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AGDA (M) (15 Sep 69) FOR 05-UT-69B835

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: MG J. M. Heiser, Jr., Engineer Logistical Command, Period 2 August 1968 to 23 August 1969 (U)

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1. Reference: AR 1-26, subject, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U) dated 4 November 1966.

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of MG J. M. Heiser, Jr., subject as above.

3. This report is provided to ensure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 1-26, as a result of subject report should be provided ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

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CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

1. Attached are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report submitted by KG J. K. Heiser, Jr. The report covers the period 2 August 1968 to 23 August 1969 during which time KG Heiser served as CG, 1st Logistical Command.

2. KG Heiser is recommended for oral debriefing by the Department of the Army staff and as a candidate guest speaker at appropriate joint colleges and service schools.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON
TLT, ACC
Assistant Adjutant General

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Regraded unclassified when separated from classified Inclosure.
Country: Republic of Vietnam

Debrief Report by: Major General Joseph M. Heiser, Jr.

Duty Assignment: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command

Inclusive Dates: 2 August 1968 - 23 August 1969

Date of Report: 20 August 1969
I, (U) General: The combat logistical support situation is highly satisfactory from the viewpoint of the combat commander. Such programs as the Commander's Critical Items List, Instruct and Advise Team concept, the continuous liaison between senior and junior personnel, and the continued presence of 1st Log personnel working shoulder to shoulder with combat personnel across all combat areas is responsible for the greatest rapport that the undersigned has ever witnessed in a field army in the combat zone. Techniques such as Red Ball FILL, and the Intensive Management Items System have all combined to place special command management emphasis on ways and means of insuring that the combat soldier gets what he needs, when and where he needs it. Projects such as COUNT I, COUNT II, COUNT ALWAYS, CLEAN I thru X, and other such projects (see what is popularly called the Pink Book - Inclosure 1) have provided the guidance and procedures within which a significant amount of progress has been made. The installation of improved ADP utilizing basically the 3S system has improved this management, attesting to the fact that progress was required. Personnel assigned to 1st Logistical Command have in almost all cases contributed everything they know in order to achieve the objects of the most efficient logistic combat support system ever achieved. I believe that we have achieved the most efficient combat logistical support; however, this Command has only now begun to achieve the tremendous progress possible and required in the near future. Based upon the progress over the years, especially that obtained in recent months, it is now practicable to make "a quantum jump" in accelerated progress in the next few months. Thus, I will not present further any progress now attained - this can readily be seen by this review of pertinent logistic measures obtained in operational readiness rates, increased efficiency in depot operations, reduced Order Ship Time, more effective maintenance, increased security, reduced inventory on-hand both in items stored as well as tonnage on-hand with an increased capability to meet customer requirements, reduced use of high priority requisitions, reduced stock at property disposal yards, high degree of retro-grade of unnecessary and unserviceable materiel, highly effective Closed Loop system, improved morale and training, as demonstrated in reduced accidents, increased recruitment, far greater attendance at church services and character guidance and many other such indicators, many of which are most significant in terms of effective and efficient combat support (see recent LOGSUMs, R&A, and log intelligence data for more detailed and specific data). For the rest of this estimate, therefore, I will concentrate on those problem areas needing continued command management in order to fully obtain solutions required for greater achievement of efficiency in logistic combat operations. Inclosures 2 and 3 contain my personal reaction concerning "lessons learned" which may be of some additional value. Also, a review of my file "Major Actions and LOCC Notes" covering the time since 2 August 1968, contains specific "on the spot" command actions and reactions to situations as they occurred. This should be of informative interest and is mandatory reading now for all key officers and men in 1st Log.
II. (C) Personnel and Training.

1. With a turnover of three to five thousand military personnel a month, the most significant requirement is to insure that trained people contribute the maximum during their one year tours. This turnover presents the one single greatest challenge in maintaining efficient and effective combat logistic support. Due to the lack of an adequate training base in CONUS, most military personnel arrive in the theater with some school training but with limited experience. Further, orientation into United States Army, Vietnam, and its mission must take place within the first few days of a soldier's arrival or time is lost which cannot be made up. This applies to officers and men of all ranks. Thus, the necessity for such projects/programs as SKILLS, KNOW YOUR MAN, etc., which are essential and must be continuously pushed at all command levels. Standard operating procedures and parallel functional organizations under Project SAME are a must and require continuing command emphasis in order to avoid the osmosis of peculiar procedures or organizations which may help a man do his job but which defeat our system objectives in the process.

2. Due to the very significant dependence by United States Army, Vietnam, on contractor operations and local civilians, two very important facets of command management must be emphasized. First, the Contractor Performance Board of Review and the Resources Management Board should be used as command management techniques to review continually the efficiency of all contracts so as to assure appropriate action to obtain effective and efficient results from all contracts, particularly CPFF. Second, the employment of thousands of local nationals makes the continued maintenance of training for them most essential. Thus, necessary resources must be developed to provide training required to accomplish the objectives of SKILLS II program. Particular care must be exercised to insure that personnel management practices both by military authority and contractor management utilizing maximum psychology in dealing with the many operational problems involving change in duties, pay, hours of work, etc., in relationship to local national personnel.

3. Military discipline, accident prevention and troop morale are somewhat more significant command responsibilities which will require continued attention at all command and staff levels. The turnover of military commanders and key personnel including noncommissioned officers makes this a more volatile element of command responsibility. No letdown can be tolerated.

4. Resources management is one of the problem areas still in need of greater progress. With the 1st Logistical Command spread across the entire length and breadth of Vietnam, intermingled with and supporting combat, combat support and combat service troops as well as units of the Army, Navy and Marines it is most difficult to assess resources requirements. The mixture of COSTAR TOE units, mostly understrength, combined with TDA organizations, contractor operations and direct hire civilian strengths,
complicates the question of capability. Even TOE units do not have correct standards which will give reliable indicators of their capability. Thus, management projects such as "OVERHEAD", FIND III, TOE REVIEW, etc., are a continuous requirement and they must be supplemented by manpower surveys and management analysis reviews. The matching of such capabilities to mission requirements becomes even more complex due to the mix of mission responsibilities. For example, 1st Log Command maintains logistic support activities in areas forward of division support commands. This has proved essential due to the support and security requirements placed on most divisional support command units which must maintain base camps at their division headquarters. The problem of comparing capabilities with requirements is further complicated by the requirements for security, many times dictated by the degree of enemy activity, and therefore, variable.

This situation requires a continuous review by all commanders and management staffs to insure updating of current mission requirements versus capabilities and emphasis on supervision to insure efficiency in use of resources. The Resources Review Board can be one of the principal means of discipline in this problem area. It has already proven of great value in helping solve this complex command problem. As a result, reductions and/or redistribution of personnel resources have been effected successfully.

5. Accident Prevention. Naturally, accident prevention is an important matter in this command, especially with the large number of troops and transportation equipment utilized. We have made some progress but not enough. Continual pressure is required in order to keep the men alert to the possibility of accidents occurring, especially in backing, right and left turns, etc. Here in Vietnam the number of accidents involving Vietnamese are particularly worrisome. Our large equipment, conditions of roads, and the lack of understanding and discipline on the part of the Vietnamese people make our record far from good. A majority of accidents involving Vietnamese are due to the lack of Vietnamese training and understanding, poor safety and traffic controls on the road, etc. We have been attempting to get the Vietnamese to assist us in helping themselves. We have just, within the last few days, tried once again through command channels to get some action on the part of civilian authorities. We have enlisted the help of the Provost Marshal, the Embassy, MACV, etc. I am sure that when an accident occurs involving the death or serious injury to a Vietnamese by an American vehicle, America loses a considerable number of friends each time. Since the family and friends of the person hurt really don't care whether the Vietnamese victim was wrong, they just know an American caused it! We have just got to continue work on this.

III. (C) Security, Plans and Operations:

1. Probably more than ever before logistic personnel have to be soldiers capable of providing their own personal security as well as that of installations and continuously subject to enemy attack. A great deal of effort has been expended in improving the alertness of logistic personnel
involved in this function. Special Assistants for Combat Security have been added to the staff of Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command as well as to the staff of each of the support command commanders to emphasize and provide expertise in this most essential function. The enemy has shifted his attention from direct contact with combat troops to what may appear to be a secure area by attacking logistic installations and activities with relatively small numbers of troops, including sappers, with attractive targets such as POL storage, ammunition storage, materiel-laden convoys, etc. Projects such as ALERT are essential in order to assure continued maximum security with a minimum expenditure of resources to avoid impairment of logistic mission accomplishment.

2. In today's environment planning becomes even more important than ever before. Planning personnel of this Command must insure the complete integration of logistical support into all tactical operations including not only combat plans, but also any retrograde that might take place out of Vietnam. Staffs at all levels must perfect their knowledge of requirements and capabilities so that planning can be based upon reliable base data leading to proper decisions in terms of disposition of available personnel and materiel resources. Lack of this essential intelligence can lead to significant errors in terms of future plans affecting the effectiveness and efficiency of specific missions of this Command.

3. The USARV G2 provides the Commanding General, 1st Log Command, with a weekly update on the enemy situation through a special intelligence briefing each Saturday afternoon after the Commander's Conference. This briefing is especially valuable because it provides warnings in many cases which can be utilized to disrupt enemy plans through changes in convoy schedules, increased alertness in certain security areas, etc. A continuation of this weekly intelligence review is urged.

4. With regard to support operations, the conventional approach wherein a logistic command supports the combat forces in the rear of division area of operation is not pertinent in Vietnam because divisions and brigades are spread in areas of operation (AO) laterally rather than in depth, with at least one large base camp area at each division headquarters, the support command of each division is generally found at a base camp. Support of that base camp includes providing a large share of the security for the base camp while the infantry and other line elements of the division are dispersed throughout the AO of that command. Through an "osmosis" process, 1st Log Command was moved into the void in support areas of most division AOs by providing logistical support areas (LSAs) in these areas forward of division base camps to support not only the divisional units but also the nondivisional organizations. Likewise, 1st Log Command transportation units move supplies not only to the division support command but also to all the LSAs forward thereof. The system is working well and combat commanders are extremely pleased with 1st Log support. However, it does require greater use of resources than would normally be expected in a conventional division-slice support. This, plus other reasons, requires that we object to the
application in applying a "division slice" to any withdrawal from Vietnam. This is even more pertinent should aviation, engineer, artillery and other combat support elements be maintained while combat units withdraw.

5. T-Day planning. Working with higher headquarters we have put together a good T-Day plan and with the first 25,000 withdrawal we have found that many of its procedures have actually been implemented through this withdrawal action. In reality, I believe the T-Day plan may very well have begun and will continue by osmosis with the initial 25,000 withdrawal. We have received the CONUS units activated to assist us in processing, etc. This initial operation should be closely watched to note its success and the problems that need solving. So far it is working fine. We are still putting together our packaging and processing material with a portion here and back-up in Okinawa and CONUS. Lumber, as you know, is critical across the command due to the CONUS price increase early in the year with resultant nonprocurement. We now have to watch lumber closely.

As mentioned below, we need to improve staging areas, etc. Further, some of our cleaning materials and equipment need close watch. For example, our high pressure water cleaners are a current problem because the initial make of pressure cleaner has not been holding up.

Regarding the T-Day phasedown of ROs and the supply pipeline, the command has taken certain actions which will provide the necessary control and management of this massive effort. I have established a 1st Log Command RO Review Board with an official charter to closely monitor all super hi dollar items (annual demand over $350,000) to include the approval of all requisitions for these items. Also, this board will assist in the formulation of overall guidance in the controlled reduction of all other TASL items.

In addition, planning has been developed by USAIC:V on the approach to be taken in actual reduction of the supply pipeline. The plan is predicated on an incremental percentage correlation of any troop draw down to the various classes of supply. Continuing action and follow-up should be directed to this area.

In any troop planning we must be especially careful should the Army have to assume responsibility for I Corps once the Navy makes a move to withdraw. Our current plans are facing up to this contingency but it will take close supervision.

IV. (C) Services:

1. Facilities. Most of our facilities' improvement has taken place with the maintenance of same, now a continuing requirement. We have just completed one-half of the cold storage warehouse in Qui Nhon and reefer storage in Long Binh has been partially completed this month and should be completed within the next 60 days. Our facilities at ports are pretty stable except for some POL and ammunition facilities at Qui Nhon and a
couple of seawall failures at Cam Ranh Bay. However, we should be able to
turn over commercial facilities in the Saigon port to the commercial/ARVN
interests progressively so that we should be out of the commercial port by
the end of October. If an occasional ship should require pier space over
and above the Newport piers then we could make such arrangements with the
ARVN operating at their Saigon piers. Maintenance of navigable harbors is
essential. Dredging at Cam Ranh Bay, Newport and Qui Nhon must be con-
stantly pursued. If Cam Ranh Bay is to remain a long range US installation,
then some improvement in toilet and washing facilities should be made.
Berms in ammunition areas and revetments in general must be continuously
maintained or they become seriously damaged. The use of sandbags is dis-
couraged in most of our base areas. We should depend upon "K-Wall", con-
crete blocks or some other type material which can be sand filled and
provide a better solution than the continual use and replacement of sand-
bags, which is a most expensive operation. Facilities required to support
T-Day operations have been identified, and a request for early construction
of those in the Newport/Long Binh areas has been submitted to USARV. This
needs command support continuously!

2. Self Service stores and their operation still present a problem
only partially solved. We are pushing to first control the items so that
troops don't simply take the self service items because they are attractive,
but only allow units to take what they need. A form of credit control
appears to be the best solution for providing the unit what it needs and
still restricting it from abusing the system. Two, once we determine the
need, then we take action to assure appropriate supply of that need. We
are reviewing general supplies on hand to determine suitable substitutes
which may be issued, thereby offsetting current zero balances for similar
items. I believe we are on the way to the solution, but we haven't reached
it yet.

3. Mortuary, laundry, bath, ice, food service, etc., are performing
well. However, laundry, bath, and ice requirements are very dynamic in the
local area depending on the movement of troops; so this has to be watched
closely, especially under the Vietnam environment of monsoon season,
humidity, heat, etc. A laundry problem has developed because the FY 70
budget for contract laundry services was reduced by approximately 30%. To
offset this cut, action is being taken to increase the field laundry pro-
duction.

4. PDO is finally moving well. However, we have to watch the effect
of customs and other indigenous peculiarities in order to avoid hold ups
in contractor effort. The Government of Vietnam is becoming more and more
interested in scrap in the Saigon area. However, they have indicated that
they are willing to share scrap generated in the Saigon area with Korean
contractors who are closely lined with the government of each nation. In
addition, we have private contractors very much interested in bidding for
scrap and these contractors have won open bid awards for scrap and usable
PDO property in each of our PDO locations. Another aspect of our PDO
operations is the MAPEX program whereby countries like Korea, Taiwan, Philippines and the Thais have indicated an interest in usable PDO property, especially vehicles, to supplement their reduced MAP programs. The Korean and Nationalist Chinese governments are most active in this regard. While they tend to be very competitive in claiming usable vehicles, recent agreements under a CINCPAC directive have pretty well taken care of this competition through recognized procedures on the part of all concerned. A current problem in PDO involves OICC excesses. Because these excesses are valued at several million dollars and consist of property in new condition, the Sales and Disposal Division, ACoFs, Services is working on a standard method of disposing of this material without selling it to the commercial market where, if this was done, the price paid would only be a small portion of the actual value of the property.

A perennial problem in disposal has been the lack of experienced personnel and special types of equipment to properly handle the large volume of property received. In November 1968, specialized scrap handling equipment was requisitioned and much of this equipment is now in-country. Although installation is not complete in all areas it is progressing. In June, as part of an overall property disposal improvement program, a PDO training team was organized, trained and sent into the field. This team should do much toward standardizing disposal procedures in-country and raise the level of individual training.

V. (C) Supplies:

1. In general, we refer to the supply as the wholesale/GS/4th and 5th echelon type of supply support to include the ICC and depot operations. The direct support and organization level is considered with others under ACoFs, Services, as already indicated with the self service store, or under ACoFs, Maintenance, whose operation is covered later in this paper under repair parts/direct support operations.

This command has come a long way through many projects listed in the "Pink Book" attached. However, there is still much room for improvement. We have reached a satisfactory level of inventory accuracy, we have reduced our Order Ship Time, we have attained a more accurate demand data base, we have improved our ADP management, reduced our ASL, and many other progressive actions. We still need to concentrate on certain specific areas perhaps more than others. For example, with the continuous change over of people, constant follow-up on inventory management and accuracy at both the ICC and depot are essential. We have found that we must assure ourselves that the managers tell the ADP program design people what is needed for management rather than allowing the program design people to put in a program and then managers find out subsequently what is provided them. We are about to enter on "VERSION 30" of the 3S system which will be provided as a service to the 1st Log Command by the Central Design Agency of USARPAC. I have directed that we will know and require modification as required prior to the implementation of Version 30. Also, we must require that specific elements of this program change be tested and debugged before we put it on the entire system.
Please note Inclosure 4 which lays down the policy which I directed recently concerning ADP management. The ICC needs close supervision constantly because of its most significant impact on major accomplishment and the cost thereof. Included are such things as close review of supply control procedures, RO updates, excess runs, monthly reconciliations between the ICC and its customers, customer review to assure that the ABFs of each depot is compatible with the ABF at the ICC and periodic reconciliation between the ICC and CONUS NICPs. The depots and the ICC should as a minimum run 2½ ADP production cycles a week. We will attain this by the end of August but it will take close supervision to maintain this standard at least until Version 30 of 3S is implemented. I have established watch committees of key senior people at each level so that the key personnel not only know what ADP is doing but also how they can best utilize its output.

2. Depot operations. The depots have come a long way in spite of the fact that we have very limited knowledge of depot operations among the military personnel being assigned to this command. I have found it essential to continuously keep in touch with inventory and location problems, with care and preservation, with management levels of MROs, with receipt processing times and with identification and classification of stock. For example, particular experience by storage personnel is essential in order to provide adequate depot operations covering communications and electronic equipment and engineer supplies. With the improvement in direct support operations, many field returns occur, some of which should be identified as excess and throught direct to Okinawa, where needed in the depot they should be so assigned and stored. We have moved much depot excess out of country; however, we are at a stage where this function becomes more difficult in that many more FSNs are involved, not all with a large volume of tonnage. We have had some delay in this retrograde program over the last 60 days due to the pressure on pick up of increasing receipts and expedited shipments of MROs to the customers. Also, we had some difficulty with our excess program at the ICC. We should now be in a better position to maintain and perhaps increase our retrograde of depot excess in the months to come. As you review future plans you will see that within such time-phasing our depots should become somewhat the equivalent of the Da Nang field Army depot with only fast moving (6 demands in 180 days) supplies stored therein. The remainder of our stock should be retrograded to Okinawa and/or CONUS for back-up support utilizing high priority and RORO. This includes the use of reserve tank in Okinawa for construction materials with direct delivery by RORO to the units authorized construction materials.

3. Statistical analysis of supply operations is a problem due partially at least to ADP programs which are complex, confusing and make it doubtful as to the efficacy of some performance data. For example, I believe that our demand satisfaction data is uncertain. For that reason we have not provided such data in our last R&A and LOGSUM. I know that we are providing increased supplies to all our customers, some of this by initial fill and much of it by back-order releases, but the data we had was too high and the data I saw was not representative of truly what the customer is getting. We may need a new definition for customer satisfaction. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army
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and Defense (Dr. Brooks and Mr. Morris) asked for a new formula last fall during a visit here. I hope we may have a proposed solution both for lst Log and for standard Army use before I leave here. In addition, I have asked that the Comptroller take a look at all our performance statistics to ensure that such elements as demand accommodation trends and hi pri requisitions, etc., are validated and true. To do this we must analyze our ADP programs because all of this is now provided by the computers. I hope we will have completed this "Verify" project by the time I depart. However, this is one of the points that we must improve upon in our management of ADP. Up to now we, the managers, have taken ADP programs as provided us then manually attempted to get whatever additional information we needed, For example, we can get the number of ASL lines at zero balance from the ADP, but we can't get the zero balances with dues-out. We are uncertain as to our back-order situation. Of course, this is under dynamic change anyhow because we have just cancelled all our dues-out over 90 days because many, almost all, of the older back-orders are not really required by the units concerned; so we are shipping supplies which would actually end up being excess and returned to either the depot or Okinawa. I think we have solved this problem through stopping status requests and status reports at DSU/Depot level through providing a monthly print-out of dues out from the depot to the DSU. Used properly this technique will provide an easy means of monthly reconciliation. This, with the reduced order ship time and stock record support capability, pre-punched PLL cards, etc., is providing a much reduced paper and exception flow throughout the system within Vietnam.

4. Such projects as IMI, FILL, MOVE/SEE, STOP/SEE, as well as others in the "Pink Book" should be pushed continuously to further the success we have had. These are dynamic projects and many of the items change therein. Further, we must use the IMI (which is tied in with AMC's OASIS) to tie in with DX at the DSU so that all major components are on a "Closed Loop" type system from CONUS source all the way to the DSU where such major components are replaced. We have not gone far enough in these techniques. There is much room for extension of these procedures which will greatly enhance our combat effectiveness and reduce costs of support.

5. The Financial Inventory Report (FIR). We have instituted financial management in lst Log to assist management by dollar summary analysis. I obtained approval last Spring from General Milreden to cooperate with CONUS and USARPAC by installing Financial Inventory Reporting in the ICC and our three major depots. I did this on the basis that while I find financial management as a valuable tool in the "wholesale level", it should stop at that level in the combat zone. I have operated on the premise that the ICC and the three large depots are the wholesale level and that financial management should not extend into the field army, which I consider the rest of the USARV logistics structure to be. But (the only exception to this would be overhaul of certain commodities such as marine equipment at Cam Ranh Bay and overhaul of generators by some contractors such as Vinnell) we are only beginning to get reliable data out of our computer in the financial inventory report. We are in the midst of analyzing the report covering the 4th quarter
of 1969 now. This will be by far the most reliable report yet produced. However, it must be watched closely because there is no question but what we need to improve is the reliability and accuracy of our financial data. The more we use it, naturally, the more accurate and useful it will become. (I have advised everyone, up to and including Mr. Resor, himself, with regard to this matter.)

6. Commander's Critical Items List. All combat commanders are now enthusiastically using a periodic CCIL to personally indicate the logistic problems especially supplies that are of personal concern to them. They have found that in this way they not only obtain response from the system, but also that they get a good handle on their own logistic situation through ascertaining what really is of critical interest to them. You will find that your close attention to this procedure and your coverage of this with each of the commanders on your liaison visits will be extremely valuable and also very gratifying in combat command response.

VI. (C) Maintenance.

1. The operational readiness rates in the United States Army, Vietnam, continue to be the highest ever found in a combat zone. But these are becoming somewhat lower as our equipment becomes older and more actively utilized. We must continue to support the necessity of Red Ball as the only process within which MILSTRIP standards for Issue Priority Group I requisitions have been met. This, with an ever improving replenishment system, is greatly assisting in keeping our operational readiness up. In fact, our management data will indicate that our NORS rates are becoming lower and our NORM rates are becoming higher. It is shifting the emphasis from lack of supply to ground maintenance, especially in our low density type equipment such as that found in engineer units. This latter category of commodities needs continuous close scrutiny as well as do the combat vehicle and tactical fleets and commo equipment.

2. We have placed increased emphasis in recent months on the direct support operations because now that the wholesale structure is far more responsive, the real secret of success is the efficiency of direct support operations. Due to the rapid turnover, I have found that the same problems continuously recur and people change, therefore, we must keep constant pressure on such projects as NCR 500 CLEAN, RAGS, Pre-Punched PLL, stock records support, and perhaps most important of all, the Instruct and Advise (I&A) Teams. This latter technique helps to make up for lack of training and is one of the most significant functions in terms of increased effectiveness. Several months ago I moved the responsibility for direct support operation out of Supply and into Maintenance because these functions were so closely aligned and because Supply had plenty to do in its own right. I believe we are beginning to make rapid progress. However, I would continue to put pressure here because at the present state of maturity, I believe that if we get the progress practicable, within three months I believe the efficiency in direct support operations will have such a great effect that all logistic operations will be far more easily managed and with greatly increased efficiency.
3. Among the many techniques available that should be stressed are the DOG Program (combined with a theater repair cycle float), the R&R Program and the OUR LIFE. Along with the most significant one previously mentioned, which is the Closed Loop type control over all IMI type items beginning with high dollar value such as major components of such items as combat vehicles. The Closed Loop system is working well but we need to improve our overall return of unserviceable reparables. The IMI/direct exchange technique will facilitate reaching satisfactory levels in this regard.

4. Due to the lack of confidence in the supply system (which was certainly merited until recently) and due to inventory "freezes", using units and DSUs have resorted to great use of high priority requisitions. Now that we are maturing and the system is more responsive, USARV/1st Log Command is attempting to reduce in-country hi-pri requisitions and controls have been established therefore. I believe that we will see a significant decrease in the next few months ahead. We are also reviewing our high dollar annual supply requirements for cost saving possibilities. For instance, we are requesting DA assistance in obtaining tire retread equipment to be installed in-country to retread at great cost savings three truck tire sizes for which our current annual supply requirement is $16 million.

5. Through the technique of CMMIs we get a good picture of maintenance management at the unit level. You will find that we have need for much improvement in this regard even though some progress has been made. It emphasizes one thing most significant - that preventive maintenance is still an absolute necessity and needs significant improvement in all units both in 1st Log Command and other USARV units. In SKILLS training program I have directed we have specific coverage of preventive maintenance techniques and make this available to all USARV units. We are stressing repair in theater rather than the previous philosophy of wholesale replacement of unserviceable components. I have recently directed each Log Command Group to set up repair troubleshooting and engine fault diagnosis schools.

VII. (C) Transportation:

1. Perhaps more so in transportation than anywhere else, we have a good professional base of knowledge. We get transportation personnel, both officers and enlisted men, who have been in the business before. As a result, this has been a better managed operation. However, the transportation function needs to become a greater part of the integrated logistic system through use of inventory-in-motion techniques as opposed to just carrying cargo around. Such projects as the supply manifest flow, inter-transit challenge, etc., have brought out some fine results and has enabled us to provide better combat support with less material on the ground. Classes III and V have particularly brought this out. However, it does require greater management but greater management can be obtained at far less cost than most management with unneeded material stored all over the combat zone.
2. Port operations have matured considerably with the advent of STOP/SEE which allowed port managers to operate efficiently rather than snowing them with a lot of stuff not needed here. However, we still have too much staying in the port too long. Also, our ports do not have sufficient staging area for wholesale retrograde; so we have to watch the work in improving this area of responsibility. Our truck fleet has been far more actively utilized in recent months and so we have to stress proper maintenance and watch the DOG Program. In addition, operators of vehicles, including material handling equipment, must be trained and given close supervision. We have a project called "RETRO-RIGHT" which provides the elements of responsibility to ensure that our retrograde moves out of here in proper condition with proper documentation, etc. We need to watch this closely because it is not an easy responsibility to carry out in any case. The Traffic Management Agency is under MACV. We must closely coordinate our requirements with them so that we can move material effectively and efficiently. This requires close watch. There has been real progress recently in our coordination of transportation functions here with CONUS at MTMTS and the LCOP.

Because of this we are now in a position to know what is on a boat almost as soon as it is loaded in CONUS. Knowing this we can challenge if necessary, we can plan its receipt at the port and at the depots, we can plan its issue if due out to a customer rather than put it in storage, etc., this allows for inventory-in-motion at its best if we take advantage of our maturing capabilities.

3. MILSTRIP MILSTAMP Interface. Progress has been made on the MILSTRIP/MILSTAMP interface but it has been made on an off-line basis. We have just about reached the threshold of a breakthrough involving the concerted efforts of USARPAC, LCOP and 1st Log as shown by our discussions with General Durrenberger here on 4 and 5 August 1969. This is a matter which will have to be followed up aggressively if we are to make this vital breakthrough. This system has to be established just as rapidly as possible because it will provide the basis for improved management of our supply and transportation system during the redeployment and T-Day period. The MILSTRIP/MILSTAMP system which is finally adopted must provide the data which we need to manage our assets on the ground and enroute if we are to control redeployment and not react to it. The system which is adopted should, therefore, have these characteristics as a minimum:

a. A periodic (perhaps weekly) print-out by FSN of selected items for which there is continued command interest, e.g., PEMA principle items, FILL and other IMI items, and certain construction materials. This report should be oriented to the needs of the ICCV Commodity manager and provide enroute identity and status from CONUS depot to the port of discharge within RVN.

b. Random access to permit inquiry by FSN or FSC for items which are not normally of a critical nature but become so as a result of situational changes.

c. Remote station access.
d. Output should be available within RVN within 24 to 72 hours after a status change in CONUS occurs.

A MILSTRIP/MILSTAMP interface system such as that will facilitate management of enroute stocks, allow for STOP/SEE extended, permit direct delivery of selected items to units from the port of discharge, and provide a realistic picture of our dues-in situation. By agreement with General Durrenberger on 5 August 1969, on-the-ground discussions will be held here in mid-August to facilitate the design of the desired system. Representatives of USARPAC, LCOP and 1st Log should be able to design a system which will meet our requirements. Aggressive action will be required to keep this project moving toward early fruition once the basic design is finalized.

4. In the transportation function we use many contracts covering stevedoring and local as well as long-range line hauling. We have had some recent labor trouble because we reduced overtime, especially in Saigon. Close coordination is essential between 1st Log Command, the Civilian Personnel Office, USARV and local transportation authorities at the support commands in order to insure full communication with contractor and his employees so that misunderstandings with labor can be minimized. We have retained sufficient military capability so that we could operate military ports as well as line-haul with military transportation and terminal service companies.

5. Containerization. Containers have proven to be one of the brighter facets of our logistical situation. More work needs to be done, however, if we are to continue to progress in this area. There is a requirement that CONUS activities containerize more supplies for direct delivery to forward points, bypassing the depots. Direct delivery in containers will reduce port handling, local drayage, depot processing, damage, and pilferage. Work is underway now to determine our requirements and to request appropriate CONUS agencies to stuff containers in accordance with our requirements of direct delivery.

VIII. (U) Procurement:

We have a very fine procurement operation generally staffed with knowledgeable pros. They do a fine job of contract negotiations and administration. However, we need to closely supervise property administration of contracts especially such as PA&E contracts supervised by USAECAV. As a result of our Contract Performance Board of Review, our Resources Management Board and the PBAC, we have greatly strengthened our management of contracts. Procurement Agency must take an active part in this regard. It is suggested that you review the current reorganization proposal from USARPAC concerning the Procurement Agency.
IX. (C) Comptroller:

1. The Comptroller when I arrived was about to be disestablished by USARV because it was not felt we had enough budget worries to maintain a separate comptroller in 1st Log. I quickly put a stop to this because not only did we have more than was recognized, but, more especially, we had to get into financial management and to overall management improvement. As a result we strengthened the Comptroller with a management analysis capability as well as giving them the responsibility of coming up with an effective management information program to include Review and Analysis. (They, by the way, are making sure our management statistics are valid.) One of the most important projects during this and future fiscal years is the one we call LIAR. This is a project to make a liar out of the budgeteers. The people in the budget business have included in the 1st Log budget many requirements that I believe we can prove unnecessary. Some of these are based upon lack of knowledge of real obligations incurred during FY 69. The management actions taken during the last fiscal year have in many cases not caught up with the budget account. As a result the obligations and commitments remain overstated by millions of dollars. For example, the USARPAC Comptroller has records which indicate that USARV has $660 million worth of dues-in of which almost over $500 million would be 1st Log Command. It is my contention that these are overstated. The budget people think that we will need between $300 and $400 million to take care of dues-in that will arrive in 1st Log during FY 70. I believe when we get at the bottom of all this that we will not need more than $100 to $150 million. This is so because many of the dues-in still on record in USARPAC have been received or cancelled. We have developed through automated process a means of purifying our due-in files through automatic cancellation and purge action. This should result in many of our outstanding dues-in being removed from the files and de-obligation of money by USARPAC. One of the problems now being solved is the fact that the complex arrangements of matching documents of receipts to dues-in ends up in a significant number of receipts being recorded as "receipts not due-in". Only because we do not have a feasible way of matching the documents. We are now looking at the possibility of utilizing the lift card furnished by LOOP to purify the due-in file and also use it to preposition material receipt cards, by ships, so that storage people will know what is coming in on each ship. This should help in the matching of documents in our due-in file and thereby help keep the file in balance. I am certain that many of the items that the budget people think are due-in have already been received and utilized. We will never pay for them again, they already have been paid for.

