### AD NUMBER

| AD505333 |

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (H) (8 Oct 69) FOR OT UT 693173 15 October 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry, Period Ending 31 July 1969 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 7TH ARMORED SQUADRON 1ST AIR CAVALRY
APO San Francisco 96357

AVBAN-JC

10 Aug 1969

SUBJECT: (U) Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry for Period Ending 31 July 1969 (RCS CSF0-5) (R7) (UIC: WGS6AA)

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(U) Under the provisions of AR 525-15, AR 870-5, USARPAC Reg 525-15; and USARV Reg 525-15, the Quarterly Operational Report-Lessons Learned is submitted.

2 Inc

2 Inc 2 wd HQ, DA

GEORGE E. DERRICK

LTC Armor

Commanding

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 7TH ARMORED SQUADRON 1ST AIR CAVALRY
APO San Francisco 96357

AVBADJC

10 Aug 1969

SUBJECT: (U) Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry for Period Ending 31 July 1969, (RCS GSFOR-65) (R1) (UIC: WGO6 AA)

1. (C) Section I, Operations: Significant Activities.
   A. There were no changes or additions to the unit mission.
   B. Organization:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASIGNED UNITS</th>
<th>M/R VICINITY</th>
<th>UNIT LOC</th>
<th>APO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7th Sqdn, 1st Air Cav</td>
<td>WGO6 AA</td>
<td>Vinh Long</td>
<td>96357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters Troop</td>
<td>WGO6 TC</td>
<td>Vinh Long</td>
<td>96357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop A (Air)</td>
<td>WGO6 AO</td>
<td>Vinh Long</td>
<td>96357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop B (Air)</td>
<td>WGO6 BO</td>
<td>Vinh Long</td>
<td>96357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop G (Air)</td>
<td>WGO6 CO</td>
<td>Vinh Long</td>
<td>96357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop D (Ground)</td>
<td>WGO6 DO</td>
<td>Vinh Long</td>
<td>96357</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   | DETACHED UNITS        |             |         |       |
   | 83d Med Det           | WBP3 AA     | Vinh Long | 96357 |
   | 261st FA Det          | WQ3T AA     | Vinh Long | 96357 |

   | ATTACHED UNITS/SECTIONS |             |         |       |
   | 31 Signal Det          | WG93 AA     | Vinh Long | 96357 |
   | 811th Sig Det          | WDX2 AA     | Vinh Long | 96357 |
   | 819th Sig Det          | WLD7 AA     | Vinh Long | 96357 |
   | 370th TC Det           | WER3 TC     | Vinh Long | 96357 |
   | 371st TC Det           | WER4 AAA    | Vinh Long | 96357 |
   | 574th TC Det           | WERL AA     | Vinh Long | 96357 |
   | Det 3, 13th Security  | atch for maint & log only |       |
   | 346th ASD              | atch for maint & log only |       |
   | Team 2, 69th Inf Det   | atch for maint & log only |       |

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DOD DIR 5200.10

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C. Command:

The following are personnel occupying major command and staff positions.

(a) LTC George E. Derrick Squadron Commander
(b) MAJ John H. Rhein Squadron Executive Officer
(c) CPT William T. Hull Adjutant
(d) MAJ Phillip G. Sheaffer S-2
(e) MAJ David E. Thompson S-3
(f) CPT Donald V. Cable S-4
(g) 1LT Gary G. Cashion Signal Officer
(h) CPT John F. Kunishi Flight Surgeon
(i) CW2 Jose A. Suarez Safety Officer
(j) CPT Robert H. Black Maintenance Officer
(k) MAJ Vernon H. Hudnall CO, Headquarters Troop
(l) MAJ Walter E. Kidwell CO, Troop A
(m) MAJ William P. Chillette III CO, Troop B
(n) MAJ William R. Rittenhouse CO, Troop C
(o) CPT Charles R. Steiner CO, Troop D

