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1st Cavalry Division Artillery
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
1ST CAVALRY DIVISION ARTILLERY (AIRMOBILE)
APO 96490

AVL1J-R-CC

12 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (AM) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 RL

Commanding General
1st Cavalry Division
APO 96490


SYNOPSIS

Throughout the period 1 May 69 to 31 July 69, the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) conducted operations within the scope of II FFORCE Operation TOAN THANG Phase III in the III Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ). Operations were conducted in AO MONTANA SCOUT northeast of TAY NINH, north of D:U TIENG in the vicinity of the "Fishhook" of the Cambodian Border, AO COMANCHE WARRIOR southeast of PHUOC VINH and northeast of BIEN HOA, AO CREEK II east of AO COMANCHE WARRIOR and SSE of PHUOC VINH, and AO KENTUCKY COUGAR, the old AO MONTANA SCOUT plus the addition of PHUOC LONG and VINH LONG Provinces, extending east to the III CTZ border. Emphasis on operations at the beginning of the reporting period was generally in AO MONTANA SCOUT with artillery units deployed to support maneuver forces conducting offensive operations, interdicting movement of major enemy forces south into critical III CTZ areas, and locating, reducing, or eliminating enemy base camps, supply bases, training and rest camps, and river crossing sites throughout the III CTZ. As intelligence revealed an increasing threat on the outskirts of BIEN HOA, 3rd Brigade shifted its resources to AO COMANCHE WARRIOR and subsequently to AO CREEK II, where great amounts of enemy material were located and were further denied to hostile forces. Toward the end of June 1969, the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) with the 11th ACR (-) under OPCON concentrated again to the north and initiated operations in AO KENTUCKY COUGAR. Additional emphasis was placed on assistance to SVN/FP units, enhancing pacification throughout the III CTZ, and interdicting primary enemy infiltration and exfiltration routes. The period was marked with numerous stand-off and heavy ground attacks against artillery fire support bases, and heavy enemy contact in AO MONTANA SCOUT.

a. Organization.

(1) Direct Support Artillery. The month of May began with the 2d Battalion, 19th Arty (-) in DS of the 1st Bde at TAY NINH West (XT 165315) with 5/2/19 on LZ CAROLYN (XT 276726), and OPCON units 6/1/77 on LZ IKE (XT 34715) and 6/1/77 on LZ GRANT (XT 36762L) providing support to

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MANEUVER UNITS IN AO MONTANT SCOUT CONTINUING OPERATION TUAN THANG III.

The 1st Battalion, 77th Artillery (-) was in GS of the 2nd Bde engaged in operations in the eastern portion of AO MONTANT SCOUT with B/1/77 on LZ DOLLY (AT 522588), and OPCON units /1/21 on LZ JIKE (AT 632665) and B/2/19 on LZ JIKE (AT 48712). 3rd Bde, involved in Operation MONTANA BLACKFOOT, a continuation of MONTANA SCOUT and MONTANA RAIDER operations, was supported by 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery, with B/1/21 on LZ HYLLIS (YT 538805) and C/1/21 on LZ JAKE (AT 628815). C/2/19 at this time was located a Camp Gorvad, supporting 1/8 Cav offensive operations in AO CHIEF.

(2) GENERAL SUPPORT ARTILLERY.

At the beginning of the period, 26th Battalion, 20th Artillery (ARA) was in GS of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) with B/2/20 at Tay Ninh West and GSR 2/19 Arty, B/2/20 at Camp Gorvad and GSR 1/77 Arty, and C/2/20 at Quan Loi, GSR 1/21 Arty. The 1st battalion, 30th Artillery was in GS of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) with /1/30 (-) 2/19 Arty located at LZ GRANT (AT 307624), B/1/30 GSR 2/19 Arty located at LZ CANVIN (AT 276786), /1/30 (Plt) GSR 1/77 Arty located at LZ DOLLY (AT 522588), and C/1/30 GSR 1/21 Arty located at LZ JIKE (AT 628615). Additional supporting fires of all calibers were provided to the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery by elements of the 23rd Artillery Group, II FFORGEV Artillery. At the beginning of the period, these units had the following dispositions: 8/6 Arty (OPCON 1st Cav Div Arty) with a mission of providing an artillery headquarters to coordinate and control the fires of elements operating under TF MEHUL (3d Brigade established this TF on 30 April 69). These firing elements include 2/11 How and 3/11 Hbw Batteries organic to 11th CR and C/2/13 GSR 1st Cav Div Arty, being utilized in NO JIKE (Loc Ninh) to add light support to TF MEHUL. C/6/27, 1st GSR 1st Cav Div Arty, was located at Camp Gorvad and provided heavy artillery support along with the remaining batteries of 6/27 Artillery located throughout the T.O.I. 1/3/197 (155) was GSR 1/77 Arty and was positioned at LZ THUNDER III (AT 766855) to assist in the security of Hwy 13.

(3) AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY.

The period began with 3d Plt (Provisional), Ptry C, 4th Bn, 60th A.D. ARTY, attached to the 1st Cavalry Division (AM). Platoon assets included four M12, L 6 tubes, and one 30 inch Xenon searchlight. For the entire period two Dusters were located at CAF CAVDIV with a mission of GS 1st Cav Div. In this role they provided security for work parties, mine sweeping teams, and road convoys passing through NO CHIEF, in addition to providing direct and indirect fires support in the NO. Two Dusters at LZ JIKE (AT 628615), CAF 1/21 Arty, has a similar mission throughout the reporting period. The Quad .50s and 23 inch searchlight moved frequently between critical FSBs during the period, in active response to the changing tactical situation. CAF CAVDIV defenses retained a Quad .50 and searchlight team throughout the reporting period, although the specific elements rotated from time to time. The NH/TVS-3 (30 inch Xenon Searchlight) was evacuated from CAF CAVDIV on 8 June for depot maintenance.

