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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned, Headquarters 17th Air Cavalry

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry
CONFIDENTIAL
HEADQUARTERS 3D SQUADRON 17TH AIR CAVALRY
QUARTER ENDING 31 Jul 69

AVGC-B
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS OSPER-65 (B1) (URC-WAMAA)

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SECTION 1
Significant Activities

1. (U) INTRODUCTION:

a. MISSION: The squadron's basic mission has been that of providing reconnaissance, surveillance, security, and economy of force.

b. ORGANIZATION: The squadron is organized under TOE 17-95T dated June 1965 and USARPAC General Order 401 dated August 1968. In addition, RL/KD teams are attached (1 per air cavalry troop) by 12th Aviation Group General Order 55 dated July 1968 and General Order 60 dated August 1969. The current organisation structure and unit locations are listed in inclosure 1 and 2.

2. (FOUO) PERSONNEL:

a. PERSONNEL CHANGES: Following is the command group and principle staff as of 31 July 1969, with the changes during the period:

HEADQUARTERS 3D SQUADRON 17TH AIR CAVALRY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<tr>
<td>LTC JOHN B. FITCH</td>
<td>CO</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAJ DUNNELL R. SANDERS II</td>
<td>XO</td>
<td>Replaced MAJ Robert H. Hailey 1Jun69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ ARTHUR S. DERVIES III</td>
<td>S3</td>
<td>Replaced MAJ Joseph L. Kulmayer 10Jul69</td>
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<td>LTR DONALD W. HILDETT</td>
<td>S1</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPT HAROLD L. HILTZ</td>
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AVGC-D

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCB CSFOR-65 (R1) (UIC-WJUM)

CPT LESTER R. BELL S4 Replaced 1ST Lawrence J. Dipasquale 15Jun65
Replaced CPT Stanley N. Gehler 1Jun65

CPT SCHUYLER N. CUNNIFF HHT CO No Change

CPT JAMES P. SKELTON JR. MAINT OFF No Change

MAJ HAROLD L. SMITH A Trp CO Replaced MAJ Burnett R. Sanders II 31May65

MAJ WILLARD D. CONKLIN B Trp CO No Change

MAJ BILLY J. SLUSHER C Trp CO No Change

CPT WILLIAM C. WHITE JR. D Trp CO No Change

b. UNIT STRENGTHS AS OF 31 JULY 1969: The squadron is authorized 85 Officers, 163 Warrant Officers, and 848 enlisted men. Assigned strength at the end of the reporting period was 120 Officers, 80 Warrant Officers, and 809 enlisted men (See Inlosure 3).

c. INFUSION: During the reporting period 20 enlisted men were exchanged for 21 enlisted men from other aviation units in furtherance of the infusion program to reduce rotational peaks. There were no officers or warrant officers exchanged during this period.

d. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS: One thousand two hundred and twenty-four awards were recommended within the squadron during the reporting period. One thousand and seventy-one were approved, 21 were downgraded and 750 are still pending (See Inlosure 4).

e. FRIENDLY LOSSES: Friendly losses for the period were nine KIA and 25 WIA. No personnel were KIA (See Inlosure 5).

3. (C) INTELLIGENCE: The squadron conducted extensive aerial reconnaissance and surveillance missions, providing its various control headquarters with valuable and timely information concerning the enemy. The Squadron's efforts were concentrated in Tay Ninh, Binh Duong, Bau Ngia, Gia Dinh, Long An, and Binh Long Provinces and, to a limited extent, in Bien Hoa, Go Cong, Kien Loc, Kien Phuoc and Long Khanh Provinces. Attention centered on known and suspected enemy base camp areas and lines of communications. The intelligence gathered provided the basis for ground operations, tactical and strategic air strikes, and artillery strikes.

c. TERRAIN: The relief in the squadron area of operations ranged from flat delta in the south and as far north as Tay Ninh to gently rolling hills in Bien Hoa and Long Khanh Provinces. Drainage is provided by the Saigon, Mekong, Dong Nai, Van Go Long, Van Go Tay, and Mekong Rivers and their tributaries. Vegetation consists of extensive rice crops in the delta regions, extensive rubber plantations in parts of Tay Ninh, Binh Duong, and Long Khanh Provinces, and extensive broadleafed evergreen forests elsewhere.

(1) Observation and Fields of Fire: Observation and fields of fire ranged from extremely limited in the forested areas of Tay Ninh, Binh Duong, and Long Khanh Provinces to excellent in the delta regions.

Incl 2

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AVGC-B
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (UIC-MAMFA)

(2) Obstacles: Neither natural nor artificial obstacles in the TACR had any effect on squadron operations.

(3) Cover and Concealment: The enemy has limited natural cover, however, he is an expert at building tunnel and bunker complexes which provide him excellent protection against direct and indirect fire as well as air strikes. The enemy has excellent concealment in jungle and plantation areas as well as among nipa palm and pineapple trees which frequently line rivers and canals in the delta areas. He also makes use of darkness and camouflage to conceal his movement or presence in an area.

