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AGO D/A ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980; AGO D/A ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980
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17th Air Cavalry


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   3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry
CONFIDENTIAL
HEADQUARTERS
3D SQUADRON 17TH AIR CAVALRY
QUARTER ENDING
30 Apr 69

AVGC-B
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 3d Squadron, 17th Air 
Cavalry for Period Ending 30 April 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) 
(UIC-WAAWA)

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SECTION 1
Significant Activities

1. (U) INTRODUCTION:
   a. MISSION: The squadron's basic mission has been that of providing 
      reconnaissance, surveillance, security, and economy of force.
   b. ORGANIZATION: The squadron is organized under TC 17-95T dated 
      June 1965 and USAREC General Order 401 dated August 1968. In addition, RI/KD 
      teams are attached (1 per air cavalry troop) by 12th Group General Order 55 
      dated July 1960 and General Order 60 dated August 1960. The current organi-
      zation structure and unit locations are listed in inclosure 1 and 2.

2. (FOUC) PERSONNEL:
   a. PERSONNEL CHANGES: Following is the command group and principle 
      staff as of 30 April 1969, with the changes during the period:

      HEADQUARTERS 3D SQUADRON 17TH AIR CAVALRY

      LTC JOHN B. FITCH       CC       No Change
      MAJ ROBERT R. HALEY      X5       No Change
      MAJ JOSEPH L. KNEITZER   S3       No Change
      LT DONALD W. HACKETT     S1       No Change
      CPT HAROLD A. HILTZ       S2       No Change
      CPT CAMELBY N. GERLER     S4       No Change

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69216
Inclosure
b. **UNIT SYMBIOTIC AS OF 30 APRIL 1969**: The squadron is authorized 85 Officers, 103 Warrant Officers, and 848 enlisted men. Assigned strength at the end of the reporting period was 106 Officers, 79 Warrant Officers, and 791 enlisted men (See Inclosure 3).

c. **INFUSION**: During the reporting period, 10 officers, 10 Warrant Officers, and 49 enlisted men were exchanged for six officers, 17 Warrant Officers, and 37 enlisted men from other aviation units in furtherance of the infusion program to reduce rotational peaks.

d. **AWARDS AND DECORATIONS**: One thousand five hundred and twenty-two airards were recommended within the squadron during the reporting period. Five hundred ninety-seven were approved, three were down-graded and 927 are still pending (See Inclosure 4).

e. **FRIENDLY LOSSES**: Friendly losses for the period were seven KIA and 39 WIA. No personnel were MIA (See Inclosure 5).

3. **INTELLIGENCE**: The squadron conducted extensive aerial reconnaissance and surveillance missions, providing its various supported headquarters with valuable and timely information concerning the enemy. The Squadron's efforts were concentrated in Tay Ninh, Dinh Duong, Hau Nghia, Gia Dinh, Long An, and Dinh Tuong Provinces and to a limited extent, in Bien Hoa, Go Cong, Kien Hoa, and Kien Phong Provinces. Attention centered on known and suspected enemy base camp areas and lines of communication. The intelligence gathered provided the basis for ground operations, tactical and strategic air strikes, and artillery strikes.

a. **TERRAIN**: The relief in the squadron area of operations ranged from flat delta in the south and areas adjacent to the Van Co Dong River, to gently rolling hills in Dinh Duong and Bien Hoa Provinces. Drainage is provided by the Saigon, Hia Be, Dong Hai, Van Co Tuy, Van Co Dong, and Neulong Rivers and their tributaries. Vegetation consists of extensive rice crops in the delta regions, extensive rubber plantations in parts of Tay Ninh and Dinh Duong Provinces, and extensive broadleafed evergreen forests elsewhere.

(1) Observation and Fields of Fire: Observation and fields of fire ranged from extremely limited in the forested areas of Tay Ninh and Dinh Duong Provinces to excellent in the delta areas.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 30 April 1969. RCS CSPGR-65 (R1) (UIC-WAMA)

(2) Obstacles: Natural and artificial obstacles in the TAOR had no effect on squadron operations.

(3) Cover and Concealment: The enemy has limited natural cover. However, he is an expert at building tunnel and bunker complexes which provide him excellent protection against direct and indirect fire as well as air strikes. The enemy has excellent concealment in jungle and plantation areas as well as among nipa palm and vegetation which frequently lines rivers and canals in the delta areas. He also makes maximum use of darkness and camouflage to conceal his movement or presence in an area.

(4) Key Terrain: Highways 1 and 4 and the Dong Hai, Saigon, Van Co Dong, Van Co Tay, and Mekong Rivers, together with their major tributaries, are considered key terrain. The highways are selected because of their importance as lines of communication for military and civilian traffic. The major rivers also serve as important lines of communication over which allied forces ship large quantities of materials. For the same reason, these rivers form important lines of communication for the enemy.

(5) Avenues of Approach: The following VC/HVA avenues of approach into the squadron area of operations are considered significant:

(a) Parrots Beak (XS 310920), and the Van Co Tay River.

(b) Parrots Beak (XS 310920), Bo Bo Canal, Pineapple Plantation (XS 580900), and Saigon.

(c) Ba Thu (XT 270050), My Thanh Dong (XT 440020), Tan Nhut (XS 700830), and Saigon.

(d) Angel’s Wing (XT 310130), An Rhinh (XT 400130), Hau Nghia Swamp, and Saigon.

(e) Angel’s Wing/Ba Thu, Van Co Dong River, Pineapple Plantation, and Saigon.

(f) Fishhook (XT 580900), Michelin Plantation, Boi Loi Woods, Saigon River, Minh Ly (XT 550160), and Saigon.

5. WEATHER: During the reporting period, the squadron area of operations was under the influence of the northeast monsoon until the latter part of March, when the transition period for the southeast monsoon began. During February, March, and most of April, weather was normally excellent. Very infrequent afternoon rain squalls were experienced and there were several instances of ground fog and haze in the early morning and early evening.
However, mission accomplishment was not greatly hindered. During the latter part of April, there was a noticeable increase in afternoon cloud formations. Temperatures during the period ranged from the high 60's and low 70's in the early morning to the mid 90's in the afternoon, although maximums in the high 90's and low 100's were experienced in the latter part of April.

