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AUTHORITY
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 29th General Support Group, Period Ending 30 April 1969 (U)

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

[Signature]

ROBERT E. LYNCH
Colonel, AG
Acting The Adjutant General

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  29th General Support Group
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R-1) (U)

THRU: Commanding General
US Army Support Command, Saigon

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

SECTION I
OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

A. COMMAND

1. (U) During the 89 day period, the 29th General Support Group continued operations as a major subordinate command of the US Army Support Command, Saigon. For 59 days of this period, the 29th Group provided, as previously, the broad and varied logistics support to the US Army and Free World Military Assistance Forces primarily in the III Corps Tactical Zone in addition to general support maintenance for both III and IV Corps Tactical Zones. Effective 1 April (last 30 days of period), this Group relinquished the entire general support maintenance mission for both III and IV Corps and assumed the direct support maintenance and supply and service support responsibilities for both III and IV CTZs. Additionally, several maintenance contracts for generators and other non-standard items of equipment were administered during the entire period. The Group headquarters continued to exercise tactical responsibility for defense of the eastern perimeter of Long Binh Post, including approximately 15 kilometers of defensive positions, three subsector operations centers, and associated communications.

2. (C) Principal organizations supported logistically were the 1st, 9th, 25th, and Thai Infantry Divisions, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), one brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division, the 199th Infantry Brigade, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 1st Australian Task Force, and various other
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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RS 607SP-65) (R-1) (U)

Combat and combat support units including the 23rd and 54th Artillery Groups, the 78th, 97th and 149th Engineer Groups, the 52nd Signal Group, the 164th Aviation Group, such elements as the 14th MP Brigade (-), the 5th Special Forces (-), the 1st Signal Brigade (-), the 1st Aviation Brigade (-), the 44th Medical Brigade (-), as well as major logistical organizations including the 4th Transportation Command (TRC), the US Army Depot, Long Binh, the 48th Transportation Group, and the 64th Quartermaster Battalion (POL). In addition, the Group provided organizational maintenance in support of some 58 units and over 500 vehicles operated in the Saigon area while providing field maintenance support to the US Embassy; Headquarters, COMUSMACV; Headquarters, USAV; Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command; Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Saigon; and Headquarters, IV Corps MACV.

3. (U) A reorganization of units within Saigon Support Command on 1 April 1969 resulted in the 29th Group losing the 3rd Ordnance Battalion (Ammo) and the 79th Maintenance Battalion (CS), minus the 59th Signal Company (D), 147th Light Equipment Maintenance Company, 60th Engineer Detachment, 315th Signal Detachment, and 445th Signal Detachment, to the 53rd General Support Group, while gaining the 2nd Maintenance Battalion and the 91st Composite Service Battalion (CS) from the 53rd Group. This realignment relieved the 29th Group of all general support maintenance and added the direct supply (less Class IV, VII and X) and service support responsibilities for IV Corps. The rationale for this reorganization was to strengthen command and control over those operations and to facilitate deployment of assets to meet changing requirements within the Group's area of responsibility.

The reorganization was accomplished smoothly. Frequent visits to the Delta by the Group Commander and his staff enabled the 2nd Maint Bn and the 91st CS Bn to be rapidly assimilated within the Group. The major operational problems initially encountered were communications and transportation. Communications have improved through refined courier procedures and use of land line teletype from existing local communications centers. Transportation, however, remains a considerable problem and solutions are being sought through intensive management from both the 29th Group and Saigon Support Command levels. Indications at this time are that the reorganization will result in improved across-the-board logistical support in III and IV CTZs.

4. (U) The 2nd Increment of the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF) completed their deployment to RVN during this period. The operation was known as "Condor III". The 29th Group participated by providing back-up support to the US Army Terminal, Newport, to include a maintenance contact team for vehicle deprocessing and a refueling capability at Newport for RTAVF convoys enroute to B earcat. The operation was conducted smoothly with no significant problems. A total of 650 vehicles were processed by...
the contact team, 5,200 gallons of diesel and 2,800 gallons of kerosene were dispensed during the operation.

5. (U) The 29th Group staff compiled data for a contingency plan called "Steel Cable" and participated in a CTP of the plan with the SF & O of Saigon Support Command.

6. (C) From 17 February to 26 March, LBP perimeter defense was on GRAY alert continuously after dark. On 23 February 1969, an enemy ground attack was launched against the perimeter resulting in a small penetration in the sector adjacent to 29th Group's. The enemy's attack was repulsed and the perimeter restored. Definite improvements were made in the sector and post defensive structures as a result of the February 22 and 23 offensives. Extensive clearing outside the bunker line for observation and fields of fire was accomplished out to a distance of 500 meters. Special infantry and artillery liaison officers from USARV HQS were assigned to assist each sector commander for approximately 14 days in improving his defensive posture. A system was established to allow sector commanders to control artillery fire within their sector. One artillery officer and two NCOs were assigned to the 29th Group sector HQS on a permanent basis to provide the professional nucleus to perpetuate the artillery training and skill within the sector. Additionally when the alert status increases to yellow, USARV HQS provides artillery liaison officers (field grade) down to the sector and sub-sector level to help control artillery fire. Mine fields were installed outside the perimeter and at locations within the perimeter across "Big John's Gulch". Chain link fencing was obtained to place RPG screens in front of each bunker. Badly needed additional equipment for perimeter defense was received on loan from Long Binh Post. This equipment included M60 machine guns, binoculars, M79 grenade launchers, compasses, radios (FRG 77s), starlight scopes, protective body armor, and Xenon search lights for the 60 foot towers. While receipt of this equipment helped, it did not satisfy all material requirements prescribed by the Long Binh Post Tactical SOP. At the close of this period, some of the loaned weapons and equipment were recalled.

7. (U) A major change was initiated in the generator and refrigeration support area during April and will be fully implemented by 1 July. It was decided that the PA&E contract for back-up support for generators, refrigeration equipment, and pumps will not be renewed. This mission will be assumed fully by 29th Group by 1 July. The 5th IM Co will operate a shop to provide the repair services previously provided by PA&E. The majority of the generator and refrigeration personnel in the Long Binh area will be consolidated in this shop to provide required support. The non-renewal of this contract results in an approximate $2 million savings.
8. (U) The mission change of 1 April added three direct support maintenance companies to the 29th Group. Included in the plans to upgrade the Delta support is the establishment of a third mechanized technical supply in the 238th Maint Co, movement of the 238th Maint Co from Camp Viking to Dong Tam base camp, revision of back-up support missions, improved means of expediting and delivering needed repair parts, and employment of mobile contact teams to improve support of isolated MACV advisory teams.

9. (U) Support of the MACV advisory teams in III CTZ continued to improve during the report period. Support for these teams now includes drive-in service where teams are accessible by road and air mobile contact teams to visit units in isolated locations. Further assistance has been provided through establishing and conducting generator classes which teach the advisory personnel how to operate and maintain their equipment.

10. (U) In April, the Long Binh Maintenance Facility moved to a new location with better facilities including metal buildings with concrete floors and a permanent hardstand. Previously, all work was done in maintenance tents erected on a dirt hardstand. During this move, some mission man-hours were lost, resulting for the time being in higher deadline rates. When all construction and moving is completed and the operation is refined, production will be enhanced greatly.

11. (U) Repair of the iron clad batteries remained an area of prime importance this past quarter due to the non-supply of new items from CONUS. At present, the 61st HEM Co battery shop is repairing from four to seven batteries on a weekly average. There is also a civilian contract for the repair of these batteries. Most demands are being met. It appears that the contract may not be required much longer.

12. (U) During February and March, courses of instruction were held at various DS maintenance units for generator operators and mechanics. Instruction was provided on the military standard family of generators, 5KW through 10KW. During this phase of instruction, 262 students from 51 units were trained. These courses are conducted on a quarterly basis with the next phase due to be started during May.

13. (U) During the past quarter, a concentrated effort was made to improve the MHE status of the 4th TC. This was accomplished under the "dog" program which allows wash-out of equipment with over 4,000 hours of operation or requiring two major assemblies, and by evacuating closed loop items for which parts cannot be obtained within 30 days. The machines retrograded were primarily 15,000 pound Hysters, for which engine and transmission assemblies are in critical supply. 4th TC has been issued replacement forklifts to maintain their authorized level. The performance of scheduled maintenance is a continuing problem as cargo must be unloaded immediately
to avoid demage. This places maintenance of equipment in a secondary role. Fourth T&S organizational maintenance shop is in the process of updating their maintenance program to ensure that equipment due for maintenance is serviced in the shop.

14. (U) During the quarter, the deadline rate of MHE at USADLB has been improving steadily. Many "dog" forklifts have been retrograded and parts from these are used to repair other forklifts. The lane of new machines has allowed additional maintenance time for other forklifts. A new system initiated in the depot assigns MHE directly to each pad which pinpoints the maintenance responsibility to the pad OIC. Also, a system for motor stables has been started whereby they are conducted by each pad OIC and spot checked by the depot MHE shop personnel. A system of performing scheduled services has also been established with services performed on 2-4 lifts each day. Continued emphasis on this program should continue to increase the availability and improve life expectancy of MHE presently on hand.

15. (U) RT forklifts have become critical this quarter. No engines are due in-country until July 1969 for 6,000 pound RT forklifts and January 1970 for 10,000 pound RT forklifts. Even more alarming is the fact that no 10,000 pound RT replacements are scheduled until 1970, and only six each 6,000 pound RTs are programmed per month. In an effort to prolong the life of 29th Group MHE, all lube order times have been cut in half and all forklift air cleaners will be cleaned twice daily.

16. (C) During the past quarter, the introduction and evaluation of the M51 AR/AV into RVN and the training of crews and support personnel began in earnest. 29th Group personnel were required to assist in deprocessing the turret portion of the initial 60 that arrived in-country.