D. Unit Strength as of 31 July 1969:

1. Military

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>FM</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNIT</td>
<td>AUTH</td>
<td>O/H</td>
<td>AUTH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHT</td>
<td>23+1</td>
<td>7+1</td>
<td>10+1</td>
<td>181+16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>18+1</td>
<td>13+1</td>
<td>30+2</td>
<td>25+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>18+1</td>
<td>19+1</td>
<td>30+2</td>
<td>26+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>18+1</td>
<td>23+1</td>
<td>30+2</td>
<td>23+0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/1</td>
<td>82+4</td>
<td>94+4</td>
<td>97+7</td>
<td>85+2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Incl.
2. Civilians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUB-UNIT</th>
<th>TECH REPS</th>
<th>US CIV</th>
<th>VN CIV</th>
<th>3RD NAT</th>
<th>CONT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Auth O/H</td>
<td>Auth O/H</td>
<td>Auth O/H</td>
<td>Auth O/H</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHT</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Overall assigned/attached strength during reporting period as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>OFFICER</th>
<th>WARRANT OFFICER</th>
<th>ENLISTED MEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31 May 69</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Jun 69</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Jul 69</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>858</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

E. Aircraft Authorized/On Hand

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBORD</th>
<th>UH1H</th>
<th>AH1G</th>
<th>OH6A</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHT</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>7/5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27/24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27/25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27/25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/1</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>88/79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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3
F. Cumulative totals:

1. Results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>TOTAL SORTIES</th>
<th>KBA</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>STRUCTURES DEST</th>
<th>DUNKERS DEST</th>
<th>SAMPANS DEST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHT</td>
<td>2,127</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>11,172</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>11,958</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>10,882</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>36,139</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>561</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AIRCRAFT BY TYPE:

- OH6A
  - Dest 4
  - Dam 26

- UH1H
  - Dest 3
  - Dam 8

- AH1G
  - Dest 3
  - Dam 8

- TOTAL
  - Dest 10
  - Dam 42

2. Losses: 1 May 69 - 31 Jul 69

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MG</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>RETURNED TO DUTY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>062B</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100B</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122B</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11020</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11D20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11DI0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61264</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67720</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71D20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. PERSONNEL

1. During June and July of this reporting period a large turn-over of enlisted aircraft maintenance personnel was experienced. Through coordination with higher headquarters, ample replacements were provided with an over-lap of from 10 to 20 days OJT with the departing personnel. The large majority of these replacements are recent school graduates and did not have the environmental experience factor required of maintenance personnel under local conditions. However, the OJT over-lap with experienced personnel has precluded a serious degradation in maintenance capabilities.

2. On 5 May 69 LTC George E. Derrick assumed command from LTC George R. Crook. The change of command ceremony, conducted at Vinh Long Airfield, was attended by Major General Bohart, SA 4th Corps.

3. Military Justice Activities for the Period 1 May to 31 Jul 69:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTION</th>
<th>SCHEDULED</th>
<th>COMPLETED</th>
<th>PENDING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Special Courts-Martial</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary Courts-Martial</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>212 Elimination Action</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squadron Level Article 15's</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. R&R Program: The Squadron continues to utilize 100% of its R&R allocations for Hawaii and Australia. Approximately 80% of the allocations to the other sites are presently being filled.

5. During the reporting period, awards and decorations have been recommended and approved as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AWARD</th>
<th>RECOMMENDED</th>
<th>APPROVED</th>
<th>DISGR / UAE</th>
<th>DISAPP</th>
<th>PENDING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DSC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFC</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMByGM</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMyVM</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1**</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACMyVM</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMB</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2***</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACM</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PH</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIB</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cert/Achieved</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* DSC Downgraded to an approved SS
** AMyVM Downgraded to an approved ACMyVM
*** 2 EMB Downgraded to approved ACM

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H. OPERATIONS:

1. The Squadron continued extensive operations under the control of the 44th Special Tactical Zone during this reporting period. This border interdiction and surveillance campaign included all subordinate troops in the battle plan.

2. The Squadron provided continuous night and day coverage of the border regions by employing two Air Cavalry Troops as a reconnaissance and surveillance element during daylight hours, and one Air Cavalry Troop as Hunter/Killer teams during the hours of darkness. The ground Cavalry Troop deployed as a fire support element for Vietnamese Forces for periods of up to seven days throughout the quarter. Headquarters Troop continued to support the Squadron in garrison and in the field.