2. In addition, we can make a liar out of the budget through such actions as reduced order ship time, less procurement of sandbags, reduced ROs based upon good demand data, reduced retention levels for supplies which will be actively needed by other parts of the Army thus establishing credits for us, etc. I have directed the staff to come up with a specific monetary goal under Project LIAR. I am convinced that through many of the things I have mentioned above and others that we can reduce our budget requirements in this fiscal year by as much as $300 million. The degree to which we can
prove we do this will depend on our reduction of what I call "lapse factor" between a management action being taken and the results of this action being recognized in the fiscal year accounting channel. We have to provide close management supervision to this especially with comptrollers of all levels so that when a manager takes an action this action progressively is recognized in fiscal records. If we don't do this, we can reduce our budget by hundreds of millions but no one will recognize it until years later when they recognize obligations just weren't spent. In the meantime, our budgets continue to carry the requirements year by year because we were in the previous year's budget. This one is most important. Of course, reductions we can make will significantly contribute to a much healthier USARV, USARPAC and DA O&M budget and offset deficits which now exist.

X. (C) Support of ARVN/RVNAP:

Another very important function is our support of ARVN/RVNAP modernization. This support is really incorporated in an all-inclusive Project "BUDDY". We have tried to get this going since last fall recognizing that the time was rapidly approaching when our US strength in Vietnam would be withdrawn depending on the ability of the Vietnamese forces to take over the job of police and defending their own nation with less help on our part. In order to do this they are getting much new standard US Army equipment. We need to support them in job training, management training, supply and maintenance backup to the extent determined appropriate. The requirements for this have not yet been firmed up. General Abrams personally approved the BUDDY concept in January but we have been unable to make real headway due to lack of interest in MACV J4 and some ARVN top level people who don't recognize the problem! General Conroy at MACV and the USARV staff with our personnel, especially in SP&O, are now trying to get with this problem so we avoid wasting more time by making use of resources available within the 1st Log Command. We are establishing Instruct and Advise Teams to begin assisting ARVN units on the ground. This will provide us logistic intelligence we need in order to better know how to help the ARVN forces. We have a psychological problem to solve in that there are those who are not intimately knowledgeable of our logistic system or the equipment provided; therefore, they cannot recognize what the requirement really is! We have the responsibility of assuring their recognition of the support requirements and then of helping them get it. The discussions held on 4, 5, 6 and 7 August between USARV, 1st Log and General Durrenberger/General Fuson have highlighted the need for rapid progress in this regard. I have also met with General Conroy to expedite this. Our staffs are now in the follow-up stage in order to specifically implement various facets of the problem.

Included in this problem, as discussed with Bill Durrenberger, Jack Fuson and Ray Conroy, are the policy questions concerning supply and maintenance support which must be provided to that equipment common with our own. I will be working on this at the DA level and will need your support here in Vietnam with regard to the most efficient way of providing this essential support.
I have had the opportunity to talk with General Mildren and General Rosson this week concerning this problem. This entire area needs continual command support at all levels in order to make the most effective use of the time available.

XI. (U) Personnel: (Excluded due to sensitive classification.)

XII. (U) Summary:

1. As one can see, we have made tremendous progress. All commanders are most appreciative of the support being rendered. The truth of the matter is we can do so much better. I believe the path to many improvements has been pretty well established. (See recent R&A, LOGSUs and Log Intelligence Book for specifics.) What we have to do now is stay in the right direction and move in a more rapid pace. Objectives and standards have been established and disseminated in most cases. We must be sure that this is so in all cases and then maintained - because progressive change here is normal in order to keep the "target out in front" and require "reaching" to attain it.

2. Our biggest problems were the fact that we got in here without a logistic tail and the fact that we continue to turnover people at such a rapid rate that continued improvement continues to be a difficult problem. I think we are about over the problem created by lack of the initial logistic tail. But in order to assure that these problems don't recur and that the progress attained by the many that have been here before doesn't decline, but continue at the even more rapid pace due to the better base, it is essential that we train everyone! More especially first line supervision and their supervisors must learn quickly what is expected of them, how they are expected to do it and what results must be obtained; then we be sure they do it! I believe that projects such as SKILLS I and II, backed up by a follow-through of the kind of projects in the "Pink Book", provide a fundamental base for techniques and training required to continue the improvement so necessary. This too requires continual up-dating! In the last analysis follow-through will result in the most rapid progress. Eventually, logistical support everywhere will attain this if we have a motivated soldier who recognizes why he is here in the first place. With the basic objective of this Command "to make every member of this Command a better American when he leaves here than when he arrived", I feel certain that with its attainment we have the means of getting this job done like never before.

5 Incl
1. Pink Book
2. CG's Logistic Lessons Learned
   w/1 Incl
3. Rpt of Exit Interview w/Historian
4. Comdr's Ltr 7-2, dtd 4JUL69
5. Conf BC fr Heiser to Hayes, subj: Briefing for Army Policy Council

CONFIDENTIAL
FOREWORD

Dedicated to the Simple Mission Objective
of the 1st Logistical Command:

We Have the Most Effective and Efficient
Combat Support Ever Rendered to
A Field Army
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Management Improvement Program

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1. SUBJECT: Command and Control Improvement Program and "Clean V"

2. PURPOSE: To explain the Command and Control Improvement Program and its relationship to "Clean V".

3. BACKGROUND: In order to optimize the management effort of the lst Logistical Command, the command objectives program and the management improvement program were combined and reorganized into the command and control improvement program.

4. DISCUSSION: a. During the period 1 August - 30 November 1968 many and varied comprehensive programs designated by the Commanding General as well as those programs of the staff sections were initiated and implemented. This period is Phase I of the command and control improvement program.

    b. Phase II of this program covers the time frame 1 December to 31 January, and has been designated as "Clean V". This was set aside as the time to assess the current command position in relation to the programs initiated and implemented in Phase I. Performance must be charted against the command and control improvement programs to see where the command had been, where it stood, and where it was going. This position was thoroughly analyzed and new targets for the uncompleted programs were established. Also, new programs for February through 30 April 1969 (Phase III of the program) were initiated. Starting on 1 February 1969, the programs established in Phase II were implemented.

    c. Phase IV is another period for reassessing and charting performance against programs as well as establishing new programs for FY 70.

5. ACTIONS TAKEN: Commander's Letter 12-10, dated 28 December 1968 required all staff sections and support commands to chart their progress against the command and control programs, to initiate new goals for Phase III and to submit these charts and new programs to ACofS, Comptroller on 13 January 1969 for the support commands and on 16 January for the staff sections. These charts and objectives were reviewed at the Commanders' Conference on 20 January 1969. The charts covering Phase III and FY 70 objectives will be submitted to the ACofS, Comptroller on 28 May 1969. The letter also required all echelons of command to establish objectives and goals and to chart progress against it. Each man on every echelon must know exactly what his job is, what he must accomplish (goals) and how well.
he is doing against the goals. He must further know where his job fits into the overall support command and 1st Logistical Command command and control programs.

SUBMITTED BY: Chief, Management Analysis Division
Project Officer; MAJ Chappell, LBN 3582
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Advance Procurement Planning Program

2. PURPOSE: This Fact Sheet provides information on the Advance Procurement Planning Program as utilized by the US Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam.

3. DISCUSSION: The primary basis for the Advance Procurement Planning Program is the necessity of receiving a purchase request far enough in advance of the time that services are actually required to ensure that adequate time is provided for each phase of the procurement cycle. Any reduction in the time available as compared with the time required for each step of the procurement cycle may very well result in deterioration of the procurement package, less than maximum utilization of the available competition, and a less than optimum contract. In an extreme case, the purchase request could be received at such a late date prior to the time services are required as to necessitate the extension of the existing contract. In most cases, this would be considered highly undesirable for such reasons as lack of competition and lack of an opportunity to contract for the same services at lower prices. Based on the above considerations, the main purpose of the Advance Procurement Planning Program is to emphasize the need for the Procurement Agency to receive the purchase request with sufficient lead time to develop an effective and complete procurement package and to allow adequate time for each phase in the procurement cycle including contractor mobilization. Advance Procurement Plans are developed for each known service requirement in excess of $100,000. These plans must provide for all phases of the procurement cycle, including any required approval phases, and they are normally developed approximately 12 months prior to the time a particular contract must be effective. The development of the plans is a joint coordination effort between the contracting personnel at the Procurement Agency, the staff personnel at 1st Logistical Command and the actual requiring activities. The importance of the first phase of the procurement cycle, receipt of the Purchase Request and Commitment (PR&C), cannot be overemphasized because all succeeding phases are dependent upon and directly affected by this phase. If the PR&C is not received by the date indicated on the appropriate plan, then something must be sacrificed in later phases in order to have a contract effective by the date services are required.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that maximum emphasis be placed on the Advance Procurement Plans. Particular emphasis should be placed on the required submittal date to USAPAV. It is also recommended that
maximum coordination between the Procurement Agency, the 1st Logistical Command staff, and the requiring activities continue to be effected.

SUBMITTED BY: ACoFS, Procurement
PROJECT OFFICER: William B. Jackson, CPT, ORDC, MACV 2767
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Command's Critical Items List (CCIL).

2. PURPOSE: To provide information concerning the implementation of the Command's Critical Items List (CCIL).

3. BACKGROUND: a. The CCIL was implemented by the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command on 1 September 1968.

   b. Twenty-six divisional and separate tactical units within USARV were requested to participate in this program.

   c. The CCIL: (1) Facilitates coordination of supply and technical data at all echelons of supply as well as the detection of system faults.

      (2) Insures intensive supply management of items critical to the tactical unit’s mission.

      (3) Provides the Commanding General of the major commands a means of reporting logistical problems which they consider to be of a most critical nature, insofar as the combat readiness or posture of their organization is concerned. These reports are processed twice a month and submitted to the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command. Replies are prepared outlining the supply or service actions being taken by the 1st Logistical Command.

      (4) Provide the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, with an overview of theater-wide assets which are presently hindering the accomplishment of individual tactical unit missions.

4. DISCUSSION: The purpose of the CCIL is to have each major commander identify and report those items of supply or services which are adversely affecting the accomplishment of the unit's mission or which will become a problem of serious consequence in the near future. Once identified and reported to the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, these items are thoroughly reviewed by the appropriate staff element or the respective item managers in the case of supply problems and a report rendered outlining what supply or service actions will be effected to expedite the release of the identified items to the unit. For those supply items identified by the item managers as critical theater-wide, command channel messages are being dispatched to the respective CONUS supply source requesting
assistance and expedited actions. Currently of the 26 units solicited, 22 are participating. While still in its early stages, this program has produced outstanding results in providing the best combat service support to the tactical units within USARV. As of 25 Mar 69, 1162 items have been processed under the CCIL program. Of these, a 79% fill has been effected.

SUBMITTED BY:
Operations Division, Dir/Requirements, USAICCV
Action Officer: Mr. H.S. Sweeney, Tel: LB 2809/6576
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Management Analysis Projects Programmed and Performed by ACofS, Comptroller

2. PURPOSE: To summarize the Management Analysis actions being implemented by ACofS, Comptroller.

3. BACKGROUND: The Management Analysis Division was recently organized and staffed to provide the command with a management analysis capability similar to that which is available to private industry. This division is responsible for providing the command with a special studies, review and analysis, cost reduction, and on-site management engineering capability.

4. DISCUSSION: The following actions are significant projects which were recently completed or are in progress:

   a. Unit Efficiency Indicators: A project is under development to provide the Commanding General with an efficiency indicator for each type of unit assigned to the command. The system will be a management tool to be coordinated with ACofS, Personnel's Project OVERHEAD in order to determine excessive labor overhead in 1st Logistical Command units. Another aspect tentatively involves a comparison of unit personnel strengths with unit output in an attempt to establish the efficiency of the unit.

   b. Personnel Surveys: Personnel Surveys were undertaken at the Saigon facility of the Philco-Ford consolidated Commercial Vehicle Parts Warehouse and at the Pacific Architects and Engineers (PA&E) Non-Standard Repair Parts Depot D. The purpose of the surveys was the review of staffing at these facilities in light of their functions and workload in order to adjust needed manpower to required level of effort. The result of the Philco-Ford survey was a two-fold recommendation that the personnel authorization be reduced by 25 persons and that the contract officer negotiate with Philco-Ford for a more complete and detailed performance based workload data report which will be the basis for further performance reviews. The result of the PA&E survey was a recommendation that the personnel authorization be reduced by 35 persons from its present authorized level.

   c. Reorganization of Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command under TASTA 70 Concept. A study was initiated to apply the TASCOM/FASCOM concept to the organization of the Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command. The objectives were to save military spaces and to improve the functional coordination within the staff by reducing the span of control. The results of the study were approved for implementation 1 Nov 68. The major changes involved the command and control structure rather than disturbance of the operating divisions of the headquarters. These changes were:

      (1) An Assistant Chief of Staff, Services was established using the

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Director of Engineering resources as the nucleus.

(2) Director of Petroleum and Director of Food became directorates under Assistant Chief of Staff, Supply.

(3) Director of Retrograde and Disposal was dissolved. The Sales and Disposal Division was made a division under Assistant Chief of Staff, Services. The retrograde functions will continue to be performed by Assistant Chiefs of Staff, Supply, Maintenance and Ammunition in coordination with the Assistant Chief of Staff, Transportation.

(4) The remaining directors were redesignated Assistant Chiefs of Staff. These changes are in keeping with current doctrine and should provide the Commanding General with one point of contact for all commodities except ammunition, which remained a separate Assistant Chief of Staff. This organizational realignment was accomplished within current authorized resources and in addition identified initially 52 spaces to use to meet other urgent requirements. The realignment will be re-evaluated after a shake-down period to identify further manpower savings.

d. Instructor and Inspector Teams: In October 1968 four ten man teams were organized to provide assistance to DSU/GSU and customer units requiring operational guidance and procedural assistance. The teams operate in each of the Corps Tactical Zones on a schedule coordinated with the support commands. Each team is composed of the major MOS's encountered in the supply and maintenance systems. Approximately four working days are spent with each unit visited, during which time the team members observe the routine duties performed at the various work stations and identify improper actions. Periods of instruction are given to the DSU/GSU personnel involved, so that proper procedures are known, incorporated in the job instructions and used in the operations. At the conclusion of the time period, a critique is conducted, a report provided to the unit commander and a follow-up checkup tentatively scheduled. By correcting procedures at the source, more valid Prescribed Load Lists (PLL's) are to be obtained. Such actions will have far-reaching effects on improving supply and maintenance data in the logistical system. Follow on projects resulting from these inspections have the objective of developing standardized procedures and layouts.

e. Personnel Review at PA&E Class IV, Engineering Construction Material Yard, Long Binh, Vung Tau, Contract DAB J-1169-C-0014: A Management Analysis Team conducted a review of subject contract and concentrated on the following areas:

(1) Personnel on hand versus personnel authorized.
(2) Personnel staffing and operations.

(3) Personnel management including payroll procedures and control.

(4) Reports control.

The result of the review was a recommendation that the personnel authorization be reduced by 627 persons from its present authorized level of 2583 persons. These findings should be valuable for future contract negotiations. A briefing on the study was held for the Commanding General.

f. 53rd General Support Group Management Survey: Recently a management assistance team conducted a management survey to determine an appropriate organization structure and manning level for the 53rd General Support Group in order to operate the Vung Tau Sub-area Command and in order to support US and Allied Forces in the Vung Tau and delta areas. Intermediate objectives were:

(1) Evaluation of the organization and functions required to carry out the combat services support mission.

(2) Evaluation of the organization and functions required to carry out port operations and terminal service missions.

(3) Evaluation of the organization and functions required to carry out the "housekeeping" mission as installation coordinator.

The study was completed with recommendations submitted to the Commanding General, Saigon Support Command.

g. Cat Lai - Cogido Ammunition Movement Study: This project was undertaken in order to determine the Cat Lai port capability and the capability of the Cogido barge site to off-load barges. During the entire survey all aspects of the operations were observed to learn if all available resources are being used in the most effective manner. The results of the study included the following recommendations:

(1) The standard for off-loading ammunition at Cat Lai should be set at 1929 short tons per day.

(2) The standard for backloading ammunition at Cat Lai should be set at 1338 short tons per day.

(3) The standard for off-loading ammunition at Cogido should be set at
1680 short tons per day.

(h) The 14 major problem areas identified should be attacked in accordance with solutions suggested in the survey.

h. Quality Assurance: The continuing interest within the Headquarters concerning the accuracy of all types of procedures and actions resulted in fact finding visits to the Long Binh and Cam Ranh Army depots by personnel from the Management Analysis Division. Reviews were made of the quality control programs and related quality assurance measures at these two installations. As a result of these visits and the Commanding General's directive to separate depot quality assurance and quality control activities, the Management Analysis Division is drafting a regulation outlining quality assurance policies and responsibilities.

i. Marine Maintenance Contract - CRB: The Management Analysis Division is undertaking a management survey of the Marine Maintenance contract with Vinnell Corporation at Cam Ranh Bay. This survey is a result of a recommendation of the 1st Logistical Command Contract Performance Board of Review. Special areas of interest will include:

1. Personnel authorization versus on hand and utilization.

2. Review of the system used to record man-hours and cost.

3. Review of systems, procedures, and records necessary to evaluate contractors performance (feasibility of establishing performance standards).

4. Review systems and procedures used to record and control requisitions made against the "stovepipe" supply system.

j. Project Find II: During February, 1969, a team was formed of management analysts, auditors, and supply specialists to undertake a study of the supply requisition flow at Saigon, Cam Ranh, and Qui Nhon Support Commands. The concept was to trace 500 requisitions for the month of December, 1968, from 10 units within the three support commands, through the supply system until each requisition was rejected, cancelled, filled, lost or passed out of country by the ICCV. The general objective of the study is a determination of the degree and causes of losses and delays in processing of the requisitions and a determination of the adequacy of the audit trail and document control. The field work has been completed to the ICCV. The team is currently awaiting answers to its customer inquiries at the ICCV.

SUBMITTED BY: ACoS, Comptroller: H.D.S
Chief, Management Analysis Division: E.N.M.
Project Officer: James W. Barnhouse, CPT, LBN 6086
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Same II

2. PURPOSE: To provide information on Same II as it relates to chart standardization.

3. DISCUSSION: a. On 5 October 1968, 1st Logistical Command Circular 335-3 covering chart standardization was published. This circular set up the standard techniques to be used in all of 1st Logistical Command official charts, thus insuring that data would be displayed identically throughout all echelons of the command. The purpose was to make the analysis of the data a much easier task for all levels of management.

b. By December 1968, the 1st Logistical Command credibility gap of assets on the ground to assets reflected in computer reports was brought to a close. Therefore, to insure against any discrepancies in data, absolute standardization of format, criteria used, formula used in computing data, cut-off dates and source reports had to be accomplished.

c. On 5 Feb 69 the standardization program was extended to include standard briefing charts at all levels of command. This phase of the program was labeled "Same X" and includes such important command projects as quality control and quality assurance of Count II, project FILL, and STOP/SEE.

4. ACTIONS: A letter was sent to all of the support commands requiring the standardization of management data and format. The 1st Logistical Command staff sections were required to submit the necessary factors as described in paragraph 3b above. This information was published in the December issue of the Review and Analysis. Using this information, support commands will standardize their charts. A continuing review and comparison of all statistical reviews is made by the ACoS, Comptroller and any discrepancies must be reconciled.

SUBMITTED BY: ACoS, Comptroller
Project Officer: MAJ Chappell, LBN 3582
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project Smart II

2. PURPOSE: To discuss the basic principles of and status of Project Smart II.

3. BACKGROUND: The Commanding General has tasked ACoS, Comptroller with establishing Project Smart II. This program was to be tied in with a system of efficiency indicators.

4. DISCUSSION: a. A system which would specify capacity and requirements of each unit in the 1st Logistical Command was desired. The original method under development for measuring unit efficiency employed a comparison of unit capabilities in manhours with unit authorization in manhours. Now, however, this approach seems too complex for the rapidly changing conditions of a combat zone. A continuing attempt is being made to develop a workable system based on personnel strengths compared with anticipated output standards.

   b. This system tentatively will be coordinated with Project OVERHEAD for the purpose of measuring and identifying excess overhead labor. Clear definitions of "overhead" and "touch" labor must be established.

   c. Appropriate output standards must be established for each TOE. Coordination with appropriate staffs sections will be necessary to identify these standards.

5. ACTION TAKEN: a. A chart has been designed to show efficiency indicators in graphic form.

   b. Basic instructions have been written explaining how to compute a unit's efficiency indicator.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACoS, Comptroller: H.D.S.
Chief, Management Analysis Division: E.N.M.
Project Officer: James W. Barnhouse, CPT, LBN 6086
AVCA CG

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND
APO San Francisco 96384

3 November 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL
CHIEF OF STAFF
ASSISTANT CHIEFS OF STAFF
CHIEFS OF SPECIAL STAFF

SUBJECT: Project "SYSTEM"

1. This command has initiated or participated in many system modifications through SOP's - "Operations" - "Projects" - and other procedural and policy changes which were made in order to achieve combat support required and, at the same time, to cause the system to become more effective or more economical.

2. Each of the actions referred to in paragraph 1 should be required to withstand the test of the question, "If we had to do this to get the job done effectively and economically, should this procedural/policy change be adopted into the logistics system of the Department of Defense/Department of the Army?" If the answer is yes, then the regulations covering such procedures/policies, such as AR 725-50, AR 711-16, AR 735-35, and other subordinate regulations should be changed ASAP. If the answer should be no, then the modifications made should be closely scrutinized to determine why they were made and has the environment within which they were born changed so that temporary expediencies are no longer appreciated. If the latter is the case, then our regulations, at least locally, should be modified accordingly.

3. The more I read and hear about the reason for the visit of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (I&L) and the Assistant Secretary of the Army (I&L), and the accompanying senior personnel, the more I am convinced that we need to present to them in a well-compiled booklet a summary coverage of all procedures/policies which fall into categories of those determined appropriate for inclusion in the permanent logistics system of the U.S. Army and the Department of Defense as proven by combat support in Vietnam. (Where practicable refer to changes that should be required and applicable AR's should be annotated in an outline form covering each procedural/policy change involved.)
SUBJECT: Project "SYSTEM"

4. Some examples of the things I refer to are:

a. OPERATION FILL - which begins to provide us with the intelligence showing what the combat essential weapons systems really need among the many thousands of stocked items in order to contribute directly to the defeat of the enemy by prevention of deadlines and continued operational readiness to the maximum extent.

b. OPERATION STOP/SEE - and its procedural implications both in retail and wholesale level in the combat theater and in CONUS.

c. PROJECT COUNTER - Project "COUNTER" personnel of appropriate numbers of MOS's at each DSII and higher logistics headquarters to provide instructor/inspector service at all levels.

d. PROJECT CLEAN - to include revised procedures pertaining to reconciliation of demand data and appropriate changes to stockage criteria based upon having high velocity stock in support of deadlined equipment forward with slower moving stock progressively removed to the rear and supported through fast transportation.

e. PROJECT FLOW - The ingredients both in and out of the combat theater which will provide command and control of supplies in transit, allowing for reduced stockage on the ground, supplanted knowledge and control of supplies in the pipeline.

f. PROJECT THRU-PUT - Wherein implementation of Project Flow provides the basis for procedures which eliminate unnecessary stopping and re-handling of supplies that should either go forward or be retrograded without stopping at intermediate locations. This includes the maintaining of memorandum accounts to insure adequate asset control.

g. PROJECT EDIT - Whereby at the lowest level the supply specialist and NCO begins the process of determining whether an item is really required and challenging the priority within which it should be requisitioned. As this process goes back through the system, it will change of necessity in some cases from a manual to an automated review. It requires special criteria in ADP programs which will cause any requirement going through the computer to be challenged by the computer and thrown out for management review whenever the specific criteria in the program is exceeded. This challenge system applies not only to requisitioning, but to movement of supplies in process because of requisitions or any "push" that may be causing movement of materiel.
AVCA-CG
SUBJECT: Project "SYSTEM"  3 November 1968

h. PROJECT MANIFEST - It will give us supply information on all manifests rather than just cube and tonnage by general nomenclature, allowing for appropriate challenge of movement and pre-planning of materiel to be received.

i. PROJECT CASTLES & FLAGS - The command and control system to assure no more, no less within two to three months stockage criteria for construction materials needed in engineer and communications projects.

5. The above are but significant examples of system changes which have been effected that are outside present system regulations. To these must be added such obvious ones as Project "INTENSIVE MANAGEMENT ITEMS", Project "CCIL", Weapons Systems Management, "STOVEPIPE", "RED BALL", etc.

6. These items are daily in this command on the tips of our tongues and fingers due to the emphasis being placed on their execution in our daily logistics routines. I want quick action to be taken by each functional director to review all such actions pertaining to systems as indicated above. It is desired that each functional director cover such actions in outline form and put together in a standard format which can be inserted into a booklet by the Deputy Commander as a tab covering each particular functional area. The Deputy Commander must have these tabs in his hands for compilation into a booklet NLT 8 NOV 68.

7. Your expedited cooperation is appreciated. We have an opportunity to make a tremendous contribution to future combat support if we do this in the manner in which I know we can.

[Signature]

JOE M. HEISER, JR.
Major General, USA
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
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1. **SUBJECT:** Contract Management in Republic of Vietnam.

2. **PURPOSE:** To provide information on the procedures utilized for contract management in Vietnam.

3. **BACKGROUND:**
   a. Contractors are responsible for timely and satisfactory performance of their contracts. However, the Government cannot rely entirely upon the contractor to make sure that the contract work is progressing as scheduled; it cannot risk poor performance in the areas of quality, quantity, timeliness or cost. At times, the Government itself encounters problems that affect contract management such as lack of GFE and parts. Changes in program requirements or new operational concepts may require redirection of the work. It may even be wasteful to continue along the original path while changes are being considered. Contract administration is expected to provide the following benefits:

   (1) Improve management of contracts.
   (2) Provide more accurate and timely support.
   (3) Decrease costs.
   (4) Intensify contractor management.
   (5) Determine adequacy of contractor progress.
   (6) Evaluate total contractor performance.

   b. Contract management at the US Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam, falls into three major workload areas, namely service contracts (89.9%), supplies contracts (1.7%) and subsistence contracts (0.4%). Monitoring is accomplished by the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Procurement Activity</th>
<th>Requiring Activity</th>
<th>DOD Activity</th>
<th>Command Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contracting Officer</td>
<td>CORs</td>
<td>DCAA</td>
<td>Technical Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract Administrator</td>
<td>Ordering Officers</td>
<td></td>
<td>Requirement Specialist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Property Admin.</td>
<td>Service Technicians</td>
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<td>Quality Assurance</td>
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<td>Price Analysts</td>
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The intensity or refinement of contract management varies in relation to the type of contract selected to obtain the services or supplies.

**DISCUSSION:**

a. Administrating of Firm Fixed Price and Fixed Price Indefinite Quantity contracts in areas of supplies, subsistence and a portion of services is accomplished by representatives of the requiring activities and agency procurement personnel. In this area, the period of contract performance is generally of short duration, requirements remain stable and progress evaluation is minimal except in those operations wherein the technical aspects of the contractors performance require emphasis. The contracting officer and his assistants continually review contract files including field reports, hold conferences with contractor personnel, supervise CORs and Ordering Officers' activities and take whatever action is required to maintain the contractual package current with the needs of the Government. These contracts seldom have Government furnished property or materials.

b. There are a limited amount of contracts which contain special aspects; such as reduction in price for large volume quantities, demurrage, and Government responsibilities for leased equipment. These contracts require a more refined degree of constant evaluation. Such monitorship is obtained by appointed CORs and Ordering Officers with added safeguards at the contracting officer level.

c. CPFF type contracts have a deployment of fully qualified individuals who assist the contracting officers in obtaining maximum performance with minimum costs. The Government participates in monitoring the actual management of the contractor's performance to control expenditures by the contractor and assure that the Government receives the services it bargained for.

d. The tasks and expenditure of funds are monitored by CORs, Ordering Officers, DCAA auditors and service technicians of the requiring activity on the work site who report contract progress to the contracting officer. The latter with his in-house manning assets reviews reports from the on-site Government personnel and the contractor. Field trips are made by the procurement agency personnel including property administration on a scheduled and/or required basis.

e. Performance standards are contained in the provisions and specifications of the contract as implemented by sound business and industrial practices associated with the task at hand.

f. Resulting compilation of reports, reviews, and visits are utilized to evaluate the contractor's performance on a day-to-day basis. In those
instances where specialists in diverse fields beyond the staffing of the procurement agency are needed in an advisory or consultatory capacity such consultants are made available by higher headquarters.

g. Although heavy emphasis is placed on economical and efficient contract management the major emphasis is insuring the best performance logistically for the combat troops of the Free World Forces.

5. ACTION: Continue to assign best qualified personnel available to contract administration and fully utilize recommendations of the Contract Performance Board of Review.

SUBMITTED BY: ACoS, Procurement
PROJECT OFFICER: Edgar F. Allen
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Contract Performance Board of Review (CPBR).

2. PURPOSE: To provide information on the purpose and conduct of the Contract Performance Board of Review.

3. BACKGROUND: a. Each year, the United States Army Procurement Agency Vietnam awards over thirty service contracts in excess of $500,000. These contracts provide the 1st Logistical Command with services critical to the conduct and support of the war in Vietnam.

   b. The 1st Logistical Command has a continuing responsibility to monitor and review these contracts to insure that the contracts do fill the current requirements of the support mission in Vietnam.

4. DISCUSSION: a. At the direction of the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, the CPBR was created to review and monitor active service contracts in excess of $500,000. The CPBR also reviews other contracts as determined appropriate.

   b. The CPBR is composed of permanent, associate, and on-call members. Only the permanent members have a vote. The Deputy Commanding General is the chairman of the CPBR. The ACofS, Procurement is the recorder.

   c. Each month, the CPBR will meet to review those contracts selected by the ACofS, Procurement. At the meetings, a representative of the staff section with cognizance over a contract to be reviewed will present to the CPBR a briefing which confirms the requirement, analyze the performance, and make appropriate recommendations to the CPBR. The Contracting Officer will submit a contract performance summary sheet which includes a description of the services; quantified standards of performance; quantities actually performed during the preceding month and the months previous to that; cost of operations for the preceding month; cost per unit; authorized, actual, and proposed increases or decreases in contractor manning tables; and the manner in which the service is performed.

   d. The CPBR will thoroughly review the performance of each contract and submit its findings and recommendations to the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command.

5. ACTION: None.

SUBMITTED BY: ACofS, Procurement
Project Officer: 1LT Sinnott
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Resources Review Board.

2. PURPOSE: To present information concerning the development and implementation of the Resources Review Board.

3. BACKGROUND: a. CG has directed the establishment of a Resources Review Board. The purpose of the board is to review the resources of the 1st Logistical Command and all subordinate elements in accordance with assigned missions in order to make recommendations for the most efficient and effective utilization of command and control headquarters, military units, civilian employees, contractors, installations, facilities, and equipment. Proposals relating to Master Planning as well as service and supply contracts (excluding contracts for depot stock), of interest to the board, will be reviewed.

   b. The DCG will be Chairman of the Board with permanent members consisting of CofS and other selected principle ACoFS's. Invited members will include ACoFS, O4, USARV and representatives from 1st Signal Brigade and USAECAV. ACoFS, SP&O will serve as the recorder and coordinator of subjects to be brought before the board and the implementation of approved recommendations.