4. (c) OPERATIONS: The 3/17 Cav area of operations was primarily in the central, southern, and western areas of III Corps Tactical Zone (See Enclosure 6). The squadron, with its troops OPCON and/or in direct support of several different units during the reporting period, conducted reconnaissance, security, surveillance, and economy of force operations throughout the major portion of III Corps Tactical Zone. The general area of operation of the squadron elements extended from the Cambodian border on the west and northwest, the Saigon River on the northeast and east, and the Song Hau Giang River on the south. This period was characterized by numerous mission changes. A Troop provided support to the Capital Military Assistance Command (CMAC); B Troop was OPCON to the 9th Infantry Division, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division; 2d Brigade, 10th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division; 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment; and 1/40 AVN. B Troop was OPCON to the 9th Infantry Division during the first part of the reporting period and became direct support to the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division on 25 Feb 69. C Troop remained direct support to the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division on 26 Feb 69. C Troop provided two hunter-killer teams (2 AH-1G's and 2 CH-53's) in direct support of CMAC. D Troop remained OPCON to CMAC during the reporting period for use in the defense of Bien Hoa as well as a ready reaction force for the II Field Force long range patrols.

a. SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONS:

(1) On 1 Feb 69, A/3/17 established contact with the enemy resulting in six KIA at XS 520790, and one hut destroyed at XS 624687. On 0124Z Feb 69, A/3/17 was released from direct support of the 3d Bde, 9th Inf Div and placed in direct support of CMAC. B/3/17 engaged one armed VC at XS 561559 resulting in one KIA.

(2) On 2 Feb 69, D/3/17 conducted night firefight missions with the following results:

(a) Four VC were KIA at WS 926047.
(b) Four VC were KIA at WS 916852.
(c) Four VC were KIA at WS 880660.
(d) Two VC were KIA at WS 910730.

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(e) Three VC were KIA at WS 861710.

(f) Three VC were KIA at WS 856645.

(3) On 3 Feb 69, B/3/17 engaged the enemy at XS 450380 resulting in 17 VC KIA and eight secondary explosions.

(4) On 4 Feb 69, A/3/17 was released from direct support of CMAC and returned to direct support of the 3d Bde, 9th Inf Div. B/3/17 accounted for two KIA at WS 056602 and during firefly missions was credited with 19 VC KIA and two sampans destroyed at WS 396699.

(5) On 5 Feb 69, A/3/17 captured one detainee, destroyed two bunkers and one sampan at WS 680650. A/3/17 engaged five armed VC at WS 786683 resulting in one KIA. B/3/17 engaged the enemy at WS 043530 resulting in five KIA and one KIA at WS 940600. B/3/17 was credited with 19 huts and 33 sampans destroyed at WS 970490. C/3/17 engaged three VC at XT 537622 resulting in two VC KIA.

(6) On 7 Feb 69, B/3/17 in scattered contact in the vicinity of WS 860930 resulted in nine VC KIA.

(7) On 8 Feb 69, A/3/17 was released from direct support of the 3d Bde, 9th Inf Div and placed in direct support of CMAC. B/3/17 was credited with 28 VC KIA during sporadic engagements in the vicinity of WS 680960. C/3/17 was credited with one KIA at XT 196613.

(8) On 9 Feb 69, during night starlight missions, B/3/17 accounted for 10 VC KIA in the vicinity of WS 052474.

(9) On 11 Feb 69, A/3/17 captured four suspected VC in the vicinity of WS 870611. A/3/17 was released from direct support of CMAC and placed in direct support of the 3d Bde, 9th Inf Div. B/3/17 engaged and killed five VC and destroyed three sampans at WS 365442. C/3/17 sustained six personnel WIA when an APC detonated an enemy mine. C Troop also accounted for one VC possible KIA at XT 426530.

(10) On 12 Feb 69, B/3/17 captured one VC POW at XT 119436 and during night starlight missions was credited with the following:

(a) Eight VC were KIA at WS 050950.

(b) Four VC were KIA at WS 930990.

(c) Three VC were KIA at WS 990920.
(11) On 14 Feb 69, B/3/17 was credited with the following:

(a) Two VC were KIA at XS 060500.
(b) One VC was KIA at XS 042523.
(c) Four VC were KIA and four sampans destroyed at XS 060493.
(d) Two VC were KIA and two sampans destroyed at XS 023522.
(e) Two VC were KIA at XS 092479.
(f) Three VC were KIA at XS 044312.
(g) Four VC were KIA at XS 070499.

C/5/17 became direct support of GM/VG with two hunter-killer teams (2 AH-1G's and 2 AH-6A's) while C Troop (-) remained in direct support of the 25th Inf Div. During a visual reconnaissance mission, C/3/17 engaged and killed one VC at XT 339514.

(12) On 15 Feb 69, B/3/17 engaged three enemy personnel in sampans resulting in three VC KIA and two sampans destroyed at WS 625075. B/5/17, in scattered action during night starlight missions at XS 073024 was credited with 14 KIA.

(13) On 16 Feb 69, B/3/17 engaged six armed enemy personnel resulting in six VC KIA at XT 332437. C/3/17, while conducting a visual reconnaissance, accounted for two VC KIA at XT 075452.

(14) On 17 Feb 69, while performing visual reconnaissance missions, B/3/17 accounted for 10 VC KIA at XS 183440.

(15) On 19 Feb 69, A/3/17 hunter-killer teams engaged and killed three VC at XS 041300, and two VC KIA at XS 090650. A/5/17 apprehended one VC suspect at XS 540570. B/3/17 detained one suspect at XS 200520 and accounted for eight VC KIA during night starlight missions.

(16) On 20 Feb 69, A/3/17 established light contact resulting in five VC KIA at XS 650590. B/3/17 inserted and engaged in WS 000650 resulting in one VC KIA. B/3/17 hunter-killer teams were credited with the following:

(a) Two VC were KIA at XS 150490.
(b) Four VC were KIA at XS 060420.
(c) One VC was KIA at XS 050560.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 30 April 1969. RGS CSFOR-65 (R1) (UIC-WAAAM)

(a) One VC was KIA at XS 160430.