3. The Air Cavalry Troops provided limited support to the 7th, 9th and 21st ARVN Divisions during May and June. These operations emphasized the rapid aerial reconnaissance of designated areas followed by the insertion of ARVN Troops on likely positions.

4. Construction of new billets for Troop B and for Troop D, 3/5 Cavalry, was started in the latter weeks of the quarter. A high priority effort has been established to insure completion of these structures by the specified target date of 23 August. Troop labor has been utilized to augment the engineer effort.

5. The physical security of Vinh Long Airfield has continued to be the responsibility of the Squadron Commander. Frequent patrolling and ambushes by aero-rifle elements of the Air Cavalry Troops has enhanced security from taper infiltration and mortar attacks.

6. The breakdown of days the units were engaged by type activity during the reporting period is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Activity</th>
<th>Days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop Movement</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Days</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I. TRAINING

1. Our training/standardization situation has improved since the last reporting period due to the addition of more instructor pilots for all categories of aircraft.

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2. Ninety-day standardization rides at the close of the quarter were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>UH1H</th>
<th>OH6A</th>
<th>AH1H</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MU</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop A</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop B</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop C</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/1 ACS Av</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. A continuing requirement exists for quotas to the In-Country AHIG Pilot Transition Course. At present, the Squadron has nineteen positions for AHIG qualified aviator unfilled.

J. INTELLIGENCE

1. During the reporting period continued emphasis was placed on the timely and accurate gathering of intelligence data. The Liaison established with the MACV S-2/3 sections continued, enhancing the Air Cavalry operations and assisting in improving American/Vietnamese relationships.

2. The perimeter expansion program is continuing with new fences and defense positions being constructed. A new perimeter lighting system will be set up and installed in the near future. With the completion of these projects the airfield will be afforded better protection from the enemy.

3. The Squadron is still operating almost exclusively for the 44th STZ and making the maximum use of the forward command post at Cao Lanh. The Last Light reconnaissance of the airfield sensitive zone is being flown regularly. These flights have proven their value for protection of the airfield and Vinh Long City.

K. SAFETY

1. During the reporting period there were six accidents involving Squadron aircraft. A brief account of these accidents follows:

   a. Troop B, OH6A, 31 May 69. Mid air collision. A flight of two OH6A's were at the AO performing visual recon. The lead aircraft was making left hand orbits at an altitude of 5 to 10 feet with low airspeed in order to locate suspicious areas. The wing aircraft was flying at 100 feet AGL and making right hand orbits when the pilot spotted a possible enemy location well in front of the lead aircraft. He judged his lead to be hovering to check on something more closely and believed he had more than enough clearance to make a low level pass over the area in question.
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From 100 feet AGL, he began a descending right turn concentrating his attention on the area of interest and observing it through the chin bubble. At this point, he lost visual contact with his lead and was inadvertently descending into the lead's intended flight path. The lead aircraft saw his wing only seconds prior to impact and his main rotor struck the lower side of the wing aircraft at the tail boom. The wing aircraft, upon receiving this impact began a violent right spin and came to rest upright. The lead aircraft rolled to the right after impact and came to rest on its right side. Major damage was sustained by both aircraft. There was no fire. The only person injured was the pilot of the wing aircraft who sustained bruises on his face, arm and back.

b. Troop C, UH1H, 6 June 69. HSP Accident. This accident occurred at Can Tho Airfield at one of the HSP pads adjacent to the south swamp. After a normal starting procedure, the pilot was cleared by the crew chief and gunner to bring the aircraft to a hover. As power was added and the aircraft grew light on the skids, the right skid hung up on a HSP stake which protruded from the pad. At this time, the left skid broke contact with the ground. This caused the aircraft to roll slightly to the right. The pilot corrected the rolling tendency with left cyclic and more power. At this time the aircraft rolled violently 270 degrees to the right and landed on its left side by the swamp. As the aircraft rolled, the main rotor blades struck the ground causing the transmission to separate from the aircraft. The transmission was found 180 feet to the rear and right of the aircraft. During the roll, the tail rotor also struck the ground and the 90 degree gear box was torn from the aircraft. It was found 50 feet forward and to the right of the aircraft. There were no injuries. There was no fire.

