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AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 15th Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 30 Apr 69

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1. Subject reports are forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR QM UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

[Signature]

Robert E. Lynch
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10th Combat Aviation Battalion
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1969 NCS CSFCO-65 (G) (U)

See Distribution

   a. (C) General: The mission of the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion did not change during this reporting period.

   b. (U) Personnel

      (1) Infusion problems continue to exist. The 10th Combat Aviation Battalion is fulfilling a requirement to infuse certain enlisted personnel in the aircraft maintenance field with a newly arrived company assigned to the 268th Combat Aviation Battalion. Infusion problems insures that warrant officer turnovers should remain at approximately 15% in October and rise to 20% in November. Commissioned officer and senior NCO turnovers should remain at about 20% for the next months of October and November.

      (2) Under the reorganization which took place 11 January 1969, TOE/MTOE 1-077G, authorizes (8) 71T20s, Equipment Records (TAERS) clerks. There are none assigned at present and it is felt that these personnel should be trained at the proper facilities and sent to overseas combat areas where their specific talents are most urgently required.

      (3) The requirement for non-rated supply officers, as indicated by past CILLES has been increased due to the new MTOE. In the past the 23rd ASHC was the only unit not authorized a Unit Supply Technician. The MTOE provides a Battalion Supply Technician but now leaves all units without an organic Unit Supply Technician, MOS 761A. The continuous requirement for requisitioning equipment and the possibility of a company being transferred to another battalion, combined with the amount of equipment authorized by the MTOE, make it essential that a qualified supply officer be authorized and assigned. There are presently two (2) aviators acting as property book officers in this battalion, thus causing another drain on the aviation resources.

FOR OTUT
692/59

Inclosure
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1969

(4) Changes in command and primary staff positions were as follows:

(a) On 13 February 1969 Major Ellis E. Lynn, Inf, 05310635, assumed command of the 281st Assault Helicopter Company from Major Andrew J. Miller, Jr., Inf, OP 102760.

(b) On 17 February 1969 Major Andrew J. Miller, Jr., Inf, OP 102760, assumed duties as the Battalion S-3 from Major Jerry P. Pleming, Inf, OP 175355, who departed 15 January 1969.

(c) On 26 February 1969 Major Roy P. Elliot, Jr., OP 106106 assumed command of the 192nd Assault Helicopter Company from Major Fred C. Strimmer, CS, OP 076542.


(f) On 26 March 1969 Major Jack R. Cheney, Pi, OP 02269463 assumed duties as the Battalion S-4 from Major John B. Reese, Pi, OP 0143760.

(5) Unit Strength as of 30 April 1969, Incl 2.

(c) Intelligence

(i) Physical Security: Continuous improvements of the defensive posture throughout the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion marked this reporting period.

(c) Additional concertina fencing has been erected and additional tripflares and claymore mines were installed along the 10th CB sector of responsibility of the Doan Be Thin complex. Headquarters and Headquarters Company completely rewired the perimeter lighting for the 5th and 7th "HHC" companies in order to provide more effective security for the north and west sides of Flanders Heliport. One starlight scope and one Xeon stroboscope have been installed in the 243rd "HHC" area and one Starlight scope was installed in the 92nd "HHC" area.
During the last quarter the 155th AHC at Ben M. Thoat, RVN installed 300 meters of additional concertina fencing and new bunkers were constructed. Additional tripwires were placed on the perimeter.

The 192nd AHC at Phan Thiet, RVN, repositioned 300 meters of defensive perimeter to provide better fields of fire. Four new bunkers were constructed.

Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence: During this past quarter, attacks on friendly installations have been initiated mostly by local forces with Cong. The 241st AHC, located at Phan Trang, received an 82mm mortar attack at 0630H 24 Feb, causing moderate damage to one aircraft.

The 48th AHC, located at Minh Hau, came under 82mm mortar attack on 14 March at 2315 hours. This attack resulted in one aircraft totally destroyed and minor damage to three others.

At 0058H 21 Mar the 32nd AHC, located at Long Be Thin, was hit by a 82mm mortar attack. Fifty-one rounds hit Flanders Field, resulting in the following: Major damage to five aircraft, moderate damage to two aircraft, light damage to five aircraft, heavy damage to one building and light damage to two buildings.

At 0200H 22 Feb, the 192nd AHC at Phan Thiet came under a ground attack. The enemy forces used rockets and mortars in support. This attack resulted in two aircraft receiving light damage, and five friendly WIA. Five enemy were killed.

Three were two attacks on the 155th Assault Helicopter Company, Camp Cornwall, Ben Me Thoat.

At 2045H 5 Feb, one 82mm mortar round fell outside the compound. Sporadic small arms fire was received. Friendly forces suffered negative casualties or damage.

At 0100H 23 Feb, twenty to thirty 82mm mortar rounds were received with negative damage or injuries.

At 2305H 4 Mar, one 82mm mortar round fell outside the compound. There was no damage or casualties.

At 0130H 5 Mar, three 75mm rounds fell inside the compound causing minor damage to two aircraft.
AVR08-12
13 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalions for Period Ending 30 April 1969 (TS OOV.65 (7) (1))

(5) At 2145H 12 May, Camp Coral received two 82mm rounds resulting in negative damage or injuries.

