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<td>TO: Approved for public release, distribution unlimited</td>
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<td>FROM: Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov’t. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 29 OCT 1969. Other requests shall be referred to Office of the Army Chief of Staff for Force Development, Washington, DC 20310.</td>
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</tbody>
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AGDA (M) (24 Oct 69) FOR OT UT 673205 29 October 1969


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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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5th Battalion, 27th Artillery
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 5TH BATTALION 27TH ARTILLERY
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96321

AVGK-AH-C

31 July 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

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1. (C) Section 1: Significant Organization or Unit Activities
   a. General:

(1) The battalion's mission during the reporting period was general support United States Free World Military Armed Forces in AO Dan An/Sheridan. The battalion was attached to I Field Force Provisional Artillery Group for the entire reporting period.

(2) Although I Field Force Provisional Artillery Group has responsibility for fire coordination in the AO, this headquarters has in conjunction maintained liaison elements with Lam Dong, Tuyen Duc, Ninh Thuan and Binh Thuan Provinces. To further facilitate operations a Tac OP (upgraded from an FSCC) was established at LZ Betty, Phan Thiet. The Tac OPs also act as FSCCs for northern Binh Thuan (east of 17°07 line) and southern Binh Thuan (west of 17°07 line) respectively. Upon the entrance of 2/1 Cav Sqn into AO (CF at Song Mao BN 2731448) in June 1969, a liaison element was established with that Hqs. Liaison also continues with the 44th ARVN Regt. (See Incl 1, Organization for Combat)

(3) Assigned and attached units 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969 (See Incl 2).

(4) Elements of 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery, attached and OPCON units completed 91 unit days in tactical operations and 29 days in tactical moves during the reporting period (See Incl 3).

b. Intelligences:

(1) Throughout the reporting period the unit coordinated and received intelligence from the following sources:

(a) 9th Republic of Korea Infantry Division

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(b) 23rd Army Republic of Vietnam Infantry Division

(c) Operations and Intelligence Center MACV, Phan Rang

(d) Province Intelligence Operations Coordination Center, Phan Rang

(e) Ninh Thuan Province Special Police, Phan Rang

(f) 35th Tactical Fighter Wing, Phan Rang Air Force Base, Phan Rang

(g) 3rd Battalion, 506th Infantry, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne (Airmobile) Division, Phan Thiet

(h) Operations and Intelligence Center MACV, Phan Thiet

(i) Binh Thuan Province Special Police, Phan Thiet

(j) Province Intelligence Operations Coordination Center, Phan Thiet (COORDS)

(k) 3rd Battalion, 503rd Infantry, 173rd Airborne Brigade

(l) Operations and Intelligence Center, MACV, Bao Loc (COORDS)

(m) Province Intelligence Operations Center, Bao Loc (COORDS)

(n) Headquarters, Task Force South, Dalat

(o) 183rd Reconnaissance Airplane Company

(p) 185th Reconnaissance Airplane Company

(q) 192nd Assault Helicopter Company

(2) Artillery Targeting:

(a) From 1 May 1969 through 31 July 1969, artillery targeting was performed by the Battalion S-2 Section and a targeting center collocated with Task Force South Headquarters in Dalat for both organic and non-organic artillery units located in Binh Thuan and Ninh Thuan Provinces. During the same period, the Fire Support Coordination elements co-located with 3rd Battalion, 506th Infantry, 101st Airborne (Airmobile) Division and MACV Sector Phan Rang, conducted
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artillery targeting for Binh Thuan and Minh Thuan Provinces.

(b) During the reporting period the Battalion S-2 Section conducted pattern analysis of areas of high enemy activity to establish targets for artillery and Naval Gun Fire.

(3) Target Acquisition:

(a) Visual Reconnaissance: Visual reconnaissance by battalion aerial observers was coordinated and directed by the Battalion S-2 Section and the Fire Support Coordination Centers located in Binh Thuan and Minh Thuan Provinces. Visual reconnaissance reports were received regularly from Army pilots, Air Force forward air controllers flying in the two provinces, who are aware of artillery firing frequencies and utilize them for immediate intelligence reports and calls for fire.