(4) Key Terrain: Highways 1, 4, 15, and 20, and the Dong Ha, Saigon, Van Co Dong, Van Co Tay, and Me Kong Rivers together with their major tributaries are considered key terrain. The highways are selected because of their importance as lines of communication, not only for military traffic but for civilian traffic as well. The major rivers also serve as important lines of communication and enable allied forces to ship large quantities of materials. For the same reason, these rivers form important lines of communication for the enemy.

(5) Avenues of Approach: The following VC/NVA avenues of approach into the squadron area of operations are considered significant:

(a) Parrots Beak (XS 310920), and the Van Co Tay River.

(b) Parrots Beak (XS 310920), Bo Bo Canal, Pineapple Plantation (XS 580900), and Saigon.

(c) Ba Thu (XT 270050), My Thang Dong (XT 440020), Tun Nhat (XS 700650), and Saigon.

(d) Angel's Wing (XT 310130), An Minh (XT 400130), Hau Nghia Swamp, and Saigon.

(e) Angel's Wing/Ba Thu, Van Co Dong River, Pineapple Plantation, and Saigon.

(f) Fishhook (XT 580900), Michelin Plantation, Boi Loi Woods, Saigon River, Binh My (XT 530180), and Saigon.

b. WEATHER: During the reporting period the squadron area of operation was under the influence of the southeast monsoon. During May the weather was generally excellent. Beginning in the latter part of June, the wet season set in with heavy showers and thunderstorms usually occurring in the afternoons and evenings. This condition prevailed through July. Friendly operations were hampered to a certain extent by low ceilings, periodic showers and thunderstorms. Temperatures during the period ranged from minimums of 71 to 78 degrees to normal maximums of 80 to 98 degrees, although maximums in the low 100's were not infrequent.

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4. (c) OPERATIONS: The 3/17 Cav area of operations was primarily in the central, southern, western and eastern areas of III Corps Tactical Zone (See Inclosure 6). The squadron, with its troops OPCON and/or in direct support of several different units during the reporting period, conducted reconnaissance, security, surveillance and economy of force operations throughout the major portion of the III Corps Tactical Zone. The general area of operation of the squadron elements extended from the Cambodian border on the west and northwest, the III Corps boundary and War Zone D on the east and the Song Hau Giang River on the south. This period was characterized by numerous mission changes. A Troop provided support to the Capital Military Assistance Command (CMAC); Binh Hoa Tactical Area Command (BTAC), and the Royal Thailand Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF). B Troop remained direct support 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. C Troop provided support to the 25th Infantry Division; 1st Infantry Division; 18th ARVN Division; BTAC; Task Force Doyle (Xuan Loc area); and the 199th Light Infantry Brigade. D Troop remained OPCON to BTAC during the reporting period for use in the defense of Binh Hoa as well as a ready reaction force for the II Field Force long range patrols.

a. SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONS:

(1) On 1 May 69, A/3/17 (-) continued to provide direct support to CMAC, with two hunter-killer teams in direct support to BTAC. B/3/17 continued direct support to the 9th Inf Div. C/3/17 continued direct support 25th Inf Div.

(2) On 2 May 69, A/3/17 elements engaged one VC resulting in one KIA at XS 874848. C/3/17 hunter-killer teams were credited with four VC KIA at XS 165424.

(3) On 8 May 69, A/3/17 cero rifles engaged several VC at YT 445305 resulting in one VC KIA and three possible KIA. B/3/17 elements were credited with one VC KIA at XS 662578. Elements also accounted for two additional KIA at XS 685528.

(4) On 10 May 69, A/3/17 hunter-killer teams were credited with four VC KIA and twenty bunkers destroyed at YT 054593. C/3/17 engaged several VC at XT 154467 resulting in three VC KIA.

(5) On 11 May 69, A/3/17 (-) was released direct support CMAC, and placed direct support BTAC with one Firefly team direct support CMAC. Alpha Troop detained four eligible mos at YS 082946. B/3/17 hunter-killer teams were credited with two VC KIA at XS 339761. C/3/17 was released direct support 25th Division and placed direct support Senior Advisor, 18th ARVN Div. Elements engaged a suspected enemy base camp at YT 490410 resulting in 10 VC KIA.

(6) On 12 May 69, B/3/17 made contact with the enemy, destroyed a 30 caliber machine gun, and were credited with seven VC KIA at XS 490706. C/3/17 elements engaged several VC at XT 499132 resulting in 10 KIA. Further significant results were 11 KIA at YT 499191.
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AVGC-B

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (WJC-MAHMA)

(7) On 13 May 69, B/3/17 was credited with two VC KIA at XS 490706, and three KIA at XS 490710.

(8) On 15 May 69, A/3/17 engaged several VC at YB 083963 resulting in two VC KIA. B/3/17 aero rifles performed a sweep in the vicinity of XS 489696 resulting in one VC KIA, two AK-47 rifles, one NVA radio and seven documents captured. Elements were further credited with one VC KIA at YT 538045 and six VC KIA at YT 400061.