The training for DS/GS personnel from the 29th Gen Spt Grb began the last week of Jan and continued into late Feb. Training for chassis and turret personnel in the 63 series and 450 series MOSs respectively were held in the 551st Lt Maint Co area at Black Horse Base Camp. Training for DS/GS fire control personnel in the 41C series MOS was conducted in the 632nd HEMCO instrument and fire control shop located on Long Binh Post. Personnel from both the 185th Maint Bn (DS) and the 79th Maint Bn (GS) attended all three courses. The quality of the instruction given by the NET Team was excellent. In Feb, USARV deployed two recon troops equipped with Sheridans. The DS/GS training was only half complete. The only personnel able to provide support was the NET Team personnel conducting the support maintenance training. When a vehicle in the field went down, the deadline was used for OMT. Enough cushion time was programmed into the POI to allow for this and the training course continued and terminated on schedule.

Several parts, all TM's, and some tools were not included in the push.
packages. Report of shortages was made to the USADLB M551 Project Officer.
These shortages handicapped the training. The push package would have been adequate for an environment other than RVN. Several parts failed which were not anticipated in the push pack or were not anticipated to the degree it occurred. For example, the failure rate on generator voltage regulators. Some problems were anticipated with the gun launcher system, however not to the degree it occurred initially. Leaking recoil seals and bad release valves caused deadlines. The problem appeared to be that the seals dried out while the vehicles were in storage and the recoil was not exercised enough prior to live firing. Problems are appearing with the aluminum pulleys for the fan, generator and crank shaft. The soft metal construction of these pulleys is not standing up under the abrasive dust conditions, which exist in Vietnam. These pulleys are being replaced with steel pulleys.

Many of these failures can be attributed to air cleaner filter failure, abuse or neglect by crew personnel.

Parts back ordered to CONUS are shipped on an expedited basis. They are, however, arriving in country without the Sheridan project code, distinctive sticker, or even a 1st Log IMI marking. Therefore, once they arrive at USADLB, they become “lost” among the other materiel there.

Parts prerequisite required by USARV were waived for the introduction of the VSS-3 searchlight into country as an ancillary part of the M551. Little coordination was done to provide support for this item. Repair parts that were available were given to the 147th TEMCO for a shop stock specifically for the VSS-3. The 147th is providing shop space and repair personnel for these searchlights.

17. (U) The R&R program for the M107/110 SP Howitzer has been changed this quarter due to shortage of repair parts. It was noted that trying to work on a scheduled basis is not feasible. The main problem is that the parts are not on hand and don’t arrive according to schedule.

The outcome of this is a system of inspecting the artillery piece first and then ordering all the parts. When all parts are on hand, the vehicle is called into the shop for R&R services.

R&R programs for the M114/A1 and M109 howitzer were initiated during the period. The same procedures of pre-inspection and parts predetermination have been employed in these programs.

18. (U) No problems have been encountered in support of the fire control systems during this period. This has been the result of a program initiated.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R-I) (U)

four months ago. All supported fire control instruments are being inspected and necessary repairs made once a month. This way the small problems can be caught before they get big.

19. (U) An increased emphasis on weapons training and forward observer technique earmarked the recent quarter. In the preparation of and the response to the enemy's TET offensive, special weapon familiarization courses were conducted on Long Binh Post. 29th GS Gp units responsible for manning perimeter bunkers received training in the M60 machinegun, M79 grenade launcher and M18A1 Anti-personnel mine. The 29th GS Gp continued to use the Long Binh Post Rifle Range when available for weekly familiarization training.

20. (C) With the addition of the 29th GS Gp Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCE) shortly after the offensive of 22-23 Feb. the number of trained and knowledgeable forward observers was increased. Under the direction of the Group Artillery Liaison officers, additional training was provided along with practical experiences requesting missions.

21. (U) On 5 March, the Long Binh Post interior patrol (Rat Patrol) was initiated. The 29th GS Gp, together with the three other sector commanders on Long Binh Post, participate on a rotational basis. The force is composed of one officer, nine enlisted men and three 4-ton vehicles with one mounted M60 machine gun. The patrol travels the perimeter bunkerline and interior areas which could be used by infiltrators.

22. (C) Construction of the new bunkerline in the 29th Gp continued during this period. The original completion date of late March was not obtained due to changes in engineer priorities primarily caused by the post-TET enemy offensive. Completion of the project is now set for early June. As a result of the reorganization in April 1969, the 53rd GS Gp is scheduled to relieve the 29th GS Gp of sector responsibility about the same time the new bunker line is completed. The 29th GS Gp will continue to provide a proportionate share of personnel and equipment for perimeter defense.

23. (U) In December 1968, 29th GS Gp evaluated the performance of the Class IX consolidated technical supply activities. 29th GS Gp owns the two largest consolidated technical activities in the world. These two, the 185th Maint Bn and the 59th Sig Co, utilized two NCR 500 systems each, the 185th processing about 40,000 requests per month and the 59th processing about 20,000 requests per month. The 185th consolidated activity supported approximately 340 customers while the 59th activity supported about 103 customers.

As a result of this study, a plan was developed and initiated to reduce this workload. The full scope of the plan involved the installation of two new mechanized technical supply activities: one in Saigon and one in Long Binh. On 15 March 69, Saigon customers were transferred from the 59th DSIA to the
new 536th HEMCO DSSA in Saigon. About 114 customers from the 185th DSSA were moved to the 59th Consolidated DSSA, filling the vacuum created by the Saigon move. When the new repair parts supply activity in Long Binh is established it will assume 65-70 customers from the 185th DSSA. The new mechanized DSSA at Long Binh is nearing completion in the 549th Maint Co, and will be in operation the latter part of May 69. At this point, the workload on the 185th will have been cut from 360 to about 155 customers. The number of requests received per month by the 185th Consolidated DSSA will have been reduced to about 20,000 and the workload of two outsized DSU repair parts supply activities will have been evenly distributed among four such activities.

The objective is to be able to cycle at least once every 24 hours using the NCR 500 machines. To accomplish this objective we must reduce the number of transactions. The machines are exposed in any one given day to a manageable level, hence the attempt at leveling out the workload.

24. (U) The facing sketch indicates the 29th General Support Group's area of operations in III Corps Tactical Zone. The 277th Supply and Service Battalion has both supply and service and maintenance units attached and provides across-the-board logistical support to the 25th Division TAOI plus one brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). The same across-the-board support is provided to the 1st Division TAOI plus two brigades of the 1st Cav by the 610th Maint Bn. Likewise, the 266th S&S Bn, the Saigon LSA (Prov) and the Bearcat LSA (Prov) supervise all logistical activities in the Long Binh, CANC, and Royal Thailand Army Volunteer Force (Division) respectively. The 185th Maint Bn performs a similar mission for various non-divisional tactical units, including the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 199th Light Infantry Brigade, and the 54th Artillery Group on a non-geographic basis.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-64) (R-1) (II)
25. (U) The facing sketch indicates the 29th General Support Group's area of operation in IV Corps Tactical Zone. The principle used in III CTZ of attaching both maintenance and supply and service units to the battalion headquarters applies in the IV CTZ.

The Saigon LSA has mission responsibility in both III and IV CTZ. In the IV CTZ, the LSA provides logistical support to the 9th Infantry Division and mobile contact teams and to specified MACV Advisory Teams.

Although the 2nd Maint Bn is located in III CTZ at Vung Tau, its entire effort is oriented toward supplying non-divisional units in the Vung Tau Special Zone and in IV CTZ, to include the 1st Royal Australian Task Force, elements of the Royal Australian Air Force, US Navy, Coast Guard and Air Force, and Republic of Korea Forces in the area.

26. (U) The 91st CS Bn provides logistical support to non-divisional units in IV CTZ, including the 164th Aviation Group, the 52nd Signal Brigade, the 34th Engineer Group and MACV Advisory elements as specified. This Bn also operated the country stores in IV CTZ. The Group has 34 companies plus 30 separate Platoons and detachments.

UNIT LOCATION - IV CTZ

29TH GS GP
B. PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, MORALE AND DISCIPLINE

1. (U) The overall enlisted personnel strength of the Group is now at 100%. This appears outstanding on the surface; however, it is merely a reduction in spaces authorized as a result of MTOE, Program 6 (Civilianization) and the exchange of two battalions. The Group was authorized and assigned the following personnel at the beginning and end of this period:

As of 31 Jan 69:  As of 30 Apr 69:

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Although enlisted military strength is at 100%, specific units are short some of our bread and butter MOSs because of the necessity to use spaces to perform additional missions without additional personnel authorization. The 537th Personnel Services Center is being kept informed of the units that have critical shortages and is assisting when possible. Another item that has a bearing is the Group's inability to hire indigenous personnel for civilianized military spaces. This in part is due to the local policy at Phuoc Vinh of not permitting additional civilians on the post and in part to the nonavailability of qualified local nationals at Phu Loi and Phuoc Vinh to perform the required functions.

2. (U) With the addition of the mission of furnishing direct support to the Delta it is necessary for the Group to continue to augment its authorized staff. Current status is as follows:

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*Includes 2 officers and 1 WO on board as replacements.

3. (U) During the period 1 Feb 69 to 30 Apr 69 the total number of Vietnamese personnel authorized under the table of distribution was increased to 969 personnel authorized. Also the Program 6 has been increased (due to the reorganization) to 919 Vietnamese personnel, bringing the total authorized under the TDA and Program 6 to 1888 personnel.
AVCA SGN 5G CP
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R-1) (U)

a. Indicated below are the total number of TDA and Program 6 Vietnamese personnel presently employed by the 29th General Support Group.

(1) TDA .................................. 886
(2) Program 6 .............................. 725

b. Daily Hire authorization for the same period was decreased to 418. The Group is utilizing all 418 spaces daily, and requested 175 more spaces.
4. (U) PERSONNEL STRENGTH

   a. During this quarter unit strengths were revised to reflect all
      MTCE changes and to delete spaces that have been civilianized under Pro-
      gram 6.

   b. On 30 Apr 69, the authorized and assigned strength, both mili-
      tary and civilian, were as shown on the following chart.

   c. Charts on the following pages indicate the trend in officers,
      warrant officers and enlisted grades as compared to previous quarter and
      last year.
# Subject: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1960

## RCS 65

### 11th Main BN

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**Personnel Asstts as of 30 Apr 29th Co CP**
5. (U) OFFICER STRENGTH

As of 30 April the officer strength was at 89% (231 assigned against an authorization of 260).
Subject: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R-I) (I)

Personnel

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Percent 17
6. (U) WARRANT OFFICER STRENGTH

The warrant officer strength is at 87% (94 assigned against an authorization of 108).
SUBJECT: Operational Report Issued for the Period Ending 30 April 1980

(RCS CSFOR-65)

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<th>F</th>
<th>M</th>
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<th>J</th>
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![Graph showing data trends over time]

- 1968-1969
- Percent Change
- Chart showing data comparison
7. (U) ENLISTED STRENGTH

The enlisted strength for the Group overall stands at 100%, but we still encounter problems from time to time in some MOSs.