(b) Tactical Air Reconnaissance: Request for tactical reconnaissance and aerial surveillance were submitted through I FFORCEN Provisional Artillery Group in Dalat and 3rd Battalion, 506th Infantry, 101st Airborne (Airmobile) Division at Phu Tho. Photographic, Red Haze and IAD missions were requested. Targets derived from the Data Terminal Coordination Station at Phu Line Mountain were immediately passed to Fire Support Coordination Centers and artillery liaison officers within the AO, when these targets were within range of artillery, for immediate engagement. Information received in APDs and Red Haze proved invaluable in the overall targeting program.

(c) General Reconnaissance: Forward observers within the AO were briefed and debriefed for all operations. Observers submitted reports on effectiveness of artillery utilization during operations.

(d) Intelligence Reports: Intelligence reports were received from higher headquarters, Task Force South and from intelligence agencies in the area throughout the reporting period.

(e) Agent Reports: Agent reports were received by the battalion from US intelligence channels, MAC and COORDS.

(f) Ground Surveillance: Detachment 272 (AN/TPS-25 Ground Surveillance Section), from 8th Battalion, 26th Target Acquisition Battalion, was placed OPCON to 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery on 29 May 1969 and became operational at IZ Sheffy on 30 May 1969. This section started to pick up plots of enemy
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31 July 1969

SUBJECT:  Interim Report of 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery for Period ending 31 July 1969, RCS GSFDM-65 (R1)

personnel on 1 June 1969 and since that day the equipment has picked up approximately 150 plots with an artillery expenditure on those plots of over 5,000 rounds. The radar plots have consisted primarily of small groups (3-5, 7-10 personnel) with a few cases of 30-50 personnel. On 24 July 1969, the AN/TPS-25 antenna was emplaced on a 48 ft. steel tower. This raised the antenna height considerably above the terrain permitting the radar to scan areas previously in defilade. See Incl 4 for specific lessons learned.

(g) Counter Mortar Radar: To assist in the rapid reaction to enemy artillery a counter mortar radar section (AN/FPS-4A section) was installed at LZ Sandy (LA 8672L2). Detachment 237 (AN/FPS-4A) arrived at Phan Thiet on 21 July 1969 and became operational at LZ Sandy 22 July 1969. (NOTE: From 5 July-16 July 1969 the enemy had conducted 13 mortar attacks on LZ Sandy).

(4) Throughout the reporting period liaison officers in Binh Thuan and Minh Thuan Provinces gathered intelligence information and forwarded it to the Battalion S-2 Section. The Battalion S-2 Section consolidated the information and disseminated it to higher and adjacent headquarters. Summaries of enemy activities and capabilities, items of special interest and new enemy tactics were consolidated periodically and disseminated to organic, attached and CFQON batteries and sections.

c. Operations and Training Activities:

(1) Plans:

(2) Operations: During the reporting period all elements of 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery participated in the following operations:

OPERATION  PERIOD

Dan An/Sheridan  1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969

Operation Dan An/Sheridan AO continued to consist of Lam Dong, Tuyen Duc, Binh Thuan, and portions of Minh Thuan and Binh Thuy Provinces. Concept of operation: Task Force South comprised of 3rd Battalion, 503rd Infantry, 173rd Airborne Brigade; 3rd Battalion, 506th Infantry, 101st Airborne (Airmobile) Division and 2nd Squadron, 1st Cavalry, in coordination with Republic of Vietnam 23rd Infantry Division (Light GP) comprised of the 44th and 53rd ARVN Regiments operated throughout the AO. In addition, there are 101 Regional Force Companies within AO Dan An/Sheridan. At the beginning of the reporting period, firing elements
either controlled or supported by this unit were located as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battery, 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery</th>
<th>AN 879138</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battery B (4 How), 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery</td>
<td>AN 877162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery C (1 How), 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery</td>
<td>OPCON to 5/22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery B (4 How), 6th Battalion, 84th Artillery</td>
<td>BP 47007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery C (1 How), 3rd Battalion, 19th Artillery</td>
<td>AN 786067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery D, 2nd Battalion, 320th Artillery</td>
<td>BP 47007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery C, 5th Battalion, 22nd Artillery</td>
<td>AN 859242</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 5/27th Arty Tac CP displaced from Dalat to Phan Rang on 2 May 1969 and subsequently displaced to Song Mo on 10 June 1969, as deemed necessary by the tactical situation. The FSCC at Phan Thiet was upgraded to a forward Tac CP because of the increase of firing units in and around the area and additional command and control responsibilities brought about by the increase in enemy activity. Task Force South moved its headquarters from Dalat to Phan Thiet for substantially the same reasons.