(b) Three VC suspects were apprehended at WS 980510.

C/3/17 detained two male at XT 130620.

(17) On 21 Feb 69, B/3/17 in scattered contacts accounted for 25 VC KBA. At 0910 hours a C/3/17 OH-6A crashed, resulting in the observer and the gunner KIA and pilot WIA.

(18) On 22 Feb 69, during check point operations, A/3/17 captured one detainee at XS 650600. A/3/17 hunter-killer teams accounted for four KBA at XS 700710. B/3/17 established moderate enemy contact resulting in 14 KBA at XS 060510, three KBA at WS 970530, and were credited. 17 KBA during night starlight missions in the vicinity of XS 202406. C/3/17 captured five suspected VC at XT 270650.

(19) On 23 Feb 69, A/3/17 led 9th Division soldiers to seventeen 107mm rockets at XS 555642, and was credited with 14 VC KBA during engagements in defense of Tan An base camp. B/3/17 engaged and killed 29 VC in scattered engagements throughout the day.

(20) On 24 Feb 69, A/3/17 engaged one VC at XS 620570 resulting in one VC KIA. B/3/17 established moderate enemy contact with the following results:

(a) Seven VC were KIA at XS 390540.

(b) One VC was KIA at XS 390560.

(c) Six VC were KIA at XS 380600.

(d) Eleven VC were KIA at XS 180400.

C/3/17 captured one possible VC during a visual reconnaissance mission at XT 270650.

(21) On 25 Feb 69, A/3/17 hunter-killer teams engaged and killed two VC at XS 556752. 3/3/17 actions resulted in the following:

(a) One VC was KIA at XS 050536.

(b) One VC was KIA at XS 400620.

(c) Three VC were KIA at XS 396524.

(d) One VC was KIA at XS 315565.
(e) Two VC were KBA at XS 245565.

(f) Two VC were KBA at XS 240556.

(g) Three VC were KBA at XS 285516.

(h) Two VC were KBA at XS 190444.

C/3/17 hunter-killer teams engaged and killed two VC at XT 820800 and were credited with two KBA at XT 865765.

(22) On 26 Feb 69, A/3/17 was released from direct support of the 3d Bde, 9th Inf Div and placed in direct support of CMAC with two hunter-killer teams. A Troop (-) was placed in direct support of BHTAC. B/3/17 was released OPCON from the 9th Inf Div and placed direct support to the 3d Bde, 9th Inf Div. 0/3/17 two hunter-killer teams were released from direct support to CMAC and placed in direct support of the 25th Inf Div. 0/3/17 accounted for three KBA at XT 090560 and two KBA at XT 140710.

(23) On 27 Feb 69, during reconnaissance operations, A/3/17 accounted for two VC KBA at XS 986950. B/3/17 was credited with 14 KBA during firefly operations in the vicinity of XS 879619. 0/3/17 engaged three VC at XT 110560 resulting in one KBA and two possible KBA.

(24) On 28 Feb 69, A/3/17 (-) was released from direct support of BHTAC and placed in direct support of the RDWLF.

(25) On 1 Mar 69, A/3/17 (-) was released from direct support of the RDWLF and placed in direct support of BHTAC. B/3/17 made contact with the enemy at XS 560575 resulting in two NVA KBA.

(26) On 2 Mar 69, B/3/17 engaged the enemy resulting in one VC KBA at XS 030460. At XS 030460, D/3/17 destroyed one hut and accounted for two possible KBA.

(27) On 3 Mar 69, A/3/17 (-) was released from direct support to BHTAC at 1700 hours and placed in direct support of the 2/18 Inf.

(28) On 4 Mar 69, B/3/17 elements made contact with the enemy resulting in two KBA at XS 590590. At XS 585624, B/3/17 engaged one person carrying an AK-47 resulting in one VC KBA.

(29) On 5 Mar 69, A/3/17 Troop (-) was released from direct support of the 2/18 Inf at 1800 hours and placed in direct support of the 1st ATF.

(30) On 6 Mar 69, A/3/17 Troop (-) was released from direct support of the 1st ATF at 1200 hours and placed in direct support of CMAC.
(31) On 7 Mar 69, B/3/17 elements established contact with the enemy at XS 734753 resulting in one VC KIA. B/5/17 was further credited with two VC KIA at XS 700690. B/3/17 again made contact with the enemy resulting in two VC KIA at XS 695694. B/3/17 was also credited with one VC KIA at XS 695708.

(32) On 8 Mar 69, A/3/17 firefly teams engaged several VC in bunkers at XS 529831 resulting in three VC KIA and five bunkers destroyed.

(33) On 10 Mar 69, C/3/17, while on a visual reconnaissance mission, made contact with the enemy at XT 134405 resulting in two NVA KIA and two NVA WIA taken as PWs. C/3/17 again established contact at XT 138399 resulting in an additional two NVA WIA taken as PWs.

(34) On 12 Mar 69, B/3/17, while conducting visual reconnaissance, established enemy contact resulting in one VC KIA at XS 518832. B/3/17 also destroyed one sampan and was credited with four VC KIA in the vicinity of XS 610590. At XS 605603, B/3/17 engaged and destroyed three sampans and were credited with seven VC KIA. B/3/17 also destroyed one sampan and three VC KIA at XS 600794. B/3/17 established contact with the enemy at XT 375550 resulting in one VC KIA. B/3/17 also recorded one VC KIA at XT 340625.

(35) On 13 Mar 69, B/3/17, while performing visual reconnaissance, engaged the enemy resulting in one KIA at XS 530560, and three VC KIA at XS 655784. B/3/17 elements captured three VC PWs at XS 670620. One of the PWs was determined to be a propagandist.

(36) On 15 Mar 69, A/3/17, while conducting a last light mission, destroyed seven unknown type rockets at XS 530920. A/3/17 established contact with the enemy at XS 590790 resulting in one VC KIA, one VC possible KIA, and destroyed one bunker with secondary explosions. At 2400 hours, two hunter-killer teams from A Troop were placed in direct support of RCT. A Troop (-) remained in direct support of RCT. B/3/17 elements engaged one VC at XS 755550 resulting in one VC KIA. B/3/17 again established contact with the enemy resulting in five KIA at XS 461819.