4. DISCUSSION: a. The board will analyze specific areas where it appears feasible to achieve increased economy and efficiency. This will include a continuous consideration of the present and projected tactical situation and the review of all major actions connected with new and changing mission requirements. Specifically, the board will review requests for units, proposed activations and inactivations, adjustments in space authorizations, MTEAs and MTOEs, reallocation of resources, TDY assistance teams, certain service and supply contracts, and any other action which results in a significant increase or decrease in total command resources, i.e., activities, facilities, equipment, or personnel. Only in cases of emergency will major activities or installations be established without prior review by the board and approval by the Commanding General. Proposals for Board consideration may be submitted by Board members, principle staff members, Has 1st Logistical Command and support command commanders. The Board will also review and make recommendations concerning Master Planning.

   b. To date the board has been involved in the following actions.
(1) On 17 January 1969 the Board reviewed FRAC's for stevedoring and transportation requirements at USASUPCON OAH. The Board recommended CO approve both FRAC's.

(2) On 18 January 1969, ACoS, Transportation presented to the Board the results of a survey conducted by a special survey group with respect to the scaling down and consolidation of 1st Logistical activities at Tuy Hoa/Yang Ro. The board agreed with recommendations presented by ACoS, Trans and recommended that the same briefing be presented to CO for approval and to the staff of IPPY with a view of coordinating the proposed action.

(3) At the monthly Commander's Conference on 20 January 1969, ACoS, SPAC represented the Board in presenting an overall analysis of the Command's resources versus requirements. This was an initial effort toward developing a detailed and accurate management tool which will assist in the attainment of 100 percent efficiency in utilization of command resources.

5. ACTIONS: a. A charter is being developed to cover the Board's specific responsibilities and procedures.

b. The Board will meet at least monthly and other times as necessary upon call of the chairman.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACoS, SPAC
Project Officer: Major Woody, LBN 2922/2782
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project SOP

2. PURPOSE: To provide information concerning the implementation of Project SOP.

3. BACKGROUND: a. The Commanding General stated in LOCC Notes dated 16 April 1969 that all staffs and units would have unit and job (Desk) SOPs by 15 May 1969. The project will be divided into the following two sub projects:

   (1) SOP-A-Unit SOPs

   (2) SOP-B-Individual SOPs

b. Provides units and individuals means to insure job continuity upon replacement of incumbents. In addition, acts as a teaching vehicle and management tool for operational consistency.

4. ACTION: Command letter to all units requiring job and unit SOPs to be completed by 15 May 69. Support commands are responsible to insure that units meet this requirement. DF to Staff, HQ, 1st Logistical Command requiring all staff elements to prepare organizational and job SOPs by 15 May 69.

SUBMITTED BY: ACofS, Comptroller
Chief, Management Analysis Division: E. N. M.
Project Officer: Major Sullenger, LBN 6086
1. SUBJECT: Project "Problem Solutions"

2. PURPOSE: To provide information concerning the implementation of Project "Problem Solutions".

3. BACKGROUND: a. The Commanding General initiated this project in Major Actions Chart, dated 16 Apr 69. The purpose of this project is to get each person of this Command to raise unsolved problems so that each significant problem can be raised to a level where solution can be effected and assured.

   b. Action required included specific review at all levels to be made within two weeks of receiving directive at all units/agencies but not later than 15 May 69. Current problems not solved are to be summarized at each level of command/supervisor and reviewed at the next command/supervisor level.

4. ACTION TAKEN: a. Message 6423, dated 4 May 69, to CG, support commands implementing Project "Problem Solutions". That unresolved problems at these headquarters be summarized and provided to ATTN: ACofS, Comptroller, 1st Logistical Command, NLT 12 May 69. These problems were forwarded to Hq, 1st Log, and answers provided to the Support Commands.

   b. As unresolved problems are recognized at Support Command levels they will continue to be forwarded to Hq. 1st Log for solution.

SUBMITTED BY: ACofS, Comptroller
Chief, Management Analysis Division: E. N. M.
Project Officer: Major Sullenger, LBN 6086
1. SUBJECT: Reports Control Board

2. PURPOSE: To provide information concerning the CCIP Project Reports Control.

3. BACKGROUND: The CG's LOCC Notes 4-17, dated 21 April required that a Reports Control Board be set up and that every staff officer requiring a report would go before this board and justify all reports required. The Commanding General verbally stated that this should be a requirement for all support commands, depots, and groups. The purpose of the board was to examine all reports, to eliminate as many as possible, to consolidate where possible, to reduce the frequency where possible, and to make recommendations to higher headquarters on the elimination of certain reports required by higher headquarters.

4. DISCUSSION: The first action to be taken was to transmit UNCLAS to all support commands establishing the requirement for a Reports Control Board. The HQ, 1st Logistical Command Reports Control Board was then established with the permanent members being:

- ACofS, Comptroller - President
- Deputy Inspector General
- Deputy ACofS, Transportation
- Deputy ACofS, Maintenance
- Deputy Commanding Officer, ICCV

The alternate members are:

- Deputy ACofS, Ammunition
- Deputy ACofS, Services

The board was first convened on 10 May 1969 and basic rules were established as well as the elimination of four reports. As of the 18 July 1969 Board meeting, 86 reports had been reviewed by the board with 56 reports being rescinded and 5 reports being revised to decrease the man-hours required to prepare the report.

ACTION: Reports Control Board will meet weekly to continuously review all reports required by this headquarters and higher headquarters.

SUBMITTED BY: MAJ Chappell
PROJECT OFFICER: 1LT D. D. Holmes/LBN 4423
SECTION II

Supply Improvement Programs
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project Castles and Flags.

2. PURPOSE: To prescribe policy and procedure for intensified management review of Engineer and Signal construction materiel requisitions; to reduce the on hand stocks of certain construction materiel.

3. BACKGROUND: On hand stocks of certain construction materiel were noted to be excessive in many cases. To reduce on hand stocks to a manageable level, procedures for intensive management review of construction materiel requisitions were developed and entitled Project Castles and Flags.

4. DISCUSSION: a. This project was designed to reduce the flow of unnecessary construction material into Vietnam. To accomplish this, all requisitions exceeding a set dollar value which require out-of-country fill will be manually reviewed at the USAICCV by appropriate commodity managers.

b. Requisitions which appear excessive will be forwarded to ACoFS, Services for further review and coordination with the requisitioning agency.

c. If a decision cannot be reached, the requisitions will be passed to general officer level for resolution.

5. ACTION: Draft regulations on Project Castles and Flags for USARV and 1st Logistical Command were compiled by this headquarters and forwarded to USARV for comments. USARV has indicated that the Project Castles and Flags concept will be incorporated into a USARV regulation. At that time, a 1st Logistical Command regulation will be published to implement the USARV regulation.

SUBMITTED BY: ACoFS, Supply
Project Officer: 1LT John C. Rahiya, LBN 4122
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project Clean Phase II

2. PURPOSE: This fact sheet is prepared to present the concept, purpose and current status of Project Clean Phase II.

3. BACKGROUND: This project was started with the objective of identifying in the forward areas stocks which were not moving. Once identified these stocks would be moved to the rear using maximum possible thru put shipments out of Vietnam to CONUS, Okinawa, Japan Taiwan or Korea.

4. DISCUSSION: This project initially concentrated on FSAs and ISAs. It has since evolved into the thru put project and has become undistinguishable from that project. The objectives of this project are now accomplished under Project Thru-Put.

5. ACTION: All actions under this project are now accomplished under and reported within Project Thru-Put.

SUBMITTED BY: ACofS, Supply
Project Officer: MAJ Braithwaite
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project Clean Phase III.

2. PURPOSE: This fact sheet is prepared to present the concept, purpose, and current status of Project Clean Phase III.

3. BACKGROUND: This project was established concurrently with Clean Phase II and had as its objective the retrograde of non moving supplies from DSU/GSU's to depots or thru put out of country.

4. DISCUSSION: Actual operation of this program has been overtaken by project Thru-Put. Under project Thru-put the support commands now work directly with the DSU/GSU in redistributing, retrograding, reporting and thru-putting excess supplies.

5. ACTION: All actions under this project are now accomplished under and reported within project Thru-put.

SUBMITTED BY: ACoS, Supply
Project Officer: MAJ Braithwaite
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project Count

2. PURPOSE: To provide information on Project Count

3. BACKGROUND: The availability balance files and stock records of all echelons of supply activities within the 1st Logistical Command contained erroneous and incomplete data. This accumulation of inaccurate logistical intelligence adversely affected logistical support to combat units and contributed also to the accumulation of excess stocks. Project Count was initiated in September 1968 and had a completion target of 15 January 1969. As of 28 December 1968, all depots reported that the physical count of all stocks had been completed.

4. DISCUSSION: The goal of Project Count was to improve reliability of the location system and inventory. The completion of Project Count on 28 Dec 68 marked the Army's first "perimeter to perimeter" inventory under combat conditions. The accuracy of the supply data base and confidence in the system was greatly improved, enabling the command to provide much better support to customers. This can be seen in the significant increase in demand satisfaction and decrease in materiel denials at each depot.

5. ACTION: As a follow-up to Project Count, Project Count II was initiated on 10 February 1969.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACofS Supply
Project Officer: CPT Manske, LBN 4962
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project Count II.

2. PURPOSE: To provide background and current status of Project Count II.

3. BACKGROUND: During the period September 1968 through January 1969, the 1st Logistical Command executed Project Count; a complete inventory of all stocks on hand at all supply echelons within the command. The updating of all supply records within the command was a first, and succeeded in reducing warehouse denial rates and increasing customer satisfaction throughout the theater. Project Count II is a program for maintaining and further improving the results of Project Count, and was begun at all command depots and DSU's/GSU's during the month of February.

4. DISCUSSION: a. The concept of Project Count II requires an accelerated 100 percent cyclic inventory to be conducted throughout the command every six months. The first of these is scheduled for completion by 31 July this year. The program is designed to permit centralized control and reporting. All depots will be inventorying FSC's in the same order throughout the period.

b. With the lessons learned from Project Count, and the present improved data base, Project Count II will insure that all supply data and records are current and accurate. Further reduction of excess supply pipelines, and number of high-priority requisitions can also be expected.

5. ACTION: Project Count II has now been implemented throughout the command. The addition of three AMC Inventory Advisors, one at each depot, has aided the total effort immeasurably. The first month of the project has seen the implementation of new inventory computer programs, determined rewarehousing efforts, and the conducting of locator surveys and updates at all command depots. Actual counting of stocks has recently begun at all depots and DSU/GSUs.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACofS, Supply
Project Officer: CPT Manske, LBN 4962
Project COUNT II
(Project)

Cognizant Activity: ACoFS Supply

CONSOLIDATED DSU/GSU INVENTORY REPORT (THEATER WIDE)

Report for Period Ending: 8 Mar 69
Project Starting Date: 10 Feb 69
Implementation Date: 25 Feb 69
% Project Completion: 3.6%

TASK DESCRIPTION/UNIT OF MEASUREMENT

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<th>Period Ending</th>
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NOTE: Explain shortfalls or deviations on reverse side

AVCA Form 80R (14Sep68)
All DSUs/GSUs had not reported to the support commands as of 5 March 1969. Saigon support command had in fact received no reports. These reports will be added to more recent ones in time for the next reporting period.
Project COUNTRY II
(Project)

Cognizant Activity: ACOFS Supply
Project Officer: CPT Manaka

DEPOT INVENTORY RESULTS
(THEATER WIDE)

Report for Period Ending 8 Mar 69
Project Starting Date: 10 Feb 69
Implementation Date: 28 Feb 69
% Project Completion: 1.13

TASK DESCRIPTION/
UNIT OF MEASUREMENT

Period Ending
LINES COUNTED (THOUSAND)

0 100 200 300 400
31 Jan 28 Feb 31 Mar 30 Apr 31 May 30 Jun 31 Jul

Projection (Black)
Completed (Blue)
Shortfall (Red)

NOTE: Explain shortfalls or deviations on reverse side

AVCA Form 80R (14Sep68)
The first month of effort was expended in computer program tests, rewarehousing operations, and complete locator surveys at all depots. Actual counting of stocks did not begin until late February or early March 69. As of 8 March, only one report has been received, that from Qui Nhon Depot.
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Depot Excess

2. PURPOSE: This fact sheet provides the background and the current status of the depot excess program.

3. BACKGROUND: Movement of excess stock from 1st Logistical Command Depots was accelerated in December 1967, when command attention was directed and maintained throughout a five phased program. This program categorized depot excesses by line item, dollar value and whether the item qualified for stockage or was an immediate candidate for excessing action by virtue of being fringe. Results of the five phase program to date are indicated by shipment out of country of 23,123 line items.

4. DISCUSSION: Wall to wall inventories by all depots has uncovered additional excess stock. This, along with the shipment of stocks to Vietnam that the USAICCV considered canceled and a change in stock retention levels from three times the requisitioning objective to 1.8 of the requisitioning objective, leaves a considerable volume of excess depot stock yet to be moved out of country. Retrograde/disposal of depot excesses is a viable program, tailored to fit current conditions and the capacity of depots to properly store and issue stocks to customers. Excessing procedures and actions are keyed to prompt removal of depot excesses from storage areas. Bulk of depot excesses are retrograded to 2d Log Comd, with certain items shipped to designated storage sites in CONUS. Formal reporting under AR 755-1 has been waived for USARV.

5. ACTION: There are 76,060 depot lines of excess stock in various phases of retrograde/disposal. Vigorous action is continuing to eliminate these lines from in-country stocks.

SUBMITTED BY:
Operations Division, Directorate of Requirements
Project Officer: Mr. Wix, LBN 2803/2809

II.6.0
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project Edit

2. PURPOSE: To preclude requisitioning of non-essential items, inordinate quantities and submission of requisitions with invalid data; beginning at the company level, each echelon of supply will be instructed to review all requisitions for essentiality and validity.

3. BACKGROUND: a. Processing of requisitions for "nice to have" items has resulted in adding non-essential lines to Authorized Stockage Lists (ASL).

b. Reduction of the number or lines on the ASL at supply activities has been a continuing objective of this Command.

c. An increasing number of requisitions are being processed that contain excessive quantities.

d. During the period of 22-26 October 1968 a 3SVN conversion team visited 1st Log Depots. This visit revealed the following:

   (1) A lack of edit and review of input documents.

   (2) A use of procedures that circumvented policies and procedures already established.

   (3) A lack of edit and review of computer generated output management tools.

   (4) The combination of (1), (2), and (3) has contributed to a high input error rate.

4. DISCUSSION: a. In June 1968 a directive was issued to all DSU/GSU's to reduce the number of the lines on their ASL's by turning in non-demand supported mission essential line items to their supporting depots.

b. A further reduction to the ASL's can be achieved through a detailed supply edit at all levels of supply to insure that only essential items are requisitioned. Unless all requisitions are edited for essentiality, starting at the unit level, demand history will be accumulated, RO's established and items which are "nice to have" rather than essential for mission completion will be stocked at all levels.
c. LC Reg 725-10, dated 27 September 1967 and 3SVN SOP Draft system implemented in February 1968 directs Policy, Responsibilities and Procedures to be followed, i.e.:

(1) Type of input documents.
(2) Format of input documents.
(3) Edit and review of input documents.
(4) Sequence of input documents.
(5) Analysis of output managerial tools.

d. Recent visits to the Depots revealed that these regulations are not being complied with; other procedures are being implemented which create more rejects than would otherwise get into the supply system.

e. The problem of self-generated errors entering the computer system could be held to a minimum with proper edit and review as well as strict adherence to existing regulations and procedures.

f. LC Reg 725-10 and 3SVN provide adequate edit criteria for units, DSUs, Depots and the ICCV.

5. ACTIONS: a. Supply edit for essentiality, inordinate quantities, and validity must be made a matter of Command interest of all levels of supply.

b. A regulation has been written and is presently being staffed, outlining the edit requirements with manual edit where ADP facilities are not available and machine edit at other echelons.

c. The supply Council must approve all new types of items recommended as additions to the TASL.

d. Depots comply with 3SVN.

e. Implementation of 3SVN at all depots and ICCV has been accomplished.

f. Quality control be established at each level of supply.

g. Review of output derived from 3SVN system to isolate and minimize the error rate.
1. Presently, customer handouts are being developed to supplement the 3SVN training program for all levels of supply.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACofS, Supply
Project Officer: Miss Alice Hudgerna, GS-12, Systems Division, LBN 5096

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### TASK DESCRIPTION/UNIT OF MEASUREMENT

1. Project Edit - Initial study of requirements.
2. USARV Reg 710-25 Draft and Staffing.
3. USARV Staffing and Publication & Distribution.

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**NOTE:** Explain shortfalls or deviations on reverse side.
Project Originally scheduled for implementation on 15 Feb. At present the shortfall is 15 days based on this original schedule. Shortfall is the result of additional staff required.
1. SUBJECT: Demand Analysis

2. PURPOSE: To provide information on demand analysis.

3. BACKGROUND: Interest in the high rate of zero balances led to the establishment of a program which would compare the number of lines stocked with the demand accommodation stratified by the number of demands.

4. DISCUSSION: The analysis was made by each of the depots and for the theater. Demand accommodation is computed for the items in each demand category on a cumulative basis beginning with more than 20 demands and proceeding to one demand. The initial study showed that approximately 5,000 lines accounted for 50% of the demand.

5. ACTION: a. Based on the analysis, the Commanding General accepted a recommendation to increase the stockage criteria from 3 demands to 4 demands. When 3SVN is implemented with an interchangeability and substitution (I&S) file, a decision will be made to increase the stockage criteria from 4 demands to 5 demands.

b. An inquiry program was run in December to identify and list the 5,000 highest demanded items in the theater ASL. This listing was compiled and distributed to the USAICCV commodity managers for their use in defining requirements for special managerial emphasis.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACofS, Supply
Project Officer: CPT Coble, LBN 5970
Cognizant Activity: AGS SUPPLY

Project Officer: CPT COBLE

Task Description:
Reduction of TASL by increasing number of demands

Unit of Measurement: # of Line Items

Note: Projection Line shows proposed size of TASL as number of demands is increased

AVCA Form 80R (14Sep68)
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Financial Inventory Reporting System

2. PURPOSE: To provide information concerning Financial Inventory Reporting (FIR) applicable to USARV Class II & IV Inventories.

3. BACKGROUND: a. Prior to 31 August 1968, there was no financial data available applicable to USARV Class II & IV Inventories. The absence of this information seriously restricts financial managers at every level in their effort to realistically project fund requirements, to support the supply system, and to efficiently manage inventories.

   b. USARPAC Message GPL0-MM, 17 November 1967, directed that regular quarterly FIA (SMR) would be furnished commencing with 30 June 1968 and that additional inventories beyond those on mechanical records at USAICCV and 34th Gp would be included as mechanization progressed.

   c. USARPAC Message GPL0-MM, 27 November 1968, provided current planning guidance for extension of the Financial Inventory Reporting system. Dependent upon installation of 3SVN, the target date for preparation of the Quarterly Stratification Report (CSGLD 1438) will be 31 March 1969. Initially, only inventories on USAICCV 3SVN will be reported. Other inventories (Aviations, Medical and Construction Material) will be included dependent on ADPE capabilities. Monthly changes in Appropriation Financed Secondary Items Inventories (CSGLD 1421) are targeted for 1 July 1969. It will be prepared by depots, and a summarized report prepared by USAICCV. Inclusion of other inventories will follow in the same manner as the stratification reports. This command recommended that the plan be changed and the CSGLD 1421 Report be made only at the USAICCV level.

4. DISCUSSION: a. The initial FIA - SMR was prepared by the USAICCV on 31 August 1968 based on the Available Balance File (ABF) of 30 June 1968. The second FIA - SMR report was submitted for 30 September 1968. The FIA - SMR data for the quarter ending 31 December 1968 was mailed by pouch from USARPAC on 9 January 1969 for preparation of the report by this command. The FIA - SMR being prepared for the past quarter will be the last report prepared in that format. Beginning with 3rd Quarter FY 69 the USAICCV will prepare the Quarterly Stratification Report (CSFLD 1438). Only those inventories included on the mechanized USAICCV 3SVN System will be reported for the 3rd Quarter.
b. Personnel requirements to accomplish Financial Inventory Reporting within 1st Log Command were outlined in 1st Log message to USARPAC on 26 December 1968. Work is now in progress to include in the MTDA for Requirements Directorate, 10 personnel to perform this function. In addition 5 personnel, planned for Directorate of Plans and Management, will be distributed 3 to Management Division and 2 to Systems Division.

5. ACTION: During the 3rd quarter FY 69 it will be necessary to obtain the FIR programs, obtain personnel to perform the various FIR management phases, and train the appropriate personnel in their FIR functions.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACofS, Supply
Project Officer: MAJ Bramithwaite
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Intensive Management Items (IMI)

2. PURPOSE: This fact sheet is to provide information on the intensive management of secondary items.

3. BACKGROUND: Based upon AR 710-50, dated 13 March 1968, a 1st Logistical Command Regulation 710-3 (copy attached), dated 6 February 1969, was published. This regulation directs the Intensive Management of Secondary Items Program within the 1st Logistical Command.

4. DISCUSSION: a. LC Reg 710-3 covers actions required at the 1st Logistical Command Headquarters, support commands, depot, DSU/GSU's and the USAICCV. A recommended list of IMI will be forwarded to support commands for dissemination down to DSU/GSU level. DSU's will conduct a LCOP inventory of IMI items and provide notification to the supporting depots. After inventory and review at the depot, information is forwarded to the USAICCV. Based upon the USAICCV review and consolidation, a list will be forwarded to the appropriate NICP's for inclusion in supply letters as stated in AR 710-50. On 22 October 1968, a letter was forwarded to General Besson, USAMC, recommending a procedure for IMI enroute following:

b. On 29 November 1968, the CG USAMC wrote a letter to CG 1st Logistical Command stating that the following actions were being taken:

(1) Project code of IMI has been assigned for use with requisitions submitted for critical items.

(2) A distinctive color marking consisting of a white rectangle with black diagonal stripes superimposed thereon, running from the upper left hand corner to the lower right corner for placement on all shipments to this command.

c. It was stated that routing all IMI requisitions through the LCOP had to be approved through DCSLOG. Information has been received from DCSLOG and it was stated that IMI requisitions would not be forwarded to LCOP for en route following. With the advent of the automatic address system at Dayton, Ohio, LCOP will be automatically notified of requisitions being submitted through the system.

d. Commodity managers at USAICCV have started utilizing project code IMI on requisitions for replenishment of critical items that have been designated under the IMI program.

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f. Based upon approval by CG KUMTS, IKI en route following has
been approved at all levels. All requisitions being submitted under
this program will have the IKI project code placed on the requisition.
When the requisitions are received at the NICPs, they will be forwarded
to the supplier who will mark all shipping containers with the special
marking. In addition, the supplier will notify the port that the IKI
is being shipped. Upon receipt at the port, the item will be loaded
and will be designated as an IKI on the transceived advance manifest.
When this is received in RVN, the consignee will be notified as to date
of arrival at port. The item is then controlled until delivered to the
consignee by reporting to the consignee as to status at each level.

5. ACTION: 'Continued' in accordance with LC Reg 710-3.

SUBMITTED BY:
ADfS, Supply
Project Officer: MjJ Morris, L.M. 4422
INVENTORY MANAGEMENT

Intensive Management of Secondary Items

1. Purpose. To establish and prescribe:
   a. Criteria for selecting critical secondary items for intensive management.
   b. Procedures for periodically publishing lists of recommended items for intensive management.
   c. Actions that will be taken by Army units and activities within 1st Logistical Command to intensively manage selected items.
   d. Policies and procedures for the automatic and timely return (to designated sources) of serviceable and unserviceable assets listed in National Inventory Control Point (NICP) Supply Letters.
   e. Formats that will be used to illustrate the present and projected status of certain selected critical secondary items.

2. Applicability. The provisions of this regulation are applicable to:
   a. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Supply/United States Army Inventory Control Center, Vietnam.
   b. United States Army Support Commands.
   c. All Army units and activities within 1st Logistical Command which are assigned a direct or general support maintenance and/or supply mission.
   d. All Army units and activities within 1st Logistical Command which are assigned a depot mission.

3. Definitions. For the purpose of this regulation, the following definitions apply:
   a. Automatic return items. Selected items of supply designated by the appropriate NICP for return to a designated source of supply or commercial contractor facility for repair, when condition warrants, without recourse to individual line item disposition instructions prior to shipment.

*This regulation supersedes LC Regulation 710-3, dated 25 September 1968.

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b. Intensive Management Items (DMI): Secondary items of supply, selected by CONUS NICP's and 1st Logistical Command meeting the criteria prescribed herein, which require intensive management at all levels.

c. Intensive management: The application of specified management actions to critical items in order to improve their supply status.

d. Secondary item: An end item, assembly, or part which supports a principal end item.

e. Serviceable item: An item of supply which is in condition for immediate use.

4. Responsibilities.  
a. The ACofS, Supply/USAICCV, this headquarters, has staff responsibility for the overall coordination and management of the intensive management program. In addition, the ACofS, Supply/USAICCV will insure that recommended intensive management lines are thoroughly screened and promptly reported to the appropriate Inventory Control Point (ICP).

b. The ACofS, Maintenance, this headquarters, is responsible for recommending candidate items on a quarterly basis for intensive management, utilizing the criteria set forth herein.

c. Support command commanders will insure that this regulation is strictly adhered to and will, where necessary, publish implementing instructions to units and activities under their command.

d. Depot commanders are responsible for timely reporting and movement of intensive managed items as outlined in this regulation.

e. DSU/JSU commanders are responsible for conducting accurate and timely inventories on intensively managed items, as well as the prompt reporting of such items to supporting depots in accordance with this regulation.

5. Procedures. 1st Logistical Command policies and procedures for the selection and management of Intensive Management and Automatic Return Items are indicated below. These policies and procedures will be closely followed by commanders at all echelons and will receive their personal attention in order that the material readiness posture of this theater will be improved.

a. Intensively Managed Items:

(1) Based on information received from supported units, the ACofS, Maintenance, in coordination with the ACofS, Supply/USAICCV, this headquarters, will prepare a list of candidate items for intensive management.
Sources for obtaining candidates are:

(a) Commanders Critical Item list (CCIL).
(b) Vehicle high deadline items.
(c) Materiel Readiness Reports.
(d) Critical items lists.
(e) High dollar value items and super high dollar value items.

(2) In order to restrict the Intensively Managed Items to a workable number of lines, the selection criteria and guidelines must be reviewed and highly essential end items and weapons systems must be identified. Then those secondary items that should be managed intensively must be selected, with special attention given to those items which reflect high deadline rates.

(a) End items or weapons systems: To identify those end items or weapon systems which require selection of supporting secondary items for intensive management, the following criteria and guidelines apply:

1. All principal items or weapons systems having secondary items and major components as integral parts will be reviewed. Ammunition will be excluded.

2. Only those actually used in combat or in direct support of combat operations will be identified.

(b) Secondary items: Selection of secondary items will be governed by the following criteria and guidelines.

1. Only those items in support of an end item meeting criteria in paragraph 5a(2)(a) 2 above will be reviewed.

2. Secondary end items must be vital to the successful employment of the end item being supported.

3. Repair parts must be functionally essential to the operation of the end item. Adornment or nonessential parts will be excluded.

(3) The ACofS, Supply/USAICCV will insure the IMI lists, and/or recommended additions to the list, are disseminated quarterly or as required, down to and including DSU/GSU level.

(h) Upon receipt of the quarterly IMI list or a list of candidate items, DSU/GSU's will conduct an immediate physical inventory to determine current
LC REG
710-3

supply position. The supporting depot will be notified within 7 days of
the inventory results on a line by line basis. The report will reflect the
following data:

(a) Total R/O.
(b) Total on hand.
(c) Total dues-in.
(d) Total dues-out.

(5) The IMI list will be utilized to verify ASL items for those types
of vehicles being supported by the DSU/GSU. On any IMI shipped to another
DSU/GSU's, give advance notice in accordance with paragraph 5a(6)(h) below.

(6) Supporting depots, upon receipt of the stock status in paragraph
5a(h) above will:

(a) Determine feasibility of lateral transfer between DSU/GSU's to
satisfy existing requirements.
(b) Issue timely disposition instructions if items are to be later-
ally transferred. On any excess items, the principles of Project "Thru-Put"
apply.
(c) Conduct physical inventories upon receipt of quarterly IMI list or
candidate lists.
(d) Add to stock on hand or place in special IMI Area, those IMI's
physically received from DSU/GSU's.
(e) Designate a special IMI area near the receiving area where in-
coming IMI items will be placed until distribution of the items to cus-
tomers can be accomplished. In addition, storage locations that presently
have IMI stocks available will be marked to indicate that the item is in-
tensively managed. The indicator will be a distinctive color marking
consisting of a white rectangle with black diagonal stripes superimposed
thereon, running from the upper left hand corner to the lower right hand
corner (See Appendix). Each IMI received at receiving will be marked with
this symbol. When an item is no longer intensively managed, the symbol will
be obliterated with white paint.
(f) Take immediate action to fill all possible dues-out. If insuf-
ficient stock is received to fill all dues-out, action will be taken to
determine where the stock is needed the most.
(g) Stock status will be forwarded to the USAICC as soon as prac-
ticable. This will give on hand balances at depots only.

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(h) Upon receipt of disposition instructions from USAICCV, due to excess stock, give advance notice to any consignee when an IMI is transferred between depots. Notification will include requisition number, FSN, number of boxes in shipment, TCMD, method of shipment, and shipment date. The purpose of this procedure is to ensure that IMI's are not lost in transit.

(7) The USAICCV will consolidate the lists received from the depots, and will conduct a review to add any additional critical items that meet the criteria to the consolidated list. Final determination of recommended IMI's will be accomplished after confirmation that the items are actually in a critical supply position.

(8) USAICCV will conduct monthly supply control reviews until such time as the item is restored to a favorable stock position. USAICCV may direct special inventories at the time of conducting monthly supply control review if deemed necessary.

(9) In accordance with stated responsibilities, the AGofS, Supply/USAICCV will insure that the recommended list is forwarded to the appropriate ICP not later than 1 June, 1 September, 1 December and 1 March.

(10) The recommended list will also be used as a source for candidate for recoverable items required by LC Reg 750-50.

(11) The following procedure will be adhered to for in-country en-route following of IMI items:

(a) USAICCV will screen all manifests for IMI items, and will coordinate with the responsible support command providing all essential data relative to the incoming IMI. Coordinating data should include FSN, TCN, manifest number (airlift cargo), aircraft tail number or vessel name, voyage document number or flight number and ETA at port of call/APOD.

(b) Upon arrival at the manifested water/aerial port of discharge, the IMI will be identified and properly documented for further transshipment. The support command is responsible for insuring consignees are notified immediately of the shipment, providing TCMD number (as applicable), shipment weight, and number of pieces shipped.

(c) The consignee will notify USAICCV of receipt of the IMI in accordance with standard 3SVN procedures.

b. Automatic returns:

(1) CONUS NICP's may select, in addition to those items selected for intensive management, items which are desired to be returned to CONUS sources without the necessity of obtaining disposition instructions. These
items will be designated as Automatic Return Items to differentiate them from Intensive Management Items. However, all IMI's are subject to automatic return.

(2) An effective supply system is dependent upon timely return or items in an unserviceable condition and serviceable items in long supply. Commanders at all echelons within 1st Logistical Command will insure that prompt return is made of those items (both intensive management and automatic return) listed in the NICP's Supply Letters. The following guidance is provided:

(a) Serviceable long supply items will be expeditiously returned to the designated supply source without prior reporting.

(b) Unserviceable recoverable items which are included in NICP Supply Letters will be returned to the designated activity, without recourse to reporting prior to shipment, provided the items are beyond theater maintenance capabilities.

(c) Unserviceable items authorized for automatic return do not require organizational maintenance prior to shipment.

(d) Preparation and processing of documents will be as prescribed in AR 725-50 and implementing command regulations. Documentation will be processed on a priority basis for the items designated in NICP Supply Letter.


b. AR 725-50.

c. LC Reg 750-50.

d. LC Reg 755-2.