### Total Missions Fired by Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquired</td>
<td>2960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterbattery</td>
<td>507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdiction</td>
<td>1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Purpose</td>
<td>939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Rounds Fired</td>
<td>85,112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA (K)</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA (K)</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers Destroyed</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings Destroyed</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caves Destroyed</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxcaris Destroyed</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(3) Training:

(a) Artillery Assistance to RF/PP and RD elements (See Inc 5).

(b) Battalion Training: When operational missions permitted, the batteries conducted training on safety, howitzer proficiency, and FDC procedures. A total of 3 personnel attended the I Field Force Artillery Forward Observer training course at An Khe, 8 officers attended the Fire Direction Officer training course at Pleiku. In June 1969, two personnel from Wha Thang visited our units and conducted training for our FDC personnel in the operation and maintenance of FADAC.

(4) Chemical: None

(5) Psy War: None

(6) Army Aircraft Utilization:

(a) Aircraft support was inadequate throughout the reporting period. Due to a mishap, the LOH-6A that was assigned to the battalion was damaged beyond repair and was never replaced. The second LOH-6A which is authorized was never issued. Since then, this unit received only one UH-1 on a daily basis for use both as a resupply vehicle to isolated fire bases and for command and control. This situation was further aggravated by the origin of the supported UH-1. The aircraft comes from a unit in vicinity of Dong Ba Thin. At least 2 hours of use are lost in non-payload missions because the majority of our units are located in southern Binh Thuan Province. Attempts continue to have the unit now stationed at Phan Thiet, 192nd Aviation Company, provide the UH-1. This unit requires as a minimum one LOH for command and control and one UH-1 as a resupply ship to our firing elements. The CH-47 support for heli-lift operations and resupply was sporadic but generally timely and accurate. The two O-1 fixed-wing aircraft allocated to the battalion are employed in Binh Thuan and Binh Thuan Provinces for visual reconnaissance, convoy cover, and adjustment of artillery fire and receive maximum utilization.

(1) Total aircraft hours utilized:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>UH-1</th>
<th>OH-6</th>
<th>OH-47</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command and control</td>
<td>304:20</td>
<td></td>
<td>89:20</td>
<td>393:40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire missions</td>
<td>199:40</td>
<td>159:40</td>
<td>271:55</td>
<td>528:50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registrations</td>
<td>98:05</td>
<td>98:05</td>
<td>13:40</td>
<td>210:50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery moves</td>
<td>528:50</td>
<td>528:50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveillance</td>
<td>303:50</td>
<td>203:25</td>
<td></td>
<td>506:75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resupply</td>
<td>8:8:10</td>
<td>785:35</td>
<td>231:20</td>
<td>893:25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Hours</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1805:25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Days</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Logistics:

(1) The consolidation of the bulk of the battalion's firing elements in the southern two provinces has provided a more workable and effective means of logistic support. With support requirements being forwarded to forward S-4 supply teams, the acquisition and shipment of supplies has been accelerated.

(2) The complete takeover, by Cam Ranh Bay Depot, of all support facilities in Dalat reduced the difficulties of resupply of the two firing batteries supported from Dalat. Both battalions presently requisition and procure all classes of supplies directly from the LSA and ASP in Dalat. No problems have been noted in this area as of yet. This takeover of S-4 supply teams to the southern provinces.