This is particularly true for personnel trained in the 62 and 63 series MOSs (engineer and automotive equipment mechanics). Also affecting our mission is the shortage in the 71 series MOS (clerical personnel).
AVCA SPC OP
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarter Period Ending
30 April 1969 (MIS SPAR-45) (v.1) (n-1)

[Diagram and Table Details]

- Graph showing trends over time with specific data points.
- Table with numerical data for various categories.
8. (U) The following awards and decorations were processed for personnel assigned to HHC, 29th General Support Group during this quarter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CERT. OF ACHIEV.</th>
<th>ARCOM</th>
<th>BS</th>
<th>IM</th>
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<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
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</table>

9. (U) The R&R spaces to areas shown below were utilized by personnel of HHC, 29th General Support Group during this quarter:

**TOTAL R&R SPACES (1 Feb - 30 Apr 69):**

- Hawaii - 20
- Australia - 13
- Bangkok - 2
- Hong Kong - 3
- Malaysia - 1
- Taipei - 5
- Tokyo - 5

10. (U) Military Police citations were issued to individuals of HHC, 29th General Support Group during this quarter. Offenses included:

- February - 1: Motor Vehicle Accident
- March - 4: 2 CID (Marijuana), 1 Motor Vehicle Accident, 1 Unauthorized Vietnamese Females
- April - 8: 1 Wrongful Appropriation, 2 Off Limits, 1 Speeding, 4 Complaints of Larceny of Motor Vehicles - (Investigations continue by CID)

11. (U) Following promotions were made in HHC, 29th General Support Group during this quarter:

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<th>E-6</th>
<th>E-5</th>
<th>E-4</th>
<th>E-3</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>April</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
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AVCA SGN SG OP

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSPOR-65) (R-1) (U)

12. (U) The 1st of February 1969 we came back under DA's objective for reenlistment FRA's 33.3%, CRA's 80.0%, AUSs 6.7% and USARs 25.0%.

We still have not obtained a Reenlistment Counselor (OCR) for the 277th S&S Bn. Even though three have been assigned on orders, none have reported to the 277th as all had been subsequently diverted.

During the month of February, SSG Spencer rotated back to the States. Also Major Barber, Reenlistment Officer, 1st Logistical Command, made a courtesy inspection of units located at Long Binh Post and offered recommendations for improving the reenlistment program.

SFC John Lennox has been assigned to the 29th Group reenlistment office.

Bearcat LSA and the 277th S&S Bn have not provided adequate office space for their reenlistment NCOs.

Following is a list of personnel eligible and the number enlisted each month during the quarter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ELIG</th>
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<th>PER CENT</th>
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<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>50.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>44.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>41.2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

13. (U) Key personnel changes during the quarter were as follows:

a. 1LT Michael Winkler, AR, Civil Affairs was replaced by 1LT Jon B. Burmeister, CE.

b. CPT (CH) Ernest Banner, Group Chaplain was replaced by LTC (CH) William W. Nagata.

14. (U) The priority projects of Civil Affairs, 29th Group, has been of necessity modified because of the enemy's post-TET offensive beginning in February 1969. Priority has been revised from orphanages, schools and public organizations to private homes which were destroyed in approximately five hamlets.

15. (U) Non-Judicial Punishment for the Command:

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 29th Group</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Ord Bn</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>*</td>
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<tr>
<td>79th Maint Bn</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17</td>
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AVCA SGN SG OP

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R-1) (U)

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<th></th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>185th Maint Bn</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td>266th S&amp;S Bn</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>42</td>
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<tr>
<td>277th S&amp;S Bn</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>610th Maint Bn</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Saigon LSA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bearcat LSA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>2nd Maint Bn</td>
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<td>89</td>
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<tr>
<td>29th Gen Spt Gp (total)</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>234</td>
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</table>

(*)Not a part of 29th Group during the reporting period

a. General Courts-Martial: Charges have been referred to General Court-Martial on one member of this Command during the reporting period. The individual has been charged with numerous money order violations and a six (6) month absence without leave. The Court will be convened by the Commanding General, lst Logistical Command.

b. Special Courts-Martial:

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<td>HHC, 29th Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>3rd Ord Bn</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>79th Maint Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>185th Maint Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>266th S&amp;S Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>277th S&amp;S Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>610th Maint Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saigon LSA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bearcat LSA</td>
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<tr>
<td>2nd Maint Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>29th Gen Spt Gp (total)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
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(*)Not a part of 29th Group during the reporting period

c. Summary Courts-Martial:

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<tr>
<td>HHC, 29th Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>3rd Ord Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>79th Maint Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>185th Maint Bn</td>
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<td>266th S&amp;S Bn</td>
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<td>277th S&amp;S Bn</td>
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<td>610th Maint Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saigon LSA</td>
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AVCA SGN SG OP
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSPOR-65) (R-1) (U)

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<td>Bearcat LSA</td>
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<tr>
<td>2nd Maint Bn</td>
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<td>91st CS Bn</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>29th Gen Spt Gp (total)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
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(*Not a part of 29th Group during the reporting period)

16. (U) Legal assistance provided totaled 382 actions, including 278 interviews, 61 instruments drafted, and other miscellaneous services.

17. (U) During this reporting period, the Judge Advocate Section also supervised claims administration, elimination actions under AR 635-212 and 635-200, performed monthly visits to prisoners in the USARV Installation Stockade, audited unit funds, and conducted investigations within the Group. The Judge Advocate Section supervises all Special Courts-Martial within this Command and reviews all Summary Courts-Martial conducted within the Group. During the month of April, the Judge Advocate Section continued to provide legal assistance, conduct, supervise and review all military justice actions for 3rd Ordnance Bn and the 79th Maintenance Bn after these units had been transferred to the 53rd General Support Group.

18. (U) The Chaplain section had a net loss of one Chaplain in the recent reorganization of 29th General Support Group, effective 1 April 1969. Plans are now being prepared to request authorization of a Chaplain space for the 610th Maintenance Battalion located at Phu Loi. Assignment of an additional Chaplain will enhance the Chaplain coverage program for the 610th personnel and for the 277th S&S Battalion located at Tay Ninh. The 277th would receive area coverage by the Chaplain.

19. (U) Chapel service attendance shows an upward trend for the entire Group. Command emphasis is credited for this rise in attendance by Group personnel.

20. (U) Character Guidance attendance shows a significant rise for the reporting period. A more accurate and efficient reporting procedure and command emphasis are credited for the significant increase in attendance.

21. (U) "Project Street Corner" has increased weekly devotional opportunities for all Group personnel. Attendance at services has correspondingly increased. This project involves the conducting of brief religious services where the men work and relax. The unit Chaplain coordinates with commanders, section chiefs, and the men to find opportune times for these brief services of 5-15 minutes. The idea is to "take the word to the men where they are."

22. (U) "Project Chit Chat" has given a helpful label to an already dynamic program fostered by the chaplains in 29th Group. The project involves active visitation by unit Chaplains to work areas, play areas, barracks, mess halls,
etc. The idea is for the Chaplain to make as many contacts with the men as possible to let them know he is interested in their welfare.

C. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

1. (C) During the reporting period the enemy initiated his long expected offensive. He struck at targets throughout the III CTZ, beginning at 230200H February 1969. The enemy relied primarily on rocket, mortar, and sapper-type attacks. With friendly forces forewarned, his efforts achieved little tactical success. In the initial phase, the enemy concentrated his efforts against positions and base camps of the 25th Infantry Division and the huge Long Binh—Bien Hoa complex. Defending allied forces inflicted heavy casualties upon the enemy ground forces committed. For the first time since the bombing halt, the enemy indiscriminately rocketed residential sections of the capital, this being an indication of his willingness to accept retaliation and establishing justification to commit ground forces against Saigon, which intelligence points out to be the ultimate objective of his 1969 Winter-Spring campaign.

According to captured documents and prisoners of war, Phase II was to consist of attacks by fire, construction of fortifications along lines of communications for protection against artillery, and regrouping and resupplying of his forces for Phase III. Enemy activity in the time frame 1 through 10 March lent credence to information supplied by the above intelligence sources. The attacks caused light casualties and damages; however, on 6 March, Saigon was again attacked by rockets causing heavy civilian casualties.

In latter March and early April, the enemy reached several high points of his campaign (Phase III), attacking allied positions in the outer periphery of III CTZ. A loss of offensive momentum resulted from allied operations disrupting his logistics system, rendering him incapable of maintaining a high level of offensive activity. Friendly operation "Atlas Wedge" halted his attempt to re-locate the 7th NVA Regiment in the Michelle—Saigon Corridor and scattered his forces along the Saigon River Corridor. His offensive posture was reduced and he had to rely primarily on attacks by fire to maintain his presence.

Presently, intelligence indicates his forces are undergoing a period of resupply and replacement in their deep base areas. Concurrently, his high headquarters staff is making a reassessment of their situation. He has left one regimental size unit from each division in forward positions to maintain his presence on the battlefield. It is expected these units will conduct limited and localized attacks. There are no reasons to expect a renewal of a coordinated corp-wide offensive. According to captured documents, the enemy has initiated an Emulation Campaign. He plans to emulate the deeds of Ho Chi Minh through small scale action, the most likely being attacks by fire. Agent reports indicate the enemy is planning a Summer-Autumn Offensive to be launched at an undetermined date in May.
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AVCA SGN 5Q OP

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSPF-65) (R-1) (U)

In the IV CTZ, enemy initiated activity decreased from a moderate to low level in April. His primary offensive interest was confined to village and hamlet level activities, attacks by fire and limited ground assaults against isolated positions. His capability to conduct significant ground attacks was diminished by loss of personnel in contacts with allied forces. The discovery of several large enemy caches further limited his tactical capability. The present low level of enemy activity may indicate a stand down to receive supplies and replacements. His plan is to build up his tactical posture to initiate another high point in the current offensive.