(9) On 16 May 69, B/3/17 accounted for one VC KIA at XS 659735; two VC KIA at WS 967471; and two VC KIA at YS 008423. C/3/17 elements made enemy contact resulting in 14 VC KIA at YT 392045.

(10) On 17 May 69, A/3/17 aero rifles were credited with one VC KIA at XT 893252. In further activity, elements engaged a bunker complex igniting one secondary explosion at XT 893250. B/3/17 elements accounted for one VC KIA at XS 678646 and two VC KIA at XS 678646.

(11) On 18 May 69, A/3/17 elements engaged several enemy resulting in eight VC KIA at YT 283026. B/3/17 was credited with three VC KIA at XS 575655 and an additional two VC KIA at XS 705566. C/3/17 elements accounted for two KIA at YT 531098.

(12) On 19 May 69, A/3/17 was released direct support BHTAC and placed direct support CMAC and the RTAVF. Alpha Troop detained three personnel at XS 943835 and approached an additional detainee at XS 952830. B/3/17 elements were credited with one VC KIA at XS 670660, three VC KIA at XS 670662 and two VC KIA at XS 622684.

(13) On 20 May 69, A/3/17 aero rifles detained one eligible male at XT 805963 and five additional detainees at YS 059802. B/3/17 elements had several enemy contacts throughout the day with the following significant results: One VC KIA at XS 452471, one KIA at XS 170456, two detainees at XS 120460, two VC KIA at XS 202470, five VC KIA at XS 222472, two VC KIA at XS 68340 and two VC KIA at XS 730513.

(14) On 21 May 69, B/3/17 had scattered contacts with the enemy resulting in one VC KIA at XS 66069; one VC KIA at XS 552759 and two VC KIA at XS 527682.

(15) On 22 May 69, A/3/17 was placed direct support BHTAC and remained direct support to CMAC and RTAVF. A Troop aero rifles picked up one detainee at YS 008812, two detainees at XS 974892 and a fourth detainee at XS 981884. Elements were also credited with one VC KIA at XS 002485. C/3/17 was released direct support BHTAC and placed direct support 2nd Bde, 25th Inf Div, and Senior Advisor, 18th ARVN Div. Elements were credited with one VC KIA at XT 496137.

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AV-8B
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Squadron, 17th Air
Cavalry for Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSPOR-65 (II)
(UIC-MAMAA)

(16) On 24 May 69, A/3/17 engaged one VC resulting in a KIA at XS 585934. B/3/17 hunter-killer teams engaged and destroyed 36 rockets at XS 198417. Elements were also credited with one KIA at XS 659732 and one KIA at XS 555265.

(17) On 26 May 69, B/3/17 made contact with the enemy on three occasions. The first at XS 694782 resulting in one VC KIA, an additional KIA at XS 720571 and the heaviest contact at WS 910594 resulting in 14 VC KIA.

(18) On 27 May 69, A/3/17 was released direct support BHTAC and received direct support GMLC and KIAVF. Elements engaged several VC resulting in eight VC KIA. B/3/17 made contact with the enemy in scattered engagements with the following results: One VC KIA at XS 356015, one VC KIA at XS 473679, three VC KIA at XS 455677 and three VC KIA at WS 705765. C/3/17 was credited with one VC KIA at XT 595905 and one possible KIA at XS 47992.

(19) On 28 May 69, C/3/17 hunter-killer teams engaged personnel in a suspected base camp resulting in five VC KIA at XT 666281 and were credited with one VC KIA at XT 510000.

(20) On 29 May 69, B/3/17 engaged the enemy on several occasions with the following results: Two VC KIA at XT 675645, two VC KIA at XS 602726 and one VC KIA at XS 744637.

(21) On 1 Jun 69, A/3/17 was credited with three VC KIA at XS 584916. B/3/17 engaged two VC in uniforms resulting in two VC KIA at XS 537589. At WS 860468, a B Troop LOH engaged four VC resulting in four VC KIA. Elements were also credited with four KIA at XS 595773 and one KIA at WS 612681. C/3/17 also credited with two VC KIA at XT 546165.

(22) On 3 Jun 69, A/3/17 engaged personnel at XT 816095 resulting in two NVA KIA. B/3/17 engaged with three VC KIA at XS 795704. C/3/17 hunter-killer teams engaged an enemy element at YT 14832 results in five VC KIA. One KIA was also recorded at XT 546165.

(23) On 4 Jun 69, C/3/17 engaged a VC base camp in the vicinity of YT 082398 resulting in eight VC KIA.

(24) On 5 Jun 69, C/3/17 was released direct support 2/25 Inf Div and placed direct support 1st Inf Div. Elements remained direct support BHTAC.

(25) On 6 Jun 69, B/3/17 made contact on several occasions with the enemy with the following significant results: Four VC KIA at XT 648738, one VC KIA at XS 655742 and an additional four VC KIA at XS 607529.

