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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
ACDA (M) (6 Oct 69) FOR OT UT 69B038
10 October 1969

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: BG Winant Sidle, CG, 1 Field
Force Vietnam Artillery, Period 16 March to 10 September 1969 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Reference: AR 1-26, subject, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U)
dated 4 November 1966.

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of BG Winant Sidle, subject as
above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized
from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in
accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be
interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of
any agency of the Department of the Army.

4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 1-26, as a
result of subject report should be provided ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days
of receipt of covering letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

ROBERT E. LYNCH
Colonel, AG
Acting The Adjutant General

1 Incl
as

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AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

1. Attached are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report prepared by EG Winant Sidle, Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery for the period 16 March to 10 September 1969.

2. EG Sidle is recommended as a candidate guest speaker at joint colleges and appropriate service schools.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
as (trip)
2 cy wd HQ, DA

C L M H, AG
1LT. AG
Assistant Adjutant General

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### DEBRIEFING REPORT (RCS-CSFOR-74) (U)

Country: Republic of Vietnam  
Debrief Report By: Brigadier General Winant Sidle  
Duty Assignment: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery  
Inclusive Dates: 16 March through 10 September 1969

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**GROUP 3**  
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ANNEX A PERSONNEL

(C) PERSONNEL SHORTAGES AND THE VIETNAMIZATION OF THE WAR

1. The recent cutback to a US strength of 515,000 in RVN and the personnel gyrations necessary to reach this figure have pointed up an incipient problem which may apply only to IFFV Artillery; however, it may be most serious as far as IFFV Artillery is concerned.

2. IFFV Artillery units are stretched over about 15% of the land mass of RVN. In recent months enemy activity and potential threats has caused the nine US field artillery battalions in IFFV to be spread out into many battery and platoon positions. Early in September there were over 50 such positions. Since there are only 30 batteries involved, this has resulted in a great drain on FDO personnel and other specialists.

3. Prior to the cutback, IFFV Artillery had been kept at over 100% of authorized strength which made this stretching out of artillery assets possible. However, it will not be possible if the artillery remains below 100% strength over an extended period.

4. The matter is complicated by shortages in some critical MOSC.
   a. Radar technician replacements are being received, but not in sufficient number to exceed 70% of full authorization.
   b. Radar crewmen are at 60% of fill.
   c. Radar repairmen are at only 25% of fill.
   d. Fire Direction and Operations NCOs are short 35 to 40%.

5. Although OJT is used as much as possible to make up the differences, it is most difficult in radar crews. Radars are particularly important in II CTZ in view of the relatively small number of combat troops available to cover some of the more remote areas. Similarly, Fire Direction and Operations NCOs of quality are essential to the successful use of split batteries which is required by the situation. It is significant also that the necessary use of OJT trained, relatively inexperienced lower ranking personnel can help but cause a reduction in effectiveness.

6. Still another complication is the necessity to use IFFV Artillery assets to support Mobile Strike Force operations in most of the corps area. Currently, there are five IFFV Artillery fire bases which have been occupied solely to support MSF operations and several others which have the principal mission of MSF/CSF support. As Vietnamization progresses this situation will probably get worse instead of better, at least until the full complement of
ANNEX A PERSONNEL (Cont'd)

(c) PERSONNEL SHORTAGES AND THE VIETNAMIZATION OF THE WAR

ARVN artillery is finally reached.

7. Conclusion: IFFV Artillery should be kept at least at 100% fill and this may be true of other Corps Artillery units as well.

8. Recommendation:

   a. That special care be taken to insure that IFFV Artillery units are kept at full strength and that they receive preference in the allocation of special skills.

   b. That the necessary action be taken to increase the input of radar trained personnel and other critical MG3C shortages.
1. (C) In the six months I have commanded IFFV Artillery, we have never had operational our full complement of IME's. Of the nine authorized the most which have been operational at any one time has been five. Of the seven instruments issued or returned after repair in the last 90 days, none has been operational upon receipt.

2. (C) All concerned are aware that the problem is two-fold: The lack of expert repairmen and the shortage of replacement parts.
   a. An expert repairman has been obtained recently within II CTZ and that problem has been solved, at least temporarily, although it is dangerous to have to rely on a single individual.
   b. The shortage of repair parts appears to be due to the continued use by the artillery of the Fairchild MC-8 microwave distance measuring equipment. As I understand it, this is not a standard production item for the Fairchild Corporation and therefore parts and repair facilities are not available on a regular basis. The Corps of Engineers is replacing the Fairchild instrument with the Tellurometer model 301A, a standard manufacture item for which parts and repair facilities are reported to be readily available.

3. (C) Recommendation: That the Field Artillery School consider authorising a change from Fairchild to Tellurometer model IME.
I. (C) IFFV ARTILLERY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS. There are three such programs in II CTZ:

a. The RF/PF/RD/PSDF Artillery Assistance Program.

b. The ARVN Associate Battery Program.

c. The CODO Artillery Assistance Program.

A. The RF/PF/RD/PSDF Artillery Assistance Program is actually artillery support of pacification.

1. The artillery in II CTZ is playing a much larger role in pacification support than it has played in the past. It has long been recognized that hamlet and village security can be greatly enhanced if artillery is available, communications between RF/PF/PSDF forces and the artillery are available, and if someone on the ground knows how to call for and adjust artillery fires. This support is readily available 24 hours a day, irrespective of the weather. However, despite the obvious truth of the above and the launching of several programs to attempt to provide such support, the support has not been satisfactory in the past.

2. The problem has been one of lack of responsibility and follow-thru. On or about 1 May 1969 it was decided that in II CTZ, a US artillery battalion or group commander, assisted as required by IFFV Artillery Headquarters, would be made responsible for developing realistic fire support plans for each of the 52 districts in the II CTZ. These plans would include the training of forward observers, establishing of fire request channels where they did not exist, selecting and firing in defensive targets for each hamlet, village, or city which fell under an artillery fan (US, ARVN, or HOK), and the conduct of both live and simulated reaction tests to ensure that the system was working.