2. (C) Major incidents occurring at locations of interest to this command during the reporting period were:

a. (C) YT075087 230200 to 230315 Feb 69 (Long Binh Post) The 3rd Ordnance Battalion received a mixture of rocket/mortar rounds of unknown caliber. Six rounds impacted in vicinity of Battalion SOC, M-2 mortar position and Towers 5, 6 and 25. Res: No damages/casualties.

b. (C) YT65518 230215 Feb 69 (Tay Ninh West Base Camp) The 548th LEM Co received one 107mm rocket in billeting area. Res: 3KHA, 31 WHA; 1-2½ ton truck destroyed, 1-2½ ton truck damaged, BEQ, Orderly Room, Mess Hall and EM club all minor damage.

c. (C) YT068064 230222 Feb 69 (Long Binh Post) The 185th Maint Bn reported that four incoming 107mm rockets impacted in the 140th Maint Co resulting in negative damages or casualties.

d. (C) YT155080 230300 Feb 69 (Song Be) A welding van belonging to the 610th Maint Bn contact team was hit by shrapnel. The extent of damage to the welding van was minor. No casualties.

e. (C) YT068069 230315 Feb 69. The 185th Maint Bn received one round in the 378th Maint Co area. Res: 1US WHA; 1-2½ ton truck damaged.

f. (C) YT95485 230330 Feb 69 (Phuoc Vinh) The 229th S&S Co received one unidentified round in POL area. Res: 20 drums 2110 PH Tub and 10 drums NQGAS destroyed; no casualties.


h. (C) YT820908 230600 Feb 69 (Quan Loi) The 81st QM Plt from the 610th Maint Bn received 19 rounds in billeting area. Res: teletype system destroyed, three tents badly damaged, minor damage to welding shack and 1½ ton trailer. No casualties.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (N-1) (U)

i. (C) YT454012 231015 Feb 69 (Long Giao) One mile north of Blackhorse, a 2½ ton truck from the 551st Lt Maint Co of the 185th Maint Bn hit a mine. Res: 1US KHA, 6US WHA; 1-2½ ton truck damaged.

j. (C) YT159009 240930 Feb 69 (Bearcat) Bearcat LSA received two rounds 107MM rocket in the 1011th S&S Co area. Res: 1US KHA; 3US WHA and 1-½ ton truck, 2-M-16s, 3-flak jackets and a protective mask destroyed.

k. (C) YT075087 232050-232155 Feb 69 (Long Binh Post) The 3rd Ord Bn received 4-6 rockets and 10 to 13 mortars. The mortar rounds impacted forward of bunkers 326-334 and at EOD gate. The rockets impacted in the Long Binh Ammo Supply Depot. No damages/casualties.

l. (C) YT097057 240030 Feb 69 (Long Binh Post) The 79th Maint Bn received three mortar rounds vicinity bunkers 404-406. No damages/casualties.

m. (C) XT165508 251905 Feb 69 (Tay Ninh West Base Camp) The 277th S&S Bn received two rounds impacting in POL storage area. No damages/casualties.

n. (C) XT955485 252120 Feb 69 (Phuoc Vinh) The 229th S&S Co received five rounds in company area. No damages/casualties.

o. (C) XT080017 272210-2250 Feb 69 (Long Binh Post) The 3rd Ord Bn received 25-30 rounds mixed rocket and mortar in the ammunition depot. No damages/casualties.

p. (C) XT820908 010630 Mar 69 (Quan Loi) The Quan Loi Base Camp received 30 rounds of mixed mortar/rockets. Nine rounds impacted in the ASP of the Quan Loi FSA destroying small amounts of ammunition (one unserviceable ammo pad and one fuse and illumination pad) and a five ton wrecker. No casualties.

q. (C) XT955485 011110 Mar 69 (Phuoc Vinh) The Phuoc Vinh Base Camp received three rocket rounds. One round impacted in the Class I yard of the 229th S&S Co. Ten pallets of nonperishables were destroyed. No casualties.

r. (C) XT820908 050600 Mar 69 (Quan Loi) Quan Loi Base Camp was hit by two 107mm rockets. One rocket hit on the road near pad 6, the eastern portion of Quan Loi FSA. No damages/casualties.

s. (C) XT955485 060300 Mar 69 (Phuoc Vinh) The Phuoc Vinh Base Camp received 30 rounds of 107mm rockets. The 229th S&S Co did not receive any rounds. No casualties/damages.

t. (C) XT165508 120645 Mar 69 (Tay Ninh West Base Camp) The 548th LEM Co received three 107mm rockets in billeting area. One HEQ took a direct hit which destroyed the building and wounded four US personnel.

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u. (c) YT082077 171938 Mar 69 (Long Binh Post) The 3rd Ord Bn received seven rounds of suspected 122mm rocket fire inside the ammunition supply depot. Two rounds were positively identified as 122mm rockets. No damages/casualties.

v. (c) XT816907 230345 Mar 69 (Quan Loi) The Quan Loi Base Camp received 26 rounds of 107mm rocket, 20 rounds of 82mm mortar, and nine rounds of 75mm RR fire. Three ammo pads belonging to the Quan Loi FSA were hit—resulting in the loss of 175mm and eight inch primers, charges, and projectiles. No casualties.

w. (c) YT0508 240044 Mar 69 (Long Binh Post) The 3rd Ord Bn received five rounds in the ammunition depot and three rounds in the battalion maintenance area. One round impacted 75 meters SE of 29th Group officer quarters. Res: 12 US WIA (all 3rd Ord), two buildings and three pallets of 2.75 rockets damaged.

x. (c) YU155080 252155 Mar 69 (Song Be) The Song Be Base Camp received 20 rounds of 82mm mortar. Elements from the 610th Maint Bn reported negative casualties/damages.

y. (c) XT165508 270500 Mar 69 (Tay Ninh West Base Camp) The 277th S&S Bn received three 107mm rockets. The rounds impacted in the vicinity of the 228th S&S Co, 548th LEM Co and Class IV office. Res: 1 US WIA and two buildings damaged.

z. (c) XT955485 271835 Mar 69 (Phuoc Vinh) The Phuoc Vinh Base Camp received four rounds of mortar or rocket. Res: No casualties/damage.

aa. (c) XT165508 272155 Mar 69 (Tay Ninh West Base Camp) The 277th S&S Bn received two rounds of mortar or rocket in the 576th Ord Co area. Res: No casualties/damage.

bb. (c) YT9090100 142132 Apr 69 (Long Binh Post) The 3rd Ord Bn received four 107mm rockets impacting in the northeast corner of the ASD. Six to eight rounds impacted between the ASD and the STRATCOM Facility. There were no casualties or damages reported.

c. (c) YT075082 172110 Apr 69 (Long Binh Post) The 3rd Ord Bn received one confirmed 107mm rocket in the southern portion of the ASD. There were no casualties or damage.

dd. (c) XT820908 222200 Apr 69 (Quan Loi) The 610th Maint Bn ASP at Quan Loi received four rounds of unknown size mortar hitting three pads. Res: Four 105mm illumination rounds, four 155mm illumination rounds and 24-155mm white phosphorus rounds destroyed.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R-1) (U)

ee. (C) XT967232 241515 Apr 69 (Binh Duong Province) A 2½ ton truck from the 229th S&S Co in convoy enroute to Phuoc Vinh exploded. Possible causes were an enemy road mine or enemy command detonated mine. Res: 2US WIA; one-2½ ton truck and six propane gas bottles destroyed.

ff. (C) XT150510 242257 Apr 69 (Tay Ninh West) The Tay Ninh West Base Camp received seven 107mm rocket rounds. Two of these rounds impacted in the 277th S&S Bn ASP at AREA #13. Res: No casualties and negligible damage to equipment.

3. (U) The 524th MI Detachment conducted a Counterintelligence Survey Inspection of units from the 3rd Ordnance Battalion, 79th Maintenance Battalion, 185th Maintenance Battalion, 610th Maintenance Battalion, 266th Supply and Services Battalion, 277th Supply and Services Battalion, Saigon Logistical Support Area, and Bearcat Logistical Support Area. The Counterintelligence measures in all units inspected were satisfactory. The Security, Plans, and Operations of Group headquarters received a satisfactory report in regards to internal security measures and handling classified documents from the 1st Log Command MOI inspection. Two new units joining the Group in April, the 2nd Maintenance Battalion and the 91st Composite Service Battalion, received favorable reports on several counterintelligence survey inspections.

4. (U) During the quarter, there was little change in the weather pattern over the III and IV CTZs. The weather was characterized as clear and less humid but hotter than the wet season. With the dry season ending in April, a few isolated showers occurred with rain fall averaging less than half inch per month. The temperature ranged from a high of 104 degrees to a low of 75 degrees in III CTZ and a high of 99 degrees and a low of 74 degrees in IV CTZ. The weather had no effect upon Group operations.

D. 5-4

1. (U) The Saigon Logistical Support Activity completed its consolidation move into Camp Davies from various locations in Saigon as scheduled. There are still some engineer requirements which need to be finished before the project is completed. The new location provides much improved operational and combat areas for the battalion.

2. (U) Once again there was a delay in getting engineer effort to upgrade the pads, berms, roads, and drainage structure in the Long Binh Ammunition Supply Depot. Approximately one third of the ASD has been cleared of ammunition in preparation for the construction. A civilian contractor has been awarded the contract and started actual construction on 28 April. With the advent of post T-day planning, the permanent upgrade of a portion of the ASD is being considered. In this light, there is a very good possibility that only one third of the ASD will be temporarily upgraded by the contract. An operational
support requirement has been approved to repair that portion of the roads and culverts in the two thirds of the ASD that will not be accomplished by the contract, which are in danger of being washed out by the upcoming rains.

3. (U) Due to the rapid turnover of personnel through either regular rotation or change in assignment, unit property accountability has proven very difficult. Property book officers have been allowed to rotate or transfer without a per-joint inventory. This procedure has caused an excessive amount of Reports of Surveys for equipment lost or misplaced. The Group policy now is that no property book officer will be allowed to rotate or transfer unless all property he is charged with has been accounted for either through a per-joint inventory or a Report of Survey, which must be in the hands of the appointing authority.
LOGISTICS. (U) The Group continues to perform its mission of providing logistical support to the United States and Free World Military Assistance Forces in its area of responsibility. This area of responsibility now encompasses the direct support mission of both the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones.