(26) On 7 Jun 69, C/3/17 was released direct support 1st Inf Div and placed direct support Task Force Doyle in the Xuan Loc area. Elements also remained direct support to BHTAC. Hunter-killer teams engaged an estimated 15 VC resulting in eight VC KIA and one concrete bunker destroyed at XT 341796.

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ATCC-B
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CEFR-65 (R1)
(UIC-WLAMMA)

(27) On 10 Jun 69, B/3/17 engaged several VC in the vicinity of XS 614703 resulting in four VC KIA.

(28) On 14 Jun 69, A/3/17 was placed direct support to HMMW and remained direct support CMAC and RAVN. C/3/17 was released direct support HMMW.

(29) On 15 Jun 69, B/3/17 accounted for five VC KIA in the vicinity of XS 735650. C/3/17 was released direct support 18th ARVN Div and placed direct support 1st Bn, 25th Inf Div.

(30) On 18 Jun 69, B/5/17 night hunter-killer team engaged a sniper at XS 305430 resulting in a secondary explosion. Hunter-killer teams engaged four VC in the vicinity of XS 367958 resulting in two VC KIA and one VC WIA. A subsequent small arms engagement resulted in the WIA and three AK-47 rifles being captured. C/3/17 elements were credited with six VC KIA at XT 052658.

(31) On 19 Jun 69, C/5/17 firefly gun supported defense of FSB Washington under ground attack, resulting in five VC KIA at XT 143570. Elements engaged a VC element at XT 302407 resulting in an additional five VC KIA. C/3/17 Cobras received fire from the area of XT 243504 which was subsequently engaged resulting in eight VC KIA, one mortar possible destroyed and two automatic weapons destroyed. At XT 163401, a Charlie Troop light fire team supported ARVN Marines in contact resulting in 30 VC KIA, one machine gun destroyed.

(32) On 21 Jun 69, C/5/17 was released direct support 1/25 Inf Div and placed direct support 199th Lt Inf Bn and 18th ARVN Div.

(33) On 23 Jun 69, A/3/17 navor rifles detained four eligible miles at XS 926855. B/3/17 established contact with the enemy in a suspected rear service area at XS 660530 resulting in three VC KIA by the navor rifles and 14 VC KIA by the hunter-killer teams.

(34) On 25 Jun 69, B/3/17 hunter-killer team engaged the enemy in the vicinity of XS 660525 resulting in two VC KIA. An additional KIA was recorded at XS 656527. Elements were credited with one KIA at XS 658526. C/3/17 elements were credited with three VC KIA and four possible KIA at XT 558239.

(35) On 26 Jun 69, A/3/17 hunter-killer teams engaged two NVA vicinity of XS 982825 resulting in two NVA KIA. B/3/17 elements engaged the enemy at XS 451841 resulting in three KIA. A further engagement at XS 451841 resulted in three VC KIA and four AK-47's captured. Elements also had two VC KIA at XS 630792.

(36) On 29 Jun 69, B/3/17 made several enemy contacts with the following results: Two VC KIA at XS 735607; two VC KIA at XS 723668; two VC KIA at XS 619799 and five VC KIA at XS 724605.
(37) On 2 Jul 69, B/3/17 hunter-killer teams engaged five VC resulting in two VC KBA at XS 868765. A Bravo Troop LCH engaged one VC resulting in a KBA at XS 867768. In a further contact, elements were credited with three VC KBA at XS 645726. A final engagement resulted in one KBA at XS 865765.

(38) On 3 Jul 69, B/3/17 elements made several enemy contacts with the following significant results: Two VC KBA at XS 716637; two VC KBA at XS 633802; one VC KBA at XS 633807; three VC KBA at XS 640726; five VC KBA at XS 671590 and two VC KBA at XS 640826. C/3/17 engaged a small enemy force in the vicinity of YS 324850 resulting in one VC KBA and two possible KBA. D/3/17 elements found 16 chicon grenades during a sweep operation at YT 132865.

(39) On 5 Jul 69, A/3/17 hunter-killer teams engaged a hut with bunkers resulting in two 25 pound bags of rice, two 55 gallon drums destroyed and one VC KBA at YS 062793. Elements also detained four personnel at XS 978815. B/3/17 elements engaged an estimated platoon in the open at XS 411875 resulting in 11 VC KBA. A further engagement resulted in one VC KBA and one VC POW at XS 411875. C/3/17 provided one hunter-killer team in support of Navy elements in the Rung Sat Special Zone.

(40) On 7 Jul 69, A/3/17 was released direct support BHTAC and remained direct support CMAC and RTAVF. C/3/17 was released direct support 199th Lt Inf Bde and 10th ARVN Div and placed direct support BHTAC.

(41) On 8 Jul 69, B/3/17 established several enemy contacts with the following significant results: One VC KBA at XS 460462; two VC KBA at XS 635523; one VC KBA, one INLA radio, one hut destroyed with secondary explosion at XS 460462. One additional KBA at XS 620710.