c. Troop A, CH6A, 13 Jun 69. Revetment strike. Pilot called tower to exit revetment and make a hover check. The tower cleared him and advised the winds were 220 degrees at 11 kts. The nose of the aircraft was pointed to a heading of 320 degrees. The pilot's intention was to hover forward into the ramp for take off. The pilot picked up to a three foot hover and noted the aircraft was yawing to the right and left. He applied more power and came to a hover at approximately 3 feet above the revetment. The aircraft turned to the right at this time to a northeasterly direction. Simultaneously, the aircraft moved to the right with its nose over the right hand side of the revetment. The pilot stated the aircraft continued to turn right to a heading of 050 degrees. He applied full left pedal to control the yaw, but the aircraft did not respond. RPM bled off and the aircraft settled. The right skid contacted the revetment. The aircraft then slid backwards and fell on its left side. Simultaneously, the tail rotor struck the left hand revetment wall causing tail rotor failure. The main rotor blades struck the ground and broke off, flying in different directions. After the aircraft came to rest on the ground, the engine continued to run for approximately 30 seconds. The observer had slight injuries to his left forearm. The pilot had no injuries. There was no fire.
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d. Troop B, OH6A, 4 July 69. Engine Failure. After being airborne for 15 minutes, the pilot noticed the first indication of engine problems. He heard a loud snap, however, all instruments were normal and he attributed this noise to air turbulence. Twenty five minutes later, the pilot noticed a drop in torque to 30 lbs; however, all other instruments remained normal. The torque gauge continued to fluctuate and dropped. The aircraft rolled and yawed to the left at this time. Autorotation was executed. The touchdown area was a rice paddy with no trees. Touchdown airspeed was estimated between 10 and 15 kts. Ground slide about 8 to 10 feet. Upon touchdown the front skid contacted a 10 inch high ridge. This caused the front strut to collapse and the main rotor blades to flex into the tailboom cutting it off. There were no injuries.

e. Troop A, AH1G, 22 Jul 69. This accident is presently under investigation. Pilot was low leveling because of low ceilings. The AH1G was being flown to Rach Gia as a replacement aircraft. The front seat was a crew chief. The nose of the aircraft pitched down suddenly and although the pilot applied aft cyclic, he obtained no response from the aircraft. The aircraft impacted on the west bank of a canal. The tail boom struck the bank and separated from aircraft. The cabin section impacted on the center of the canal and sunk in 18 feet of water. The transmission tore off from the aircraft. The front seat occupant received skull injuries and has been evacuated to Okinawa after a skull operation. The pilot received minor injuries. The engine and various components of the aircraft are undergoing analysis to determine the cause of this accident. There was no fire.

f. Troop A, OH6A, 23 July 69. This accident is presently under investigation. The pilot experienced tail rotor failure and proceeded to Bihn May Airfield and attempted a running landing. Upon contact with the ground, the aircraft spun violently to the right and crashed. The pilot and observer sustained minor injuries. There was no fire.

2. Safety Record (1 May 69 to 31 Jul 69)

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3. Miniport:

1. The FSP pads at the mini pumps, because of weather erosion, presented a hazard to refueling aircraft. Some pads were loose because of erosion damage to the sides of the mini pads. The following corrective action is in progress:

(a) P A & E is presently building a cement border around each pad where erosion exists or could develop in the future. This wall is approximately two feet deep and one foot wide. The wall is level with the FSP surface at all sides. Gravel and concrete provide a bonding surface which adheres to the FSP and should protect the pads from erosion damage in the future.

(b) Loose dust and sand causes FOD damage to engines and rotor blades. The miniport area adjacent to the pads will be peneprimed in order to keep erosion to a minimum.

2. Grounding wires were installed at all 14 miniports. Ground plugs were manufactured locally. Made of brass, and machined to specifications, they provide suitable grounding during hot refueling operations. Refueling personnel and pilots have been briefed to use the ground wire and to exercise care to prevent misuse that may damage the installation.

4. Ramp Inspections:

1. Inspections are being conducted periodically on ramps 2 and 3. Corrections are being made on the spot. Emphasis has been placed in the proper storage of LOH doors in the racks provided at the ramps. A policy letter has been published outlining the method of securing these doors with a rope to prevent rotor wash turbulence or gusty winds from picking up the doors and damaging equipment or injuring personnel. Surface winds reached a peak gust of 45 kts on 20 July. The ramp inspection is equally effective to remove foreign objects and hazards adjacent to aircraft areas.