1. (C) Supply

a. Class I

(1) (C) For the first two months of the quarter, 29th Group operated eight Class I supply points in support of approximately 112,000 troops. On 1 April, with the assignment of IV CTZ units to 29th Group, this was increased to 10 Class I supply points and approximately 149,000 troops. In addition, the Group operates 14 "country stores" in the IV CTZ in support of area MACV Advisor Teams. Facilities located in III CTZ are resupplied from the US Army Depot, Long Binh, by the 48th Transportation Group, 29th Group organic vehicles and commercial contract transportation. This is coordinated through the 3rd Transportation Center (MC), Saigon Support Command. In the IV CTZ, resupply is effected by 48th Transportation Group vehicles, ocean-going vessels, barges, air shipment, and 29th Group organic vehicles.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R-1) (n)

CONFIDENTIAL
(2) (U) Class I procedures in the Delta area of operations differ extremely from those employed throughout the rest of 29th Group. The main source of resupply for the MACV Advisor Teams is the "country store". These are small Class I supply points which provide food for the advisor teams in areas where the food available on the economy is either unsuitable or deficient in diet. The Group is currently establishing procedures to increase the selection of items available in the country stores by obtaining items desired through commissary sources. Currently, the bulk of Class I resupply to Can Tho, which in turn issues to the country stores, is by barge. Arrangements have been made to utilize air shipments from the Saigon area to resupply non-perishable items for the country stores.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVCA SGN SG CP
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSPOR-65) (R-1) (U)

(3) (U) Class I issues for the quarter totaled 9,932,664 rations, which represents an increase of approximately 200,000 rations over the previous quarter. This increase was largely due to the expansion of 29th Group support into the IV Corps Tactical Zone. The expansion did not cause significant Class I operational difficulties but some Class I procedures had to be intensified to insure proper stockage of needed items. The programmed decrease of stocks on hand at the Class I supply points has magnified the need for efficient requirements determination and prompt and dependable transportation of Class I supplies on Requested Delivery Dates (RDD). Group Class I points are now advising this headquarters at least three days prior to scheduled issue of any items for which required issue quantities are not available. This permits 29th Group headquarters to effect emergency procedures for obtaining priority transportation if required.
SUBJECT: Operational Report January through April Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RC-131/245) (N-1)
b. (U) Class II, IV and VII

(1) For the first two months of the reporting period, 29th Group operated six Class II and VII supply points and two Class IV supply points.
The addition of IV Corps support units increased the number of Class II and VII supply points to eight.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS GSPOR-65) (N-1) (H)
During the quarter, the 29th Group Class II, IV & VII supply points received 103,135 requisitions of which 60,550 were for authorized stockage list items (ASL). Demand accommodation was 59%. Initial fill of ASL requisitions from stock was 24,799 for a demand satisfaction of 41%. During the previous quarter, 87,858 requisitions were received of which 48,927 were on the ASL. This represents a demand accommodation of 55%. Of these, 19,655 were initially filled from stock for a demand satisfaction of 40%. Demand accommodation, therefore, increased 4% over the previous quarter. Demand satisfaction increased 1% over the previous quarter. As a follow-up of the previous quarter's wall-to-wall inventory, the Group has continued a program of cyclic inventories designed to improve stockage accuracy. These inventories reflect an overall location accuracy of 98% and an inventory accuracy of 71%. These percentages are expected to continue to improve because of a vigorous training program to improve the caliber of our personnel. The basis of this program is our internal SOPs that were published by Group and distributed down to the DSUs.
SUBJECT: Operational Report

Quarterly Period: April 1969

The report details the performance metrics for the quarter, including graphs and tables that track various operational parameters. The data is presented in thousands of units.

The graphs illustrate monthly performance trends, with the years 1968 and 1969 indicated on the x-axis. The y-axis measures performance in percentages and thousands of units.

The tables provide numerical data for each month, with columns labeled for different categories of performance metrics.
c. Class IX

(1) Eleven Tech Supplies are presently being operated by units of the 29th Group to provide repair parts. A twelfth is due to begin operation next quarter at the 266th S&S Bn. This represents an increase of four Tech Supplies over last quarter with the addition of two battalions to the Group and the establishing of a Tech Supply at the Saigon LSA.
AVCA SGN SG OP

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Jan 69 (RCS CSPOR-65) (R-1) (U)
The addition of support responsibilities in IV CTZ brought three new Tech Supplies under 29th Group control. The Tech Supplies are located at Can Tho, Dong Tam and Vung Tau.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSPOR-65) (L-1) (MI)
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (NSI) (U)

A substantial increase in the volume of requests placed upon the DSUs in February after the termination of Project Count I, combined with a decline in the number of receipts and an increase in fringe requests received, depressed the percentage of demand satisfaction for that month. This trend in demand satisfaction continued in March through the causal factors changed somewhat. March was a complex month. A reduction in ASL corresponded with a further depression in demand accommodation. Many productive man hours were channeled into the preparation and retrograde of considerable excess; and more productive hours were lost to special projects such as Project Clean, Count II, Pre-punch, and several surveys involving manual statistical research.

Another significant factor was the project of establishing and opening the new mechanized DSSA in Saigon. Many production hours were lost at the 59th Sig Co DSSA due to the use of men and ADF time at the 59th to extract from their records an ASL for the Saigon activity plus the cutting of the stock record ledgers, customer pre-punched request cards and initial requisitions for the new activity. The loss of a great deal of production time in the Class IX DSSAs resulted in a decreased demand satisfaction for the month. Contributing to the low demand satisfaction was the newly established 536th NEW Co DSSA which commenced operation with a 90% zero balance position.

In April, the receipt of initial stockage in the 536th DSSA and the consequent decrease in zero balance rate to 65% resulted in a dramatic rise in demand satisfaction in the new activity from less than 5% to more than 25%. This decrease in zero balance coupled with a drastic rise in the number of cycles completed in all DSSAs was responsible for the improved demand satisfaction for the whole Group. The increase in the number of requisitions received was the result of the addition of three technical supply activities.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarter 1, Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFR-65) (Confidential)

Operational Report

Lessons Learned

For Quarter 1,

Period Ending: 30 April 1969

(Confidential)
c. (C) Class III

(1) For the first two months of the reporting period, the Group operated six Class III supply points with a total bulk capacity of approximately 1,197,000 gallons. Most supply points located in the III Corps Tactical Zone were resupplied primarily by the 64th Quartermaster Battalion, using line haul procedures. The exceptions, the Bearcat Logistical Support Area and the Class III supply point at Phu Loi, are resupplied using organic transportation.
AVCA SGN SG OP

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
30 April 1969 (RCS CSPOR-65) (R-1) (U)

All figures represent bulk storage capacity in thousands of gallons.

CONFIDENTIAL

51
Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R-1) (U)

As of 1 April, with the addition of the IV CTZ, the Group operated nine Class III supply points and one petroleum depot at Vung Tau with a combined total bulk capacity of approximately 10,834,000 gallons. Resupply of Class III in the IV Corps area is accomplished by 'T' Tankers, barges, 'Y' boats and commercial suppliers.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (g-l) (n)
(3) Issues of Class III products for the quarter totaled 27,511,000 gallons. This represents an increase of 9,049,200 gallons over last quarter's issues. This increase was caused primarily by the addition of the IV Corps supply points. Stockage of package fuel has been minimized in the forward support areas. Stockage of package JP-4 and AVGAS was completely eliminated this quarter in the III Corps Tactical Zone. Stockage of other package fuels was reviewed extensively and these have been reduced to a minimum operating level. This reduction was possible as package fuels were, for the most part, contingency stocks. Increased reliability of transportation and security of the main supply routes were the main factors effecting this stockage review. The total reduction amounted to approximately 55,000 gallons. This reduction of packaged products has permitted increased efficiency while reducing unneeded stockage in forward areas.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R-1) (IV)

MILLIONS OF GALLONS

CONFIDENTIAL
(1) During the first two months of the quarter, the Group operated four ammunition supply points. In April, this was increased by five ASPs located in the IV Corps Tactical Zone. As of 1 May, two more ASPs will be taken over at Cu Chi and Lai Khe. This will make a total of 11 ASPs in the 29th Group. The stockage objectives for these ASPs are shown on the two Class V charts. The 576th Ord Co plus the 205th Mag Plt will provide personnel and equipment to man ASPs in III Corps. The 148th Ord Co will do the same for the ASPs in IV CTZ. Both parent organizations are also charged with providing technical assistance in their areas of responsibility.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
30 April 1969 (RCF CSFOR-65) (R-1) (n)
(2) The month of April saw the reorganization of the Group with the addition of the IV Corp Tactical Zone. Added to Class V management and operation were ammunition supply points at Can Tho, Vinh Long, Soc Trang, Dong Tam, and the 148th Ord Co operating the Vung Tau ASP. The total points operated by the 29th Group increased to nine with a stockage objective of 14,363 short tons. The 29th Group now serves in two different environments; the northern or III CTZ, all supplied by truck convoy and sling out loads as compared to the southern or IV CTZ, wherein the delivery is mainly by water and airlift as roads are not suited for heavy convoys in the Delta. To offset this new experience, increased emphasis has been placed on the professional management of the ammunition supply points through the implementation of a new 29th Group Class V Standing Operating Procedure written to include the lowest operational level and in sufficient detail to describe each individual's activity.
AVCA SGN SG OP

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R-1) (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
AVCA SGN SG OP

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS GSFOR-65) (R-1) (U)

(3) The months of February, March and April were exciting months for Class V within the 29th General Support Group: ammunition stockage was reduced overall, the TET offensive caused an upsurge in issues, controlled management induced in the previous quarter had taken effect by the retrograde of unserviceable, suspended and excess serviceable ammunition out of country, the acquisition of IV Corps Tactical Zone in the Delta which caused the loss of the 3rd Ord Bn and Long Binh Ammunition Supply Depot (LBASD), but the acquisition of five more ammunition supply points for a total of nine to be operated by the Group.