(37) On 18 Mar 69, A/3/17 was placed in direct support of CMAC. B/3/17 established contact resulting in four VC KIA at XS 421865. B/3/17 engaged 10 VC at XS 430755 resulting in 10 VC KIA. B/3/17 was credited with an additional four VC KIA at XS 429865. At 1336 hours, a B/3/17 AH-1G was downed by hostile fire at XS 471819 resulting in the aircraft commander and pilot KIA.

(38) On 19 Mar 69, A/3/17 elements engaged and destroyed one bunker resulting in a secondary explosion at XS 541903. At 2400 hours, A/3/17 (-) remained in direct support of CMAC while two hunter-killer teams were placed in direct support of the 1st ATF.
(39) On 21 Mar 69, A/3/17 was placed in direct support of BHTAC with two hunter-killer teams and remained in direct support of CRAC with Troop (-). A/3/17 engaged the enemy resulting in one VC KBA at XS 025962. A/3/17 killed three VC with six VC possible KBA at XS 245972. A/3/17 engaged two VC with one Secondary explosion. A/3/17 also engaged 15 personnel resulting in two VC KBA and six possible KBA. A/3/17 was placed in direct support of the 1st ATF at 2400 hours with two hunter-killer teams. A Troop (-) remained in direct support of CRAC. B/5/17 engaged one VC at XS 872575 resulting in one possible KBA.

(40) On 23 Mar 69, A/3/17 engaged the enemy resulting in one VC KBA at XS 025962. A/3/17 killed three VC with six VC possible KBA at XS 245972. A/3/17 also engaged two VC with one Secondary explosion. A/3/17 also engaged 15 personnel resulting in two VC KBA and six possible KBA. A/3/17 was placed in direct support of the 1st ATF at 2400 hours with two hunter-killer teams. A Troop (-) remained in direct support of CRAC. B/5/17 engaged one VC at XS 872575 resulting in one possible KBA.

(41) On 24 Mar 69, A/3/17 was released from direct support of the 1st ATF and placed direct support of BHTAC with two hunter-killer teams. A Troop (-) remained in direct support of CRAC.

(42) On 1 Apr 69, B/3/17 hunter-killer teams accounted for one KBA at each of the following coordinates: XS 220810, XS 440850, XS 650590. C/5/17 was credited with five KBA for an engagement on 30 Mar at XT 530500. C/5/17 engaged five VC resulting in two KBA at XT 560480.

(43) On 5 Apr 69, A/3/17 was credited with two VC KBA at XS 800350. B/3/17 in scattered contact, was credited with one KBA at XS 050450, two KBA at XS 620350 and one KBA at XS 080500. C/5/17 was credited with two VC KBA at XT 375463.

(44) On 9 Apr 69, while conducting visual reconnaissance missions, A/3/17 killed one VC at XS 682857. B/3/17 gunships engaged two VC at XS 526550 resulting in two VC KBA.

(45) On 11 Apr 69, B/3/17 made light contact and accounted for five VC KBA in the vicinity of XS 404199. C/3/17 engaged a five VC resulting in one KBA and three VC KBA at XT 040180.

(46) On 17 Apr 69, B/3/17 engaged seven VC at XT 065646. C/5/17 rescued a US soldier who had been prisoners of the VC for over a year and had escaped 17 days earlier (See Inclosure 10). C/3/17 engaged one VC at XT 120577.

(47) On 18 Apr 69, while conducting checkpoint operations, A/3/17 captured two detainees at XS 910350. B/3/17 engaged six armed NVA at XS 510570 resulting in three NVA KBA, three NVA PW's and one AK-47 captured. At XT 524530, C/3/17 engaged one KBA.

(48) On 23 Apr 69, during firefly operations, C/3/17 engaged and killed seven VC at XT 065646. C/3/17 visual reconnaissance missions resulted in one KBA at XT 044566, one KBA at XT 034366, one KBA at XT 524542, and one KBA at XT 524542.
(49) On 24 Apr 69, B/3/17 was credited with two KIA at XS 535598, two KIA at XS 545598, and three KIA at XS 555595. Two VC were killed in the vicinity of XS 084689. Firefly missions by C/3/17 resulted in one KIA at XT 072711.

(50) On 26 Apr 69, during a last light mission, A/3/17 engaged and killed two VC at XS 708636. In several separate engagements, B/3/17 was credited with nine VC KIA in the vicinity of XS 600577. C/3/17 was credited with 17 NVA KIA for actions while supporting fire support base Frontier City against a battalion size attack.

(51) On 27 Apr 69, A/3/17 accounted for three VC KIA and three AK-47 captured at XS 884854. Night firefly missions resulted in two VC KIA at XS 527878. B/3/17 engaged and killed two VC at XS 798624. Another VC was KIA at XS 835649. On last light reconnaissance missions, C/3/17 killed one VC at XS 490341.

b. SUMMARY: While flying 26,964 sorties, the squadron lifted 10,227 troops, 42 tons of cargo, and was credited with 728 enemy KIA, 478 structures destroyed, and 286 sampans destroyed (See Inclosure 7). During the quarter, the squadron was engaged in numerous small scale operations but visual reconnaissance was the primary mission.