(3) The policy of procuring supplies from Cam Ranh Bay and transporting them to Phan Rang for further shipment to outlying stations is still proven highly effective. Many items of supply that are not stocked at other logistics areas are shipped directly from S-4 resources in Phan Rang. Also, as units redeploy throughout the area of operations, a brief layover in Phan Rang provides them with refitting and immediate resupply opportunities. Phan Rang is also used as the base from which emergency resupply of Class IV to all areas of Class V to northern Binh Thuan is conducted.

(4) The direct support maintenance elements in Phan Thiet and Dalat have an improved capability of providing support for both track and wheel vehicles and all artillery weapons in their areas. A relatively new innovation, which has worked very effectively, is to have a contact element from the supporting maintenance unit travel to the fire base to conduct on the spot maintenance. In addition, the battalion maintenance section makes periodic contact visits to each fire base to assist in maintenance of vehicles. This is somewhat effective;
however, there is no authorized qualified truck vehicle mechanic in the batta-
ion maintenance section. Repair parts are still relatively difficult to
procure. To assist in the receiving of repair parts, it has become necessary
to develop a unique parts requisitioning system. When a battery requires
parts, it drafts the requisition and sends it to their supporting maintenance
facility. If the part cannot be immediately received, the requisition is
forwarded from the battery to battalion maintenance in Than Rang, where it is
forwarded to the depot at Cam Ranh Bay. This has been found to be the most
expedient means of receiving parts.

(5) Transportation of supplies continues to be by use of aircraft and road.
Though road transportation is becoming increasingly effective, with the movement
of the cavalry element into the area of operations, it is still greatly limited
by the availability of vehicles and the relative seclusion of several fire
bases; therefore, airlift continues to be the primary means of resupply.
Principally the Chinook has been used for the transportation of classes III, IV,
V and water. With helicopter operations originating from two major points (Than
Rang and Phan Thiet), the programming for resupply is unstable.

e. Personnel: This battalion experienced significant personnel problems
during the reporting period. The percentage of personnel, as indicated below,
maintained this unit at an average strength not commensurate with the mission.
Serious shortages prevailed in non-commissioned officers in the grades E-6
thru E-8. The critical shortages of E-6, E-7, E-8 have been partially resolved
with the recent arrival of two E-6s and one E-7. The battalion is required to
staff, maintain and support 49 positions not provided for by the TOE (INO, FSCC,
Radio Relay). This in itself requires maintenance of 110% strength.

(1) Personnel strength during the reporting period was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Battalion Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>101%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>101%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>103%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Overall critical shortages existed in the following grades and MOS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>MOS</th>
<th>Shortage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E-8</td>
<td>13222</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-6</td>
<td>13842</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-7</td>
<td>13232</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-5</td>
<td>13240</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-3</td>
<td>13240</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUJET: Operational Report of 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery for Period Ending 31 July 1969, EC8 605 R-05 (R)

f. Artillery: The 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery, in addition to its organic batteries, has Battery B, 3rd Battalion, 6th Artillery (105mm SP) attached; Battery C, 5th Battalion, 22nd Artillery (8.7/175mm) attached; Battery A, 5th Battalion, 22nd Artillery (8.7/175mm) OFCON; Battery C, 3rd Battalion, 319th Artillery (105mm M102) OFCON, and Battery D, 2nd Battalion, 320th Artillery (105mm M102) OFCON. All artillery batteries have sufficient training, personnel and equipment to accomplish their mission.

g. Communications: During the period 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969 the battalion communications section reoriented its resources to meet the changing tactical situation.

(1) When the battalion Tac CP closed into Phan Rang Air Force Base on 2 May 1969, VHF circuits were extended to the 1 FFORCDEV Provisional Artillery Group headquarters and to the Scrappy South operations facility in Phan Thiet to provide required land line communications throughout the AO. One AN/RC-46 with required security equipment and other communications items were left in Dalat for the recently formed 1 FFORCDEV Provisional Artillery Group to utilize until their equipment arrived.

(2) Pri Line Relay, 1 FFORCDEV Provisional Artillery Group, S-3 Operations, Scrappy South, and all fire bases were issued secure voice speech devices during the early part of June 1969. These secure speech devices enabled the fire bases to receive better information concerning the frequent tactical changes which took place within their firing fans.