(6) At 0045H 13 May, seven 81mm mortar rounds fell inside the 155th AHC compound resulting in heavy damage to two aircraft and light damage to four aircraft.

(7) At 0130H 21 May, fifteen 75mm recoilless rifle rounds hit Camp Coral causing light damage to one aircraft.

(8) At 1755H 23 May, the 155th AHC compound received six 122mm rockets. There was negative damage to aircraft or facilities. Two HV were treated and released and one HV was evacuated through medical channels.

(9) At 2320H 6 Apr, Camp Coral received 14 82mm mortar rounds. Ten aircraft were damaged; three heavy, one moderate, and six light. There were no friendly casualties.

(10) At 2355H 25 May, ten 82mm mortar rounds hit Camp Coral resulting in light damage to four aircraft; heavy damage to two buildings and light damage to two vehicles.

1. (c) Operations

(1) Plans: At the close of the reporting period the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion is commanding and coordinating the mission of its assigned units from its base camp at Dona Ba Thin, ARVN. On 29 April a forward tactical operations center moved to Bu Prane (Vic XII/856) to support Task Force Alpha.

(2) Operations: Units of the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion continued to provide aviation support throughout the seven southern provinces of the II Corps Tactical Zone, and to Task Force Alpha in Northern III Corps. The Battalion continued to support Task Force South/23rd Inf Div Light Combat Post, (a joint US/ARVN operation in the D-la, Bu Loc, Phan Thiet area), ARVN Ranger training, 9th Ton Infantry Division (White Horse), the 22nd and 23rd ARVN Division, 5th Special Forces and general support missions throughout the Battalion area of operations. No unit displacements have occurred during the quarter. The 22nd Artillery (-) operated from a forward base camp in the Hue/Phu Bai area while in support of Project Delta from 26 March to 30 April. The 92nd Assault Helicopter Company continues to maintain a base camp at Dona Ba Thin, but supports Task Force South/23rd Inf Div Light Combat Post from its forward area located at Bu Loc. Operational results chart attached at Inc 5.
AVIATION E

SUBJECT: Operational report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1969 OSFW-65 (C) (D)

(a) Operations of the 10th Assault Helicopter Company: The 10th AHC continued in general support of the 9th ARVN Infantry Division. Missions included command and control, resupply, combat assaults and extractions, administrative troop movements, convoy cover, reconnaissance, and medical evacuations. The 10th AHC provided general support to US and ARVN forces in the southern II Corps area. During the quarter, the White Horse ARVN Infantry Division, supported by the 10th AHC killed 659 enemy and captured 9. One hundred eighty small arms, 314 grenades, 94 mortar rounds and 36,426 rounds of small arms ammunition were captured. A total of 25,220 sorties were flown while 36,008 troops and 2,221 tons of cargo were lifted by the 10th AHC. The 390th Transportation and 279th Signal Detachments were transferred into the 10th AHC as part of the 7701-0770. This has been accomplished with no difficulty. During the month of April the POL section was required to set up and operate a forward refueling point which performed without difficulty.

(b) Operations of the 92nd Assault Helicopter Company: At the close of the reporting period the mission of the unit continued to be general support of the II Corps Tactical Zone. Mission time was divided between support to Task Force South/23rd Inf Div LT CP and general supply missions to NVA. Seven lift ships and four gunships were committed on a daily basis to Task Force South/23rd Inf Div LT CP. Task Force South/23rd Inf Div LT CP includes the 44th and 53rd Inf Regt, 3–503 ABN Inf and the 3–506 ABN Inf (AM). The 192nd continued the following statistics: 5,491 hours and 20,110 sorties flown, 19,437 troops and 577 tons of cargo lifted.

(c) Operations of the 155th Assault Helicopter Company: The past quarter was characterized by the commitment of the majority of the company's aircraft in support of the 23rd Inf Div, 5th Special Forces Group, and the 5th Infantry Division. In addition to the support provided to US and ARVN forces, the company provided an aircraft daily to Quang Duc and Dalat sectors. During the last part of the reporting period there was a significant increase in enemy activity. The unit conducted thirteen combat assaults for 5th Special Forces Group, five for the 43th Infantry Regiment, and four for Dalat Sector. These combat assaults took place in the Bu Teng area under the control of Task Force Wood. A total of 6,099 hours and 21,659 sorties were flown and 350 tons of cargo and 32,600 troops were lifted during this last quarter.

(d) Operations of the 192nd Assault Helicopter Company: The 192nd AHC continued to provide general support to Task Force South/23rd ARVN
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AVBC 19-E

13 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1969 [OS01-65 (10) (U)]

Inf Div LT CP, 116th Eng BN and Vietnamese military forces in Binh Thuan, Ninh Thuan, Lam Dong and Tuyen Duc provinces. The unit's gunships were credited with 143 enemy killed during this quarter, a total of 6,371 hours and 18,668 sorties flown with 27,806 troops and 600 tons of cargo airlifted.

(a) Operations of the 221st Helicopter Company: During the reporting period the 221st continued in its mission of general support to the II Corps Tactical Zone. They also supported 5th Special Forces Group, Project Delta, Task Force South/23rd Inf Div LT CP, Task Force Hood, MACV Secondo School, and units along the coastal area. A total of 3,552 hours and 13,624 sorties were flown with 16,870 troops and 1,076 tons of cargo being transported during this last quarter.

