Results: Enemy - 13 KIA; one AK-47 captured; Friendly - 4 CSF KIA; 10 CSF WIA.

(l) IV Corps Tactical Zone (Go D).

During the reporting period, Company D assets conducted a total of 1,065 company or larger, 6,111 platoon and 5,969 squad operations. A total of 230 contacts were made with the following results: Enemy - 256 KIA, 28 enemy and 191 weapons captured; Friendly - 5 USASF, 2 VNSF and 55 CIDG KIA; 9 USASF, 6 VNSF and 164 CIDG WIA; 62 weapons lost.

(a) On 5 May, elements of the 4th MSFC, CAO LAM, A-136, "PHONG TINH" Province, on an operation with the US Navy (USN), were ambushed by an estimated VC in the southern coastal section of the U HINH FOREST. Results: Enemy - 10 KIA; Friendly - one USN and one NSF KIA; eight USN, one VNN and four NSF WIA.

(b) On 8 May a CSF company operation from KINH QUAN II, A-326, CHAU DOC Province, engaged an estimated VC company, 21 km SW of MOI HOA. Results: Enemy - 14 KIA; one AK-47 captured.

(c) On 11 May, two CSF companies on an operation from BA YOAI, A-21, CHAU DOC Province, were engaged by an estimated VC company, 21 km NE of BA TIEN. The Air gunships and artillery supported. Results: Enemy - 11 KIA; four enemy, eight 107mm rockets, four AK-47's and one B-40 rocket launcher captured; Friendly - one CSF WIA.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL


(d) On 10 May, a MSF platoon from the 1st Battalion, 4th MSFG was attacked by an estimated VC platoon on NUI COTO, CHAU DOC Province. Results: Friendly - 7 MSF KIA; 7 MSF WIA; 2 MSF MIA.

(e) On 10 May, a 30-man security element from TY PHUOC TAY, A-111, DINH TUONG Province, was attacked by an estimated VC platoon 39 km S of MOC HOA. Results: Friendly - five GF KIA; one CSF WIA; four small arms and one HT-1 radio lost.

(f) On 21 May, a CSF FOB located three km NW of CAI CAI, A-131, KIEN PHUC Province, was attacked by an estimated 30 VC. Results: Friendly - five CSF KIA; one AK-47 captured.

(g) On 29 May a CSF company from BINH THUONG, A-13, KIEN PHUC Province, on a DUTCHMASTER operation, encountered an unknown size enemy force 23 km SSW of MOC HOA. Results: Enemy - five KIA; three small arms and three kilos of documents captured; Friendly - a CSF and two US (not USASF) WIA.

(h) On 31 May, a VC squad initiated contact with two CSF platoons from BINH THAN TON, A-131, 15 km WSW of MOC HOA. Results: Enemy - five KIA; two small arms and miscellaneous documents captured.

(i) On 22 June a CSF company operation from THUONG THOI, A-132, KIEN PHUC Province, was engaged by a reinforced VC company 27 km SW of CHAU DOC. Results: Enemy - four KIA; one small arm captured; Friendly - three CSF KIA; two USASF and 12 CSF WIA; three small arms were lost.

(j) On 27 June, the 1st Battalion, 4th MSFG, encountered an estimated NVA company 15 km SW of NUI COTO, CHAU DOC Province. Results: Enemy - 21 KIA; 17 KIA; 13 small arms and one crew-served weapon, one CHICOM radio and 250 pages of documents captured; Friendly - one MSF KIA, two USASF and nine MSF WIA.

(k) On 4 July, the 1st Battalion, 4th MSFG, was engaged by an estimated 200 VC 25 km W of NUI COTO. Results: Enemy - three KIA; Friendly - one USASF and three MSF KIA; 17 MSF WIA.

(l) On 6 July, two CSF companies from TY PHUOC TAY, A-111, DINH TUONG Province, encountered an estimated 35 VC 31 km SE of MOC HOA. Results: Enemy - one KIA; 15 assorted small arms captured.

(m) On 6 July, 1st Battalion, 4th MSFG engaged an estimated VC company 22 km W of NUI COTO, CHAU DOC Province. Results: Enemy - six KIA; three small arms captured; Friendly - four MSF KIA; eight MSF WIA.

(n) On 18 July, CSF artillery from BAO XAOAI, A-121, CHAU DOC Province, fired on an unknown number of enemy 3 km SW of CHAU DOC. Results: Enemy - 7 KIA.
AVG-6C  
CONFIDENTIAL  
15 August 1969

SUBJECT:  Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, ROCS GSFG-65 (RT)

(a) On 4th July, a C&C helicopter flying over KOC HMA, B-11, KANG TUONG Province, was reconnoitering by fire 25 km ENE of KOC HMA, when an explosion occurred. Results: Friendly - 2 USASF, 5 US, one VNSF and one interpreter KIA; one helicopter, one M79, one CAR15, one Cal.45 pistol, one pair of binoculars and one PRC-25 radio destroyed.

(5) Special Operations,

(a) 3rd MSFG Operation CENTURIAN VII, 17 April through 30 May. Three battalions and one Recon company were committed to Jar Zone D in III CTZ, with standard augmentation of artillery, FAC's, aerial relay and army aviation units. On 30 April, the 1st Battalion, 3rd MSFG engaged two VC companies and discovered a cache, km northeast of BIEN HOA. Results: Enemy - four KIA; 150 small arms and 20 crew-served weapons captured; Friendly - one USASF and ten MSF WIA. On 7 May the 3rd Battalion engaged an enemy force of an unknown size, Results: Enemy - 17 KIA; 8 AK-47's and 2 RPG's captured; Friendly - six MSF KIA and 27 MSF WIA; 74 USASF WIA. On 18 May the 3rd Battalion received an attack in the BC position from an unknown size force, Results: Enemy - 13 KIA and eight small arms captured. On 28 May the FOB received an unknown number of 50mm and B-40 rockets. Results: Enemy - six KIA; Friendly - nine MSF WIA. Total results of the operation which terminated on 30 May were: Enemy - 123 KIA, 273 weapons captured; Friendly - one USASF and 15 MSF KIA; nine USASF, ten VNSF and 96 MSF WIA.

(b) 3rd MSFG Operation CENTURIAN VIII, 7 June through 1 July. The 3rd MSFG was deployed with a similar task force organization as on CENTURIAN VII. On 11 June the FOB at PT-70 received 90 mortar rounds. Results: Friendly - three MSF KIA, nine MSF, one WIA, and three US WIA. On 20 June the 2nd Battalion initiated an ambush of a 1st company. Results: Enemy - 13 KIA, one AK-47 and 11 binoculars captured. On 3 July the 2nd Battalion discovered a cache site and captured 24 mortar rounds of B-40, 128 rounds of B-416 rockets, 100 lbs of TNT, 19 sections of heng-tore torpedoes, two cases of B-40 and B-16 87mm. Total results of the operation which terminated on 17 July were: Enemy - 53 KIA, 27 weapons captured; Friendly - two VNSF, five MSF KIA and three USASF, one VNSF and 13 MSF WIA.

(c) PROJECT DEKTA Operation Cass Park II, 5 May through 31 May, CTZ, QUANG TIN Province, OCPAR to the Americal Division. A total of ten Recon Team and eight Roadrunner Team operations were conducted. Total results: Enemy - 6 KIA; Friendly - one USASF WIA.

(d) PROJECT DEKTA Operation Cass Park II, 10 June through 2 July, returned to CTZ with the same task force for continuation of CSS DEKTA II in QUANG TIN Province, OCPAR to the Americal Division, they conducted a total of five Roadrunner and six Recon Team operations. Total results: Enemy - six VC KIA, one small arm and one VC captured.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

(a) 5th MSFC Operation ROOSTER IV, 8 May through 25 May. One company and one CRP of the 5th MSFC conducted a search and clear operation with USN elements in the RUNG SAT Special Zone of III CTZ. These elements made eight contacts during the operation, and temporarily disrupted enemy attacks on shipping in the capital area. Total results: Enemy - 44 VC KIA, 2 VC and 6 small arms captured; Friendly - 2 MSF KIA and 12 MSF WIA.

(b) 5th MSFC Operation JAVELIN I, 11 May through 18 May. Two companies and one CRP conducted offensive operations in order to neutralize the Viet Cong infrastructure and destroy enemy forces on PHU OUOC ISLAND. These elements made nine contacts during the one week period. Results: Enemy - one VC KIA and three small arms captured; Friendly - one MSF KIA and one MSF WIA.

(g) 5th MSFC Operation ROOSTER V, 30 June through 31 July. One company and one CRP of the 5th MSFC conducted a search and clear operation with USN elements in RUNG SAT Special Zone of III CTZ. These elements made seven contacts during the operation. Total results: Enemy - one VC KIA, one captured, four small arms captured and eight sampans destroyed.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS C5FOR-65 (RI)

d. Plans and Organization.

(1) CIDG Camp Conversions.

(a) Camps DONG TRE (A-222), VINH THANH (A-120) and VINH THACH (A-238) were converted to Regional Forces (RF) status 30 June 1969. Due to recent conversions of other camps in March, Company B and subordinate B-detachments have become proficient in the execution of the conversion cycle. The conversion of these camps was considerably smoother than past conversions due to the expertise enjoyed by Company B and 505th conversion personnel.

(b) Difficulty was again encountered in MACV and ARVN assuming their share of the conversion responsibilities. Support from MACV/ARVN elements in the conversion of camps was minimal, although it was noted that some improvement had been made over previous conversions.

(c) Particularly significant was the recruiting effort in the June conversions: DONG TRE 95% of goal, VINH THANH 100% of goal and VINH THACH 100% of goal. Success in recruiting is directly attributable to the psychological preparation, motivation and indoctrination program undertaken by VNSF and USASF.

(2) Phasedown in CIDG Strength.

(a) As a result of several joint conferences with MACV, VNSF and 5th SFSA Plans personnel, a plan for the phasedown of CIDG strength over a six month period to 26,258 troops was developed and distributed (5th SFSA OPlan 1-69). Execution of Phasedown has not been ordered by COMUSMACV; however, the plan received his approval and was forwarded to JCS in Washington. COMUSMACV is awaiting approval of the additional RF spaces and plan. When approval is granted it is anticipated that 5th SFSA will be notified immediately. In order to give each camp a minimum of a 90 day conversion cycle, the first camp will not convert until a minimum of 90 days after execution of Phasedown is announced. For example, if execution of Phasedown is announced 1 August 69, D-Day would be 1 November with D+1 being 30 November, and D+6 being 30 April 70.

(b) Phasedown will also cause a corresponding reduction in USASF strength of approximately 200 personnel nationwide. MTOE input is being submitted now by the companies, special detachments and staff sections. The new MTOE's will encompass elements formerly authorized under TDA's. Under Phasedown there will be 32 border oriented camps, 11 command and control detachments and one training center. The following is a breakdown of detachments by CTZ:

-22-

CONFIDENTIAL
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15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RSC CSFOR-65 (RI)

BORDER CUTS

(A-Detachments)

BORDER CUTS

(B and C-Detachments)

NSF

I CTZ
II CTZ
III CTZ
IV CTZ

9
12
9
8

2
3
3
3

3
6
3
4

B-51, B-52, B-55 and B-57 will be retained with B-55 being authorized 9 NSF companies and one NSF headquarters and Service company. Each border camp will be authorized 530 men, composed of three NSF companies, 132 men each (TOE CS-1), three CRPs of 32 men each (TOE CS-2), a 16 man POL-War Team (TOE CS-3) and a 16 man Heavy Weapons Section (TOE CS-9). This configuration may appear to reduce the flexibility on the part of the company commanders; however, this is not the case. Then a particular camp is under heavy attack or siege, NSF units from other camps and NSF may be placed in these camps on a TDY basis until such time as the enemy pressure diminishes.

(3) CIDG Force Development. The following Camp Strike Force and Mobile Strike Force TOE's were published and distributed during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>DESIGNATION</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIDG/CS-9</td>
<td>Heavy Weapons Section, Camp Strike Force</td>
<td>15 April 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDG/CS-10</td>
<td>Guard Platoon, Camp Strike Force</td>
<td>15 April 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDG/CS-2</td>
<td>Camp Strike Rifle Company, Camp Strike Force</td>
<td>30 May 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDG/CS-3</td>
<td>Combat Reconnaissance Platoon, Camp Strike Force</td>
<td>30 May 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDG/MS-5</td>
<td>CIDG Nung Security Company, Detachment B-52, Project Delta</td>
<td>10 May 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDG/MS-6</td>
<td>Roadrunner Reconnaissance Company, Detachment B-52, Project Delta</td>
<td>10 May 69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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(h) CIDG Artillery. Eventually, all CIDG camps will have at least one 105mm howitzer. At present, all camps have this 105 capability and arrival of 20 more is expected during the next 90 days.

(5) I Corps Tactical Zone (Co C)

(a) Current Plans and Concepts. During the next 90 days it is anticipated that I Corps camps will receive five (5) additional 105s during the first quarter, Co 70. Crews for these guns are trained at Camp Thuong Duc under the direction of 14th Artillery personnel at that location. The training program is two weeks. During the reporting period five crews were trained, with four (4) additional crews presently in training. As required by current campaign plan, all camp locations are evaluated continually for closure, relocation, transfer to RF/PF, or movement to relocate in respect to the disposition of ARVN or RF." Current plans call for continued recruiting of CIDG personnel for replacements. There is a concerted effort being made to reach the authorized strength of 530 CIDG for each camp.

(c) Long Range Plans and Concepts. Company C has submitted proposed MTO 31-107G to Co 5th SFDA for consideration. This proposed MTO was prepared with current mission and operational requirements being the prime consideration. Under the present MTO, Company C was authorized 63 Officers, 2 warrant officers, and 184 enlisted personnel. MTO 31-107G, as proposed by Company C calls for 67 officers, 2 warrant officers, and 249 enlisted personnel. It is felt that this company can more effectively perform its assigned mission if MTOE 31-107G were approved. Company C is concentrating on reducing the CIDG personnel within the IRE & SFC Co, 1st SFG, in preparation for meeting requirements of 5th SFG. Confidential Message 90700PC dated 11 Mar 69, Subject: CIDG Phasedown Planning. However, as indicated in paragraph 4a, above, all efforts are being made to achieve and maintain the strength authorized at each camp. Consequently, Company C was directed by BG Bennett, III MAF Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans), to prepare a long-range study of CIDG camps in I CTZ with particular interest concerning relocation to areas which allow more adequate fulfillment of border surveillance mission. This plan was completed and submitted 8 August, after two months of detailed analysis. VNDF were consulted on this issue and concurred on basic concept of this plan, with the exception of the time frame that was outlined.

(c) Organization/Force Development. On 1 July 1969, Detachment B-22, Quin Nhon was closed, and was subsequently moved to Chu "ai, I CTZ, and redesignated Detachment B-11 under Company C. Construction of the compound is underway, and it is anticipated that Detachment B-11 will be operational on 15 August 69. It will then assume operational control of the five southern camps in I CTZ, camps TRA ROY (A-107), PA MANG (A-104), KHANH LONG (A-108), MA "O (A-106), and ODA "BO (YNDF A-103).
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RSC OSFOR-69 (RI)

(d) Miscellaneous. Camp TUONG DUY, A-109, was authorized to maintain an operational percentage of 30% from period 30 June through 1 August. It was felt the camp perimeter was unsatisfactory, and in some places nonexistent. In view of the oncoming monsoon season, it was determined priority should be given to camp construction and rehabilitation. This original period was extended to 10 August, with the outlined projects about 90% completed.

(6) II Corps Tactical Zone (Co B)

(a) Current Plans and Concepts. On 30 June, THU THU and YTU TBE, the east of the camps in the battalion B-22 area, were converted to RF/FF. Upon the completion of two of these camps, Detachment B-22 was deactivated and relocated from the II Corps area to I Corps. Company B is presently anticipating a directed phasedown of CIDG forces within II Corps. Under the present phasedown concept, four camps will be converted to RF/FF; these camps being TUONG DUY, PLATAN GI, AN LUC, and KHOI CO. Plans also call for the standardization of all Camp Strike Force organizations to 3 CSF Companies, 3 Combat Recon Platoons, 1 Heavy Weapons Section and 1 MIA Team. Total strength is to be maintained at 530 men. Due to the level of enemy activity, location, and size of the TAROS of certain camps, Company B has requested that six of the camps be standardized and relocated from the II Corps area to I Corps. Company B has submitted recommendations for augmentation to the G Series MDL. The recommended augmentation reflects the positions that have been developed as the scope of Special Forces operations has expanded. The recommended augmentation generally calls for the addition of slots for the C, B, and A-teams. The bulk of the recommended additions are within the logistical, medical, and CASN PO fields.

(b) Long Range Plans and Concepts. Phasedown will have a definite effect on the personnel requirements of Company B. In an effort to forecast these requirements, Company B has submitted recommendations for augmentation to the G Series MDL. The recommended augmentation reflects the positions that have been developed as the scope of Special Forces operations has expanded. The recommendations generally call for the addition of slots for the C, B, and A-teams. The bulk of the recommended additions are within the logistical, medical, and CASN PO fields.

(7) III Corps Tactical Zone (Co A)

(a) Current Plans and Concepts. During this reporting period, all Special Forces/CIDG camps continued to utilize saturation patrolling techniques and aggressive small unit operations within assigned Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAROS) to find, fix, and destroy the enemy. Emphasis is being placed on rapid reaction to intelligence, the expanded use of heliborne combat assaults and D-detachments directed toward joint and complimentary operations with US and ARVN forces operating in and adjacent to Special Forces TAROs. The use of both B-52 strikes and preplanned tactical air assets has proven to be a valuable extension of the combat operations of the 3rd Mobile Strike Force Command and for Camp Strike Force elements.

(b) Long Range Plan/Concepts. This headquarters remains prepared to accomplish those missions as assigned for implementation in the Combined
Campaign Plan 1969, AB 114 (U). Currently the planning phase of AB 114 is in progress. To this date special instructions have not been received pointing joint "ES" and ARVN decisions at the Joint General Staff and "BCV" levels of command.

(c) Organization/Force Development. The modification of the CIDG force structure based on 5th SICA letter dated 16 April 69 was accomplished during this reporting period. This headquarters has requested an authorization of a heavy weapons section in both camp "A" and camp AB 114. Under the new force structure within a camp the authorization for these sections and both camps are located in an area of high enemy armored attack threat. During this reporting period, the introduction of CIDG artillery into III CTZ at camps CHU N TRU and KINH VAN will necessitate a re-evaluation of the authorized force for these two camps.

IV Corps Tactical Zone (Co D).

(a) CIDG Conversion. A plan has been written for the conversion of CIDG camps to RF/PF. Camps to be converted are camps "A", "B", "K", "N", "T", "V", and "W".

(b) CIDG Phasedown. Another plan is being written for the reduction of CIDG in IV CTZ. This plan calls for reduction of all CIDG camps to three Light Infantry Companies, three CRP's, one P.K.I. Team and one Heavy Weapons Section per camp. The Mobile Strike Force is going to be reduced to three Light Infantry Companies and one Boat Company. Phasedown action has not been scheduled.
AVGB-C

CONFIDENTIAL

15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RGS CSFOR-65 (RI)

1. Training:

   (1) General

     (a) The Strike Force Training Center (SFTC) at AN NIE has the mission of conducting three weeks of refresher training for CSF/MSF units. Five CSF companies, two MSF companies and four battalions underwent this training during the reporting period. The current student input is three CSF/MSF companies every three weeks. A proposed increased input schedule calls for six CSF/MSF companies every four weeks. This would be a gain of 27 additional CSF/MSF units trained per year.

     (b) The program of instruction for the replacement Combat Orientation Course continues to be evaluated and modified based on reports from the field. During the reporting period 108 officers and 338 enlisted men went through the 12 day course.