(AVCA GL-PM-PP)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL: DAVID D. HULSEY

MAJOR, AOC

Chief of Staff

LEE S. KICKMAN

ASST AG

1 Appendix

IMI Symbol

DISTRIBUTION:

II.10.7

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APPENDIX

IMI SYMBOL

II.10.8
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REQUISITION AND ISSUE OF SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

Management Review and Financial Control of Requisitions

1. Purpose. To establish policies, fix responsibilities and describe procedures for the managerial and financial review of requisitions and the financial accounting therefore.

2. Applicability. This regulation applies to all requisitions generated by, and passed through, the United States Army Inventory Control Center, Vietnam to out-of-country sources of supply for the following supply classes:
   a. Class II
   b. Class IV
   c. Class VII
   d. Class IX

3. General. Users of this publication are encouraged to submit recommended changes and comments to improve the publication. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line or the text in which the change is recommended. Reasons will be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be forwarded to Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GL.

4. Responsibilities. a. The Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command:
   (1) Reserves the authority to approve requisitions within the criteria set forth in the Appendix.
   (2) Determines the effectiveness of financial controls imposed on requisitions submitted to out-of-country supply sources.
   (3) Reviews and approves monthly financial reports on fund reservations and commitments on requisitions submitted.

   b. The Commanding Officer, USAICCV is:
      (1) Responsible for approving requisitions within the limitations of the Appendix.
      (2) Responsible for the effective managerial review of requisitions within the USAICCV as set forth in the Appendix.
Accumulating statistics and reporting to Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GS the dollar value of requisitions forwarded by the USAICCV to out-of-country supply sources. These statistics will include the dollar value by material category and will be subdivided into O&MA, stock fund, PEMA P and PEMA S funded items.

Developing and implementing the necessary automatic programs to capture and update the dollar value of outstanding requisitions in process by out-of-country sources.

Coordinating with offshore supply sources on dollar value of requisitions forwarded to other Pacific commands and CONUS for action.

c. The ACofS, Comptroller, 1st Logistical Command is responsible for:

1) Coordinating and periodic reconciling of the total and outstanding fund reservations and commitments for requisitions processed by the USAICCV to offshore supply sources.

Establishing reporting requirements for 1st Logistical Command and higher headquarters briefings and reports.

5. Policy. a. Requisitions being processed by the USAICCV for submission to out of country sources of supply will be reviewed at the levels of management set forth in the Appendix to determine and justify the essentiality of the requirement by quantity and dollar value.

b. Financial controls will be established to determine the overall fund reservations and commitments for class II, IV, VII and IX material requisitions.

6. Procedures. a. The CO USAICCV will:

1) Establish a program for automatic referral of requisitions falling within the criteria set forth in the Appendix for managerial review as specified therein.

2) Establish internal procedures for justification and recommendations to accompany requisitions forwarded to the Commanding General for approval. As a minimum, justification will include the following:

a. Supply control study.

b. Results of managerial review at lower levels.

c. Higher authority or directive if applicable.
(3) Establish internal controls to assure requisitions are not split to evade the review criteria, and that separate requisitions submitted for the same item during the same cycle are considered as falling within the review criteria.

(4) Maintain statistics on requisitions reduced or disapproved as a result of managerial review.

(5) Assure that documentation supporting managerial release of requisitions is retained in accordance with AR 335-210.

(6) Provide a means for automatic accumulation of financial statistics on the dollar value of requisitions processed out-of-country.

(7) Provide a means for automatically updating due-in records on out-of-country requisitions.

(8) Prepare a monthly financial report for submission to Headquarters, lst Logistical Command AVCA GF on requisitions passed out-of-country categorized as follows:

(a) Material Category Budget Code.
(b) Dollar Value of Requisitions Passed.
(c) Dollar Value of Requisitions Outstanding.
(d) Dollar Value of Requisitions Cancelled.

(9) Maintain comparison statistics of dollar value by month, material category and budget code.

(10) Review and analyze unusual fluctuations in monthly totals, whether by MAT CAT, Budget Code, or Theater.

(11) Initiate action on unfavorable trends detected.

(12) Provide financial statistics to the ACofS, Comptroller for coordination and periodic reconciliation of fund reservations and commitments for requisitions passed to out-of-country sources of supply.

b. The ACofS, Comptroller this headquarters will:

(1) Periodically review the adequacy of financial controls and the validity of statistics for out-of-country requisitions.
(2) Reconcile, at least quarterly, the dollar value of requisitions submitted or outstanding with financial reports provided by USARPAC, Central Financial Management Agency.

(3) Provide monthly command statistics on total and outstanding financial reservations and commitments for review by the Commanding General.

(AVCA GL)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DAVID D. HULSEY
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

STANLEY D. WILD
LTG, AGC
Asst AG

Appendix
Approval Authority for Out-of-Country Requisitions

DISTRIBUTION:
D, plus
2-CG, USARV
2-CG, USASUPCOM-QNB
2-CG, USASUPCOM-SGN
2-CG, USASUPCOM-DNG
2-00, USASUPCOM-CRB
50-00, USAIOCCV
5-AVCA GF

11.10.12
83
## Approval Authority for Out-of-Country Requisitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approving Authority</th>
<th>Principal Items</th>
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<tr>
<td>Commanding General, 1st Log Comd</td>
<td>Over $1,000,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO, USAECCV</td>
<td>$500,001 - $1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director of Requirements</td>
<td>$200,001 - $500,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chief, Commodity Division</td>
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<td>Chief, Commodity Branch</td>
<td>$25,001 - $100,000</td>
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<td>Item Managers</td>
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<th>Secondary Items and Repair Parts</th>
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<tr>
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**NOTES:**
1. Dollar value criteria is based on the total value of a single requisition, or the total value of separate requisitions for the same item requisitioned during the same processing cycle.
2. Although criteria is established in dollar value, commodity divisions will give consideration to changes in the level of managerial review required when requisitions have quantities exceeding 100% of the requisitioning objective.

II.10.13
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Key Depot

2. PURPOSE: To provide information concerning key depots.

3. BACKGROUND: Before the key depot concept was established, each depot had a stock of low-density, low mortality items that were stocked because of their essential nature. It was felt that this multiple stockage of slow-moving items was cumbersome due to the duplication of effort and storage space involved.

4. DISCUSSION: The key depot concept is designed to reduce the number of in-country locations where low density, low mortality items are stocked. Single location stockage allows more effective control over these items, frees storage space at other locations to receive ASL type items, and allows closer supervision of demand history. It is important to note that keying an item to a specific depot is not a method of IMI (Intensive Management of secondary items). More intensive management of the items is a side benefit, but it should not be construed as the purpose of the key depot concept.

5. ACTION: a. Cam Ranh Bay has been designated as the key depot for Marine Maintenance items and has been recommended as the key depot for appropriate items in support of weapons, tactical vehicles, and communications-electronics equipment.

   b. Nonstandard items of repair parts have been keyed to the Long Binh Depot because of the unique nature of these items.

   c. In addition, the following items are being stocked under the key depot concept:

      (1) Radar chronograph items
      (2) Air drop peculiar items.
      (3) Parachutes.
      (4) FADAC items
      (5) Medals, decorations and awards.

SUBMITTED BY: ACofS, Supply
Project Officer: ILT Leaper, LBN 5096

II.11.0
85
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: RVN Supply Manifest Test

2. PURPOSE: To provide information on the current status of the supply manifest test between Okinawa and Cam Ranh Bay.

3. BACKGROUND: In June 1968 a test was initiated, between 2d Logistical Command, Okinawa and US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay, to furnish cross-referenced supply and transportation data on ocean shipments to Cam Ranh Bay. The purpose of the test is to determine what benefits can be gained by having advanced detailed information on supplies prior to their arrival in RVN.

4. DISCUSSION: The test involves marrying the cargo manifest cards with the detail supply cards to obtain a detail line item listing by requisition of the stocks on board an incoming vessel. The results thus far are inconclusive mainly because the Okinawa - Cam Ranh Bay shipments comprise only 10% of the total receipts of the Cam Ranh Bay Depot. The 32nd Medical Depot located at Cam Ranh Bay is receiving between 90% and 95% of all receipts from Okinawa. Coordination was effected to include the Medical Depot on the use and evaluation of the test data. There have been four (4) ships arrive since the start of the actual test (1 September 1968). The percentages of receipts from Okinawa to the Cam Ranh Bay Depot remain the same. It was proven however, that even with a (3) day sailing time between Okinawa and RVN, the use of the transacted cargo manifest cards can be accomplished within the acceptable time frame. The detail supply manifest listing is being used in conducting Project Stop. This has been particularly valuable in processing multi-pack shipments. A command letter was forwarded to USARV and indorsed to USARPAC requesting that the test be expanded to include shipments from CONUS activities to Cam Ranh Bay. USARPAC has made the decision not to expand the test at Cam Ranh Bay pending an interface system presently being developed by Field Systems Agency. Target date for this new system is 1 May 1969.

In a Memorandum dated 28 December 1968, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (I&L) approved a system of In-transit Shipment Control, matching shipments units and actual materiel to original requisitions, for world wide implementation. The plan will be structured to identify, first, the short-range efforts needed to improve the current processing of shipments to Vietnam (to include the capability to frustrate and divert shipments of materiel which are not needed in Vietnam) and secondly, the long-range need of a DOD wide in-transit shipment control file.

5. ACTION: Continuing action on the part of USARPAC and DOD to implement the expanded system.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACofS, Supply
Project Officer: MAJ Jinks, Systems Division, LEN 3020/3079
II.12.0
86
Supplementary Test

Cornizant Activity: Systems Division
Project Officer: Major Jenkins

Task Description:

UNIT OF MEASUREMENT

Test between Okinawa and Cam Ranh Bay.
Expansion to include CONUS to Cam Ranh Bay shipments

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Completion of test

- Req for expansion

- Req for expansion denied

- Projection
- Completed
- Shortfall

AVCA FORM 908 (14 Sep 68)
Project Status Chart
LC Cir 10-1

Report for Period ending 28 Feb 69
Project Starting Date: Jun 68
Implementation Date: Sep 68

Project Completion Test: 100% complete

Note: Explain shortfalls or deviations on reverse side.
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: PURA

2. PURPOSE: To provide information with reference to PACOM Utilization and Redistribution Agency (PURA).

3. BACKGROUND: In May 68, PURA was activated at Headquarters, 2d Logistical Command, Okinawa. Purpose of PURA was to screen excesses within PACOM and arrange for redistribution so as to assure full utilization of known excesses.

4. DISCUSSION: This command had taken action to eliminate excesses prior to PURA. The first approach was the "gray-box concept". Currently excesses are being retrograded, fully identified and correctly packed and crated. Initially this command participated in PURA as an off-line operation because of the limited computer availability within the command. Five lines per week were being reported to PURA; however, it was determined that excesses were extensive and a considerable delay was encountered awaiting instructions for disposition. It was determined that the majority of supplies that this command has in excess would be retrograded direct to Okinawa, thereby assuring little delay in accomplishing the total retrograde program.

5. ACTION: It is anticipated that after the majority of excess has been retrograded to Okinawa to fill our permissive overstockage, we will then be in a position to participate fully in PURA, as well as T-Day operation.

SUBMITTED BY: ACofS, Supply
Project Officer: Major Norris, LBN 4122
1. SUBJECT: Project PURA V

2. PURPOSE: To furnish information on Project PURA V.

3. BACKGROUND: It was determined that excesses were being retrograded from Vietnam without checking in-country resources. The CG, 1st Log Command directed that Project PURA V be initiated to assure in-country screening of reports.

   a. The initial action was to deliver lumber excess lists to the Navy, Air Force, and Marine contractors.

   b. In addition, Stop/See lists were furnished to all interested agencies as a possible source of excess.

   c. Prior to excessing of materiel, all known requirements in-country are reviewed to assure that stocks are made available to those who desire the items.

5. ACTION: Continuing review of in-country excesses so as to inform valid customers that desired items are available.

SUBMITTED BY: ACofS, Supply
ACTION OFFICER: MAJ Norris, LBN 4122
1. SUBJECT: Project Rags

2. PURPOSE: To provide information and background on the origin of Project Rags.

3. BACKGROUND: The number of requisitions backordered at all echelons in the command was excessive. To alleviate the problem, an intensive reconciliation program was developed and entitled, "Project Rags."

4. DISCUSSION: a. The project was designed to assure command interest and project officers were assigned to personally supervise the program. Project Rags required a twofold reconciliation; one between DSU and using units and a second reconciliation between depot and DSU customers.

b. The program has been extremely beneficial; a high percentage of backorder requisitions at DSU/unit level have already been validated and cancelled. Most of the backorders cancelled were for requisitions over 90 days old.

c. The twofold initial plan was completed in November 1968. Aggressive follow-up is being made with command emphasis continued to assure compliance with established reconciliation regulations and procedures. The basic regulation has been republished to reflect a new 60-day requirement for all DSUs.

5. ACTION: Place command emphasis through Commanders letters and directions to assure continued reconciliation in accordance with existing 1st Log Comd regulations.

SUBMITTED BY: ACoS, Supply
Project Officer: Major Norris, LEN 4122
1. SUBJECT: Requisitioning Objective/Order-Ship Time.

2. PURPOSE: To provide background information on the reason for reviewing order-ship time and update information to include latest developments in order-ship time analysis.

3. BACKGROUND: Prior to January 1968, USARV had an established Requisition Objective (RO) of 195 days of supply: 135 days Order Ship Time (OST), 30 days Safety Level (SL) and 30 days Operating Level (OL). A General Accounting Office (GAO) audit conducted in late CY67 studied the OST on a limited basis and recommended an across-the-board reduction to 105 days OST. This study was based on the calculated mean (average) of a limited sample of receipts and did not address the variance of OST. Use of the reduced OST effected a reduction in the demand satisfaction which in June and July 68, dropped to 45%.

4. DISCUSSION: In August 68, an OJT study began with the intent of making a complete study of OST, stratified by Material Category (Mat Cat) and by depot. The OST was calculated by finding the number of days required to obtain the desired percentage of receipts and subtracting the SL. The SL and OL are established by regulation for Southeast Asia at 30 days of supply for each. Thus the RO is calculated by adding the variable OST, SL and OL for each Mat Cat for each depot.

5. ACTION: In December 68 a review was made of the variable OST being utilized within the USAICOV computer. Based on the previous two months review and the fact that the new supply system implemented 1 Jan 69 required certain changes in the Mat Cat/depot OST matrix, a revision was made to the Mat Cat/depot OST matrix which reflected reductions in the OST. These reductions were accomplished through increased command emphasis on the handling of requisitions and receipt processing times. Continuing monthly review will be accomplished in order to reduce OST as changes are effected so that an economical, as well as effective system is accomplished.

SUBMITTED BY: ACofS, Supply
Project Officer: CPT Coble
10 March 69
**Cognizant Activity:** ACOM SUPPLY  
**Project Officer:** CPI GC LE  

**TASK DESCRIPTION/UNIT OF MEASUREMENT**

**VARIABLE COST MATERIAL UNCONTROL/INTR**  
**US-MTR COST DATA**

**VARIABLE COST INTR: COMPUTED FOR 3:**

**GRAFF VARIABLE COST INTR: ITEMS INDICATED BY LATER TEST CONTROL**

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**AVCA Form 80R (14Sep68)**

**Report for Period Ending:** MONTHLY  
**Project Starting Date:** AUG 68  
**Implementation Date:**   
**% Project Completion:**   

**NOTE:** Explain shortfalls or deviations on reverse side
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project Same

2. PURPOSE: To provide information on Project Same.

3. BACKGROUND: It was determined in August 1968 that procedures for depot operation required more detail and standardization.

4. DISCUSSION: The project consists of the publication of detailed standard guidance in the form of regulations and directives. Thus far, six regulations have been published and several more are in process. The latest regulation completed is 740-4, Care & Preservation of Depot Stocks.

5. ACTION: When all regulations concerning depot operations are completed, they will be consolidated into a single depot operations manual.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACofS, Supply
Action Officer: MAJ Saunders, LBN 4962
Cognizant Activity: ACOFS Supply
Project Officer: MAJ Sanders

Report for Period Ending: 1 Mar 69
Project Starting Date: 1 Aug 68
Implementation Date: 1 Aug 68
% Project Completion: 50%

Tasks Description/Unit of Measurement:

# Pages Published

Diagram:
- Projection (Black)
- Completed (Blue)
- Shortfall (Red)

AVCA Form 80R (14Sep68)

NOTE: Explain shortfalls or deviations on reverse side
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project Stop

2. PURPOSE: To discuss factors which contributed to the essential requirement for USARV recourse to the logistic expedient, Project Stop. Further, to discuss the need for new doctrine, policy and procedures, of amendments to existing regulations, which are required to minimize or correct similar conditions in future force deployments.

3. BACKGROUND: Automatic push shipments and the lack of an effective centralised inventory control system combined to cause the accumulation of large supply excesses in USARV depots during the period April 1965 thru December 1966. During 1967 the lack of valid asset data at the 11th ICC resulted in requirement determination, procurement and receipt of additional excesses. Reconciliation and cancellation actions with CONUS supply agencies were taken in January-February 1968. The results were insignificant. The magnitude of the problem increased until May 1968 when the concept for mass cancellation or shipment frustration of unneeded supplies on requisition was developed. The concept was approved by DA, designated Project Stop and implemented in June 1968.

4. DISCUSSION: a. Project Stop was a success to the extent of the cancellations actually effected. The lack of more complete success in frustrating inventory in transit is attributed to deficiencies which exist in the DOD MILSTANDARD systems MILSTRIP, (DOD MIL-0.17-M) (AR 725-50) and MILSTAMP (DOD Reg 4500.32R). It can be reasonably concluded that a portion of the inventory shipped, which could not be stopped from entering this theater, was caused by lack of specific procedures, i.e., MILSTRIP cancellation procedures apply up to the point where the cargo involved has been offered to transportation for shipment. Beyond this point MILSTAMP transportation tracer actions apply. Discussions during the Project Stop conference revealed basic weaknesses in this process, which resulted in cancellation actions not being effective in stopping the flow of material.

b. At the Project Stop conference it was recommended that the LOOP be given the mission of managing cancellations for USARV until such time as revised MILSTANDARD procedures are published and are effective in assuring diversion or frustration of material for which a valid cancellation request is received. Publication of the required procedural changes should be accelerated as it is essential to achieve the objective of reducing excesses in Vietnam.
c. The problem of excesses in a combat theater is not new. Current logistics doctrine states the dictum that the problem of excesses will continue as an inevitable consequence of war and readiness for war because the variables in lead time and consumption rates which occur in an intense combat environment cannot be accurately predicted. Excesses would be a minor problem if all old items wore out before new ones were adopted and errors in judgement could be eliminated. However, new items are adopted before old ones are consumed, and human judgement remains fallible. It is believed reasonable to expect that the problem of generating excesses will attend any future force deployment and rapid troop build up in an oversea area. The procedures and methodologies developed for Project Stop were interim measures, mutually developed and agreed upon at OSD, DSA, GSA and DA ADHOC meetings and published by electronic message. A need exists for revision of certain existing policy and regulations and early development and promulgation of pertinent standard and uniform systems and procedures which will apply to all future cancellation/cargo frustration actions. Also procedures which will be required in connection with the phasedown or cessation of hostilities.

5. ACTIONS: a. OSD expedite completion of required changes to DOD 4140.17M and DOD 4500.32R.

b. DA establish a central control agency for cancellation/cargo frustration requests for oversea areas, and publish such changes to pertinent regulations as required.

c. OSD develop and publish an appropriate instruction, and DA publish implementing regulations, to provide for a system within which the cancellation or frustration of unneeded supplies or equipment can be effectively accomplished.

6. COMPLETION: This project was a one-time cancellation of shipments for unneeded supplies which has subsequently been completed.

SUBMITTED BY: ACofS, Supply
Project Officer: Mr. Haworth, LBN 5970
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Reduction of Excesses (Project Stop/See)

2. PURPOSE: This Fact Sheet is to provide information concerning the background and current status of Project Stop/See.

3. BACKGROUND: Project Stop/See, instituted by the DCG, USARV, and the CG, 1st Log Comd, in September 1968, is designed as a program for the selective cancellation and frustration of certain commodities being received in Vietnam beyond current requirements or the ability of USARV/1st Log Comd to handle and store. Items involved are office and billet furniture, office supplies, stationery, paper and mess products, and Engineer Class IV items categorized as bulky "space eating" commodities which aggravate an already serious shortage of depot space. These items were stopped from arriving in the theater but will be called forward only as required or when storage space is available. During December 1968, an intense review of construction material resulted in a 15% "across the board" K/O reduction.

4. DISCUSSION: The current status of Stop/See is as follows:

   a. To date 1496 FSNs have been identified as specific stock lines to be cancelled and/or frustrated.

   b. As a result of DA message 887731 DCSLOG/DGSSO dtd 192235Z Nov 68, the CG 1st Log, in coordination with USARV Engineer and G4, instituted an "Expanded Stop/See" for construction materials falling into material categories (MATCAP) B and T. This program has recently been expanded on a mechanized basis to include cancellation/frustration of 24 engineer Federal Stock Classes. Action was also undertaken to identify and report FSCs for paper products and office furniture to be blocked in their entirety by CONUS NICPs. In mid-December 114,565 FSNs were included in the Project Stop/See Class Block. Further review continues on 12 FSCs consisting of housekeeping supplies and material for possible inclusion in the overall program. Coordinated 1st Log/USARV G4 reply is to be provided DA on these additions.

SUBMITTED BY: ACofS, Supply
Project Officer: COL E. S. Goeppe, LBN 2101

II.19.0
97
1. SUBJECT: Project Thru Put

2. PURPOSE: This Fact Sheet is to provide update information on Project Thru Put.

3. BACKGROUND: On 23 Oct 68, 1st Log Comd message 38308, Subject: Retrograde of Excesses, was sent to all subordinate commands and outlined the requirements for the retrograde of depot excesses and a procedure for the moving of excesses from all forward units direct to point of destination. This retrograde of excess from these units was called Project Thru Put.

4. DISCUSSION: a. Based upon the 1st Log Comd message, coordination was accomplished between 1st Log and USARV. HQ USARV issued a further implementation message for Project Thru Put and this was sent to all units within USARV.

b. The procedure established is for all forward units having excesses to notify the area support command and request assistance for identification and transportation of the excesses.

c. Upon notification, the support commands were required to furnish a special team to assist the units. Based upon information derived from an on-site review, support command representatives were to query support command DSU's and arrange for the delivery of critical supplies. For those supplies not required at the support command DSU's, a request would be forwarded direct to the USAICCV for disposition instructions. The USAICCV is then responsible for furnishing disposition instructions within 48 hours after receipt of notification.

d. Project Thru Put will have a favorable impact on T-Day Planning. The elimination of excesses will result in a more manageable level of supplies & equipment to be retrograded in conjunction with T-Day.

SUBMITTED BY: ACoS, Supply
Project Officer: Major Korris, LBN 1122

II.20.0
98
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project Update

2. PURPOSE: To explain the nature and objectives of Project Update to include the conditions which fostered the need for the project, and to provide information on the current status of the project.

3. BACKGROUND: In October 1967 the USAICCV converted from 1st to 2nd generation computer equipment. This afforded a greater capability for Data Storage Accessibility and Manipulation. This provided the capability to mechanically identify asset record, Catalog Data and/or omission errors in the files. The initial FIA report for USARV was completed in January 1968. At that time there were over 79,000 stock and part numbers that did not match the AMDF. Nearly 18,000 of these were invalid due to invalid stock and part numbers. This condition existed primarily because the system was not designed to positively identify the erroneous data and to initiate corrective action.

4. DISCUSSION: a. The primary objective of Project Update are: (1) To install a disciplined and command emphasized program to update and maintain current all catalog change data in stock records of the ICCV, depots, DSU/GSU and TGE units on a monthly basis and (2) To insure the complimentary requirement to maintain current catalog data in locator files, and on containers and bin locations, is effectively accomplished.

   b. Formerly this project was coupled with the Field Stock Record Support Project. However, recently they have been identified separately as Project Update is nearing completion and soon will be a routine action to design the system and interrogate the invalid stock or part numbers upon initial attempts to enter the system.

   c. Continued progress has been made in purifying the unmatched and/or invalid FSN's in file at the USAICCV. During the period December 1968 - January 1969, the USAICCV and USARV depots were converted to the USARPAC 3SVN computerized "counting" system. Currently, 20,000 lines of the unmatched and/or invalid FSN's have been positively identified and are being added to the USAICCV's A.P by the insertion of item data file documents. The ICCV has broadcast the latest AMDF, I&S File, and Catalog changes to all depots. This action will be routine monthly. For the first time the depots will have the same capability as the ICCV to identify the unmatched and/or invalid FSN's in a like manner as accomplished at the ICCV. The depots have been issued instructions on identification of these lines for reporting purposes.

5. ACTIONS: During the early part of April 1969 it is anticipated to review the remaining 26,000 lines, these represent the residue of the original 80,000 lines and are the hard core remaining lines. This review will be conducted within the ICCV. The residue will require output to the submitting depot for positive identification through physical inventory procedures, and updating both the depot and ICCV's records, after which daily routine policing of the system will be strictly enforced.

SUBMITTED BY: ACoS, Supply
Project Officer: Mr. Alexander, Systems Division, LBN 5096

II.21.0 99
**Update (Project)**

**Cognisant Activity** Systems Division - PMO  
**Project Officer** Mr. Alexander

**Task Description/Unit of Measurement**

- Purify FSN's on ANV.
  - a. Goal: validate 80,000 FSN

**Questionable FSN's on the ANV.**
- b. Unit of measure is line items.

### Period Ending

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**Note:** Explain shortfalls or deviations on reverse side

**AVCA Form 80R (16Sep68)**
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project Verify

2. PURPOSE: All information be checked by the two-man rule prior to forwarding it to next higher office and/or headquarters.

3. BACKGROUND: With the many actions involved in furnishing statistical information to higher headquarters, it was found that information must be checked by the two-man rule, thus Project Verify was initiated so as to insure valid data at all levels in which to assist in the improving of supply discipline.

4. DISCUSSION: This project is a continuing project and must have command emphasis at all levels to insure that statistical data and narrative information being forwarded is accurate and properly prepared.

5. ACTION: That each commander director, division and branch chief in the command employ the two-man rule to verify each and every action for accuracy prior to forwarding it to the next higher office and/or headquarters.

SUBMITTED BY: ACofS, Supply
Project Officer: Mr. Haworth, LBN 5970
1. SUBJECT: Project 551
2. PURPOSE: To provide intensified management of an item.
3. BACKGROUND: Details of this project are classified.
4. DISCUSSION: Details of this project are classified.
5. ACTION: This headquarters in coordination with USARV and certain CONUS Commands is providing intensive management of the selected item.

SUBMITTED BY: ACoS, Supply
Project Officer: MAJ Linwood A. Pace, LBN 4422
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Data Automation Requirement (DAR) for Increased Computer Capability at USAICCV

2. PURPOSE: To explain the requirements for additional computer capability for the USAICCV.

3. BACKGROUND: The present computer configuration (IBM 7010/1460) on site at the USAICCV under the old ICCV system was saturated. Because of additional features and management tools provided by JSVN (ICCV level) it is anticipated that the saturated condition will not be improved under JSVN. To provide an acceptable level of customer support and management data, additional computer capability is required. To remedy this situation, the 1st Logistical Command forwarded a Data Automation Requirement (DAR) on 24 September 1968 requesting the approval and installation of an IBM 360/50 computer. Subsequent reviews indicated that sole source procurement for the computer as requested in the DAR dated 24 September 1968 was not a policy of DOD. Therefore, the approach was changed and a Justification of Requirements for Additional ADPE for USAICCV was submitted on 26 November 1968.

4. DISCUSSION: a. It is not considered feasible to install another IBM 7010/1460 system at the USAICCV for the following reasons:

   (1) Annual rentals cost for the 360/50 configuration requested for ICCV is $151,000 less than that of another 7010/1460.

   (2) IBM Maintenance support for 7010/1460 computers is increasingly difficult to obtain and the addition of another such configuration would compound the problem.

   (3) Additional climatically controlled space at the USAICCV computer site would be required.

   (4) Installation of 3rd generation hardware would facilitate a smooth and rapid upgrading of ADPE at some future date.

   (5) It is extremely difficult to recruit and retain qualified systems analysts and programmers to work with 2nd generation equipment.

   b. The original DAR proposed six applications to initially be installed on the IBM 360/50 computer. Four of the six applications are subsystems found in the USARPAC 3S. By removing this workload from the approved JSVN computer (IBM 7010/1460) at the USAICCV the basic supply cycle can be accomplished more frequently, thus improving customer support. The six applications proposed in the DAR are:

II.24.0
(1) Central Munitions System, Vietnam.
(2) Demand Analysis/RO Computation.
(3) Stock Record Support for DSU/OSU.
(4) Financial Inventory Accounting, Vietnam.
(5) Intensive Management of Items.
(6) Automation of Class 1 (Subsistence).

c. The estimated computer time for the six applications is approximately 350 hours per month.

d. Future plans call for the addition of stock fund accounting, project OASIS and a MILSTRIP-MILSTAMP interface.

5. ACTIONS: a. Acquisition of ADP equipment was approved 29 January 1969. Approved configuration is IBM System 360 Model 50.

b. Work requests for necessary modification to the existing computer site were prepared as follows:

(1) Approved Job Order Request No. 018-3227-69, dated 31 December 1968 for electrical power adjustment.

(2) Job Order Request No. 018-4011-69 dated 5 March 1969 for physical security modifications.

c. As a result of a site survey in November 1968, PA&E determined that no additional air conditioning is required.

d. Supply requisitions for necessary electrical supplies have been prepared and submitted to appropriate supply sources.

e. Electrical power modification to be accomplished.

f. Complete initial applications design.

g. Complete initial programming.

h. Accomplish training in Operations, Programming and Management.

i. Install, test and demonstrate satisfactory operation of equipment for Government acceptance.

SUBMITTED BY: ACoS, Supply
Project Officer: Mr. R. L. Morris, DPD, LBN 2870

II.24.1
104
# ADDITIONAL COMPUTER FOR USAICCV

(Please)

Cognizant Activity AGS Supply

Project Officer Mr. R. L. Morris

Report for Period Ending 11 Mar 69

Project Starting Date 1 Sep 68

Implementation Date June 69

% Project Completion 10%

## TASK DESCRIPTION/UNIT OF MEASUREMENT

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1. Requirements for equipment submitted

2. Electrical Power Adjustment

3. Site Modifications

4. Initial Applications Design

5. Programming of Initial Applications

6. Training in Operations, Programming & Management

7. Equipment Delivery

8. Government Acceptance

- Projection (Black)
- Completed (Blue)
- Shortfall (Red)

**NOTE:** Explain shortfalls or deviations on reverse side

**Remarks:** Items 2-7 will be charted when information reflecting delivery date of equipment is received.

AVCA Form 80R (14 Sep 68)
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project Condition.

2. PURPOSE: To provide information of Project Condition.

3. BACKGROUND: During Project Count, it was ascertained that a large percentage of the stock on hand at the depots is less than ready for issue condition, i.e. condition code A. Due to Project Count, the Command's logistical intelligence regarding quantities on hand is greatly improved, but the need still exists for more systematic emphasis on the condition coding of these supplies. Project Count II, the continuation of the effort to further purify and update all supply records, was considered a likely vehicle for the implementation of the condition coding project.

4. DISCUSSION: The intent of Project Condition is to purify condition data of materiel assets at each depot. Project Condition consists of two basic phases; the first phase being closely associated with Project Count II. Phase I of the program will be implemented by Count II personnel during the physical count of supplies in storage during the inventory. The task involved will be the separation of all stock counted into two categories; those which are obviously Condition Code A items, and all others which will be designated as Code J. Phase II will consists of the condition coding of all incoming depot stocks as either code A or code K. Code K will identify all receipts which are obviously not condition code A. Quality control technicians will inspect all J and K coded materiel to determine the correct condition code of the materiel. Material thus inspected and coded will be reviewed by stock control personnel to determine requirements and to recommend priorities for Care and Preservation. Material not immediately required by depot customers will be reported to the USAICCV. The USAICCV will collate all data thus received and make determination of priorities for the theater wide Care and Preservation program.