3. This plan was briefed at the 4th II CTZ Artillery Seminar in May and elicited great interest on the part of both ARVN and HOK artillery commanders. Both wanted in. The ARVN wanted to amend the plan to make ARVN responsible for proper FO training of RF/PF/PSDF and hamlet and village officials. The HOK's wanted to be responsible for a number of districts in their TAOR.

4. As a result, a planning conference met in late May, attended by artillery representatives of all three nations and hosted by IFFV Artillery. As the result of this conference, IFFV Arty drew up a draft "Letter of Promulgation" (Incl 1) which was to be signed by the top commanders of all three forces in II CTZ and would serve as the basis for artillery support of pacification. The document, emended by both ARVN and HOK proposed changes, was in fact signed on 24 June 1969 by the CO, IFFV, CO, II CTZ, and DCO, HOKVF.

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ANNEX C OPERATIONS (cont'd)

5. This document made the QVN District Chief responsible for developing an effective artillery fire support plan for his district, and for reporting progress monthly to the ON, II CTZ; and the US district senior advisor, assisted as necessary by the responsible US/ROK artillery officer, responsible for assisting the District Chief in the matter. The responsible artilleryman, US or ROK, was required to follow through and report progress through Artillery channels.

6. The Letter of Promulgation was immediately implemented by US Forces but worked very slowly down the chains of command of both the QVN and the ROK forces. However, thanks primarily to the continuity provided by making a senior US Artillery officer monitor the progress in each district, the program has made amazing strides. For example:

Prior to 21 May when the US portion of the program was implemented, no one knew how many RF/PF units had trained forward observers. In fact, CORDS and Artillery figures varied by as much as 50 percent. 120 hamlet and village defensive targets had been planned at various times in the past but only 68% or 16 percent had been fired in, and many of these were out of date due to population shifts. Under the new system, each district's plan was reevaluated, districts which had no fire plan developed one, and by 20 August all districts had a plan, 5,869 DT's had been planned, and 1,926 actually fired in for a rate of 32 percent. DT's were being fired in at a rate of about 900 per month and the total fired in in the two months since publication of the Letter of Promulgation had doubled the former figure.

FO training has also greatly improved with more than 60 percent of the territorial units in all but two provinces having trained FO's. More importantly during the 11 August enemy high point series of attacks in II CTZ, at least eight friendly hamlets drove off VC attacks by simply calling for previously fired DT's. Since 95% of the population in II CTZ falls under some artillery fan, the Artillery Assistance Program should be a major factor in improving territorial security.

7. Problems:

a. DT's in heavily populated areas are sometimes difficult to fire in. Two workable solutions have been found:

   (1) The better one is to "sell" the District Chief on the program to the point that he will direct the Village/Hamlet chief to pick a specific time when the DT's in a certain area will be fired in. The population then assembles in a safe area and actually observes the hamlet/village FO fire in the targets, monitored of course by the US/ROK Artillery advisor concerned. This solution has the added benefit of increasing the population's confidence in the artillery. On some occasions Hamlet/Village chiefs have agreed to the above w/o urging by the District Chief.

   (2) Surveying in DT's when they cannot be fired in.
b. Due to the constant repositioning of US, ARVN, and ROK Artillery units in II CTZ, there is a need to assure that the artillery units in any given district are aware of the status of fire planning, PO training, etc. This has been solved by making sure that the responsible artillery officer keeps all artillery units concerned up-to-date on progress. For example, should a US unit replace an ARVN unit in a certain area, the responsible artillery officer must visit the new unit and insure that it has all the data generated by the out-going unit.

8. Assuring maximum ARVN artillery support has been a problem only in that initially US Artillery tended to fire in too many DT's, which should and could have been fired in by the ARVN. This has been remedied by the stress being placed on Vietnamisation of the war. Today, both US and ROK stress is on firing in DT's using ARVN artillery to the maximum possible extent.

8. Conclusion: Artillery assistance to pacification in the form of providing additional, readily available artillery fire support for hamlets and villages is proving most helpful in II CTZ in improving population security.

b. Associate Battery Program

1. This program has become closely allied with artillery assistance to pacification since in the long term the ARVN artillery will have to provide all of such support. In addition, this program is proving significant in the Vietnamisation of the war.

2. Under this program each ARVN Artillery battery is provided a sister US Artillery battery. The latter is required periodically to send contact teams to the sister battery to assist in any way possible in improving the professionalism of the battery. We have found that some batteries are excellent on all counts while others need considerable help. There are a sizeable number of excellent ARVN artillerymen, but the accelerated expansion program has stretched them thin and they need all the assistance they can get.

3. A relatively recent development has been emphasizing to the ARVN artillery the necessity to become expert in air mobile operations. Considerable training in this matter is now underway and in recent weeks with US urging a number of batteries and Platoons have used the air mobile mode to support ARVN ground operations. It has been our experience in II CTZ that without US tactful pressure, the ARVN artillery will tend to be immobile, and that with such pressure they are often more amenable to make combat assaults by air than on the ground.

b. Conclusion: The Associate Battery Program is a must if Vietnamisation is to be successful.

c. The CIDG Artillery Assistance Program.
ANNEX C  OPERATIONS (cont'd)

1. In II CTZ, CIDG artillery has been effective only in the direct fire role. Although many contact teams have spent many hours training CIDG personnel in both service of the piece and fire direction, there seems to be a tendency for CIDG personnel to transfer the trained CIDG artillerymen to other duties.

2. To help ensure that all CIDG artillery in II CTZ can accurately place indirect fires, each camp has been made the responsibility of the nearest US artillery group commander. A pilot program has been undertaken in Ben Het using a full time US team to train CIDG artillery in all aspects of firing and fire direction. Similar action is underway in a number of other camps. Additionally, the CO, 5th SFU has agreed that considerably more attention must be paid to the training and proficiency of CIDG Artillerymen and that, once trained, the artillerymen must be kept on the job. Although, our experience factor is too small to make a definite projection, it appears from the Ben Het example that it will take from six to eight weeks to train a complete CIDG artillery team from scratch.