     (c) A study is being conducted to determine the possibility of establishing a CSF Training Center in each CTZ, using only those internal assets presently available from C and B-detachments. The goal is for each CSF company to undergo refresher training annually.

   (2) I Corps Tactical Zone

     (a) CIDG. Two CRP platoons are currently in training at CIDG B: TN, one CRP Company is training at AN NIE, and five CIDG personnel are at the Armed Forces Language School in Saigon. From 14-28 July 1969, Detachment D-16 set up a training program at HA MAHN (A-104) CIDG camp. The personnel trained were 239 MSF, commanded by 16 VSF, and supervised by 16 VSF. The training consisted of weapons firing, squad, platoon, and company tactics.

     (b) 105mm Howitzer Training. In order to train CIDG personnel from all A-detachments in the procedures necessary for plotting targets, firing and adjusting the 105mm Howitzer, a program was conducted at THUOC DUC (A-109) SF camp.

     (c) Basic Training Course. During this quarter the majority of the A-detachments were below the CSF authorization. It is anticipated that this headquarters will initiate an accelerated recruiting program during the next quarter. Because the Training Center at AN NIE will be unable to provide sufficient allocations to train the CSF, this headquarters has decided to establish a Basic Training Course for new CSF recruits in I CTZ.

   (3) II Corps Tactical Zone

     (a) The requirement for more intensified training for CSF and MSF elements was illustrated on several occasions during the period. It is
apparent that CSF and NSF elements do not possess the degree of training and discipline required to effectively combat a well equipped and trained NVA unit. Increased emphasis has been placed on obtaining additional training allocations for available training centers and establishing local training programs to insure training is provided for all units when not involved in combat operations. The NSF Training Center located at An Hue continues to provide refresher training for CSF and NSF elements. Since the first of the year, Company B has had a total of eight CSF companies and two NSF battalions complete training at the center. There are presently four CSF companies attending the training course.

(b) 105mm Howitzer Training. During the reporting period, Company B received four additional 105mm howitzers which were programmed to detachments A-21h, A-25h, A-26h and A-113. Coordination was made with the 37th ARVN Artillery Battalion, located in Pleiku, to train six-man gun crews and four-man FDC teams from each camp receiving the new weapons. Training commenced on 2 July 1969 and terminated on 23 July 1969. During the program the gun crews received basic instruction in the firing techniques and maintenance of the weapon, while the FDC section received basic instruction in directing and controlling artillery fire. To provide additional training and assistance in establishing firing positions and laying in the weapons, coordination was made with the 52nd Artillery Group and the 4th Infantry Division for the provision of Mobile Artillery Training Teams to the camps that had completed the basic course at Pleiku.

(4) III Corps Tactical Zone.

(a) General. The III CTZ CIDG Training Center at Det A-301, TR An Hue, continues to provide basic and refresher training, on a Corps Wide basis, to all CIDG personnel. During this reporting period the number of newly recruited CIDG personnel was still declining. The limited number of recruits has permitted more comprehensive training and the development of a workable Plan to give the CIDG the best training possible.

(b) CIDG. During this reporting period the following recruits were trained and assigned to CIDG camps as indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRAINING CO</th>
<th>DATE GRADUATED</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>GAINING UNIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>83rd Co</td>
<td>06 June</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>B-32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85th Co</td>
<td>09 June</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>A-33h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86th Co</td>
<td>07 July</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>A-33h</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (Rl)

(5) IV Corps Tactical Zone (Co D)

(a) CIDG. During the reporting period two MSF companies completed six-weeks of basic training at TO CTA Training Center. Refresher training is being conducted at P7G PAN, and airborne training at CAO LADH. Four MSF companies have received refresher training at TO CTAU. Two CRFs have received training at P7G PAN TIN Training Center, and thirty-six CIDG received four weeks of artillery training at CAO LADH. A total of 66 CIDG completed CIDG Leaders Course and another 36 are in training.

(b) Status of Training. Out of 12 MSF companies that should be airborne qualified, only two companies are airborne trained. The next allocation for airborne training is in November and December. Of 23 CRPs, 15 have received formal training at P7G PAN TIN. Considerable progress has been made in training but the lack of allocations and training facilities prevented us from attaining the desired status of training.

(6) MACV Recendo School.

(a) The mission of the MACV Recendo School is to train selected personnel from US/TFWAF unit in specialized techniques and skills necessary to conduct successful Long Range Reconnaissance Operations in the Republic of Vietnam.

(b) Average assigned and attached strengths of cadre personnel were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>ATCH OFF</th>
<th>ATCH EM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAY</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>1 AATTV, 1 ROK</td>
<td>2 ROK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUNE</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>1 AATTV, 1 ROK</td>
<td>1 ROK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JULY</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>1 AATTV, 1 ROK</td>
<td>1 ROK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) During this reporting period the MACV Recendo School received 273 students for the three week Recendo course. Classes R-19-69 thru R-1-70 have graduated. Following is a breakdown of students for R-19-69 thru R-1-70 Recendo classes by Corps and Unit area:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RECONDO CLASSES</th>
<th>Entr</th>
<th>Dropped</th>
<th>Grad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IFFV 1st Inf Div</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173rd Abn Bde</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co C (Ranger) 75th Inf</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROKFV</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-29-
CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C          15 August 1969
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSFCR-65 (R1)

ENTR  DROPPED  GRAD

IIFY
1st Inf Div  15  1  14
9th Inf Div  15  5  10
25th Inf Div  18  1  17
1st Cav Div  20  1  19
3rd Bde, 82nd Abn Div  16  3  13
199th LID  21  2  19
RTAVF  6  0  6
Co D (Ranger), 1st Inf  20  5  15

XIV Corps
101st Abn Div  20  1  19
1st Bde, 5th Inf Div  8  1  7
American Div  22  1  23
III MAF  23  0  23

OTHR
5th SFG (Abn), 1st SF  12  3  9
USAF  7  1  6
USN  5  2  3

(d) The mission of the Combat Orientation Course is to train selected United States Army Special Forces personnel in the special combat skills required for duty in the Republic of Vietnam and to prepare these individuals to deal effectively as counterparts to the Vietnamese Special Forces in their conduct of stability operations and pacification programs.

(e) During this reporting period the MACV Recce School received 515 students for the nine day combat orientation course. The following is a breakdown of students for classes 44-69 thru 4-70:

COC Classes  Dates  Comp
44 - 69  01 May - 13 May 69  48
45 - 69  08 May - 20 May 69  49
46 - 69  15 May - 27 May 69  49
47 - 69  22 May - 03 Jun 69  20
48 - 69  29 May - 10 Jun 69  36
49 - 69  06 Jun - 17 Jun 69  25
50 - 69  12 Jun - 24 Jun 69  36
51 - 69  19 Jun - 01 Jul 69  37
52 - 69  26 Jun - 08 Jul 69  37
1 - 70  03 Jul - 15 Jul 69  21
2 - 70  10 Jul - 22 Jul 69  33
3 - 70  17 Jul - 29 Jul 69  61
4 - 70  24 Jul - 06 Aug 69  93
AVG-3-C

CONFIDENTIAL

15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS OSFR-65 (RI)

(7) VNSF Training Center (Detachment B-51).

(a) General. During the reporting period particular emphasis was placed on the improvement of the existing training facilities. These projects included the lengthening of 62 CA Drop Zone, the reconstruction of the Quick Kill Firing Range, and the construction of a range control tower at the firing range. The drop zone project consisted of clearing a heavily wooded area that increased the length of the drop zone by 600 meters. This project which entailed over 250 man hours of work will significantly increase the efficiency of training and make the drop zone safer for the jumper. The Quick Kill Firing Range project consisted of the redesign and reconstruction of the Quick Kill Firing Range. The new range will undoubtedly increase the effectiveness of this training. Also at the firing range, the construction of a control tower has begun with a scheduled completion date of 2 August 1969. This tower will increase the instructor’s ability to control his class, at times numbering over 150, thus increasing the efficiency of the training.

(b) Training. The main area of interest during the reporting period was the improvement of the CIDG Leadership Course. The 36th Course was monitored in its entirety by LT Timothy Harper of this detachment. Following the completion of the course, an extensive report was prepared by the monitor. This report, coupled with reports from the C-detachment concerning their thoughts on what areas should be stressed in CIDG training, formed the basis of a new P.O.I, which was written by LT Harper and the Group S-3 Training Officer. This P.O.I. has now been approved by all concerned and will go into effect with the next CIDG Leadership class, scheduled to start on 15 September. The 6th and the 7th Camp Commanders Courses graduated during the reporting period. Both these courses were monitored in their entirety by 2LT James Kneller of this detachment. Evaluations of the VNSF Officers in these courses were compiled by the monitor and forwarded to the Group Commander. With the graduation of the 7th Course, 121 Officers have completed this course in the past seven (7) months. The 8th Course will begin when the turnover in officer strength warrants it. Two courses a year will now be needed to keep up with the need to present this instruction to new VNSF Officers. The 16th USASF Basic Airborne Course was conducted during the period. The main problem encountered in this course was an attrition rate of over 60% caused primarily by a lack of motivation on the part of the students. Steps have been taken to improve the selection of applicants for the next course in an effort to correct this situation.

(c) Courses Graduated or in Progress During the Reporting Period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COURSES</th>
<th>GRAD DATE</th>
<th>STUDENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6th Camp Commanders</td>
<td>5 May 69</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36th CRF</td>
<td>26 May 69</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL

38th CIDG Leaders 28 May 69 95
8th VNSF BAC 31 May 69 97
1st VNSF Medical 9 Jun 69 45
7th Camp Commanders 12 Jun 69 16
15th VNSF OFF/NCO Basic 20 Jun 69 56
16th USASF BAC 27 Jun 69 13
13th CIDG BAC 29 Jun 69 184
39th CIDG Leaders 16 Jul 69 113
37th CRP 16 Jul 69 80

Courses Currently in Progress:
16th VNSF OFF/NCO Basic 14 Jul 69
6th VNSF Radio Operators 7 Apr 69
2nd CIDG Radio Operators 7 Apr 69
40th CIDG Leaders 29 Jul 69
10th CRP 30 Jul 69
5th Taekwondo Do 10 March 69
9th VNSF BAC 7 Jul 69
f. Combat Developments.

(1) The Combat Developments Section, 5th SFGA, is responsible for testing and evaluating equipment applicable to the missions of Special Forces. All items are tested by 5th SFGA field units to determine their potential and usefulness.

(2) The following are projects tasked or under consideration by Combat Developments.

(a) Parawin Precision Aerial Delivery System (PPADS): Recent tests conducted by CD have concluded great potential for this system. The PPADS consists of an all flexible lift canopy, a radio receiver guidance control assembly and a ground control radio transmitter. The delivery unit can home automatically to the location of the transmitter, or be guided to any desired location by using the manual controls on the transmitter. Present load capacity is 500 pounds, however a 2000 pounds load capacity is expected to be developed in the near future.

(b) Plastic Utility Kit: This kit is designed to provide the field soldier with a lightweight, multiple use, plastic container. The uses of this kit are unlimited, such as a water bag, food bag, equipment protectors, flotation aid, collnets, etc. The entire kit consists of 6 mil polyvinyl chloride film. There are two parts; a carrying pouch, and a tube which measures 6' X 10' flat. The kit is currently under field testing throughout the country.

(c) Waterproofed Indigenous Rucksack: This is a standard issue, indigenous rucksack that has been treated with a waterproofing compound. The rucksack was tested under all terrain conditions found in RVN with unsuccessful results. The item was not considered superior to the standard rucksack.

(d) Infra-Red Rotating Beacon: The IR Rotating Beacon is used by ground troops to covertly identify their positions to friendly forces for night extractions or night air support. This item is currently being tested by detachment B-52 with good results. The beacon has worked well with A/C 119 SHADOW.

(e) Spray Pocket Dispenser (SPD): The SPD is designed to aid in the capture of POW's. The item is cylindrical in shape and fits easily in the hand for firing. The effective range is 3 - 5 meters. The SPD fires CS-1, or CS-2. It is presently being tested by detachment B-52; no results are available.

(f) Claymore Flash Attachment: Testing of this item has been carried over from the last reporting period. The item is an anti-disturbance device which, when attached to the claymore mine, will "flash" if the mine is removed from the ground. It can also be wired to detonate the mine or flash a warning light within the compound. In preliminary testing the item was not found to be completely reliable. Detachment B-55 is presently testing the attachment.
CONFIDENTIAL

15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

(3) During the quarter 5th SFGA was visited by a special research team contracted by Department of Defense. Their mission was to gather data on Small Independent Action Forces (SIAF). Ultimately the goal is to define the mission and tactics used by SIAF and to improve their equipment. The human team arrived on 10 July and departed on 28 July. Personnel from detachments B-52, B-55, A-502 and RECONDO were interviewed.

(4) Project Sonjia. On 27 June, SFC Taylor was sent to Company A with 81 Project Sonjia items. He was immediately dispatched to the various B-detachments to give detailed instructions. Items were issued to the Mobile Strike Force Command and Detachment B-32. Currently II FFV regulations prevent the full utilization of these items because of the restrictions placed on Project Sonjia. The immediate reaction capability in order to capitalize on the discovery of new base camps or trackers is lost. Steps are being taken to remedy this problem.
AVOB-C
CONFIDENTIAL
15 August 1969
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSFGR-65 (RI)

5. Aviation.

(1) Tactical Fighter Support. Increased command emphasis has been placed on requesting pre-planned TAC AIR. Data for the past three months is as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I CTZ (Co C)</td>
<td>50/55</td>
<td>155/55</td>
<td>155/55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II CTZ (Co B)</td>
<td>103/15</td>
<td>267/163</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III CTZ (Co A)</td>
<td>211/188</td>
<td>253/232</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV CTZ (Co D)</td>
<td>130/89</td>
<td>102/108</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>502/378</td>
<td>511/249</td>
<td>1077/549</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) I Corps Tactical Zone (Co C)

(a) Tactical Air Support. Tactical Air Support for the past quarter was generally outstanding. However, Special Forces was not given credit for all the tactical air sorties flown throughout I CTZ in support of SF Operations. This was because units adjacent to Special Forces TAOR's attached their air request numbers to the Special Forces air requests. Coordination has been made between Company C 3-3 air and I Corps 0-3 air to issue each detachment a block of request numbers to submit when requesting all tactical air.

(b) Skyspots. Skyspots were being cancelled by the Americal Division when their troops were within 5 Kms of the Special Forces TAOR border line. Coordination has been set with excellent results as units have been notifying each other of skyspots within 5 kms of SF boundaries.

(c) Tactical Airlift Support. Air transportation has to be requested through different supporting organizations for Mobile Strike Force operations. The HSF must be able to react instantly to combat operations within the CIDG Camp TAOR. Delays encountered in moving HSF troops have been numerous. Organic helicopter support for the HSF would definitely add to the effectiveness of the HSF operations.

(d) Tactical Air Missions: May Jun Jul

| Requested | 105 | 188 | 193 |
| Flown     | 40  | 80  | 70  |
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

(3) II Corps Tactical Zone (Co B)

(a) Army Aviation Support. This continues to be adequate for heliborne troop lifts, but there are frequent delays due to low priorities given to the CIDG mission. Army Aviation Support for administration and liaison purposes is adequate.

(b) Tactical Airlift Support. For unit troop moves this has been excellent over the past several months. All missions have been flown as scheduled with the exception of delays caused by adverse weather conditions.

(c) Tactical Fighter Support. This has been excellent for immediate air strike requests. All immediate strikes have been timely and accurate. Preplanned air-strike support has been inadequate over the past two months due primarily to the nonavailability of tactical fighters for preplanned strikes and poor weather conditions.

(4) III Corps Tactical Zone. (Co A)

(a) Army Aviation Support. This headquarters received the same dedicated assets as was reported during the last reporting period. These assets remain two UH-1 model helicopters utilized as a work chopper and C&C ship. Again additional support has been requested to meet the ever-increasing demands placed on this headquarters. This request was denied by II FFV because of non-availability of aircraft.

(b) Tactical Airlift Support. This headquarters receives two C7A aircraft daily and one C-123 aircraft 5 days a week. These aircraft are supplied by the 834th Air Division through II FFV. The majority of troops moved by Company A throughout III CTZ are assigned to the 3rd SFC. During the reporting period, a total of 18,148 pax were moved in 1,721 sorties.

(c) Tactical Fighter Support. During this reporting period, the tactical fighter support was outstanding in regard to preplanned and immediate airstrikes. A total of 684 flights were requested with 589 flights flown against preplanned targets in support of Company A's operations. A total of 136 Combat Skyspots were nominated and fifty-one were flown. The majority of Skyspots were not flown because the Australian Air Force was tasked during this reporting period to fly these missions. They were restricted from flying within ten nautical miles of the Cambodian border.

(d) Miscellaneous. During this reporting period the "Night Owls" program was initiated. "Night Owls" are preplanned air strikes during the hours of darkness using "Sleepy Time" FAC's with starlight scopes, a flare ship and tactical fighter aircraft. The program has yet to yield significant results due to the weather problems during this time of the year. Once the dry season arrives, these programs will be very valuable in night interdiction of enemy activities.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, CSFR-65 (RI)

(5) IV Corps Tactical Zone (Co D).

(a) Army Aviation Support. Army Aviation Support is not completely adequate for the job we have to do. This is due to the lack of rotary wing aircraft support allocated by IV CTZ.

(b) Tactical Airlift Support. Tactical Airlift Support by Army Aviation is controlled and allotted by the 11th Special Tactical Zone. C14 airlift support is provided seven days a week by the 536th Tactical Airlift Squadron at Vung Tau. This support is restricted by maintenance problems and limited flying time for both the crew and the aircraft as set forth in Air Force regulations. These limitations are causing loss of cargo sorties and creating a backlog of supplies and equipment waiting for shipment. C-123 Airlift support is provided by the 315th Special Operations Wing at Phan Rang five days a week except Sunday and Thursday. The support provided is marginal.

(c) Tactical Fighter Support. USAF Tactical Fighter Support is provided by the 3rd Tactical Fighter Wing located at Bien Hoa Air Base, and is superior.
15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

Awards and Decorations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUN</th>
<th>JUL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valor</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order; AGG total May, Jun, Jul.

Article 15: 7

Summary Court-Martial: 0

Special Court-Martial: 0
CONFDENTIAL

AVGRG-C 15 August 1969
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

h. Logistics.

(1) Supply

(a) The average number of personnel supported during the period 1 May - 1 July 1969 were:

USASS 2,576
CSF 34,471
NSF 8,773

(b) During the reporting period the siege of Ben Het in II CTZ under B Company received support from the ISC supply and maintenance facilities. All shipments to Ben Het were either top priority or "Red Ball". During June the FY 70 Budget was approved.

(c) Local Purchases during the 3 month period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>$46,742.37</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$211,738.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>$139,315.72</td>
<td>$31,749.28</td>
<td>$12,709.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$186,058.09</td>
<td>$31,749.28</td>
<td>$224,447.92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The large increase in local purchase for May is due to buying of ceiling fans.

(2) Maintenance.

(a) The percentages of deadline equipment for the reporting period were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crew served weapons</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortars</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forklifts</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSFCR-65 (RI)

The percentage for vehicles has been constant for the past three months; however, large quantities of ½-ton and 3/4-ton tires were received at the end of July, which will result in substantial decreases in diesel-line percentages. During July the 5th SFSA entered the "Closed Loop" program which makes it possible to obtain items not normally available through regular reimbursable channels.

(3) Movements.