In February, LBASD lifted over 111,246 short tons and issued 43,245 short tons versus a receipt of 34,709 tons. Heavy demands created by the TET offensive caused this large issue. Meanwhile, the tonnage at LBASD was reduced from 64,236 to a low of 57,410 short tons mainly through retrograde shipments, selective call forward of stockage and issues. Shipments to forward ammunition supply points at Quan Loi, Phuoc Vinh and Tay Ninh were 7,708 tons, versus issues of 8,975 short tons.

In March, the trend continued in the same fashion with another record lift of 103,555 short tons and an increased issue of 49,587 tons versus receipts of 34,943 short tons. The retrograde program was completed; however, the tonnage at LBASD continued downward to an all-time low of 36,081 short tons as of 31 March. This reduction coincided with the planned close-out of Area IV in the LBASD to enable engineer effort to renovate the 60 storage pads in that section of the depot. Shipments to the ASFs at Quan Loi, Phuoc Vinh and Tay Ninh amounted to 10,971 short tons versus issues to tactical troops of 12,051 tons indicating the continual trend of the TET offensive.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarteriy Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFO865) (R-3) (R-7)

THOUSANDS OF TONS

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MONTHLY PERFORMANCE

Chart 2: Performance Data

Note: The chart shows the performance data for the months from January to December 1968 and January to June 1969.
2. (U) SERVICES
   
a. Bakery Production

   The Long Binn Bakery produced a total of 1,489,900 pounds of bread during the reporting period. This represents a 17% increase in production over the previous quarter. The new west wing of the bakery was opened on 13 April. With this addition, the bakery is now producing approximately 32,000 pounds of bread per day and supporting the entire III CTZ with the exception of the Saigon Local area. At the present time, bread for IV CTZ is produced entirely through commercial contract. These commercial contracts provide approximately 5,000 pounds of bread daily at Vung Tau and 7,000 pounds daily at Can Tho.
b. Laundry Production

During the quarter, the Group operational laundry sites were increased from 10 to 12 because of the addition of the IV CTZ. A total of 2,890,151 pounds of organizational and individual laundry was processed during the reporting period, of which 182,180 pounds was produced by laundry sites in the IV CTZ. Total production represents a 31% increase over the previous quarter. This quarter's increase is due primarily to the addition of the IV CTZ sites and overall increased troop activity.
# Operational Report

**Subject:** Operational Report

**Report Period:**

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**Monthly Production**

- **June 1969:** 1,234 units
- **July 1969:** 567 units
- **August 1969:** 890 units
- **September 1969:** 345 units

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**Note:** The table and graph above represent the monthly production figures for the specified period.
c. Graves Registration

With the assignment of units operating in IV CTZ to the Group on 1 April, the number of graves registration collection points increased from six to eight. A total of 878 remains were processed during the quarter. Of these, 24 remains were processed by collection points located in the IV CTZ. Total remains processed represents an 11% increase over the previous quarter. This increase was as a result of the Group gaining two additional graves registration collecting points in the IV CTZ and overall increased troop activity.
AVCA SGN SQ OP

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
30 April 1969 (RCS CSPOR-65) (R-1) (II)
3. (U) FIELD MAINTENANCE PRODUCTION

a. Automotive

During the past quarter, 29th Group gained three maintenance units, the 238th Maint Co, 2nd Maint Bn, and the 51st Maint Co. This transfer took place in early April and consequently the number of job orders received and completed during that month was higher than that of the preceding months of February and March. Another factor in this increase was the 48th Trans Group's addition of a truck company. New five ton diesel trucks were added to the 48th Trans Group this quarter. During the period, these new vehicles were placed on job order for "defecting" and the old ones were on job order for 461-5 action.

Overall receipts and completions for this quarter were lower than those for last quarter. Although completions for the past quarter were greater than the receipts, the number of vehicles backlogged at the end of the period increased due to the addition of the three maintenance units to the Group.
SUBJECT: Operation FL1 Report - Tessons learned for current period

30 April 1969 (RESC-65)
b. Artillery

Artillery maintenance support improved during February through April. Recoil mechanisms and obturator spindles for M114A1, 155mm towed howitzers are no longer a problem area. During the TET offensive of March and April, the RAR programs were suspended. The receipts and completions increased in April when the RAR programs and other maintenance was once again performed on a scheduled basis.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSM-65) (n-1) (n)

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PERCENT

71
c. Fire Control

No problems have been encountered in support of the fire control system. Approximately four months ago a program was started of inspecting all fire control instruments once a month. This has significantly decreased the backlog. Additionally, the backlog dropped significantly in April with the loss of the 632nd HEM Co of the 79th Maint Bn. The backlog now represents a true Direct Support backlog.
Subject: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CFSQ-65) (R-1)

Date: 30 April 1969

Abstract:

The report details operational activities and metrics for the quarter ending 30 April 1969, providing a comprehensive overview of performance and progress.

Graphs and Data Tables:

The report includes several graphs and data tables illustrating key metrics and trends over the quarter. The graphs depict changes in various indicators, and the data tables provide numerical values for detailed analysis.

Appendix:

The appendix contains additional data and references supporting the report's conclusions.
d. Signal

In the communications and electronics (C&E) equipment commodity area, receipts and production dropped sharply during February and early March. Receipts dropped due to increased activity of supported units which reduced ability to evacuate equipment and caused them to retain marginal equipment in operation during the critical period of the TET offensive. During this same period, a major portion of the repair work force man hours was consumed in security and defensive operations reducing productive capability. Receipts and production resumed a normal pace during April, bringing the three month averages near to the averages of the past year. Production exceeded input very slightly during February and April but is still precluded from reducing overall backlogs due to lack of supply response in repair parts. An overall increase above previous averages for the month of April is primarily due to a reorganization which added three C&E shops to the Group.
e. Heavy Engineer Equipment

During the last quarter, heavy engineer receipts, completions, and backlog have all shown an overall decrease in activity. This is a direct result of the forming of the 62nd Land Clearing Battalion with organic third echelon support, thereby relieving the 610th Maint-Bn of this mission. Repair parts for low density items remain critical, causing the washout rate to be extremely high for closed-loop items.
f. Quartermaster Heavy

During the first half of the quarter, many forklifts were retrograded under the closed-loop program, i.e., waiting parts over 30 days. Because the washout rate was high and the replacement rate even higher, the receipts and backlog decreased. By the end of the quarter, however, RT forklifts had become very critical and commercial forklifts were being used as substitutes. This caused an increase in the commercial backlog. No relief is in sight for RT forklifts, as engines remain the critical item.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969

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1968 1969

Quarterly Production

Monthly Production

294H GEN SEP CE
g. Power Generation

The backlog at this time can be attributed to the lack of repair parts. The overall decrease in backlog can be attributed to the receipt of replacement Mil Std engines and the strict adherence to the closed-loop criteria. The continuing operator and organizational mechanic schools has contributed significantly to this decrease.
AVCA 5GH SQ CP
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
30 April 1969 (RCS CSPG-65) (N-1) (v)

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PERCENT
**AVCA SGN SG OP**

**SUBJECT:** Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R-l))(U)

**h. Deadline and Equipment Status**

Selected equipment status of major units directly supported by the 29th Group is identified below. Reflected are the quantity of equipment authorized, on hand, deadlines at organizational and field maintenance and % of equipment available (availability is expressed as a percentage of equipment on hand). Data was obtained from reports provided by major units and is current as of 20 April 1969.

### ORDINANCE AUTOMOTIVE - WHEELED VEHICLES

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CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSPOR-65) (M-1) (U)

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SECTION II

LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. PERSONNEL - None

B. OPERATIONS

1. (C) ITEM: Recoil Failure for M551 AR/AAV Sheridan

   a. OBSERVATION: Since the introduction of the Sheridan tank in RVN, there have been numerous recoil system malfunctions. The two primary causes of this were leaking recoil seals and recoil valve assembly failure. The initial recoil system failures have been significantly reduced during the past 45 days. Replacement of parts and more extensive exercising of recoils prior to firing has improved reliability. Poor quality assurance and inadequate in-storage maintenance significantly contributed to the unsatisfactory situation that occurred. The recoil seals had dried out in storage and the initial recoil system exercising during equipment deprocessing was not sufficient to expand and seat them properly.

   b. EVALUATION: Impact on using combat unit was great. Several of these failures occurred during actual contact with the enemy.

   c. RECOMMENDATION: It is anticipated that steps are being taken to determine the exact cause of recoil failures so as to remedy the situation. As an interim measure, the Armament Section of the 140th HEMCO increased the exercising of the recoil assembly from 10 times to 35 and 40 times. Additionally, actions have been taken to provide sufficient seals and valves in-country. This will insure greater equipment availability. A float recoil at each DSU in support of Sheridan vehicles would greatly decrease maintenance time required to replace bad seals.

2. (U) ITEM: Maintenance Support for Newly Introduced CORREL Equipment.

   a. OBSERVATION: Many items of equipment are introduced into the theater with inadequate maintenance support prior to provisioning. This inadequacy applies to personnel training, maintenance facilities and test equipment. New equipment is often introduced before either trained maintenance personnel or completion of in-country training programs, including both formal schooling or on-the-job training. Usually either form of in-
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Electrical equipment are not authorized in any of the 29 series (COSTAR) TOWEs. All of the sets in country were firmly committed to mission operations. Attempts have been made to cross-train radar personnel pending MTOE action with little success due to non-availability of the equipment to the maintenance activities. The primary means of maintenance and repair support has and continues to be provided by the on-site organizational maintenance personnel. Required test equipment peculiar to this end item was not programmed for DS/GS maintenance support. MTOE actions have been initiated but response in providing authorization for requisitioning has not been forthcoming. The most effective and responsive method of direct support repair for this type equipment is on-site replacement of components and/or subassemblies. To provide such response, it is necessary that a complete end item (so-called mock-up) be available at the forward support point. In this method of operation, a serviceable subassembly from the mock-up is used to replace the defective component on site. The defective component is then returned to the shop, repaired and operationally tested in the mock-up set. The usual method of obtaining a set for use as a mock-up has been to allocate a set as maintenance float when asset availability and operational requirements allow. A second example is that of the radio set AN/GRC-106 which was new to the Army inventory when introduced to the theater. In this case, a limited number of test sets were provided after the initial commitment of the equipment. Personnel (RCS 31820) were authorized and on hand but required in-country training. Within the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones, the test facilities were distributed to provide direct support capability in three geographical areas with back-up and general support at one location. This distribution necessitated establishment of special support, evacuation and transportation systems to cover the present 11 direct support activities providing area support. In some instances, this area support (11 areas) is already spread very thinly. Personnel training provided by the in-country Signal School has been excellent. However, it has been after the fact and maintenance problems due to lack of technical knowledge have been experienced during the process of establishing a technically qualified personnel base.

c. EVALUATION: Inadequacy of maintenance support prior to provisioning results in excessive deadline rates, down time and reduced combat efficiency of tactical units. The lack of support capability at forward elements places additional burdens on transport capabilities.

d. RECOMMENDATION: When an item of equipment is new to a theater of command, regardless of whether it is new to the Army inventory or not, the following is imperative:

(1) Personnel with adequate training for each item of equipment must be provided or trained prior to introduction of new items to a theater or command.