3. Conclusion: That Special Forces personnel and nearby US artillery units must assist in training CIDG artillery and must periodically check to ensure that the trainees are being used properly.

D. Recommendations:

1. That all US artillery units in RVN which have not already done so adopt the three programs outlined above, insofar as possible.

2. That emphasis be placed upon the air mobile training of ARVN artillery.

3. That CIDG artillery training become a top priority project for US and Vietnamese Special Forces.
SUBJECT: Letter of Promulgation for the Coordination of District Fire Support in II CTZ in Support of Pacification (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (U) REFERENCES:
   a. II CTZ Combined Campaign Plan, 1969 (U).

2. (C) PURPOSE: This letter promulgates an agreement made by the CG, II Corps, DCG, ROKFV FC and CG, I FFORCEV to adopt procedures which will result in better district fire support in II CTZ.

3. (C) GENERAL:
   a. The GVN District Chief is responsible for the protection of the inhabitants of his district. To carry out this responsibility effectively he must ensure optimum fire support of his district by all available means through the preparation of a coordinated District Fire Support Plan (DFSP). The provisions of Annex G (Fire Support), II CTZ Combined Campaign Plan, 1969, apply in the support of pacification.
   b. The functions and responsibilities of the District Chief, in special instances in II CTZ, apply to Province Chiefs, Mayors of cities and towns and commanders of special sectors. Accordingly, in these special instances, the provisions of this letter pertaining to District Chiefs also apply.

4. (C) IMPLEMENTATION:
   a. Assistance to the District Chief in the preparation of the DFSP will be provided by:
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21st Jun 69

SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction for the Coordination of District Fire
Support in II CZ in Support of Pacification (9)

1. The District Senior Advisor.

2. The ROK or US artillery commander designated to provide technical
assistance. (Incl 1)

3. ARTF, ROK and US artillery commanders providing fire support in
his district.

b. The District Senior Advisor is responsible for coordination of the
assistance provided to the District Chief in preparing and keeping current
this DFSP.

c. Artillery Support: District fire support planning will include
but not be limited to the following:

(1) RF/TF, RD and PSDF forward observer training.

(2) Establishing responsive fire request channels.

(3) Establishing military and political clearance procedures.

(4) Establishing day and night free fire zones.

(5) Provision of appropriate communications means.

(6) Selection of preplanned defensive targets.

(7) Firing in the maximum number of these preplanned targets.

(8) Exercising the system through reaction tests conducted once each
quarter for each village.

(9) Developing and maintaining a written District Fire Support Plan.
Example for Phu My District, Inclusion 2).

d. Training of RF/FF, RD and PSDF forward observers will be the
responsibility of CG, II Corps, assisted as necessary by CG, I FORCEV
and DCI, ROKFV-FC. Requests for such assistance will be forwarded through
established channels.

5. (C) RESPONSIBILITIES:

a. CG, II Corps, will:

(1) Provide overall supervision of the program.
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AVFA-AT-D 24 Jun 69
SUBJECT: Letter of Promulgation for the Coordination of District Fire Support in II CTZ in Support of Pacification (U)

(2) Supervise forward observer training for RF/PF, RD and PSDF elements within capabilities and in coordination with allied forces.

(3) Ensure, through division commanders, 26th STZ Commander and Province Chiefs, that District Chiefs institute and continually update the District Fire Support Plan to include fire planning, fire request channels, survey, adjusting defensive fires and participation in reaction tests in coordination with allied forces and District Senior Advisors.

(4) Provide artillery or heavy mortar fire support to RF/PF, RD and PSDF elements when requested.

b. DCG, ROKFV-FC, will:

(1) Provide, through ROK artillery commanders, technical assistance at district (Incl 1).

(2) Assist in ARVN forward observer training for RF/PF, RD and PSDF elements by providing instructors, transportation, equipment and facilities within capabilities and in coordination with allied forces as requested by ARVN.

(3) Assist the District Chief in preparation of the DFSP, in coordination with allied forces and the US District Senior Advisor.

(4) Assist in establishing and maintaining fire request channels from each RF/PF, RD and PSDF element to the district TOC and to the nearest CFSCC, FSCC or appropriate fire unit.

(5) Provide artillery or heavy mortar fire support to RF/PF, RD and PSDF elements within range when requested.

(6) Participate in district defensive fire planning to include survey, adjusting defensive fires and participation in reaction tests.

c. CG, I FFORCEV, will:

(1) Provide, through US artillery commanders, technical assistance at district (Incl 1).

(2) Assist in ARVN forward observer training for RF/PF, RD and PSDF elements by providing instructors, transportation, equipment and facilities within capabilities and in coordination with allied forces as requested by ARVN.

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AVFA-AT-D  24 Jun 69

SUBJECT: Letter of Promulgation for the Coordination of District Fire Support in II CTZ in Support of Pacification (U)

(3) Assist the District Chief in preparation of the DFSP, in coordination with allied forces and the US District Senior Advisor.

(4) Assist in establishing and maintaining fire request channels from each RF/PF, RD and PSDF element to the district TOC and to the nearest CFSCC, FSCC or appropriate fire unit.

(5) Provide artillery or heavy mortar fire support to RF/PF, RD and PSDF elements within range when requested.

(6) Participate in district defensive fire planning to include survey, adjusting defensive fires and participation in reaction tests.

d. Province Chiefs will:

(1) Ensure that the District Fire Support Plans are prepared properly.

(2) Provide assistance to the District Chiefs in all aspects of district fire support.

e. District Chiefs will:

(1) Assume overall responsibility for preparing and updating the DFSP.