(42) On 9 Jul 69, A/3/17 was placed direct support BHTAC and remained direct support CMAC and RTAVF. C/3/17 was released direct support BHTAC and placed direct support 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div.

(43) On 13 Jul 69, B/3/17 established scattered enemy contacts with the following results: One VC KBA at XS 811698; one KBA at XS 657686; three KBA at XS 657686; one KBA at XS 657686; one KBA at XS 657686; one KBA and one POW at XS 726984.

(44) On 14 Jul 69, B/3/17 began a three day maintenance standdown. Bravo Troop displaced from Dong Tam to Di An during the period 14 Jul to 16 Jul 69. A/3/17 and C/3/17 provided one team each to 3/9 Div during this period.

(45) On 17 Jul 69, B/3/17 resumed direct support 3/9 Div. Elements engaged five VC at XS 745537 resulting in five VC KBA.

(46) On 19 Jul 69, A/3/17 hunter-killer teams engaged several targets in the vicinity of XS 564903 resulting in one hut, one bunker destroyed and four possible VC KBA.
On 22 Jul 69, C/3/17 LCH received fire at XT 185278. Elements engaged the area resulting in three VC KIA.

On 24 Jul 69, C/3/17 was released direct support 1/25 Div and placed direct support OG, 199th Lt Inf Bde.

On 25 Jul 69, B/3/17 elements engaged two VC evading at XS 638658 resulting in two VC KIA. A night hunter team made enemy contact at XS 459605 resulting in six VC KIA.

On 27 Jul 69, C/3/17 made enemy contact in the vicinity of YT 550200 resulting in seven KIA.

On 28 Jul 69, B/3/17 elements engaged an unknown number of VC at XS 594171 resulting in eight VC KIA.

On 28 Jul 69, A, B, and C/3/17 were released of all commitments and placed OPCON to CMAC for reconnaissance and security missions in support of President Nixon's visit to Saigon and DiAn.

On 30 Jul 69, A/3/17 returned direct support CMAC and RTAVP, and B/3/17 returned direct support 3/9 Inf Div. C/3/17 was placed direct support BHTAC.

On 31 Jul 69, A/3/17 was placed direct support BHTAC and remained direct support CMAC and RTAVP. C/3/17 was released direct support BHTAC and placed direct support CG, 199th Lt Inf Bde.

b. SUMMARY: While flying 10,968 sorties, the squadron lifted 15,302 troops, 66 tons of cargo, and was credited with 604 enemy KIA, 343 structures destroyed, and 130 sampans destroyed (See Inclosure 7). During the quarter, the squadron was engaged in numerous small scale operations but visual reconnaissance remains the primary mission.

5. (U) TRAINING: During this reporting period, the squadron had maximum participation in all allocated school courses. All new in-country replacements received training at the 1st Infantry Division Replacement Training Center, located at DiAn.

a. All training within the squadron was conducted with no loss in the operational status of the unit.

b. Training days = 0
   Tactical moves = 1
   Operational days = 92
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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Squadron, 17th Air
Cavalry for Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSPM-65 (R1)
(UI-MAAAM) (UIC-MAAAM)

a. School quotas filled by squadron during the period:

- OH-6A Airframe: 4
- T-65 Engine: 6
- T-53-L-13 Engine: 2
- Escape and Evasion: 1
- Aircraft Armament Subsystems - Enlisted: 1
- UH-1H Airframe: 1
- AH-1G Airframe: 2
- In-Country Replacement Training: 147
- AH-1G Transition: 1
- OH-6A Transition: 2
- Instructor Pilot - OH-6A: 3
- Instructor Pilot - AH-1G: 2
- Instructor Pilot - UH-1H: 1

6. (c) LOGISTICS:

a. AMMUNITION TYPE

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<td>7.62mm 4 Ball 1 Tracer M-60</td>
<td>12,232</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.62mm Minigun</td>
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<tr>
<td>.45 Cal</td>
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<tr>
<td>50 Cal Inc</td>
<td>2,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40mm Illum WS Rpm</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>40mm HE</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40mm HE Cobra</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81mm Mortar, Illum</td>
<td>53,019</td>
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<tr>
<td>81mm Mortar Sdk, WP</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>81mm Mortar HE</td>
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<tr>
<td>106mm MR HEP-T</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gren, Hand, Offensive</td>
<td>823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gren, Hand, Frag M-33</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Hct 2.75IN Flochotte</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hct 2.75IN Hent</td>
<td>120</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hct 2.75IN 17 lb VT</td>
<td>211</td>
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</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

AVG-1B

SUBJECT: Operational Report-LEMCOR of 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 31 July 1969. ROCS CSFOR-65 (R1)
(UIC-MAANAA)

b. AIRCRAFT STATUS: Squadron aircraft status at the end of the reporting period was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>On Hand</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(See Inclosure 6)

7. (U) SAFETY:

a. During the reporting period there were six accidents involving squadron aircraft. A brief account of these accidents follows:

(1) B Troop, AH-1G, 1 May 1969: Aircraft had just taken off and was on climb out. Witness said aircraft began a rapid descent, appeared to level out at tree top and then crashed into trees and caught fire. The cause was determined to be pilot error.