5. (v) TRAINING: During this reporting period, the squadron had maximum participation in all allocated school courses. All new in-country replacements received training at the 1st Infantry Division Replacement Training Center, located at Bien.

a. All training within the squadron was conducted with no loss in the operational status of the unit.

b. Training days = 0
Tactical moves = 0
Operational days = 89

c. School quotas filled by squadron during the period:

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<th>Course</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
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<td>OSHA Airframe</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-63 Engine</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-53-L-13 Engine</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tech Supply</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escape and Evasion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Armament Subsystems - Officer</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Armament Subsystems - Enlisted</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH1H Airframe</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH1G Airframe</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Country Replacement Training</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. (c) LOGISTICS:

a. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Rounds Expended</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ctg. 5.56mm Tracer</td>
<td>3,880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg. 5.56mm Ball</td>
<td>42,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg. 7.62mm LKD 4-1 (11-60)</td>
<td>51,599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg. 7.62mm 750 RB Belt (Minigun)</td>
<td>045,056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg. Cal .30 Special Ball</td>
<td>2,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg. Cal .45 Ball</td>
<td>3,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg. Cal 50 RL &amp; TR LKD</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg. 40mm XM576 (Cannon)</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg. 40mm 1S EJA</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg. 40mm HE M66 (M-79)</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg. 40mm HE XM5/6M (XM-28)</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg. 60mm Illum</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg. 60mm HED</td>
<td>1,124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg. 106mm Heat</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg. 106mm HEP</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ctg. 106mm Beehive</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuse Grenade, Hand Offensive</td>
<td>1,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gren Hand Frag M3</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gren Hand Frag M26</td>
<td>435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gren Hand Ino</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gren Hand Offensive</td>
<td>1,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gren Hand Smoke White</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gren Hand/Rifle WP</td>
<td>1,789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gren Hand Smoke Green</td>
<td>438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gren Hand Smoke Yellow</td>
<td>525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gren Hand Smoke Red</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gren Hand Smoke Violet</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gren Hiat GS</td>
<td>494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rkt 2.75IN Flechetto (10 lb Warhead)</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rkt 2.75IN HE VT Fuzo (10 lb Warhead)</td>
<td>1,337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rkt 2.75IN HE ED Fuzo (10 lb Warhead)</td>
<td>12,552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rkt 2.75IN WP ED Fuzo (10 lb Warhead)</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rkt 2.75IN HE VT Fuzo (17 lb Warhead)</td>
<td>575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rkt 2.75IN HE ED Fuzo (17 lb Warhead)</td>
<td>2,141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rkt 66mm Boat Low M72</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine AP M3 Claymore</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig Illum WS GB-Clus</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig Illum GD - PARA White</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flare Surface Trip</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chg Demo EXK Plastic M112</td>
<td>33 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chg Demo EXK Plastic M118</td>
<td>60 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chg Demo EXK TM 12 lb</td>
<td>1,018 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cap Blasting Non - Electric</td>
<td>1,168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cord Detonating</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuse Blasting Time</td>
<td>353 ½ ft</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
b. Aircraft status: Squadron aircraft status at the end of the reporting period was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>On Hand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AI-1G</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-6A</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(See Inclosure 8)

7. (U) Safety:

a. During the reporting period there were six accidents involving squadron aircraft. A brief account of these accidents follows:

(1) A Troop, AI-1G, 6 February 1969. Aircraft was exiting a revetment and lost antitorque control due to a strong tail wind condition. Tail rotor hit revetment and the debris hit the main rotor. Main rotor debris hit a second AI-1G. Both aircraft lost main rotor, transmission and tail rotor.

(2) C Troop, CH-6A, 21 February 1969. Scout aircraft was low on fuel. After landing in a secure area, pilot took off again on a 15 minute flight with 40 lbs of fuel remaining. Aircraft was low level when engine quit. Pilot was unable to recover control and aircraft crashed killing two of the three crew members. Helmets of all three crew members came off in the crash.

(3) C Troop, AI-1G, 20 February 1969. Aircraft was on a training flight. At the termination of a practice autorotation, the aircraft touched down on the heels of the skids and bounced. Pilot tried to make a power recovery by rolling on power and aircraft spun to the right 200 degrees damaging the skids and underside of the fuselage.

(4) C Troop, CH-6A, 6 March 1969. IP was supervising pilot during a practice autorotation. Pilot pulled pitch too high and IP was not ready to react. Aircraft landed hard with low rotor RPM and tail boom was severed.

(5) C Troop, AI-1G, 16 April 1969. CH-6A and AI-1G hunter-killer team were on station conducting a visual reconnaissance mission. An Air Force OV-1QA entered the area and collided with the AI-1G. Two fatalities.

(6) A Troop, UH-III, 22 April 1969. Aircraft was on a night firefly mission. At 40 knots and 120 feet the tail rotor pull control rod failed. Aircraft entered a spin and pilot attempted an autorotation. Aircraft landed hard damaging skids and tail boom.
b. SAFETY RECORD (FEBRUARY, MARCH, APRIL)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>TOTAL HOURS</th>
<th>ACCIDENTS</th>
<th>RATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INRT</td>
<td>936</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>00.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>5667</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>5464</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>00.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>5107</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>78.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/17 ACS</td>
<td>17174</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. SUMMARY:

(1) While the accident rate has steadily improved over the first half of FY 69 (52.3), the trend of fatal accidents has increased.

(2) The predominant factor in the accidents listed, is pilot error/pilot technique. The first three accidents indicate poor judgement on the part of the pilots. The fourth and fifth accidents demonstrate a lack of attention to procedures and techniques. The sixth accident was caused by material failure. However, due to low airspeed the pilot was unable to make a recovery.

(3) It was determined in the 21 February accident that at least one crew member died because his helmet came off. The squadron flight surgeon has refitted all aviation personal to insure that helmets would stay on in a crash.

d. (U) CHAPLAIN:

a. RELIGIOUS FUNCTIONS:

(1) Worship services conducted: 54
(2) Attendance: 5439

b. RELIGIOUS EDUCATION:

(1) Classes conducted: 11
(2) Attendance: 246

c. CHARACTER GUIDANCE:

(1) Classes conducted: 27
(2) Attendance: 2818
d. PASTORAL VISITS: 1152
9. (U) CIVIC ACTION:

a. The squadron civic action project, under the supervision of the squadron chaplain is to provide assistance to the Bethany Orphanage at Ho-Nai Village. The squadron has assisted the orphanage since 20 September 1968, in the form of food, clothing, health items, building materials, money, and labor. The squadron has donated $1400.00 during the reporting period which is being used for the construction of a new classroom building. The old building was very old and inadequate for the 113 children at the orphanage. Approximately 12,000 pounds of food and 300 pounds of clothing have been donated from the squadron. The squadron also provided a salvaged 5000 gallon water tank to alleviate the water storage problem at the orphanage.

b. Plans for the future include:

(1) Donations of money for a building fund.