(b) Operations of the 243rd Assault Support Helicopter Company: The unit continued in general support of the II Corps Tactical Zone and Task Force South/23rd Inf Div LT CP. Normally three aircraft were allocated to these units located in the Bo Loc-Daiat area. The 9th FW Inf Div and the 23rd GTM Division were also supported on a daily basis. The 243rd Assault Support Helicopter Company compiled a total of 3,297 hours and 7,468 sorties flown while 33,353 troops and 9,306 tons of cargo were lifted. A total of 15 tactical aircraft were recovered during this period.

(3) Operational Results (Incl A)

(g) Training

(1) Emphasis continued to be placed on aviation safety in training this quarter. Classes were held in all units on safety procedures for aircraft crews with the emphasis on overloading of aircraft and hot refueling. The rules of engagement were also discussed at each meeting.

(2) Standardization: Frequent liaison and training visits were made to the companies during the quarter. Numerous standardization publications and information from Fort Tucker, US CW, 1st Aviation Brigade, 17th Combat Aviation Group, and the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion were disseminated. The Battalion RIP administered sixty five check rides during the quarter. Approximately 300 hours were flown in support of these activities. Increased emphasis was placed on Standardization and Instructor pilot qualification throughout this quarter.

(3) Summaries of unit training are discussed in paragraphs below.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1969  (RD) (U)

(a) 48th Assault Helicopter Company: The training program continued to expand during this reporting period. All new incoming personnel were required to zero their individual weapons and under go orientation on Security, Survival, Safety of Firearms, and Sunrise Duty. All personnel were cross-trained or familiarized with other duties to provide for continuity and depth of training. Continued emphasis was placed on Safety during on the job training. Command Information, Character Guidance, and Safety Training were conducted to meet normal requirements.

(b) 92nd Assault Helicopter Company: Classes were held on a weekly basis covering the following subjects: Geneva Convention, Code of Conduct, Drivers Training, Command Information, Weapons Safety, and associated subjects.

(c) 155th Assault Helicopter Company: The 155th AHC increased its emphasis on the training program during the next reporting period. All personnel were required to pass through the CBI chamber to check their protective mask. CBI training is now being held on a quarterly basis. Incoming personnel zero their individual weapons upon arrival in the unit. Weekly classes were conducted in Weapons Safety, Drivers Training and General Safety. This training will be held quarterly.

(d) 192nd Assault Helicopter Company: Scheduled classes, to meet the requirements of directives issued by higher headquarters, have continued throughout the period. Aviation Training, Care and Use of Field Fuel Points, and Prevention of Heat Injuries were subjects presented in March. Classes for April included Survival, Ground Safety, and Escape and Evasion. Weapons firing was conducted on a weekly basis.

(e) 281st Assault Helicopter Company: Training for this quarter included Military Courtesy and Discipline, Ground Safety, Prevention of Heat Injuries, Code of Conduct, and CBI Warfare. Emphasis was placed on Flight Safety and Standardization.

(f) 243rd Assault Support Helicopter Company: During the reporting period one Rotary Wing Standard and two Rotary Wing Tactical Instrument Tickets were renewed. Checkrides were administered and orders published making three aircraft commanders and three IPs. The unit continued its cross-training of non-navigator crewmembers. Necessary qualification of individuals with the M-16, M-79, and M-60 was accomplished.

h. (U) Logistics
13 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1969

(1) Major logistics efforts during this reporting period have been directed toward:

(a) Dust suppression and soil stabilization.
(b) Replacing unserviceable tentage at Phan Thiet with WISTOC buildings with metal roof and wood or concrete floors.
(c) Improving overall maintenance operations.
(d) Procurement and issue of flight helmets, Nomex flight suits, and flight gloves.

(2) POL: Many improvements were made in the last two quarters. Problems at this time are the lack of some grounding cables and small leaks. Responsibility for the refueling point at Song Mau was transferred to the 44th Inf CoT (2-7) for operational control. Battalion POL personnel inspect that location once a week to ensure that requirements and safety procedures are being maintained.

(3) Maintenance: Organizational aircraft availability has shown steady improvement during this reporting period. This is primarily due to an aggressive lateral search program initiated within each unit, and improved efficiency on the maintenance line. However, the extensive lateral Search Program does cause a drain on unit assets.

(4) Aircraft Status as of 30 April 1969 (Incl 4).

(5) Quarterly Summary of Maintenance Data and Flying Hour Program is as shown on Inclosure 5.

1. (C) Organization: The assigned aviation companies remained the same during the reporting period.

j. (C) Civil Affairs: During the past quarter, units of the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion have supported a number of civilian institutions.

(1) The 4th Assault Helicopter Company continued to provide medical support to the Vietnamese in the Minh Hien area. A project is underway to construct beds for the Catholic orphanage in the city of Minh Hien.

(2) The 92nd Assault Helicopter Company continued its support of the orphanage at Bao Loc.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1969 TCS COFO 69-01 (L) (U)

(3) The 243rd Assault Support Helicopter Company contributed approximately 15,000$ to the orphanage at Tan Binh Village.

(4) The 281st Assault Helicopter Company continued to support the Vinh Son orphanage in Nha Trang. The unit has completely renovated the orphanage. Fifty-one boxes of clothing and twenty-one beds were donated to the orphanage.