Cargo moved in short tons by LSC during the reporting period was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airlift</td>
<td>1606.3</td>
<td>2311.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST</td>
<td>289.6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convoy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) I Corps Tactical Zone (C-C)

(a) Supply. This FSP supports 1364 CSF, and 262 US personnel for a total of 1622 troops. Supply emphasis is on maintaining an adequate basic load of all classes of supply and a build-up in preparation for the monsoon season. Air conditioners have been received for the communications bunkers of all A-detachments. These will be released pending an inspection by communications personnel to verify that the bunker is prepared for an air conditioner. The CIDG hospital and TCC/Headquarters will have duct-type air conditioners installed, freeing many smaller window type for use throughout the company. Eight hundred additional M-16's, 3 ea 107mm howitzers, and 13 ea M-60 machine guns were received and distributed in coordination with the S3. Construction of all camps is being pushed to finish all projects prior to the monsoon season. Cement capping of bunkers is a priority project at all detachments to save both the cost and time of continual sandbag replacements. Construction of the new B-detachment camp (B-11), began on 8 July.

(b) Maintenance. Deadline rate for vehicles again dropped during the reporting period to approximately 5%. The primary problem in vehicle maintenance is the expeditious extraction of vehicles not repairable on site. Generator deadline rate remained about 20%. This is a slight increase over the last reporting period, but still a significant reduction over the average for the last year. Appliance deadline rate remained at about 10%. Lack of parts, especially compressor motors, still hinders appliance repair.

(c) Cargo Movements. The following tonnages were moved during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>TONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Land</td>
<td>2140.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSFCR-65 (RI)

Air Drop 12.0
Convoy 14.1
Sealift 166.5
Total: 296.1 *Thru 13 Jul 69

(d). Aircraft availability was slightly better during this period over last period. Five camps now have strips with C-130 capability, 3 with C-7A capability, and one, Camp KONG SON, has no fixed wing air strip. III MAF has tasked the Seabees for maintenance of all Special Forces airfields in I Corps.

(2) Services. Effective 13 Jul 69, the FSP began purchasing fresh food for CIPG from a local contractor in DANANG, and the extremely hot weather during the last two months has caused extensive spoilage of the food. One entire shipment, cost $9,000, was entirely spoiled and had to be replaced. The prices in the DANANG area are very competitive with II Corps prices, and a 12 month contract was established that precludes any changes in prices during the contract period.

(f) Facility Improvements. The medical supply warehouse is 90% complete. This will double the storage capacity for medical supplies and eliminate the CONEX containers used for bulk storage. A cold room for storage of perishable drugs is included along with space for an office. The POL berm has been completely capped with concrete. Large timbers have been placed around the walls to keep vehicles and forklifts from chipping the concrete or damaging the walls. The cargo helipad is being renovated and is 60% complete at present.

(g) Adequacy of Logistical Support. This unit has received outstanding support from the Naval Support Activity and First Logistical Command, both located in DANANG. LSC support continues to be outstanding, however, with the ever-existent problem of transportation between DANANG and NHA TRANG, it is more feasible for this unit to utilize local support agencies to the maximum extent as long as cost is not increased over LSC allowances.

(h) Potential Problem Area. While aircraft availability increased during this period, the only dedicated aircraft allocated this unit is one C-13A aircraft. One C-7A aircraft moves about 25% of the total tonnage, so aircraft utilized on an as-available basis moves the bulk of this unit's cargo. As more airfields are being upgraded to C-130 capability, the dedication of one C-130 aircraft to this unit would enhance the resupply effort and provide greater flexibility for the Commander not only for supply, but also for troop movements for tactical operations.

(5) II Corps Tactical Zone (Co B).

(a) Supply. During this reporting period, Company B provided logistical support for approximately 9000 CSF, 2700 NSF and 550 USASF personnel. This
AVGB-C

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abb.) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RG5 GSFR-65 (R)

was accomplished by utilization of the Forward Supply Point at Pleikhu and the outstanding support rendered by the tactical airlift aircraft, and the continuation of convoys. The recent crisis in III CTZ was a significant operation, with over 935,000 pounds of supplies and equipment being transported to the camp. The single line repositioning system continues to be the most efficient method devised to support our operations in III CTZ. Local purchases averaged $8.00 per man during this reporting period. Items purchased were primarily plumbing fixtures, electrical supplies and repair items not available in the supply system. Quality was generally below American standards.

(b) Maintenance. Bilingual checklists on operational maintenance are in use at all detachments. The generator-automotive school is fully operational at this time and has produced outstanding results. The equipment deadline rate at Company B remains below 10%. This is due to the practice of continually sending operational readiness teams, led by a technical representative, around to all detachments to make required repairs.

(c) Movements. Two significant problems exist in the movement section. Foremost was the general shortage of available air items. This problem became critical during the BEN HET crisis. The other problem lay with subordinate detachments submitting late material requests creating too many priority re-supply missions. The following is a monthly total of cargo weights as delivered by the mode of delivery indicated:

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{May} & \text{Airland} & 2,131,647 \text{ lbs} \\
 & \text{Airdrop} & 16,111 \text{ lbs} \\
 & \text{Convoy} & 2,083,940 \text{ lbs} \\
\text{June} & \text{Airland} & 2,091,302 \text{ lbs} \\
 & \text{Airdrop} & 401,735 \text{ lbs} \\
 & \text{Convoy} & 1,124,514 \text{ lbs} \\
\text{July} & \text{Airland} & 1,581,215 \text{ lbs} \\
 & \text{Airdrop} & 67,165 \text{ lbs} \\
 & \text{Convoy} & 1,325,000 \text{ lbs} \\
\end{array}
\]

(d) Services. Logistical support of all classes, I thru V, are provided from the FSP at Pleikhu for all detachments within Company B. The maintenance facility, with its operational readiness team, is responsive to all levels requiring maintenance support.

-42-

(a) Problem Areas. Availability of construction materials continues to be a major problem area. Also, a shortage of available vehicles for convoy service hampers construction and resupply missions. The deletion of the FSP at PLEI KHU during the month of May, put additional responsibility on the PLEI KHU FSP. This was designed as an economy move without lowering the standards of the Company B logistical support system.

(b) Plans. Future improvements in the FSP include the posting of a new SOP, as well as the drafting of a revised MTOE. The current MTOE does not provide for enough US personnel to efficiently operate a FSP. The revised MTOE would correct this deficiency.

(c) Logistical Support. The following is an examination of the logistical support received from 1st Logistic Command and 5th SFCA LSC.

1st Log. - Excellent. Our largest handicap is a lack of personnel to transport supplies. The new MTOE would correct this.

LSC - Excellent. The only exception is lumber and barrier material.

(d) III Corps Tactical Zone (Co A).

(a) Supply. The FSP at Company A continues to support 7,500 CSF, 2,500 ISF and 125 ISAF personnel. Logistical support continued at a high level, with only two exceptions. A critical low was reached in the resupply of Indigenous Camouflage Fatigues and in that of FIR rations. However, this was no fault of Company A or LSC. A strike in port at Okinawa delayed supplies and requisition requirements could not be met. Local purchase of rice subsistence reached a high level of 1,350$N per 100 lbs per plastic lined bag. The price increase was due to a shortage of rice in III CTZ prior to the fall harvest, and to inflated prices and taxes throughout the Saigon area. Purchases in Codes 905, 909 and 910 remained average, but purchases were all of non-available resupply type items. Fresh food contracts in III CTZ have been equally divided between the two food contractors presently employed by Company A. This equal distribution has added greatly to a more competitive atmosphere, and has caused a considerable price reduction. Supplies are supplied monthly with a list of currently available items of subsistence. Commanders at each CSF company determine the menu for their CIDG troops. Any combination of subsistence may be purchased provided a ceiling of $8 $N per man per day is not exceeded. The price of each item quoted at the beginning of the month is fixed for that calendar month. If prices in the Corps area increase, the food contractor is forced to take a loss on that particular item; conversely, if prices drop, the contractor stands to gain. Effective 1 June 1969 a scale was purchased and put into use by Company A. VN fresh foods are weighed and checked for freshness by American representatives just prior to being shipped to subordinate detachments. During the first week of food inspection, many discrepancies were found; however,
Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSFOP-65 (RI)

payment for these items was prorated according to actual quantities received, which soon forced the food contractors to deliver amounts ordered. Many compliments have been received from subordinate detachments on quality and quantity of foodstuffs. CIDG company commanders have also voiced their approval of the new system.

(b) Maintenance. At the beginning of this reporting period 16 Libby 10 KW generators were deadlined due to magnetic amplifiers and injection pumps. A Tech Rep was sent to LSC to be instructed on maintenance of magnetic amplifiers. Upon return the Tech Rep supervised the repair of 10 of the 16 Libby 10 KW generators. DX of defective injection pumps is still a critical problem in Company A, as these items are almost non-existent in supply channels. At present Company A has no generator repair Tech Rep, being short 5, due to rotation back to the Philippines. This has placed a great burden on the maintenance NC/IC, and has slowed work production to a certain extent.

(c) Movement. During the reporting period a total of 10,142,155 lbs of cargo and 25,104 T pax were transported by airlift. These loads were broken down in the following categories: 226,353 lbs by special airlift (C-130); 1,491,237 lbs by C-130 A/C; 1,681,835 lbs by C-7A A/C; and 1,910,700 lbs by rotowings A/C. During the reporting period, 6,940,968 lbs of cargo was moved by convoy. Road convoys are at present the main resupply method for Detachment B-54 and B-55.

(d) Services. The RAU facility at Company A, during the last reporting period, has constructed two new water towers to replace old towers which were a safety hazard. In so doing, a 5,000 gal tank was substituted on one of the towers for a 500 gal tank which had not met the needs of the company. The generator facility at Company A has been enlarged to house two additional 100 KW generators. This project is in its final stages at the present time. RAU expendable supplies such as fluorescent light fixtures, bulbs and bus type fuses continue to be in short supply, and have caused most projects in III CTZ to come to a halt. Non-expendable supply items such as chain saws, skill saws and squad carpenter sets, are in very short supply and have hampered the RAU mission greatly during this reporting period.

(7) IV Corps Tactical Zone. (Co D).

(a) Supply. During the reporting period the supply section supported the following number of personnel:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USASF</td>
<td>394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSF</td>
<td>7,124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>1,925</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

AUGUST 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSFGR-65 (RI)

In May the change was completed to the new family of weapons. The M-16's and M-60's were issued to all exterior camps with a border surveillance role to include Detachment B-50 MSF. The interior camps that will be turned over to RF/PA will be standardized to M-2 carbines, replacing the M-1 Carbine, M-1 carbine and the BAR. On 19 May, receipt of all ammunition support from ARVN sources in CAN THO began. A battalion of MSF remained in position on Hui Coto, with all supplies and support being provided through the SF at Detachment B-43.

(b) Maintenance. This quarter, an OJT program for all disabled CIDG veterans was conducted. Through this, operational commitments were able to be met. The deadline rate has decreased considerably in the last part of this quarter due mainly to availability of parts and increased command emphasis on maintenance. Another important factor in the reduction of the deadline rate is the implementation of scheduled maintenance contact teams. The plans for expansion and improvement of the maintenance facility have been approved and construction is pending. There is presently a shortage of VN personnel, due to increases in the draft and age restrictions. Plans are being formed to initiate a round-robin-type training program for CIDG personnel on vehicles, generators, outboard motors and erdelators.

(c) Movements: Summary of logistical support is as follows:

Received from LSC: 3,025,575 lbs
Received from 1st Log: 1,012,698 lbs
Shipped to detachments: 5,640,394 lbs

Supplies Shipped:
Airland: 2,596,679 lbs
Airdrop: 329,394 lbs
Sling Load: 2,267,437 lbs
Convoy: 466,881 lbs

Total line items issued to A and B-detachments: 875
Total repair jobs completed: 829

Vehicles: 331
Generators: 120

Air conditioners and Refrigerators: 234

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(d) Problems. The major difficulty within the FSP continues to be lack of qualified rigger personnel and Filipino technicians. With the influx of new recruits the following items of equipment are critically short: Mosquito bars, ponchos, blankets and hammocks. In the maintenance field, erdelator and refrigeration repair parts are the major reasons for the high deadline rate.

(e) Planned Improvement. Construction plans have been submitted and approved for renovation and extension of the maintenance facility. Construction will begin when construction materials become available. Fill is being hauled for reclamation of swamp land to gain additional space for FSP.
CONFIDENTIAL

15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for
the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

1. Engineer.

(1) Construction and Rehabilitation.

(a) The following construction was completed during the reporting
period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>PROJECT</th>
<th>CONSTRUCTION UNIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C1 DANANG</td>
<td>Support platoon billets and Latrine, Contract/Self Help</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1 DANANG</td>
<td>Leaching tanks, medical supply warehouse, JASAP Latrine, MSF Billets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1 MAI LOC</td>
<td>CIDQ Latrines</td>
<td>Self-help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1 THANH</td>
<td>Medical Bunker, TOC Extension</td>
<td>Contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1 HA THANH</td>
<td>Ammunition Bunker</td>
<td>Self-Help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1 NGUONG SON</td>
<td>CIDQ Latrines, Generator Shed</td>
<td>Self-Help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1 NGUONG SON</td>
<td>POLWAR Building, CIDQ Messhall, Covered POL Storage Area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1 TRA BONG</td>
<td>Generator Shed</td>
<td>Self-Help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1 THUONG DUC</td>
<td>Ammunition Bunkers</td>
<td>Self-Help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 PLEIKU</td>
<td>Generator Shed, Hospital Guardhouse, Ammunition Bunker</td>
<td>Contract/Self-Help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 BAN NE THUOT</td>
<td>BEQ, Personnel Bunker, Burn Pit, Well</td>
<td>Contract/Self-Help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 PLEI DJENG</td>
<td>Machine Gun Bunker, Interpreter's Self-Help</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 KONTUM</td>
<td>BEQ/BEQ, MSF Latrine &amp; Shower</td>
<td>Staff Engineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 DUC LAP</td>
<td>Dispensary</td>
<td>Self-Help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 DAK PEK</td>
<td>Machine Gun Bunkers</td>
<td>Self-Help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 HANG BUK</td>
<td>Sleeping Bunkers, Ammunition Bunkers</td>
<td>Self-Help</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS USFOR-65 (R1)

C2 DUC CO CIDG Latrines Self-Help

C3 BIEN HOA Hospital Renovation, Detention Center, Supply Extension, Storm Drain System, 2 Water Towers Contract/Self-Help

C3 BU D'P 8 Dependent Billets, Water Tower KB-1/Self-Help

C3 TRA CU Generator Shed, Teamhouse Extension, 15 Airboat Ramps Self-Help

C3 LOC NINH POLVAR Teamhouse, MSF Teamhouse Self-Help

C3 SONG BE 5 Dependent Billets Self-Help

C3 TAY NINH Communications Bunker Self-Help

C3 TRANG SUP Classroom Rehabilitation Self-Help

C3 MINH THANH CIDG Billets Self Help

C4 BINH THANH THON Machine Gun Tower, Renovation of CIDG Club, MSF Billets Self-Help

C4 CAN THO 40 Prefabricated Latrines Self-Help

C4 CAN THO NSF Showers, Playground Equipment Self-Help

C4 TUYEN NHON Mortar Pit, Rewiring of Compound Self-Help

C4 CAI CAY Elevated POL Platform Self-Help

CH THUONG THOI Two burn-out latrines Self-Help

CH DON PHUC CIDG Billets Self-Help

CH MOO HOA SFOB NHA TRANG Concrete Water Tower, Maintenance Contract Warehouse Self-Help

(2) Well Drilling Operations:

(a) A well has been drilled at Tra Cu, utilizing a contractor owned and operated airmobile well rig. This well is producing 15 gallons per minute.

(b) Wells were drilled in the SFOB and at BAN ME THU'T East Field, 

CONFIDENTIAL
AVGB-C

CONFIDENTIAL

15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for
the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

(c) Wells are currently under construction at AN KHE and DUC LAP.

(3) Status of CAC Funds.
   a. Obligated: $224,869.00
   b. Unobligated: $1,275,131.00

(4) Public Works and Utilities:
   a. The repair and utilities section (R&U), processed 748
      work orders during the reporting period.
   b. The carpenter shop constructed 7,500 pallets and 37,750
      concrete blocks.
   c. The water supply has remained at an acceptable level during
      the reporting period.

(5) Problem Areas. Lack of construction materials to include all sizes
    of lumber, electrical materials and some plumbing supplies is causing delay
    in many projects.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

J. Political Warfare (POLWAR).

(1) General. During this period the activity of the Group S5 Section consisted of improving current programs and the initiation of significant new projects.

(2) Psychological Operations (PSYOPS).

(a) A log of Hoi Chanhs was started in July and will be maintained by the Group PSYOPS Officer. All Special Forces companies are required to submit the following information on each Hoi Chanh that turns himself in to an SF detachment: Name, Rank, Date, Camp, and exploitation.

(b) The translation and editing of a captured Viet Cong Company Grade Political Officer Manual was undertaken. This document gives a very clear and detailed description of the duties and responsibilities of a Viet Cong political officer. Great emphasis through repetition is placed on the multiplicity of roles he is to perform in his unit. This provides additional insight on the concepts and techniques of communist troop motivation and indoctrination in the Southeast Asian context. Final coordination is being effected with the VNSF High Command Motivation and Indoctrination Officer for comparison with the original text on the accuracy of reproduction of ideas and concepts. Plans are to print this material as soon as feasible and coordinate its distribution to all military agencies involved in unconventional warfare.

(c) Closer coordination between VNSF High Command POLWAR Section and the USASF Group S5 Section aimed at rapidly and effectively disseminating GVN policy to troops as a countermeasure to Communist propaganda's being implemented. The present atmosphere created by the various negotiations lends itself quite well to the spreading of demoralizing rumors by the enemy among GVN troops. Taking the initiative away from the enemy in the propaganda war is the first objective of this coordination improvement effort. Facilitating and speeding up immediate reaction to enemy initiative through joint USASF/VNSF channels is the second.

(3) Civic Action. During this reporting period it was found that many of the CA/FO officers did not follow the proper methods of requesting CA supplies. This was partly due to the rapid turnover of CA/FO officers and the fact that many of the officers were not school trained. In addition, a review of the old 6th APOA Reg 725-3 found the regulation to be outdated, and it has, therefore, been rewritten. The regulation is in reproduction at the present time, and is expected to be in circulation by 9 August 1969.

L Corps Tactical Zone (Go C)

(a) Psychological Operations. Throughout the reporting period continuous PSYOPS was conducted and directed toward friendly target audiences which include CIDG, their descendents, civilians and any other indigenous personnel within the
Safe Areas of Camp TACR's. The media most commonly used, and means of delivery are: airborne leaflets, posters, handouts, ground and air loudspeaker systems, movies and face-to-face contacts. The face-to-face contacts are the most effective, as immediate feedback is possible. Face-to-face contact is in the form of lectures, rallies, civil meetings, educational classes, Medrants and Cultural Drama Team performances. The predominant propaganda themes used are support of the people by GVN, support of GVN by the people, payment of rewards for information (VIP), revolutionary development and refugee support programs of GVN. Direct support of PSYOPS in I Corps is received from 7th PSYOPS Bn, DACMA. They provide direct support in the development and production of leaflets, posters, newspapers, and any printed material requested in support of PSYOPS. The 7th PSYOPS Bn also coordinates with the 9th Special Operations Squadron, USAF, 9THSOG for aerial delivery of leaflets and tape recorded broadcasts. CORPS, Region I, 3RD AFX, provides support through the distribution of printed materials such as newspapers, leaflets, posters and agricultural literature from JUSPAC. Current PSYOPS policy and guidance from "AO/FAW" is provided through G-5, III MAF.

(b) Psychological Warfare (PSYWAR). The target audiences for PSYWAR include VC/NVA, hostile groups outside of safe areas and neutral or uncommitted groups from areas bordering the Safe Area. The supporting units are basically the same as mentioned in the preceding paragraph. CITG POLWAR Teams also accompany operations for the purpose of distributing surrender and Chieu Hoí literature in enemy areas. They also make use of ground loudspeaker broadcasts when in contact with enemy troops. The predominant PSYWAR themes are, Chieu Hoí, Anti-NVA, third party inducements, Anti-Communism; and whenever the situation is favorable, the VC/NVA dis-sention themes are exploited.