(2) Ensure sufficient RF/PF, RD and PSDF personnel within each district receive forward observer training to provide each platoon sized element, RD Team and hamlet with a trained forward observer and ensure that trained personnel are utilized as forward observers.

(3) Ensure the establishment of responsive fire request channels for each RF/PF element, RD Team and hamlet in each district.

(4) Within capability, provide radios or other reliable communication equipment to each RF/PF element, RD Team and hamlet in each district so that supporting fires can be requested from each district headquarters.

(5) Request and establish day and night free fire zones, through province and II Corps.

(6) Ensure defensive targets are planned and fired-in quarterly around each village/hamlet when the situation permits.

(7) Establish a system of political clearance procedures to ensure there is a designated clearance authority at district level 24 hours a day and that this authority be empowered to clear fires for the district chief.
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AVFA-AT-D
24 Jun 69

SUBJECT: Letter of Promulgation for the Coordination of District Fire Support in II CTZ in Support of Pacification (U)

f. District Senior Advisors will:

(1) Serve as principal point of contact for all forces participating in the program.

(2) Assist the District Chief in preparation of the DFSP, to include all aspects covered in para 4c above.

(3) Keep a record of those RF/PF and RD elements and villages which have had defensive targets fired.

g. ROK and US artillery command representatives (Incl 1) will:

(1) Provide technical advice to District Chiefs/DSAs.

(2) Monitor all aspects of the program within assigned districts.

(3) Assist in coordinating the artillery fires of the various allied forces within districts concerned.

(4) Provide reports as required.

h. All artillery unit Commanders (ARVN, ROK and US) will:

(1) Actively assist in the overall program.

(2) Be prepared to provide fires in support of any district into which their pieces can fire.

6. (U) REPORTS:

a. RVN. The District Chief will prepare a monthly report and submit it to the Province Chief. The Province Chief will consolidate the district reports and submit them to the appropriate division commanders or the special sector commander, and to the Corps Commander by the 10th day of the following month. The report will contain the following information as of the last day of the month.

(1) The number of forward observer personnel that have been trained in each district.

(2) The number of forward observer personnel now being trained in each district.

(3) The number of forward observer personnel remaining to be trained in each district.

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SUBJECT: Letter of Promulgation for the Coordination of District Fire Support in II CTZ in Support of Pacification (U)

(4) A description of the assistance provided by ARVN, ROK and US artillery.

(5) The number of fire missions requested in each district by RF/PF, RD cadre and PSDF personnel and the results obtained.

(6) The number of RF cadre used as forward observers in mobile operations.

(7) The number of reaction tests conducted in each district.

(8) The number of visits made by the District Chief and Province Chief to outposts or villages and the names of the outposts and villages visited.

(9) Suggestions to improve the program of district fire support.

b. ROK. All ROK forces implementing this plan will prepare the following report at the end of each month and submit it to Headquarters, ROKFV-FC not later than the 10th day of the following month. The report will be prepared by the unit located in each area assignment. Items to be included in the report are as follows.

(1) Assistance provided for RF/PF, RD and PSDF forward observer training.

(2) Assistance provided in establishing fire support request channels.

(3) Status of fire support provided to RF/PF, RD and PSDF.

(4) Number of reaction tests conducted and participation in the District Fire Support Plan to include number of defensive targets planned, surveyed and adjusted.

(5) Other items as necessary.

(6) Problems encountered and recommendations, as appropriate.

c. US. Submit reports in accordance with I Field Force Vietnam Regulation 350-1.

7. (C) COORDINATION: In accordance with reference lb, each Sector Commander in II CTZ conducts a monthly meeting with the senior officer of
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AVFA-AT-D

SUBJECT: Letter of Promulgation for the Coordination of District Fire Support in II CTZ in Support of Pacification (U)

The ARVN and FMF tactical commands within the sector for the purpose of discussing military support of pacification. One topic specifically to be discussed at these monthly meetings is the progress being made in coordination of district fire support as promulgated by this document.

MD LU LAN
Commander
II Corps and II CTZ

2 Incl.

ARVN DISTRIBUTION

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23d Div - 5
24th STZ - 2
ea Sector Cmdr - 1
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CAM RANN Spec Sect - 1
HQ, NHA Det - 1
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3 - CO, C B, 5th SFMA
100 - I FORCES Arty
1 - CO, 5th FA
1 - CO, 17th FA
3 - 2d South
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2 - 1st Sr Adv
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**ROK and US Area Assignments**
**RF/PP, RD and PSDF Assistance Program**

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<td>Bình Dinh</td>
<td>Pleiku</td>
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<tr>
<td>9th Infantry Division (ROK)</td>
<td>Phú Yên</td>
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<tr>
<td>4th Infantry Division (US)</td>
<td>Phước Long</td>
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**I FORCEN Artillery**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>HEADQUARTERS</th>
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<td>Khánh Hoà</td>
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<td>Bình Định</td>
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**Enclosure 1**

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
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I FORCEN Provisional Artillery Group

Pleiku

Kontum

Dak Soc
Dak To
Kontum
Chuang, Ngia

I FFCR7 Provisional Artillery Group

Darlac

Buu Ho
Buu Ho Tract
Phoap An
Lac Thien

Quang Duc

Duc Lap
Kien Duc
Khien Duc

Tuyen Duc

Lac Duong
Duc Trong
Don Duong

Ninh Thuan

An Phuoc

Binh Thuan

Hoa Da
Phan Ly
Tuy Phong
Ham Thuan
Thien Giao
Hai Long
Hai Minh

Lam Dong

Bao Loc
Di Linh

Phu Yen

Tuy Hoa
Son Hoa

6th Battalion, 32d Artillery

173d Airborne Brigade

3d Battalion, 319th Artillery

Binh Dinh

Hoai Nhon
Tan Quan
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ANNEX A (Fire Support Plan) to Phu My District Pacification Plan (Unpublished)

SITUATION:

a. Enemy Forces - Current Intensities

b. Friendly Forces:

(1) 5th ARVN Regiment - Conducts operations in support of Phu My District Forces pacification operations in the assigned AO.