5. ACTION: In preparation for the implementation of Project Condition coincident with Project Count II on 10 February, initial guidance was furnished to all depots. Detailed instructions as well as a form for reclassification of supplies have been distributed. The Project is now in progress.

SUBMITTED BY:
AGofS, Supply
Project Officer: MAJ Saunders 4962

II.25.0
106
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project Care and Preservation I.

2. PURPOSE: To develop a Care and Preservation program which will maintain or return all materiel to a ready for issue condition, i.e. Condition Code A, and which will be responsive to the needs of the theater.

3. BACKGROUND: In storage, maintenance to date has been primarily limited to recouperage of materiel with minor individual care and preservation efforts at each depot operating independently of each other and without regard to overall theater requirements.

4. DISCUSSION: The program will be generated and updated monthly using data developed by Project Condition. The USAICCV will match unserviceable assets against theater requirements and will designate priorities for care and preservation, maintenance, and recouperage. Priority requirements for the theater will be compared with depot requirements and capabilities to develop a theater-wide program. Theater and depot program projections and accomplishments will be reported and monitored in terms of numbers of line items, short tons and dollar value.

5. ACTION: a. Care and Preservation contracts are being augmented.
   
   b. LC Reg 740-1 (Care & Preservation) is being published.
   
   c. The implementation of Project Condition consonant with Project Count II will soon begin to generate initial basic data for materiel requiring care and preservation.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACofS, Supply
Project Officer: MAJ Saunders 4962
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project LEVELS

2. PURPOSE: To provide background information and current status of Project LEVELS.

3. BACKGROUND: On hand stocks at DSU level are often in excess of levels required to provide satisfactory supply support to customers. Policy within this command is to have on hand only that amount of supply necessary to provide required support.

4. DISCUSSION: a. Project LEVELS was introduced on 6 February 1969, as a means of reducing on hand stocks at DSU level. Phase I of Project LEVELS consists of an order ship time (OST) study, designed to obtain data from which actual OSTs between DSU and supporting depot can be determined.

   b. Actual OSTs will then be used to adjust the requisitioning objective (RO) in order to lower it, and consequently reduce on hand stocks. Phase II of Project LEVELS will study the effect of reduced stockage levels on a unit's ability to provide supply support.

5. ACTION: Eight DSUs, two per support command, are collecting OST data from which actual OSTs will be determined. This data will be submitted to 1st Logistical Command on or about 31 March 1969 for review, analysis, and recommendations to the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACofS, Supply
Project Officer: 1LT John C. Rahiya/LBN 4122

II.27.0
108
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Closed Loop.

2. PURPOSE: The Closed Loop Program is a tightly integrated supply and maintenance program for managing selected items of equipment. It is designed to provide sufficient assets for the overhaul/rebuild program, for the replacement of unserviceable items and combat losses, and for depot maintenance float stocks.

3. DISCUSSION: a. The Closed Loop program can be described as being in a circle form. Retrogrades go to Japan, Okinawa and CONUS for the overhaul/rebuild programs. Phase-outs go to CONUS. Overhaul/rebuilds and procurements are returned to Vietnam to meet the monthly programmed inputs.

   b. There are 15 Closed Loop Codes, indicating the items of equipment the codes stand for, the number of standard and non-standard items in each code and the NICPs supporting each code. These codes are:

<table>
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<th>NICP</th>
<th>CODE</th>
<th>EQUIPMENT</th>
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SUBMITTED BY: Closed Loop Office, Dir/Requirements, USAIICC
Action Officer: MAJ Stratton, LBN 2607/2973
1. SUBJECT: Project ORANGE BALL

2. PURPOSE: To develop a means of providing dependable, longer-lasting dry batteries (FSC 6135) to units in the field.

3. BACKGROUND: a. There are currently more than 60 types of dry batteries in use in USARV. The design tropical shelf life of these batteries varies from eight to eighteen months, depending upon type.

   b. So long as dry batteries (FSC 6135) remain in cold storage (0°F) the shelf life can be significantly extended.

   c. The lack of adequate refrigerated storage in Vietnam, on-hand stocks of old batteries, the uncompromising environment, coupled with an unwieldy distribution system has resulted in the use of substantially deteriorated batteries in the field. Consequently, using units have lost confidence in all dry batteries, and the usage of dry batteries is currently 1/3 to 1/5 of their design life.

   d. The army wide supply of available refrigerated reefers (1600-1800 cu ft) has been virtually exhausted due to the needs of Vietnam for Class I perishables.

   e. The current pipeline cost of dry batteries for 1st Log Comd exceeds $7.5 million.

   f. Experimental test shipments of dry batteries to Vietnam indicated that dry batteries, properly cared for, can be used in Vietnam according to design criteria, i.e. three to five times as long as currently used.

4. DISCUSSION: a. The nonavailability of reefer assets throughout the Army CONUS and all theaters - precludes resolving the problem according to doctrine, i.e. storing dry batteries in refrigerated storage until used.

   b. An alternate solution to the problem of battery deterioration is to lower in-country quantities and accelerate the distribution of dry batteries from the time they leave refrigerated storage until they are delivered to the using unit. The intent of this alternate is to minimize the exposure time of batteries to the Vietnamese environment and to deliver batteries to the field with a credible shelf life expectancy.

5. ACTION: a. The ORANGE BALL concept was developed which invisions the distribution of frozen (0°F) dry batteries from manufacturers, through Japan, and to Vietnam. Upon arrival in South Vietnam, dry batteries will be handled, processed, issued, and transported in a manner paralling that for Class I perishables and below depot level, will be handled through Class I channels.
(1) Units would requisition batteries from their supporting Class I supply points using a multiple line item request for Issue/turn-in (DA Form 3161). Supply points will replenish stocks as necessary to insure that batteries will be available for the units next cyclic ration pick ups. This procedure would be repeated each week.

(2) A safety level (15 days of supply) would be maintained in frozen storage at depot level storage facilities only.

(3) Distinctive ORANGE BALL markings will be applied to identify dry batteries and to indicate the remaining shelf life.

b. A letter of Agreement has been negotiated between US Army Japan and 1st Log Command to delineate responsibilities necessary to insure a proper interface between the two Commands for Project ORANGE BALL.

c. HQ USARV has indorsed the project and will implement necessary procedures among the combat and combat support units.

d. Movement of batteries in accordance with the ORANGE BALL concept will be initiated as soon as the following are completed:

(1) Construction of frozen storage facilities for safety levels to be stored at Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon and at Da Nang.

(2) Acquisition and distributions of distinctive ORANGE BALL markings.

(3) Construction of storage facilities (non-refrigerated at Class I yards below depot level.

(4) Stocking of all facilities.

e. Following the initiations of Project ORANGE BALL, batteries now in II & IV facilities will be recalled for testing, evaluation and disposition.

SUBMITTED BY: ACofS, Supply
Project Officer: MAJ Saunders, LBN 4962
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project Supply Control 5

2. PURPOSE: To provide information on the background and current status of Project Supply Control 5.

3. BACKGROUND: Project Supply Control 5 has been developed to insure that all levels of management within the 1st Log Command review, as a minimum, five supply control studies per week on intensively managed items.

4. DISCUSSION: As an essential element of supply management, the supply control study program has been given increased emphasis as a follow on to such Projects as STOP/SEE, Count, CCIL, Fill, IMI, etc., and is the basic tool by which supply postures are maintained at optimum levels. Under this program, five intensively managed items will be studied on a weekly basis by each level of management from the item manager, to the Commanding General of 1st Log Command. Reviews are designed to provide command emphasis on items which require exceptional management, and in addition, will serve to keep all levels informed of overall supply positions.

5. ACTIONS: Continuous action to monitor and improve the program, as well as management data and method of computations.

SUBMITTED BY:
Directorate of Requirements
Project Officer: Mr. H.S. Sweeney, Jr., (Operations Div 2803/2809)
**SUPPLY CONTROL 5**

*Project*

**Cognizant Activity**: Dir/Rqmts

**Project Officer**: H.S. Sweeney, Jr.

**Report for Period Ending**

**Project Starting Date**: 25 Feb 69

**Implementation Date**: 27 Feb 69

**% Project Completion**: Continuing

### TASK DESCRIPTION/UNIT OF MEASUREMENT

**TASK DESCRIPTION**: To review a minimum of five supply control studies per week at all levels of supply.

**UNIT OF MEASUREMENT**: Line items reviewed per month based on 4 week month.

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**AVCA Form 80R (14Sep68)**

NOTE: Explain shortfalls or deviations on reverse side
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project Asset Control

2. PURPOSE: To provide information on Project Asset Control

3. BACKGROUND: Prior to the establishment of Project Asset Control, the accountability of unserviceable equipment was a separate and distinct portion of the supply system, allowing no provision for considering unserviceables as Theater assets.

4. DISCUSSION: The proper handling of unserviceables requires that they be managed as Theater assets and that strict accountability and audit trail be established and maintained on all unserviceable equipment within the Theater.

   b. It was determined that commodity managers at the USAICCV should manage unserviceable equipment just as they do with new items. Economically repairable equipment must be considered as an asset to Theater stocks. All unserviceable equipment must be recorded on the Depot and USAICCV Availability Balance Files.

5. ACTION: A regulation covering the above points was published and distributed and follow-up action will be taken to assure compliance.

SUBMITTED BY: ACoS, Supply
Project Officer: 1LT Leeper, LSN #122
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Supply Support to ARVN through US Logistics System

2. PURPOSE: To maximize utilization of excess and long stocks, to decrease order and shipping time for ARVN customers, to build up ARVN stocks to their authorized RO, to reduce transportation cost incident to shipment of supplies into or out of Vietnam and to preclude shipment from CONUS of items which are presently available in theater.

3. BACKGROUND: USARPAC letter, dated 28 January 1969, subj: USARPAC Plan for Supply Support ARVN through US Logistics Systems, describes the concept agreed upon in a conference held at USARPAC FSA to outline supply support to ARVN.

4. DISCUSSION: 
   a. A "shopping list" of FSN's will be provided ARVN by matching their ASL against the USAICCV AUF. ARVN will submit MILSTRIP requisitions by mail for items on the shopping list which will enter SVN at the USAICCV.

   b. The USAICCV will refer requisitions for USAICCV ASL items to the depot nearest the customer who can fill without penetrating its RO/level, if filling the requisition will not penetrate the theater RO/level. The USAICCV will refer requisitions for fringe items to any depot which can fill the requisition.

   c. Any quantities requisitioned which cannot be filled will be passed to the US Army Depot Command, Japan for further action.

   d. ARVN demands will not be used to calculate USAICCV RO but will be collected and sent to USADCJ on a monthly basis. Also, a monthly record of issues and cost of stocks that were furnished ARVN will be sent to USADCJ for use in billing ARVN, who will pay with Military Assistance Service Funds.

5. ACTION: ARVN requisitions are being processed off line presently, awaiting reprogramming of SVN to accommodate ARVN. This reprogramming is expected to be completed 24 Mar 69, at which time all ARVN requisitions for items on the shopping list will be processed through the USAICCV.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACofS, Supply
Project Officer: 1LT Carmichael, Systems Division, LBN 6174

II.32.0
/15
Support of ARVN
(Project)

Cognizant Activity Systems Division, ACoFS, Supply

Project Officer LT Carmichael

Report for Period Ending 28 Feb 69
Project Starting Date Sep 68
Implementation Date Apr 69
% Project Completion 80%

TASK DESCRIPTION/
UNIT OF MEASUREMENT

1. Put requirements and specifications in reading format.
2. Coordinate requirements with USAICCV DPD.
3. Finalize requirements and specifications.
4. Reprogramming and de-bugging.
5. Write SOP for USAICCV add Depots.
6. Write ARVN SOP.
7. Finalize SOP's

Projection (Black)
Completed (Blue)
Shortfall (Red)

AVCA Form 80R (14Sep68)

NOTE: Explain shortfalls or deviations on reverse side
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project Demand Analysis and Requisitioning Objective Computation

2. PURPOSE: To standardize the Demand Analysis and Acquisition Objective (RO) Computation that will be identical for the US Army Depots, Vietnam and will interface with the ICCV.

3. BACKGROUND: Prior to conversation to the SVN Computerized Accounting System, the US Army Depots at Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon and Da Nang were operational on the UNIVAC 1005 Computerized Accounting System, with a unique system for reporting demands, while the USAICC and Long Binh Depot were operational with the IBM 7010/7040 Computerized System. The ICCV's system was another unique system, while Long Binh Depot was operational under the USARPAC 3S System. Interacting with these three different systems was very difficult and validity of demands were highly questionable.

4. DISCUSSION: a. The primary objective of Project Demand Analysis and Requisitioning Objective Computations is to standardize to one system within the US Army Depots and ICCV so that all demands are recorded and reported by the depots in exactly the same manner, and interfaced with the USAICC.

b. The Standardized System will require the recording of demands on each stock record affected during the review period. This will include Red Ball and Passing Action Items that formerly were questionable as to whether demands were being recorded. The system under this project will have the capability to reverse demands as the results of customer cancellations or upon receipt of reject status.

c. This new system will also be maintained by demands of individual organizational elements and will have the flexibility to transfer organizational demands between materiel support areas as organizational elements are redeployed within the country, or to reduce the demands of a materiel support area as organizational elements are deployed out of the country.

d. Requisitioning objectives will be computer computed for all items, with a provision that Inventory Managers may accept or reject the computed RO on Manager Managed Items. The RO's will be computed on the last 12 months demands and will employ exponential smoothing factors to arrive at the RO and RO Factor. The Manager will have the capability to change the RC as military expediency may dictate. All RO Computations and changes to the ICCV's Availability Balance File (ABF) will be perpetuated thru the system to record the RO's on the depots ABF, a working tool the depots require when considering excess reductions, and nonmission customer sur...

II.33.0

//7
5. **ACTION:** Currently the Project Systems are being incorporated into the depots and ICCW simultaneously. It is anticipated to be completely operational by mid-March 1969 and will thereafter become a standard 3SVN Operational Procedure.

**SUBMITTED BY:**
ACofS, Supply
Project Officer: Mr. Alexander, Systems Division, LBN 5096
Demand Analysis and RU Computation (Project)

Cognizant Activity: Systems Division, PMD

Project Officer: Mr. Alexander

Report for Period Ending 28 February 1969

Project Starting Date: January 1969
Implementation Date: January 1969

% Project Completion: 66

### TASK DESCRIPTION / UNIT OF MEASUREMENT

To standardize Demand Analysis and RU Computations within the USAICCV and US Army Depots.

1. Develop standard program. (USARPAC F5A)
2. Test runs
3. De-bugging
4. Incorporate in 3.VN

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Projection (Black)  
Completed (Blue)  
Shortfall (Red)

AVCA Form 8OR (14Sep68)

NOTE: Explain shortfalls or deviations on reverse side
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project Count Always

2. PURPOSE: To provide background on Project Count Always.

3. BACKGROUND: During the period September 1968 through January 1969, the 1st Logistical Command executed Project Count I, the first Perimeter-to-Perimeter inventory of depot and DSU/GSU stocks ever made in a combat theater of operations. On 1 February 1969, the command began Project Count II, a follow-up to Count I, to further purify and update stock records. This inventory is currently in process, and is scheduled for completion on 31 July 1969. As a further sequel to these two inventories, Project Count Always has been developed.

4. DISCUSSION: Project Count Always is planned to fill a previously existing void in the inventory programs of the 1st Logistical Command. This inventory will be the first of the truly "SOP" inventories in that all lessons learned in Counts I and II will be put into command-wide practice. This includes all problems encountered and solved in storage, re-warehousing, condition coding, actual counting procedures, documentation, automated data processing, inventory programming, etc. Project Count Always is scheduled for an indefinite period, but will be broken into six month cyclic increments. Project Count Always will see the initial implementation of the Standard Supply System Vietnam (3SVN) inventory program. This new procedure will greatly reduce manual effort; as compared with Counts I and II. Count Always will feature the one count method of taking inventory, and will produce, on a print-out, all information needed for control of the project. A new quality assurance report has also been developed, thereby increasing overall knowledge of each depot's actual performance.

5. ACTION: Implementation of Project Count Always on 1 September 1969.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACofS, Supply
Project Officer: CPT Wynn/LEN 4962

II.34.0
120
1. SUBJECT: Project TOE Count

2. PURPOSE: To provide information on the inventory of all TOE equipment by 1st Logistical Command Units.

3. BACKGROUND: It was determined that a significant disparity existed between actual on-the-ground assets versus that quantity reported on AR 711-5 Command Equipment Status Report. In view of projected troop withdrawals and subsequent impact on support missions of the 1st Logistical Command it was deemed imperative to ascertain the actual quantity of TOE equipment on hand. Project TOE Count was initiated on 2 July 1969 and is scheduled for completion on 30 Sep 69.

4. DISCUSSION: All 1st Logistical Command Units will report to the USAICCV all TOE Equipment currently on hand. The inventory is cycled in three phases: Phase I Inventory of three specifically identified Semi-trailers to be completed 15 Jul 69. Phase II Inventory of all Materiel Handling Equipment to be completed 15 Aug 69. Phase III Inventory of all TOE Equipment to be completed by 30 Sep 69 in accordance with schedules developed by each SUPCOM.

5. ACTION: a. Follow-up to SUPCOM's to insure suspenses are met and schedules are developed for Phase III Inventory.

b. Establish charts and report formats to measure progress.

c. Disseminate the results of the inventory to all concerned organizational elements.

SUBMITTED BY:
USAICCV, Supply Mgmt, Opns Div
Project Officer: MAJ Stockhammer, LBN 2503
1. SUBJECT: Elimination of Unnecessary Historic and Erroneous Data from the 3SVN Systems Files at both ICCV and 1st Logistical Command Depots (Project SCAVENGER).

2. PURPOSE: To insure that the 3SVN Systems Files are kept to a minimum size for complete and efficient processing without removing any useful or required information.

3. BACKGROUND: Several investigations of various 3SVN files in February and March 1969 disclosed that in several cases information retained on the files was duplicative, historic, or outdated and/or erroneous. In some cases the volume of such records was sufficient to materially increase the size of the files and thereby increase computer run time.

4. DISCUSSION: Each of the 3SVN files used in the ICCV and Depot Systems has its own purge program to remove all unnecessary data. In some cases, i.e., the Depot Customer Status and Performance File, the Purge Programs will not remove records which are still open on the file, no matter how old they are. Therefore, special programs have been developed to accomplish that purge. These programs are specials and will be run only to prevent further build-up of unnecessary data on those files. All other files are kept to minimum size by running the Standard 3SVN Purge Programs as stipulated in the SOP's.

5. ACTIONS: a. Data Processing Activities at the ICCV and Depots will continue to run the Standard 3SVN Purge Programs as required by the SOP's.

   b. Systems Division, P&M Directorate, ACoFS, Supply will monitor the output from each file to insure that all files carry no unnecessary information and will correct where necessary any future discrepancies.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACoFS, Supply/CO USAICCV
Project Officer: LTC Evans, Systems Division, LBN 3174
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Depot/DSU Prepunched Cards

2. PURPOSE: To provide prepunched DA Forms 2765 to PLL customers of manual DS/GS Units receiving Stock Record Support from 1st Logistical Command depots.

3. BACKGROUND: Prior to April 1969, Stock Record Support was provided to USARV DS/GS units by 2d Logistical Command. Due to the distance involved and the heavy workload of 2d Log Comd, this support was not current and responsive. In April 1969, 1st Logistical Command depots assumed the responsibility for providing Stock Record Support to DS/GS Units in SVN. The first output from the system was provided during April 1969, and is now provided on a regular monthly basis.

4. DISCUSSION: a. Under the Stock Record Support System, mechanized units (Units with NCR 509 equipment) provide prepunched DA Forms 2765 to their PLL customers. Most units do not have this capability; however, most of the manual DS/GS Units do not have PLL customers.

   b. For those manual DS/GS Units having PLL customers, it became apparent that some method had to be devised to provide those PLL customers with prepunched DA Forms 2765. The Stock Record Support system provides two (2) prepunched requisitions to each manual DS/GS Unit. This is insufficient to permit distribution to the customer, and the manual DS/GS Unit has no means whereby they can reproduce the cards.

5. ACTIONS: a. Those manual DS/GS Units with PLL customers were identified, to include the number of PLL customers supported.

   b. A Univac 1005 program was designed to provide prepunched requisitions in sufficient quantity to permit their use by the PLL customer.

   c. The program uses as input the normal output from the SRS program for the manual DS/GS Unit (two prepunched DA Form 2765). Based upon the number of PLL customers supported, a control card determines the number of prepunched cards required.

   d. These prepunched cards are then forwarded along with the remainder of the normal SRS output to the manual DS/GS Unit. When a PLL customer brings in a request for supplies, the DS/GS Unit can provide them with a replacement prepunched DA Form 2765.

SUBMITTED BY:
Systems Division, USAICCV
Project Officer: Mr. F. Otey, Systems Division, LBN 3020

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# Pre-Punched PLL (Project)

**Cognizant Activity:** Systems Division  
**Project Officer:** Mr. F. Otey

**Report for Period Ending:** 30 Jun 69  
**Project Starting Date:** 1 Apr 69  
**Implementation Date:** 1 Jun 69  
**% Project Completion:** 100

## Task Description/Unit of Measurement

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[Diagram showing timeline and tasks]
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Prevention of Issuing More than Authorizations of Class I (Project Overdraw)

2. PURPOSE: This Fact Sheet is to explain procedures designed to stop units that have a tendency to overdraw from obtaining more than authorized.

3. BACKGROUND: Based on the DA Form 2970 "Subsistence Report and Field Ration Request", previously submitted to the Class I Supply Point, a unit draws its authorized issue of Class I on a Field Ration Issue Slip (DA Form 3294), which the Class I Officer has prepared from the information contained on the DA Form 2970. AR 30-50 establishes the requirement for the DA Form 3294.

4. DISCUSSION: On a monthly basis, Class I Supply Points must prepare a DA Form 2969, "Subsistence Supply and Services Summary", as required by AR 31-130, using data taken from DA Forms 2970 submitted that month, as well as data from DA Form 3289, "Cumulative Summary of Field Rations Issued". The Supply Points forward the DA Forms 2969 to the Support Command in sufficient copies so that four copies reach the Director of Food, Headquarters 1st Logistical Command. The Director of Food checks these forms for accuracy, files one copy, sends one copy to G-4, USARV, and 2 copies to the US Army Food Service Center, Chicago. These forms are used by Chicago to compute ration costs, determine absentee rates, develop other data for supporting budget estimates, to establish or verify data needed for cross service billing for meals served to active Army messes to other than active Army personnel, and to provide statistical information to use in presentations to Congress, Department of Defense, the Secretary of Defense, and other government agencies. AR 31-200 requires the Class I officer to immediately inform the Food Advisor of the unit concerned of the dollar amount of any over issue. It is then the responsibility of the Food Advisor to determine the appropriate action to be taken.

SUBMITTED BY:
Director of Food
Project Officer: LTC Stone, LBN 1076
1. SUBJECT: Project Edit II - Priority

2. PURPOSE: To provide information on the background and implementation of Project Edit II - Priority.

3. FACTS: a. Surveys of Hi-Pri requisitions within the command by this headquarters as reported in the 1st Logistical Command Review and Analysis as well as a recent DOD survey of installations worldwide, reveals excessive numbers of Hi-Pri requisitions when these requisitions could have been submitted under lower IPDs. A factor in this situation within 1st Logistical Command has been the frozen items which at one time reached 20-30% of the stocks. Impact of this situation is that all Hi-Pri's then become routine thus delaying supply action.

   b. Project Edit II - Priority has a double goal; one, the assignment of realistic IPDs to all requisitions and; two, improved expeditious processing of all true Hi-Pri requisitions. It is intended that all supply activities, from unit thru ICCV, will broadcast this program so that all commands of USARV are aware of the necessity for correct IPD assignment. At DSU, Depot and ICCV, surveys will be made to determine by requisitioners, the ratio of Hi-Pri requisitions to normal 12 and 17 priority requisitions. Where these ratios appear excessive, action will be taken to advise the commanders concerned. Other measures to implement this program include re-training of stock control personnel, inclusion of information in customer supply newsletters and continuous review of Hi-Pri requisitions at all levels.

4. ACTION: Announcement has been made on this project through the LOCC notes of 16 July. Once necessary co-ordination is effected with USARV G4 a message to all commands will be published to insure widest dissemination of the program.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACofS, Supply
Project Officer: MAJ Charles O. Sims III/LBN 4178
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project SEE/MOVE

2. PURPOSE: To relate establishment of Project SEE/MOVE

3. FACTS:  
   a. Project SEE/MOVE was established by 1st Logistical Command Message 11838, dated 17 July 1969. Project SEE/MOVE is the reverse of Project STOP/SEE. The purpose of Project SEE/MOVE is to provide a basis for increasing the efficiency of retrograding excess supplies from the depots. Stocks are suspected excess that show long standing weather wear for which no issue has been made. Also, the stock may be an excess suspect by the size or quantity involved. Third criterion for excess is excessive Requisitioning Objectives (RO's).

   b. A SEE/MOVE project officer is appointed on orders at each depot. LTC C. C. Conway is the Project SEE/MOVE Officer at USAICCV. Three action officers or GS-12 DAC's from USAICCV will operate in the depots to insure SEE/MOVE items are identified and processed expeditiously. In addition, the SEE/MOVE action officers have under their control, at each depot, a team of at least three people to assist.

   c. Depot operation personnel will set up a "?" on each stack of items that they suspect as being excess. The SEE/MOVE team must clear each "?" with an "R" for retrograde or an "S" for keep.

   d. A monthly report RCS AVCA-69-39 of activity under SEE/MOVE will be sent to AVCA GL IM 13 with info to CO, USAICCV.

SUBMITTED BY: ACofS, Supply  
ACTION OFFICER: LT JACK E. SCHMIDT/LBN 4122
SECTION III

Maintenance Improvement Program
1. SUBJECT: Control/Repair Criteria for Maintenance

2. PURPOSE: To provide information relative to development of the general support maintenance program.

3. BACKGROUND: a. Paragraph 23j, AR 750-1, 21 June 1967, "Maintenance will be accomplished with due consideration to the economy of resources. Where practical, the Inspect and Repair Only as Necessary (IROAN) principle will be applied at all categories of maintenance. In applying this principle, general support and depot maintenance activities will accomplish that overhaul necessary to return the item to the supply system in accordance with maintenance standards established for each item of equipment in pertinent technical manuals and technical bulletins."

b. Paragraph 3b(7), USARV Reg 750-1, 28 June 1968, "Inspect and Repair Only as Needed (IROAN). This technique will be employed to obtain maximum life of components, assemblies, and parts prior to disassembly or replacement. Emphasis will be placed on those repairs necessary to meet tactical, operational and safety requirements."

c. Paragraph 3f(2), USARV Reg 750-1, 28 June 1968, "General support capability will be established for the overhaul of end items, components and assemblies."

d. Paragraph 3a, USARV Reg 750-27, 5 September 1968, "The basis for overhaul programming will be supply requirements as indicated by equipment stockage objectives of this command on records of the Inventory Control Center, except as stated in para 5b, below."

e. Paragraph 5b, USARV Reg 750-27, 5 September 1968, "The overhaul program will be developed for all major equipment items, assemblies, and subassemblies to be overhauled in-country or out, but will exclude items to be repaired under already established programs such as closed loop support programs and cyclic overhaul programs for specific items."

4. DISCUSSION: The FY 70 1st Logistical Command general support maintenance is based on requirements as stated by the USAICCV. The program was developed in coordination with USARPAC and USARV representatives and was finalized at a USARPAC maintenance conference in Okinawa, 4-9 November 1968.

5. ACTION: To ensure that the most efficient use of available general support manhours is achieved, the ACofS, Supply sent message AVCA GL-PM-PP 38645, DTG 300745Z October 1968 to DA. The text of message

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follows:

"a. With the limited overhaul maintenance means within RVN it is necessary that available capability be expended only on critically needed items in support of combat/combat support operations. More effective use of existing GS maintenance capability could be realized if this command were aware of the worldwide supply position on items currently in the USARV GS overhaul program.

b. It is requested that DA consider the establishment of a program which would provide a list of items which should not be overhauled in RVN due to the supply position."

SUBMITTED BY: ACoS, Maintenance
Project Officer: LTC Gentry, LBN 2083
1. **SUBJECT:** Project Dog

2. **PURPOSE:** To provide information relative to identification of items of equipment that present continuing maintenance problems and that aged or excessively worn equipment which should be replaced/retrograded for overhaul or disposed of otherwise.

3. **DISCUSSION:**
   a. Shortly after his arrival in the 1st Logistical Command, the Commanding General directed that a thorough inspection be made of 16 selected items of equipment to determine their operational status. As a result, some problem areas were identified which required prompt attention in order to assure a continuing readiness posture which would permit accomplishment of the combat support mission. Inclosure 1 lists the original 16 items that were studied and the actions which followed.

   b. Since these initial inspections the program has been expanded to include equipment across the board in all commodity areas. This program has been named Project Dog signifying its purpose - to identify the maintenance "Dogs" and that equipment which should be replaced. Several means of identifying equipment that should be replaced include retrograde criteria of mileage, hours of operation, number of rounds fired, etc. Most important also is the analysis of maintenance records to investigate down time (availability rates), frequency of repairs, parts, components, and assemblies consumed along with repair expenditure limits. Support units of 1st Logistical Command have been directed to conduct technical inspections on all equipment on a continuing basis and submit reports to HQ, 1st Logistical Command, on the 15th and 30th of each month so that this information is available to planning officers.

   c. In addition to the continuing program, special Dog examinations are conducted. An example is the complete technical inspection of all M107/M110 SP artillery completed on 28 Sep 68. Of the weapons inspected (152), 39 were identified as "Dogs" to be retrograded ASAP for overhaul. As of 10 Mar 69, 34 of these had been exchanged.

4. **ACTION:**
   a. Letters have been sent to major tactical commanders at the separate brigade and higher levels to advise them of Project Dog and recommend that they initiate a similar project within their commands utilizing their organic maintenance personnel.
b. It is expected that project Dog will be an ever continuing project with the 1st Logistical Command.

SUBMITTED BY: ACofS, Maintenance
Replacement Requirements for Selected Items of Equipment (Dogs)

1. 12 Ton S&P Trailers remain in short supply throughout the country. The current shortage totals 550 trailers. New M127A2C trailers are being shipped into country but they have proven to be failure prone and require more maintenance effort than the older models. Fleet shortages must be replaced before serious consideration can be given to "Dogs" replacement.

2. 5 Ton Cargo Trucks. In the January through June period, 1020 new 5 ton cargo trucks are programmed into country. There are currently approximately 400 vehicles which will qualify for "Dogs" replacement in that time frame. The quantity of replacement vehicles due in should be sufficient to replace the "Dogs" on hand and fill all TOE shortages.

3. 5 Ton Dump Trucks. The Command Deadline Report shows that the dump truck fleet is short 461 trucks as of 10 January 1969. Approximately 350 of the dump trucks in country at present are approaching the point where they will be candidates for replacement under the "Dog" program. A total of 1660 dump trucks are programmed to arrive in country in the period January through June. This quantity should be sufficient to replace "Dogs" currently on hand and fill TOE shortages.

4. Two and a half (2.5) Ton M19C Fuel Trucks. Delete from Dogs List - not a problem.

5. Five (5) Ton Bridge Trucks. Ten (10) Bridge Trucks are in excess of 20,000 miles. One hundred-seventeen (117) trucks are in excess of 8 years since manufacture and should be programmed for replacement should the vehicle be critical in accomplishing the missions of authorized units.

6. 100KW Generators (All Models). Profile data was presented to USARPAC at the Closed Loop Reprogramming Conference in October. It was tentatively agreed that programmed input to RVN would be increased beginning Jan 69 pending DA approval of the draft program. Increased assets will also provide a more realistic retrograde schedule. The final approval has been made by DA; the approved quantities were determined by the CLS brochure published by USARPAC and released in Jan 69. The Taiyo 100KW generator is still being maintained by additional money allocated to USAECACV for purchase of repair parts. It is not being rebuilt however.