(c) Social Welfare. Social welfare is being promoted in all of the camps by the support of health and sanitation, education and agricultural projects. The distribution of health kits on a regular basis along with lectures and demonstrations by POLWAR Teams, USAF and VN medics at all camps is helping to create health and sanitation-conscious villages. This program is more quickly absorbed by young people, which is good in that it will likely be perpetuated by them until it becomes a natural community characteristic. Support to education is provided in the form of school kits, building of schools and the repair of existing ones. Clothes are provided to the dependents of CIDG. Bulk food is obtained, whenever possible, from voluntary agencies for distribution to refugees on an emergency basis. All camps are presently in the process of starting new agricultural projects. A fish pond was constructed at Camp 2A T0 and an existing pond at Detachment B-11, CHU LAI, will be stocked from the fish hatchery at Camp KLUH LONG.

(d) Motivation and Indoctrination. The Motivation and Indoctrination program consists of various activities within the camps to improve morale and esprit of the CIDG soldier. Those which have proved to be most effective
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RC3 CSFOR-65 (RI)

are CIDG Soldier of the Month programs, ceremonies for heroic action awards, camp celebrations and CIDG cantoons. When operated under sound management, the CIDG canteen is one of the best means of improving morale of the CIDG soldier. Here they have an opportunity to buy items at a reasonable cost, something which would be impossible on the local economy. All of the camps in I Corps now have operating cantoons. Lectures and rallies by the Camp Commander and members of the POLVAR Team help keep the CIDG informed of current events. Newspapers and magazines are purchased in DANANG and sent to each camp on a recurring basis. The sale of the rice to the CIDG families by the USAF provides food which would otherwise have to be purchased at black-market prices. Periodic performances by the Cultural Drama Team provides the CIDG with entertainment as well as motivation and indoctrination. Each POLVAR Team now has a 16mm movie projector for showing motivation and indoctrination films obtained from agencies such as JUSPAO.

(a) Civic Action. Recent examples of Civic Action are a bridge built for the civilian population at Camp MNHN LONG, a bridge repaired at Camp TPH YNH, a market place built at MNHN LONG and churches built at MNHN LAN, MNHN LONG, and HAI LAN. Schools in each TAR are provided with school kits and teaching kits. Using self-help labor, the POLVAR Teams assist in keeping all of the schools in each TAR in a good state of repair. At Camp AN LAC, four teachers are paid from Special Forces Funds. Teachers are also paid at TPH YNH and HA THAM.

(b) Civic Action. In the area of food and agriculture, Detachment C-2 stocked fish ponds at camps TON HU and MNHN CO. Twenty bags of TR-8 rice were obtained from the PHU RIKU agricultural chief free of charge for the villages near camp MNHN CO. Coordination was made with the PHU RIKU economic chief so that over 1000 bags of rice were supplied to the villagers near MNHN CO for only 1100$ VN/bag. Animal husbandry programs were initiated at camps AN LAC, TPH YNH and DUC IAP. All A-detachments under B-23 now have garden plots for the CIDG.
CONFIDENTIAL

15 August 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for
the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS, CSFOR-65 (RI)

(c) Psychological Operations. During the month of May, 10,700,000 leaflets were dropped in support of combat operations and on suspected enemy locations and 26 hours of airborne loudspeaker missions were conducted. Five (5) Chieu Hoi returned to the GVN during the month of May. Psychological operations picked up in BEN HET and DUC LAP TAOR's due to enemy activities. 120,000 copies of a special leaflet reminiscing the NVA of their defeat last August were dropped in DUC LAP's TAOR. In the BEN HET area a Chieu Hoi returned to the GVN and a leaflet was prepared which had a picture of the Ho Chi Minh and a written appeal by him to his comrades to return to the GVN. 200,000 of these were dropped in BEN HET's TAOR and 200,000 were shipped to B-24 for future exploitation. The Ho Chi Minh also prepared a tape with the same appeal as above which was broadcast over a 10 watt loudspeaker by an ARVN POLWAR unit stationed in BEN HET. A total of 7,000,000 leaflets were dropped in June and 84 airborne loudspeaker missions were flown. Two Chieu Hoi returned to the GVN. During the month of July 5,952,000 leaflets were disseminated and 394 hours of airborne loudspeaker missions were flown in support of III Corps Special Forces operations. One Chieu Hoi returned to the GVN at THANH PHUC on 11 July 1969.

(6) III Corps Tactical Zone (Co A).

(a) Political Warfare. During this reporting period, Company A lost its Mobile Training Team consisting of CIDG stationed at Company A. They were present and active for approximately two months of this reporting period. This team trained, re-trained, evaluated, and improved the Polwar Team at subordinate detachments. They wrote PRI lectures and presented them to the CIDG at Company A; then the lectures were distributed to the subordinate detachments. They also established guidelines for debate competition to be used by all detachments. This team compiled and wrote a III Corps CIDG newspaper each month. When there were problems with any of the POLWAR teams at subordinate detachments, the Mobile Team was sent out to this particular detachment to work with the Polwar Team to find out what the problem areas were, retrain the members if any were not previously trained and establish new programs for the Polwar Team having problems.

(b) Psychological Operations (PSYOPS). During the reporting period, a poster explaining five DO's and DONT's for Civic Action. This poster was made and disseminated to subordinate detachments. This poster explained five DO's and DONT's for Civic Action. This poster was made and disseminated to subordinate detachments. This poster explained five DO's and DONT's for Civic Action. This poster was made and disseminated to subordinate detachments.

As a result of an increase in malaria cases in the 3rd MSF, an educational program has been presented to MSF explaining malaria, what causes it and how to prevent it. GVN movies and a special tape made by C-3 VNSF doctor have been shown to patients at Company A CIDG hospital and forwarded to B-36 LONG HAI where it was shown to patients in the convalescence center.

CONFIDENTIAL
c) Social Welfare. Primary Social Welfare activities include the improvement of living conditions for the CIDG and their dependents, construction projects, and agriculture projects. Work is continuing on the dependent housing projects in camps that do not have sufficient housing for the dependents to live. Presently all camps have schools within their camps, or are supporting a school nearby, thus furnishing the dependent children the opportunity to obtain an education. In one of the isolated camps a program was set up where a certain number of dependents would be picked up and brought into town and picked up the following day. By doing this the dependents are able to purchase the extra groceries needed in camp. Another program that was set up to aid the dependents is for the camps to obtain food to have their own food through Company A S-4, who in turn buys the food for the dependents through the food contractor. This supplementary food is shipped to the camps participating in this program with the regular food delivery. All camps that are able to maintain gardens have them in production or are working on getting them started. Fish ponds have been placed in this, as it is a simple project to accomplish. The people already have knowledge in this field and are interested in it for they know they will benefit from this project because it provides them with food. Fish ponds are being dug and stocked in some of the camps. These fish ponds will furnish a ready source of food for the troops and dependents. Ducks are also being raised in these camps with fish ponds, since the ducks can furnish some of the fertilizer needed for the fish, and the ducks can obtain food from the vegetable matter in the pond. These ducks are also a good source of food for the CIDG and dependents. Project Assist, a program designed to improve the low morale of the CIDG patients in the Company A Convalescent Center, continues to be a success.

(d) Motivation and Indoctrination (M/I). The basic Motivation and Indoctrination program conducted by the Polwar teams in the III Corps camps includes a competitive sports program which was conducted in C-3 by the S-5 section. Each detach and a volleyball team and a ping-pong team from which the best team was chosen from a play-off at B-detachment level. Each B-detachment in turn sent their best teams to Detachment C-3 for the C-detachment playoffs. The best were then sent to Nha Trang for the country-wide competition. Each B-detachment under C-3 has a Culture Drama Team made up of talented CIDG who go to A-sites to perform skits, play music, and provide a cultural lecture along with an M/I lecture from the A-detachment Polwar Team.

(e) Civic Action (C/A). The primary Civic Action projects performed by the Polwar Teams were to improve the living conditions of the civilian population in the field of health and sanitation. All detachments with a civilian populace conducted CEDCAP'S resulting in 60% of the A-detachments and 100% of the B-detachments being active in the war. The obvious results of the CEDCAP is to improve the health of the civilians and at the same time gather intelligence. The Polwar Teams continue to provide feedback.
CONFIDENTIAL

15 August 1969

Aничтожение, карточек и других печатных материалов, а также объявления. Пропаганда лекции также включены. Все медицинские наблюдения дезинфицированы в течение недели, чтобы предотвратить распространение. Важнейшую роль играет то, что это обеспечивает доступ к медицинской помощи, а также способствует улучшению отношений между гражданским населением и военными. Основная задача - борьба с эпидемией, которая может быть остановлена до ее распространения.

В дополнение к этому, Экспедиция приняла на себя обязанности по оказанию помощи гражданскому населению в обучении и подготовке, включая медицинское обслуживание. Это помогает улучшить отношения между гражданским населением и военными, а также способствует улучшению отношений между гражданским населением и военными. Основная задача - борьба с эпидемией, которая может быть остановлена до ее распространения.

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with sufficient posters, leaflets, and tapes to permit them to accomplish their mission. The Volunteer Information Program (VIP) was emphasized by the S2 and S5 by coordinated efforts. Special VIP tapes have been made and sent to subordinate detachments. Also being utilized are special VIP posters and standard VIP leaflets in support of this program.

(b) Social Welfare. The company is continuing to actively participate in backed operations at all detachments. Medical hospital visits to combat detachments continue to be a major factor in determining the length of time required for convalescence.

(c) Motivation and Indoctrination. In support of Motivation and Indoctrination Program, ten 16mm projectors were shipped to specific subordinate detachments. There have been numerous successful combat operation ceremonies for the CSF and MSF to draw attention to specific acts of bravery or outstanding achievement.

(d) Civic Action. All forms of the agricultural program are currently being expanded. Coordination of duck projects, pig projects and fish projects in individual corps is also being strengthened. The company is continuing to support numerous schools, hospitals, churches, roads, market places and bridge reconstruction with money, material, or labor in the Tet.

(e) Psychological Operations. Company D is continuing a large scale psychological operations program in the Seven Mountains area in IV Corps. To assist them in exploiting situations as they develop in this operation, Navy P3R, Navy Beach Junior Units, the 16T Team at TSWON, and the 10th Psyops Battalion's assets are being utilized.

-56-

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RGS GSFG-65 (RI)

x. Personnel.

(1) Strength: Authorized and assigned strengths at the beginning and at the close of the period were as follows:

(a) Beginning of Period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>1D</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>AG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2765</td>
<td>3480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2650</td>
<td>3387</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Close of Period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>1D</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>AG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2765</td>
<td>3480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2674</td>
<td>3175</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Replacements: During this period, a total of 32 officers and 22 enlisted replacements were assigned, while the losses totaled 209 officers and 584 enlisted personnel.

(3) Promotions: A total of 347 enlisted personnel were promoted during this period.

(4) Personnel Management: Critical Enlisted Shortages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>ASG</th>
<th>PROJ. ASG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11F</td>
<td>Inf. Om &amp; Intel Spec</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11C</td>
<td>Hwy Wpn Ldr</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51H</td>
<td>Const Foreman</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73C</td>
<td>Pay Specialist</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73D</td>
<td>Accountant</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91S</td>
<td>Prov Med Spec</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91Z</td>
<td>Sr Med HC0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05C</td>
<td>Radio TT Opn</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31E</td>
<td>Radio Repairman</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) R&R Allocations: The following R&R allocations were received by the 5th SFSG for the months indicated:
Subject: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Air) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. ROG CSFGR 65 (R1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SITE</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taipei</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuala Lumpur</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penang</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>257</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Utilization Ratio: 100.4% 125.3% 118.5%

During this period the average number of allocations per month remained the same at 256. Our utilization ratio has improved from 108 percent the previous period to 118.7 percent for this period. This improvement will allow the 5th SFDA to receive more seat allocations in the future.

(a) Awards and Decorations:

(a) The total number of decorations awarded to 5th SFDA personnel for period ending 31 July 1969:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AWARD</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MH</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LM</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS OSFOR-65 (RI)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIC</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CON</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COS</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Awards of the Bronze Star and below are approved by 5th SFGA. Silver Stars to Distinguished Service Crosses are approved by USARY, however Silver Star recommendations may be disapproved by the CO, 5th SFGA.

(b) Percentage of each unit's personnel who were decorated for the period ending 31 July 1969:

-52-

CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
15 August 1969
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFR-65 (RI)

(a) The recommendation for the Meritorious Unit Commendation for the period 31 January 68 to 31 December 68 is presently at Headquarters, USARV, for processing and subsequent submission to Headquarters, Department of the Army. The Presidential Unit Citation for the period 1 November 1966 to 31 December 1968 has been awarded to 5th SFGA as of 13 June 1969. See Inclosure 7.

(7) Special Services.

(a) GENERAL. During the past three months special services has continued to make great strides toward improving its facilities and activities to further enhance the morale, comfort and physical fitness of 5th SFGA personnel. During this period 5th SFGA conducted an active volleyball program, culminating in an intra-group team play tournament, which was won by CIDG Finance. Plans have been approved for the construction of an air conditioned special services facility which will include a dark room, pan room and exercise room.

(b) Library. The Green Beret Library continues to offer a fine selection of books and magazines. Life Magazine has placed the facility on its complimentary mailing list effective 1 July 1969. The Green Beret Library reflects the following attendance figures for the period:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAY</td>
<td>624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUNE</td>
<td>598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JULY</td>
<td>653</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(8) Safety. On 28 June 1969 the 5th SFGA Safety Council held its first meeting to discuss accident reports, motor vehicle accident prevention, firearm safety. The council recommended that the individual commanders play a more active role in the prevention of accidents and increasing safety consciousness on the part of the personnel within their commands. The 5th SFGA Safety Newsletter has proven to be an important asset of the Safety Program. Suggestions and comments received as requested by the newsletter have been mostly helpful in preparing articles to the prime safety problem area. The number of accidents by type during this period are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EOD Violations</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons Violations</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Vehicle</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falls</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-60-
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

15 August 1969

SITUATION: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSFTR-65 (RI)

(9) Civilian Personnel:

(a) The 5th Special Forces Group employs civilians throughout the Republic of Vietnam. The number of civilians employed by units during the period ending 31 July 1969 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Company A</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company B</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company C</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company D</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Det B-51</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Det B-52</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Det B-55</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSPTC</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Det A-502</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CID</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOD</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1070</td>
<td>3055</td>
<td>2968</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) The civilian personnel strength decreased from the previous quarter, however, as a steady rise was noted, a moratorium on civilian hire was declared as of 31 June 1969. Units were instructed to review their TD's in anticipation of possible phase out or a reduction in force.

(c) The slow decrease of civilian personnel during this period reflects a reluctance on the part of units to operate well below their authorized strength. Future moratorium on civilian hire will be coupled with readjustments of the civilian Table of Distribution for each unit. This would in effect reduce the ceiling of authorized hire.

(10) Reenlistments:

(a) The following are the 5th SFOD, 1st SF, reenlistment statistics for the period ending 31 July 1969.

-61-

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ELIGIBLE</th>
<th></th>
<th>PERCENTAGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RA</td>
<td>AUS</td>
<td>RES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>206</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RA</td>
<td>AUS</td>
<td>RES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>93</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) The following are the Regular Army statistics for the same period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ELIGIBLE</th>
<th>ELIGIBLE</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than four (≤) years</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than four (&gt;4) years</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Thirty-three (33)FM extended their ETO.

(11) Chaplains Activities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services Conducted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attendance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Parish Activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital Visits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counselling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communion Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communicants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA/Psyops Activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memorial Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attendance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for
the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS GSFGR-65 (RI)

MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS: During the three months 16,152 separate items
of religious literature, devotional books, magazines, paper-back
books, SF prayer cards, calendars, religious medals, and gift packages
of items received from supporters in the USA were sent out to all
detachments of the 5th SFGR.

(12) Discipline, Law and Order:

(a) Discipline Reports:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THIS QUARTER</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pass Violation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off Limits Violation</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curfew Violation</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic Violation</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Charges</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWOL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
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<table>
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<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
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<td>Traffic Violation</td>
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<td>79</td>
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</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
AVGB-C
CONFIDENTIAL
15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

(b) Judicial Punishment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<td>Special Court-Martial</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Court-Martial</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary Court-Martial</td>
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<td>0</td>
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</table>

(c) Non-Judicial Punishment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>JULY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Article 15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Article 15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Legal Assistance: Legal assistance was rendered to 212 clients, a decrease of 26 over the past quarter.

(13) CIDG Strength Accounting: Strength accounting statistics revealed that there are 36,717 members of CIDG assigned as of the end of 31 July 1969.

(14) 2 Corps Judicial Zone (Co C).

(a) Strength: Strengths at the beginning and end of the reporting period were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers Authorized</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15 August 1969

Report of the Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS OSPFR-65 (RI)

REPLICA

Authorized 166 184
Assigned 158 164

(b) Replacements: The flow of replacements during the reporting period was satisfactory. All personnel were well qualified and ready to assume their jobs. A shortage of 91E's and 11F's CA/PO NCO's is to a degree hampering the effectiveness of some detachments. This situation could become critical if existing vacancies are not filled.

(c) Discipline. Two Article 15 punishments were imposed during the reporting period; both administered by the Company Commander. Contributing factor in both cases was the individual overstaying special leave; rendering himself AWOL.

(d) Morale and Personnel Services. There was one serious incident during the reporting period. MSG Lampkins, Lloyd R, 52-31-7373, presently in Pre-Trial confinement at United States Installation Stockade, Long Binh, RVN, is to be tried for unpunahed murder. Subject EM was involved in a shooting incident on 31 May 1969 resulting in the death of SPC John N. Lachina, Btry C, 3rd Bn, 16 Arty, APO 96371. MSG Lampkins was reassigned to the Long Binh facility. Leave and R&R's processed rapidly and in almost all cases corresponded with approved dates and locations. There were a total of 51 R&R's and 16 special leaves during the reporting period. There were sixteen enlisted promotions during the reporting period. Five officer promotions were also approved during the previous 90 days. The award and decorations office has processed almost 150 recommendations during this period. The prompt and continued use of the Impact Award program has been encouraged.

(e) Personnel Management. Command emphasis is being placed upon the revision of the existing TOE. At the present time, many personnel in key or operational MOS's are working out of their MOS in jobs necessary to the overall mission of this command, but not yet authorized under TOE now being used. Coordination of all staff sections is currently under way in the preparation of the MTCE with job descriptions and justifications to cover these shortcomings.

(f) Civilian Employees: Company C presently employs 399 civilians in order to provide centralized civilian services in the fields of logistics, medicine and administration necessary for C, B, and A detachments to maintain maximum effectiveness. Civilian employees are recruited, paid and managed in close accordance with established tables of distribution and 5th SFG (Abn) Reg 690-l.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS OSFOR-69 (R)

(15) II Corps Tactical Zone (Co B)

(a) Strength: Strengths at the beginning and end of the reporting period were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFFICERS</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(TABLE CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE)

The decrease in personnel was caused by the conversion of four A-Camps in the B-22 area to RF/PF. One A-detachment in B-33's area was also converted. The conversion, plus normal turnover in personnel, has resulted in a decrease of 50 officers assigned to Company B.

(b) Replacements. At the present time Company B has received 28 new officers and 64 new enlisted personnel replacements over the reporting period. Personnel gains include some individuals with quite a bit of experience in staff and in combat; whereas in previous periods, officers lacked experience and many NCO's were new to Special Forces.

(c) Discipline. Throughout Company B, discipline is not a major problem. Non-Judicial Punishment has been held at 7 Article 15's over the reporting period.

(d) Morale and Personnel Services. A total of 108 R&R allocations were obtained with all 108 slots being filled over the reporting period. During the same period Company B has had 60 enlisted personnel promoted.