(2) 1/1st Bn, 50th Inf - In cooperation and coordination with Phu My District and 5th ARVN Regiment, conduct operation in support of Phu My District Forces pacification operations in the assigned AO.

(3) Artillery Support:

(a) Btry B, 37th ARVN Arty (155mm)
(b) Btry C, 222d ARVN Arty (105mm)
(c) Btry B, 63d ARVN Arty (105mm)
(d) Btry B, 7th Bn, 14th Arty (105mm)
(e) Btry C, 7th Bn, 13th Arty (105mm)
(f) Btry A, 7th Bn, 15th Arty (81mm/175mm)
(g) Btry B, 7th Bn, 15th Arty (81mm/175mm)
(h) Btry A, 23d Bn, 319th Arty (105mm)
(i) Btry A, 60th ROK Arty (105mm)
(j) Btry B, 60th ROK Arty (105mm)
(k) Btry C, 60th ROK Arty (105mm)
(l) Btry B, 248th ROK Arty (155mm)
(m) Organic 60mm, 81mm, and 1.2in mortars
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2.(C) MISSION - RVNAF and US artillery and mortars will provide responsive supporting fires for the pacification and security of village, hamlets and district forces of Phu My District. Additionally, ARVN and US artillery in Phu My District will conduct extensive US/RVNAF Artillery Assistance Programs to improve the effectiveness of artillery support in the district by providing fire planning, training, communications, and logistical support as required.

3.(C) EXECUTION:

a. Concept:

(1) The Phu My District Chief has overall responsibility for the district pacification program. The objective of this program is to bring 100% of the population of the district under Government of Vietnam control. The procedure used is to cordon a hamlet with RVNAF and/or US maneuver forces for security, check the population for Viet-Cong Infrastructure personnel using Vietnamese National Police and insert a Revolutionary Development (RD) Team into the cordoned area to work with civilian populace. The program will be conducted in two phases. During Phase I, which is currently underway and will last until 30 June 1969, pacification efforts will be conducted in 26 hamlets. During Phase II which commences on 30 June 1969 and is to last indefinitely, efforts will be made to pacify an additional 13 hamlets. All artillery located within or capable of firing into the district will be made available to support the Pacification Program through the District Fire Support Coordinator on a priority basis. The District Fire Plan (Appendix 1) will be used for planning and delivering all supporting artillery fires in the district.

(2) RVNAF and US artillery forces in Phu My District will conduct an extensive RVNAF/US Artillery Assistance Program (Appendix 2). The program will emphasize mutual exchange of intelligence and targeting information, technical advice and assistance and training assistance. The goal of the program will be to improve the overall effectiveness of all artillery support in Phu My District.


c. 41st ARVN Regiment - Conduct operations in support of Phu My District Forces pacification operations in the assigned AO.

d. 1st Bn, 50th Inf - In cooperation and coordination with Phu My District and 41st ARVN Regiment, conduct operations in support of Phu My District Forces pacification operations in the assigned AO.
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e. 7th Bn, 13th Arty - In cooperation and coordination with Phu My District and 111th ARVN Regiment, provide responsive fire support for the District Pacification Program and emphasize an active participation in the RVNAF/US Artillery Assistance Program.

f. 7th Bn, 13th Arty - In cooperation and coordination with Phu My District and 111th ARVN Regiment, provide responsive fire support for the District Pacification Program and emphasize an active participation in the RVNAF/US Artillery Assistance Program.

g. Air Support - Helicopter gunships, Spooky and tactical air support will be provided, as needed, to support pacification operations in Phu My District.

(1) RVNAF requests for support will normally be processed through Province to 22d ARVN Division to II Corps Headquarters. An exception to this policy may be made in emergency situations only. Under "Operation Red Dragon" the District Advisor may submit a direct emergency request for air support to the 173d Abn Bde TDC.

(2) US requests for air support will be processed through normal communication channels to the Fire Support Coordination Element in the 173d Abn Bde TDC.

h. Naval Gunfire Support - Naval gunfire support, when available, will be provided, as needed, to support pacification operations in Phu My District. All requests for support should be processed through the same channels of communication as requests for air support.

i. Artillery Support

(1) Field Artillery

(a) General - Field Artillery support will be provided, as required, for support of pacification operations in Phu My District. Requests for this support should be processed through normal channels of communication to the 7th Bn, 15th Arty, Btry B, 37th ARVN Arty or Btry C, 222d ARVN Arty as outlined in Appendix 3 (Communications).

(b) Organization for Combat

1. Artillery units in Phu My District

a. Btry B(-), 37th ARVN (155mm)

b. Btry C, 222d ARVN Arty (105mm)

c. Btry E, 7th Bn, 15th Arty (81in/175mm)

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Artillery units capable of firing into Phu My District

a. Btry B(-), 37th ARVN Arty (155mm)
b. Btry B, 63d ARVN Arty (105mm)
c. Btry B, 7th Bn, 13th Arty (105mm)
d. Btry A, 7th Bn, 13th Arty (8in/175mm)
e. Btry A, 3d Bn, 319th Arty (105mm)
f. Btry A, B, C, 60th ROK Arty (105mm)

(2) Air Defense Artillery

(a) Air Defense Role - M12, 40mm "Dusters" and M55 Quad 50 caliber are capable of providing air defense support to Phu My District.

(b) Ground Support Role - M12, 40mm "Dusters" and M55 Quad 50 calibers will support ground forces as convoy security and perimeter security elements.

j. Clearance For Fires

(1) All requests for political and military clearance for artillery fires in Phu My District will be processed through the Joint Tactical Operation Center (JTOC) at Phu My District. Representatives from all maneuver units in the district will be collocated with representatives of the District Chief. These personnel will be capable of determining immediately whether political and military clearances can be granted for artillery fires.