(5) The 192nd Assault Helicopter Company continued to make monthly donations to support the “Poor House” of Thin Thiet.

k. (U) Surgeon

(1) Activities: The 10th CAB dispensary's mission at the present time is the care of 10th CAB personnel, area coverage for other aviation companies and a small number of non-aviation personnel. At the present time the personnel who are responsible for the care of 10th CAB personnel are as follows: 1,573 10th CAB troops, 433 troops from other aviation companies and 2,018 troops from non-aviation companies. This coverage is supplied by detachments at Ban Ve Thuot, Phan Thiet, and Minh Hoa and a combined dispensary with two physicians at Dong Ba Thin.

(2) The medical coverage supplied by 10th CAB dispensaries indicates that they are being utilized as general dispensaries as well as flight dispensaries. This is especially true at Dong Ba Thin where the Battalion Surgeon has the duties of monitoring the functions of the dispensaries at Ban Ve Thuot, Phan Thiet, and Minh Hoa and advising the Battalion Commander. Time for these duties is limited.

(3) A new MTOE (1-76E) for the Battalion surgical section became effective 1 January 1969. The new MTOE authorizes equipment to perform complete eye exams, ear exams and X-rays. All of the above are necessary for complete flight physicals. An MSC officer is also authorized. The MSC officer will assume most of the duties of supply, direct monitoring of drugs and the compiling of reports. The authorized personnel and equipment have not yet arrived.

1. (U) Information

(1) The 10th Battalion public information program continued to provide coverage of events occurring at the Dong Ba Thin complex and at outlying units.
13 May 1969
SUBJECT:  Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1969 CSFON-65 (ND) (U)

(2) The Vagabond Voice, the bi-monthly Battalion newspaper, has increased both in circulation and production quality. Recognition for the part it plays in personnel morale has been noted by the Information Office of 1st Aviation Brigade and 17th Combat Aviation Group.

(3) The following PIO releases were processed through Battalion:

(a) Number of printed releases - 70.
(b) Number of pictorial releases - 15.
(c) Number of hometown news releases - 40.
(d) Number of hometown pictorial releases - 32.

(1) A new antenna was constructed for use with this Battalion's N/C-106 radio and teletype net. Raising the antenna 70 feet above ground level has improved the quality of this net considerably.

(2) A telephone circuit was constructed between the Dong Ba Thin Control Tower, the Dong Ba Thin Fire Station, and the 10th C'B Dispensary. This circuit will be used for emergencies requiring fire department assistance and/or medical assistance. A N/PIC-25 radio was furnished the fire department and will operate on the Dong Ba Thin tower frequency.

(3) A sole user telephone circuit was requested for use by the 92nd NHQ and their forward element located at the 92nd NHQ. Approval for its installation has been received from the 1st Signal Brigade. Installation is expected to be completed by 15 May thus offering a more satisfactory communications link to assist in the control of aviation assets.

(4) ECM assistance was received on a request for technical assistance to improve operations of the N/TIC-116 High-Frequency Radio within the 17th CBA radio net.

(1) During the quarter the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion Chaplain, has conducted a total of 26 Sunday and 60 week-day Catholic services with a total attendance of 1,760 soldiers. Services were conducted in each of the Battalion's outlying units.
SUBJECT: Opportunity for 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1969

2. Section II. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evolutions, Recommendations and Command Actions.

a. (ii) Shortage of MOS qualified personnel.

(1) Observation: The shortage of MOS qualified supply and motor maintenance personnel creates problems in these two major areas.

(2) Evaluation: MOS's 1-2566, 1-770, and 1-2580 authorize one Property Book officer at Battalion level, but none at company level. Because of the large dispersion of subordinate units, property books must be maintained at company level. Inexperienced non-MOS trained warrant officers are being utilized as FBOs in many of the units. The experience level of supply and motor maintenance personnel is extremely low. Only one experienced supply sergeant (76Q10) is assigned. Seven armorers (76V30) are authorized, however only one is assigned with an average of five months experience. Seven rotor mechanics (63G40) are authorized, only five are assigned. Of the five assigned, one has 21 years experience in rotor maintenance. Wheel vehicle mechanics (63M20) average less than one year experience in rotor maintenance. Eight T/58 clerks (71B20) are authorized, however, none are assigned.

(3) Recommendations:

(a) That maximum emphasis be placed upon obtaining experienced MOS qualified personnel to fill existing vacancies in supply and motor maintenance areas.

(b) That additional in-country schools be established in supply and motor maintenance areas.

4. Command Action:

(a) This Headquarters submits monthly MOS inventories to higher Headquarters, giving number of personnel authorized and assigned in each MOS and number of losses by MOS programmed over a 12 month period.

(b) Higher Headquarters has been notified of problems in these areas.

(c) Frequent technical assistance visits are conducted by this Headquarters in an effort to alleviate problems in these areas, caused by a lack of experienced personnel.

b. (ii) Air Traffic Control
AVBCB-4E
13 May 1969
SUBJECT: Operational Report on 26th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1969

(1) Observations: The 26th Assault Helicopter Company handles on an average of 230 aircraft in traffic each day as well as functioning as a flight service facility for aircraft operating between Nha Trang, Tyu Hoa, and Phu cat. There are no personnel in this unit who are trained or qualified to handle the very technical and important responsibilities of air traffic control.