(e) Civilian Employment. As of the end of the last pay period, Company B has 600 civilian employees throughout II CTZ. These civilians are employed as cooks, interpreters, mechanics, and carpenters. They are also employed as supply warehousemen, waitresses, secretaries and general laborers.

(16) III Corps Tactical Zone (Co A).

(a) Strength: Strengths at the beginning and end of the reporting period were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFFICERS</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
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CONFIDENTIAL

15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (HI)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENLISTED</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Significant Activities: Major changes within the C-detachment during the reporting period were as follows. On 18 July 1969 LTC James A. Lillard assumed command of Company A, replacing LTC Robert M. Campbell, who departed due to DEROS. On 1 July 1969 Capt John E. Birch replaced Maj Alfred Evans as head of the Company A S2 section. Maj Evans departed for PCS.

(c) LRRP Administration: Unnecessary delay and confusion has occurred as a result of LRRP personnel pay records being maintained through their parent units. Efforts have been made to get these records transferred to 101st Finance at B/RN HMA. Such a move would enable a more efficient system of processing LRRP personnel pay records. Presently, all such requests for transfers have not been processed. Another problem facing LRRP administration is that, due to the fact that the 9th Infantry Division has redeployed to CONUS, 5 men have been lost from the authorized LRRP augmentation. An unsettled question is whether these slots will be divided among the remaining units, or whether the authorized LRRP augmentation will be decreased by five. The preferred solution would be to retain the slots.

(d) Transfer of Company A Financial Records: During the month of May, the financial records of all personnel assigned or attached to Company A were transferred from 22nd Finance in NHA TRAAD to the 101st Division Finance office in B/RN HMA. The move has proven very beneficial to the unit in time saved off-site as well as facilitating the solution of pay complaints. Continued improvement is being conducted and the payroll for July was under a completely mechanized system.

(e) Disciplinary Action: Article 15s administered to Company A personnel during the reporting period are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUN</th>
<th>JUL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Military Police reports received on Company A personnel during the reporting period are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUN</th>
<th>JUL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

(f) Morale and Personnel Services. During the reporting period, the Company A film system continued to operate smoothly. A control system, utilizing a DA Form 1203, insures an efficient rotation of films among the detachments. Each gaining detachment signs for the incoming series of films, thus giving a continuous record of the present location of all films. The following awards and decorations were processed and forwarded to 5th Special Forces Group A&D for the reporting period: 133 valor awards, 61 service or achievement awards and 24 Air Medals.

(g) Leaves and R&R. There was a total of 90 R&R’s and 93 leaves during the quarter.

(h) Special Services. More recreational equipment has been requisitioned to replace as needed the expendable items received during the last reporting period. New, varied athletic equipment has been requisitioned in an attempt to expand recreational resources.

(i) Personnel Management. During the first two months of the reporting period there was a very critical shortage of operational MOS’s. Medical and operational intelligence personnel were extremely critical and in demand. However, this problem is being solved with the influx of newly assigned personnel from NMA-TRAD.

(j) Civilian Employees. Presently, 5... civilian employees are employed by Company A; 194 at the C-detachment, 166 at the fourteen B-detachments and 166 at the fourteen A-detachments. A 30-day moratorium, from 11 June to July, was placed on civilian hire with views toward reduction. No civilians were hired in III Corps during the period. Civilian salaries continue to be above the Group average. The density of the population around SAIGON - DIENTHOA is the main reason. To employ and maintain employment of competent civilians, Company A must pay a slightly higher wage in comparison to other Corps. In ‘my, interpreter/translators’ pay was changed to a fixed salary for each grade and step. In most cases this resulted in a slight increase of pay. Also the Staff Engineer was given approval for eight (8) temporary hires to be funded under cost code 906-1030 on a monthly basis.

(17) IV Corps Tactical Zone (Co D).

(a) Strength: Strengths at the beginning and end of the reporting period were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFFICERS</th>
<th>MAY</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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SPECIAL FORCES GROUP

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for
the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFGR-65 (RI)

EMTIT IA CY JUL
Authorized 259 259
Assumed 266 237

(b) Critical Shortages:

Officers:

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>DUTY POSITION</th>
<th>GRADE</th>
<th>SHORT</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1642</td>
<td>A-Det XO/CPO Officer</td>
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<td>6</td>
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Enlisted:

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<th>ASC</th>
<th>SHORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11B</td>
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<tr>
<td>11B</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11C</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92B</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65B</td>
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<td>-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12B</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(c) Personnel Management: Promotions:

<table>
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<th>N.Y</th>
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<th>JUL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENLISTED</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rotation: A recurring problem exists in the late receipt of
reassignment notification and orders. This imposes hardships on individ-
uals in settling personal affairs.

R/P |
| MAY | JUN | JUL |
| Auth | 26 | 23 | 26 |
| Taken | 18 | 29 | 24 |

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15 August 1969
SUBJECT, Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSFR-65 (R1)

1. Medical.

(1) USASF Medical Care. There has been an increase in the incidence of malaria towards the close of the reporting period. This increase is in part due to extended operations in febrifuguin areas and partly within normal seasonal trends at the onset of the rainy season. Generally, the health of the USASF personnel has remained excellent throughout the reporting period. There has been a substantial decrease in battle injuries apparently related to the reduction in enemy activity. The new Group Surgeon has placed increased emphasis on camp visits by unit medical officers. This should serve to increase unit effectiveness in recognizing disease patterns as they appear at our isolated A-detachments.

(2) CIDG Medical Care. A pre-induction physical examination and immunization program for CIDG has been established by USASF and VNRF regulation. This procedure was necessitated by large numbers of physically unfit candidates being admitted into the CIDG program, and by the inability of medical officers to determine adequate dates of disability upon release of personnel from the program. This latter problem has resulted in several fraudulent disability claims that had to be voided because no permanent health records had been kept on CIDG personnel. Under the new system, a complete pre-induction physical examination will be performed on each inductee. A medical officer or his designate representative will then determine on an individual's medical qualification for duty. If determined fit, then a medical record would be generated and periodically updated. During the reporting period there was a serious malaria epidemic in III Corps among CIDG personnel. This epidemic immobilized over 60% of personnel in that area. With the onset of the rainy season still to come, it was decided that a malaria prophylaxis program should be initiated consisting of a single dose of a weekly chlorquine-primaquine tablet and a monthly chloroquine-proguanil tablet for CIDG personnel. It was recognized that Asian peoples have a tendency towards increased hemolytic with the use of dapsone due to the G6PD chromosome characteristic. The Group Surgeon discussed this problem with the ARMY Surgeon's staff. It was decided that approximately 5% of CIDG personal were allergic to the drug and that this rate could vary by as much a factor as 2, however, it was decided to institute one full malaria prophylaxis program due to the fact that the intensity of malaria sickness was far greater than that due to drug reactions. Instructions have been put out to all Group medical personnel to closely monitor the program. Authorizations have been given to withdraw the dapsone requirement from all CIDG personnel who show symptoms of sickness. A report of the results of the program will be made at the end of the next reporting period. The CIDG convalescent center in III Corps has now been collocated with the Company A CIDG Hospital. It is envisioned that this center will serve all four corps. The problem of additional personnel needed to staff the hospital is being studied and should be resolved by the next reporting period.

(3) Preventive Medicine and Veterinary Activities. The outbreak of
CONFIDENTIAL

15 August 1969

OPERATIONAL REPORT OF 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (Abn) FOR THE PERIOD ENDING 31 JULY 1969, RCS CSFGR-69 (R1)

Malaria among III Corps CIDG has been effectively controlled and virtually eliminated by a strong Preventive Medicine effort that included aerial spray, ground spray, fogging, isolation of victims and full malaria prophylaxis of CIDG personnel. Group Preventive Medicine personnel spend 75% of the time in the field advising Camp Commanders. Requirements for corrective action on Preventive Medicine deficiencies are made in writing and signed for the group Commander. It has been noted that camps are not following policies and procedures as outlined in the newly published Preventive Medicine Manual, 5th SFG Pam 60-10. A directive has gone out to all units reminding them of their responsibilities in fulfilling Group Preventive Medicine requirements. Company Commanders were introduced to the manual at a recent meeting. No unusual disease outbreaks have occurred in USASF and CIDG personnel during the reporting period other than the III Corps Ebal outbreak. The group has been faced with a chronic shortage of Preventive Medicine specialists, MOS 91S. A conference with Colonel Walsh, USAFR Chief of Preventive Medicine, revealed that there is an excess of 91S personnel in-country. Although they are not SF qualified, it was decided to reutilize a number of these personnel equal to the chronic shortage in that MOS. In this manner, additional support will be gained that otherwise would have been unobtainable. An organizational change among Group Preventive Medicine personnel was recommended to the Company Commanders. It was recommended to pull Preventive Medicine Specialists back from the B-detachments and consolidate them at the C-detachments. From there, they would be available to travel throughout the TAC as advising Camp Commanders and making progress inspections. In this manner, it is hoped that PM efforts may be more effectively controlled and disseminated. This action was deemed necessary after medical and combat inspections indicated that PM deficiencies were not being corrected quickly enough at the detachment level, and is in consonance with the recently submitted MTOE. During the past three months, the canine rabies vaccination program has continued at the A and B-detachments. Vaccination of all small animals belonging to USASF and CIDG personnel in I Corps was completed in June. Presently, the program is being carried out in II and III Corps. In the following weeks, the Group Veterinary Officers will visit each A and B-detachment to vaccinate pets and livestock as applicable. To date, approximately 1738 dogs have been vaccinated in I and IV Corps. During the period July to November, the incidence of two endemic cattle diseases, foot and mouth disease (FMD) and rinderpest, seems to increase. In July FMD was diagnosed in a cattle herd belonging to a II Corps A-detachment and was suspected in certain cattle sent from Nha Trang to A-detachments for CIDG ration use. There is no vaccine or specific treatment for foot and mouth disease. Detachments receiving or possessing cattle exhibiting any hoof and mouth alterations should request veterinary assistance, isolate cattle, and butcher for ration use prior to the development of extensive debilitation or secondary infection. Cook all meat thoroughly. Vaccine is available for the bovine disease, rinderpest; however, vaccination efficiency is
SPECIAL SUBJECT

SUBJECT: Operation Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

Limited and of questionable value after clinical signs become apparent. Neither disease is transmissible to man but of great economic importance in the cattle industry.

(h) Medical Supplies. During the reporting period, the forward supply point located at Detachment B-23 was closed down. This was accomplished due to diminished supply requirements. Medical supplies for detachments under B-23 are now coming from Company B or directly from the Group Logistic Support Center. This logistical support change has caused no noticeable medical difficulties to date for the supported detachments.

(5) Training. The new Group Surgeon has placed increased emphasis on counterpart relations between VNSF and USASF medical personnel. All directives affecting the CIDG program are now jointly staffed. It is recognized that whenever the VNSF must assume the full medical role in the CIDG program. Advance training programs have been arranged for CIDG medical specialists. One of the goals of these programs is to gain recognition for our CIDG medical specialists by the RVN government. At present, CIDG medical specialists receive no recognition whatsoever outside of USASF-VNSF channels.

(c) I Corps Tactical Zone. (Co C)

(a) USASF Medical Care. USASF personnel are only treated in the CIDG hospital for minor ailments. Any disease or procedure that requires hospitalization must first go to NSA or 95th Evac Hospital. All dental work is done at the Support Group.

(b) CIDG Medical Care. All CIDG and their direct dependents are treated at the CIDG hospital for whatever ailments they have. Any surgical or medical disease that is beyond the abilities of the staff or facility are sent to NSA or 95th Evac Hospital. All routine dental work is done by one of the staff. All routine obstetrical work is done by the Surgeon and his staff. Patients evacuated from the field are sent to the closest American hospital for treatment and are then sent to the CIDG hospital for convalescence and deployment to their homes or units. New programs at the CIDG Hospital include completion of a 5-bed isolation ward; the addition of a medical emergency number; institution and completion of an immunization program for all CIDG of Tetanus, Smallpox, Cholera, and Plague; requiring regular checkups on all non personnel and maintaining preventative medicine conferences and suggestions of improvements to the C, 3, and A-attachment by the Preventive Medicine Specialist on a weekly and/or monthly basis. A new air conditioner to cool the entire hospital is in the process of being installed. The most critical shortage is still medics. At present only one camp has the allotted two medics and many of those medics are due to EIRVS with no replacements in sight. The NSF operates with half the needed number of medics. There should be at least one more medic to work at the CIDG Hospital. There should also be one additional OMO 3-1000 to aid in the
CONFIDENTIAL
15 August 1969

RCS Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for
the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

1. Introduction of the medical at the B and A-sites and operation of the
CIDO Hospital.

(c) Veterinary Medicine. There is no veterinarian attached to
Corps C, but there is a veterinarian assigned to Group Headquarters
on a rotational basis to assist in all animals as needed. There have been cases of Rinder-
pest reported at MNN-139 and cases of buffalo dying at CIA VUC but no
cases was made although Rinderpest was suspected.

(c) Medical Supply. During this period a reassessment of support
and supply was conducted. It was determined that better support
would be obtained from Group rather than a medical supply depot some
sixty miles away. Coordination was made with the Group Medical Supply
officer. A new authorized medical stockpile list is being compiled.
With it is published, it will be distributed to subordinate detachments.
In the future, DA Form 2765-1 will be implemented to requisition medical
supply. Previously, a "shopping list" form was used. This old method
still does not allow each item to be treated as a separate request. By using the
new form, subordinate detachments should receive better medical supply
support.

(e) Training Program. No formal training was given in the last
month. The B-1 Medical Section has a tentative schedule of another
Medical Training Course to commence in October. This will be a basic
medical course and will probably consist of a class of about 10.

(i) CIDO. There has been no TTRAP done at the C-detachment level
due to the lack of USAF medics and doctors, and the amount of work already
was done at the CIDO Hospital. One-shot TTRAP in the past have proven
to be little benefit in changing health standards among rural population,
but can be of excellent payoffs value.

(j) Miscellaneous. The CIDO hospital, located at DANANG, though necessary,
is not an essential component part of a Special Forces Company, and should have
been tailored to its needs. It is not realistic when the work of a
novice at CIA VUC is accomplished by only one doctor and two enlisted
medics on a 24-hour basis.

(i) II Corps Tactical Zone (Go B).

(a) USAF Medical Care. There were two cases of hepatitis among USAF
personnel in the II Corps area. One individual was known to have had a rami-
frick shot three months before. His disease was mild, lasting only two
and one half weeks. This illustrates the effectiveness of G6 in reducing the
severity of the disease. Yet the status of G6 immunization is still unclear
as it is authorized for USAF but often not given. There is a popular and
prevalent misconception among SF personnel that the shot "lasts" only a few
hours and doesn't do any good. Even the TM med on hepatitis offers that there
AVGB-C

CONFIDENTIAL

15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RSA CSFCR-65 (RI)

There is no definite data regarding the degree of protection or dosage. If all positive data were presented with explanation of gammaglobulin's effectiveness it would probably be better enforced.

(b) CIDG Medical Care. About 7000 patients were treated at the two hospitals and approximately 90,700 were cared for at the II Corps A and B-detachments. The Pleiku CIDG hospital now has a capacity of 101 beds since a third ward was opened. This makes it possible to keep patients longer and discharge them only when their wounds are fully healed. During the "56-57 siege, the hospital was above capacity with 120 patients. Cots were put up in the aisles. Because of Ward III and the upcoming physical therapy building, some more nurses will have to be requested. The physical rehabilitation building for the CIDG hospital has been approved and soon will be contracted out. One of the indigenous medics is being trained at the 71st Evac Hospital to operate the newly arrived equipment and to instruct the patients in proper therapy. Often patients heal their fractures or wounds but won't use the limbs unless someone works with them. A recurring problem in medical care for the CIDG is that often the patients are given extensive workups either at the CIDG hospital or the 71st and then they either refuse surgery or leave before the definitive treatment can be accomplished. All A-camps have requested and received vaccine for the immunization of the CIDG, and most of the camps are accomplishing these immunizations. This is particularly important in view of the three area epidemics of plague in Company B. Also, a cholera epidemic has been reported in Thailand. Preventative medicine continues to be the biggest medical problem at the A-camp. Mosquito and fly control, as well as latrines are recurrent problem areas. A PM man is needed who does nothing else for the C-detachment except travel around to the A-camps checking on the preventative medicine program. After just completing a year of PM work, the two PM specialists who were the C-detachment psychiatrists for the II Corps SF area stated that lack of interest and motivation is the usual reason for their failure.

(c) Medical Supply. Camps have mentioned problems in obtaining diesel fuel to use in burning out their latrines and getting aerosol insecticide bombs to control flies within buildings. Crutches are hard to obtain; even the 71st Evac Hospital has had trouble keeping up its supply. There is now only one medical FSP, located at Pleiku, for II Corps SF. The RAN MS THINT FSP has closed out.

(d) Training Program. The RAN MS THINT hospital graduated 3 nurses and 7 medics in the last quarter. A class of 27 medics graduated in June from the first basic medics course held in the Pleiku CIDG hospital's newly completed classroom. Another course is to begin on 4 August for the same number of medics. Training aids are badly needed for this program. Material sent from US drug companies turned out to be inappropriate for this level of training. A series of slide strips on common health problems are planned for the second course. The VNSF Det C-2 Surgeon has been training practical experience in operating procedures at the USA 71st Evac Hospital

CONFIDENTIAL
which greatly increased his medical proficiency and confidence.
For continued training of medics at A camps, the increased use of
quizzes is planned. This should be a refreshing change for them
from the more didactic newsletter.

(c) MEDCAPS. A-detachments reported a total of 92 MEDCAPS in the
month of June. A common opinion around the A-camps of Company B is that
MEDCAPs have a very limited usefulness in that so often there can be no
followups for continued treatment. Experience indicates that people often
lose their medicines or take incorrect amounts. The consensus is that
they are mostly beneficial only for psyops rather than for medical reasons.
A few medics state, however, that if a MEDCAP is conducted properly it
can be of benefit. Those are the medics that take microscopes with them,
conduct followups and insure that medicines are taken properly.

(A) III Corps Tactical Zone. (Co A).

(a) USASF Medical Care. The CIDG hospital continues to function as a
Special Forces company-level medical facility for USASF personnel. Medical
and dental records are maintained at company level, and the hospital conducts
routine daily sick call for members of the C-team. The hospital also admin-
isters all immunizations. While all emergency cases from A and B-teams are
medevac’d directly to Evacuation or Surgical Hospitals, CIDG hospital screens
all patients requiring more sophisticated medical care not offered on site.
This includes X-rays, laboratory procedures, casting, and appraisal by the
Company Surgeon. All dental work is referred to the 499th Dental Detachment
in Men Non.

(b) CIDG Medical Care. The hospital capacity has been increased from
79 to 100 beds. During the reporting period, the hospital had a mass casualty
situation, receiving over 400 MSF with malaria. The Gymnasium at Company A
was turned into an additional ward to handle the casualties. This temporary
facility enabled the hospital staff to treat the sick MSF with optimum ef-
ficiency. The construction of the new convalescent center is under way. It
is expected to be completed within the next month.

(c) Preventative Medicine. There has been no epidemic of any signifi-
cance reported in III CTZ during the reporting period. Preventative Medicine
personnel continued to be a major problem area. Only two are currently assigned
to Co A.

(d) Training Program. The training program for nurses and medics continued
at Company A, with 12 CIDG dental students graduating from the dental training
course. This included 10 weeks of intensive didactic and clinical training in
field dental care. A new nursing training course with 10 students is now in
progress. Presently 16 CIDG medics are enrolled in the 8 week dental training
program.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS GSFCR-65 (RI)

(9) IV Corps Tactical Zone (Co D).