(2) B Troop, AH-1G, 1 May 1969: Aircraft in cruise flight yawed left, engine idled dropped to zero. Entered autorotation and was unable to jettison external stores. Autorotation unsuccessful, landed hard and rolled on left side. Failure of atomizer. The primary cause of the accident was pilot error with a contributing cause of atomizer failure.

(3) C Troop, OH-6A, 12 May 1969: At approximately 75 feet and 50 knots, RPM surged causing rotor overspeed, the pilot pulled in power to counter the overspeed. Aircraft then lost power and pilot was forced to land in a thinly wooded area. One main rotor blade, tail rotor assembly, tail rotor drive shaft, tail boom and main rotor head damaged beyond repair. The cause of the accident was high side governor failure.

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(4) C Troop, OH-6A, 16 May 1969: Aircraft was on a low level VR. RPM bled off and pilot tried to regain his RPM. RPM continued to bleed off and aircraft settled into the trees causing STRIKE damage. The cause was determined as a low side governor failure.

(5) A Troop, AH-1G, 9 June 1969: Aircraft was at about 150 feet approaching Bearcat for fuel. Aircraft was seen to make a climbing left turn and appeared to enter autorotation. Aircraft settled into 40 foot rubber trees, tail first. Aircraft was evacuated to Cu Chi. The cause was pilot error due to fuel exhaustion.

(6) C Troop, OH-6A, 13 June 1969: Aircraft was flying straight and level when it started to receive fire. Pilot made a descending S turn in an attempt to fly low level. Aircraft did not recover at level flight, hit the trees and crashed. Pilot was dead when rescue personnel arrived. The cause of the accident is classified as unknown.

b. SAFETY RECORD (MAY, JUNE, JULY)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>TOTAL HOURS</th>
<th>ACCIDENTS</th>
<th>RATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>HHT</td>
<td>977</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>000.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>6107</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>6125</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>6106</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>49.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/17 ACS</td>
<td>19318</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. SUMMARY: The squadron completed FY 69 with an accident rate of 46.1 per 100,000 flying hours. This is a great reduction from the rate of 52.3 for the first half of FY 69. This is due, largely, to increased emphasis within the squadron.

8. (U) CIVIC ACTION:

a. The squadron continues to emphasize civic action projects. Main efforts are concentrated in aid to Bethany Orphanage located in Ho Nai, Bien Hoa Province. Bethany is the home of some 125 parentless children and faces a constant struggle to obtain food, clothing, and adequate shelters for housing and schooling. The squadron continues to help the orphanage along these lines.

b. The squadron has donated approximately 195,290 VN$ to a building fund administered by the 12th Combat Aviation Group Chaplain. This money is being used to help pay for a new stone and brick classroom building at the orphanage. This replaces an antiquated wood structure now being used. These donations come through contributions on payday and through the Chaplain offerings.
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AVGC-B
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 31 July 1969. RGS CSFOR-65 (R1) (UIC-WALMAA)

o. Approximately 8000 pounds of food, 80 pounds of clothing, and 15 pounds of health items have been taken to the orphanage in addition to 100 health kits and 100 school kits.

d. One hundred children from the orphanage were brought to 3/17 Headquarters in Dian for a day of entertainment. Each child was provided a soldier for the day. The children were fed, given toys, and taken to a carnival of games sponsored by Headquarters, A and C Troops. Each child was also presented a picture of himself/herself piloting a static helicopter. The day ended with a program of native songs and dances by the children.

o. Plans for the future include:

(1) Building 90 desks and benches for the new classrooms.
(2) Acquisition of a pump for use at the newly-drilled well.
(3) Continued financial aid for the new building.
(4) Continued food and material assistance.
(5) Another visit to Dian by the children.
SECTION 2

Lessons Learned

Commander's observations, evaluations, recommendations, and command actions.

1. (U) PERSONNEL:

a. OBSERVATION: There has been a shortage of critical personnel during the periods of increased rotation. Constant monitoring must be made of personnel rotations to preclude losses in excess of accepted standards.

EVALUATION: During a unit's first year in country it is imperative that a carefully planned infusion program be instituted to evenly distribute personnel losses. However, peak rotational periods will continue to appear during the second year in country as a result of these infusion programs. The following program was instituted by this squadron in its second year in country to evenly distribute its losses. As new personnel arrive in the squadron, a review is made of each troop's strength by MOS. Projected peak periods of rotation in this MOS and closely related MOS's are checked. After these two factors are considered, the new individual will be assigned to the troop which has a rotational peak month in this particular MOS. Simultaneously an individual from the same troop with a like MOS and with a DEROS in the peak month is re-assigned to another troop. This process is very desirable in that it creates a minimum of personnel turbulence since only one man is displaced. After only a few months of application, each troop should reach a point of equilibrium in personnel losses.