(2) Evaluation: This is a safety hazard to aircraft and personnel as well as placing additional responsibilities on the operations section. To give effective and expeditious support to aviators and ground units the radio dispatcher/air traffic controller of an aviation unit must be highly trained. Telephonic mission requests, artillery advisory, and airfield service calls are among the constant messages which occur 24 hours a day within the aviation operation section of an aviation unit. Besides taking many telephonic messages and quickly relaying to aircraft by radio, there is the need for basic air traffic control and flight followings of local traffic. The unit airfield is frequently used as the base airfield for large operations where different types of helicopters are utilized in large numbers. When emergency situations occur quick and decisive action is required on the part of the airfield controller. Personnel with limited knowledge of aviation cannot always be relied on to make these timely decisions. This situation can be remedied by altering the current TOE, or placing airfield controllers TOE or attached to the unit.

(3) Recommendations:

(a) That the TOE be augmented to authorize two slots in each aviation unit for ATC personnel.

(b) Recommend that until such time as a TOE change can take place, arrangements be made for the attachment of air traffic controllers to aviation units who control their own airfields.

(4) Command Action: A request is being initiated, through 17th CINCPAC, that the TOE be changed to authorize two ATC slots per separate aviation company, and that, until such a change is effected, two ATC specialists be attached to units operating base airfields.

c. (U) Training: None.

d. (U) Intelligence: None.

e. (U) Logistics
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1969

13 May 1969

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(1) Gunship.

(a) Observation: Virtually all UH-1B/C helicopter gunships arrive in-country from U.S. overhaul facilities with serious armament wiring problems and/or lack of required armament MWO kit installation.

(b) Evaluation: UH-1B/C helicopter gunships can perform their assigned mission only if armament sub-systems are fully operational. All UH-1 aircraft received within the past eight months have required crucial attention and extensive down time prior to becoming operationally ready. Breakdown of most serious deficiencies are:

(1) Aircraft received on 13 Apr 68 wired for M-5 (40mm grenade launcher) system. It did not have basic M-16 wiring, so could not be retrofitted to rocket or minigun systems. Aircraft was not Operationally Ready Armament until M-156 modification was received and applied on 10 May 69.

(2) Aircraft received in Dec 1968 was wired only for the M-16 system. The M-16 system is obsolete and of no use to unit. A M-21 wiring kit was located and installed and the aircraft was Operationally Ready in early March.

(3) Two aircraft equipped with M-156 systems had never been wired to accept M-5 systems. Wiring kits remained on requisition until last aircraft was retrograded on 15 April 1969.

(c) Recommendation: That aircraft be properly wired when reported ready for issue by Direct Support Units or required wiring kits be made readily available to using unit.

(d) Corrective Action: Memorandum, this HQ, dated 15 April 1969, subject: "Armament Problems", was discussed at 17th Combat Aviation Group Commander's Conference on 16 Apr 69. A copy was given to CO, 14th Trans Bn, 34th FSS for resistance.

(2) Conversion of aircraft to MIL-L-23699 Oil.

(a) Observation: Aircraft components with over 100 hours usage, since new or overhaul, experience numerous quill seal leaks when changing from MIL-L-7808 to MIL-L-23699 oil.

(b) Evaluation: Due to properties of MIL-L-23699 oil, it attacks carbon seal deposits formed by MIL-L-7808 oil. This deposit loss subsequently results in excessive leakage requiring quill replacement and excessive aircraft down-time.

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The present procedure of 100% conversion of HU-1 helicopters to 23699 at
next scheduled oil change is unacceptable. Experience has shown that
components exceeding 100 hours since new or overhaul cannot be converted
without excessive maintenance problems. Only engines on CH-47 helicobters
may be converted. To facilitate maintenance, it is best to use only
MIL-L-7808 in these aircraft. The supply system is converting to almost
total stockage of MIL-L-23699 at too fast a rate. At present, MIL-L-7808
is in critically short supply. The stock should be slowly phased in over
a long enough period to require only components on HU-1 helicopters with
less than 100 hours to be converted.

(c) Recommendation: Phase in of approximately 12 months, with supply
activities stocking both quantities of oil in approximately equal amounts.

(d) Command Action: WO00, this HQ, CH-47 helicopters will exclusive-
ly use MIL-L-7808 oil. HU-1 helicopters will be converted only as the
components are installed.

(f) (U) Organization: None.

(g) (U) Signal: None

(h) (U) Maintenance.

(1) Observation: Aircraft repair parts (EDP) in many cases requires
excessive transportation time or are lost in transit from releasing depot
to EMD.

(2) Evaluation: Aircraft repair parts (EDP) are turned over to Air
Force control for shipment from in-country depots to receiving units.
This loss of Army control results in critically needed parts receiving
a low movement priority for less than plane load shipments of being lost
in transit. Delays of seven days are considered acceptable and receivers
of items that do not arrive are delayed until this time has elapsed.
This excessive delay encourages units to misuse Issue Priority Designators
and results in unreasonable large numbers of high priority requisitions
requiring special handling. To maintain acceptable Operational Ready
standards, units are forced into an extensive internal search program they
cannot afford. This amounts to approximately 500 flying hours per
month for the battalion at a cost of approximately $100,000 and loss of
maintenance officers and technicians from the maintenance line.