(a) CIDG Medical Care. During the month of May the medical section provided medical personnel and supplies for the operations on FNB CHUOC Island and NUI COTO Mountain. A program designed to immunize the Mike Force was undertaken at B-10. Similar programs have been initiated at each camp in an effort to immunize the CIDG. Mike Force personnel strength diminished markedly due to malaria and gastroenteritis in June. Field sanitation has been given emphasis as a means to preclude gastroenteritis. The salience of malaria chemoprophylaxis has been re-emphasized. All CIDG located in the vicinity of the Seven Mountains area are required to take dapsone daily in addition to the weekly chloroquine- primaquine prophylaxis. Progress seems to have been made in this area. A request for expansion of the dispensary was approved by Headquarters, 5th SF Group. Renovation and improvements to the medical supply warehouse have been completed. Included is a cement vault designed to provide adequate security for narcotics and Code R Items in consonance with Group Regulation 40-4.

(b) Preventive Medicine. Rat traps (wire type) were constructed and distributed to teams. The wire trap has proven to be efficient and is more desirable in the prevention of plague and other diseases caused by infectious insects.

(c) Medical Supply. Effective 1 July, a revised stockage list and requisition form will be used by Co D operational detachments for the purpose of requisitioning medical supplies.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVOB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (MI)

m. Signal.

(1) Operations. All means of communications utilized by the 5th SFGA operated at a high level of efficiency for the reporting period. Few significant difficulties were encountered. The continuing efforts emphasizing realistic message precedence now reflects the tactical urgency of communications. The 5th SFGA generated immediate traffic is now 6.2% of all traffic. A review of the Group SOI/SSI indicated that these publications were outdated, difficult to use, and did not coincide with higher headquarters directives. The entire SOI for the month of June was changed to eliminate these deficiencies. During the month of July, SOI Item (50) was completely revised to provide secure call-signs and prefixes for all individuals in the SFOB. Prior to this revision an unclassified call word was given to the commanders for the duration of their assignment. The revision eliminated this un-secure means of identification and provided all commanders within the 5th SFGA a secure call-sign to reflect USARV policies and regulations. The revised SSI provides a more comprehensive instruction source for the Group SOI. A project was undertaken to rewire the SFOB with a cable system and remove the WD-1 field wire presently used for internal telephone communications. All of the cable needed has been installed. This project has been brought to a temporary halt by a shortage of terminal boxes needed to connect the field phones to the cable system. Once these terminal boxes are secured the phone communications will be cut-over to the cable system. A new S-2/S-3 complex was approved and the installation of telephone service was begun and the complex cable system is complete. A shortage of terminal hardware needed to connect the instruments to the house wires has arisen and full service cannot be installed until this shortage is filled. Coordination was made with the Air Force communications personnel to install an overhead cable from the junction box in front of Signal Company to the B-55 area. The old cable (number 006) had an intermittent short which would periodically interrupt service. The new cable was completed in late July and cut-over has been made.

(2) Training. The 14-hour communications refresher course continues to provide excellent instruction to newly assigned signal personnel. Radio operators are now reporting to their field assignments with adequate proficiency in CW operations and the necessary familiarization with communications equipment being utilized within the 5th Special Forces Group.

(3) New Concept/Equipment. To meet a need for greater mobility in 3-52's communications, a new radio teletype van was designed by MSG Loyd of this office. The old AN/OCR-26 used by B-52 consisted of a large receiver and transmitter with associated teletype equipment contained in 24 ton van. The equipment did not lend itself to sling loading and was prone to droppage during on and off loading due to weight and balance. The new van uses a FRC-93 radio with associated teletype equipment housed in a 3/4 ton shelter. The shelter is much lighter and lends itself to sling loading, using the shackles which are an integral component of the shelter.

-77-

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFCR-65 (RI)

(h) Miscellaneous. A definite communications problem has been experienced in camps turned over to the VNSF due to the lack of training on new equipment and limited familiarization with communications concepts unique to Special Forces operations. Subordinate commands are implementing a vigorous training program to insure that all VNSF radio operators are able to assume the responsibility for all camp communications so that there will be a smooth transition to total VNSF communications personnel. There is also a lack of qualified VNSF electronics repairmen. The VNSF could not at the present time provide electronic maintenance support in the event of troop reduction or complete US withdrawal. It has been recommended that VNSF repairmen be given on-the-job training at all echelons of repair. The ultimate goal of this program would be for the VNSF technicians to take over more and more of the electronics repair responsibility until such time as they could assume all the maintenance support and insure a smooth transition from United States to total Vietnamese support.

(5) I Corps Tactical Zone (CoC)

(a) Operations. Secure teletype remains the primary means of communications with higher and adjacent headquarters. Presently (1) one troposcatter circuit (SF0B) and (2) land line circuits (II MAF COC and DAVANG Major Relay) are in operation. The DAVANG South Minor Relay through which this unit was previously supported was deactivated on 1 June 1969. The DAVANG Major Relay Facility now affords us access to the Defense Communications System (DCS) with world-wide routing. Communications with and between subordinate units are facilitated by secure frequency modulated (FM) radios and single side band. Maximum emphasis is being placed on the advantage of secure voice operations. All detachments presently have a secure voice capability with other other detachments LRO's, C-Teams, or adjacent units. On 5 July 1969, detachment B-22 (detachment B-11 designate) began relocation from QTVR HTN to QTVR LAI. Construction of the Communications Center has now begun. Detachment B-11 will begin operations or about 15 August and will assume operational control of Detachments A-103, A-104, A-105, A-106, and A-108. It is anticipated that initial communications will be via radio teletype, teletype relay through Americal Division CommCenter, SSB and telephone, until such time as more channels become available in I CTZ for Sole User Voice and Secure Teletype circuits. An alternate communications center is presently under construction. The alternate center will provide a pre-designated facility from which to operate in the event of emergency.

(b) New Concepts. Radio Sets AN/PRC-93 (XM-2A) and/or AN/PRC-74 were hand received to Vietnamese Special Forces personnel corps wide. Selected VNSF personnel were trained in the operation of this equipment, and a net closely paralleling that of the USASF was activated on 15 May 1969. Operation of this net has been highly successful and only minor difficulties have been experienced. This is considered particularly noteworthy since the USASF communications personnel were involved only when absolutely necessary.
CONFIDENTIAL

15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

Recorder-Tape Unit, AN/GMH-17 and a limited number of Coder-Burst devices, AN/GHA-17, are being requisitioned for use in I CTZ on a trial basis only. With a 300 WFM capability at the A-detachment level, minimum time would be spent passing combat essential traffic.

(c) Problems. This unit is still experiencing shortage of X-mode cables and adapter cards for use with secure voice equipment. This shortage precludes corps-wide distribution of KY-30's. There is a shortage of communications personnel (NOS OSB) in I CTZ. Although this shortage is not critical at the present time, it can become so upon rotation of ten (10) of the total of twenty-six (26) OSB's assigned. Rotation is scheduled to take place within the next 60-90 days.

(d) Miscellaneous. Plans are underway to isolate the radio room from the remainder of the Communications Center. Relocation will minimize the possibility of compromising emanations and will satisfy the requirements of CONSEC regulations.

(6) II Corps Tactical Zone. (Co B)

(a) Operations. Seven of fourteen B Company A-detachments are required to relay FM traffic to the next higher headquarters at least part of each day. This is significant in that high grade FM circuits are required to accommodate encryption devices, KY-8 and KY-38. In an effort to upgrade marginal FM circuits, the Signal Officer has requisitioned high gain, directional antennas to be installed at affected sites. As an additional measure, the Signal Officer is attempting to locate a source of wide band filters for use in the AN/VRC-16 during A-dias operations. The installation will be made in accordance with THM-5820-LOL-20, section 3, paragraph 7.a.2.(b) and will replace the narrow band filter used in normal operations. The remaining alternative is to install three retransmission sites to facilitate direct secure voice communications with next higher headquarters.

(b) Training. The primary emphasis remains with on-the-job training in NOS OSB (radio operator) and 31E (radio repair). Company B, in the past, has had operators who were neither qualified to send and receive an acceptable level of CW nor were they familiarized with the practical aspects of radio operations and antenna construction. Where possible, inexperienced operators are assigned to B-detachments for a period of orientation and then further assigned to an A-detachment with an experienced operator.

(b) New Concepts/Equipment. There is a requirement for a mobile teletype terminal such as the AN/VSC-2 or AN/GRC-142 to support tactical headquarters in the field, e.g., 4SF multi-battalion task force headquarters or A-detachments in prolonged contact such as a state of siege. Secure teletype equipment will provide page copy for routine reports and requests. This additional capability will significantly reduce the traffic load on tactical FM and SSB frequencies during extended combat operations. The AN/VSC-2 and AN/GRC-142 are specifically
CONFIDENTIAL

15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

recommended due to air transportability and reliability.

(d) Miscellaneous. The current authorization of eight AN/PRC-25/77 radios per A-detachment is inadequate to support operational requirements. In general, A-detachment commanders indicate that they require at least eleven FM radios to support the simultaneous company size operations (at three radios per company), plus local security operations and general use (three radios), plus two radios as back up or float. The goal of the increase is to preclude limiting operations for lack of communications. The AM radio set HT-1 is often used in lieu of the AN/PRC-25/77, however, the HT-1 has a limited range of one mile and will not net with the FM radios of supporting units such as air and artillery. Company B requires an additional eight X-mode cables for the RT-524 in order to complete installation of the secure FM voice system. It appears that these cables are not available within RVN supply channels and they must be requisitioned from CONUS. X-mode cables have been on requisition through 5th Group Signal Office since October 1968.

(7) III Corps Tactical Zone (Co A)

(a) Operations. The SSB Radio AN/PRC-93 is a primary means of communications for passing administrative traffic between C and B-detachments. Present Company A is emphasizing the importance of utilizing the SSB for passing administrative traffic between A and B-detachments. This will clear the air on FM and preclude extended administrative traffic from interfering with operational traffic such as contact reports. FM communications continue to be very reliable in III Corps. This reliability is enhanced through the use of Nut Ba Don as a radio relay site. There is a problem, however, in areas with large troops concentrations with regard to frequency jamming. This problem has been discussed with III FFW and they are looking into the possibilities of issuing more discrete frequencies in these areas. Presently there are VHF circuits to 3 B-detachments and RTT to the other (B-36) as primary teletype systems. The company utilizes RTT as backup for these systems. Recently the VHF circuits have been unreliable so RTT communications have had to be relied upon. Most of the problems with the VHF and Tropo circuits line in the low priority assigned them. Steps are being taken to raise these priorities.

(b) Training. Cross training programs at C and B-detachment level are continuing in order to insure maximum utilization of communications personnel.

(c) New Concepts/Equipment. Secure voice systems continue to enhance the communications in the III CZ. The reliability of the equipment has been excellent and the maintenance problems low.

(8) IV Corps Tactical Zone (Co D).

(a) Problem Areas. There is a lack of equipment necessary to establish

CONFIDENTIAL
adequate secure voice nets. There has been a great deal of command emphasis placed on the need for increased secure voice capabilities throughout the 5th Special Forces Group, but this was not accompanied by an increase in available equipment. The Group lacks the necessary X-code cables for the installation of the KY-9 secure voice system. Several of Company D's outlying camps require the KY-8 because the range on the KY-35, which is readily available, is considerably less than what would be necessary for them to contact their next higher headquarters.

(b) Training. During this quarter a training program was conducted on the PRC-77A. The Vietnamese have a pressing need for some time now to establish a voice radio net down to their B-detachments and they were finally able to obtain the necessary assets. The instruction covered installation and operation of the PRC-77A. The effectiveness of the teaching is reflected by the fact that the Vietnamese Special Forces have now established a voice radio net from HQ Command down to, and including all of the B-detachments and there have as yet been no operator or equipment problems of any consequence. The on-the-job training system that requires new operators to remain at the company when they first arrive has continued and has proved to be quite effective. Working at the company under direct supervision until they become more proficient and aware of their responsibilities greatly reduces problems when the individual eventually goes to a subordinate detachment.

(c) New Concepts/Equipment. Through close coordination with the other staff sections, the signal maintenance facility has been able to get much more use out of their air assets available. The use of these assets has greatly enhanced the efficiency of the electronics maintenance shop by allowing personnel to go to the various subordinate detachments and actively seek out equipment needing repair. Air assets also allow equipment to be returned to the team much more rapidly than was the case in the past. During the rainy seasons in the past the airboats have always used the long whip antenna with the PRC-25 radio. This has proved unsatisfactory in that the long whip can not stand up to the constant beating it receives from bushes, reeds, trees, etc. A test was conducted with a vehicular antenna and matching unit mounted on an airboat. The test showed that not only was the antenna capable of taking the beating, but the communications improved with the use of the matching unit. Additional units have been placed on requisition.

-31-

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

25 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. COS OSFG-69 (RI)

n. Controller.

(1) Verification of Dependents: The current pay and allowances system for the CIDG limits family allowance payment to four dependents. In April a joint USASF-USSF conference was held to develop a directive requiring verification of all dependents. Marriage certificates and birth certificates are now required for CIDG who are capable of obtaining these documents. In the case of certain ethnic groups, where no records are available, a certified statement will be accepted.

(2) Joint Pay Directive: A joint USASF-USSF pay directive has been implemented to strengthen procedures controlling payment of the CIDG. This directive also stresses the joint responsibilities of USASF and VNSF commanders. Although VNSF commanders will participate in paying the CIDG, the control and expenditures of CIDG funds will remain with USASF personnel.

(3) III Corps Tactical Zone (Co A)

(a) General. Dependent verification forms were distributed to all camps during the reporting period and completed by 25 July except at B-36 where, due to a large number of malaria cases, the completion was delayed but scheduled to be completed 10 August. Dog tags are being made for all CIDG in III Corps. Presently B-32 is near completion and B-33 and B-34 are sending completed forms to the C-detachment for the tags to be made and returned to camps. ID cards and pay cards have been distributed to all camps. Pictures still remain a problem. Film is present but no camera is available, only the ID adapter. B-36 completed most of its pictures with a camera borrowed from a nearby detachment. Expenditures in May were approximately $804,417 but dropped to $653,775 in June mainly because of 90% dropping $110,000 due to Operation CENTURIAN VIII and 90% dropping $41,000. In May, cost leaders were required to accompany fund reports to the C-detachment so analysis of expenditures could be made at this level. This has proven over the last three months to be very useful not only in analyzing expenditures but also for comparison with reports received from Group.

(b) IV Corps Tactical Zone (Co D).

(a) Funds. The change in the auditing techniques has proven to be very successful. During this reporting period, a policy was established to systematically audit every subordinate detachment fund report, correct the deficiency, return the report to the responsible agent for approval and signature, then submit it to CIDG Finance. Attachment of CIDG Finance audit personnel intensified the thoroughness of the check. Future attachment of these highly qualified personnel will save many dollars and man hours.

(b) Next of Kin Roster. During this reporting period, the next-of-kin roster was established. By utilizing the roster as a means to cross-check identify transient personnel, a more positive identification can be made.
Using this roster in this manner, it was also possible to cut down on the number of personnel that had excessive dependents or, in some cases, were even impostors themselves. It is felt that this check will aid the Company D Controller Section in its quest to minimize the corruption in the system. A thorough screening of all new marriage certificates, though a slow process, has yielded a great degree of success. Cross-checking marriage certificates with the Next-of-Kin Report has revealed very few CIDO desire that their wives receive their money from death gratuity. They instead feel that their money should go to their mother since the mother will care for both wife and children, and fear that their wives will desert the mother and possibly even the children.
2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel.

(1) Review of Recruiting Lists. (Co C)

(a) OBSERVATION: On 25 June 1969, CIDG Finance sent a team to an A-detachment for the purpose of paying the assigned CIDG. During the pay procedure, three individuals came to the pay line to receive their pay. The pay officer noticed that on their pay cards they had been dropped as deserters at a time in the past. These individuals had been again recruited as CIDG recruits. Another instance found one person dropped as a deserter in May, and reasserted as FTO in June. When this person came to the pay line, the picture on the card and the appearance of the person to be paid were entirely different.

(b) EVALUATION: Some camp commanders are trying to circumvent the recruiting procedures previously established. Instead of submitting the necessary paperwork on new recruits, they are reinstating a deserter and giving him new and position as a new recruit.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The policies previously set forth should have non-combat emphasis placed on them. The A-detachment Executive Officers should review all recruiting lists sent to Company C, and also review all pay cards of deserters to ensure that the new recruits are not using the name of a person previously dropped as a deserter.

(2) Shortage of Qualified NCO's in Infantry MOS's (B-36)

(a) OBSERVATION: During the last quarter there has been a great number of qualified NCO's with Infantry MOS's departing this command, either due to death, wounds, or DEP. There is now a shortage of qualified replacements to fill the gaps left by these departing individuals, lacking the necessary Infantry NCO's, non-Infantry NCO's, i.e., medical and communications, are being utilized in the role of company advisers. This is leaving the battalion without adequate medical or communications support.

(b) EVALUATION: So long as such a shortage continues, companies and battalions can not be expected to operate at 100 per cent efficiency.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: All Special Forces detachments subordinate to Company A, should be carefully screened for excess Infantry NCO's not assigned within said MOS, and reassign these personnel to 3rd NFGC to work within their MOS.

(3) Shortage of qualified NCO's in Medical MOS (B-36)

(a) OBSERVATION: Qualified medical personnel are desperately needed for assignment to the maneuver battalions.
AVGB-C

CONFIDENTIAL

15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

(b) EVALUATION: At the present time the three maneuver battalions are authorized a total of six USASF medical personnel. There is one assigned. This drastic shortage necessitates battalions being committed with just that medical coverage provided by their organic indigenous medical aid man, thus requiring the usual six to eight USASF battalion advisors to go on combat operations minus qualified USASF medical personnel.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Medical personnel assignments to Company A should be screened for excess of nonassigned medics. III Corps should also be tasked to provide qualified medical aid men in the same manner LRRP augmentation personnel are secured to augment the Recon Company.

(l) Medevac Messages/Orders.

(a) OBSERVATION: This unit does not receive instructions in the form of messages/orders until, in some cases, weeks after the departure of the individual to one of the out-of-country hospitals.

(b) EVALUATION: Due to the elapsed time between medevac and receipt of instructions, it often happens that only days after personal effects and records are shipped, the individual returns to this unit. There is then a tremendous amount of difficulty in processing the effects and records returned to this unit. In some instances, the time lapse has been several months.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Something must be done to get the medevac messages out in a more timely manner. Then, contact should be established with the various hospitals to provide a more timely and efficient system to return the effects and records. Also encountered has been the problem of subsequent evacuation from the hospitals to a CONUS hospital. Months after arrival in CONUS, we receive requests from individuals for their records, etc., which were previously sent to Japan, Philippines, etc. The hospitals should be queried for possible assistance in improving this operation.

-85-
b. Operations.

(1) Air Support for 1st Mobile Strike Force Command. (Co C)

(a) OBSERVATION: Categorically, the 1st MSFC has two types of missions: immediate deployment, and planned employment. During this reporting period all operations except four, were initiated by aerial combat assault. Air support for mission requirements was fair to unsatisfactory. The operational success of the 1st MSFC is dependent upon timely helicopter/air support for Command and Control, visual reconnaissance, medevacs, extraction of detainees/refugees, and resupply and extraction of maneuver elements.

(b) EVALUATION: Operational success of the 1st MSFC was marginal due to inadequate planning for air support. Detachment C-1 is unable to provide adequate air support due to its limitation to two UH-1D helicopters to support nine camps located throughout I CTZ. Operations of the 1st MSFC are normally directed against a known enemy force, or are based on hard intelligence for a specific area of operation. Presently, all air support is provided by III MAF, or its subordinate units. It is recognized that these units are pressed to meet I Corps operational requirements due to shortage of aircraft, operational losses, and required maintenance time.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: 1st MSFC, in conjunction with C-1 staff, should thoroughly analyze aviation support requirements, to include lift helicopters, resupply aircraft, FAC's and gunships, during the planning stages of future operations. Then, effect coordination with III MAF, and/or its subordinate units to insure that adequate and timely aviation support will be available to preclude emergency-type requirements.