(2) Initial programmed inputs must include allocations for maintenance float to be used as maintenance training aids in sufficient quantities to provide trained personnel at all logistical forward support areas within a reasonable time frame.

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(3) Test facilities and peculiar test equipment must be provided in a timely manner for all forward support activities as well as at back-up units.

(4) End items must be specifically allocated for use as mock-ups at all logistical support points in consonance with qualified personnel.

(5) Equipment authorization procedures and policies must be revised to provide response to mission changes in terms of weeks rather than months or years as is the present case.

3. (U) ITEM: Push Packages for M551 Sheridan

   a. OBSERVATION: The employment of new equipment requires the prepositioning of repair parts at organizational, direct support and general support levels. In the employment of the M551 Sheridan vehicle, "push packages" of parts were often incomplete and inadequate.

   b. EVALUATION: Push packages for the M551 Sheridan arrived in-country but not in the state and completeness initially reported. Push packages were to be separated into Org, DS and GS push packages and were to be in separate CONEX containers. Push packages came in separate individual crates and in many instances without individual packing lists to aid in identifying maintenance level. Parts and manuals which were supposed to be included were missing.

   c. RECOMMENDATION: The employment of new equipment must be accompanied by adequate repair parts, manuals and special tools required. Separate push packages must be provided for the organization, for the direct support unit and for the general support unit. Each package should contain the repair parts, manuals and special tools needed for that level of maintenance. Packing lists inside and outside the package must be provided. Finally, special markings should be prominently displayed to insure delivery to the appropriate unit at the same time deployment of the end item of equipment is effected.

4. (U) ITEM: NCR 500 Mechanized Stock Control

   a. OBSERVATION: To provide NCR 500 mechanized stock control DSU/GSU with a program designed to check the balance of the equation dues-in plus on-hand equals R/O plus dues-out on each ledger and take action to correct out of balance ledgers.

   b. EVALUATION: The correct stockage position is attained when the dues-in plus the on-hand equals the R/O plus the dues-out. When this equation does not balance the stockage position is either short or excess for the subject line item, and corrective action must be taken to return it to a balanced position. This corrective action is accomplished by the initiation of replenishment
requisitions in a shortage position, by the cancellation of replenishment dues-in in an average position, and in extreme cases of overage the declaration and retrograde of excess stock on hand.

Presently, this stock position must be manually checked and corrections made in the case of an average position with NCR 500 mechanized stock control units. It has been amply demonstrated that the mechanized DSU/GSU tends to move toward an excess position. Thus many man-hours are consumed in the identification and correction of excess stockage positions. Aside from consuming productive man-hours this manual review can only be conducted for each line item every 60 to 90 days and is susceptible to inaccuracies. A machine sum check of this equation and machine self-initiation of corrective action would greatly improve the efficiency of the NCR 500 mechanized DSU/GSUs.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That a machine sum check of the equation dues-in plus on-hand equals R/O plus dues-out and that a machine self-initiated corrective action capability be designed into Programs V11 and V15. This program change would cause the NCR 500 to run a sum check on the stockage position equation each time a ledger was run on V11 or V15 and to cancel excess dues-in by generating an AC1 card (in the same manner it generates replenishment requisitions now with these programs) and declare amounts on hand above the retention level.

If lack of sufficient memory remaining in the NCR 500 processor with programs V11 and V15 prevent the above program design change, two alternative methods should be considered. One alternative method with limited remaining memory is to have the machine sum check and a machine halt condition in the event of an imbalance. Finally, if there is no memory utilization remaining with programs V11 and V15, a new and separate program could be written to accomplish both the machine sum check and corrective action.

5. (U) ITEM: NCR 500 ASL Program Reorder Point

a. OBSERVATION: Presently, all NCR 500 ASL programs compute the reorder point by the sum of the serviceable-on-hand balance and the unserviceable-on-hand balance.

b. EVALUATION: This presents a stockage position problem for non-DX and non-Closed Loop items. The stockage position of ordinary ASL lines should be computed on the basis of RFI items and not unserviceable items. Utilization of ASL ledgers for maintaining unserviceable asset balances with current programs could result in unfavorable stockage positions where large quantities of slow-moving unserviceable assets or high rates of unserviceable receipts are acquired.
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C. RECOMMENDATION:

(1) That HCR 500 ASL programs be redesigned so that they will not use the sum of serviceable and unserviceable assets on hand in computing reorder points.

(2) That until such time as the program is redesigned, a manual basis be used for unserviceable accountability.

C. TRAINING

1. (U) ITEM: SOPs for DSUs

   a. OBSERVATION: Junior officers reporting for assignment to direct support units have a general knowledge of combat service support units and missions, but lack detailed knowledge of specific operational procedures required to properly administer assigned duties such as Class I supply point officer; laundry platoon leader; maintenance shop officer and maintenance platoon leader. Gaining headquarters do not have the time, facilities or personnel to provide the required training for these officers prior to assignment to subordinate units. Furthermore, section or platoon NCOICs are often inexperienced and thus cannot provide the degree of assistance formerly expected from an NCO during the junior officer's initial few months following assignment.

   b. EVALUATION:

      (1) This situation results in a "do-it-yourself" OJT program for junior officers with widely varying results which are directly dependent upon the initiative of the individual officer and the availability of experienced personnel to assist him. Lack of knowledge of accepted procedures usually results in inefficient use of both personnel and materiel assets. The dynamic nature of the support requirements in a combat zone and the frequent personnel changes require that these young officers pass rapidly through the adjustment phase if they are to become effective leaders.

      (2) It is recognized that the COMUS training base cannot provide junior officer specialists in every phase of combat service support activities. Thus, the solution to this problem must be found within USAFRY and the various major subordinate commands. This headquarters has assisted its junior officers by preparing detailed standing operating procedures for each of our various support functions. These SOPs not only provide the junior officer with the "how" of his new assignment, but assure standard operations throughout the 29th General Support Group. It is believed that this project will not only assist the junior officer in stepping into a new position.
quickly, but will also provide the source material for subsequent training of subordinates and the source document from which to inspect the overall quality of support provided to our supported units.

c. **RECOMMENDATION**: It is recommended that the preparation and utilization of such detailed standing operating procedures be considered for general application throughout USARV as a positive step at direct support unit level toward overcoming the lack of experience of junior officers in specific functions.

D. **LOGISTICS**

1. **ITEM**: Increased Equipment for Bath Sections.

   a. **OBSERVATION**: Bath sections organic to the supply and service company are often deployed separately from the laundry and bath platoon. When this happens, they are usually deployed to support a small isolated force such as a fire support base. Organic water storage tanks of the laundry and bath platoon are kept with the laundry as they are essential to its function leaving the detailed bath section without a water storage capability. Furthermore, water sources at the operational site are usually inadequate for the operation of the showers.

   b. **EVALUATION**: This situation necessitates the supply of a temporary water storage capability. This is usually done by furnishing a 3000 gallon collapsible water tank to the bath section.

   c. **RECOMMENDATION**: That organic bath sections be authorized a 3000 gallon collapsible water tank to support each shower point. This authorization should be an as required augmentation since bath sections operating at a combination laundry and bath site would not require a separate water storage capability.

2. **ITEM**: Mack ENDT Model Diesel Engine

   a. **OBSERVATION**: A requirement exists to retorque two cylinder heads of the Mack ENDT model diesel engine after the first 3000 miles of operation.

   b. **EVALUATION**: Recently the density of the Mack ENDT 673 model diesel engine deployed in 5-ton tractors was significantly increased in III CTZ, Vietnam. Deployment was accomplished without the lead time to obtain required repair parts in suitable quantities. Additionally, a requirement exists to retorque the cylinder head after 3000 miles of initial operation. In order to perform this requirement, the valve cover must be removed and normally the valve cover gasket is destroyed during this operation. No replacement valve cover gaskets are on hand in theater in expectation of this
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS SFOR-65) (R-I) (U)

RECOMMENDATION: When increases in equipment deployed in a tactical zone is effected, sufficient lead time must be allowed to obtain PLL and ASL stocks. Effective support can not be given without timely provisioning of required repair parts.

E. ORGANIZATION

1. (U) ITEM: Consolidated Supply Activities

   a. OBSERVATION: The organization of consolidated technical supplies in 29th Group has led to the development of many problems. In many cases the supply support provided has been less than desirable.

   b. EVALUATION: Consolidated technical supplies within 29th Group, in some cases, have 15,000 to 20,000 line authorized stockage lists and a monthly transaction volume of 40,000 to 60,000 actions. These activities have been formed by consolidating the supply personnel and equipment of two or more maintenance companies. Necessary personnel and equipment is not available in these consolidated organizations. Specifically, the following problems exist:

      1) The trained MOS qualified supply management and supervisory personnel required to operate a supply activity of this size are not authorized.

      2) The number of storage and warehousing specialist MOSs required to operate large volume storage, receiving and issue sections are not authorized.

      3) MHE required to efficiently move large quantities of stock in and out of warehouses and open storage areas is not authorized.

      4) The NCR 500 system is not capable of handling these large volumes of transactions.

Numerous actions have been taken by 29th Group to attempt to reduce the problem areas inherent in these large activities. Some of the actions are:

   1) Use of two NCR 500 systems in the two largest supply activities.

   2) Local national augmentation to provide more personnel.