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It was returned on 15 July and was awaiting completion of a 60 foot searchlight tower for employment atop that facility at the close of the reporting period. A second team provided defensive fires and illumination at LZ CHUIT for the entire period (1 May - 31 July). A third team, .50 -searchlight team, GSR 1/77 "Artillery" was placed at LZ JOE early in the reporting period because an attack against the FSB was anticipated (See para b (2), On 23 May the team moved from LZ JOE to LZ LORI where they remained until 22 June reinforcing the fires of 1/77 Arty. On this date LZ LORI was closed out, and operations in AO KENTUCKY COUGA necessitated separating this particular team. The Quad .50 moved through LZ LETTY to LZ ANDY for base defense and the searchlight was positioned at LZ JAMIE, where each remained for the balance of the period. The fourth team, GSR 1/21 Arty reinforced defenses on LZ PHILLIS early in May, displacing through CAMP GOVAD and on LZ LIBBY in conjunction with 3d Brigade deployment in AO COMANCHE "Waddell. The team remained ON LZ LIBBY for two days before moving to LZ ROCK for two weeks (21 May - 7 June). On 7 June the team was again relocated at LZ JOY where it played a key role in the LZ defense while under heavy enemy attack. When operations in AO COMANCHE Waddell terminated, the Quad .50 - searchlight team accompanied 3d Brigade elements to AO KENTUCKY COUGA and remained in position at LZ WESTCOTT throughout the balance of the reporting period.

B. Operation TO. IN TILING III, "O MONTANT SCOUT"

(1) General: As the reporting period began, this operation was well established as 1st Cavalry Division elements continued offensive operations to interdict movement of major enemy forces south through critical areas of II CTZ, and to locate and destroy enemy forces, facilities and material. To accomplish this mission, 1st Brigade operated in the western portion of "O MONTANT SCOUT" south of base area 353, 2nd Brigade in the eastern portion of the AO north of the Michelin Rubber Plantation, and 3rd Brigade in the vicinity of base area 352, the FISHHOOK, and LOC NINH (AU LANCE).

(2) EXECUTION: Beginning with the first day of the reporting period TF DURAC was replaced by TF MEEHAN and 11th ACR elements proceeded to LN LOC / Quan Loi for a maintenance standdown of short duration. With light batteries at LZ PHILLY and at LZ JAKE, medium artillery also at LZ JAKE and LN based at Quan Loi, 1/21 Artillery was well prepared to support 3rd Brigade in the Phuoc Long and Phuoc Dinh areas. To the west, stand-off attacks in addition to numerous ground assaults, were mounted against the major landing zones in "O MONTANT SCOUT." On 060250 May, LZ MEEKLY received a heavy volume of incoming rounds, estimated at more than 200 including 107mm rockets, 75mm RAs, 82 and 60mm mortars, followed by heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire. The firing batteries /1/2/19 & B/1/30

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returned fire on pre-selected countermortar/rocket targets. The AM/HERC-4 radar located at LZ CAROLYN acquired several mortar/rocket positions and these were also taken under fire. The howitzers then commenced direct fire on targets approximately 200 meters outside the LZ perimeter while the base piece provided self illumination. Nine sections of ARA from A/2/20 were committed to the action, expending 964 2.75" HE rockets and 239 Flechette rockets during the attack and were credited with 24 kills. At approximately 0300 hours, the ammunition storage area received two direct hits from incoming shells, setting it on fire and subsequently detonating HE and WP ammunition which covered the position with shell fragments. A/2/19 maintained a barrage of Beehive, Firecracker, WP and "Killer Junior", expending over 800 rounds in direct fire and 100 rounds in indirect fire. B/1/30 fired 597 rounds in defense of the LZ and was credited with 25 kills while suffering 25 WIA within the battery. All available artillery within range was quickly called into action and completely surrounded the FSB with final protective and blocking fires. The attack, made by a regimental enemy force, was suppressed at 0600 leaving the ammunition and POL dumps destroyed, 9 US KIA and 64 US WIA. Enemy losses included 101 NVA KIA, 29 NVA WIA, 42 AK-47s, 6 SKS's, 11 RPG-2s, 3 RPG-7s, 9 RPG-MG's, 2 x 60mm mortars, 2 radials, 1 field phone, and 1 .30 cal MG captured. Also on 6 Aug, at 0323H, LZ JOE received a ground probe prefaced by a 60mm and 82mm mortar attack, followed by B-40 rockets. A/1/30, B/1/77, and A/3/197 immediately engaged preselected counter-mortar targets and were assisted by ARA. The results of this attack were 8 NVA KIA, 4 US KIA and 25 US WIA. On 120245H May and on 130315 May, LZs JAMIE and CHANT respectively came under heavy ground attack. At LZ JAMIE, a regimental size force attempted a coordinated assault, firing over 200 rounds of mixed 82mm mortar and 107mm rocket ammunition. LZ JOE received mortars and small arms at the same time leading to the belief that these attacks were well planned, as LZ JOE and LZ JAMIE were mutually supporting FSBs. Following the indirect fire attack at LZ JAMIE the enemy employed 12.7 mm machine guns, B-40 and B-47 rockets, recoilless rifles and sappers against the FSBs. At 0345 hours, the NVA had occupied one bunker on the southern portion of the perimeter, after breaching the wire. A/2/19 counterattacked with direct fire and six sections of ARA supported the LZ until contact was broken at 0645H. Results of the engagement were 83 NVA KIA, 7 US KIA, 35 US WIA, and 1 x 105mm howitzer damaged by rockets. At LZ CHANT, the enemy attacked with a two company size force employing heavy small arms, B-40 and indirect fire. The perimeter was breached but subsequently retaken by the QRF. Tube artillery, six sections of ARA, Flare and Spooky gunships supported the defenders. All available artillery within range was fired on avenues of approach around the LZ. Fire plans covering routes of withdrawal were distributed to available artillery units and their fires commenced as soon as contact was broken. Flechette rockets were employed by ARA on the withdrawal routes. The contact broke at 0500H with the following results: 45 NVA KIA, 3 NVA WIA, 6 AK-47s, 6 RPG-7s, 6 RPG-2s, 1 pistol, 96 Chinese grenades, 11 B-40 rds, 15 sawed off charges and 2 Bangalore torpedoes captured or destroyed. Friendly casualties were 5 US KIA and 40 US WIA. The first two weeks of the reporting period
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was characterized by numerous significant attacks on 1st Cav Div FSBs which were abortive in nature as evidenced by enemy failure in every attempt and by his extremely high casualty rate. During 7-12 May, 11th ACR elements were no longer in a standdown posture, 1/11 How Ltry having displaced to XT 641707 on 7 May and 2/11 How Btry to LZ IVA (1VA) on 8 May to provide support to maneuver elements operating in AOs WULT AND SUEZ (Vic XT 5961). On 13 May, 3d Bde and 1/21 Arty (-) began displacement to AU COMANCHE WABILUM, NE of Bien Hoa picking up E/2/20 GSR 1/21st Arty, and releasing C/2/20 to become GSR 1/77 Arty, (see para C, Operation COMANCHE WABILUM). On the same day, 1st Sqn, 11th ACR was released and 2d Bde assumed control of the 11th ACR AO. 1/1/21, remaining at LZ JUE, was placed under OPCON of 1/77 Arty. In conjunction with the redeployment of forces, C/1/30 moved to QUAN LOI on 13 May in preparation for assignment to operations in AU COMANCHE WABILUM. Similarly, C/1/21 displaced to BIEN HOA and subsequently to LZ LOIS on the same day. As a result of increasing enemy activity in AU MUNTANA SCOUT and plans to begin operations in AU COMANCHE WABILUM, B/6/15 was moved with approval of II FFORCE Artillery from LZ SHIRLEY (XT 762893) to LZ WHITE (XT 444625) to lend additional artillery support to maneuver forces in that AO. The AN/TPQ-4 radar at LZ CULWYN was repositioned at LZ ST. BANANA on 14 May to more effectively cover the western reaches of the 1st Bde AO. Two days later, A/2/19 and B/1/30 (-) followed, closing out LZ CULWYN and in position at LZ ST. BANANA to support 2/12 Cav in offensive operations. Also on 16 May, B/1/30 (Flt) moved from LZ CULWYN to LZ GUNT, effectively redistributing medium artillery support for 2/12 Cav, covering the loss of FSB CULWYN. These moves were partially in response to the recent and widespread attacks on fire bases. On 16 May, defenders at LZ IKE (XT 341715) repulsed a 30 - 40 man ground probe, believed to be a sapper attack. Individuals carrying satchel charges were observed through a starlight scope attempting to breach the perimeter's second wire. The enemy was immediately engaged by mortar, tube artillery, ARA and Spooky gunships.

In all, all available artillery was fired in to the attacking force and a comprehensive blocking fire plan was initiated to cover routes of withdrawal. The action terminated at 0400H with the following results: 11 NVA KIA, 2 NVA Pls, 6 AK55s, 1 B40 rocket launcher, 2 satchel charges, 2 Bangalore torpedoes, captured or destroyed and 2 US KIA. On 23 May, an anticipated attack against LZ JOE (XT 632665) materialized as the enemy pounded the FSB with 200 rounds of rocket and mortar fire, followed by an estimated reinforced company sized ground attack. In addition to artillery and ARA support, Air Defense Artillery (ADA) pumped 3700 rounds of .50 ammunition onto the enemy force from Quad 50 on location. After contact was broken, the enemy suffered 6 KIA and friendly casualties amounted to 18 NIA. Also on 23 May, 5/7 Cav had begun improvements on LZ CAI (XT 666622) and by 1700H both A/1/71 and A/3/197 had closed this LZ to support offensive operations. On 25 May, B/1/77 (Flt) participated in a 1/5 Cav operation cleaning up a recently discovered food and weapons cache.
B/1/77 (Plt) displaced to LZ PHILLY on 25 Mar, and two days later rejoined the battery at LZ DOLLY. Enemy activity was light and scattered for the first five days in June. On the sixth day LZ JAMIE again received incoming rocket and mortar fire followed by a multi-sided ground probe that lasted most of the night. Immediately after the attack began, B/2/19 engaged counter mortar/rocket targets firing both HE and ICM. A total of four sections of 105s were on station as sappers were continually attempting to breach the perimeter wire. The LZ was mutually supported by medium artillery from Lzs GAU1 and DOLLY. At 0900H, Sabre 11, 1st Sqn, 9th Cavalry Scout Team spotted 90 - 100 NVI in the open, 900 meters NE of LZ JAMIE. Medium artillery, A/1/30 (Plt), from LZ DOLLY attacked with HE and ICM and an air strike was called in.

Assessment for artillery was 15 NVA KIA, 10 bunkers and 100 meters of trench-line destroyed. US casualties were 2 KIA and 7 WIA. Following this action, A/1/30 (-) moved from LZ GAU1 to LZ JAMIE, and was ready to fire by 1345H.

On 8 June, B/2/19 returned to the control of the 2/19 battery due to a boundary change, and continued to support the 2/7 Cav while conducting follow up operations for heavy artillery in LO QULJ. On 12-13 June, 1/12 Cav (supported by C/2/19) and 2/12 Cav (supported by C/1/77) switched places, giving 2/12 Cav the mission of securing CHIEF and GAU1. B/2/19 returned to LZ GAU1 with 1/12 Cav and continued supporting that unit in offensive operations in LO MONTANA SCOUT. This move placed all three organic batteries of 2/19 artillery under the control of its parent headquarters. Also on 12 June, LZ DOLLY received incoming mortar fire, and countermortar targets were immediately engaged by the artillery located at that LZ. On 15 June, A/1/21 (Plt) moved from LZ IDAL to LZ JAMIE to more effectively cover maneuvers of 5/7 Cav. The second attack on LZ IKE during this reporting period occurred on 18 June when an estimated reinforced company sized unit attacked with heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire under a cover of 60mm mortars and 840 rockets. Three LPS were unable to close into the perimeter, which restrained the artillery from counterattacking with direct fire. When the LPS finally closed, the artillery opened up with "Killer Junior" and firesupport. All available artillery engaged the enemy and withdrawal routes were effectively covered by fire. Contact broke at 0330H leaving 37 NVI: 21 NVA KIA, 3 NVA PltA, 10 AK47s and 5 RPG launchers. Friendly casualties were 3 US KIA and 7 US WIA. A third attempt to overrun LZ IKE occurred two days later when an estimated heavily reinforced enemy battalion (K2, 18B Regiment) poured 30 - 35 107mm rockets, 40 X 57mm RR rounds, 45 X 82mm mortar rounds, 80 X 840 rounds, and 60 X 60mm mortar rounds into the LZ, followed by heavy small arms and .51 cal M2 fire. A 60mm lird-dog was immediately dispatched with the dual mission of directing artillery fire for the LZ and restoring and maintaining communications which had been lost during the heavy barrage. The enemy was engaged with organic tube artillery, GAU and Shadow ships. B/1/77 fired firecracker and "Killer Junior" in continuous direct fire and provided self-illumination for the LZ.
available artillery again covered routes of withdrawal to the northwest as contact broke at 0240, leaving 90 NVA KIA, 15 NVA Pkts, 10 82mm RRs, 2 SSK rifles, 23 AK/7s, 3 RPD light MGs, and 2 E-81 rocket launchers. Friendly casualties were 7 US KIA and 19 US WIA. After reported heavy attacks on 1st Cav Div FSBs during this reporting period, the enemy suffered severe manpower and equipment losses, and failed to experience even limited success in any of his overrun attempts. Beginning 21 June, preparations for a major redistribution of 1st Cav Division maneuver elements and supporting artillery were begun. 5/7 Cav began construction of LZ BERTY (AS 866654) and on 21 June /1/21 (Pit) moved from LZ UMO (OR LZ BERTY.

The next day, /1/21 (-) followed, completing the new FSB with 552 WIA KIA, 5 VNA WIA. 1/7 Cav CP also on 22 June, /3/197 (-) moved to LZ THUNDER III, closing LZ DLQ. On 24 June, 40 HONTANA SCOUT was replaced by NO KENTUCKY COUGAR.

C. OPERATION COMANCHE WARRIOR:

(1) General: The 3d brigade was assigned the mission of detecting and interdicting enemy buildup north and northeast of BIEN HOA - BIEN HAN complex. Intelligence indicated an increasing threat in that area (NO COMANCHE WARRIOR), prompting employment of the 3d Brigade and its direct support and reinforcing artillery.

(2) Planning: In preparation for the redistribution of forces to NO COMANCHE WARRIOR, C/1/30 (CSR 1/21 Arty) moved from LZ JAKE (YT 625815) on 13 May to QUIN LOI and on to BIEN HOA the next day via fixed wing transport. C/1/21 already moved from LZ JAKE to BIEN HOA and in support of the 1/8 Cav, was displaced to LZ LOIS (YT 129230) on 13 May, joining D/2/40, 105mm Battery of the 199th LFB in BS of the 3/7 Inf. On 14 May, B/1/21 deployed LZ PHILLIS (YT 536065), moved through PHUC VIET, and closed at LZ CINDY (YT 137106) on 15 May, prepared to support the 1/7 Cav. B/2/20, at CP/2/20, was placed in CSR 1/21 Artillery for this operation, with a limited 90mm, refueling and rearming facility set up at LZ DUSTY END (Victors 4733). On 15 May, C/1/20 deployed BIEN HOA and moved into LZ LOIS in position to lend medium artillery support to all elements of 3d Bde. Offensive operations continued and intelligence indicated that a greater enemy threat existed to the east. On 20 May, NO CREEK II came into effect to meet the enemy buildup, and 1/7 Cav began construction of LZ LIBBY (YT 432390). B/1/21 moved from LZ CINDY to LZ LIBBY, closing on 20/7/20, prepared to support new offensive operations in NO CREEK II, approximately 20 kilometers SNE of XU-LIN. During the next few days, elements of 1/7 Cav CINDY received incoming rockets and several small ground probes. PWS were taken in the enemy force was identified as elements of the 2d Bn, 272d Regt, 5th VC DIVISION.
On 23 May, the 3/7 Inf (OPCON 1st Cav) moved into LZ LOIS and continued to be supported by D/2/40 Artillery (OPCON 1/21 Arty). On the same day, C/1/21 departed LZ LOIS and was repositioned at LZ ROCK (XT 483553) closing at 1330L and in support of 1/8 Cav. Following these moves, HQ 1/21 dislocated from D/2/40 to BL/CHANCE (Vic AU/N LOC) in order to facilitate positive control. Activity decreased in AO COMMUNE 1/21 and increased in AO CREEK II (mainly the uncovering of food and supply caches), C/1/30 moved from LZ LOIS to LZ LLIBY, joining B/1/21 on 24 May and in position to lend heavier artillery support in destroying bunker and fighting position complexes also found in that area. Activity in AO COMMUNE 1/21 continued to decrease, and on 30 May, the AO was turned over to the 18th RVN Div. The next day, 3/7 Inf and D/2/40 were released to become under OPCON of CO/21 and LZ LOIS was closed. 3d Bde elements continued to uncover supply caches, reporting a total food stuff tonnage of 170 tons during the period 24 May through 14 June. Enemy contact increased, and the 1/7 Cav opened LZ JOY (YT678256) followed by its supporting artillery, B/1/21, which arrived from LZ LLIBY on 051745 June. Tons of supplies were found, and numerous bunker complexes were reported along with increasing enemy activity. On 7 June, LZ LLIBY was closed as C/1/30 moved to LZ JOY, once again lending the weight of medium artillery to hard targets in the area. On 12 June LZ JOY received a battalion-sized ground attack preceded by a heavy combined rocket and mortar barrage. Artillery supported the defenders combing blocking fires, direct fire and AR fires, breaking up the attack after nearly three hours. Of significant importance in this action was the additional firepower and illumination provided the FSB defense by ADA assets located at LZ JOY specifically, a Quad .50 machine gun and a 23 inch Xenon searchlight. At the time of the attack, a dense fog had settled over the LZ which greatly limited the fires of "RA" and Spooky. Limited visibility also made ryuko operations extremely hazardous. The SLT was placed at the center of the LZ, and its light was directed vertically as a beacon for the aircraft in addition to providing adequate direct light for the defenders to engage the enemy in the wooded surrounding the FSB. The Quad .50 MG was brought into action as it moved to reinforce that portion of the perimeter which was under attack, and expended over 10,000 rounds as it moved quickly from position to position. This action vividly demonstrates the great value of automatic weapons and searchlights in support of FSB defenses. The results of the battle were 26 KIA, 1 FM, 3 US KIA and 6 US WIA. Enemy activity remained light and scattered in AO CREEK II, aimed primarily at keeping 1st Cav Div elements from locating and destroying additional supply bases. Operations in AO CREEK II terminated on 23 June and 3d Bde elements redeployed north to VINH LONG and THI HIGH Provinces, preparing for operations in AO KENTUCKY COMM.R. Beginning 21 June, C/1/30 moved to BL/CHANCE in preparation for the new operation, and began a northward movement through VINH LONG and VINH VINH for redeployment in the VINH LONG area. Also on 21 June, B/1/21 moved from LZ JOY to LZ LLIBY (GUAN LOI), closing at 1015L and temporarily under OPCON of 6/21 Artillery.
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SUBJECT: Operation Report of the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (AN) for Operation TOAN THANG III - AO KENTUCKY COUGAR

D. OPERATION TOAN THANG III - AO KENTUCKY COUGAR:

(1) General: Although the basic mission of the 1st Cavalry Division remained essentially the same, when AO KENTUCKY COUGAR became effective on 24 June, added emphasis was given to joint operations with CIDG and ARVN forces. The 1st Cav Div TACO increased to the east, extending as far as the III CTZ boundary, and military effort was significantly enhanced to advance pacification at District and Province levels. The 11th ACR (-) was again placed under OPCON of the 1st Cav Div on 22 June, and was assigned an AO in conjunction with its mission of securing QL 13 (Thunder Road) and interdicting enemy movements throughout. All brigade size elements of the 1st Cav Div, with their full complement of DS and GS Artillery, commenced operations in AO KENTUCKY COUGAR.

(2) Planning: With the 11th ACR operating in a separate AO, coordination was made with II FFORGE Artillery and with 23d GROUP Artillery to provide an artillery headquarters capable of controlling and coordinating the artillery assets available to the 11th ACR. 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery (GSR 1st Cav Div Artillery located at QUAN LOI) was given the additional mission of DS 11th ACR and provided OPCON of 2d How Btry, 3d How Btry, F/16 (155 towed), C/2/13 (105 towed) and F/3/197 (155 towed). Initially, B/1/21 was also placed under OPCON 6/27 until its parent battalion arrived in the new AO. Artillery in support of 1st and 2d Brigades remained in position at the close of AO NOME NAM SCOUT. On 23 June, C/1/30 closed at CHP GORVIL in preparation to continue its displacement by road convey to QUAN LOI. On the same day, all 3d Brigade maneuver elements left LZ ROCK and AO GORVI II for deployment through QUAN LOI. 1/21 Artillery assumed responsibility for QUAN LOI base defense upon closing LZ GRAY.

(3) Execution: On 26 June, C/1/21 moved from LZ ROCK to LZ WESTCUTT (XT 059906) in support of the 1/8 Cav, B/1/21 reverted to control of 1/71 Artillery located at QUAN LOI. Units under OPCON of 6/27 Artillery were positioned as follows: 2d How Btry - LZ SHIRLEY (Vic AN LOC), 3d How Btry - LZ SIDEWINDER (XT 769820), F/16 - LZ JUIN (QUAN LOI), C/2/13 - LZ SHIRLEY (AN LOC) and F/3/197 LZ THUNDER III (XT 768655). Distribution of heavy artillery (8" - 175mm) placed F/6/27 at LZ JUIN, B/6/27 at LZ BUTTONS (SUNG BE) and C/6/27 at CHP GORVIL. On 26 June, C/1/30 completed its move and closed LZ BUTTONS at 1710 H. On 27 June, 1/1/21 moved from LZ BETTY to LZ JOE and prepared for a fixed-wing C-130 move to the SONG BE area. 1/1/21 closed LZ JUIN (LT 254149) on 171220 June, in position to support 5/7 Cav offensive operations. With maneuver elements and supporting artillery organized and positioned in the 11th ACR and 3d Bde AO, the 1st Cav Div now conducted offensive operations extending across an unprecedented 150 kilometers of primary infiltration routes. Throughout AO KENTUCKY COUGAR, no maneuver element was without artillery coverage, and all FMs were mutually supported by artillery fires - a task not easily accomplished.
CONSIDERING THE

June, 2/11 Sqn extended THUNDER CAVD security north, placing 2d How Btry at LZ KELLY (XU 733084), and conducted mechanized RIF operations from that FSB. The occupation of LZ BUTTONS provided an excellent location for the counterterror radar, and on 2 July the C-4 at LZ ST BILBAO was moved to LZ BUTTONS by fixed wing aircraft. To insure mutual support and to extend medium artillery influence, C/1/30 (-) moved from LZ BUTTONS to LZ WINDZOT, joining C/1/21 on 2 July. Concurrently, boundary changes between 1st and 2d Brigade AOs placed C/2/19 and B/1/30 (-) at LZ CHIEF GSR 1/77 ARty and /1/30 (-) at LZ JEWEL GSR 2/15 ARty. 155mm howitzers located at LZs CHIEF, DOLLY, and JEWEL continued to be mutually supporting and provided effective support of medium artillery across all infiltration routes through the western region of AO KENTUCKY COUCH, on 6 July, offensive operations were conducted northeast of LZ KELLY and north of LZ FORD CHIEF (XU 929082). To effectively support the 1/7 Cav, 2d How Btry 11th ARty displaced east to LZ ALICE (XT 231435) remaining in the 11th ARTY, but now under OPCON of 2/11 Artillery. Similarly, B/1/21 moved from LZ JUDY to LZ KELLY, filling the void left by 2d How Btry and was placed under OPCON of 6/27 ARty. On 7 July, 2/12 Cav in AO CHIEF and 1/5 Cav at LZ DOLLY reversed their positions, retaining habitual association with C/1/77 and B/1/77 Artillery through their concurrent displacement. Closing time was 1715H, with B/1/77 under OPCON of 1/30 ARty at CAVD and C/1/77 under organic control of 1/77 ARty at LZ DOLLY. B/6/15 at LZ WHITE, GSR 1st Cav Div ARty, departed to KENTUCKY COUCH for redeployment at DJU TIAMO on 6 July. Intelligence information prompted the opening of LZ BECKY (XT 372210) with 2/8 Cav on 9 July. This battalion was placed under OPCON of 1st Bde and was followed by /2/19 from LZ ST BILBAO, closing at LZ BECKY 09450H. In PHOC LONG Province, 5/7 Cav began joint operations with 1/7 CAVD on 10 July to the west of LZ ELLER (XU 039062). /1/21 departed and closed out LZ JUDY, arriving at LZ ELLER to provide direct support artillery. Along QL 13, 3d How Btry, 11th ARty moved frequently in the vic of LZs THUNDER III, DOLLY, JEWEL (XT 720850) and BUTTON (XT 695928), always within supporting range of road convoys. On 13 July, 2d How Btry 11th ARty and B/1/21 returned to control of their parent units, B/1/21 moved from LZ KELLY to LZ VIVIAN (XU 908024) in support of 1/7 Cav offensive operations and 2d How Btry returned to LZ KELLY. On 14 July, boundary changes placed B/2/19 OPCON and /1/30 (-) GSR to 1/77 Artillery with LZ JEWEL now located in the 2d Bde AO. Current intelligence indicated that the 5th VC Division was moving north through PHOC LONG Province. To meet this contingency 2/12 Cav and C/1/77 located at LZ DOLLY were airlifted to DJU TIAMO on 17 July and constructed FSB O'KEEFE (YT 197839). By 1401H, the battery was laid and ready to fire and under OPCON of 1/21 Artillery. To provide fire support at LZ DOLLY B/6/15 was returned to KO KENTUCKY COUCH, occupying the LZ with a mission of FP FORCESV. In the 11th ARTY, 2d How Btry displaced from LZ KELLY to XT 772027 in support of joint RIF operations involving 2/11 Sqn, 4/9 MAN and Recon Company 9th ARVN.
In accordance with plans to release LZ ST BiRdui to the 25th Inf Div, 3/1/30 (Flt) deployed on 18 Jul to LZ O'KEEFE, adding medium artillery support to that critical area with a mission of GSR 1/21 Artillery. Concurrently, II FROGCEV artillery placed C/6/15 (Flt) on LZ ST BiRdui for defense of the FSB. As of 21 July, LZ ST BiRdui was controlled by the 25th Inf Div. On 27 July, boundary and mission changes for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Brigades resulted in the closure of LZ IRE. The 2nd Brigade assumed control of that portion of the 3rd Brigade's AO South of the SUOI C.T. RIVER and north of AO CHIEF. A/1/77 moved from LZ IRE to SUOI BE by airlift on 27 July. At 2000H Jul 27 LZ JG 12/19 at LZ JG 12/19 and B/6/15 at LZ DOLLY came under the OPCON of the 2/19 Art. On 27 Jul, A/1/77 was airlifted to LZ MARY (YT 265998) and was operational by 281700H Jul in DS of the 2/5 Cav. At 281700H July, 1/77th Art assumed control of 1/1/77 and C/1/77 from 1/21 Art which had exercised control of those batteries during the initial stages of the 2d Brigade's occupation of its new TAOR. The reporting period ended with the 1/77 Art in direct support of the 2d Brigade in the new TAOR.

E. OPERATIONS IN AO CHIEF:

(1) General: During the period, the maneuver battalion assigned to AO CHIEF (with the mission of securing the area surrounding the 1st Cavalry Division base camp at Camp Gordon) turned the AO over to a sister battalion three times. In each case, the transition was accompanied by a similar change in the direct support artillery battery, thereby maintaining the concept of habitual association. The period was highlighted by several unsuccessful enemy attacks against CHIEF CO/2AD and a significant extension of the AO's boundaries concurrently with adoption of AO KENTUCKY CO/2AD.

(2) Execution: As the period opened, artillery disposition at CHIEF CO/2AD included 1st bn 30th Artillery, GS 1st Cav Div (AM), performing the traditional mission of coordinating and controlling artillery fires in support of operations in AO CHIEF. C/2/19 Artillery, OPCON 1/30 Artillery, was in direct support of 1/8 Cav. Additional artillery included C/6/27 (8" - 175mm), F/8/6 (4.2" How), and C/2/13 (105mm) each GSR 1st Cav Div Art. 2d Bn, 20th Art, GS 1st Cav Div, and B/2/20, GSR 1/77 Artillery, provided AAA support. Enemy activity remained at an extremely low level and on 10 May C/2/13 departed CHIEF CO/2AD redeploying with the 11th ACR in vic AN LOC. On 11 May activity increased sharply as E/1/8 Cav conducted a successful ambush in vic XT 960460 south of the perimeter resulting in 6 VC KIA, and 10 KL7s, 146 satchel charges, 9 gas masks and 19 sets of web gear captured. On 12 May, the enemy launched a severe attack on the north side of the perimeter following a rocket and mortar attack. After individuals in the wire had been engaged with organic weapons and six sections of 1R4, first light checks revealed 9 VC KIA and 84 satchel
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SUBJECT: Operation Report of the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (M) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, HCS CP FOR-65 (RI)

charges captured. On 13 May, 1/8 Cav departed for operations in AO CHIEF and was replaced by 1/12 Cav, with C/2/19 remaining in position. On 16 May, C/1/9 Cav again came under attack, receiving 31 X 107mm rockets from four separate volleys during the night. Although artillery immediately fired counter-rocket targets and ARV and Spooky engaged suspected firing positions, there was no enemy assessment. Enemy activity decreased over the next 30 days and consisted mainly of numerous token stand-off attacks and very small unit contacts resulting in no significant friendly casualties or damage. On 10 June, 1/30 Artillery assumed control of the RHOC VINH WCC. On 13 June, 1/12 Cav moved to LZ DOLLY, changing places with 2/12 Cav at that LZ, while the latter initiated operations in AO CHIEF. C/2/19 and C/1/77 made a like exchange, maintaining the concept of habitual association. On 25 June, 1/1/9 Cav spotted numerous bunkers and individuals via XT 994370. After engagements throughout the day, supported by artillery and ARV, enemy KIA were assessed at 13. On 26 June, concurrently with the changing 1st Cav Div T/O, AO CHIEF expanded to include the SONG BE RIVER, and Division Artillery assumed responsibility for securing the SONG BE Bridge and surrounding area from the 1st Inf Div. Through the combined efforts of Division Artillery, 1/12 Cav, and 8th Engineers, defenses at the bridge site were significantly improved. Quick fire channels with 1st Inf Div Artillery units at LZ's HOLIDAY INN and JIM were established and plans were developed for offensive operations in that critical area. On 4 July, C/1/77 (Plt) conducted an artillery raid, moving to XT 934454 in support of C/1/9 BLUES who were searching an area from which heavy ground to air fire had forced down an LOH, killing its three occupants. The howitzers returned to C/M P GORVAD later that day after successfully covering the BLUES. On 7 July the maneuver battalion and supporting battery again were replaced, as 1/5 Cav arrived C/M P GORVAD with B/1/77 in support, allowing 2/12 Cav and C/1/77 to redeploy to LZ DOLLY. A significant addition to artillery support in AO CHIEF was made when B/2/20 combined forces with B/82 artillery to form its own limited killer platoon, commonly referred to as "BLUES-20/82." For the remainder of the period, hostile activity directed against RHOC VINH and the surrounding area remained at a low level, although active reconnaissance, both visual and electronic, indicated a continuing enemy interest in C/M P GORVAD and AO CHIEF.

F. SUPPORT OF NON-1ST CAV DIV UNITS:

(1) General: Because of its short reaction time, great range, and unique capability, ARV assets are requested for use by units operating adjacent to the 1st Cavalry Division (M) in emergency situations. Division Artillery and 2/20 Artillery have been able to provide this support on numerous occasions.
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SUBJ/ET: Operation Report of the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (ARA) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CPDA-65 (RI)

(2) Execution: On 1 May 1/2/20 dispatched six sections in support of the 2d ARVN Airborne Division which was in heavy contact with an estimated enemy regiment at grid XT 114413. 295 2.75 inch HE rockets were expended as along with 150 flechettes against 8 anti-aircraft positions, resulting in 25 confirmed KIAs. On 12 May 1/2/20 again supported the 2d ARVN Airborne Division, expending 100 rockets on grid XT 110410 and receiving credit for 15 confirmed KIAs. On 21 May 1/2/20 bounced one section in support of LZ CROOK a 25th Inf Div fire base which was under ground attack. The section expended 76 2.75 inch rockets and received credit for 20 confirmed KIAs. On 6 June 1/2/20 was instrumental in routing the enemy from T'IY NINH CITY. LZ CROOK (25th Inf Div) came under heavy ground attack again on 7 June and 1/2/20 sent three sections to support. Eleven plus anti-aircraft positions were set up and the flechette bird destroyed three of them. Two hundred and sixty 2.75 inch HE rockets and 87 flechettes were expended, resulting in 97 confirmed KIAs. The ARVN's called for BLUE H.A. again on 9 June, and 1/2/20 assembled one section to grid XT 148422. The section expended forty six 2.75 inch HE rockets and 17 flechettes resulting in 10 confirmed KIAs and one .50 cal destroyed. On 9 June 1/2/20 began providing the "KILLER" ship for 1/9 visual recon teams. The operations have been conducted in the 25th Inf Div AO and have produced substantial kill credits for 1/2/20. One 27 June 1/2/20 sent three sections to grid XT 315576 in support of ARVN. Three hundred and twelve 2.75 inch HE rockets were fired, but no surveillance was available. On 18 May B/2/20 flew 16 sorties in defense of ARVN at KU NINH who were being overrun. The enemy was repulsed. No surveillance was reported. C/2/20 supported Special Forces Team A341 at grid KU 855205 with 16 sorties. Two hundred and twenty five 2.75 inch rockets were fired and the battery was credited with silencing one .50 cal. C/2/20 was credited with the destruction of two rocket positions by mortar patrol ships.


a. Personnel:

   (1) Technical Inspectors.

   (a) Observation: A recent large turn over in technical inspectors has left the 2/20th Arty (ARA) short of qualified technical inspectors.

   (b) Evaluation: All batteries have been required to initiate a vigorous OJT program for training technical inspectors. Quotas to the ARNIS courses have been utilized to increase the skills of these individuals required to perform technical inspector duties. The ARNIS course is directed towards a review of the Army record system and therefore is not an adequate course for training technical inspectors.
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AVDAAR-CO

SUBJECT: Operation Report of the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (AM) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOA65 (RI)

(c) Recommendations: That school trained technical inspectors be assigned to the 2/20 Arty to insure quality control of organizational maintenance.

b. Operations:

(1) Timely Response to Sensor Targets.

(a) Observation: Direct Support Artillery battalions, in placing timely fire on sensor-acquired targets, must have the best communications possible, within their capability, with the ground sensor monitoring station.

(b) Evaluation: Although the decision to attack sensor targets must rest with the maneuver commander, it is incumbent upon the direct support artillery battalion to obtain target data in the most direct and quickest manner possible. Only in this way can artillery fires be immediately responsive once clearance has been obtained and the decision to fire has been made.