5. Grounding of Rocket Pods:

Ground rods have been ordered to be installed at the AHLG's revetments to ground the aircraft when the rocket pods are loaded. Thirty five brass plugs are being manufactured locally to specifications so that the aircraft grounding jack can be utilized effectively for this purpose. In this manner, the possibility of static electricity discharging rockets will be eliminated when the aircraft is properly grounded in the revetment and the pods are loaded.
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L. COMMUNICATIONS:

1. The extended distances over which the Squadron regularly operates frequently exceeds the range of voice communications equipment. The monsoon season, with attendant low clouds and adverse atmospheric conditions aggravates this situation. The problem has been alleviated to a great extent by the use of a communications "packet". This "packet", consists of the following equipment:

   a. One RC-292 antenna.
   b. One AN/GRA-50 antenna.
   c. One AN/GRA-46 FM radio.
   d. One PRC-25 FM radio.
   e. One small CP tent with poles.
   f. One AN/GRC AM radio.
   g. One 1.5 KW generator.

   This "packet" is slung out to the field by one of the organic UH1H aircraft to a secure area, which is located between the area of operation and the Squadron Tactical Operations Center. This "packet" then enables the Squadron to maintain constant radio communication with elements in the area of operation.

2. One troip has tested a new configuration of radio equipment in one of its command and control aircraft which has proven to be superior to other more conventional equipment. It consists of a second FM radio ARC-54 and multiple "Y" cord adapters in the passenger compartment. This arrangement eliminates the bulky space restricting radio console and still allows the commander to maintain constant communications with his Tactical Operations Center and maneuver elements in the area of operation. Since we use more than one Command and Control aircraft at times and the same aircraft are not always available due to maintenance; it would be very beneficial if all our UH1H aircraft were equipped in this manner.

M. LOGISTICS

1. During the reporting period, the S-4 continued logistical support of the 7/1 ACS. Availability of critical items has greatly improved since the last quarter.
2. In the last ORLL it was stated that a shortage of Nomex Flight Suits existed. Since that time they have been made available and all aviators and crew members in the Squadron now have two pairs.

3. In early May the generators used by the Squadron for maintenance of aircraft began to break down due to age. This became a serious problem because replacements could not be readily obtained. In early July an adequate amount of generators were obtained with hand carry requisitions and the problem was rectified.

4. In the last ORLL it was stated that construction of EM barracks had been started. To date one has been completed and four more have been started with an expected completion date of late August.
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SECTION II. Lessons Learned: Commanders' Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

A. Personnel: None

B. Operations:

1. Ordnance Selection on Night Hunter-Killer Missions:

(a) Observation: Aerial rocket fire has serious disadvantages at night.

(b) Evaluation: The bright flash of the rocket motor tends to momentarily destroy the pilots' effective night vision. The problem is compounded by the reflective glare from the AH-1G canopy under flare illumination. These conditions impede accuracy of rocket fire and are conducive to vertigo as well. The type of targets normally engaged in such operations, personnel and sampans, can be effectively neutralized with the turret weapons systems thereby eliminating the rocket motor flash and also allowing the pilot to devote his attention more fully to attitude flying and the gunner to concentrate on target engagement.

(c) Recommendation: That AH-1G pilots be encouraged to make maximum use of turret weapons on night hunter/killer missions. This will minimize inherent safety hazards, and provide in most cases for equally efficient and more economical target neutralization.

(d) Command Action: This procedure is being further evaluated at Squadron level for possible incorporation in the standard operating procedures for night operations.

2. Single Gunship Utilization on Night Hunter/Killer Missions:

(a) Observation: Single gunship utilization on night hunter/killer missions yields savings in blade time and pilot fatigue with negligible sacrifice of effectiveness.