   3) Preparation of SOPs to standardize operations and to increase the effectiveness of the technical supplies.

   4) Development of on-the-job training courses to enhance the qualifications of personnel.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSPOR-65) (R-1) (U)

(5) Realignment of customer support missions to reduce the size of the supply activities.

After thorough analysis of these technical supply activities, the only solution is to reduce their business to a manageable level. To accomplish this the 29th Group has initiated action to have four technical supplies handle the customers originally supported by two activities. One of these two technical supplies is currently in operation and the second is scheduled to initiate operations on 15 May.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That the employment of consolidated technical supplies be discouraged whenever possible. The experience in 29th Group has shown that the optimum size of activity appears to be 6,000 to 8,000 stockage lines with no more than 10,000 requisitions per month. Employment of a consolidated technical supply should be resorted to only as a last recourse.

F. ESCAPE AND EVASION - None

G. OTHER - None

1 Incl
1 - 29th GS Op
Organizational Chart

LOUIS HACHELER
Colonel, OrdC
Commanding
TO: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA CG O
AIO 963R

1. (U) The Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 29th General Support Group for the period ending 30 April 1969 is forwarded in accordance with AIO-525-15.

2. (U) Reference Section I, page 7, paragraph A.23. CONCUR. The 29th General Support Group is conducting the shift in customers who are authorized to draw on the resources of any one DS/GS unit. CONCUR in this plan as a means for leveling the workload of the supporting units.

3. (U) Reference Section I, page 12, paragraph B.3. CONCUR. The 229th Service and Supply Company in Phouc Vinh has been restricted from hiring local national employees by lst Cavalry Division Hse Camp policies. Correspondence on this problem has been forwarded by ST.O to lst Logistical Command for their action. Unfortunately, qualified local nationals are not available to Phu Loi and Phouc Vinh. The Civilian Personnel Office is aware of this and they are attempting to alleviate the situation.

4. (U) Reference Section I, page 13, paragraph B.3.a. NO CONCUR. It is interesting to note that assigned local national strength is 1611 in paragraph 3.a, page 13, but is 1834 on the chart on page 15. Our most recent report reflects 1703 local nationals assigned.

5. Reference Section I, page 23, paragraph B.12. NO CONCUR. S/Lt Carl T. Jackson was assigned two months ago but was given duties as TCICO. In lay the unit assigned him as full time career counselor.

6. (U) Reference Section I, page 23, paragraph B.15. CONCUR. The 29th General Support Group has one of the best legal sections in the command. Cases are processed smoothly, expeditiously and with few errors. Considering the number of troops involved, the case load is within acceptable limits. The upward trend in Article 15s for the reporting period has subsided.

7. (U) Reference Section I, page 25, paragraph B.18. CONCUR. This request for an additional chaplain reached this office and has been recommended favorable action.

8. (U) Reference Section I, page 25, paragraph B.19., 20, 21, 22, CONCUR. The referenced paragraphs indicated a vigorous response in the Saigon Support Command emphasis on Character Guidance Chapel and visitation by chaplains in troop areas. This program has been presented through the use of projects Street Corner, Prayer, and Chit Chat in consonance with a strong command emphasis on Character Guidance participation. The 29th General Support Group has shown corresponding increases with the increase occurring command wide.
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9. Reference Section I, page 30, paragraph B.2. Concluded. In addition to the operational support, USACAV has been asked to establish a maintenance effort in the ASD during monsoon season.

10. Reference Section II, page 86-88, paragraph B.4. and 5. Concluded. Observations, evaluation and recommendations appear to be valid. These problem areas will be taken under further study by USACAV to determine broad application to all NCA 500 operating units. If justified, a suggested program revision will be forwarded to Department of the Army, Automatic Data Field Systems Command which has responsibility for all NCR programs and their revision.

11. (U) Lessons Learned, observations and recommendations are concurred in by this command with the exceptions above. A copy of this indorsement has been provided the originating headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

TEL: LB 2604

L. S. ROBBINS
CPA, AG
Asst AG
1. The Operational Report—Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, 29th General Support Group for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning Recoil Failure for the M551, page 84, paragraph B1. Initially, there was a problem with the recoil seals. This was not due to long periods of storage as the recoil seals in the initial Sheridans were installed prior to shipment. Upon receipt in-country, the Sheridans were issued to using units and the initial seals were considered to be the best available. However, since the Sheridan was introduced into Vietnam there has been a design change in the recoil seal. This problem has been and remains an area of interest and study for the Action Technical Representatives in Vietnam. It is believed that introduction of contaminated recoil oil could have caused some of the failures. This is impossible to prove due to the loss of oil after a leak develops. Currently there is an adequate supply of recoil seals in Vietnam. Upon replacing recoil seals, exercising of the recoil mechanism should be accomplished. This will not assure long life for the seals but will allow them to become properly seated.

b. Item concerning Maintenance Support for Newly Introduced CONUS Equipment, page 84, paragraph B2. Concur. Action required must be taken at the Commodity Command (USACOM) and Department of the Army levels. New equipment has been introduced piece meal and in most cases support units will be the last to receive maintenance field/mock-up. CONUS training lags behind the introduction of new equipment by several months. New Equipment Training Teams (NETT) and in-country training programs have been the sources of training for maintenance personnel supporting new equipment introduced in-country. This training is accomplished under less than ideal conditions and at the expense of trained personnel in-country. This headquarters has requested and received technical assistance from USACOM. Trained Department of the Army Civilians and/or Field Service Representatives have been provided to give on-the-job training (OJT) and formal training as required. This problem has been larger than would be ordinarily required due to lack of CONUS training of military personnel of the various units. The impact of the lack of receipt of peculiar tools and test equipment to support newly adopted and introduced equipment in RVN was covered in 1st Log Comd O&L dated
Subject: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 29th General Support Group for Period Ending 30 April 1969 RCS CSFOR-65, (U)

19 Feb 69. Recommend a concerted effort be made to insure personnel training, peculiar tools and test equipment, and allocation and receipt of maintenance float/mock-up coincide with the receipt of new equipment by using units.

c. Reference item concerning Push Packages for M551 Sheridan, page 86, paragraph B3. Concur. Although the concept of push packages is sound, experience has shown that in most cases the push packages are not complete and are poorly documented, causing poor support to be given to newly introduced pieces of equipment. It was agreed by the Project Manager for Sheridan Weapons System Headquarters, USA RV and Headquarters, 1st Log Command that manuals would be included in the initial Project JCN push package at all levels. Only the Organizational Manuals came in with BILICI. The special tools and manuals have been requisitioned by the USAICCV with a RDD NLT 15 July 69 for the remaining CY 69 program. These tools and manuals will be issued to the units as outlined in the Mission Support Plan.

d. Reference items concerning NCR 500 Mechanized Stock Control, page 86, paragraph B4, and NCR 500 ASL Program Recorder Point, page 87, paragraph B5. Both items pertain to changing NCR 500 programs that are centrally controlled by the Computer Systems Command (CSC). The Special Assistant for Data Systems of US Army Support Command, Saigon has been advised of this and states that official requests for program changes will be forwarded to this headquarters. Following receipt and staffing, recommendations will be forwarded to CSC for evaluation and implementation.

e. Reference item concerning Increased Equipment for Bath Sections, page 89, paragraph D1. Concur. The collapsible water storage tanks should be added as an MTOE change for specific application in RVN. Saigon Support Command is aware of the proper procedures for MTOE action. No action required by higher headquarters at this time.

f. Reference item concerning Mack ENDT Model Diesel Engine, page 89, paragraph D2. Concur. It is a standing policy of the USAICCV to review the ASL of any major items when notification is received that a significant increase in density is to occur and necessary adjustments to the ASL are made. However, in a case such as this where abnormal requirements are generated, the item manager of the ICCV will adjust his ASL based on information received from the unit of such anticipated increased usage. Reference HQ, USAICCV Supply Operating Procedure #18, revised 29 May 69.

g. Reference item concerning Consolidated DSU Supply Activities, page 90, paragraph E1. Concur. In addition to the problem presented, haphazard consolidation in RVN has reduced the flexibility for combat service maintenance support.
AVGA GO-MH (10 May 69) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 29th General Support Group for Period Ending 30 April 1969 AGS CSFOR- 65 (U)

3. (U) Concur with the basic report as modified by this and previous indorsements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 4839

LARRY K. KELSEY
1Lt, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

CF:
USASUPCOM-SGN
29th GS Group
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters, 29th General Support Group.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning "Maintenance Support for Newly Introduced COMM>L Equipment," section II, page 84, paragraph B2; concur. Action should be taken at DA level to insure that the provisions of AR 700-70 are complied with by all commands. This regulation recognizes that maintenance support requirements begin with the delivery of new equipment, and it requires prior distribution of repair parts and support items. The gaining commander can waive this requirement if a delay in the arrival of the new equipment will jeopardize the accomplishment of the unit's mission. The training required for new items of equipment is normally provided by a New Equipment Training Team (NETT) that usually arrives prior to or concurrently with the new equipment. The fifth recommendation in the unit's ORLL is of critical importance. MTOR action requires excessive periods of time to be effected. Newly introduced equipment requires immediate changes in the support unit's TOE, i.e., new tools, test equipment, different MOSs, etc. Recommend that DA consider making all of these changes a part of the support planning and introduce these changes with the new equipment.

   b. Reference item concerning "SOPs for DSUs," section II, page 88, paragraph C1; nonconcur. The training given junior officers in CONUS schools covers a broad spectrum of material and is of necessity fairly general in nature. The details of a specific job are left to the new officer and his commander. Unit SOPs have routinely been used to provide detailed guidance and direction for the operation of a specific unit. Although like units may operate in a similar manner, the proposal to develop a USARV-wide SOP is impractical because of the variations in missions, areas of operation, unit strengths and capabilities.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON

Lt. AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

For the record:

AVHGC-DBT (10 May 69) 3d Ind

Subject: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R-1) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375-27 JUL 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters, 29th General Support Group.

2. Comments follow:

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FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON

Lt. AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

For the record:
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 29th General Support Group for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C. L. Linstead
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 29th General Support Group

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb 69 to 30 Apr 69.

CO, 29th General Support Group

10 May 1969

N/A

N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

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