(2) A visit by the children to DiAn guests of the squadron.

(3) Continued weekly visits to donate food, clothing, and other collected items.
SECTION 2

Lessons Learned
Commander's observations, evaluations, recommendations, and command actions.

1. (U) PERSONNEL:

   a. OBSERVATION: Several changes have been recommended to the MTOE 17-096T, 17-09CT, and 17-099T.

   EVALUATION: Predicated on the condition that the 3rd Squadron, 17th Cavalry will continue to operate from a fixed installation for extended operations in RVN, the squadron has recommended several changes to the present MTOE.

   RECOMMENDATION: That the MTOE changes outlined in Inclosure 9 be incorporated into the present MTOE.

   COMMAND ACTION: A letter from Headquarters, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry, dated 30 March 1969, subject: Proposed MTOE, has been sent to CG Ist Aviation Brigade for approval.

   b. OBSERVATION: This unit experiences a continual shortage of aircraft commanders for the AH-1G due to the lack of a sufficient pool of qualified pilots from which to train aircraft commanders.

   EVALUATION: Current AH-1G rated pilot manning level for the air cavalry squadron is 57. With the requirements for at least one such rated pilot as maintenance officer per air cavalry troop, a maximum of 10 operational pilots are available in each weapons platoon. Troop commanders, maintenance detachment commanders and key staff personnel may also be AH-1G rated which counts against the manning level. Additionally, the 27 assigned aircraft justifies the retention of an AH-1G SIP at squadron level. Based on a maximum allowable total of 160 hours per aviator per 30 day period, an absolute minimum of five Cobra rated AC's are needed to obtain the 700 average AH-1 flying hours the air cavalry troop accomplishes each month. In order to maintain this number in the face of R&R's, accidents and casualties, at least seven AC's should be on hand at all times. Although there is no USAF requirement that every AH-1G be commanded by an AC, this unit has attempted to follow this practice to increase safety of operation, greater accuracy of fires, and overall improved mission performance. Considering the normal period of three months in-country and 300 hours flying experience before an individual can become an aircraft commander, together with the requirement to have at least seven qualified AC's on hand at all times, the air cavalry troop regularly experiences periods of several months duration when it cannot muster the minimum number of AC's. In order to correct this situation, enough AH-1G qualified pilots should be authorized so that no
greater than one-third need be AC's at any one time. Based on the minimum figure of seven AC's, the authorization per weapons platoon should be 21. In addition, each troop should retain one maintenance officer while the squadron should have one SIP for a manning level total of 67 AH-1G pilots.

RECOMMENDATION: That the authorized manning level of AH-1G qualified pilots for the air cavalry squadron be increased from 57 to 67.

COMMAND ACTION: The present manning level has made it necessary to place relatively inexperienced personnel as pilots in command of AH-1G aircraft. For obvious reasons, an experienced AC would be more desirable.

2. (c) OPERATIONS:

a. OBSERVATION: Starlight missions are more effective when conducted with the AH/YASS-3 Xenon infrared light and M-18 infrared binoculars rather than the AN/PAS-6 metascope assembly.

EVALUATION: It has been found that the crew served metascope has too much diffusion and is unsatisfactory for the mission. Observation with the M-18 binoculars in conjunction with the Xenon infrared light would improve area coverage and target detection. The AC/YASS-3 used on white light has been found more effective than the C-130 landing light cluster presently in use.

RECOMMENDATION: That air cavalry troops be authorized the AH/YASS-3 Xenon searchlight and the present authorization of M-18 infrared binoculars be increased from six to twelve.

COMMAND ACTION: This squadron has closely monitored the results of the AH/YASS-3 in use by other units.

b. OBSERVATION: The AH-1G was designed for a 10 minute rearm and refuel time. Average turn around time is 20 to 35 minutes.

EVALUATION: Although rocket pods and XM10's are reloaded while still on the aircraft, the AH-20 could be rearmed in a matter of minutes if additional 7.62 and 40mm trays were available. These trays could be reloaded and inserted into expended aircraft, by simply replacing the trays. Rearn and refuel time could be reduced to 10 minutes if these trays were available.

RECOMMENDATION: That additional ammo trays for the 7.62mm and the 40mm in the AH-20 system be authorized for each authorized AH-1G.

COMMAND ACTION: Additional personnel are used to assist in rearming the AH-1G.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVIO-B

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

0. OBSERVATION: During the last reporting period, D Troop has been supporting two separate organizations. They provide three 18 man reaction teams to the 151st Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol, and support Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command with a platoon (–).

EVALUATION: To support the present split mission, D Troop has found it necessary to temporarily reorganize the troop. This breaks down troop integrity, redistributes troop assets, and organizes the troop in a manner which they were not designed to operate. By combining the assets of the entire troop, they can more adequately perform reconnaissance, provide security, and engage in offensive, defensive and delaying action as an economy of force unit.

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that D Troop be returned to a single mission OPCON to one unit or headquarters, so that the troop can be utilized in its designed combat role.

COMMAND ACTION: The troop will continue to meet both mission requirements despite the breakdown of troop integrity and assets. The problem has been discussed and recommendations made to the Commanding Officer, BHTAC, the Commanding Officer, D Company (Ranger) 151st Long Range Patrol, and to the AC of S, G-3, II FFGV.

d. OBSERVATION: There is a need for two additional UH-1H aircraft in each Air Cavalry Troop.

EVALUATION: Presently, there are seven UH-1H helicopters assigned to each Air Cavalry troop. Two additional UH-1H are required to perform various support missions essential to the overall troop operation. The principle combat assault mission of carrying aero rifle personnel is presently limited to three aircraft due to the following UH-1H requirements:

(1) One UH-1H is required for Command and Control and must be available to the CO at all times.

(2) One UH-1H is used by maintenance to shuttle parts from widely scattered support units. The road transportation problem, combined with the constant push to maintain maximum aircraft availability, require daily parts and equipment flights.

(3) One UH-1H is frequently needed for standardization and in-country orientation rides. The high rate of personnel turnover make in-country and standardization flights a necessity.