(b) Evaluation: The difficulty of target acquisition at night for gunships necessitates prolonged tracer marking by the C&C aircraft. It is often impossible for the C&C aircraft to remain clear of the gunship-target line and still provide tracer marking for a long enough interval to allow two gunships to roll in succession. The lead-wingman concept of gunship operation is difficult to employ in this situation. Utilization of a single gunship causes little sacrifice of effectiveness while providing substantial savings of blade time and reduction in pilot fatigue. It also eliminates the hazards of two gunships operating at night within the same vertical airspace.
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(c) Recommendation: That single gunship utilization for night hunter/killer operations be further explored and evaluated.

(d) Command Action: Selected missions dependent upon the tactical situation are being directed to utilize one AH-1G aircraft.

C. TRAINING

1. Weapons Familiarization

(a) Observation: There have been no range facilities available for individual weapons familiarization firing in the Vinh Long area. The requirement to establish a zero on all M-16 and M-14 rifles had not been complied with.

(b) Evaluation: A survey of the local area was conducted to acquire a suitable range facility that could be made available on short notice for familiarization firing.

(c) Recommendation: An area of sand fill adjacent to Vinh Long Airfield was suggested for use.

(d) Command Action: A 25 meter range has been constructed on the site with the assistance of the 36th Engineer Battalion. Targets of regulation size and shape were fabricated for use in zeroing individual weapons. Familiarization and zero firing of individual weapons has been accomplished. The range remains available for orientation firing in support of the in-country training program.

D. INTELLIGENCE: None

E. LOGISTICS

1. Shortage of Self Service Items

(a) Observation: During this reporting period a critical shortage of self service items has been experienced.

(b) Evaluation: The shortage of self service items has made it extremely difficult to perform administrative functions and has caused many undue hardships on personnel.

(c) Recommendation: That sufficient self service items be placed in the country store in order to support using units.
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(d) Command Action: Numerous liaison visits have been made to the 574th Support Company in Binh Thuy in efforts to obtain self service items. Requisitions have been submitted but are seldom filled.

F. OTHER

1. UH1H and AHIG T/R Hub (MSN 1615-928-6311 and 1615-933-825)

(a) Observation: After installation of new hubs which are required to be inspected every 100 hours, it was found that 75% of them must be repaired by replacing parts such as bearings, grease plugs, and trunnions. At times the complete hub must be salvaged because of cracks.

(b) Evaluation: All hubs are inspected every 100 hours by a general support unit and all parts are rebuilt or replaced at GBU or manufacturer level.

(c) Recommendation: The manufacturer has in production a new hub called the 801. This hub is to be inspected every 1100 hours. However, the hub being used at the present time originally was to be inspected every 1100 hours as well. Within 3 months of adoption the present hub was reduced from 1100 hours inspection to every 100 hours, and 75% of these hubs are found defective with bad bearings, trunnions, and cracks in the hub itself. The new 801 hub which enters the supply system in July 1968 will be beefed up in all areas. It is suggested for longer life that this hub should be lubricated every 10 to 15 flying hours. It should also be lubricated daily if the aircraft is flown in rain. Experience has shown that water is sucked into all hubs forcing the grease out causing excessive wear and a shorter life. Presently these hubs are greased every 25 hours. This command firmly believes that the hub being used today and the new 801 hub will have a longer life and sustain less wear if the above suggested lubrication procedures are followed. If the new beefed up 801 hub is not greased properly every 10 to 15 flying hours and daily after the aircraft has flown in rain, the 1100 hour inspection will also have to be reduced.

(d) Command Action: Grease all hubs every 10 to 15 hours and daily if the aircraft is flown in rain. Inspect the new 801 hub every 100 hours until assured of its stability and stamina to last 1100 flying hours.

2 Incl

1. Appendix I to Part I
2. H-2 Heavy Equipment Captured or Destroyed

Incl 2 wd HQ, DA

15

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AVERAG-C (10 Aug 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational report of 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry
For Period Ending 31 July 1969, ACS, CoSN-65 (HI)

Da, u., 164th Aviation Group (CST), w/o 96215, 29 August 1969

D: SEC: DISTRIBUTION

1. The attached 7/1st ACS OML for the period ending 31 July 1969 has been reviewed by this headquarters.

2. The following additions are made to the report:

   a. Section I, para 1B, page 1: add organization chart (Incl 1 to this indorsement).

   b. Section I, para 10, page 2: add the following changes within the command group and principal staff:

      (1) Lieutenant Colonel George R. Derrick, 526321144, assumed command of the Squadron on 5 May 1969, replacing Lieutenant Colonel George A. Crook, 465366197.