(2) Air Advisories - 7/13 Arty will be responsible for publishing all air advisories in Phu My District.

L. ADMINISTRATION - Appendix 2 (RVNAF/US Artillery Assistance Program)

5.0 COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

a. Signal - Appendix 3 (Communications)

b. Command

(1) District Fire Support Coordinator - CO, 7th Bn, 13th Arty

(2) Chains of Command - Appendix 4 (RVNAF and US Chains of Command)
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Appendixes:
1. District Fire Plan - To be published
2. RVNAH US Artillery Assistance Program - To be published
3. Communications - To be published
4. RVNAH and US Chains of Command - To be published
5. Illumination - To be published
II. (C) TARGET CLASSIFICATION/AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES

1. Although the current system of analyzing field artillery ammunition expenditures originated in IFFV Artillery, I am not satisfied that it is entirely adequate.

2. I believe there are two problems which require additional analysis.

   a. Whether a target should be classified as "acquired" or "interdiction."

   b. Whether the current 10 percent "unwritten law" limitation on interdiction fires is reasonable under all circumstances.

3. By definition, an acquired target is determined by electronic detection devices of various types. Attack of the target must be within six hours, the targeting agency must have performed a terrain analysis to verify the logic of the target, and it must also be validated by analysis of enemy patterns of operations.

4. In many instances, the targeting agency does not receive the target until after six hours has elapsed, but it still might logically be fired if the suspected enemy unit is one that does not move often or if the target is in an obvious area of enemy threat. This creates a quandry for the artillerymen concerned. If the target is fired it must be labelled as interdiction; however, too many of such targets build the unit up to over 10 percent of interdiction fires. This means undoubtedly that some fires are either classified incorrectly as acquired or are not fired at all even though they should have been.

5. I have instructed my units to use logic in the matter. However, if the target classification system is to be truly meaningful, I believe it should be studied further.

6. With respect to the 10 percent limitation on interdictionary fires, there are numerous occasions when this must be exceeded particularly with troops in contact or expecting contact. During the Battle of Ben Het/Dak To in May and June of this year, particularly during the final stages when the enemy was concentrating on Ben Het, it was known that sizeable enemy forces encircled Ben Het, but there was little knowledge as to enemy locations. As a result, the artillery was instructed to fire an extremely heavy interdiction program around Ben Het, especially at night. On the night of 23 June, nearly 2,000 rounds were fired. POW's and Ho Chi Minh later stated that this heavy artillery fire broke up the final attack planned by the enemy that night before it could get started. The interdiction program also greatly raised
II. (C) TARGET CLASSIFICATION/AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES

the percentage of interdiction fires for the principal US battalions involved.

7. A similar instance occurs when a US artillery unit must man an isolated fire base in support of a MSF battalion. Security is always a problem and the units carry standard orders to shoot interdiction fires at will if the situation appears threatening, ammunition resupply being the major limiting criterion.

8. It seems to me that when troops are in or expecting contact the only limiting factor should be RSR VS ASR by caliber.

9. Recommendation:

   a. That the restrictions on interdiction fires be eliminated or at least that no criticism, inferred or actual, be made of a unit which logically exceeds the limitation.

   b. That the relationship between interdiction and acquired targets be reevaluated to make the ground rules more meaningful.
III. (C) US FORWARD OBSERVER SUPPORT OF MSF/CSF FORCES

A. Mobile Strike Force FO Support.

1. Until the spring of 1969, MSF units normally neither requested nor desired US or ARVN artillery support for reasons unknown to me. However, the increasing exposure of MSF forces to the enemy as the result of the Vietnamization program makes it clear that such support must be available in the future.

2. In II CTZ we have already had considerable experience in the matter. Beginning with the enemy build-up prior to the Battle of Ben Het/Dak To in May and June of 1969, MSF battalions have found themselves in considerable heavy contact with the enemy and in genuine need of responsive fire support. Enemy activities near Tieu Atar, Bu Prang, Nhon Co, and Duc Lap have provided additional examples.

3. The initial solution adopted was to provide two FO's, officer or enlisted, and an RTO to each MSF battalion in the field and to reposition US or ARVN medium or light artillery, at least in platoon size, to support the battalion's AO. This did not work since the MSF battalion commander kept the FO with him and he served more as a liaison officer. On one occasion in early May, the US FO was unable to reach the actual scene of contact with the result that artillery support was not responsive and the MSF battalion suffered heavy casualties.

4. In a meeting in early May between SSF and IFFV Artillery representatives, it was decided that a standard team of seven personnel would be assigned by IFFV Artillery to any MSF battalion requiring US artillery support. To date, the ARVN have been somewhat loath to provide this support and the US has been the principal supplier. The team is composed of one officer liaison officer who sticks with the battalion commander, an NCO assistant who is a qualified FO, two FO's either officer or enlisted, and three RTO's.

5. Although we have not been able to provide a full seven man team on all occasions due to personnel problems, experience has shown that this is a very good solution. Since MSF forces normally operate in the remote areas of II CTZ, it has also become standard to airlift US artillery assets as their primary means of artillery support. As of this writing, four such battalions are being supported from five remote temporary US artillery bases.

6. Recommendation: That this solution be made available to all agencies and organizations outside of II CTZ who might be interested.
ANNEX C OPERATIONS

III. (C) US FORWARD OBSERVER SUPPORT OF MSF/CSF FORCES

B. Camp Strike Force FO Support.

1. Since CSF forces rarely fight in battalion formations, the FO problem is considerably easier. In fact, it has been our experience that one FO party will suffice for most CSF operations. However, again, the only surefire solution at this time is to provide a US FO since the ARVN has not yet demonstrated much interest in the problem.

2. Another practice which has developed and seems to be working is the use of CSF companies to provide fire base security for US artillery units supporting MSF battalion operations.