(2) Expansion of RF/FF Operations. (Co C)

(a) OBSERVATION: Presently, in many CIDG/Special Forces camp TAORs, there is a district headquarters and RF/FF forces. In most areas, the RF/FF confine their operations to the manning of outposts, local security patrols, and night ambushes within the confines of what is generally recognized to be the "Safe Area".

(b) EVALUATION: The RF/FF are capable of securing the "Safe Area" and protecting the local populace and district headquarters. In the event of relocation of CIDG/Special Forces camps, the RF/FF are going to be lacking in "on the ground" familiarity with the enemy's base areas and infiltration routes, etc., that are in or run through the area of responsibility that they will inherit. With planned relocation of many CIDG/Special Forces Camps, and the cut-back in U.S. troop participation in the Viet Nam conflict, the RF/FF role will be greatly expanded to protect SVN interests and pacification efforts in the outlying areas presently manned by CIDG forces.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That MACV influence increased coordination between US advisers to district officials and RF/FF forces and the US advisers to CIDG
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RGS CSFOR-65 (RI)

Camps in an effort to increase RF/PF participation in operations outside "safe areas". This could possibly be accomplished through the conduct of joint RF/PF and CIDG operations. Also, that MACV equip the RF/PF soldier to operate for extended periods away from their base area or the "L" area. Specific needs noted were an indigenous rucksack, adequate web gear and load bearing equipment, and an indigenous ration similar to the PIR (Patrol Indigenous Ration). Presently, the RF/PF in the outlying areas are ill-equipped to operate effectively away from their base area for periods in excess of 2-3 days.

(3) AC-117/AC-119 Support.

(a) OBSERVATION: On various operations during the past quarter it has been noted that the enemy has attempted to confuse the SPOOKY/SHADOW aircraft by employing a strobe light at the same time friendly forces employ theirs.

(b) EVALUATION: As successful as SPOOKY/SHADOW has been on past operations, it is quite logical that the enemy devise a tactic to curb or delay this type of support. One instance of this attempt to confuse SHADOW was done through means of FM. A SHADOW aircraft almost left station when an unidentified station ordered it back because the area was "not clear".

(c) RECOMMENDATION: To prevent this, various tactics may be employed. An authentication system should be established between SPOOKY/SHADOW aircraft and ground troops, or additional signalling devices be developed in addition to the strobe light. A strobe light placed inside a 60mm mortar tube or inside an M-79 is an excellent way to prevent the enemy from noticing the signalling effort.

(4) Aerial Resupply.

(a) OBSERVATION: It has been noted as a result of the siege at BEN HET that problem areas exist in the control of aerial resupply drops on desired locations.

(b) EVALUATION: Camp BEN HET had to be resupplied by air drop during the siege. In the process of resupplying the camp by air, due to the tactical situation, supplies were dropped outside the perimeter, on the wire barriers and in some instances, on CIDG dependent housing. The problems mentioned above were further compounded by the understrength of the camp and the failure of responsible personnel to give advance notice to the camp as to the type of supplies and quantity being dropped.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That an AIR CONTROL TEAM (ACT) be made available as soon as possible to a besieged camp in order to relieve communication equipment and USASF personnel for more pressing tactical commitments.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVOB-G

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for
the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

(5) Increased AWOL Rates. (B-36)

(a) OBSERVATION: Battalions are deploying on combat operations short
an excessive number of personnel due to ever increasing AWOL rates.

(b) EVALUATION: The continual increase in the AWOL rate among the
maneuver battalions decreases their battle strength, thus their battle effi-
ciency. This sky-rocketing AWOL rate is a direct result of continuous extended operations, heavy casualties, a lack of sufficiently trained replacements (both USASF, LLDB, and indigenous battalion members) and inadequate stand down down
time to conduct extensive unit training, which could help the number. Trun-
mented groups common to indigenous battalions into one close knit organization.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Replacement USASF and LLDB personnel should be
especially screened to insure that only the most qualified officers and NCO's be selected for duty with the 3rd MSFG. Further, that a stand down of suf-
cient length be granted to allow extensive unit level training. Motivation
and indoctrination lectures should be a daily inclusion on the battalion train-
ing schedule.

(6) Proper Utilization of Claymore Mines. (B-34)

(a) OBSERVATION: In the utilization of claymore mines for demolition
ambushes, the CIDG have a tendency to place the mines too close to the trail.

(b) EVALUATION: This poor utilization of the claymore cuts down tremen-
dously on the kill zone of the mine along the trail.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Despite the relative simplicity of claymore mines,
continual training is necessary for the CIDG. Besides the functional training,
some instruction should definitely be given concerning proper employment to
to obtain maximum results.

(7) Remain Over Night Positions. (B-34)

(a) OBSERVATION: The Camp Strike Force companies move until after dark
and then just stop and form their personnel in the semblance of a circular
perimeter.

(b) EVALUATION: The CIDG are not in a good defensive posture when they
just form a circle and lay down for the night. In case of a surprise attack
there is nothing to use as a basis for a defensive stance and in event of a
mortar attack there is no cover whatsoever.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: CIDG should be issued entrenching tools and
instructed in the proper way to dig a perimeter. Every night the CIDG
should stop early enough that their perimeter is in, claymores are out, and
listening posts in position before total darkness.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVOB-C

15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

(8) Joint CIDG/US Operations. (Co A)

(a) OBSERVATION: It has been noted that the first time CIDG conduct joint operations with US forces, many problems are encountered.

(b) EVALUATION: When Detachment A-301 commenced large scale and extensive operations with US units, minor problems were experienced in areas such as heliborne operations, rate of movement, recon by fire and the offset method of navigation. On occasion, tense and excited CIDG exit the helicopters on combat assaults from the wrong door and become temporarily separated from the main element.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When CIDG first commence a joint operation with a new US unit, simple and short operations should be planned so they become accustomed to working with each other. Experiences of Detachment A-301 indicate 24 hours is sufficient. Each chopper during a combat assault should have a designated CIDG commander. This corrective action along with a more detailed briefing of the ground tactical plan increases the CIDG combat effectiveness.

(9) Heliborne Operations in Delta Area. (Co A)

(a) OBSERVATION: On a recent heliborne operation in Detachment A-325's TAOR, only one very light contact was made in an area where numerous company size units of VC/NVA had been observed during the week preceding the heliborne operation. The lack of concealment in this TAOR affords the VC/NVA opportunity to observe any insertion of heliborne troops, and in many cases, to keep them under surveillance until they enter their own position. It appears that VC/NVA units moving through this TAOR toward the Cambodian border attempt to avoid contact if possible, and will in most cases bypass friendly elements known to be in the area.

(b) EVALUATION: None.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Heliborne operations in terrain such as this would obtain better results if one of the following concepts was employed:

(1) Select a minimum of four LZ's and establish priorities. Insert troops on each LZ in turn and sweep surrounding area until contact is established or all target LZ's are covered.

(2) Employ heliborne troops as a reaction force working in conjunction with a minimum of three ground recon elements; the reaction force to be inserted only when one of the recon elements establishes contact.

(10) Use of CSF Against NVA. (Co A)

(a) OBSERVATION: CSF soldiers can be effective against large NVA units as well as local and main force VC.

(b) EVALUATION: Camp CII Dinh engaged the K-3 Bn, 111st NVA Regiment, numerous times within a 6 day period and scored a distinctive victory over...
the enemy. CHI LDH reinforced the original company to repel the enemy, and this was done three times until a friendly battalion size force was committed in the area. The results of the engagement were: 1 USASF KIA, 2 CSF KIA, 20 CIDG WIA, 70 NVA KIA.

(a) RECOMMENDATION: A-detachment Commanders need not always be hesitant to commit their CSF troops against NVA units. The CSF can perform extremely well when provided the proper supporting fires.

(11) Sky Spots.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the month of June, combat Sky spots flown for II Field Force Vietnam were flown by the Australian Air Force.

(b) EVALUATION: This headquarters requests combat Sky spots from II FFV. The Australian Air Force has certain limitations which include not flying within ten nautical miles of the Cambodian border. The majority of our camps are located within the proximity of the border. Therefore, this headquarters was unable to fill the many requests for combat Sky spots received from the detachments.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: During periods when the Australian Air Force is flying combat Sky spots for II Field Force Vietnam, G-3 Air, II FFV makes arrangements with G-3 Air, III CTZ to exchange dedicated Sky spots aircraft to meet the requests placed on them by subordinate commands. This recommendation has already been discussed with both the G-3 Air, II FFV and G-3 Air, III CTZ.

(12) Aerial Reconnaissance Missions.

(a) OBSERVATION: During a recent aerial reconnaissance mission, it was noted that the success of the mission was greatly enhanced by bringing the C&C ship as close as possible to suspected enemy hiding places. An experienced C&C "back seat" could determine the minute details and flaws in camouflage which would betray the enemy's hiding places.

(b) EVALUATION: The Eagle Flight mission is of great value when reacting to known intelligence, but when making an armed reconnaissance flight, a single "back seat" concentrating on finding the enemy can more easily produce the desired results.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: An experienced C&C pilot, an experienced observer, an experienced gun team and minimum initial support, i.e., one slick of reaction squad in the air, could provide a valuable extension to airborne tactics.

(13) Coordination with friendly units.

(a) OBSERVATION: Uncoordinated operations of RF/PF units in operational areas assigned to other friendly units.
CONFIDENTIAL

15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Air) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RGS CSFOR-65 (RI)

(b) EVALUATION: Three (3) times in the past week elements from Company D on joint operations have had to change prearranged plans, signal and ambush locations due to uncoordinated operations of RF/TF units within our assigned area. This not only poses a threat of possible enemy contact between friendly units, but movement of our elements after establishment of night locations leaves friendly units exposed to possible fire from night air assets.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Rigid control should be exercised over RF/TF operations in other friendly units' assigned area of operations. Coordination should be affected between higher headquarters of friendly elements and once coordinated at this level, direct coordination should be authorized between operational elements and elements assigned to areas in which operations are planned. This will not only reduce the possibility of accidental contact between friendly elements, but will lead to the establishment of a closer and more effective working relationship between friendly elements while generating valuable operational intelligence within that particular area.
CONFIDENTIAL

15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCB CSFOR-64 (RI)

C. Training

(1) Officer Training. (Co B)

(a) OBSERVATION: It has been noted that in certain instances the training of junior officers does not reflect current problems being experienced in the USASF-CIG role in Vietnam.

(b) EVALUATION: Throughout the quarter, staff visits and inspections have brought to light numerous deficiencies that exist as a result of inexperienced officers being assigned. One of the biggest problem areas created as a result of inexperienced USASF officers being assigned to units is the doubling of the workload for the experienced officers assigned. This in turn reduces the effectiveness of the experienced man. The placement of inexperienced officers on an understrength team places a large burden on the more capable individuals of the detachment.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The training received at the Special Forces Officer Course should be revised and augmented to include a more realistic phase in connection with the Special Forces requirements of officers assigned to units (Counterpart relations, funds, CIG operations, adjustment of indirect fire support, directing machine and FAC's).

(2) Small Unit Training. (Co B)

(a) OBSERVATION: When a small size friendly unit (platoon size or less) is assaulted or hit at their night locations, no specific plans are followed in rallying or reorganizing.

(b) EVALUATION: Probably caused by the lack of training on this subject, numerous CSF have been killed trying to return to empty the injured and rallying at a predetermined point. Especially valid are the observations made during a recent violent attack on a platoon size CSF night location. It is still not possible to determine if these CSF KIA were the result of friendly fire while evading at night, suffered at initial contact, or a result of enemy ambushes.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: More emphasis should be placed on practical exercises and immediate action drills at the various CSF training centers and the field after each operation. Also a constant reminder in way of newsletter or memo should be disseminated to all units.

(3) Small Unit Training. (1-15, Co D)

(a) OBSERVATION: Frequently CSF units "freeze" when contact is made.

(b) EVALUATION: This situation is only corrected when the VHC or USASF advisor is able to reach the CSF leader and summon appropriate reinforcements.

-92-

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
15 August 1969
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS OSFORD-65 (RI)

(c) OBSERVATION: More squad and platoon training in basic fire and maneuver tactics are needed at A-team levels.

(h) Booby Trap Training.

(a) OBSERVATION: Too many GSF troops are being wounded by booby traps during operations within their TAC.

(b) EVALUATION: Formal military publications are rare which cover specific booby trap and guidance for their detection. More attention at the local level is necessary to decrease the number of wounded due to booby traps.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Training at the corps should be initiated to deal with identification, disarm, likely location, various types, etc., of booby traps common to the particular AO's. This would better acquaint the troops with the enemy's devices and increase their ability to deal with them and strengthen their self-confidence.

(5) Target Location.

(a) OBSERVATION: CIDG elements are unable to effectively mark location of enemy positions, especially during night operations.

(b) EVALUATION: CIDG elements demonstrate a lack of ability to accurately or effectively mark enemy locations and or positions for supporting air assets, especially during night operations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: CIDG personnel must be trained in methods of marking enemy targets prior to participation in ground combat operations. A most effective method now being used at this location includes M-79 burst flashes, flares, and the use of tracer ammunition, controlled by radio between the ground element commander and the C&G ship. When a language barrier exists the above is also effective when controlled between the engaged ground element and the VNSF, from the VNSF to USASF, and from USASF to C&G ship.

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AVCG-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. Rcs CSFOR 65 (Mr)

15 August 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

d. Intelligence.

(1) Background Investigation of CIDG.

(a) OBSERVATION: On 11 May 1969, Nguyen Xieu was apprehended by elements from Camp NONG SON. Upon interrogation of the above named individual, he admitted being a VC and implicated two other persons at NONG SON who were told by the VC to join the CIDG program in order to obtain information about the camp and operations. Xieu's information on the infiltrators proved to be true. Immediate apprehension of the two suspects could not be made since the VC was training at An Khe. On 27 May 1969, Nguyen Hoan Tho and Nguyen Oua were apprehended and brought to Company C headquarters for questioning. Both individuals admitted having been VC prior to joining the CIDG program. However, adamently maintained they were no longer working for the VC. Oua admitted being a transportation section chief for the VC since 1962. Tho stated that he had been in a local force unit since 1965. Tho also implicated three other CIDG at NONG SON who had been in his local force unit. These persons were also brought to Company C headquarters for questioning. All admitted having served with the Viet Cong, however, they stated that there was no longer any connection between themselves and the VC. All five of the CIDG had been recently recruited into the CIDG program. Intelligence agencies have known for quite some time of an extensive VC effort to infiltrate CIDG forces; yet recruitment of VC in the CIDG program in T Corps still remain lax with respect to security. Duc Duc district headquarters had the past records of all five CIDG, yet no effort was made during recruitment to check these records. Thus, five potential VC informants were permitted to join the CIDG program and become located in one camp.

(b) EVALUATION: The value to the enemy of the intelligence these individuals could have supplied, concerning the camp and its operations would have been immenurate. More stringent security measures should be employed in the future when recruiting persons into the CIDG program. CIDG camps are extremely vulnerable to infiltration of enemy agents employing the above technique. VC acting as civilian employees or laborers can also find penetration of CIDG camps as easy unless strict controls are used when they are hired.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: All persons recruited into the CIDG program should be given a limited background investigation at district level. The MIAF and VNRF intelligence sergeant or operations sergeant should run a check, bilaterally, through the local district headquarters and VNRF to determine if any undesirable information is on file regarding their new recruits. This should be accomplished as a minimum at the A-detachment level. Since most people in the CIDG program remain in camps near their lifelong homes, it is relatively easy to conduct such an investigation. District headquarters is the most plausible location to conduct such an investigation. Here, records are kept on individuals having or having had affiliations with the Viet Cong. If recruits are from areas outside the local district, then coordination through
CONFIDENTIAL

15 August 1969


the local district, IDF, and NDF should be accomplished in order to gain at least a limited back-ground investigation on each individual.

(2) Phoung Hoang Training Team

(a) OBSERVATION: In many cases there does not exist adequate knowledge by either VNSF or USASF personnel as to the meaning or intent of the "Phoung Hoang" or "Phoenix" program, nor is there an adequate understanding of the nature of the Viet Cong Infrastructure, i.e. it's modus operandi and the most successful methods of it's discovery and neutralization.

(b) EVALUATION: Beyond the current pamphlets and memoranda which are available concerning this program and phase of intelligence, perhaps, a more effective means of communicating the intent and purpose of concentrating intelligence efforts against the Viet Cong Infrastructure would be for a mobile training team to actually meet with and explain their program to A-team personnel.

(c) PROPOSITION: By direction of II Corps, the Phoung Hoang program at province level should establish training teams (which exist presently in several sector areas) which would go out to the A-site meeting with VNSF and USASF personnel to survey the local situation, coordinate efforts of both district and A-attachment intelligence assets as targeted against the VCI and by face-to-face communication, explain their program and the modus operandi of the infrastructure.

(3) Collection Orientation

(a) OBSERVATION: Both Vung Buk and Dak Pek have initiated successful collection operations based on the concept of small area coverage throughout the TACOR (trail and stream watches within a 2km x 2km area). This has provided early warning of enemy infiltration and supplemented CRP and CSF coverage of the TACOR.

(b) EVALUATION: While the above situations witnessed the employment of mainly civilian collection assets, this type of targeting (outside of populated areas into these sections of the TACOR under minimal friendly control) could have easily employed CSF/CORP assets, as the target of collection efforts, in this case, was not friendly villages.

(c) PROPOSITION: Those camps which do not have population bases should initiate collection programs, recruiting from CIDG personnel, oriented toward area coverage of their TACOR to give advance warning of VC trail activity or infiltration.

(b) APD Missions.

(a) OBSERVATION: An ALO FAC can be employed in conjunction with an APD mission.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUbject: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS GSFCR-66 (RI)

(b) EVALUATION: Past APD missions have followed the same general scheme of events.

(a) After a heavy reading, gunships expended.

(b) If enemy is present in area, he evades in numerous directions.

(c) A FAC is called on station within twenty minutes, and approximately 40-60 minutes elapse prior to TAC air support.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: This headquarters has been very successful by employing an ALO FAC in conjunction with APD. The FAC trails not in sight of the APD mission. Once a heavy mark and enemy movement has been noted, gunships make their first pass, followed by an immediate air strike.

(5) CI and Indicators.

(a) OBSERVATION: It has been noted that some CI nets Case Officers are unaware of the many CI EEI and indicators that can be levied on CI agents. Consequently, targeting in some instances is limited to "looking for VC in the camp and detecting espionage, subversion and sabotage agents", without assigning the many indicators related to this and to internal camp security in general.

(b) EVALUATION: Hard CI information is not easy to obtain and normally involves the piecing together of bits of information or indicators. CI net agents must be trained over a period of time to look for and report on the numerous small indicators that provide potential leads.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: CI Branch at Group should research CI EEI and indicators and publish a comprehensive list for use as a basic guide in targeting all CI nets.

(6) SPAR Activity.

(a) OBSERVATION: Currently there is no method of determining the approximate unit size of individual SPAR reports distributed down to the B and A-detachment level.

(b) EVALUATION: A knowledge of unit size SPAR reports would facilitate comparison with other forms of intelligence sources, such as agent reports. This possible comparison would greatly enhance the chances of pinpointing and identifying enemy units throughout our TACR.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all B-detachment S-2's be briefed on the definition of code words utilized in SPAR reporting.
CONFIDENTIAL

AYGB-C


15 August 1969

e. Logistics

(1) The DUSH Program

(a) OBSERVATION: Many items with long lead times, such as typewriters, gasoline pumps and air conditioners that had normally been purchased by CSF on CSF-MORE PROCUREMENT were stored because of the RUSI restrictions. It was determined these items could be purchased through RUSI (Ray U.S. Here). The DUSH contractors were contacted for correct procedures.