      (2) Captain William T. Hall, 336320897, assumed duties of Squadron SI on 5 May 1969, replacing Captain Raymond A. Fields, 561462559.

      (3) Major Phillip G. Sheaffer, 144288801, assumed duties of Squadron S2, on 28 July 1969, replacing Captain Robert A. White, 509286631.

      (4) Chief Warrant Officer Jose A. Suarez, 130248804, assumed duties of Squadron Safety Officer on 1 July 1969, replacing Captain Charles H. Mohanis, 170366286.

      (5) Captain Robert H. Black, 286309182, assumed duties of Squadron Maintenance Officer on 20 July 1969, replacing Major James H. Weaver, 410642142.


      (8) Captain Charles H. Steiner, Jr., 272384646, assumed command of D Troop on 18 July 1969, replacing Captain Ronald D. Craelie, 176365397.

3. Section I, para 1D2, page 3, should reflect 8 Vietnamese national Civilians authorised and on-hand in Troop B. The total Vietnamese national civilians authorised and on-hand in 7/1st ACS should be 43.

4. The following comments are made on the report:

   a. Section I, para I3, page 7: During this quarter the 164th CAO received 10 quotas for the AH-IG transition training course. Due to requirements in the 307th CAB they received 6 of these quotas, and the 13th CAB 4.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
AND REMOVED
CONFIDENTIAL

AVH460-C (10 aug 69) 1st Ind 29 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational report of 7th maneuver squadron, 1st Air Cavalry
For Period Ending 31 July 1969, lCU, CAVDIV-65 (AU)

and 7/1st received 2 each. The 7/1st MI was allocated 5 quotas of the 6 quotas that have been received for the period from 10 August to 10 October. Additional quotas have been requested and as quotas are received they are allocated to the 7/1st based on current requirements.

b. Section II, para B1(c), page 13: Concur. Other units within this command have experienced similar difficulties when firing rockets from the M-10 at night; however, the nature of certain targets necessitates the use of rockets.

c. Section II, para B2(c), page 14: This headquarters concurs with recommendation. A light fire team is scheduled for this mission; however the unit commander, dependent upon the tactical situation, may elect to use only one gunship.

d. Section II, para C1(c), page 14: Concur.

e. Section II, para F1(c), page 14: Concur. This headquarters has also experienced difficulty in obtaining sufficient quantities of self-service items. The 574th Supply and Service company's inventory levels are unable to keep up with the demand for these items.

f. Section II, para F1(c), page 15: Concur.

Jack N. Thomas
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

Distribution:
2-MA, ATTN: AGSUR
1-UC, 1st Avn Bde, ATTN: AVH460-C

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AVBAGC-O (10 Aug 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry for Period Ending 31 July 1969 (ACS CBOR-65) (HI) (UIC: 1BC6AA)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Aviation Brigade, AR 96304 8 SEP 1969

THRU: Commander, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVBCO-DST, APO 96375
         Commander-in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GFOR-OFT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs with the contents as indorsed.

2. The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

   a. Paragraph 21, page 14, addresses the shortage of self service supply items. Concur with the recommendation to increase stock levels. The Director of Supply, Saigon Support Command advises that this situation was caused by the relocation of the Vung Tau Self Service Supply Center to the I Corps area. This created an increase of customers on the remaining DSU, SSSC in the Delta. Present plans are to increase the size of the facilities and stock objective. The shortage is compounded by the unavailability of air transportation. Surface transportation from Saigon to Can Tho is unreliable and arrival times cannot be firmly established. In view of the transportation problems, completion of the enlargement plans cannot be established at this time.

   b. Paragraph 31(a), page 15, addresses defective characteristics of the UH-1H/AH-1G tail rotor hub. Concur with the recommendation to increase the frequency of servicing and inspection.

      (1) The greasing of tail rotors every ten to fifteen flying hours as recommended by the 7/1st ACS is a standard practice in Vietnam. The increased frequency of servicing tail rotor hubs with regard to environmental conditions such as rain, dust, and temperature has been in effect for some time. The greasing of tail rotor hubs on a 90 day basis has shortened the service life of the tail rotor hubs and working parts that are used in Vietnam. The frequency of such greasing should be established by each unit depending upon its operating environment and conditions.