7. 6000lb Forklift. Engines for the 6,000lb forklift were nominated 23 Nov 63 for the Closed Loop Program. Closed Loop status would improve the retrograde program for these engines. At the USARPAC Closed

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Loop Rescheduling Conference held in October 68, a recommendation was made to reduce the Time Between Overhaul (TBO) on this item from 7500 hours to 5000 hours. The revised CLSP was released by USARPAC on 20 Jan 69.

8. 30KW Hol-Gar Generators. The profile data was presented to USARPAC at the Closed Loop Reprogramming Conference in October. The final DA approved input for RVIJ was made known by the CLS brochure released by USARPAC in Jan 69. It is anticipated that the programmed quantities will be increased for FY 70. These generators are used on the NCR 500 system. A msg was sent out to all users of the NCR 500 on 1 Jan 69 requesting profile data be furnished on the 30KW in order to ascertain requirements for future replacements.

9. 4000lb Electric Forklift. Profile data was used at the USARPAC Closed Loop Rescheduling Conference in October. It was requested that the TBO be reduced from 9000 hours to 3000 hours. The revised CLS was released by USARPAC on 20 Jan 69.

10. Laundry Units. After a complete inspection of all laundry units in the command in mid October it was determined that organizational maintenance was extremely poor, and PLLs had not been established. Some improvement is being made in the maintenance area as a result of recent formal instruction conducted by Saigon Support Command Personnel for operators of the laundry units. The ACofS, Services has been working with the USAECON representative toward establishment of a complete PLL for each unit.

11. 7% Ton Reefer Units. As a result of a technical inspection conducted in October of all 7% ton reefer units and vans, it was determined that 33 percent of these units had an estimated remaining serviceability of 6 months. New reefer units arriving in the command are expected to keep pace with the loss rate; however, they are of a different type from previous models. Operator negligence is the primary factor contributing to the failure of the reefer units. Since many of these machines are nearing the end of their estimated serviceability, the maintenance time required for each item will continue to increase.

12. Paper Collators. Insufficient information was received from the support commands to indicate a definite problem exists in this area at the present time.

13. Rock Crushers. Three (3) new 225 TPH plants were received in Oct and Nov 68 and put into operation by USARV Engineers. There are at present six (6) plants in the inventory. However, two (2) of the
plants are 1953 models, are at zero rebuild and have been having increasing deadline problems. Original plans were to replace these two (2) plants with two (2) of the new arrivals; however, all six (6) were kept in operation. Action on whether to wash out the two (2) "Dogs" is currently pending a USARV Engineer decision. Three (3) more plants are available in CONUS and will be shipped to RVN in the near future.

14. Gas Generators. Technical inspections have been completed by the support maintenance units on all Engineer gas generating plants. The TI sheets are now in the hands of the CRB ACofS, Services personnel and plans are being made to wash out two (2) oxygen plants, which are in Condition Code R-4 and one (1) carbon dioxide plant which is in Condition Code X. Replacement plants are on order. CDC is conducting a study of the gas generating plants and has recommended the use of commercial semi-mobile units.

15. 10 Ton Crawler Crane. The 10 ton crane is now obsolete for RVN and is scheduled to be replaced by the 12½ ton crawler crane. Reorganization of units under the G series TOE/MTOE effective Oct 68 has decreased the authorized quantities of 12½ ton crawler mounted cranes from the original 53 authorized by TOE/MTOE to 26.

16. Bakery Units. All bakery plants have been TI'd and evaluated. Required repair parts are on requisition and replacement items for those considered to be uneconomically repairable have been requested. Ovens are generally in extremely poor condition.

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FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: DX Lists in Maintenance Units

2. PURPOSE: To provide the Commanding General information relative to the DX program.

3. BACKGROUND: 1st Logistical Command (Dir of Maint) message AVCA GM-MM 35098 DTG 160458Z Aug 68 to all support commands for Directors of Maintenance advised that: "Recent visits to direct support maintenance units indicate a low level of activity in direct exchange programs for providing maintenance supplies to supported units. Direct exchange transactions are simple and accelerated because documentation is reduced to a minimum. Direct exchange program guidance is found in AR 711-16." The message also stated "Further request you initiate action in coordination with Dir of Gen Sup, your command, to have subj lists expanded as appropriate and take necessary action to maximize the use of direct exchange procedures."

4. DISCUSSION: Staff visits and queries have revealed that the support commands have each instituted programs designed to optimize utilization of the DX program. These programs have resulted in the following:

   a. Expansion and purification of lists commensurate with equipment supported.

   b. Periodic reviews and revision as indicated.

   c. Use of RBX to decrease zero balances of items on DX lists.

5. ACTION: This office will continue to monitor the DX program through staff visits.

SUBMITTED BY: ACofS, Maintenance
Project Officer: LTC Gentry, LBN 2083
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: General Support Maintenance Program

2. PURPOSE: To provide information relative to development of the general support maintenance program.

3. BACKGROUND: a. In November 1967 a team from USARPAC visited the command and insisted that a realistic command general support maintenance program be developed based on the stockage objectives on file at the USAICCV. These stockage objectives were obtained, the closed loop program items were considered; the command's equipment, facilities, personnel skill level, and available manhours were considered resulting in a realistic command general support program for the second half of FY 68 and FY 69.

   b. The FY 69 program has undergone several revisions due to in-country unprogrammed requirements, i.e., M48 Tank overhaul program, repair of vehicles for issue to ARVN, PIP for M107/M110 and necessary diversion of effort to direct support and back-up direct support missions.

   c. Listed at inclosure 1 is a breakout of the FY 69 program by commodities indicating those items which were programmed in-country, off shore and CONUS.

4. DISCUSSION: a. The FY 70 maintenance program was developed by this directorate on 1 November 1968 based upon stockage requirements provided by the ICC, washout rates, overhaul mileage criteria, available manhours and the availability of repair parts and unserviceable assets.

   b. It is realized that in GS units many manhours are required to perform other functions which are not directly related to the repair and return of items to the supply system; therefore, the FY 70 general support maintenance program was developed taking this into consideration. The program consists of:

   (1) Back-up direct support

   (2) Major items repair

   (3) Major assembly repair

   (4) Sub-assembly repair

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c. A study was conducted to determine the total estimated manhours which would be available for production during FY 70. TOE units and proposed contracts were addressed in this study. The following factors were considered in determining the available manhours:

1. TOE and TDA authorizations would remain the same.
2. Units would be at 75% strength throughout the year.
3. Only productive personnel, E-1 through E-5, LNs and contract personnel were considered.
4. 65 hours per week for TOE personnel and 60 hours per week for contract personnel.
5. Manhours for leave, passes, R&R, sick call, KP, details and other such non-mission functions were excluded.

d. The following basic assumptions were utilized in developing the program:

1. Repair parts would be available to support the program.
2. Unserviceable repairable assets available.
3. Tools and test equipment on hand.
4. Qualified supervisors available.
5. Maintenance personnel qualified in their MOS.
6. Required manhours would be available.

e. The USAICCV provided a listing of major items and components required
by this command for FY 70.

f. The USARPAC and 1st Logistical 260 Item FY 69 overhaul programs were used as a basis to develop the FY 70 program. Critical assemblies causing high deadlines in the command were added to these programs.

g. COLED V loss data for the period of April 1967 to April 1968 was used to project the estimated losses during FY 70.

h. The USARV Retrograde Report (DA 1280 Report) for the past year was used to determine the estimated end items to be retrograded during FY 70.

i. The monthly combat and wheel vehicle mileage report was used to forecast the number of vehicles in the command which would require overhaul based upon the average number of miles driven during the year. The DA mileage overhaul criteria was also applied to each type vehicle.

j. All closed loop items were reviewed and none were included in the FY 70 program.

k. The command’s FY 70 program was presented at the USARPAC maintenance conference on 4-9 November 1968. The program was approved after certain items were added and/or deleted based upon the known status of repair parts and unserviceable assets as well as 2d Logistical Command’s capability to support this command.

l. 1st Logistical Command’s out-of-country requirements were presented and the 2d Logistical Command and Taiwan FY 70 programs were developed to support out stated requirements. Additional conferences were conducted in Japan and Korea to determine their programs to support this command.

m. A DA worldwide maintenance conference was conducted in CONUS in December to review all programs, develop requirements and determine those items which are to be overhauled based upon worldwide assets, stockage objectives and repair parts.

5. ACTION: a. A 1st Logistical Command Regulation on general support maintenance overhaul program to include detailed planning guidance and reporting procedures is being written by the ACofS, Maintenance.

b. A monthly meeting will be held with support command representatives, supply, maintenance and R&D personnel from this headquarters to review and analyze production versus program quantities, cross-level repair parts and unserviceable assets and revise the program as necessary.
c. To ensure that the most efficient use of available general support manhours is achieved the ACofS, Supply sent message AVCA GL-PM-PP 38645, DTG 300745Z October 1968 to DA. The text of message follows:

(1) With the limited overhaul maintenance means within RVN it is necessary that available capability be expended only on critically needed items in support of combat/combat support operations. More effective use of existing GS maintenance capability could be realized if this command were aware of the worldwide supply position cn items currently in the USARV GS overhaul program.

(2) It is requested that DA consider the establishment of a program which would provide a list of items which should not be overhauled in RVN due to the supply position.

d. Upon receipt of reply from DA to the above message, program will be reviewed and revised as indicated.

SUBMITTED BY: ACofS, Maintenance
Project Officer: LTC Gentry, LBN 2083
### FT 69 MAINTENANCE PROGRAM

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FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Interservice/Interagency Support Agreements

2. PURPOSE: To provide information relative to maintenance support furnished by 1st Logistical Command under current ISSA/IASAs.

3. DISCUSSION: a. The following ISSAs relative to maintenance are currently in effect:

   (1) US Air Force - a total of seven (7) ISSAs for various maintenance services in the II, III, and IV CTZ, RVN.

      (a) Services rendered include repair of POL bladders and small arms, maintenance of tactical and commercial vehicles, maintenance of air conditioning equipment, fire fighting equipment, MHE, engineer construction equipment, generators, metascopes, binoculars, xenon searchlights, and vehicles.

      (b) Monthly manpower requirements are:

         1. Commissioned - 4612
         2. Enlisted - 20,854
         3. LN - 122,472
         4. DAC - 605

      (c) All support is non-reimbursable and amounts to approximately $424,624 monthly.

   (2) US Navy - a total of six (6) ISSAs in the I, II, III, and IV CTZs.

      (a) Services include maintenance of LARC V vehicles, tactical vehicles, engineer power and construction equipment, commercial vehicles, radios, Decca navigator systems, and selected items of non-standard equipment.

      (b) Monthly manpower requirements are:

         1. Commissioned - 1368
         2. Enlisted - 11,534
         3. LN - 72,144

III. 5.0

/42
4. DAC - 266

(c) $232,800 of monthly funds is non-reimbursable and $700.00 is reimbursable.

(3) US Marine Corps - Five (5) ISSAs are in effect with the Marines for repair of 500 gal and 10,000 gal POL bladders, maintenance of switchboards, radar sets, generators, and air conditioners.

(a) Monthly manpower requirements are: Commissioned - 57, enlisted - 826, and DAC - 5.

(b) All funds are non-reimbursable ($63,920 per month), reimbursable funds - $183,000.

(4) Coast Guard - two (2) ISSAs are in effect providing maintenance services on tactical vehicles, buoys, and sinkers.

(a) Monthly manhour requirements are:
1. Commissioned - 55
2. Enlisted - 320

(b) All funds are non-reimbursable ($3,450.00 per month).

(5) MACV - a total of four (4) ISSAs are in effect providing maintenance services to MACV HQ, MACV Naval Advisory Group, and to all CTZs.

(a) Services include maintenance of tactical and commercial vehicles, communication and electronic equipment, generators, engines, and air conditioners.

(b) Monthly manhour requirements are as follows:
1. Commissioned - 239
2. Enlisted - 2370
3. LN - 10,050

(c) Reimbursable funds amount to $300,000.00 per month. Non-reimbursable funds total $17,960 per month.
(6) Other agencies are provided maintenance services under six (6) ISSAs. These agencies include MSTS, DOD, Advanced Research Project Agency, and Defense Communication Agency.

(a) Services include maintenance of tactical and commercial vehicles, communication and electronics equipment, generators, office machinery, and air conditioners.

(b) Monthly manhour requirements are as follows:

1. Commissioned - 28
2. Enlisted - 1,430
3. LN - 2,140
4. DAC - 15

(c) Non-reimbursable funds amount to $2,150 per month. Reimbursable funds total $22,250 per month.

b. The following ISSAs relative to maintenance support are currently in effect.

1. Special Forces in II, III, and IV CTZs.

2. Services - maintenance of parachutes, D-bags, aviation kit bags, and slings.

(a) Monthly manhour requirements are as follows:

1. Commissioned - 2
2. Enlisted - 100
3. LN - 100

(b) All funds are non-reimbursable ($1,400.00 per month).

3. USAID in II and III CTZs.

(a) Services - organizational and direct support maintenance for US and civilian agency vehicles.

(b) Monthly manhour requirements are as follows:

1. Commissioned - 44

III.5.2
144
2. Enlisted - 1/0
3. LN - 7,040
(c) All funds are reimbursable ($5,400.00 per month).
(4) USO in II, III, and IV CTZs.
(a) Services - maintenance of commercial vehicles, air conditioners, and refrigerators; supply support.
(b) Monthly manhour requirements are as follows:
1. Commissioned - 5
2. Enlisted - 40
3. LN - 70
(c) Reimbursable funds amount to $2,400.00 per month. $600.00 per month is non-reimbursable.
(5) Vinnell Corporation in II, III, and IV CTZs.
(a) Services - maintenance of office equipment.
(b) Monthly manpower requirements are as follows:
1. Commissioned - 1
2. Enlisted - 100
(c) All funds are reimbursable ($500.00 per month).
(6) MACV in I, II, III, and IV CTZ.
(a) Services - direct and general support level maintenance of radios, generators, rifles, mortars, grenade launchers, and machine guns.
(b) Monthly manhour requirements are as follows:
1. Commissioned - 36
2. Enlisted - 1,100
3. LN - 800
(c) Reimbursable funds amount to $200,000.00 per month. $15,000.00 per month is non-reimbursable.
(7) PACEX throughout RVN.
(a) Services - direct and general support maintenance of jeepsters, travelalls, trucks, trailers, and forklifts.
(b) Monthly manhour requirements - 780 enlisted.

(c) All funds are reimbursable ($4,045.33 per month).

(7) Pacific Stars and Stripes in II, III, and IV CTZs.

(a) Services - maintenance of tactical and commercial vehicles and maintenance of office equipment.

(b) Monthly manhour requirements are as follows:
1. Commissioned - 16
2. Enlisted - 180
3. LN - 400

(c) Reimbursable funds amount to $1,100.00 per month. $400.00 per month are non-reimbursable.

(8) American Express

(a) Monthly manhour requirements are as follows:
1. Enlisted - 36
2. LN - 60

(b) Reimbursable funds amount to $60.00 per month. $50.00 per month are non-reimbursable.

(9) Bank of America

(a) Monthly manhour requirements are as follows:
1. Enlisted - 28
2. LN - 60

(b) Reimbursable funds amount to $180.00 per month. $50.00 per month are non-reimbursable.

(10) Chase Manhattan Maintenance of Vehicles

(a) Monthly manhour requirements are as follows:
1. Commissioned - 2
2. Enlisted - 52
3. LN - 60

(b) Reimbursable funds amount to $150.00 per month. $800.00 are non-reimbursable.

(i) Esso Standard Eastern, Inc., Maintenance of Vehicles

(e) Monthly manhour requirements are as follows:
1. Commissioned - 2
2. Enlisted - 60

(b) There are no reimbursable funds per month. $1,500 are non-reimbursable.

4. SUMMARY: See recapitulation sheet at inclosure 1.

SUBMITTED BY: ACofS, Maintenance
Project Officer: LTC Ryan, LBN 2083/2085
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSAs</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION OF SERVICE</th>
<th>MANHOURS PER MO</th>
<th>FUNDS ($ PER MO)</th>
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<td>COMM EHL LN REIMB NON REIMB</td>
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<td>USAF</td>
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<td>Repair POL bladders, small arms Maintenance - tac veh, commercial veh, air conditioners, fire fighting equip, MDE, engr const equip, generators, instruments.</td>
<td>4612 20,854 122,472</td>
<td>0 424,624.00</td>
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<td>USN</td>
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<td>Maintenance - LARC V, tac veh, generators, engr const equip, commercial veh, radios, Decca nav systems, nonstandard items.</td>
<td>1368 11,534 72,144 700.00</td>
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<td>USMC</td>
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<td>Repair POL bladders switchboards, radar sets, generators, air conditioners.</td>
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<td>16</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>Maintenance - jeepsters, travelalls, trucks, trailers, forklifts</td>
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<td>PS&amp;S</td>
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</table>
1. SUBJECT: Marine Maintenance Parts

2. PURPOSE: To provide updated information on Marine Maintenance Parts

3. BACKGROUND: All US Army watercraft in RVN were built prior to or during 1951 except for the John UD Page which was built in 1959. Vessels of one design may have different models and/or makes of major components such as engines and reduction gears. Some of the manufacturers of these major components have gone out of business. Many of the major components are only incorporated on a few pieces of equipment in the entire Army supply system. Prior to our commitment in RVN, the majority of the Army fleet was in storage. This caused a gap to be created in the supply system because the system is demand supported. The parts required for some watercraft are not listed in any DA publication.

4. DISCUSSION: Marine repair parts remain critical; however, there has been some relief due to special supply procedures recently implemented. CINCUSARPAC and AMC have approved a new supply channel for these items. It provides for the direct forwarding of procurement action to the SFPO from USAMMNAV for those marine parts which are non-standard and for standard parts not available in normal channels in sufficient time to meet requirements. This new channel has been operational for approximately one month and has proved to be an excellent method of obtaining "hard to get" items. 2295 requisitions have been submitted to SFFPA. 1700 of these requisitions were from Vinnell for vessels to be overhauled at CRB, at a cost of $1,271,569. The remaining 595 requisitions were for "hard to get" items for units operating in RVN. Of this total, 57 items have been filled at a cost of $7,604.

5. ACTIONS: Recommend the system be continued and utilized to the maximum extent.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACofS, Maintenance
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Repair and Return Program

2. PURPOSE: The purpose of this fact sheet is to describe the Repair and Return concept and outline the actions taken to implement the program.

3. BACKGROUND: a. Increasing deadline rates of M107/M110 Self-Propelled Artillery prompted a project to conduct a technical inspection of the entire USARV fleet of M107/M110 weapons during August and September of 1968. As a result of the generally poor maintenance condition of the fleet and apparent lack of training and knowledge at the operator, organizational and direct support maintenance levels a concept of scheduled quarterly maintenance services was developed. This program is known as the "M107/M110 R&R Program.

   b. This concept calls for the evacuation of a weapon to a direct support maintenance unit for one week of intensified maintenance on a quarterly basis. The crew will accompany the weapon to perform organizational maintenance and receive maintenance instruction. Direct support maintenance units would as a minimum pull power packs for service and tuning, flush and steam clean radiators, purge hydraulic systems, check out electrical systems and perform direct support maintenance as required as well as provide technical assistance and instruction for the crews. In areas where evacuation to direct support maintenance facilities is impractical, direct support maintenance units will provide contact teams to the battery site or battalion maintenance point to perform the same services.

4. DISCUSSION: a. The following actions were taken in the development of the R&R program:

   (1) Programs of instruction have been prepared.

   (2) Repair parts stockage areas and supply mission assignments have been made (Inclosure 1).

   (3) Direct exchange item lists and allocation allowances have been made and distributed (Inclosure 2).

   (4) Maintenance units have been designated to perform the DX mission (Inclosure 3).

   (5) Quarterly maintenance and support repair center areas have been designated (Inclosure 4).

   (6) PLL and ASL lists have been prepared and distributed.

b. On 23 Oct 68, detailed instructions for implementing the program were issued to the support commands by 1st Log Command letter. Implementation of the program is being handled by personnel of the direct support maintenance units; however, an instructor-inspection team composed of four (4) USATACOM field maintenance technicians and three (3) NCO specialists has been organized to assist in instruction and training.
and assisting in problem areas. This team is now operating throughout RVN in all support command areas and are servicing an average of six weapons per week. A total of 31 weapons have been serviced since the start of the program.

c. M108/109 Self-propelled weapons were not included in the original program because the OR rates for these vehicles were favorable and the majority of the fleet was relatively new. While the OR rates for M108/109 weapons have been exceptionally satisfactory, it has become evident that an R&R Program should be started to insure the continued high readiness posture of these weapons. Such a program is being established and will be implemented in the Saigon-Long Binh area on a trial basis with command wide implementation schedules to follow.

d. The R&R concept has been well received by all commanders.

e. The success of the M107/110 R&R Program has promoted this headquarters to study the feasibility of expanding the concept to include other weapons systems. Plans are being developed to implement an R&R Program for all crew served weapons.

5. ACTION: Review and continued emphasis with corrective actions as indicated are necessary for this program to be successful. There is every indication that this can be a very helpful program in attaining and maintaining a high state of readiness in our self-propelled heavy artillery.

SUBMITTED BY: ACofS, Maintenance
Project Officer: W. C. McMillan, COL, GS, LBN 5286
REPAIR PARTS STOCKAGE AREAS AND SUPPLY MISSION ASSIGNMENT

AREAS AND UNITS:

a. Da Nang Support Command:
   (1) Chu Lai 588th Maint Co (DSU)
   (2) Da Nang 156th HEM Co (GS)
   (3) Phu Bai 67th Maint Co (DS) (DIV)
   (4) Quang Tri 634 Main Support Co (DS)

b. Qui Nhon Support Command:
   (1) Qui Nhon 5th Main Support Co (DSU)
   (2) Pleiku 624 En Tech Supply (DSU)

c. Cam Ranh Bay Support Command:
   (1) Cam Ranh Bay 135th HEM Co (GS)
   (2) Phan Thiet 135th Maint Co Det (GS)
   (3) Phu Hiep 136th Maint Co (DS)
   (4) Nha Trang 129th Maint Support Co (DS)

d. Saigon Support Command:
   (1) Tay Ninh 548th Maint Co (DSU)
   (2) Cholon 536 Maint Co (GSU)
   (3) Long Binh 185th Bn Tech Supply (DSU)
   (4) Phu Loi 610th Bn Tech Supply (DSU)

Incl 1

III.7.2
15-3
### DIRECT EXCHANGE ITEMS LIST AND ALLOCATION ALLOWANCES

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* Note: Close Loop Item

Incl 2

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III.7.3

/54/
## SELECTED MAINTENANCE UNITS FOR DIRECT EXCHANGE REPAIR MISSIONS

1. **Da Nang Support Command:**
   - Da Nang        156th Maint Co GSU

2. **Qui Nhon Support Command:**
   - Qui Nhon        160th Maint Co GSU

3. **Cam Ranh Bay Support Command:**
   - Cam Ranh Bay    135th Maint Co GSU

4. **Saigon Support Command:**
   - Long Binh       623d Maint Co GSU

Incl 3

III.7.4

15'5
QUARTERLY MAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT REPAIR CENTER AREAS

1. Da Nang Support Command:
   a. Quang Tri
   b. Phu Bai
   c. Da Nang
   d. Chu Lai

2. Qui Nhon Support Command:
   a. Qui Nhon
   b. Pleiku

3. Cam Ranh Bay Support Command:
   a. Phu Hiep
   b. Nha Trang
   c. Phan Thiet

4. Saigon Support Command:
   a. Long Binh
   b. Tay Ninh
   c. Phu Loi

Incl 4

III.7.5
1560
Cognizant Activity: ACoS, Maint
Project Officer: CPT Lyons

Task Description/Unit of Measurement:
BLACK - Objective
BLACK DASHES - Completed
TOTAL COMPLETED FROM START OF PROJECT 101

Report for Period Ending: 13 Mar 69
Project Starting Date: 7 Nov 68
Implementation Date: 30 Nov 68
% Project Completion: Continuous

AVCA Form 80R (14 Sep 68)

NOTE: Explain shortfalls or deviations on reverse side.
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: "Our Life"

2. PURPOSE: To provide information relative to the establishment of Project "Our Life".

3. BACKGROUND: Project "Our Life" was initiated at the direction of the Commanding General as a means of evaluating the value of our overhaul programs. The purpose of "Our Life" is to conduct an evaluation to determine the reliability, service life and overall quality of overhauled equipment. This in turn will provide a measure of the economic effectiveness of our overhaul programs.

4. DISCUSSION: a. The first step in the implementation of project "Our Life" was the initiation of "Our Life I" in February 1969. "Our Life I" is a program to compare the performance of selected items of overhauled equipment with performance of similar new items.

b. During "Our Life I", data is being collected on the following types of equipment:

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<td>Truck, 5T, Cargo, M54A2</td>
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<td>Truck, Tractor, 5T, M52A2</td>
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<td>Truck, Forklift, Rough Terrain, 6000lb</td>
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<td>Generator Set, 3KW</td>
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<td>Generator Set, 30KW</td>
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<td>Loader, Scoop, 2½ Cubic Yard</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
c. The following data is being extracted from TAERS records to form the base for our study:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATA</th>
<th>SOURCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nomenclature</td>
<td>DA Form 2408-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA or Serial Number</td>
<td>DA Form 2408-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturer or last overhaul activity</td>
<td>Data plate/rebuild data plate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of manufacture or date of last overhaul</td>
<td>Data plate/rebuild data plate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owning Unit</td>
<td>DA Form 2408-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date received in unit</td>
<td>DA Form 2408-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative usage since manufacture or last overhaul (miles/hours)</td>
<td>DA Form 2408-1 (monthly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative downtime (less scheduled maintenance)</td>
<td>DA Form 2408-1 (monthly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of deadline during last 90 days</td>
<td>DA Form 2408-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causes of deadline during last 90 days</td>
<td>DA Forms 2407 &amp; 2408-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major components replaced (to include date of replacement and usage at replacement)</td>
<td>DA Form 2408-10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. To the extent possible, the sample being taken during "Our Life I" will include equal numbers of new and overhauled items of each type.

5. ACTION: The data gathered during "Our Life I" will be analyzed by the ACoS, Maintenance and used to develop "life expectancy" factors for overhauled equipment.

SUBMITTED BY: ACoS, Maintenance
Project Officer: LTC Ryan, 2083
Report for Period Ending 10 Mar 69
Project Starting Date 1 Feb 69
Implementation Date 13 Feb 69
% Project Completion 30%

### TASK DESCRIPTION/
UNIT OF MEASUREMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period Ending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FEB</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 8 15 22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Development & Dissemination of "OUR LIFE I" directive.
2. Gathering of data - initial sample.
3. Analysis of initial sample data.
4. Subsequent samples.

- [ ] Projection (Black)
- [ ] Completed (Blue)
- [ ] Shortfall (Red)

NOTE: Explain shortfalls or deviations on reverse side

AVCA Form 80R (14Sep68)
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project Direct Support

2. PURPOSE: To intensify efforts to provide responsive and flexible support to customer units in all areas of maintenance and supply responsibility.

3. BACKGROUND: a. Effective 1 Mar 69 the Commanding General directed that all staff supervision functions related to DSU/GSU operations would be the responsibility of the ACofS, Maintenance for all maintenance units and the ACofS, Services for all supply and service units. This includes Class IX for ACofS, Maintenance and Classes II, IV and VII for ACofS, Services.

b. The ACofS, Maintenance, in order to be responsive to this new task, realigned his organization to provide a Supply Management Division to monitor all supply operations in the DSU/GSUs.

4. DISCUSSION: a. The ACofS, Maintenance will be responsible for all facets of Instruct/Inspect Teams within 1st Logistical Command. All 1st Log Comd DSU/GSUs will be visited twice annually, and other USARV units will be visited upon request of the commander concerned.

b. Automated systems (NCR 500) will receive particular attention and extensive coordination will be necessary between the ACofS, Supply and the ACofS, Maintenance.

c. The ACofS, Maintenance will be the focal point for coordination of actions to insure maximum support. Problem areas will be identified through staff visits, I/I Team visits and reports. Recommendations for problem solution will be coordinated so that various staff elements act in concerted effort in DSU/GSU supply and maintenance matters to include correction of deficiencies.

d. Army supply procedures, regulations and channels will not be negated by Project Direct Support. The ACofS, Maintenance will function similarly to a project manager to emphasize, expedite and exercise staff supervision over all supply and maintenance activities of 1st Logistical Command maintenance units.

III.9.0
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e. The ACofS, Services acts in a like manner for all 1st Log Cmd service u... with the exception that the I/I Teams are under the control of the ACofS, Maintenance.


b. Provide adequate staff to ACofS, Maintenance to coordinate, analyze and recommend action to improve DSU/GSU operation.

c. Insure an adequate training program for NCR 500 systems.

d. Coordinate and insure CMMI and I/I Teams complement each other and are responsive to command needs.

SUBMITTED BY: ACofS, Maintenance
Project Officer: Major Gayler
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project Clean

2. PURPOSE: This fact sheet is to provide information on Project Clean.

3. BACKGROUND: Project Clean was initially established to purify DSU stock records maintained on NCR 500 accounting machines. A 100 percent manual review of NCR 500 ledger cards was conducted to find and correct errors, cancel requisitions for items no longer needed, and initiate requisitions if necessary. This requirement was on a one-time basis.

4. DISCUSSION: a. The original Project Clean was a success, in that a large number of requisitions were cancelled and a great saving was realized.

b. In order to assure that the benefits of Project Clean are not negated in the future, it was felt that the project should be established on a cyclic basis. This action will provide a means of constant purification of DSU records and will prevent excessive and over-age backorders. It will also allow detection and correction of errors before they can have an adverse effect on the supply system.

5. ACTION: Directives were sent to the field establishing Project Clean on a quarterly basis. The cycle is to be spread over the entire quarter with reports submitted monthly to this headquarters indicating the number of errors detected, number and value of requisitions cancelled, number and value of requisitions initiated, and the value of excesses generated.

SUBMITTED BY: ACoFS, Supply
Project Officer: 1LT Leeper, LBN 4122
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project Clean Phase IV

2. PURPOSE: This fact sheet is to present the concept, purpose and current status of Project Clean Phase IV.

3. BACKGROUND: Project Clean Phase IV was established with the objective of having the computer identify and mark each repair part/secondary item which the computer decided to add to the ASL. The items so marked would then be individually reviewed by the commodity manager with technical assistance being rendered for repair parts by ACofS, Maintenance when necessary. A requirement was generated to have the Supply and Maintenance Advisory Council review all additions and deletions to the TASL.

4. DISCUSSION: Based on a presentation (by members of ACofS, Supply) to the supply and Maintenance Advisory Council on 21 December 1968 the requirement for council review of additions and deletions to the TASL was superseded. In its place the Commanding General approved using the month end statistics to analyze the ABF by SLC and to develop line item trends for ASL and nonstock items in the inventory. During the analysis SLC's "C" and "H" will not be deleted as was done previously. However, the depot statistics will be developed by deleting SLC's C, H, I and T. These calculations were made in December and all previous data adjusted to this method of computation. In addition a narrative analysis will be provided if the net increase to the ASL exceeds 1% of the ASL for any month. A printout will be made showing all additions and candidate additions to the ASL.

5. ACTION: ACofS, Supply has a requirement to develop a quantity/dollar matrix for use in reviewing new additions to the ASL. This matrix would be similar to the one now used to identify significant RO increases or decreases. Appropriate review of additions to the ASL will be made based on the matrix.

SUBMITTED BY: ACofS, Supply
Major Braithwaite
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project Fill

2. PURPOSE: This fact sheet is to present the concept, purpose and current status of Project Fill.

3. BACKGROUND: Project Fill is designed to inform CONUS of those items of equipment or supplies vital to combat or combat support operations in Vietnam which are in short supply at in-country DSU/GSU and depot levels on a recurring basis.