(3) Recommendation: That a system of dedicated airlift be estab-
lished. This could consist of organic Army CH-47 helicopters and/or Air
Force transports and would insure responsiveness to unit demands.
AVB.GD-E

13 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1969 GS AREA-65 (D) (V)

(a) Command Action: A ltr, 1st Ind this HO, dated 22 May 1969, Subject: "Extensive Relay in Account of Critical Aircraft Parts (CRP)", was submitted to 7th Combat Aviation Group for forwarding to 34th GSG for consideration.

1. (U) MK24 Flares

(1) Problem: The requirement to drop flares from AH-1 helicopters in support of night operations is at best highly dangerous. There are numerous cases on record of fatal or near-fatal accidents and serious injuries, not to mention the numerous potentially dangerous incidents averted by quick thinking, resourceful crewmembers.

(2) Evaluation:

(a) The technique of storing the aerial flares in the helicopter, stacked on the floor, and the discarding of them by throwing them from the helicopter is completely unsatisfactory and presents a serious safety problem. The possibility of lever/pull-up is ever present. One solution to the problem of floor storage is a locally manufactured carrying bin installed on the sides of the helicopter. This system requires the crew chief/door gunner to reach out, lift the flare out of the bin, then throw it overboard. This system is only half safe, in that the bins are connected to the helicopter by quick release straps. In the event of a pre-initiated flare, the difficulty of finding the quick release straps when flash blinded, is a matter of speculation. Many Army aviators feel that the bin itself is not airworthy and will create additional flight problems.

(b) Other problems associated with the use of the MK24 aerial flare are the possibility of rotor/chute foul-up, flare hang-up on the sides of the aircraft due to a malfunction of the lever/pull-up, causing aircraft damage, and the ever-present possibility of a pre-initiated flare in the cargo compartment causing flash blindness of the crew, resulting in loss of control of the helicopter. One method of eliminating flash blindness of the crew is to have a fire-resistant curtain, or a similar type of fire-resistant curtain between the cockpit and cargo compartment.

(c) A pamphlet published by the US Army Frankford Arsenal, Philadelphia, Pa., entitled "Pro Mission Preparation of Flares", dated 16 September 67, describes various homemade devices for arming and launching the MK24 aerial flare from the UH-1 helicopter. This effort and the foregoing device mentioned in paragraph 2 are examples of the lack of interest, urgency, and professionalism displayed in the development of a safe, dependable flare dispensing system.
The MK24 aerial flare is a Navy development designed for Naval use. It is not designed for launch from helicopters, nor should it be deployed from US Army helicopters, regardless of accomplishments on adaptations and locally developed operating procedures. The use of the MK24, Navy flare is indicative of a false economy and extremely dangerous planning and procurement.

(3) Recommendations: It is proposed that the US Army Combat Developments Command Aviation Agency prepare a material requirement for the safe delivery of aerial flares from helicopters, or alternatively develop a non-flare illumination system to eliminate flares entirely. The proposed dispersing system should include a new flare designed for delivery from Army helicopters. The dispersing system should be self-contained and capable of being pre-loaded. It would be attached to the hard points on the exterior of the helicopter and be easily jettisoned by either the pilot or crew members. This system should operate within the normal parameters of climate and environmental conditions described to other weapons systems.

(4) Command Action:

(a) This Battalion has found it necessary to publish a list of rules of engagement for the utilization of aircraft flares. These rules basically state that aircraft flares are to be used as a last resort, and then only after all other means of requesting other types of illumination has been exhausted. It is felt that the present system of Navy rice, Home made dispensers are a potential death trap. Continued use of helicopter flare ships will eventually cause another tragic accident.

(b) A letter dated 28 March 1969, Subject: Material Requirement for Aerial Flare Dispensers was submitted thru the 17th Combat Aviation Group to the Combat Developments Command liaison officer; I请求 adding requesting that work begin immediately on a completely new, safe and efficient flare or non-flare illumination system for US Army helicopters.

J. (U) Gunship Employment

(1) Problem: Operation of UH-1C gunships at high density altitudes.

(2) Evaluation: UH-1C gunships are being used in areas where the density altitude varies from 3,000 to 9,000 feet, (Delta-Cond Ly). A quick glance at the performance charts in the -1C will show that the maximum allowable gross weight allows a payload of negligible value while operating at these altitudes. This problem has severely restricted
gunship operational capabilities while supporting units in high density altitude areas. To provide support, even on a limited basis, gunship aircraft Commanders have been directed, to off-load some ammunition, not to utilize the gunner, defuel, or a combination of the above in order to stay at or below the maximum allowable gross weight. AH-1G gunships are capable of operating efficiently at these altitudes without severely restricting its operational capabilities.

(3) Recommendations:

(a) That AH-1G gunships be tasked to provide necessary support in the Delta/Com-Ly area.

(b) If the above is not possible it is recommended that POL facilities and ammunition resupply be located at Lion Phoung Air Field (Coord RN 1499). Principle users of the site will be aircraft from the 92nd AHC, 243rd ASHC, and 7th Avn. This site located approximately 15 km from Delta is sufficiently lower in elevation than Delta, and would enable gunships to provide adequate support in the Delta area.