(3) The AN/MPS-20 radar at Phan Rang was provided with a direct line to the AFB Central Security Control and another circuit to the FSCC located at MACV TOC, Phan Rang. These circuits cut the radar reaction time to mortar soundings which were received by both agencies. A circuit was installed between the ground control approach radar and the counter mortar radar, but this circuit was discontinued when the CCA radar was moved from Phan Rang Air Force Base.

(4) On 10 June 1969 the battalion Tac CP displaced to Song Mao and the following communications changes were established:

(a) VHF circuits were established between the Tac CP and 1 FFORCDEV Provisional Artillery Group, Scrappy Main in Phan Rang, Phan Thiet LD, and Scrappy South in Phan Thiet.

(b) An additional fire support coordination net was established for the northern Binh Thuan Province.
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(c) Six radios were installed on Nui Ta Dom Mountain as relay since FM radio communications could not be established between Song Mao and Phan Thiet.

(d) Scrappy South in Phan Thiet was increased to a full time telephone switching central utilizing SB-22.

(5) The 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery received two AN/GRC-142s in late May 1969. These radio vans have enabled the battalion to maintain steady secure radio teletype with its higher headquarters.

Section 2 (C) Lessons Learned; Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel:

(1) Observation: RTO personnel are extremely critical for smooth operation. When a unit has several fire bases, some due to fragmentation, there is almost complete reliability on radio communications. As a result, RTOs must be both proficient and knowledgeable of the operations and the part they play.

(2) Evaluation: There is little solidity as pertains to personnel in this type environment. It takes quite some time to train RTOs to understand the operations they are involved in and how they fit into it. When several RTOs rotate simultaneously, this can be detrimental to a unit's operations.

(3) Recommendation: That all units attempt to stagger their RTOs as pertains to their DEROS and have other personnel cross trained by rotation of jobs to prevent peak situations to occur.

(4) Observation: The utilization of flak vest on fire bases has prevented many deaths and serious injuries. While injuries may occur, serious chest or back wounds can be avoided.

(5) Evaluation. Most fire received in a fire base is from light mortars causing a wide pattern of shrapnel. It is entirely possible for an entire gun crew to become casualties rendering the gun out of action. The wearing of flak vests both reduces this possibility and induces more confidence in the crews.

(6) Recommendation: That whenever the unit's fire bases are subject to a period of mortaring, flak vests be worn at all times, zipped closed. This is especially critical during periods of congestion such as messing.
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b. Operations:

(1) Observation: When a unit has elements separated by quite a distance, the requirement for a command and control aircraft is highly important.

(2) Evaluation: This unit currently has 2 attached and 3 OFCON batteries besides its organic batteries. These batteries are spread out over 3 provinces plus maintaining a battalion rear in the 4th province. The battalion now occupies 9 fire bases and 2 Tac CPs at separate locations. This unit lost its LOH in April 1969 and receives only 1 dedicated UH-1 on a daily basis which doubles as a command and control and resupply aircraft. Some bases are accessible by vehicle, but the roads require clearing prior to use plus a security escort. In several instances the fire bases are accessible only by air.

(3) Recommendation: That units required to operate separate fire bases be given a higher priority for a command and control aircraft in addition to a dedicated UH-1 aircraft which must be used as a resupply aircraft.

(4) Observation: Areas subject to mortar fire can deter many such incidents with the employment of the TPS-25 radar set. (See Incl 4, LL TPS-25)

(5) Evaluation: The TPS-25 is designed to pick up personnel movement. As soon as the detection is complete, artillery should be employed to discourage the enemy from coming close enough to use mortars. TPS-25 targets should always be followed up by VBs and sweeps with the results reported.

(6) Recommendation: That consideration be given to employ the TPS-25 radar on fire bases, especially those subject to or receiving frequent mortar attacks. Also, by elevating the antenna mast section above its usual 25 ft. level, defilade can be eliminated.