RECOMMENDATION: Active programs as described above should be carried out to level rotational peaks within units rather than relying entirely on infusions to correct peak losses.

COMMAND ACTION: The above described program has been initiated by this squadron.

b. OBSERVATION: There is a shortage of communications personnel within the squadron.

EVALUATION: Each troop communications section is vital to the success of the tactical mission in the it must be capable of performing a dual role of control and control for each troop and providing the squadron with timely and accurate intelligence. Each air cavalry troop is presently authorized six communications personnel. The squadron is presently operating at 75% of its authorized communications personnel.

RECOMMENDATION: That emphasis be placed on this shortage through command channels in an attempt to supply units with their authorized communications personnel. It is further recommended that units assigned intelligence gathering missions receive priority in the assignment of communications personnel.
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AVIC-8

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Squadron, 17th Air
Cavalry for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)
(UIC=IAAM/A)

COMMAND ACTION: The squadron SI and communications officer have made
continuous efforts through command channels to obtain communications personnel
which the squadron is authorized.

2. (C) OPERATIONS:

EVALUATION: Due to the consistent level of battle damage sustained as
a result of the new methods of engagement, it is assumed the enemy has been
better trained in anti-aircraft tactics. Because of the frequency of contacts
made during reconnaissance missions, it is believed that the enemy has been
encouraged to engage aircraft more aggressively than in the past.

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that evasive tactics and contact
methods as employed by hunter-killer teams be emphasized and that pilots be
informed of the new methods of engagement.

COMMAND ACTION: Hunter-Killer tactics were immediately reviewed by the
scout pilots as a result of the changing nature of enemy contact methods.
Higher airspeed during low-level reconnaissance was initiated as well as more
defensive maneuvering in the area of operation.

3. (U) TRAINING: None

4. (U) INTELLIGENCE: None

5. (U) LOGISTICS AND MAINTENANCE:

a. OBSERVATION: It has been observed that the armament control panel
lights in the gunner’s cockpit of the AH-1G are too bright for night flying
when the instrument lights are adjusted to a satisfactory level of intensity.

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EVALUATION: Since the AH-1G is frequently used for night missions, maximum night vision for the gunner is absolutely necessary. The present single rheostat system in the gunner’s cockpit is used for controlling the intensity of both the flight instruments and the armament control panel lighting systems. When the flight instrument lights are adjusted to the proper level of intensity, armament control panel lights are too bright. Conversely, when the armament control panel lights are dimmed to an acceptable level, the intensity of the flight instrument lights is not sufficient.

RECOMMENDATION: That a separate rheostat for the flight instruments and the armament control panel be installed in the AH-1G. This would allow each system to be separately regulated to a satisfactory intensity of brightness.

COMMAND ACTION: An EIR has been submitted for this modification.

b. OBSERVATION: Due to the lack of a UHF Radio Control Head in the front seat of the AH-1G, the pilot/gunner of an AH-1G cannot change the frequencies on the UHF radio.

EVALUATION: In an emergency situation, a radio is of utmost importance. If the aircraft commander were to be incapacitated, the pilot would have to take control of the aircraft. As a minimum, he should have the capability of changing to the UHF guard radio frequency, so that an emergency could be declared.

RECOMMENDATION: That a remote control head for the UHF radio be factory installed in the front seat of the AH-1G to enable the pilot/gunner to change the frequency of the UHF radio.

COMMAND ACTION: All tactical radios in the AH-1G are kept on troop frequencies whenever possible so the pilot/gunner can always reach a station on either FM or UHF in an emergency. An EIR has been submitted through channels to have a remote control head installed in the gunner’s cockpit.

c. OBSERVATION: There is a shortage of barrier filters for the OH-6A aircraft.

EVALUATION: This shortage in the supply of barrier filters subtracts from the safety margin of the aircraft and reduces its combat effectiveness. The filters are in critical demand as they wear out much sooner when used in the OH-6A during a normal scout mission. This is due to the dust and POD accumulated during low level flight. As the filters become worn and accumulate dirt, there is a reduction in air intake. It is believed that this is a contributing cause of recent fuel control problems in the OH-6A.

RECOMMENDATION: That an effort be made to increase the supply of barrier filters to units which continually use the OH-6A for low level flight. A satisfactory supply would be to have two barrier filters for each OH-6A. This would allow the OH-6A crew chief to rotate the filters each day and properly clean the one not in use.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 31 July 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (V.C-MAWAW)

COMMAND ACTION: All efforts have been made by squadron maintenance through supply channels to obtain additional barrier filters.

d. OBSERVATION: The present attitude indicator in the OH-6A aircraft is not adequate to withstand the stresses of continuous visual reconnaissance operations required of this type unit.

EVALUATION: The structural limitations of the present OH-6A attitude indicator apparently cannot withstand the continuous unusual attitudes, rapid movements, and "G" forces exerted on the aircraft during normal visual reconnaissance missions. These conditions result in excessive precession of the gyro, instability of the gyro mechanism, and a faulty attitude indication. Incorrect attitude indication is a flight safety hazard which becomes extremely critical during night flight and inadvertent IFR conditions.