      (2) The frequency of lubricating the new 801 tail rotor hub is specified in 71: 55-1520-210-55. If the established criterion is not adequate,

units have been advised to submit EIRs in accordance with TM 58-750 so that USAAVCOM can establish accurate lubrication requirements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

ARTHUR W. LITTLE
CPT AG
Asst AG.

Copy Furnished:
7/1st ACS
AVHOC-DST (10 Aug 69) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry for
Period Ending 31 July 1969, ROE CSFOR-65 (R1) (UIE: W3Z6AA)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375
2 SEP 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for
the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, 7th Armored Squad-
ron, 1st Air Cavalry.

2. Reference item concerning "Shortage of Self Service Items", section II,
page 14, paragraph El; concur. This headquarters in conjunction with the 1st
Logistical Command has initiated action to correct deficiencies which have re-
sulted in insufficient supplies being available in self-service supply centers.
These measures, to become effective on 1 October 1969, are intended to improve
supply availability and customer satisfaction. A standard stockage list,
identifying those items that will be stocked by all self-service supply centers
in RVN, will be published and distributed to all customer units. The stock-
age list will be reviewed periodically and updated to insure that required
supplies are made available to the customer. To prevent over-procurement by
some customers at the expense of others, a credit control system is being
established which will authorize the customer to draw supplies in relation to
the requirements of his mission. Requisitions have been submitted to CONUS
sources for sufficient supplies to insure adequate initial stockage and to
satisfy all requirements for self-service supplies. These supplies are expect-
ed to arrive in the command prior to 1 October 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furb:
7th Arm Sqdn, 1st Air Cav
1st Avn Bde

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GPOP-DT (10 Aug 69) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 29 SEP 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Arm AG
CONFIDENTIAL

INCLUSION I

1. A, B, and C Troops devoted the majority of their efforts to armed visual reconnaissance and interdiction operations along the Vietnam/Cambodian border in the vicinity of Kien Giang, Chau Doc, Kien Phong, and Kien Teung provinces. The squadron divided this zone into two areas of responsibility, assigning each area to one air cavalry troop for daylight coverage. At night, the third troop would organize for combat into two teams, consisting of one command and control aircraft (the hunter), two AHIC cobras (killers), and one UH60 flare helicopter each. These two teams provided a surveillance and strike capability across the entire front. The experience gained from three months of night operations elicits the following observations:

   a. The Mark III "People Sniffer" was mounted in the command and control helicopter to test its usefulness for night operations. The helicopter flew over the border regions at an altitude from 50 to 300 feet, and at 80 knots airspeed to detect personnel infiltrating into Vietnam from Cambodia. This practice was considered unsafe by the Team Commanders due to poor visibility and unidentifiable terrain features. Since the "sniffer" is not effective at higher altitude, its use on night operations was discontinued.

   b. On several occasions a significant target was acquired with "starlight" scopes and the AHIC "killer" team were called in to make terror strikes in these areas. While operating in the "Hunter/Killer" configuration, it was found that the most successful means of marking a target for the "Killer" team was to employ incendiary grenades in or near the target and to adjust their fire accordingly. The illumination of the burning grenade provided the pilots of the killer aircraft a positive target for their sights enabling more accurate fire.

   c. The Air Cavalry Troops used a mixture of point detonating and variable time fuzes on its rockets while on night operations. Ninety percent of all targets brought under fire are never seen by the gun ship pilots, therefore an immediate area coverage of the target by employing VT fuse has proven very effective. The fleshette round, when available, is ideal for area coverage and has been used with devastating effect on targets detected by sensing devices.

2. The Squadron was successful. By providing 24 hour a day coverage of the border in conjunction with Vietnamese ground forces a significant decrease in enemy troop movement and activities has been noted. Several night contacts were made with large forces attempting to infiltrate, and the response to these threats forced the enemy to withdraw into Cambodia.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry

Experiences of unit engaged in counter-insurgency operations, 1 May 69 to 31 July 69.

CO, 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry

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