3. Recommendation: None
ANNEX C OPERATIONS

IV. (C) POSITION AREA SECURITY

A. General.

1. I have been greatly disturbed at the general lack of expertise on the part of most artillerymen in IFFV Artillery in the matter of fire base security. When and if US major infantry forces depart Vietnam, the artillery will have to become more and more reliant on themselves to defend their fire bases.

2. The areas of weakness are all basic: clear and interlocking fields of fire; proper installation of obstacles and their coverage by observation and fire; plentiful use of claymores and trip flares and varying their positions constantly; frequent inspection of wire, claymores, and trip flares; the requirement for interior walking guard posts; varying times for posting all guards; use of patrols to sweep likely enemy attack or firing positions before dusk; use of reconnaissance by fire at night; continuing improvement of position; proper bunkering and use of sufficient overhead cover; dispersal of ammunition and its proper protection; emplacement of artillery to provide optimum final defensive fires; conduct of many reaction tests; and counter sapper training. Actually, I should not include the artillery emplacement item since it has been well done on most occasions.

3. Due to intense and continuing command emphasis all along the line the situation has improved considerably in recent months. However, the continuing turnover of personnel makes this an unending problem. Moreover, the rapid promotions required today have deprived our battery grade officers of the necessary experience in this matter which was SOP in the "old days." Field commanders would be greatly assisted if more attention were paid to this subject at appropriate training centers in the US.

4. Recommendation: That increased emphasis be placed on fire base security (position area security) in training artillery enlisted men and battery grade officers.

B. Ammunition Storage and Protection in the Field.

1. This subject also requires special attention even though it is part of the problem outlined above.

2. Again the problem lies basically in lack of experience and failure somewhere along the line to substitute instruction and training for this lack of experience. For many of our young, dedicated, and very good field grade officers today this is their first actual combat. Most senior NCO's are in
IV. (C) POSITION AREA SECURITY

They have no actual experience in the matter of protecting artillery ammunition from enemy fire with the exception of those few who have learned the hard way while here in Vietnam. They do not realize what can happen when an enemy mortar round hits in the middle of 500 rounds of 155 powder. Unfortunately, some do not really believe you when you describe what can happen although, of course, they will obey orders to change things. When occupying a hasty position, they will provide themselves with overhead cover before going to sleep, but many think that half a culvert covered by one layer of sandbags is sufficient.

3. Based on my experience, we have also lost expertise among ordnance and engineer personnel. On two occasions I have requested information as to what these experts considered minimal bunkering requirements for artillery ammunition. One answer was unsatisfactory because it failed to deal with the various types of overhead cover. Three feet of loose dirt is certainly not the equivalent of three feet of tightly packed sandbags. The other answer provided for the construction of massive underground bunkers, something not possible under a situation where the units of a single battalion have to make over 100 moves in six months.

4. In my opinion, an analysis should be made of the minimum bunkering requirements to include types of materials available in Vietnam against the common high explosive weapons used by the enemy. There is little protection possible against a direct hit by a 105mm rocket or a 122 with delay fuse. However, three layers of tightly packed sandbags will normally protect against the fragments of mortar and recoilless rifle rounds. Today's science can certainly provide some rather precise answers to this problem, at least using probabilities. Perhaps this has been done but, if so, the institutional memory of IFFV has not retained it.

5. Recommend that:

a. The study suggested above be made. If it has been made, that the results be re-issued to the field.

b. That the results be stressed in appropriate training centers in the US.
ANNEX D LOGISTICS

I. (C) MAINTENANCE IN GENERAL

1. My experience in six months as CO IFFV Artillery has convinced me that something we have been probably taking for granted no longer exists. That is the awareness among junior officers and senior NCO's of the vital importance of maintenance. As I have said elsewhere in this report, the problem is primarily the lack of experience on the part of our battery grade officers and to a lesser but important degree on the part of our senior NCO's. Rapid promotions available today simply do not provide enough experience for these individuals to learn either good maintenance practices or its importance in time to prevent excessive deadlines.

2. I am speaking simply of battery level maintenance—vehicles, weapons, generators and all the basic items which most of the older officers were required to become familiar with simply through exposure over the years. Early in my tour I encountered a young, eager battery commander who was having motor maintenance problems. I suggested that one thing he should do, when possible, is to have motor stables daily. He did not know what I meant by motor stables. I agree that this is undoubtedly an extreme case, but it is symptomatic of the problem.

3. My feeling is that our training system is still based on the assumption that the officers and enlisted men who are responsible for making a battery able to shoot, move, and communicate know all the aspects of their job. This is simply not so. Advance Course battery officer graduates from Fort Sill are well versed in gunnery, fire direction, combined arms tactics and the like, but they don't know that check lists and SOP's exist which will help ensure that generators will not break down, let alone being familiar with the ramifications of such things as maintenance on heavy artillery.

4. An additional factor, at least in IFFV Artillery, is the lack of recent FA troop experience on the part of many of our field grade officers, particularly lieutenant colonels. I would say unequivocally that all of my current LTC's are considerably above average in ability and potential. Only two, however, of the battalion commanders have any genuine knowledge in the matter of sound maintenance procedures. They are learning by direction but, in the meantime, their inexperience and the inexperience of their subordinates give me goose bumps every morning when I pick up the daily deadline report.

5. Recommend that Fort Sill, Fort Bliss and others involved in training artillerymen, to include refresher courses, reexamine their curricula to see if sufficient attention is being paid to the basic maintenance background or lack of it of our current breed of artillery officers and enlisted men.

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ANNEX D  LOGISTICS

II. (C)  REPAIR AND RETURN (R&R) PROGRAM FOR SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY WEAPONS

1. To alleviate the extremely high deadline rate of M107/M110 guns and carriages the concept of the Heavy Artillery Maintenance Program was originated at this headquarters. It was presented to and adopted by 1st Logistical Command on 3 November 1968. This program was expanded to include M108/M109 howitzers on 3 February 1969.