(7) Observation: From 23 April 1969 to 4 May 1969, Battery C, 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery (3 How) participated in an operation via Tieu Atar Special Forces camp (2Y 021621). In preparation for this operation, due to the flexible nature that was indicated, the minimum essential equipment was taken to operate effectively for combat assault into the AO. While enroute from Dalat, one CH-47 stopped at Ban Ho That for refueling necessitating unhooking and re-hooking again by inexperienced personnel. This resulted in damaging the quadrant, quadrant mount and elevating gears of one howitzer which rendered it inoperable. This condition was not discovered until after insertion into the AO. Since this was the only howitzer to arrive the first day this resulted in the unit not being able to accomplish its mission until the second day when the other 2 howitzers
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arrived. Less than 10 individuals received their personal gear the first day and no section equipment arrived until the second day (1 set). Hook sorties continued to arrive late, too few or not at all on different occasions throughout the operation.

(8) Evaluation: When a unit heli-lifts into an operation, it is completely dependent upon aircraft for insertion and resupply. The manner in which this unit was inserted was completely unsatisfactory. The aircraft pilots would not carry Beehive and Firecracker ammunition internally.

(9) Recommendation: That personnel from the parent unit either be stationed at all bases the aircraft uses enroute or accompany the aircraft to be responsible for any unhooking and re-hooking. In the case of an abort, these personnel can be responsible for safeguarding the equipment and getting it to a back-up aircraft. Sufficient back-up aircraft must be provided in order for a unit to accomplish its assigned mission in a specified time frame.

c. Training: None
d. Intelligence: None
e. Logistics:

(1) Observation: This unit has 3 self-propelled batteries under its control. The requisition of parts and lack of qualified battalion track vehicle mechanics is a handicap.

(2) Evaluation: Periodic visits by maintenance battalion personnel are somewhat effective, but maintenance could be brought up to satisfactory level if this unit were assigned sufficient qualified personnel.

(3) Recommendation: That a senior track vehicle mechanic be attached to this unit to assist in the maintenance and requisition of parts for the self-propelled batteries.

f. Organization:

(1) Observation: Difficulties arise when more than one nation's artillery is located in proximity to each other.

(2) Evaluation: In Minh Thuan Province a Combined Fire Support Coordination Center was formed as a control element since US, ARVN and ROK artillery is
AVPK-AH-C

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Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFCR-65 (R1)

Located within the province. This resulted in more rapid requests for fire,
more rapid clearance of fires, adequate convoy coverage, more extensive counter-
mortar fires and more effective defensive fires for hamlets and villages.

(3) Recommendation: When possible, and in a unit's capabilities, a CFSCC
should always be established for the control of artillery fires.

g. Other:

(1) Observation: The constant use of water trailers on isolated fire bases
necessitates either constant resupply or additional water trailers in excess of
the unit's authority.

(2) Evaluation: In using the CH-47 for hooking out of water trailers
several times a week, the trailers are frequently damaged either by being bounced
around or by the sling catching external fittings such as faucets. The use of
600 gal fuel containers, converted as water pods and hooked out of and delivered
into the bed of a 21/2 ton truck to minimize damage and establish a ready means to
transport water once on the ground.

(3) Recommendation: When a fire base is accessible by convoy, consideration
should be given to provide that fire base with sufficient water pods to permit
pod exchanges, as well as trailer exchanges. Consideration should be given to
authorizing units water pods (old fuel pods) for aerial resupply.

(4) Observation: In unit splits the requirement for resupply of rations
is greater.

(5) Evaluation: If a unit inserts a cook with some mess gear, he can usually
provide 2 hot meals a day, reduce the necessity of bringing in hot meals and free
aircraft for more critical missions.

(6) Recommendation: That during splits units should give serious consider-
ation to providing a cook with limited mess gear. This normally will require
only 1 sorty a day for ration resupply.

(7) Observation: Personnel on isolated fire bases are lost to the unit up
to several days when they have to return to some rear area for dental care.

(8) Evaluation: By the use of mobile dental teams, much dental work can be
performed at the fire base itself resulting in reducing lost man days. A side
benefit is that the men seem to have better morale when they receive attention from personnel not normally associated with an isolated fire base.