(4) Due to the monthly average of 90 hours on each aircraft, one UH-1H is continuously in maintenance for periodic inspection or repairs.
RECOMMENDATION: That the Air Cavalry Troop be issued two additional UH-1H aircraft to more effectively perform their normal combat and support missions. This would give each Air Cavalry Troop five available aircraft to be used for the insertion of the 40 personnel in the aero rifle platoon. Request that the UH-1H authorized on MRES 17-096T be issued to the weapons platoon, and that the TOE reflect an additional UH-1H to the Troop Headquarters.

COMMAND ACTION: This unit is preparing a recommended change to the MRES requesting the additional aircraft.

e. OBSERVATION: An experimental weapon system, XM-6, 40mm grenade launcher, has been installed on two UH-6A scout helicopters for combat evaluation.

EVALUATION: This system has proven to be an extremely accurate, useful system for employment in the AO, and gives every indication of being more versatile than the XM27E1 (mini-gun). Another advantage of the XM-6 system is that it appears to be less of a problem to maintain than the XM27E1. It is a less complex system, easier to clean, load, and clear than the minigun.

RECOMMENDATION: That the XM-6 testing program be encouraged and closely monitored by the administrative and combat units during the evaluation.

COMMAND ACTION: A thorough and comprehensive evaluation report will be submitted at the completion of the combat test.

f. OBSERVATION: The location and number of fire extinguishers in UH-1 aircraft is insufficient.

EVALUATION: Many in-flight fires could be extinguished by either the crew chief or door gunner if a fire extinguisher were readily accessible. With the single extinguisher mounted by the co-pilot's seat, access in flight by crewmembers in the rear is very difficult.

RECOMMENDATION: Two additional extinguishers should be mounted in the cargo compartments of each UH-1, with one under both the crew chief's and door gunner's seat.

COMMAND ACTION: An EIR is being submitted through maintenance channels suggesting that additional fire extinguishers be mounted.

3. (c) TRAINING:

OBSERVATION: Frequently, the training period for replacement personnel such as crew chiefs is not considered, which causes serious shortages in key positions.
EVALUATION: Providing an overlap in the tours of personnel with highly specialized skills such as crew chiefs is considered most important. Operating effectiveness may be sacrificed while new personnel go through a break-in period without the benefit of learning from the experience of their predecessors.

RECOMMENDATION: Prior planning as to need and allocation of qualified crew chiefs would alleviate this problem. It would be desirable to request and obtain a qualified replacement at least 30 days prior to a crew chief's DEROS.

COMMAND ACTION: It has become necessary to use a crew chief on more than one aircraft and to train door gunners and available individuals to assist crew chiefs.

4. (U) INTELLIGENCE: None

5. (U) LOGISTICS AND MAINTENANCE:
   a. OBSERVATION: There is an inadequate number of emergency survival radios available.

EVALUATION: This squadron is authorized 80 URC-10 radios and has four on hand. The squadron presently has 64 RT10 substitute radios on hand for a total of 56 survival radios. Since 20 January 1969, a total of 12 radios have been turned in as unserviceable and none have been received as replacements. The lack of proper survival equipment places crewmembers in unwarranted danger.

RECOMMENDATION: That command emphasis be placed on this problem to assure proper action is being taken.

COMMAND ACTION: Requisitions for this equipment have been submitted. Survival radios will be placed on the commander's critical items list.

b. OBSERVATION: AH-1G turrets malfunction quite frequently and qualified personnel are not readily available for repair.

EVALUATION: With the armament systems becoming more complex, maintenance problems increase. Numerous electrical problems have arisen with the XM-20 that only Emerson Electronics representatives can repair. This necessitates taking the AH-1G to their location and leaving it until it is repaired.

RECOMMENDATION: That Emerson Electronics technical representatives be assigned to battalion size elements employing the AH-1G, with XM-20 Emerson systems.
CONFLICT

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 30 April 1969. RGS OSFDR-65 (R1) (UIC-WAAMAA)

COMMAND ACTION: The squadron has made numerous attempts to obtain Emerson Technical Representatives from outlying posts. On infrequent occasions, representatives at Phu Loi and Long Thanh have been available for information and assistance.

c. OBSERVATION: There is no repair facility for the cable tensiometer in Vietnam.

EVALUATION: The requirement to check cable tension on aircraft systems and the fact that this system is very delicate has led to wear and breakage of this item. Normal life expectancy of a tensiometer is two years with calibration every 90 days.

RECOMMENDATION: A tensiometer repair facility be designated and a direct exchange program for the item be established.

COMMAND ACTION: Squadron maintenance detachments have inquired at all possible support channels and have found no facilities for tensiometer repair.

d. OBSERVATION: AH-1G swashplate assemblies have evidenced excessive wear.

EVALUATION: It has been noted that this item has an 1100 hour life between overhauls. Many units with the AH-1G have reported internal swashplate failure between 300 and 500 hours. The difficulty in obtaining swashplates and the 75 man hours required to replace the assembly has caused a serious maintenance problem.

RECOMMENDATION: That Aviation Materiel Management Command reevaluate the swashplate presently installed on the AH-1G.

COMMAND ACTION: Equipment improvement reports have been submitted to the Aviation Materiel Management Command.

e. (U) ORGANIZATION: None

10 INCLUSIONS

1. Unit Organization
2. Unit Location
3. Unit Strengths
4. Awards & Decorations
5. Friendly Losses
6. Operations Log
7. Operational Results
8. Aircraft Status
9. NIKE Changes
10. Recovery of PM-W Van Putten 21

Incl 1 - 10 wd Hq, DA

CONFIDENTIAL
DA, HEADQUARTERS, 12TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP, APO 96266 22 May 1969

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, APO 96266

In accordance with USARV Reg 525-15, the Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry Squadron, for the period ending 30 April 1969, is forwarded.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

David L. Forte
MAJ, Inf
Adjutant
This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for the period ending 30 April 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

B. G. Macdonald
1st AG

[Signature]

23
AVBG-0 (12 May 69)  3rd Ind.

SUBJECT:  Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 30 April 1969.  RCS G3OR-65 (HI) (UIC-MAANA)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384  11 JUN 1969

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVBG-DST, APO 96375
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

TO:  Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed this report, considers it to be adequate and concurs with the contents as indorsed, except as noted below.