2. Initial implementation consisted of establishing a direct exchange point for selected repair parts and assemblies at each firing battery. These parts and assemblies were requisitioned initially by Red Ball Express. An increased stockage of PLL repair parts was established at each firing battery. These items were initially requisitioned by Red Ball Express.

3. A maintenance program was established which enables the firing batteries to take self-propelled artillery weapons to the appropriate supporting DSU for a complete quarterly systems service. This also serves as valuable training in preventive maintenance required of the crew. Quarterly services are scheduled by each battalion to assure that the weapon going to the DSU is the next scheduled for quarterly service. It does not preclude a battalion from having more than one weapon in quarterly service provided there is not more than one weapon in each DSU. The schedule is coordinated with the respective DSU's.

4. Initial deadline data showed that a positive trend had been demonstrated. At the end of November the guns that had received a service had a deadline rate of only 5%. At the end of December the overall deadline rate was 12%, representing a 3.8% decrease over the preceding 11 months, when the deadline rate had been 15.8%. At the end of May, 1969, the deadline rate had decreased to 9.6% for M107/M110 weapons and 6% for M109's. The density of weapons by type are 16 M107/M110 and 18 M109's. 11 of the M107/M110 have been through the program a second time. Turnover time has decreased from an average of 9.7 days to 8.5 days per piece. The decrease in turnover time can be attributed to better trained personnel and improvement in the R&R facilities.

5. It is believed that when the PLL stockage for the weapons increases the deadline rate will decrease accordingly.

6. Recommendations:
   a. That the R&R program be considered for adoption elsewhere, if such action has not already been taken.
   b. That a major effort be made to increase PLL stockage for the weapons.

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III. (C) EXCESSIVE DOWN TIME FOR RADAR SETS

1. Both counter-mortar and ground surveillance radars play an important role in II CTZ. The large size of the corps area and the relatively few friendly troops make these radars most valuable in finding and shooting the enemy.

2. The ground surveillance radars, when operating, have proved particularly effective. One at LZ Sherry during the period 27 June 1969 to 4 September 1969 make a total of 323 sightings; 167 being engaged. The radar at Tuy Hoa from 13 August to 4 September 1969, averaged 4-5 sightings per night most of which were engaged. Follow-up sweeps found blood trails on numerous occasions.

3. For the period 1 March to 31 August 1969 the AN/TPS-25 sets, the principal ground surveillance radar averaged a down time rate of 47 percent. The counter-mortar radars were better but not good—the AN/MPQ-10a averaging 19.8 percent and the AN/MPQ-4a averaging 9.3 percent.

4. The majority of non-available time for these sets is attributed to the combination of the following:
   a. The shortage of properly trained and qualified operators.
   b. The shortage of properly trained and qualified organisational mechanics.
   c. The shortage of radar technicians.
   d. The shortage of repair parts at the organisational level (PLL).
   e. The shortage of repair parts at the support level (ASL).
   f. The lack of qualified repairmen at the support agency.

5. The shortage of parts at the support level mainly pertains to the AN/TPS-25 and AN/TPS-1A/5. This is the direct result of the low density of items being supported and the short record of demand data. This situation is expected to improve as demand data builds. A list of recommended repair parts was sent to Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon Support Command requesting that those parts be stocked without regard to demand data.

6. The lack of proper preventive maintenance is attributed to the fact that there is a serious personnel problem within the 8th Target Acquisition Battery, 26th Artillery. This deprives the unit of the needed maintenance knowledge and supervision which is necessary to insure that maintenance is properly applied (see ANNEX A, para 4).
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ANNEX D LOGISTICS (cont'd)

7. The shortage of qualified radar maintenance personnel is mainly found in the Cam Ranh Bay Support Command area of responsibility. The only general support signal maintenance unit that this command presently has is the 128th Signal Company. This unit does not have any school trained counter mortar or ground surveillance radar mechanics. On several occasions it has been necessary for the 128th to obtain a contact team from Long Binh or Qui Nhon in order to repair a radar set.

8. Recommendation: That the appropriate agencies and organisations study the problem to determine better ways of:

   a. Providing timely replacement of radar personnel, both operating and maintenance,
   
   b. Stocking needed parts at appropriate locations.
   
   c. Ensuring improvement of the overall radar situation within the US Army.
ANNEX D LOGISTICS

IV. (C) MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED WITH THE M-18 GUN COMPUTER (FADAC).

1. Although not overly serious at the moment, IFFV Artillery has had a continuing problem with FADAC maintenance.

2. According to maintenance personnel in direct support units, common failures are:

   a. Erasure of memory disk.

   b. Corroding of electrical terminals.

   c. Power surge due to erratic generator governor.

3. Common causes for failure are:

   a. Erasure of the memory disk is normally caused by turning the set back on before the disk has stopped rotating from previous operation, moving the set prior to the disk having stopped rotating and occasionally, electrical feedback will cause grounding of the disk, thereby erasing the memory bank.

   b. Corroding of the electrical terminals is attributed to heat, humidity and dust conditions which are prevalent throughout South Vietnam. Filters are changed every eight to twelve hours of operation to help control this condition; however, this has not eliminated the problem.

   c. Power surge due to erratic generator governors can be caused by water in the fuel, carbon deposits on spark plugs, and normal wear or dirt particles entering the combustion chamber through the carburetor will restrict the fuel flow momentarily causing the engine to lose RPM. The governor will surge to overcome this restriction resulting in a momentary overspeeding of the engine which would in turn affect the cyclic output of the generator.

4. Most of the downtime experienced is due to the non-availability of circuit boards (modules) and memory disks. Presently the 129th Maintenance Support Company has no trained repairmen which may cause a problem in the immediate future.

5. Recommendation: That these problems be brought to the attention of the Field Artillery School and other appropriate headquarters and agencies.
**Senior Officer Debriefing Report: BG Winant Sidle**

Senior Officer Debriefing Report, 16 March to 10 September 1969.

BG Winant Sidle

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