(9) Recommendation: That units make arrangements and provide necessary transportation to insert dental teams to their fire bases on a recurring basis.

(10) Observation: The personnel at fire bases LZ Sherry and LZ Sandy are frequently subjected to road mining incidents.

(11) Evaluation: By insuring that all vehicles that enter or leave these fire bases are properly sandbagged, no injuries have occurred even though several vehicles have struck mines and received irreparable damage.

(12) Recommendation: That all units utilizing vehicles in any area subject to mining make extensive use of vehicle sandbagging. The effort involved is well worth saving lives or preventing injuries.

Incls 1 - 5 wd HQ, DA

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CG, USAVE ATTN: AVFA (OST) (2)
CG, I FFORCE Provisional (6)
Artillery Group ATTN: AVFA-AT-PG

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AVFA-AT-D (31 Jul 69) 1st Ind (C)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery, APO 96350 29 AUG 1969

TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFA-GC-OT, APO 96350

1. (U) This headquarters concurs with the subject report.

2. (U) Reference paragraph 2(1)(2)(3): This is a training and an assignment problem which should be handled at the battalion level. Neither this headquarters nor higher headquarters has any control over the assignment of personnel within a battalion. The impact of personnel losses due to DEROS can be lessened by proper assignment within the battalion.

3. (C) Reference paragraph 2b (6): Two AN/TPS-25's are usually assigned to one infantry division. This precludes the utilization of the set in a counter mortar role at the numerous firebases in a division's AO. The AN/MPQ-4A Counter mortar Radar is organic to the Direct Support Battalions. This radar which can rapidly be moved to a new position concurrent with the employment of a DS Battalion, provides the necessary flexibility needed to counter the enemy mortar rocket threat.

4. (U) Reference Inclosure 4: The discussion of the AN/TPS-25 is well reasoned and valid. An aggressive program of this sort not only increases the proficiency of both radar and gun crews, but also builds confidence in radar gunnery techniques.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JAMES N. HILL
Lieutenant Colonel, FA
Adjutant
CONFIDENTIAL

AWPA-CC-HIST (3 Jul 69) 2d Ind (C)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery for period ending 31 July 1969, HCS CSGR-05 (R1)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVMC-DST, APO 96355

18 SEP 1969

1. (U) This headquarters has evaluated subject ORL and forwarding endorsement and concurs, except as noted below.

2. (C) The following comments are made reference aviation support:

   a. Reference para 1(c)(a): The availability of aircraft and daily priorities determine the source of aviation support. The aviation unit stationed at Phan Thiet is normally in support of other tactical units in the Phan Thiet and Song Mao area. In the future aircraft from Phan Thiet will be provided when available, and on a priority basis.

   b. Reference para 2b(1): Concur. UH-1s have been centralized at specific locations for support of I FFORCEV Arty. Control and allocation of these aircraft for command and control purposes has been vested with I FFORCEV Arty.

   c. Reference para 2b(3): Non-concur, as pertains to resupply aircraft. Requests for UH-1 aircraft for resupply purposes are requested from and are approved by this headquarters on an availability and priority basis daily. Insufficient aviation assets preclude the dedication of a UH-1 to the 5/27 Arty.

   d. Reference para 2b(8): Concur. Planning and coordination between the supported ground unit and the supporting aviation unit will preclude future difficulties of the type mentioned in para 2b(7).

FOR THE COMMANDER:

FREDERICK E. HOLLAND
1LT AGO
ASST AB

CF:
1 - I FFORCEV Arty
1 - 5/27 Arty

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10
AVHGC-DST (31 July 69) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery for Period
        Ending 31 July 1969, REG CSFOR-65 (R1)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO:  Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
       APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned
for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, 5th
Battalion, 27th Artillery and concurs with the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. J. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy fumed:
5/27th Arty
1 FFV
GPOP-DT (31 Jul 69) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 5th Battalion 27th Artillery for
Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96550 16 OCT 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C., 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

CPT, AGC
Asst AG
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May 69 to 31 July 69.

CO, 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery

Report Date: 31 July 1969

Supplementary Notes: N/A

Abstract: N/A