4. DISCUSSION: DSU/GSU's and 1st Logistical Command depots will identify and report to the USAICCV those PLL and ASL items which continuously reflect a zero balance and for which there is a high frequency of Red Ball or other high priority demands. Lists will be consolidated by the USAICCV and forwarded to AMC, DSA, LOOP, and the NICPs on an accelerated basis. The initial Project Fill list was forwarded on 2 November and was compiled from the Availability Balance File, Demand History File and the Army Maintenance Board listing of items requisitioned on Red Ball five times or more during the past sixty days. Subsequent lists will be submitted as required. As the supply position improves on an item it will be removed from the list.

5. ACTIONS: a. Continuous action at DSU and depot levels to identify Project Fill candidates.

   b. Command interest and emphasis at all levels.

   c. Identification by the USAICCV of items having a high frequency of high priority demands.

   d. Development of a Project Fill/Fringe program, to encompass fringe type items which are critical to the accomplishment of tactical missions.

SUBMITTED BY: Operations Division, Directorate of Requirements
Project Officer: LT Burns, LBN 2803/2809
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Stock Record Support

2. PURPOSE: To provide information concerning implementation of Stock Record Support to USARV DS/GS units by supporting 1st Log Depot ADP activities.

3. BACKGROUND: The 2d Log Comd has been providing Army Field Stock Record Support to 58 USARV Command direct and general support units. Due to distance and other priority requirements, the 2d Log Command has not been able to furnish this support on a current, comprehensive basis. Heavy workloads forced the suspension of stock record support processing at 2d Log Command during September, October, December 1968 and January 1969. Approximately 50% of the eligible USARV DS/GS units are not presently receiving the benefits of Stock Record Support.

4. DISCUSSION: a. With increased Automatic Data Processing capabilities installed at US Army Depots Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay, the 1st Logistical Command assumed stock record support responsibility for all eligible support units in Vietnam, effective 1 March 1969. The present objective is to provide stock record support to all 1st Log Command and USARV DS/GS units (approximately 117 units) as of 1 April 1969.

   b. All 1st Log Command and USARV direct and general support units operating under AR 711-16 will be provided with stock record support. US Army Depots at Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay, and Long Binh will provide stock record support to DS/GS units on the respective depot's Authorized Requisitioner List. USAD Qui Nhon will support Da Nang DS/GS units.

   c. The standard USARPAC 3S Stock Record Support System, consisting of nine computer programs, will be modified for local use. Under this system, DS/GS units submit ASL additions, deletions, and changes to the supporting depot monthly and will receive the following output:

      (1) Monthly: Units will receive a listing of additions, deletions, and changes made from ASL changes submitted, and pertinent changes in item nomenclature, price, stock number, or unit of issue resulting from monthly catalog changes. Manual units will receive a Title Insert (DA Form 1297) for each ASL item added or changed, and two pre-punched requisition cards (DA Form 2765) monthly for each ASL item on file. Mechanized units will receive MILSTRIP ASL response cards for use in correcting their master availability balance files.

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(2) Quarterly: Units will receive all of the monthly outputs plus a complete ASL Listing with up to four interchangeable or substitute items for each ASL item.

(3) Semi-Annually: Units will receive all of the monthly and quarterly outputs plus new Title Inserts of response cards for the entire ASL of the unit.

5. ACTIONS: a. Initiated modification and testing of Stock Record Support computer programs. Scheduled for completion and broadcast to all depots by 22 March 1969. This schedule was met.

b. Requested current ASL Tape records of units presently supported by 2d Log Comd.

c. Requisitioned initial supply of Title Inserts and DA Form 2765 from USARJ. Delivery expected at depots by 1 April 1969.

d. Drafted detailed implementing instructions and schedule for distribution to US Army Support Commands.

e. Modified USARPAC SOP on Stock Record Support for inclusion in 1st Log Comd 3SVN Depot SOP.

f. Revised LC Reg 711-3 (Stock Record Support, RVN) to reflect change in support responsibility and to clarify preparation of ASL submission documents by DS/GS units.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACofS, Supply
Project Officer: CPT TAM, Systems Division, LBN 5096
### Stock Report

**Cognizant Activity Systems Division, ACofS, Supply**

**Project Officer** Captain Tam

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**Task Description/Unit of Measurement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task Description</th>
<th>Period Ending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Obtain MASTASL/PLL Tape from 2LC.</td>
<td>Jan Feb Mar Apr May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Modify USARPAC 35 SRS Programs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Load additional DSU/GSU ASL's.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Breakout and distribute to Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 1st update complete implementation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Report for Period Ending 28 Feb 69**

**Project Starting Date** 1 Jan 69

**Implementation Date** 1 Apr 69

% Project Completion 90% (Programming)

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**AVCA Form 80R (14 Sep 68)**

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**NOTE:** Explain shortfalls or deviations on reverse side
Shortfall thus far is only in receiving the MASTER ACL tape from 2nd Log Comd. If received by 31 Mar the program can still be implemented by 1 April with first update 10-15 April 1969.
1. SUBJECT: Project Level

2. PURPOSE: To describe Project Level

3. DISCUSSION: a. Supply management improvement programs have improved the reliability of the database, provided better intelligence of demands and visibility of supplies in transit to the degree that serious consideration should be given to a reduction in stock levels. This will reduce funding requirements for stockage, prevent losses through deterioration of excesses and decrease cost in terms of money and manpower for the storage, handling, shipping and in storage maintenance of supplies.

   b. Level I of this project focuses on the DSU/GSU activities. The stockage levels presently maintained include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stockage Level</th>
<th>Requirement (DOS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operating Level</td>
<td>30 DOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety Level</td>
<td>15 DOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order ship time</td>
<td>15 DOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requisitioning Objective</td>
<td>60 DOS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   The initial objective is to reduce this requisitioning stockage objective by 25%. If experience indicates further reduction can be effected, levels will be reduced accordingly. Safety levels will be reduced or eliminated. Order ship time will be reduced to the lowest realistic level feasible.

   c. Level II pertains to depot stockage levels. The current stockage levels are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stockage Level</th>
<th>Requirement (DOS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operating Level</td>
<td>60 DOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety Level</td>
<td>30 DOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable order ship time</td>
<td>90 - 135 DOS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. ACTION: a. Each support command will select a pilot model DSU/GSU to test feasibility of reducing levels without significantly degrading customer support.

   b. DSU/GSU and depot activities will make a maximum effort to reduce receiving and shipping time and increase use of Red Ball requisitions as necessary to maintain supply effectiveness.
c. ACofS, Transportation will explore possibility of obtaining increased airlift from CONUS.

d. If experience of DSU/GSU tests prove reduced levels are feasible, levels at all such 1st Logistical Command installations will be reduced. USARV will then be furnished statistical data as a basis for consideration of reduction of levels at DSU's organic to combat units.

e. Depot stockage levels are being reviewed with a view to reduction as soon as it is determined feasible.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACofS, Supply
Project Officer: COL Pister, LBN 4120
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: NCR 500 Phase IIA.

2. PURPOSE: To improve the performance of DSU/GSU Tech Supply through the installation and use of NCR 500 Mechanized Stock Accounting Systems.

3. BACKGROUND: Phase IIA of NCR 500 systems implementation is currently in effect. Following completion of Phase IIA, 1st Logistical Command will have a total of 32 NCR 500 Mechanized Stock Control Systems. Receipt of the final system to 1st Log Comd is scheduled prior to 1 April 1969.

4. DISCUSSION: NCR 500 Phase IIA programs one additional NCR 500 system for 1st Logistical Command. This is for the 552nd Light Maintenance Co (DS) USASUPCOM Qui Nhon. The estimated delivery date for this equipment is in Mar 69. This is the total number currently programmed into units of 1st Logistical Command.

5. ACTION: Insure that after receipt of system the 552nd LEM Co (DS) has the capability to properly utilize and maintain the system.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACoFS, Maintenance
Project Officer: CPT Paulsen, LBN 2376

III.15.0
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FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project "Engineer II"

2. PURPOSE: To provide information and assistance toward improving support of Engineer construction equipment and improving the operational readiness (OR) rates of all using units of Engineer equipment.

3. BACKGROUND: Using units throughout RVN have consistently experienced high deadline rates on Engineer Equipment. The greatest problem is a shortage of repair parts and tool kits. This project is designed to combine IMI/FILL/FIND procedures with better demand analysis and management and improved technical assistance to improve DSU support.

4. DISCUSSION: a. Failure to receive the Closed Loop Support Program (CLSP) quantities programmed for input into RVN has significantly contributed to the low OR rate on Engineer equipment. The full track tractor and the engine and turbocharger for the end item; wheeled tractor; scoop loader and engine and transmission for the end item; road grader; and 20 ton truck mounted crane are all included in the CLSP. Other items of equipment, such as the 20 ton rough terrain crane and the engine for the wheeled tractor, have also been nominated for inclusion - a point which will be discussed at the next programming conference. Assets have not been received in programmed and required quantities.

b. The shortage of repair parts for Engineer equipment continues to be a major contributing factor to the high deadline rate. Recent studies by the ACOS M maintainability teams reveal a high percentage of requisitions are lost in the system; demand data is incomplete or non-existent in a significant number of cases; extended time lags in processing requisitions; and many other improper supply procedures. A list of critical repair parts is being compiled to furnish USAMECOM in order that they can assist us with a one time air shipment of those items deemed to be critical. This will facilitate an earlier get well date and subsequently allow supply action under Projects IMI and FILL to maintain adequate stockage.

c. The activation of a number of land clearing companies as separate units has created a higher deadline rate and complicated the mission of providing support to Engineer construction equipment. These companies are highly mobile and operate almost exclusively in remote areas. By activating these units as separate companies, the organic DS maintenance capability, which is normally included in the Engineer Construction Battalion, has been eliminated. Therefore, support must be rendered by contact teams and/or detachments located at the site of the land clearing operation. A command-wide shortfall in the area of Engineer construction equipment repairmen at the DS level has limited the capability to provide support, especially in remote areas. This shortfall is being alleviated in part by the use of GS maintenance units in DS roles and by contract augmentations. In addition an MTOE is pending which will provide authorization for more repairmen and increase the
engineer support capability. Also USARV has been requested to form and provide 10 man teams to be attached to land clearing companies in the I and II CTZ's where they are operating independently. An additional problem created by formation of the land clearing companies is the accelerated consumption of end items and parts caused by the extremely adverse enemy and terrain conditions under which the companies must operate.

5. ACTION: Continue to coordinate actions to:
   
a. Implement necessary corrective actions identified under projects FIND/FILL/IMIT.
   
b. Reconstruct demand data on critical repair parts and adjust stockage levels as appropriate.
   
c. Cause the proper recording of demand data.
   
d. Review the adequacy of the CLSP for engineer equipment and major components and recommend program changes as appropriate.
   
e. Increase technical assistance to engineer units
   
f. Obtain approval and fill of MTOE to obtain more engineer equipment repairmen and achieve greater support of Engineer equipment.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACofS, Maintenance
Project Officer: LTC Nelson, LBN 2025
1. SUBJECT: Project Lateral Supply

2. PURPOSE: To provide information on Project Lateral Supply.

3. BACKGROUND: It has been established that twenty (20) to twenty-five (25) percent of all Red Ball and hi-priority (02) requisitions initiated by DSUs could have been filled by lateral supply procedures. With approximately 16,000 Red Ball requisitions being extracted out of RVN each month, it is readily apparent that a great saving in the use of prime transportation and processing time could be effected if twenty percent of these requisitions could be filled through lateral supply.

4. DISCUSSION: Although cross leveling and lateral search for supplies has been accomplished at depot level, no effort has been made to accomplish lateral search at DSU before a Red Ball or 02 is passed on to depot. In the future each DSU before passing a Red Ball or 02 requisition will contact at least two sources of lateral supply. If the part is located at a lateral supply source a nonrecurring demand will be recorded on the stock records of the unit having the part. Arrangements for delivery of the repair part will be worked out at the time of the original lateral supply transaction by both parties involved in accordance with the local circumstances. In addition listings of assets generated from customer unit turn ins, ASL deletions, phase out of unit PLLs and ASLs will be forwarded to at least battalion level for screening against requirements of other DSUs in the area.

5. ACTION: a. Each DSU Tech Supply will, before passing a Red Ball or 02 priority requisition, make a lateral search of at least two other units for the item needed.

b. Battalion, group and SUPCOM headquarters will monitor this program to insure it is carried out to the maximum extent possible.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACofS, Maintenance
Project Officer: CPT C. G. Paulsen, LBN 2376
1. SUBJECT: Prepunched PLL Cards.

2. PURPOSE: To provide information concerning the use of Prepunched PLL cards.

3. BACKGROUND: In accordance with LC Reg 700-23 all direct support units which have a machine capability will furnish each supported unit two prepunched DA Forms 2765 for each line on the supported unit's initial submission of its PLL. Supported units will retain prepunched DA Forms 2765 in the applicable pocket of their visible index file until needed for replenishment of stock. Upon submission of a prepunched DA Form 2765 for repair parts, the mechanized DSU will furnish a replacement prepunched card.

4. DISCUSSION: 1st Logistical Command has set a goal that 70% of all requests received at the DSU will be prepunched. Instruct and Advise Teams are now checking during their visits to insure that the procedure for prepunched cards outlined in LC Reg 700-23 is being followed by the DSU's. One major problem encountered is that supported units are not aware of the benefits of the use of prepunched DA Forms 2765, which are fewer errors and increased response to a customer's request. This is stressed during I&A Team visits and by tech supply personnel during their daily contact with supported units. The importance of the prepunched DA Forms 2765 had been forwarded to USARV and they have implemented the requirement to provide these to all supported Divisional Units.

5. ACTIONS: Instruct and Advise Teams will continue to monitor this area during their visits to DSU/GSU's. DSU's must continue to emphasize the benefits of prepunched DA Forms 2765 to support units.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACofS, Maintenance
Project Officer: CPT Paulsen, LBN 2376

III.18.0
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FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Direct Support Improvement Program.

2. PURPOSE: To increase the efficiency of the DSU/GSU's and to intensify efforts to provide responsive and flexible support to customer units.

3. BACKGROUND: a. The effective and efficient operation of the DSU/GSU's is a critical element in the 1st Logistical Command's total support mission. Much improvement has been achieved in the DSU/GSU's, but even greater efficiencies and improvements can be realized that will reduce the burden on the total Army Logistical System. To provide the best possible customer satisfaction, the problems of the DSU/GSU's must be understood, evaluated, and corrective action taken as necessary.

b. In March 1969 the staff supervision of DSU/GSU Operations for maintenance units was assigned to the ACofS, Maintenance and for supply and service units was assigned to ACofS, Services.

4. DISCUSSION: DSU/GSU improvement actions are determined as a result of analysis of DSU performance data and analysis of the other problem areas that are evident as a result of combat support in RVN. The approach, method of evaluation and current actions are outlined as follows:

a. Problem identification.

(1) Prior to the realignment of staff responsibility for DSU/GSU control, little significant data was available for the evaluation of the commands' DSU and GSU's. A data base was reconstructed so that the units could be evaluated and corrective action taken as necessary. The analysis was completed on 15 June 1969. Additional analysis will be conducted each month to quickly identify potential problem areas or units.

(2) Instruct and Advise Teams' feedback data and reports provided a ready source of problem identification.

(3) It was recognized that data evaluation alone is insufficient for developing a DSU improvement program. Therefore, an additional approach was undertaken, the identification, assembly and listing of many of the problems in the DSU's and then if possible, potential solutions to these problems were developed. This is known as Problem/Solution.

b. Evaluation.

(1) After the initial analysis, a monthly data analysis of DSU/GSU performance is being conducted.

(2) Continuing evaluation of I&A reports.

(3) Analysis of Problem/Solution.

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c. Actions. These are actions that are currently in progress to implement the DSU/GSU improvement program.

(1) A study of the order and ship time between the depot and the DSU.

(2) Special I&A visits are scheduled to help units that are identified as "below average" in performance.

(3) I&A cyclic visits are provided to the SUPCOM DSU/GSU's to assist in improving supply and maintenance operations within subordinate elements.

(4) Implementation of a 10 day control period at DSU/GSU is to reduce ASL lines stocked; and to compensate for dynamic movement of units through the support areas which result in the fast decline of demands.

(5) Publication of DSU Bulletins to "get the word" to the DSU/GSU's on policies and procedures that are not found in regulations and to provide solutions to problems that arise due to the peculiarities of environment in RVN or the NCR 500 system.

(6) This HQ has fostered a concentrated effort to eliminate mistakes which contribute to poor requisition fill and delivery of wrong items. HQ 1st Logistical Command developed a standard edit procedure that encompasses and integrates the prepunch PLL car, return, microfilm reader, key punch verifier and NCR 500 edit checks. The elimination of mistakes at DSU/GSU's prevent the mistakes from being perpetuated throughout the supply system.

(7) The development of a 1st Logistical Command wide DX list and procedure, with updated repair parts and kits as supplements.

(8) The development of a 1st Logistical Command DSU/GSU tech supply SOP.

(9) The use of the NCR 500 Clean as a continuing cyclic procedure whereby one third of the ledgers are reviewed manually each month to determine excesses, shortages and recommended cancellations for items that are no longer required.

(10) The emphasis of Project SKILLS at Battalion level.

(11) The reconciliation of requisitions monthly between the Depot and the DSU, and the DSU and its customer to insure validity.

(12) The expansion of the Problem/Solution from an outline to practical and workable subprograms for DSU improvement.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACofS, Maintenance
Project Officer: MAJ E. F. Show/LBN 2376

III.19.1
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SECTION IV

Transportation Improvement Program
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project Challenge

2. PURPOSE: To provide information on Project Challenge

3. BACKGROUND: Due to the operational environment with which we are faced, every effort must be made to insure that critical supplies reach the customer on a timely basis. The large amounts of tonnage moving within RVN coupled with the complexity of the transportation and supply systems present many problem areas. One significant problem area which has become apparent is the excessive number of unnecessary and non-essential shipments within RVN. An allied problem is the misuse of the transportation system by placing higher priorities than necessary on shipments and the use of unrealistic Required Delivery Dates (RDD). Project Challenge has been initiated by this command in an effort to ensure prudent use of the transportation system and eliminate unnecessary or non-essential shipments.

4. DISCUSSION: a. Project Challenge consists of the challenging, by supply and transportation agencies, of all questionable shipments sponsored by the US Army within RVN. Special emphasis has been placed on:

   (1) Inter-depot shipments
   (2) Air shipments
   (3) Convoy
   (4) Large amounts/tonnages of supplies which obviously cannot be used by the consignee in a short time frame, i.e., cement, asphalt and other construction material.
   (5) Challenge by shippers (depots, etc.): Prior to offering the cargo to the appropriate support command Movement Control Center (MCC), the shipper, for any questionable shipments, validates the requirement with the requisitioner.
   (6) Challenge by the MCC: The MCC challenges questionable shipments first by contacting the shipper. If satisfaction is not gained from the shipper, the MCC then contacts the consignee to validate his need. By challenging, the MCC expects to achieve one of the following objectives:
   (7) Cancellation of shipment if it is not required.
(b) Lower the priority to the level commensurate with the urgency of need.

(c) Extend the Required Delivery Date (RDD) if requested RDD is unrealistic.

(d) Schedule large tonnage shipments out over a more reasonable time from commensurate with the consignee's capability to receive and use the item.

(7) It should be noted that, in the case of air, rail or water shipments when the cargo has to be further offered to MACV-Traffic Management Agency (TMA), the shipment is subject to still another challenge; so, in effect, shipments go through three phases of challenging.

(b) An allied action initiated by this headquarters is the "on-the-spot" challenging of convoys. Under this program the convoy commander is charged with the responsibility to personally check all cargo loaded aboard his trucks with a view toward detecting commodities and items which are questionable (i.e., floor wax destined to a location known to have only cement floors, construction material of a certain type known not to be needed at destination).

(c) To assist MCC's in the challenge program, Supply Liaison Officers have been assigned to each MCC:

(8) Task List for Project Challenge

(a) Challenging, by supply and transportation agencies, of all questionable shipments sponsored by the US Army within RVN

(b) Establish a system by which convoy commanders are charged with the responsibility to personally check all cargo loaded aboard his trucks with a view toward detecting questionable commodities.

(c) Assignment of Supply Liaison Officers to each MCC.

5. ACTION: MILSTAMP should be changed to provide standardized procedures for challenging shipments that would apply to all services and DOD sponsored movements.

SUBMITTED BY: ACofS, Transportation
Project Officer: Major R. L. Sterling, LBN 3975/6923
Cognizant Activity: Stabilization

Project Officer: J. Sterling

Report for Period Ending: 16 Dec

Project Starting Date: 1 Jan

Implementation Date: 31 Oct

% Project Completion: 100%

**TASK DESCRIPTION/UNIT OF MEASUREMENT**

- **Note:** Project 5312 is a continuing project which was implemented on 31 Oct. The goal of this project is the attainment of a responsive and efficient transportation system.

### AWCA Form 80R (14 Sep)

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<th>Feb</th>
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<th>Apr</th>
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<th>Nov</th>
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**Projection (Black)**

**Completed (Blue)**

**Shortfall (Red)**

**NOTE:** Explain shortfalls or deviations on reverse side.
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project Flow

2. PURPOSE: To provide information on Project Flow.

3. BACKGROUND: Although the identification of vessels destined for RVN ports was being closely monitored at this headquarters, there was little effort being made to identify and coordinate the movement of tonnage by class of supply or by specific or critical items of supplies aboard these vessels.

4. DISCUSSION: a. Project Flow was implemented in late September 1968. The ultimate goal of Project Flow is to have visibility of all item in the pipeline by specific item identification with a view toward positive management over their final destination and/or disposition. Early identification of specific items would result in such benefits as throughput to the customer, diversion of vessels within RVN or automatic reconsign-ment of items without their being transported to a depot and then back to the port. Further, with total visibility of supplies, in-country stockage levels can be reduced since supplies could actually be managed while en-route to RVN.

b. The initial implementation of Project Flow is a projection of tonnage destined for major RVN ports (Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay, and Saigon) categorized by class of supply, ports to which destined and the approximate location between CONUS and RVN, expressed in time frames of 1-7, 8-14, 15-21 and 22 plus days out of port. The program also involves the identification of critical items designated by the CG such as tanks, APC's and SP artillery pieces. Attached as Inclosures are sample Project Flow Charts.

c. Data for Project Flow is obtained from MILSTAMP Cargo Traffic Messages, cargo manifests, weekly newsletters from Western Area Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service and Eastern Area Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service and information submitted by commodity managers. Data is updated every Monday, verified and posted to view graphs for presentation in the Logistical Operations Control Center (LOCC). Data for the first 14 days is considered to be 85% accurate with the percentage falling thereafter due to non-receipt of input data. The majority of input data arrives between 14 to 20 days prior to arrival of vessels.

d. After data is compiled each week, a meeting is held by ACofS, Transportation with 1st Log Comd commodity managers. The primary purpose of this meeting is to bring the commodity managers into the picture to ensure a fully coordinated effort. Commodity managers are then expected to analyze data and make recommendations as to final disposition of cargo.
e. The initial phase of Project Flow, as described in para 4b above, has presented very few problems, as it is relatively easy to identify tonnage by class of supply from ships' manifests and other available documents. However, under current procedures the ultimate goal of specific item identification will be impossible in many cases, simply because manifest information is not explicit enough. To achieve complete and accurate results it appears that more descriptive noun nomenclature and FSN's are required on the manifest or some other system which would permit specific item identification. In this connection a "supply" manifest test is being conducted at Cam Ranh Bay for all vessels originating at Okinawa to Cam Ranh Bay which cross references the TGN contained on the regular manifest and the FSN of the item. When the regular manifest is received at Cam Ranh Bay, the card file is then cross referenced to the manifest and specific item identification is achieved. A recommendation has been forwarded through command channels to expand this test to include CONUS POE's with shipments destined for Cam Ranh Bay.

5. ACTIONS: a. The refinement of ship's manifests or other innovations which would permit specific item identification should be developed. There is a need to bridge the gap between MILSTAMP and MILSTRIP. Both of these regulations involve DOD policy and standardization consideration.

h. In an effort to improve our data base, letters, signed by General Heiser, have been sent to both Eastern and Western Area, MTMS, requesting that they refine their newsletters to include more detailed data.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACofS, Transportation
Project Officer: CPT D. K. McBride, LBN 3973/3974
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<th></th>
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<th>DUE IN 15-21 DAYS</th>
<th>DUE IN 22 plus DAYS</th>
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NP = Non-perishable  P = Perishable  MCI = Meal Combat Individual
### CLASS V

**RVN INBOUND TONNAGE (STOW)**

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A = US Army  
B = ARVN  
F = US Air Force  
N = US Navy
## INTENSIVE MANAGEMENT ITEMS (IMI)

### RVN INBOUND TONNAGE

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**Notes:**
- QNH: 0
- CRB: 0
- SGN: 0

### RVN OUTBOUND TONNAGE

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FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project Intransit

2. PURPOSE: To provide information of Project Intransit.

3. BACKGROUND: The operational environment in RVN necessitates responsive logistical support. A vital part of this support is the transportation function - the delivery of supplies to the customer. The 1st Log Comd concept calls for a minimum amount of supplies on the ground reinforced by a constant flow in the pipeline from the supplier to the customer. In other words, everything that is needed is either moving or actually being consumed. To accomplish this objective an effective traffic management system is required. In this regard the command has initiated a comprehensive program involving several key actions designed to detect bottlenecks and improve the flow of Army-sponsored cargo within RVN.

4. DISCUSSION: a. Establishment of Movement Control Centers (MCC): Until recently the Army has relied fully on MACV's Traffic Management Agency (TMA) for managing the movement of Army-sponsored cargo within RVN. As a result the Army has not really had a handle on the movement of its own cargo. To alleviate this situation, MCC's have been established within each support command to function as the focal point for all USARV shippers. Rather than offering shipments directly to TMA field officer, USARV shippers are now submitting their requirements to their supporting MCC. When mode selection is highway, the MCC satisfies the requirement with Army resources; however, for other modes, requirements must be passed on to TMA. This system gives our MCC's the opportunity to monitor the requirements of Army shippers as well as the capability to discipline shippers on the use of the transportation system.

b. Challenging: One of the significant problem areas which has resulted in an over-saturated transportation system has been the excessive number of unnecessary and non-essential shipments within RVN, coupled with the misuse of the transportation system through the use of unrealistic priorities and required delivery dates (RDD). To combat this problem, the command has instituted a program of challenging questionable shipments, both within supply and transportation channels. Emphasis has been placed on challenging inter-depot shipments, air shipments, truck convoys and large tonnage shipments. This program is expected to reap benefits by eliminating non-essential shipments, thereby allowing for a more expeditious flow of essential cargo.
c. Cargo Backlog Reporting System: Due to the vast amount of cargo moving within RVN it has been, more often than not, difficult to distinguish between that cargo which is really in trouble, i.e., past or near its RDD, and that which has been for shipment but still has sufficient time for delivery. In order to provide better management to the cargo situation, a Weekly Cargo Backlog Report has been devised. Support commands report cargo which is on hand (cargo offered and not moved) as of 1800 hours each Friday, broken out into categories of booked, not booked, cargo within five days of RDD and cargo past RDD. Cargo past RDD is further identified by class of supply and destination. This report has been most helpful in detecting problem areas and determining where action and emphasis needs to be placed to expedite movement.

d. Monthly Port Cargo Backlog Report: Another problem area causing concern within RVN has been large amounts of tonnage which remain in the ports undelivered for various reasons. To determine the scope of this problem a monthly report has been developed to identify that cargo which has been in port in excess of two weeks. Support commands report the cargo by short tons, consignee, consignor, action being taken to deliver cargo, and assistance, if any, required from this headquarters. Using this report this headquarters is able to direct efforts toward getting frustrated cargo moved to appropriate consignee or, if identification of consignee cannot be made, moving cargo to the nearest depot for stockage.

e. Order-Ship Time: AR 725-50 prescribes standard segments of Order-Ship Time (OST) under the Uniform Material Movement and Issue Priority System (UMMIPS). The total number of days of OST authorized for each transportation priority under UMMIPS is as follows: Priority 1 - 5 days; Priority 2 - 8 days; Priority 3 - 20 days; Priority 4 - 30 days. The transportation segment of the OST as prescribed by UMMIPS is as follows: Priority 1 - 3 days; Priority 2 - 4 days; Priority 3 - 8 days and priority 4 - 14 days. Under the MACV-TMA transportation priority system, the transportation segment of the OST corresponds exactly to the entire OST times prescribed by UMMIPS (5, 8, 20, and 30 days for priorities 1 - 4 respectively). This policy has resulted in a considerably extended OST for RVN and has been the possible cause of unresponsive support, particularly for priority 3 and 4 shipments. In an effort to rectify this situation, this headquarters recommended to USARV that the transportation segment of the OST be reduced. USARV has formally indicated their concurrence and is recommending to MACV that they revise their system to coincide with the transportation times prescribed by UMMIPS. If approved by MACV this will result in a higher sense of urgency for all priorities and particularly priorities 3 and 4. Regardless of the MACV decision on this recommendation, this headquarters has directed that the UMMIPS transportation times be applied to the command's organic highway and marine assets. This policy went into effect 15 November 1968. A report was devised to measure performance under this system on a monthly basis.
f. Movements Program (forecasting requirements): An integral part of an effective traffic management system is forecasting requirements. During the last few months, this headquarters has intensified its efforts to develop a usable and comprehensive Movements Program. With an effective program, data will be readily available indicating tonnages, by class of supply, that are projected for movement over the various channels. Further, an accurate and complete program will permit proper planning for the allocation and utilization of transportation resources, both with this command's assets and those controlled by TMA.

g. Project INTRANSIT: Task List

1. Establishment of Movement Control Centers (MCC) at each Support Command.

2. Challenge of questionable shipments within supply and transportation channels by MCC's.


5. Reduction of OST to 4 MHIQS standards.

6. Establish a movements tailored to accurately forecast transportation requirements.

5. ACTION: Continued emphasis is required at all levels to improve the posture of the Army traffic management system within RVN. ACofS, Transportation will continue to look for, and develop, ways to improve the system with the ultimate objective of totally responsive transportation support.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACofS, Transportation
Project Officer: Major R. L. Sterling, LBN 3975/6923
NOTE: Project JTS is a continuing project implemented on 30 Nov 68.

AVCA FORM 609 (14 Sep 68)
Project Status Chart
LC Cir 10-1

NOTE: Explain shortfalls or deviations on reverse side.
1. SUBJECT: Project DOCRITE

2. PURPOSE: To explain the scope and aims of Project DOCRITE

3. BACKGROUND: DOD Reg 4500.32-R (MILSTAMP) is designed to standardize movement and documentation requirements within the Defense Transportation System through the use of uniform coded and non-coded data, formats and procedures. Within RVN, MILSTAMP is used extensively, however there were many areas where documentation procedures were not being followed or nonexistent.

4. DISCUSSION:

   a. Project DOCRITE was implemented during phase III, Clean V in January 1969 with the objective of improving and standardizing documentation procedures within 1st Logistical Command.

   b. Import documentation procedures at all Support Commands were inspected August 1968 through January 1969. A manifest transmission and inspection of export documentation procedures were scheduled during February, March and April.

   c. Interim procedures were implemented as deficiencies were noted and at the completion of the initial phase, standardized procedures will be published. Phase II will be a continuing program of inspections.

   d. Project DOCRITE: Task Lists

      (1) Inspect documentation and documentation procedures at all support commands. (Water ports to first consignee). Accomplished

      (2) Re-inspect documentation procedures at all support commands (Target 28 Feb 69).

      (3) Conduct Manifest Test (Target 30 Mar 69)

      (4) Inspect export documentation procedures (Target 15 Apr 69)

      (5) Publish 1st Logistical Command Regulation implementing documentation procedures. (Target 31 May 69)

      (6) Conduct follow-up inspections.

5. ACTION: A Transportation Inspection and Instruction Team (T&I) has been formed and is visiting all Support Commands.

SUBMITTED BY: ACofS, Transportation
Action Officer: CPT McBride, LBN 3973/3974

IV.4.0

/92
Report for Period Ending 10 Mar 69
Project Starting Date 1 Jan 69
Implementation Date 1 Jan 69
% Project Completion 30%

AVCO FORM 80R (14 Sep 68)
Project Status Chart
LC Cir 10-1

NOTE: Explain shortfalls or deviations on reverse side
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project Iceberg

2. PURPOSE: To explain the scope and aims of Project Iceberg.

3. BACKGROUND: Transportation truck units operating in RVN have consistently been unable to attain the task vehicle availability envisioned by the TOE and other standards setting publications.