(4) Command Action:

(a) Commanders have been directed to insure that gunships operate within the 8500 pound weight limitation and that weight and balance be figured for each gunship for home base operations and for areas where gunships will operate. Hover checks will be made with 6600 RPM as the minimum take-off criteria. In the event 6600 RPM cannot be maintained at a one foot hover, aircraft Commanders will off-load ammunition, gunner, fuel, or a combination of all in order to stay within Maximum Gross Weight.

(b) A request for a POL/mmo facility at Lion Phoung Airfield has been initiated by the 92nd Assault Helicopter Company.

JAMES H. BUTTRESS
LTC, CE
Commanding
CONFIDENTIAL

AVASC-SC (13 May 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1969 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 17th Combat Aviation Group, APO 96240 24 May 1969

TO: Department of the Army (CSFOR, DA) Washington, D.C., 20310
Commanding General, I Field Forces Vietnam APO 96350
Commanding Officer, 10th Combat Aviation Battalion, APO 96377

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the attached report, considers it to be adequate, and concurs with the contents as stated, except as indicated below.

2. (C) The following comments and recommendations are submitted.

a. Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities:

   (1) Paragraph 1b (1), Infusion, Page 1: Infusion problems do exist and are receiving command action. A request for infusion of aviators outside 17th Group was sent to 1st Aviation Brigade on 12 May 1969. A directive for all battalions to infuse to the maximum within their respective units and to report their needs beyond their capabilities is being published at this time.

   (2) Paragraph 1d and 1e inadvertently omitted, resulting in improper paragraphing.

   (3) Paragraph 1f (2) (a), Operations of the 48th Assault Helicopter Company, Page 5: Reference to the 390th Transportation and 279th Signal Detachments being transferred into the 48th AHC is clarified. These detachments were inactivated in January 1969 per GO 771, Headquarters, USARPAC, dated 22 November 1968. This same GO reorganized Assault Helicopter Companies under MTOE 1-077G. New MTOE incorporated capabilities within the companies which was previously provided by the transportation and signal detachments.

   (4) Paragraph 1m (1), Signal, Page 10: This action is being initiated in all Battalions and the Air Cavalry Squadron and has proved highly effective.

b. Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander’s Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:

   (1) Paragraph 2a, Shortage of MOS qualified Personnel, Page 11: Concur. Shortages as stated do exist. Concur with recommendation that schools be increased or established, and that emphasis should be placed on securing personnel. This headquarters screens records and provides equitable distribution of all personnel. Staff assistance.

CONFIDENTIAL
visits in supply and maintenance areas have been increased to offset the critical shortage.

(2) Paragraph 2b, Air Traffic Control, Page 11: Nonconcur with recommendations. The air traffic control capability was deleted from aviation company TOE’s and responsibility assigned to Aviation Support Detachments. An intra-Group survey will be made to determine the requirement for an ASD at Ninh Hoa. If it is determined that one is needed, a request will be submitted.

(3) Paragraph 2e (1), Gunships, Page 13: Concur. This headquarters has coordinated armament wiring requirements with the 14th Transportation Battalion in an effort to solve this problem. Recommend action be taken in CONUS to insure UH-1B/C aircraft are fully prepared for gunship utilization when they arrive in RVN from CONUS.

(4) Paragraph 2e (2), Conversion of Aircraft to MIL-L-23699 Oil, Page 13: Concur. The 17th CAG requirements for MIL-L-7808 oil and will stock both oils until transition is completed.

(5) Paragraph 2h, Maintenance, Page 14: Concur. Recommend the U.S. Air Force be tasked to provide additional dedicated airlift for aircraft EDP parts. Nonconcur with use of CH-47 helicopters on a dedicated basis. These aircraft are used on a mission basis to support aviation unit requirements; however, their primary function is combat support to tactical units.

(6) Paragraph 2i, Flares, Page 15: Concur. The 17th CAG policy regarding the use of helicopters for flare missions is that helicopters will be used only when other means are not available, i.e., artillery or Air Force. Additionally, helicopters must use the jettisonable flare racks mounted outside the cargo compartment. Recommend USARV determine worldwide requirements and initiate an ENSURE request to rectify this problem area.

(7) Paragraph 2j, Gunship Employment, Page 16: Concur with recommendation to establish POL and ammunition resupply facilities at Lien Khuong. A request for cited facilities has been initiated by the using unit. Assistance will be rendered by this headquarters upon receipt of request. All-10 gunships are not available in sufficient numbers to support cited mission.

(8) Format of Section II is not in accordance with pertinent regulations (AR 525-15, USARV Reg 525-15). Use of functional headings is mandatory. Paragraphs 2a and 2b, Page 11, should be grouped under the
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1969 RCS GSPOR-65 (R1) (U)

The functional heading of Personnel. The Operations and Organization functional headings were omitted.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

MARC L. TÜMAS
CPT, ADA
Adjutant
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1969

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350 7 JUN 69

TO: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO 96384

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and concurs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

FREDERICK E. HOLLAND
1LT AGC
ASST AB

Copy furns:
2-ACSPF, DA
A-10th Cbt Avn Bn
TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed this report, considers it to be adequate and concurs with the contents as indorsed, except as noted below.