RECOMMENDATION: That the present attitude indicator in the OH-6A be modified or replaced by one which is structurally capable of withstanding the stresses of continuous visual reconnaissance missions.

COMMAND ACTION: An EIR has been submitted by this squadron.

6. (U) ORGANIZATION: None

8 INCLOSURES

1. Unit Organization
2. Unit Locations
3. Unit Strengths
4. Awards & Decorations
5. Friendly Losses
6. Operations Map
7. Operational Results
8. Aircraft Status

DISTRIBUTION:

10 - Commanding Officer, 12th GAG
2 - CINCUSARPAC
3 - Commanding General, USAV
5 - Commanding Officer, 1st Avn Bde
15 - S3 3/17 Cav

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AVBACA-SC (31 Jul 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 31 July 1969. HCS CSPOR-65 (R1) (UIC-WAAAA)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 12TH AVIATION GROUP (COMBAT), APO 96266 24 August 1969

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, APO 96266

In accordance with USARV Reg 525-15, the Operational Report—Lessons Learned of the 3/17th Air Cavalry Squadron, for the period ending 31 July 1969, is forwarded.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

GORDON M. HUNT
Major, Infantry
Adjutant
AVBOC-ER-II (3 Sep 69) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 31 July 1969. RGSP 055865 (RL) (UIC-WAAMAA)

DA, HQ II FOBCHY, APO San Francisco 96266 5 SEP 1969

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBA-C, APO 96307
Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVBOC(BST), APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for the period ending 31 July 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
B.G. Macdonald
LT, AGC
Asst AG
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (UIC-WAAK-MA)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384 SEP 1969

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHHG-DS, APO 96775
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs with the contents as indorsed.

2. The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

a. Section I, paragraph 7a, page 11 and 12, submits brief discussions of unit aircraft accidents. Records kept by this headquarters indicate that the unit experienced 7 accidents during the reported period. The omitted accident occurred on 7 Jun 69. An OH-6A crashed and was destroyed when the observer dropped an armed white phosphorous grenade inside the aircraft. The 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry recognizes the omission of this accident from this report.

b. Section I, paragraph 7b, page 12, addresses the safety record for May, June and July. Accident statistics in paragraph 7b should be changed as follows to incorporate the accident stated in paragraph 2a above:

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<th>RATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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(3) The 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry recognizes the omission of this accident from this report.

(2) The 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry has been informed of the revised rates.
d. Section II, paragraph 1b, page 14, addresses personnel shortages. No valid evaluation can be made regarding the shortage of communications personnel since the frame of reference is too vague to facilitate any judgement. This unit has been advised to submit specific MDS's for evaluation and possible corrective action by this headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

AR: CBR. W. Little
CPT AGC
Asst AGC

CF
3/17th ACS

21
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry.

2. Reference item concerning "There has been a shortage of critical personnel during the periods of increased rotation," section II, page 14, paragraph 1a; concur. Infusion programs accomplished by using personnel from the replacement stream is a valid solution in resolving a rotational hump. Such a system is used by this headquarters in accordance with the UBARV Controlled Infusion Program.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
3d/17th Air Cav
1st Avn Bde
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 29 SEP 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

CPT, AGC
Asia AG.
**CONFIDENTIAL**

**HEADQUARTERS**

3D SQUADRON 17TH CAVALRY
QUARTER ENDING
31 Jul 89

**OPERATIONAL RESULTS, QUARTERLY CALL**

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<th>UNIT</th>
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<th>Cargo Tons</th>
<th>Enemy XLA</th>
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3/17 Cw 18968 15302 66 604 25 315 1 150 12 66

**AIRCRAFT LOSS AND DAMAGE:**

A TROOP  *Aircraft Loss:* OSHA - 2, LM1G - 1, UH1H - 0  *Aircraft Damage:* OSHA - 3, LM1G - 3, UH1H - 3

B TROOP  *Aircraft Loss:* OSHA - 5, LM1G - 1, UH1H - 0  *Aircraft Damage:* OSHA - 23, LM1G - 8, UH1H - 4

C TROOP  *Aircraft Loss:* OSHA - 3, LM1G - 0, UH1H - 0  *Aircraft Damage:* OSHA - 11, LM1G - 7, UH1H - 1

D TROOP  *Aircraft Loss:* UH1H - 0  *Aircraft Damage:* UH1H - 0

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HEADQUARTERS
3D SQUADRON 1TT CYCL
QUARTER ENDING
31 JUL 69

AIRCRAFT STATUS, QUARTERLY CALL

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ENCLOSURE 8
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May 69 to 31 July 69.

CO, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry

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<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Originator's Report Number(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned on report)</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Supplementary Notes</td>
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<td>Sponsoring Military Activity</td>
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<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Abstract</td>
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N/A

N/A

HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310