2. The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

   a. Section II, para 1a, page 16: Nonconcur with the changes proposed at Inclosure 9.  MTOE revisions for the three Air Cavalry Squadrons assigned to the 1st Aviation Brigade were prepared during January and February 1969, by representatives of the three ACSs and G-3 Section this headquarters. These draft documents were returned to the field for comments during March 1969. These comments were returned to this headquarters, evaluated and inserted where appropriate in the applicable documents. The proposed MTOEs were staffed throughout this headquarters, and forwarded thru USAV to Department of the Army in May 1969. Due to the DA directed standardization program for authorization documents, certain changes as outlined at Inclosure 9 were modified and incorporated into the proposed MTOEs so as to best serve all ACSs in this command.

   b. Section II, para 2a, page 17: Nonconcur.  The AN/VASS-3 Xenon searchlight is an acceptable device for night target detection; however, it was designed primarily for use on tracked vehicles, hence the weight and bulk present undesirable features. Prior to inclusion on authorization documents for air cavalry troops further testing and evaluation is required.  Heliscopes have been deleted through MTOE action and starlight scopes were added as night target detection devices. Accordingly, the increase of M-18 infrared binoculars will not be required for mission accomplishment.  An NSN4585 item number 260 (Aero Searchlight) is scheduled for evaluation in RVN on or about 15 June 1969.  Results of this evaluation may justify modification of MTOEs for air cavalry troops.

   c. Section II, para 2b, page 17: Concur.  Ammunition trays for the 7.62 MM and the 40 MM in the XM-28 system are not major line items therefore inclusion on authorization documents is not feasible. Additional trays should be ordered through the supporting maintenance unit.
d. Section II, para 2a, page 19: Concur. Two additional UH-1H aircraft will facilitate more efficient scheduling and provide greater flexibility for the troop commander, however, this requires MICE action. Revisions to MTOE 17-98T were submitted during May 1969; further revisions must be delayed until pending action is completed.

e. Section II, para 3, page 19. There can be no disagreement that an overlap in tours would substantially enhance training capability and unit effectiveness. Support of such a system would require a constant over-strength of approximately 8-10%. This is not feasible when viewed from man-power management and budget considerations; the impact would reach all the way to increased draft calls, accelerate frequency of overseas tours, and require additional funds for training and salaries. The actions by the unit to cross-train personnel and utilize crewchiefs on more than one aircraft are considered proper and generally adequate for mission accomplishment.

f. Section II, para 5a, page 20: Concur. The URC-10 radio has been declared obsolete. Manufacture of the basic radio and components has been completed and no further contracts will be let. The URC-68 will replace the URC-10. The radio is presently in production and is anticipated to arrive in RVN during the last Qtr FY 69/first Qtr FY 70. As assets become available they will be "force-issued" to units having tabular authorization for the old family radios. Presently there are no known URC-4, URC-10, or HT-10 assets in-country.

g. Section II, para 5b, page 20: Nonconcur. All Emerson Representatives were removed from RVN approximately 20 Feb 69, however, Weapons Command Representatives are available throughout the country. The 3/17th ACS has been advised that one representative is located at Tan Son Nhut, and one is at Phu Loi.

h. Section II, para 5c, page 21: Nonconcur. The 34th GS Gp has indicated that it does not have the capability for repair of tensiometers other than possibly the Corpus Christi Bay Floating Aircraft Maintenance Facility. At this time it is impossible to verify this fact in that the ship has returned to drydock for yearly maintenance. The unit has been advised to requisition a replacement for the worn-out tensiometer.

i. Section II, para 5d, page 21. The recommendation for AVMC to evaluate the swashplate presently installed on the AH-1G will take place automatically when EIR's submitted to that location and it has been determined that these events are not single isolated occurrences.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVEAGC-O (12 May 69) 3rd Ind 11 JUN 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 30 April 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (UIC-IAAAMAA)

of EIR action is imperative and necessary to give AMMC necessary information upon which they can base their investigation. EIR submission will be a subject stressed in Commander's Notes published in this headquarters for the month of June.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

DAVID R. ANDERSON
CIP, AGC
Ass. AG
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (30 Apr 69) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Squadron, 17th Air
Cavalry for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSPOR-65 (HL)
(UIC-WAAMU)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 14 JUL 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons
Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters,
3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. (C) Reference item concerning "This unit experiences a continual
shortage of aircraft commanders for the AH-1G due to the lack of a sufficient
pool of qualified pilots from which to train aircraft commanders," section
II, page 16, paragraph 1(b); nonconcur. This headquarters does not identify
a manning level for individual units. During the period covered by the ORLL,
a shortage of AH-1G qualified aviators existed throughout the command. Major
requisitioning headquarters were assigned AH-1G qualified aviators on the
basis of two per AH-1G. This situation has improved to the point where
assigned status is nearly 100% over this basis of two per AH-1G. This in-
crease in AH-1G qualified aviators is expected to continue and this head-
quarters is working to bring assigned AH-1G aviator strength up to author-
ization.

   b. (C) Reference item concerning "There is a need for two additional
UH-1H aircraft in each Air Cavalry Troop," section II, page 18, paragraph
2(d); nonconcur. USARV has submitted a request to DA for a trade-out of
81 UH-1B/C for UH-1D/H helicopters. Of the 27 aircraft currently authorized
in the non-divisional air cav troop (10 OH-6, 9 AH-1G, 2 UH-1B/C, and 6
UH-1D/H), the two UH-1B/C helicopters are included in the trade-out plan.
This action will increase lift capability by adding two UH-1D/H helicopters,
and decrease maintenance support requirements from four to three type
aircraft, but it will not increase the total number of aircraft authorized.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON
1LT, AV
Assistant Adjutant Co
3d Sqdn, 17th Air Cav
1st Avn Bde

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
GPOP-DT (30 Apr 69) 5th Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (Rl)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 16 AUG 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C. L. Short
CPT, AGC
Adj AGQ
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb 69 to 30 Apr 69.

CO, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry

Undated

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N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

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