(b) EVALUATION: The group should use this procedure when possible for such items as mentioned previously when an immediate need arises for the product.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The DUSH program was tried and it has worked in an outstanding manner. Group purchased 50 air conditioners and 35 typewriters with delivery in a 90 day period. The items were all received in good condition and prior to expected delivery date. Most items are at a lower cost than the government pays and the price also includes transportation.

(2) Coordination of Issue Requests

(a) OBSERVATION: Requests for an issuance of clothing, equipment and weapons to the CSF are often hampered by confusion and argument over what is needed, the quantities issued, etc.

(b) EVALUATION: This confusion and consequent disagreement is imbibed to counter-art relations and also results in an abnormal amount of time consumed in issuing procedures. In most cases, the VIF or CSF are asking for something that is not on hand or is in short supply, but through a misunderstanding they feel the USASF do not want to issue the items to then.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Counterarts and CSF leaders must be kept informed regarding stockage levels and status of requisitions. When the VIF and CSF leaders are aware of the supply situation, many requests will be turned down with explanations by them before they reach the USASF, eliminating headaches and confusion.

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AVGB-C

OPERATIONAL REPORT OF 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (ABN) FOR THE PERIOD ENDING 31 JULY 1969.

CIC - CSFOR-65 (RT)

f. **Political Warfare.**

(1) General lack of understanding of S-5 mission.

(a) **PERCEPTION:** There exists throughout Vietnam a general lack of understanding of the purpose and goals of the Civic Action-Psychological Operation program. With the exception of the relatively few personnel who are assigned to S-5 related positions, most people do not even have a basic knowledge of why it is important to be concerned with the general welfare of the population and the operation of the soldier and his dependents. This lack of understanding has given rise to many misconceptions which cause CA/PO personnel many problems which are difficult to overcome. For instance: It is not too difficult to understand that a CA/PO officer on an A-site must feel when he discovers that, of the Americans, he alone must carry the S-5 burden because no one else considers it important enough to worry about. At the very least, just the moral support and encouragement of his efforts by the other team members would be of great help. Too often, though, not only is this not the case, but instead, his duties are the butt of too many "heart and mind" jokes and in this kind of atmosphere it is understandably difficult for him to pursue his duties with any kind of enthusiasm.

(b) **EVALUATION:** The above observation is substantiated time and time again. Staff visits to A-sites, discussion with non-CA/PO personnel, talking with S-5 personnel from other Corps areas, and personal experience has indicated this to be a general trend throughout the country. It should be noted that this condition is not confined to A-detachments only but is quite noticeable at B and C-detachments as well.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** Considerably more emphasis should be placed on the portion of the initial orientation received by in-coming personnel. The process of action-building should be stressed and explained. It should be made clear that in order to achieve maximum effectiveness from the program it must receive the support of every individual, and not just those assigned as CA/PO personnel. To make this of more importance to the average replacement who knows that he will not have a CA/PO slot, correlations between CA/PO and tactical operations should be made. It should be explained that although Civic Action projects may not result in higher enemy body counts, they can, and do, result in lower "friendly" body counts by denying the enemy the support of the population which he so badly needs in order to operate, and even to exist. Finally, it should be made clear that it is the Commander's policy that this program receive maximum support wherever practicable from all "USAF" personnel. In addition, it is clear that the S-5 program is a command responsibility at all levels and that every one done or not done within the S-5 program is the direct responsibility of the detachment commander concerned.

CONFIDENTIAL
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RQG CSFOR-65 (RI)

(2) Coordination between S-2 and S-5. (Co B)

(a) OBSERVATION: Most Poliar officers are not aware of the coordination required between themselves and the S-2 at all levels, to develop and employ accurate and timely Psyops support.

(b) EVALUATION: A-detachments CA/PO officers have been assuming that a civic action project is an end in itself when in reality it can prove to be a lucrative means of gathering intelligence data. They appear to misunderstand the possibilities of an interworking relationship between the two functions. While civic action projects are a necessity to aid the populace, they also present a means to gain the support and confidence of the people. After this difficult but important step has been realized, the way is paved for the CA/PO officer to exploit the possibilities of gathering intelligence from the people being supported.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The intelligence collection potentialities of CA/PO activities should be emphasized during initial briefings by both S-5 and S-2 personnel and commanders at all levels should take an interest in, and monitor this neglected means of gathering intelligence.

(3) Dual Role - Civic Action Projects. (Co B)

(a) OBSERVATION: CA/PO officers do not fully realize the Psyops possibilities connected with civic action projects and therefore do not always take advantage of an exploitable situation.

(b) EVALUATION: Almost all civic action projects present a great opportunity for face-to-face communications with a given target audience, as well as presenting opportunities for the distribution of Psyops materials.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Psyops (CA/PO) officers should be made aware of the tools they can use in support of civic action projects. The CA/PO officer should understand how to mold a "give away program" into a meaningful and effective Psyops tool.

(4) CDG Participation with the Cultural Drama Team.

(a) OBSERVATION: When the Cultural Drama Team performs, it is advisable to include singing contests for the CDG.

(b) EVALUATION: Whenever the CDG are allowed to participate in the Cultural Drama Team performance, the morale of the troops is raised, and a more personal relationship with the OVN is formed.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: All POLAR personnel should work closely with the Cultural Drama Team in order to include a portion of the performance in which the audience is allowed to participate.
CONFIDENTIAL
15 August 1969
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

(5) Leaflet Dissemination.

(a) OBSERVATION: Dropping leaflets from a quantitative standpoint has been found to be wasteful and unproductive.

(b) EVALUATION: More emphasis should be placed on locating a target audience and dropping a special leaflet directed toward that audience.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: An audience and a reason should be established before executing a leaflet drop.

(6) Earlyword.

(a) OBSERVATION: The "earlyword" system in loudspeaker aircraft came into wide use during this reporting period. This system allows any signal transmitted from a ground station and which can be heard on the aircraft intercom system to be re-broadcasted to the ground via the loudspeaker system.

(b) EVALUATION: The earlyword system has been used very successfully for quick reaction psychological operations by some of the A-detachments.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: All CA/PO personnel should become thoroughly familiar with the earlyword system and its use in a quick reaction POP.

(7) Montagnard Leaflets:

(a) OBSERVATION: In too many instances Vietnamese language leaflets and posters are utilized in predominantly Montagnard areas.

(b) EVALUATION: These leaflets are of no value since the target audience cannot read them.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The ethnic make-up of an area must be studied before requesting leaflets and posters for dissemination.

(8) Combining Propaganda with MEDCAPS.

(a) OBSERVATION: Combining extensive and well-prepared propaganda with MEDCAPS has proven to be very effective in gaining population support and intelligence information.

(b) EVALUATION: MEDCAPS conducted with propaganda as a deliberate, professionally planned objective have produced excellent lasting results and valuable intelligence.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The POLMAR Team is an effective tool for conducting propaganda with MEDCAPS, and should be utilized to the fullest. All medicines dispensed during MEDCAPS should be wrapped in VIP propaganda leaflets.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 8th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, I/2 CSFPR-65 (RI)

9) Motion Picture Films.

(a) OBSERVATION: While indigenous soldiers and their families enjoy American movies, a more varied program of entertainment and education can be realized by locating a source of films in their native language.

(b) EVALUATION: JSRMD has motion pictures available in both the Vietnamese and Cambodian languages. In addition to films intended purely for entertainment, there is a wide selection of films of an educational nature.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: All possible sources of films should be investigated in order to provide the best possible POLWAR entertainment program.

10) Loi Chanh's.

(a) OBSERVATION: One of the greatest fears of Loi Chanh is that they will be killed while trying to rally.

(b) EVALUATION: Once a camp has gained the reputation of being a safe place to rally, you will receive more ralliers. Example: PHUC TAM outposts (X213 COI) has had 9 ralliers in May and June from the same enemy division.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: CIDG must be convinced that the Chieu Hoi program is good and verifiable. This can be done by lectures, written material and even aerial loudspeaker broadcasts.

11) Civic Action and Psychological Operations Program: (Co A)

(a) OBSERVATION: Leaflet loudspeaker program could be more effective.

(b) EVALUATION: In the past months, several reports from Loi Chanh have indicated that our leaflet and loudspeaker attempts have been reaching the enemy but their effectiveness has been lacking. These Loi Chanh have stated that the Vietnamese people like poetry, and messages directed to them in the form of a poem. These are not only read, but enjoyed.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is suggested that in the future selected messages to the enemy be in the form of poetry.

12) Skill of POLWAR Team: (Co D)

(a) OBSERVATION: Progress on civic action projects has been limited by the POLWAR team's lack of manual skill.

(b) EVALUATION: The inability of the POLWAR team to undertake projects requiring skill in carpentry, masonry, etc, has slowed certain civic action
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. ROCS CSFDR-65 (RI)

Although projects considerably, since it has become necessary to rely on the B-detachment's skilled labor pool for support. Commitments to other necessary projects frequently prevent these skilled laborers from being available to assist POLWAR projects.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Selection and recruitment of additional members for the POLWAR team should be weighted heavily towards individuals possessing a trade or skill which can be usefully exploited for POLWAR projects, such as carpenters, masons, and drivers.

b. Organization.

None.
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15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

h. Other

COMUNICATIONS

(1) OBSERVATION: FM communications between A and B detachments are frequently jammed with routine administrative traffic, and passing tactically urgent traffic is difficult.

(2) EVALUATION: Excessive operator chatter and the improper use of nets have made it difficult to maintain communications on the A/G FM net. Each team is authorized and is capable of terminating a minimum of three radio nets: (1) the SSB Command net for passing administrative traffic, (2) the FM tactical net for use while on tactical operations and (3) the FM/AG net for air/ground use only. The FM tactical net can be used to effect an airstrike. This problem is complicated by the use of unauthorized or "bootlegged" frequencies. These practices tend to confuse, rather than enhance, effective communications and should not be utilized.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: All stations designated as NCS by the 5th Group SOI should exercise greater control over the stations within their nets.

MEDICAL

(b) CIDG Physical Examinations and Immunizations.

(a) OBSERVATION: There exists a definite requirement to medically screen candidates for the CIDG program and to insure that those personnel integrated into the program receive a complete series of routine immunizations.

(b) EVALUATION: The Office of the Surgeon, 5th SFSG, has drafted a proposed joint directive which will require an initial pre-induction physical examination for all candidates for the CIDG program. This examination can be completed by the team medic and the results posted to a permanent Individual Health Record which will be maintained with the Individual Earning Record. Those personnel not meeting the basic physical requirements should not be integrated into the program. Others who have some form of disability but are otherwise fit for service will have the disability (ies) recorded on the health record in order to preclude a later claim for disabilities which existed prior to service. After induction into the CIDG program all personnel will be administered a basic series of immunizations. A record of the immunizations will be maintained on the reverse side of the Individual Health Record.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: This joint directive should be staffed and published.

(5) Use of Serum Albumin.

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AVQG-C  CONFIDENTIAL  15 August 1969
SUBJECT: On-ratio report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

(a) OBSERVATION: Serum Albumin is a substance used to prevent shock due to loss of blood. A recent directive from the Department of Defense limits its use to only USARV hospital facilities.

(b) EVALUATION: Through a special directive from the MACV Surgeon, 5th SFMA has been allowed to retain serum albumin for field use. This valuable medical item, however, must be reserved for utilization in MACV hospitals and by qualified medical personnel on extended field operations. The special authorization to continue to utilize this item may be withdrawn if it is used excessively and without proper justification.

(c) COMMAND: Command emphasis must be maintained on the proper use of serum albumin by authorized personnel only.

(6) Prophylactic Gamma Globulin.

(a) OBSERVATION: It is 5th SFMA medical policy that all assigned USARV personnel receive the basic series of G3 shots and a booster every six months. Spot checks of individual immunization records indicate this policy is not being followed.

(b) EVALUATION: Gamma Globulin has been found to be an effective defense against hepatitis. Even though it will not preclude one from infection by the hepatitis virus, it will subsequently reduce the chance to a subclinical form and lessen the damage to the liver. 5th SFMA has the highest exposure rate to hepatitis of any unit operating in the Republic of Vietnam.

(c) COMMAND: Command emphasis must be placed upon maximum use of prophylactic gamma globulin.
15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969. RGS-OSFOR-65 (RI)

8 Incl

See Table of Contents

Incl 2 - 4, 6 - 8 ed. Hq., PA

Colonial, Infantry

Commanding

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1 - CO, 8th SFDA, 1st SF, APO 09837
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1 - Co D, 5th SFDA, 1st SF, APO 96916
1 - CMD Ln Det, 5th SFDA, 1st SF, APO 96213
1 - 16th SF Co, 1st SF, APO 96261
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2 - CO, G3A, ATTN: HH, APO 96337
1 - SACCA, OCS, Washington D.C. 20330
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AVIGC-DST (15 Aug 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS GPOR-65 (R1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 30 SEP 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) The headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (U) Reference item concerning "Shortage of qualified NCOs in Medical MOS 91B", section II, page 84, paragraph 2a(3); nonconcur. Records available in this headquarters show the authorized and assigned strength for MOS 91B2S/91B4S, as of 12 September 1969, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GRADE</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>ASD</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>E5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E6</td>
<td>99</td>
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<td>E7</td>
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<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A review of requisition fill information and an analysis of the losses and projected gains indicates that this unit is projected to be at 100% of their authorized strength in MOS 91B by 31 October 1969.

b. (U) Reference item concerning "Medevac Message/Orders", section II, page 85, paragraph 2a(4); nonconcur. A survey was made of all former members of the 5th Special Forces Group medically evacuated from Vietnam during the period 1 July - 31 August 1969 inclusive. Total number of evacuees surveyed was 170. Survey results indicate: (1) Reassignment message orders (PCS) pertaining to all except five of the evacuees surveyed were received by this headquarters within an average of 48 hours from the gaining off-shore hospital; (2) In all but six cases, reassignment message instructions were transmitted by this headquarters to the 5th Special Forces Group within an average of 48 hours following receipt of message orders from the off-shore hospital; (3) Of the six cases in which notification was not made within the average of 4 days following admittance of the evacuee to an off-shore hospital, one case required 12 days, one case 8 days, three cases 7 days, and one case 32 days.
The first five cases were the result of delayed transmission of message orders from the off-shore hospital. The case requiring 32 days was the result of an incorrect unit designation of the evacuee which resulted in delayed notification to the 5th Special Forces Group. A representative of the USARV Adjutant General visited the 5th Special Forces Group during the week 14-20 September 1969 to make an on-site appraisal of the problem. Areas requiring assistance were identified and corrective actions initiated. During the visit, the representatives also discussed other matters referred to in the ORLL and the inquiries received by the 5th Special Forces Group from COMUS hospitals on the status of evacuees' records and baggage.

c. (U) Reference item concerning "Remain Over Night Positions", section II, page 88, paragraph 2b(7); concur. Entrenching tools are not a controlled item and may be requisitioned through normal supply channels. No action is required by this or higher headquarters.

d. (C) Reference item concerning "FC and Indicators", section II, page 96, paragraph 2d(5); concur. Specific guidance to units and instructors is necessary to produce effective coverage. This headquarters is drafting a CI plan which will provide guidance to units in the field. No action by higher headquarters is required.

e. (U) Reference item concerning "The LUSH Program", section II, page 97, paragraph 2e(1); concur. USARV depots provide support to the 5th Special Forces Group on an inter-service support agreement basis. All requisitions from the 5th SFG that cannot be filled at a USARV depot are passed to the USA Army Inventory Control Center (USAICCV) for final determination as to whether the item is available in the USARV assets-in-country. Requisitions are processed on a "fill" or "kill" basis at USAICCV. If a requisition cannot be filled by USAICCV from assets in-country, the requisition is annotated accordingly and returned to the 5th SFG for procurement action through SF channels using SF funding. The 5th SFG may then procure the required items in-country or off-shore.

f. (U) Reference item concerning "Prophylactic Gamma Globulin", section II, page 104, paragraph 2h(6); concur. This concurrence applies only to the 5th SFG in its present geographical location and environment.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

C. L. V. "L" N. ENSON
LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn: 5th SFG
MACV

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GPOP-DT (15 Aug 69) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne),
1st Special Forces for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 18 OCT 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORTY
CPT, AUC
ARM AG
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## STATISTICAL DATA

1. **(C) Missions:**
   - a. Squad
     - CTZ
       - I: 2663
       - II: 6263
       - III: 1418
       - IV: 5669
       - RF/PF: 520
       - TOTAL: 20,157
   - b. Platoon
     - CTZ
       - 1071
       - 1864
       - 770
       - 1694
       - 37
       - 95
       - TOTAL: 10,375
   - c. Company or Larger
     - 458
     - 456
     - 770
     - 1065
     - 57
     - TOTAL: 2,855

2. **(C) Contacts:**
   - a. Fr initiated
     - 179
     - 269
     - 249
     - 134
     - 26
     - 900
   - b. VC initiated
     - 115
     - 229
     - 96
     - 5
     - 22
     - 532
   - c. Incidents
     - 6
     - 36
     - 50
     - 17
     - 1
     - 111

3. **(C) Confirmed enemy KIA:**
   - a. KIA
     - 188
     - 330
     - 622
     - 254
     - 20
     - 1456
   - b. Cprtr
     - 18
     - 30
     - 7
     - 23
     - 2
     - 85

   c. Quarterly Comparison of Confirmed Enemy Losses Country-Wide:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>Cprtr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug - Oct 68</td>
<td>2172</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov - Jan 69</td>
<td>1112</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb - Apr 69</td>
<td>3095</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May - Jul 69</td>
<td>1166</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. **(C) USASF Losses:**
   - a. KIA
     - 0
     - 6
     - 6
     - 5
     - 1
     - 18
   - b. WIA
     - 7
     - 30
     - 34
     - 9
     - 6
     - 86
   - c. MIA
     - 0
     - 2
     - 0
     - 0
     - 0

Incl 5 to 5th SFSA ORLL for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969.
(d) Quarterly comparison of USAF casualties country-wide:

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<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug - Oct 68</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>156</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov - Jan 69</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>77</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feb - Apr 69</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>163</td>
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<tr>
<td>May - Jul 69</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>106</td>
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5. (C) VNSF Losses:

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>CTZ</th>
<th>CTZ</th>
<th>CTZ</th>
<th>CTZ</th>
<th>SF</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. KIA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. WIA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. MIA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
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d. Quarterly comparison of VNSF casualties country-wide:

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug - Oct 68</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov - Jan 69</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb - Apr 69</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>126</td>
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<tr>
<td>May - Jul 69</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>37</td>
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6. (C) CIDG Losses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>CTZ</th>
<th>CTZ</th>
<th>CTZ</th>
<th>CTZ</th>
<th>SF</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. KIA</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
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<td>242</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. WIA</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1170</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. MIA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
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d. Quarterly comparison of CIDG casualties country-wide:

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<th></th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug - Oct 68</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov - Jan 69</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb - Apr 69</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>562</td>
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<tr>
<td>May - Jul 69</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>1370</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1689</td>
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7. (C) RF/PF Losses:

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>CTZ Only</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>a. KIA</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. WIA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. MIA</td>
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</table>

d. Quarterly comparison of RF/PF casualties country-wide:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug - Oct 68</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>335</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov - Jan 69</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td>Feb - Apr 69</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
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</tr>
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<td>May - Jul 69</td>
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8. (C) Weapons:

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
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<th>IV</th>
<th>CTZ</th>
<th>CTZ</th>
<th>CTZ</th>
<th>CTZ</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>RF/PF</th>
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<tr>
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<td>b. Wpns Capt</td>
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CONFIDENTIAL
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 5th Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May 69 to 31 July 69.

CO, 5th Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces