### AD NUMBER

<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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### CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TO:</th>
<th>UNCLASSIFIED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
<td>CONFIDENTIAL</td>
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### LIMITATION CHANGES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TO:</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### AUTHORITY

AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980

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Best Available Copy
SUBJECT: Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery, 27 Oct 69

LESSONS LEARNED

Lessons learned during current operations are provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future. Information contained in this report may be adapted for use in developing training material.

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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AVGE-TC 5 August 1969
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery
Period Ending 31 July 1969, (RCS-CSPOR-63) (R1) UIC: W03EAA (U)

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1. (C) SECTION 1. Operations: Significant Activities.

   a. Personnel

      (1) The 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery remains assigned to the 23rd Artillery Group.

      (2) Routine S1 activities were conducted during the period 1 May thru 31 July 1969.

      (3) The average battalion strength during May, June and July was 97.9 per cent. At the close of this reporting period the battalion strength was as indicated below:

        | AUTHORIZED | ASSIGNED | NUMBER SHORT |
        |------------|----------|--------------|
        | OFFICERS   | 37       | 37           | 0            |
        | WARRANT OFFICERS | 6 | 4 | 2 |
        | ENLISTED MEN | 494 | 486 | 8 |

      (4) At the close of the period the following critical personnel shortages existed:

        | RANK   | MOS   | TITLE                  | AUTH BY MTOE | NUMBER SHORT |
        |--------|-------|------------------------|--------------|--------------|
        | SGT    | 13E40 | Reconnaissance SGT     | 6            | 5            |
        | SGT    | 31G40 | Tactical Communications Chief | 4 | 4         |
        | SP5    | 63C30 | General Vehicle Repairman | 1 | 1           |
        | SGT    | 13B40 | Field Artillery Crewman | 21 | 5           |
        | SSG    | 13B40 | Chief of Section       | 19 | 5           |
        | SSG    | 13E40 | Liaison Sergeant       | 3            | 1            |
        | SSG    | 63C40 | Motor Sergeant         | 4            | 1            |
        | SP6    | 71D20 | Legal Clerk            | 1            | 1            |
        | SSG    | 76Y40 | Supply Sergeant        | 5            | 4            |
        | SSG    | 82C40 | Chief of Survey Party  | 1            | 1            |
        | SSG    | 91B40 | Medical Section Sergeant | 1 | 1           |

FOR OT UT
693116
Inclosure
5 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery
Period Ending 31 July 1969, (RC5-CSFOR-65) (R1) U/CID: VP1762A (0)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>MOS</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>AWARDED BY MOS</th>
<th>NUMBER BEGHT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GP6</td>
<td>91020</td>
<td>Senior Clinical Specialist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP6</td>
<td>94B40</td>
<td>First Cook</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1SG</td>
<td>12250</td>
<td>Operation/Intelligence/1SG</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>13B40</td>
<td>Chief of Firing Battery</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>71H40</td>
<td>Personnel Sergeant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>94B40</td>
<td>Mess Steward</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) Twenty-eight casualties were inflicted as a result of hostile fire. No personnel were killed in action during this period.

(6) The following awards were presented during the reporting period:

(a) Bronze Star - Valor 1
(b) Bronze Star - Service 16
(c) ARCOM - Valor 1
(d) ARCOM - Service 15
(e) Purple Heart 28

(7) The following recommendations for awards were forwarded and are pending:

(a) Legion of Merit 1
(b) Silver Star 2
(c) Bronze Star - Valor 7
(d) Bronze Star - Service 10
(e) Bronze Star - Achievement 1
(f) ARCOM - Service 29
(g) ARCOM - Achievement 1
(h) ARCOM - Valor 6

(8) There were no significant disciplinary or morale problems encountered during the reporting period that affected the operational capability of the battalion.
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AVGB-70
5 August 1969
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery
Period Ending 31 July 1969, (RUS-CHPUB-65) (R1) UID: WPDEAA (U)

(9) Eighty-two (82) officers and enlisted men participated in the
R&R program during the report period.

(10) There were no vehicle or aircraft accidents significantly
affecting operations during the period.

(11) In addition to Protestant and Catholic religious services available
to all battalion personnel, Episcopal, Jewish, Church of Christ,
Latter Day Saints and Seventh Day Adventist religious services are offered
at Cu Chi Base Camp. The 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division provides
Chaplain support for B and C Batteries which are based near Tay Ninh Base
Camp. The 2d and 3d Brigades, 25th Infantry Division provides Chaplain
support for the Service Battery which is on the Cu Chi Base Camp. The
1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, provides Chaplain support for
A Battery and the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery based at Dau Tieng.

b. Operations.

(1) The battalion continued normal operations consistent with the
assigned mission of general support II FORCEV during the reporting period.
Listed below is the disposition of the battalion elements on the first day
of the reporting period:

(a) Headquarters Battery - Dau Tieng Base Camp

(b) A Battery - Dau Tieng Base Camp

(c) B Battery - PSB Station (XT 303 378)

(d) C Battery - Cu Chi Base Camp

(1) Elements of the 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery participated in the
following operations during the reporting period:

(a) Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery continued as the
artillery control for Dau Tieng Base Camp. During the reporting period
the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division moved from Dau Tieng Base Camp
to Cu Chi Base Camp. The 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division moved to
Dau Tieng Base Camp and assumed responsibility for the area of opera-
tions on 30 June 1969. This changeover had no effect on the battalion
operations. The battalion retained its responsibility for the operation
of the Dau Tieng Artillery Control Center and the Base Camp Defense Fire
Support Coordination Center.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery
Period Ending 31 July 1969, (RCG-CSPR-65) (R1) UID: WEDAAA (U)

(b) A Battery, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery continued the mission of
general support II FORCEV in support of operations around Dau Tieng Base
Camp until 8 July 1969. During this reporting period the battery made six
moves. Listed below are dates and summaries of those moves:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SUMMARY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 July 1969</td>
<td>A Battery moved from Dau Tieng Base Camp to vicinity XT 349 594 and assumed the mission of general support reinforcing 25th Infantry Division Artillery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 July 1969</td>
<td>A Battery displaced one platoon from XT 349 594 to the vicinity of XT 360 580 for a one day operation firing direct fire on Nui Ba Den. The platoon returned to XT 349 594 the same day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 July 1969</td>
<td>A Battery moved from XT 349 594 to Tay Ninh Base Camp. The mission remained general support reinforcing 25th Infantry Division Artillery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 July 1969</td>
<td>A Battery moved from Tay Ninh Base Camp to FSB Mitchell XT 166 457 and returned to Tay Ninh Base Camp the same day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 July 1969</td>
<td>A Battery moved from Tay Ninh Base Camp to FSB Mitchell and returned to Tay Ninh Base Camp the same day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 July 1969</td>
<td>A Battery moved from Tay Ninh Base Camp to Dau Tieng Base Camp and resumed the mission of general support II Field Forces.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) B Battery, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery continued the mission of
general support reinforcing 25th Infantry Division Artillery. B Battery made three moves during the reporting period. Listed below are
dates and summaries of those moves:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SUMMARY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 June 1969</td>
<td>B Battery moved from FSB Stoneman (XT 303 378) to FSB Hull (XT 263 380) and returned to FSB Stoneman the same day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 July 1969</td>
<td>B Battery moved one platoon from FSB Stoneman to Tay Ninh Base Camp and returned to FSB Stoneman on 6 July 1969.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 July 1969</td>
<td>B Battery moved from FSB Stoneman to FSB Hull and returned to FSB Stoneman the same day.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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5 August 1969


(d) O Battery, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery continued the mission of general support reinforcing 25th Infantry Division Artillery while located at Cu Chi Base Corp. On 15 May 1969, O Battery displaced from Cu Chi Base Corp to FSB Washington (XT 146 568). Presently located at FSB Washington, C Battery continues the mission of general support reinforcing 25th Infantry Division Artillery. While at FSB Washington, C Battery made five one-day moves. Listed below are the dates and summaries of those moves:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>BATTERY</th>
<th>SUMMARY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 May 1969</td>
<td>C Battery</td>
<td>moved from FSB Washington to the vicinity of XT 150 630 and returned to FSB Washington the same day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 May 1969</td>
<td>C Battery</td>
<td>moved from FSB Washington to the vicinity of XT 150 630 and returned to FSB Washington the same day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 June 1969</td>
<td>C Battery</td>
<td>moved two platoons from FSB Washington to the vicinity of XT 150 630 and returned to FSB Washington the same day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 1969</td>
<td>C Battery</td>
<td>moved one platoon from FSB Washington to the vicinity of XT 310 560 for a direct fire mission on Bien Ho Don and returned to FSB Washington the same day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 July 1969</td>
<td>C Battery</td>
<td>moved from FSB Washington to the vicinity of XT 150 630 and returned to FSB Washington the same day.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) The missions fired and the amount of ammunition expended by the battalion during this reporting period is listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BATTERY</th>
<th>NUMBER OF MISSIONS</th>
<th>TOTAL ROUNDS EXPANDED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>3,526</td>
<td>27,939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>10,966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>2,644</td>
<td>25,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOT.L</td>
<td>6,969</td>
<td>64,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) The battalion was accredited with the following surveillance during the reporting period. Listed below is a breakdown by battery:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BATTERY</th>
<th>EPA</th>
<th>BUNKER DESTROYED</th>
<th>FIGHTING POSITIONS DESTROYED</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>NONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>6 80 Hkt Lauchers destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2 Scupens destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(5) At the beginning of the reporting period the battalion had two
liaison parties and three forward observer parties supporting other units.
One liaison party and one forward observer party were supporting US units
and one liaison party and two forward observer parties were supporting
AVN units.

e. Training.

(1) The following periods of mandatory training were conducted by
units of the battalion throughout the reporting period (92 days).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(a) Command information</th>
<th>63</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(b) Care and Handling of weapons and ammunition</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Mobility training</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Weapons familiarization</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Convoy procedures</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) Mines and booby traps</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) SANDA</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(h) Physical Security</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) Duds and explosives</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(j) Safety Non-Arty weapons</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(k) First Aid</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(l) Gunnery</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(m) Character Guidance</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n) Drivers training</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(o) Security orientation</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(p) CBR refresher</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(q) M-72 LAW</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(r) Geneva Convention</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(s) Air Mobility</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery
Period Ending 31 July 1969, (R:8-OSFOR-65) (Rt) U/D: NDREMA (U)

(t) Military Justice

(u) Civil Affairs

(2) In-Country Replacement Training for newly assigned personnel of this battalion is presently being conducted by the 3a Brigade, 82d Airborne Division at the brigade replacement training school in Phu Loi and by the 25th Infantry Division replacement training school in Cu Chi.

d. Intelligence. Information of intelligence value for the battalion was obtained from the supported infantry elements, the 1st and 25th Military Intelligence Detachments, the US Advisers to the SVN districts, Special Forces units and from NTSUMS received from higher headquarters. Additional valuable target information was gained from USAF Forward Air Controllers, Red Haze, People Sniffer, and SLAR aircraft. One of the two TOE authorized aerial observer slots was filled for the reporting period. This aerial observer provided on the average two hours of visual reconnaissance per day.

e. Logistics. Service Battery, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery is located at Cu Chi Base Camp on the Main Supply Route between Long Binh and the junction to Tay Ninh and Dau Tieng. Classes 2, 4 and 7 are obtained from the 266th Supply and Service Battalion, Long Binh and the US Army Depot, Long Binh. Break down is completed at Cu Chi and material is then shipped to the supported batteries by organic transportation. Classes 1, 3 and 5 are drawn by the supported batteries from local supply points. Class 5 requirements in the Dau Tieng area are provided by a scheduled throughput from the Ammunition Supply Depot, Long Binh. Repair parts are provided by the 94th Light Equipment Maintenance Company, Cu Chi with additional "fill or kill" support from direct support units in the various batteries area of operations. During the month of July when all three firing batteries were operating in the Tay Ninh area, the ammunition section and maintenance section moved their base operations from Cu Chi to Tay Ninh Base Camp to better support the operations of the firing batteries. During this time all three firing batteries could be reached by road from Tay Ninh and the move of these sections to Tay Ninh improved the battalion operations greatly. These sections returned to Cu Chi Base Camp on 25 July 1969.

f. Organization. None.

g. Civil Affairs.

(i) During the report period approximately 1422 MEDCAP patients were seen. This is an increase of 1022 in the number of personnel treated over the last report period. This increase resulted from the expansion of the MEDCAP program and the relocation of outlying villages that were
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery
Period Ending 31 July 1969, (RCS-CSFOR-65) (R1) USA: VDJEMA (U)

moved closer to Dau Tieng Village. The MEDCAP station utilized approxi-
mately $1,100 in medical supplies in treating patients.

(2) The battalion distributed 850 pounds of food to personnel of
Dau Tieng Village through the civil action program during this report
period.

2. (v) LESSONS LEARNED: CORRESPONDING OBSERVATIONS: EVALUA-
TIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. Personnel: None.

b. Operations:

(1) PADAC Generator Monitoring

(c) OBSERVATION: The voltage and frequency output fluctuate when
the engine RPM of the PADAC generator fails to remain constant causing
PADAC failure.

(b) EVALUATION: The most common PADAC failure experienced by this
unit is due to the fluctuation in frequency and voltage output. To pre-
clude damage to the PADAC, the operation of the generator must be moni-
tored at all times. This is sometimes impossible because the generator
is located away from the PADAC operator. To eliminate damage to the
PADAC, cycles per second meter and a voltage meter should be wired
remotely and the meters located adjacent to the PADAC operator to enable
him to monitor the generator output. If a fluctuation of the frequency
or voltage output is noted, the operator can shut down the PADAC thus
precluding the possibility of damage.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all units using the PADAC adopt this
procedure.

(2) Use of the Firecracker Round in Defense of Fire Support Base.

(c) OBSERVATION: The firecracker round can be used successfully
in the defensive fires around a fire support base.

(b) EVALUATION: Firecracker was fired at a range of 600 meters in
defense of a fire support base under ground attack. Standard table values
were used and the rounds were very effective.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That firecracker be considered in defensive
fires in the range of 800 to 1000 meters in the indirect fire role.

(3) Use of the White Phosphorus Round in the Killer Junior Role.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery
Period Ending 31 July 1969, (PCS-CSPOR-65) (R1) UDC: WD3MAA (U)

(a) OBSERVATION: The white phosphorus (WP) round can be used in the
defensive fires around a fire support base.

(b) EVALUATION: White phosphorus was used as a very effective means of
defensive fires in the Killer Junior role. The ranges were such that
high explosive rounds could not have been used because of the fragmenta-
tion effect on friendly troops. The WP rounds were very effective
against the attacking force and no fragmentation was received by friendly
troops from those rounds. The increased weight of the WP rounds made the
WP Killer Junior burst at a lower height of burst than the regular Killer
Junior. This height of burst using the regular Killer Junior firing data
was very effective.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that the use of white phosphorus be
included when planning defensive fires around fire support bases and base
camps.

(4) USE OF ILLUMINATION IN THE DEFENSE OF A FIRE SUPPORT BASE.

(a) OBSERVATION: Illumination rounds can be fired at a low elevation
with the time set so that they ejet the flare at the distance re-
quired and have most of the time left for surface illumination.

(b) EVALUATION: The light from these illumination rounds help to
silhouette the enemy fighting positions which are between it and the
bunker line of the fire support base. This technique of illumination
could be used effectively in lieu of, or in addition to, the normal
illumination in an attack against a fire support base located on open
terrain. This method illuminates the battle area without illuminating
the firing battery position and can be fixed using Killer Junior data.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that this method of illumination be
included when planning defensive fires in support of fire support bases
and base camps.

c. Training

Observation Tower Team Training

(a) OBSERVATION: Observation tower teams have a certain amount of
difficulty in detecting, estimating range and determining direction to
flashes from enemy weapons being fired, especially during the hours of
darkness.

(b) EVALUATION: Training exercises for observation tower teams to
detect and fix enemy weapon firing locations can be held. These exercises
can consist of rounds fired in the sector of responsibility of each
observation tower. The rounds should be fired without notice to the
towers and the response time of the crews in reporting detection,
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery
Period Ending 31 July 1969 (RCS-CSFOR-65) (R1) UIC: WD3EAA (U)

Direction and distance recorded. After each exercise, a critique should be conducted and corrections made to improve the ability of the tower teams to react rapidly and accurately.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that the training program outlined above be initiated at all base camps in Vietnam utilizing observation towers.

d. Intelligence.

The Angle of Fall for the CHICOM 107 MM Rocket Versus Range:

(a) OBSERVATION: The angle of fall for a CHICOM 107mm rocket can be determined and can be used to estimate the range to the rocket firing position.

(b) EVALUATION: Expended 107mm rocket motor bodies peel back when they hit the ground. By setting the rocket motor body on a level surface the angle between the longitudinal axis of the rocket and the surface closely approximate the angle of fall of the rocket. The following is an extract from a 107mm rocket firing table obtained from the Combined Material Exploitation Center, US Military Assistance Command Vietnam:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range (ft)</th>
<th>Angle of fall (deg/min)</th>
<th>Range (ft)</th>
<th>Angle of fall (deg/min)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>4.48</td>
<td>5200</td>
<td>19.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2200</td>
<td>5.11</td>
<td>5400</td>
<td>19.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2400</td>
<td>5.41</td>
<td>5600</td>
<td>20.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2600</td>
<td>6.27</td>
<td>5800</td>
<td>21.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2800</td>
<td>7.10</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>22.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3000</td>
<td>7.53</td>
<td>6200</td>
<td>24.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3200</td>
<td>8.38</td>
<td>6400</td>
<td>25.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>16.52</td>
<td>8200</td>
<td>47.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A correlation between the angle of fall and range can be made from this table.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That this technique and information be disseminated to all SHELREP teams in Vietnam and be taught at USAFA School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma.
AVG-TC
5 August 1969
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery
Period Ending 31 July 1969, (HO-6-CSFOR-65) (R4) UID: WPSORAA (U)

5. Organization

.1 TO & E Incurrence of Grade Authorization for the Firing Battery
Executive Officer.

(a) OBSERVATION: Firing battery Executive Officers do not have the
experience required to properly train, operate and control the firing
battery.

(b) EVALUATION: With the rapid promotion to captain the executive
officer of the firing battery usually has less than one year of experience
in that position. Upon promotion the officer is moved to another job,
just when he has gained the experience and is ready to contribute signi-
ficantly to the overall operation of the battery. This position requires
an officer who has the knowledge and experience connected with the firing
battery while he is serving in that position.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the TO & E position of the battery Execu-
tive Officer be upgraded to the grade of captain.

5. Other

(1) Rapid Deterioration of Wheel Cylinders on 5 Ton, 2½ Ton, 3/4 Ton
and 2 Ton Vehicles.

(a) OBSERVATION: Due to the damp climate and ever present moisture
in the air here in Vietnam brake cylinders, including new ones, rust and
corrode at an alarming rate. This weakens the cylinder at several points
and from the constant pressure these points eventually start to leak.

(b) EVALUATION: The cylinder must have all of the rust removed and
be well lubricated before installation. The lubrication prevents any
further catalytic action between the cylinder and rust. Once installed
in a clean and lubricated condition, the brake fluid will prevent further
rusting action.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That this information be disseminated to all
units in Vietnam and taught at USAFA School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

(2) Construction of Sumps into Perimeter Bunkers.

(a) OBSERVATION: The placement of 105 ammunition boxes for steps
leading from the top portion of perimeter bunkers to the bottom portion
of perimeter bunkers is effective in reducing the deterioration of these
installations due to troop use.

(b) EVALUATION: The placement of ammunition boxes eliminates the
constant replacement of sandbags and also removes the possibility of slipping on wet sandbags and causing personal injury. The same boxes used as steps leading to the bottom portions of the bunkers also serve as a basic foundation which stops the dirt from slipping into the stairwell around the entrance and eventually filling it in.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That this information be disseminated to all units in Vietnam.

(3) Extending Overhead Cover on Permanent Structures.

(a) OBSERVATION: Erosion caused by rain and weather conditions has resulted in replacing sandbags and other barricade material at an alarming rate.

(b) EVALUATION: Extending overhead cover on permanent type structures will reduce the overall deterioration of sandbags and other barricade material. This results in a saving of these costly materials as well as reduced labor requirements. If adequate materials are available, a cement facing over chicken wire is another means that can be employed for increasing the life span of bunkers and barricade material.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That this information be disseminated to all units in Vietnam.

DISTRIBUTION:
2 Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific
3 Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam
1 Commanding General, II Field Force, Artillery, Vietnam
6 Commanding Officer, 23d Artillery Group
AVGE-0 (5 Aug 69) 1st Ind


DA, Headquarters, 23d Artillery Group, APO 96289, 21 August 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery,
ATTN: AVFPAC, APO 96266

1. (U) This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report for the period ending 31 July 1969, from Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery.

2. (U) Pertinent comments follow:

   a. Reference Section 2, Paragraph 2b(1): Concur. It is noted, however, that the FADAC is equipped with an automatic power cut-off system designed to protect the FADAC from voltage and phase variations.

   b. Reference Section 2, Paragraph 2b(2): Concur.

   c. Reference Section 2, Paragraph 2b(3): Concur.

   d. Reference Section 2, Paragraph 2b(4): Concur.

   e. Reference Section 2, Paragraph 2c: Concur.

   f. Reference Section 2, Paragraph 2d: Concur.

   g. Reference Section 2, Paragraph 2f: Non-concur. Any position in the Army which has an assigned TOE grade could undoubtedly be better filled by an individual with more experience and more rank. Lieutenants, properly led and motivated, can and have demonstrated their ability to successfully perform duties as battery executive officers.

   h. Reference Section 2, Paragraph 2g(1): Concur.

   i. Reference Section 2, Paragraph 2g(2): Concur.

   j. Reference Section 2, Paragraph 2g(3): Concur.


W. BEINKE
Colonel, FA
Commanding

Copy Furnished:
1st Bn, 27th Arty
AVFB-FAC (5 Aug 69) 2d Ind


DA, HEADQUARTERS, II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM ARTILLERY, APO 96266  28 AUG 1969

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFBC-RE, APO 96266

1. (U) The quarterly report of the 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery adequately reflects the operations during the reporting period.

2. (C) Reference paragraph 2d: Non-concur. Range data collected by this method has shown many inconsistencies that cannot be explained. Until such time as further data verifies the system, it should be used with reservations. The angle of fall method for determining range is probably valid only when the rocket strikes level and cleared terrain. The effect of sloping or dense jungle terrain on the peel back effect of the rocket motor body has not been determined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

AQUILA E. STIPE
Major, FA
Adjutant
AVFBC-EM-H (4 Sep 69) 3rd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery
Period Ending 31 July 1969, (RG5-OSPOR-65) (R1) UIC: WDSEA (U)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVFBC(DST), APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report -
Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery for the
period ending 31 July 1969, as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

B.G. MACDONALD
LT, AGC
Asst AG

15
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning "FADAC Generator Monitoring", Section II, page 8, paragraph 2b(1); concur. Recommend the Army Material Command determine if meters and connecting cables should be issued as component parts of a FADAC Generator.

   b. Reference item concerning "The Angle of Fall of the CHICOM 107 MM Rocket Versus Range", Section II, page 10, paragraph 2d; 1st Indorsement and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2: nonconcur. No tests have been conducted to confirm or refute the basic theory. MACV plans to initiate tests designed to determine the correlation between the angle of fall and range.

   c. Reference item concerning "Rapid Deterioration of Wheel Cylinders on 5 Ton, 2½ Ton, 3/4 Ton and ½ Ton Vehicles", Section II, page 11, paragraph 2c(1); concur. The described maintenance is taught at all service schools and outlined in applicable technical manuals. This item will be published in the USARV Maintenance Information Summary, but further dissemination is not required.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cy furn:

1/27 Arty

II PFF

C. J. WILSON

IL, AGC

Assistant Adjutant General
GPOP-DT (5 Aug 69) 5th Imd
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RC3 CSFOR-65 (HI)
HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 16 OCT 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as endorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C.P.T., AGC

17
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May 69 to 31 July 69.

CO, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery

**Report Date**
5 August 1969

**Total No. of Pages**
20

**Originator's Report Number(s)**
693116

**Sponsoring Military Activity**
OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310