2. The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

   a. Paragraph lb (2), page 1, and paragraph 2a, page 11. The shortages and low experience level in supply and maintenance supervisors exists brigade wide and is critical. The assistance of higher headquarters is needed to provide improved input of personnel with the required KOS.

   b. Paragraph 2e (2), page 13. A USAFR letter, subject: Use of MIL-L-23699 and MIL-L-7808 Oils in Army Turbine Powered Aircraft, dated 3 May 1969 outlines the proper use of oil and changeover procedures. The complaint of leakage problems upon changeover to MIL-L-23699 in components which have been using MIL-L-7808 for some time is a general reported fault and appears to be valid. When problems are encountered the letter specifies requirements for submitting EER's with certain information contained therein. Bringing attention to these problems through the use of EER action is the most expeditious way of affecting a change in procedures. This headquarters is in agreement with a recommendation to changeover oils as new components are placed into use and to eliminate the requirement to changeover old components at the next Periodic Inspection. This would eliminate all problem areas and is a more logical procedure for executing the changeover.

   c. Paragraph 2h (1), page 14. The 34th General Support Group Transportation Office states that the majority of EDP items leave their Saigon depot within 48 hours by Airforce aircraft. There is no dedicated airlift capability in the 34th GS Group which could be utilized for such a specialized system. There is a recognized problem in the area of air transport of aircraft parts throughout Vietnam. The problem has been brought to the attention of USAFR through recommendations made by visiting program managers and by 34th GS Group. It is doubtful that sufficient airlift from existing resources could be made available to meet the needs for transporting EDP parts under a dedicated system. Units encountering constant problems in this area have been advised to contact their supporting 34th GS Group Maintenance Battalions for the purpose of determining other ways in which total
lapsed time from requisition to receipt of the part could be reduced. The flow of the requisition to the depot, the local transportation used upon the parts arrival in the DSU or sub-depot areas for delivery to the unit, and the monitoring system in effect are but three possible areas of investigation. The Aircraft Maintenance Officer has coordinated this with the 34th General Support Group staff, the problem is recognized and has been addressed by higher headquarters but no real solution for dedicated airlift is forthcoming.

d. Paragraph 21, page 15. Concur with the evaluation and discussion of dropping the M-24 flare from helicopters. In the 1st Aviation Brigade, when a requirement occurs for illumination, artillery and mortars should provide the initial illumination, if available, and continue as required until the mission can be assumed by Air Force aircraft. Helicopters should be used only when these other means are not immediately available, and then only until the mission can be assumed by one of the other means. The requirement for a safe, effective flare dropping apparatus was stated in this unit's last Significant Problem Areas Report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. H. Pierce
LTC, USA
ADJUTANT GENERAL
AVHDC-DST (13 May 1969) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1969 HCS OSFON-65(ND) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 31 JUL 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96358

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters, 10th Combat Aviation Battalion.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning "Shortage of MOS qualified personnel," section II, page 11, paragraph 2a; nonconcur.

      (1) Assignment of officers to a unit is limited to positions authorized by TOL/HOTOL. There is no authorization for a property book officer at the company level. The unit is advised to submit a request for MTOE action which will, if favorably considered, place a property book officer at the company level.

      (2) Records available at this headquarters confirm a shortage in MOS of the enlisted grades noted in the basis correspondence. The 1st Aviation Brigade is slightly below the USARV average in MOS 63B and 77T. Action will be taken to bring the brigade up to the USARV average in these MOS's. The brigade is above strength in MOS 63C, 76Y20/76Y30 and above the USARV average in MOS 76Y40. A shortage of junior grade NCO supervisors, grades E5 and E6, has been experienced throughout USARV and is expected to continue.

   b. Reference item concerning "Gunships," section II, page 13, paragraph 2e(1) and 1st Indorsement b(3); concur. Headquarters, Department of the Army was advised of the problem by message on 6 January 1969. The US Army Aviation Supply Command (USAAVSCOM) was directed by the Department of the Army on 13 February 1969 to take the necessary corrective action.

   c. Reference item concerning "Conversion of Aircraft to MIL-L-23699 Oil," section II, page 13, paragraph 2e(2); nonconcur. USARV Letter, dated 3 May 1969, subject: Use of MIL-L-23699 and MIL-L-7808 Oils in Army Turbine Powered Aircraft, outlines the proper procedures to be used for the oil conversion and specifies the action required of the unit when a problem is encountered. No further action is required by higher headquarters.

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AVHOG-DST (13 May 1969) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1969 HCS CSFOR-65 (RD) (U)

   d. Reference item concerning "Maintenance," section II, page 14, paragraph 2h; concur with 3d indorsement, paragraph 2c. Heavy lift aircraft support is provided on an area basis. Airlift for a specific requirement is available through the respective field force headquarters, which have aircraft allocated to them by Headquarters, MACV.

   e. Reference item concerning "MK24 Flares," section II, page 15, paragraph 2i; concur. Locally fabricated devices for the dispensing of MK24 Flares are currently being evaluated. The results of this evaluation will be used as a basis for determining the actions required to further develop a safe and efficient flare dispenser.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON
LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:

10th CAB
1st AVN Bde
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 26 AUG 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORT
CPT, AGQ

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## OPERATIONAL RESULTS AS OF 30 APRIL 1969

### 1. (C) Results

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**Total**

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### Quarterly Summary of Maintenance OTD and Flying Hour Program

**February thru April 1969**

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**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 10th Combat Aviation Battalion**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb 69 to 30 Apr 69.

**CO, 10th Combat Aviation Battalion**

**ABSTRACT**

N/A