(c) Recommendation: That direct support battalions, when possible and feasible, establish direct communications with ground sensor monitoring stations which control sensors in the battalion's area of influence.

(2) Sniffer/IR Target Analysis.

(a) Observation: Erroneous Sniffer/IR read-outs have resulted in areas of recent troop occupation and/or areas recently attack with artillery fire.

(b) Evaluation: Soda cans, extraneous garbage, smoking refuse fires, artillery shell "hot spots", and other miscellaneous residue have periodically caused wasted effort in the analysis of intelligence data gathered by electronic devices. In order to derive maximum benefit from these assets, each area subjected to electronic observation should be "clean" of all friendly residue.

(c) Recommendation: That whenever possible, areas designated for observation by Sniffer/IR devices be declared "Off Limits" to friendly forces and supporting artillery fire through the use of special Specified Strike Zone (SSZ).
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Summary Report of the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (AM) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS GSFOR-65 (RI)

(3) Flechette Warhead (DV-4A/A) 600 Meter MSD.

(a) Observation: The 2/20 Arty (ARA) is restricted in the employment of the flechette warhead because of the 600 meter MSD.

(b) Evaluation: The flechette warhead's complete pattern has not been satisfactorily determined. There is no way to see the pattern visually from the air as the flechettes produce very little visual cues which aid in determining the pattern. The flechettes have been effectively employed against anti-aircraft weapons when troop safety was not a factor. However, its use in contact missions or in defense of a fire base is severely limited because of the 600 meter (MSD).

(c) Recommendation: That definitive tests be conducted which identify the complete flechette pattern when the flechette warhead is fired from an AH-1G Cobra at various altitudes, dive angles and airspeeds.

c. Training:

(1) Forward Observer and Liaison Officer Training on Employment of ARA.

(a) Observation: Numerous delays and much confusion has occurred during the adjustment phase of fire missions.

(b) Evaluation: The causes of these delays can be attributed to the following:

1. FO not proficient in using the GT line as a common reference line for the adjustment phase.

2. LNO insisting on directions of attack which are not tactically sound, i.e. not parallel to friendly positions.

(c) Recommendation: That the Artillery School at Fort Sill include both classroom instruction and CF classes on the tactics and employment of Aerial Rocket Artillery stressing CF with the AH-1G Cobra.

d. Intelligence: None

c. Logistics:

(1) Night Sighting Devices.

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SUBJECT: Operation Report of the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (AM) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

a. Observation: The 2/20th Arty (AMA) flies approximately 30 hours each night on rocket/mortar patrol. At present the AH-1G has no target acquisition capability other than the pilots eyes.

b. Evaluation: In order to increase the effectiveness of rocket/mortar patrol the AH-1G should be equipped with a night sighting device for locating and identifying targets.

c. Recommendation: That the 2/20 Arty (ARA) be issued a night sighting device adequate for use in the AH-1G for conducting night reconnaissance of suspect rocket/mortar positions and for aided visual reconnaissance of those areas in which other sensors have indicated enemy activity.

(2) Armament Control Panels and Circuit Breakers.

(a) Observation: Present safety precautions require that seven circuit breakers be pulled out before the system is considered safe.

(b) Evaluation: The circuit breakers in the AH-1G are located on the right side of the pilot. They are difficult to pull out and their design is not one which can withstand the numerous pull outs.

(c) Recommendation: That the armament circuit breakers be redesigned to a two position On/Off switch type mechanism similar to the circuit breakers in a home circuit breaker box. This should reduce the number of broken circuit breakers which must be replaced and ease considerably the task of turning them on and off without reducing the safety requirements of the armament system.

f. Organization: None

g. Others: None

JAMES A. MUNSON
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding
AVDAGT-DT (12 August 1969) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (AM) for the Period Ending, 31 July 1969, RCS CFSFOR-65 (R1)

DA, HQ, 1st Cavalry Division (AM) APO San Francisco 96490, 14 August 1969

TO: Commanding General
IIFFV
ATTN: AVHGC-DST
APO 96266

1. This Headquarters has received the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division Artillery and concurs with the report.

2. Report is forwarded in compliance with USARV Reg 525-15.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. E. DOYLE
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (AM) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RL)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHG(DST), APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (AM) for the period ending 31 July 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

B.G. MacDONALD
LT, APO
Asst AG

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Subject: Operational Report of the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery, for the Period Ending 31 July 1969.

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (Airmobile).

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning "Technical Inspectors," section II, page 13, paragraph 2a(1); concur. It is desirable that school trained technical inspectors be assigned to insure quality control of organizational maintenance. Technical inspector replacements received by USARV are assigned on a proportionate basis to each command against their authorizations.

   b. Reference item concerning "Sniffer/IR Target Analysis," section II, page 14, paragraph 2b(2); nonconcur. The declaration of certain areas as "off limits" to friendly forces is the prerogative of the local tactical commander. Close coordination and detailed Sniffer/IR mission planning will resolve the problem. APD/IR missions should be integrated into the overall tactical plan of the unit concerned. APD/IR mission planning and coordination must include a determination of whether there has been recent friendly activity within the search area. The same factor must be considered when determining readout validity. In the future, the referenced problem and evaluation will be emphasized during the G2 Air Orientation Course which is conducted monthly to orient newly assigned G2/S2 Air personnel on capabilities, planning and employment of the in-country aerial reconnaissance and target acquisition systems. No action by DA or USARPAC is required.

   c. Reference item concerning "Forward Observer and Liaison Officer Training on Employment of ARA," section II, page 15, paragraph 2c(1); concur. Recommend this item be forwarded to the US Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma to be considered for inclusion in the program of instruction.

For the Commander:

C. D. Wilson
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Cav Div Arty (AM) for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 16 OCT 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORFF
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 1st Cavalry Division Artillery

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May 69 to 31 July 69.

CO, 1st Cavalry Division Artillery

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ABSTRACT

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