4. DISCUSSION: a. Project Iceberg is a program to identify and minimize the hidden degrading factors which reduce vehicle availability in 1st Logistical Command's operating transportation truck units.

   b. Task vehicle availability is degraded as follows:

   (1) Vehicles lost to maintenance (scheduled and emergency repairs).

   (2) Vehicles TDY or hand receipted and thus lost to the unit.

   (3) Vehicles forced to RON and thus not available for the following day.

   (4) Vehicles not available for use due to driver shortages.

   (5) Vehicles lost to the cargo hauling mission because they have been hardened to serve as security vehicles for convoy operations.

5. ACTION: a. Comprehensive statistical data on these degrading factors are kept for each battalion and separate company. Thru a monthly analysis at Hq 1st Log Comd, deficient areas and unfavorable trends are identified and isolated for corrective action at the applicable level. Corrective measures in the areas of supply, maintenance, personnel, depot receiving and shipping and others have been taken with encouraging success.

   b. Task vehicle availability by Support Command, by type vehicle, is reported in Volume I of the 1st Log Comd monthly Review and Analysis.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACofS, Transportation
Action Officer: MAJ Perkins, Chief, Rail and Highway Division

IV.5.0
194
YOTBERG
(Project)

Cornizant Activity: ACofS, Trans
Project Officer: MAJ Perkins

5 Ton Tractor Availability

Report for Period Ending: Feb '69
Project Starting Date: Jan '69
Implementation Date: Jan '69
% Project Completion: N/A

AVCA FORM MOR (14 Sep 67)
Project Status Chart
LC Cir 10-1

NOTES: Explain shortfalls or deviations on reverse side.
TASK DESCRIPTION/UNIT OF MEASUREMENT

REPORT

AVCA FORM 80R (14 Sep 68)
Project Status Chart
LC Cir 10-1

NOTE: Explain shortfalls or deviations on reverse side
ICEBERG
(Project)

Cognizant Activity: ACofS, Trans
Project Officer: MAJ Perkins

2 1/2 Ton Truck Availability

Report for Period Ending Feb '69
Project Starting Date: Jan '69
Implementation Date: Jan '69
% Project Completion: N/A

% TABLE

Projection
Completed
Shortfall

AVCA FORM 880 (14 Sep 66)
Project Status Chart
LC Cir 10-1

NOTE: Explain shortfalls or deviations on reverse side.
ICEBERG
(Project)

Coordinating Activity ACofS, Trans
Project Officer MAJ Perkins

Report for Period Ending Feb 69

12 Ton S & P
Semitrailers
Availability

Project Starting Date Jan 69
Implementation Date Jan 69

% Project Completion N/A

TASK DESCRIPTION/
UNIT OF MEASUREMENT

AVCA FORM 80R (14 Sep 68)
Project Status Chart
LC Cir 10-1

NOTE: Explain shortfalls or deviations on reverse side
**LOG MOVES**

*Project*

Cognizant Activity: ACoFS, Trans

Project Officer: CPT Arko

---

**TASK DESCRIPTION/UNIT OF MEASUREMENT**

**1995**

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<th>TASK 1</th>
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**AVCA FORM 80R (14 Sep 68)**

Project Status Chart

LC Cir 10-1

**REPORT FOR PERIOD ENDING**

10 Mar 69

**Project Starting Date**

1 Jan 69

**Implementation Date**

30 Apr 69

% Project Completion: 20%

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**NOTE:** Explain shortfalls or deviations on reverse side
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project Lognove

2. PURPOSE: To provide information on Project Lognove.

3. BACKGROUND: At the present time only USASUPCOM, Saigon has an established movement control organization with sufficient personnel authorizations. The need for an effective movement control organization in each support command exists. Each of the other support commands have established a Movement Control Center (MCC) to control the flow of cargo shipments within their area, however, no formalized MTOE/MTDA organization exists. The lack of personnel and equipment authorizations is hindering the effectiveness of the overall 1st Log Comd Movements Program.

4. DISCUSSION:

   a. Project Lognove was implemented during Phase III, Clean V in January 1969 with the objective of providing an effective 1st Log Comd movement control organization in each support command.

   b. In order to have an effective 1st Log movement control organization, each support command must have a formal organization with sufficient personnel and equipment authorized by MTOE/MTDA to able to carry out their portion of the overall 1st Log Comd Movements Program.

   c. Project Lognove: Task List

      (1) Provide guidance to support commands concerning movement control coverage desired.

      (2) Receive optimum movement control organization requirements from support commands.

      (3) Validate requirements submitted by support commands.

      (4) Obtain personnel spaces to finance each support command movement control organization.

      (5) Formalize support command movement control organizations by initiating TOE/MTOE action.

      (6) Coordinate with USARV concerning the integration of the USARV highway regulation organization into the 1st Log Comd movement control organization.

      (7) Obtain personnel and equipment to staff and equip support command movement control organizations.

IV.6.0
200
5. ACTION: The following actions are being accomplished under Project Logmove to achieve the desired results:

   a. Support commands submit their organization requirements to HQ lst Log based on guidance provided concerning coverage desired.

   b. HQ lst Log validates the support command requirements and takes action to obtain personnel spaces required.

   c. HTOE MTDA actions are initiated to formalize the support command movement control organization.

   d. Personnel and equipment are obtained to staff and equip the movement control organization.

SUBMITTED BY: ACofS, Transportation
Project Officer: CPT Arko, LBN 3172/6077
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project MD-RO-RO- (More Roll on/Roll off).

2. PURPOSE: To provide information on Project MD-RO-RO.

3. DISCUSSION: 
   a. Project MD-RO-RO was established in January 1969 with an objective to maximize the use of cargo semi-trailers for intra-coastal (within and between each support command) RO/RO service.

   b. Project MD-RO-RO: Task List

   (1) Determine availability of assets which could be made available for RO/RO service (both trailers and marine).

   (2) Develop program and procedures.

   (3) Disseminate procedures to field-publicize program.

   (4) Monitor program to determine performance and extent of use.

   (5) Analyze performance and usage and make modifications accordingly.

4. ACTION: To achieve the desired results the following actions must be accomplished:

   a. Determine availability of assets (both trailers and marine) which could be made available for RO/RO service.

   b. Develop program and procedures.

   c. Implement the program.

   d. Monitor the program to determine performance and extent of use.

   e. Analyze performance to make modifications accordingly.

SUBMITTED BY: ACofS, Transportation
Action Officer: CPT Massengale, LBN 3078/6173
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**Projection (Black)**

**Completed (Blue)**

**Shortfall (Red)**

**NOTE:** Explain shortfalls or deviations on reverse side
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project RUBS (Rapid Unaccompanied Baggage Shipment)

2. PURPOSE: To provide information on project RUBS

3. BACKGROUND: There are many incidents where personnel are experiencing hardship because of untimely receipt of unaccompanied baggage.

4. DISCUSSION:
   a. Project RUBS was proposed on 12 January 1969. The ultimate goals of Project RUBS are the reduction of delay in receipt of unaccompanied baggage and single management of all unaccompanied baggage activities in the II, III, and IV Corps Tactical Zones.

   b. In order to achieve maximum results the following procedures were proposed:

      (1) Rapid and correct processing at baggage facilities.

      (2) Timely movement of unaccompanied baggage from processing points to the aerial ports.

      (3) Monitoring of hold time at the aerial ports.

      (4) Expeditious processing of tracer actions.

      (5) Insure carriers perform in accordance with their letters of intent.

      (6) Increased emphasis on baggage inquiries. Treat each inquiry as if it was your own.

   c. 1st Logistical Command now has control of all the baggage facilities within II, III, and IV Corps Tactical Zones, with the exception of Long Binh Post and U.S. Army, Headquarters Area Command. It is proposed that the facilities at Long Binh Post and U.S. Army, Headquarters Area Command, presently under U.S. Army, Vietnam control, be assigned to 1st Logistical Command.
d. Project RUBS: Task Lists

(1) Rapid and correct processing at baggage facilities.

(2) Timely movement of unaccompanied baggage from processing points to the aerial ports.

(3) Monitoring of hold time at the aerial ports.

(4) Expeditious processing of tracer actions.

(5) Insure carriers perform in accordance with their letters of intent.

(6) Increased emphasis on baggage inquiries. Treat each inquiry as if it was your own.
**RUBS**

**(Project)**

**Commodant Activity:** ACoFS, Trans  
**Project Officer:** CPT Hilton

**Report for Period Ending:** 10 Mar 69  
**Project Starting Date:** 1 Jan 69  
**Implementation Date:** 30 Apr 69  
**% Project Completion:** 80%

### TASK DESCRIPTION/UNIT OF MEASUREMENT

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**NOTE:** Explain shortfalls or deviations on reverse side

**AVCA FORM 80R (14 Sep 68)**  
Project Status Chart  
LC Cir 10-1
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project UPTIGHT (Phase III, Clean V)

2. PURPOSE: To provide information on Project UPTIGHT.

3. BACKGROUND: This Command contracts for transportation services amounting to approximately $68,000,000 per year. To increase and expand the Command's monitorship of these contracts, Project UPTIGHT, Phase III, Clean V was established.

4. DISCUSSION: Implemented during Phase III, Clean V, Project UPTIGHT has specific objectives as follows:
   
a. Increase the Command's capability to monitor transportation contracts.
   
b. Perform on-site technical evaluations of contractor operations.
   
c. Review contractor effort to determine where this effort can be reduced or improved.
   
d. Project UPTIGHT: Task List

   (1) Request assignment of another officer to Plans and Analysis Division, Officer of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Transportation.

   (2) Initiate action to establish a Contracts Branch in the Plans and Analysis Division through formal TDA action.

   (3) Develop a series of preliminary spread sheets to indicate theater-wide capabilities (military and contract) and theater-wide requirements, as they are now known.

   (4) Develop and coordinate an itinerary for on-site technical evaluations of major contracts.

   (5) Complete technical evaluations of major contracts.

   (6) Refine preliminary spread sheets (2c, above) into firm statements of theater capabilities and requirements.

   (7) Analyze the requirement for theater contract effort.

   (8) Make formal recommendations to the Resources Review Board.

   (9) Make formal recommendations to USAPAV concerning modifications that may be required for FY 70 contracts.

IV.9.0
207
5. ACTION: To accomplish the above objectives, the following actions must be taken:

a. Obtain an additional officer for the Plans and Analysis Division, ACofS, Transportation and initiate a contracts Branch within this division.

b. Develop preliminary spread sheets to indicate theater wide capabilities and requirements, both contractor and military.

c. Perform on-site observation of the contractor operations to insure that the contractor effort is utilized only to supplement military capabilities and to investigate methods to improve the contractor/military operations.

d. Make recommendations to the Resources Review Board and/or USAPAV.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACofS, Transportation
Project Officer: 1LT Smitherman, LBN 3172/6077
### UPTIGHT (Phase III Clean V) (Project)

**Cognisant Activity** AG2S, Trans

**Project Officer** LL Smith

**Report for Period Ending** 10 Mar 69

**Project Starting Date** 1 Jan 69

**Implementation Date** 25 May 69

**% Project Completion** 30%

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### TASK DESCRIPTION/
### UNIT OF MEASUREMENT

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**NOTE:** Explain shortfalls or deviations on reverse side.

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AVCO FORM 80R (14 Sep 68)

Project Status Chart

LC Cir 10-1
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: WATERDAT (Phase III Clean V)

2. PURPOSE: To provide information of Project WATERDAT

3. DISCUSSION:
   a. To provide the Terminal and Water Transport Division of the ACofS, Trans a more effective management tool this program was improvised. On numerous occasions, questions have arisen concerning port operations, shallow draft vessel utilization, and intra-coastal vessel operations and a complete bank of statistical data was not available to answer these queries. This required Support Commands to provide several special reports which are time consuming. The WATERDAT program has been time phased as follows:

   (1) Provide guidance to Support Commands for improved compilation of vessel/lighterage and port operations statistics.
   (2) Validate capabilities of ports by actual performance.
   (3) Ascertain Areas for improvement and establish goals and objectives for Support Commands.
   (4) Verify equipment requirements commensurate with actual port workloads.

   b. The success of this program will be measured by the completion of above events, reduced deep draft and lighterage turnaround times, more effective utilization of lighterage and reduced cost to the government.

   c. Project WATERDAT: Task List

   (1) Provide guidance to Support Commands for improved compilation of vessel/lighterage and port operations statistics.
   (2) Validate capabilities of ports by actual performance.
   (3) Ascertain Areas for improvement and establish goals and objectives for Support Commands.
   (4) Verify equipment requirements commensurate with actual port workloads.

4. ACTION: To provide Support Commands with policies and procedures for compilation of desired statistical data Appendix I to LC Reg 55-5 was revised and will be distributed to the field.
Cognizant Activity: ACoFS, Trans

Report for Period Ending: 15 Mar 69

Project Officer: CPT Bourne

Project Starting Date: 1 Jan 69

Implementation Date: 1 Jan 69

% Project Completion:

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- Projection (Black)
- Completed (Blue)
- Shortfall (Red)

AVCA Form 80R (14Sep68)

NOTE: Explain shortfalls or deviations on reverse side.
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project RETRO-RIGHT

2. PURPOSE: This fact sheet is submitted to define Project RETRO-RIGHT. RETRO-RIGHT is concerned with reducing to zero, deficiencies associated with the identification, inspection, packaging, documentation (supply and transportation), and shipment of retrograde cargo.

3. FACTS: a. On an almost daily basis this Command receives complaints from CONUS and PACOM terminals and depots regarding the manner in which cargo is prepared and shipped from RVN. Most common and recurring deficiencies are:

   (1) Supply documentation (i.e., DD 1348) not with cargo in accordance with MILSTRIP, paragraph 4-28.

   (2) Cargo thrown into container without proper blocking/bracing. Trash thrown into containers with cargo.

   (3) Hazardous material (i.e., composition C-4, 90mm projectile) left in trucks and tanks in violation of Code of Federal Regulation 46, Part 146.

   (4) Project codes and FSN not shown on TCMD (therefore not on manifest in accord with USARPAC policy).

   (5) Cargo not inspected and certified to be free of trash, ammunition/components, toxic/hazardous or flammable materials as prescribed by AR 740-20, para 10b and c.

   (6) Cargo returned to CONUS which, because of condition, should have been salvaged in RVN and thus save transportation costs.

b. Responsibility for retrograde cargo is fragmented among supply, maintenance, ammunition, transportation and to some extent, medical personnel.

c. Requirements and procedures are spelled out in a myriad of Federal DOD, DA, MACV, USARV, and LC regulations.

d. Any omission or improper action tends to be perpetuated from origin to consignor due to the nature of cargo. People do not normally regard a retrograded truck with the same sense of urgency and care they do with a new inbound truck.

IV.11.0

2/2
There also appears to be an incorrect philosophy that "since we are fighting in RVN we can ignore parts of the regulation."

e. ACofS Transportation has been given responsibility to define/monitor specific actions required by classification, packaging, shipping, reporting, inspecting, and terminal activities. (Reference: LOCC Notes 25 Jun 69.)

f. RETRO-RIGHT will be conducted in phases as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Target</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Appoint an officer as single source of information and policy for retrograde. Determine requirements and responsibilities. Who, by activities and job title, does what? Input and personnel assistance will be required from Supply, Ammunition, Maintenance, Transportation and certain MACV/USARV offices.</td>
<td>2 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Publish comprehensive instructions that encompass all aspects of the program from identification through shipment and performance measurement.</td>
<td>15 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Disseminate instructions to the field by means of a 1st Log sponsored seminar to be attended by Maintenance, Supply and Transportation representatives from all SUPCOMS. USARV will be invited, as divisions and brigades ship considerable cargo under THRU-PUT. Effect coordination with USARV and MACV to obtain compliance by USAF, USN, and USAID.</td>
<td>20 July</td>
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<td>IV</td>
<td>Form Inspection and Assistance Team to visit all SUPCOMS on a regular basis (monthly). Team would be composed of Supply, Maintenance and Transportation representatives.</td>
<td>2 July</td>
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<td>V</td>
<td>Continual followup to insure replacement personnel are fully educated on RETRO-RIGHT so that quality and momentum are not lost by attrition.</td>
<td>Continual</td>
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SUBMITTED BY: ACofS, Transportation
Action Officer: MAJ C. H. BLACK (LBN 3973)
SECTION V

Personnel Improvement Programs
1. SUBJECT: Army Education Program in 1st Logistical Command

2. PURPOSE: To survey projects and programs initiated, continued, or emphasized in the 1st Logistical Command as regards the Army Education Program. To provide the CofS with up-dated information on education programs.

3. DISCUSSION: a. New Army Education Centers or expanded services are planned for Da Nang, Phu Bai, Quang Tri, Que Nhon Valley, Pleiku and Can Tho. The portable buildings purchased earlier in the year have been delivered to Centers to overcome crowded conditions and the restriction on new construction. These buildings are designed for use in testing, counseling, classwork and languages. A request is being made for commercial vehicles to enable the Education Services Officers to visit the company and battalion-sized units for counseling, testing and surveying their needs.

b. Additional DAC space authorizations were received for seven educators to be utilized at Cam Ranh Bay; Qui Nhon Valley, Pleiku; Da Nang, Phu Bai, Quang Tri; and Can Tho. Recruitment for replacements has been moved up to six-months lead time so that new arrivals may have an opportunity to work with the person they are replacing.

c. Emphasis on educational services has changed from one of minimal services at several locations to maximal services wherever we have a center. It is expected that the professional educators we have will be able to reach more and more of the men. It is their function to counsel and advise military personnel on their career program and to create the facilities for getting the job done. Counseling, testing and participation are now the criteria for a well-rounded education center.

d. Education centers are evaluated by means of their reports made to this headquarters. The quarterly report ending 31 Dec 68 indicates that over 20% of 1st Log Comd personnel are engaged in some form of educational activity.

4. ACTION: That the above be noted.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACofS, Personnel
Project Officer: Mr. W. M. Cleveland, GS-13, LBN 4081
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project Pill III

2. PURPOSE: To fill essential personnel requirements in 1st Log Comd by reducing malutilization of personnel.

3. BACKGROUND: a. The current posture of enlisted personnel strength in the 1st Logistic Command requires the efficient utilization of assigned personnel. HQ USARV advises that this command will be maintained at less than 100% of authorized enlisted personnel strength less the Program 6 reductions through any given month.

   b. The command developed Primary Military Occupational Speciality (PMOS) Inventory is the tool available to commanders to identify malutilization problems. This inventory is reviewed by the Command Personnel Assistance Advisory Team (PAAT) and enables the team to assist support commands, during visits, in resolving problem areas.

4. DISCUSSION: a. Though the PMOS Inventories are reviewed and updated monthly, there continues to be excessive malutilization. The Personnel Management Officer reviewed in detail the inventories of 30 November 1968 to determine the rate of malutilization at the initiation of this project. The criteria contained in AR 600-200, Enlisted Personnel Management System, AR 611-201, Enlisted Military Occupational Specialties, and DA Cir 611-4, Personnel Selection and Classification, were used to determine misassignments excluding those personnel with combat MOS's. These personnel were assigned to the command to alleviate critical shortage areas and cannot be reclassified because of current regulations. Personnel being utilized in the same career group (first two characters of the MOS) were also excluded. The rate of malutilization for the support commands ranged from 19.8 to 27.4 percent with a command average of 22.1 percent. Charts have been developed and information is compiled by the Personnel Management Office to update these charts monthly. The PAAT visits each support command on a recurring basis to assist them in reducing the rate through retraining and reclassification as applicable.

   b. The reduction of the number of enlisted personnel who are assigned duty in areas other than the PMOS field is the objective of Project Pill III. Commanders are required to place special emphasis on this program in consonance with their mission requirements and priority of assignments. Each command conducts a detailed review monthly and submits information of the rate of malutilization to the Personnel Management Office with explanation of deviations.

5. ACTION: Due to the nature of personnel turnover in Vietnam, a continuing program to reduce malutilization is necessary. The goal is to reduce
malutilization in the command to not more than 2% of assigned enlisted
strength. Progress is reflected on the attached graph.

SUBMITTED BY:
Adjutant General
Project Officer: Captain Dessauer, LBN 3983
Reduce Diversion of Senior Enlisted Replacements

Project

Commissant Activity: AG
Project Officer: Cpt. Dessauer

Report for Period ending: 28 Feb 69
Project Starting Date: 1 Sep 68
Implementation Date: 15 Oct 68

Task Description / Unit of Measurement

AWCA Form 909 (14 Sep 69)
Project Status Chart
LC Cir 10-1

NOT: Explain shortfalls or deviations on reverse side.
Explanations of objective:

Reduce the diversion of senior enlisted replacements and assign them to position designated by DA. Diversion rate on starting date was 29%. Objective is to achieve USARV level of 7%. Maximum deviation is 5%.

STARTING DATE: Program started on 1 Sep 68 and objective was achieved by 1 Mar 69.

NARRATIVE: As of 28 Feb 69, diversion rate of senior enlisted replacements was at 6%, 1% under the desired program. The objective of reducing the diversion of senior enlisted replacements has been accomplished.
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Infusion of Reserve and National Guard Units

2. PURPOSE: To inform commanders and staff officers of 1st Logistical Command's tailored unit infusion plan which infused this command's Reserve and National Guard Units.

3. DISCUSSION:
   a. Infusion for all new units arriving in-country with their personnel is necessary during the first year in-country as the tour in Vietnam is one year. A rotational hump problem exists in this situation as the personnel are all eligible to rotate (DEROS) at the same time. Therefore, to maintain a new unit at its maximum operational efficiency and to preclude a rotational hump an exchange of personnel from other units with individuals having various rotational dates is required (Infusion).

   b. During September, October and November 1968, this command received 25 Reserve and National Guard units into our structure. To preclude all of these personnel from departing their units during the same time frame, a tailored unit infusion plan was developed in cooperation with the support command infusion officers to specifically meet the peculiarities of each unit. Attention was given to the units selected to infuse with these reserve units to insure that there would be no deterioration in mission accomplishment and to preclude any monthly rotational humps.

   c. A detailed unit infusion plan was developed and approved for each unit. The infusion progress of each unit will be monitored by this command's infusion officer to insure that the infusion is being accomplished as indicated on their approved plan.

   d. The designated Reserve and National Guard units will be seventy-five percent infused by the end of the units 10th month in-country in order to maintain maximum operational efficiency of the unit.

SUBMITTED BY: ACofS, Personnel
Project Officer: MAJ Crowley, LBN 4181
1. **SUBJECT:** The Know Your Man Progress

2. **PURPOSE:** The Know Your Man Program is designed to obtain maximum utilization of all our personnel resources by having every man know his fellow man, whether senior, contemporary or subordinate and look out for his welfare.

3. **BACKGROUND:** Of the 11 principles of leadership, as outlined in FM 22-100, the most important one as it relates to morale and welfare is, "Know your men, and look out for their welfare." Adherence to the principle of knowing your men and looking for their welfare is most important at all times and especially in a combat situation. Each and every individual in this command must know that someone is concerned with his welfare, that someone cares about him as an individual, not simply as a tool with which to get a mission accomplished. With complete adherence to this principle, the incident and accident rate of the command should decrease, the morale and esprit de corps of the organization should be enhanced, and a corresponding improvement in overall efficiency should be realized.

4. **DISCUSSION:** After a four month trial stage, the Know Your Man Program, although achieving remarkable results, has proven to be administratively difficult to manage. Therefore, LC Circular 28-2 and LC Regulations 28-9, 28-8, 600-30 and 600-20 have been revised, rescinded and superseded as necessary so that basically, the only councils required - down to battalion level - are a NCO Council, a Character Guidance Council and a controlling board called the PARB (Personnel Activities Review Board). Only PARB Minutes are required to be forwarded to higher headquarters. By reducing the number of council meetings and by eliminating the requirement for so many sets of minutes, responsible personnel will be freed from this paper bottleneck and should have more time to devote to implementing the Know Your Man Program.

5. **ACTION:** In the future, two new management tools will be added to the ACSPER arsenal. Junior Officer Councils will be established throughout the command for the express purpose of retaining quality young officers by giving them the opportunity to explore problems that cause the young officer to leave the service. The other new program is aptly named Ton Trong. You will hear a great deal more about Ton Trong at a later date. Suffice to say, Ton Trong is coming.

**SUBMITTED BY:**
ACofS, Personnel
Project Officer: J. J. Burns, 4081
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Noncommissioned Officer Logistical Program (NCOF)

2. PURPOSE: To provide commanders and staff officers the status of NCOF within 1st Logistical Command.

3. DISCUSSION: a. AR 600-300, Enlisted Personnel Management System, outlines the Noncommissioned Officers Program and prescribes the selection prerequisites, procedures for submission of applications and nominations, and the use of selected NCO's in key staff and support operation positions in the Army logistical system.

   b. On 17 December 1968, Department of the Army approved sixty-four (64) positions nominated by this headquarters to be designated under the Noncommissioned Officer Logistical Program for a total of 107 positions identified for this command.

   c. In view of the 1st Logistical Command being the largest Logistical organization in the Army, the Commanding General desires that all commanders and staff officers continue to review and identify logistical positions for inclusion in the Noncommissioned Officers Logistical Program.

   d. All commanders and staff officers should give their personal support to this program which is designed to increase the NCO's skills and future development within the logistics system. It also provides the supervisor with a well trained enlisted replacement.

4. RECOMMENDATION: That the above be noted.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACofS, Personnel
Project Officer: MAJ Crowley, LBN 4181
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project SKILLS I.

2. PURPOSE: To present the concept, purpose, and current status of Project SKILLS I.

3. BACKGROUND: Project SKILLS I was implemented on 15 February 1969 and is designed to offer orientation, indoctrination, specialist training, and on-the-job training on a recurring basis at all levels of the command to improve the logistical personnel base.

4. DISCUSSION: Project SKILLS I is divided into three components;

   a. SKILLS I ALPHA which is a detailed orientation and indoctrination of newly assigned Colonels and higher, key staff officer and commanders at battalion or higher level, DAC’s of equivalent grade, and command Sergeants Major. Pre-assignment brochures with the above information will be furnished each Colonel assigned to 1st Logistical Command.

   b. SKILLS I BRAVO which is the orientation, indoctrination and formal training of specialist newly assigned to elements of the command.

   c. SKILLS I CHARLIE which is the orientation, indoctrination and formal on-the-job training of personnel assigned to the command.

5. ACTIONS:

   a. Each staff section at this headquarters is preparing information for inclusion in all three phases of SKILLS I.

   b. Each support command is furnishing a listing of Schools/Courses currently being conducted which will become a part of SKILLS I and future schools/courses to be conducted.

   c. Copies of 1st Logistical Command staff divisions input will be furnished each support command.

   d. Monitoring of instruction will be by personnel of the Training Division, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Security, Plans, and Operations, this headquarters.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACofS, SP60
Project Officer: Major George, LBN 2822/2782
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project SKILLS II - Training Program for Local National Employees.

2. PURPOSE: To provide increased effectiveness in the Local National work force through formal training.

3. BACKGROUND: With the increasing role of the Local National in manpower resources available to the CG, 1st Logistical Command, a need for a training program to provide skilled Local Nationals was recognized and in October 1968 Project SKILLS II was started.

4. DISCUSSION: a. Through on-the-job training, training conducted by the Area Civilian Personnel Officers, and training conducted by the Central Training Institute the skill level of our Local National employees has been markedly increased.

   b. Training in subjects such as auto mechanics, clerical work, English language, carpentry, and safety are taught.

   c. In February 1969 as the number of SKILLS II graduates became proficient in their jobs the need to develop Local Nationals who could be managers was recognized. Project SKILLS IIA was started and in conjunction with the Central Training Institute, Local Nationals with demonstrated manager potential were scheduled for courses in personnel management, advanced English, and other advanced job-related courses.

5. ACTION: Supervisory personnel must constantly be alert to the need for continuous training of Local Nationals for as the efficiency of our work force increases, so will our mission performance capability.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACofS, Personnel
Project Officer: MAJ McCloy, LBN 3018
Cognizant Activity: ACS/PSR
Project Officer: M.J. McCloy

Report for Period Ending: 28 Feb 69
Project Starting Date: 2 Oct 68
Implementation Date: 2 Oct 68
% Project Completion:

Period Ending:

NOTE: Explain shortfalls or deviations on reverse side

AVCA Form 80R (14Sep68)
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project Smart

2. PURPOSE: To provide information concerning Project Smart.

3. DISCUSSION: 
   a. 1st Log Comd Circular 700-1 has been distributed to all units and defines Project Smart as a part of the Logistics Improvement Program (LIP) wherein participation by each member of this command is encouraged so that good ideas may be forwarded for review and possible adoption. This is a channel in addition to and in support of the Army Suggestion Program, the Cost Reduction Program, the Incentive Awards Program, and Project MACONOMY.

   b. A Project Smart Council has been established at this headquarters and at each Support Command, Group and Battalion. These councils are responsible for screening ideas, recommending adoption by office of primary responsibility, or for submission through more formal channels.

   c. Each member of the command is encouraged to submit three ideas per week to his supervisor for forwarding directly to the recorder of the local Project Smart Council. Appropriate recognition is to be given to the originator of an approved idea.

   d. Since maximum publicity is a required feature of participation by all members of the command, the local IO has been asked to assist Project Smart Councils in informing the troops about the salient features of this program.

   e. The council at Hq, 1st Log Comd operates for all of the command under the intent of the Circular. Its function for the headquarters will be to screen ideas submitted by headquarters personnel and to review ideas submitted to it by the Support Commands. The Council will recommend appropriate action as necessary for adoption or rejection.

4. RECOMMENDATION: That the above be noted.

SUBMITTED BY:
AcOfS, Personnel
Project Officer: Mr. W. M. Cleveland, LVN 4081
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Command Safety Program.

2. PURPOSE: To provide guidance to 1st Logistical Command personnel in the implementation of the Command Safety Program.

3. BACKGROUND: Army Regulation 385-10 establishes the Army Safety Program, and requires implementation throughout the Department of the Army.

4. DISCUSSION: The safety Program of the 1st Logistical Command is to reduce and keep to a minimum accidental manpower and material losses, thus providing more efficient use of resources and advancing the command's effectiveness.

   a. The 1st Logistical Command Safety Program provides for a continuing and comprehensive accident prevention effort compatible with the mission throughout all echelons of command and in all activities. The program at each echelon includes all phases of safety and is directed toward the prevention of all types of accidents.

   b. The Command Safety Program is under the overall staff supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Personnel, 1st Logistical Command.

5. ACTION: The Chiefs of Staff sections this headquarters in coordination with ACoS, Personnel will as necessary, develop safety policies and directives pertinent to their area of responsibilities. The ACoS, Personnel this headquarters will provide for the establishment and continued implementation of plans, policies and procedures for the conduct of an aggressive safety program at all levels of command.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACoS, Personnel
Project Officer: Mr. W. R. Touchstone LBN 4081
1. SUBJECT: Program 6 Civilianization.

2. PURPOSE: To provide information on background and status of the Civilianization Program.

3. BACKGROUND: DOD directed 12,000 military spaces be civilianized in the Republic of Vietnam during the period 1 June 1968 through 31 May 1969. Of this quota, 1st Log Comd was directed to eliminate 5,654 military spaces.

4. DISCUSSION:

   a. Methods authorized by USARV to implement the reduction were line by line substitution, inactivation with contract replacement, inactivation without replacement and conversion to type B. The plan for elimination of military spaces using each method is shown at Chart 1 (Incl 1).

   b. Contracts to replace military capability lost through civilianization are shown at Chart 2 (Incl 1).

   c. Military spaces reduced and hiring status as of 28 Feb 69 are shown at Chart 3 (Incl 2 and 3).

SUBMITTED BY: ACofS, SP60  
Project Officer: MAJ M. L. Rinkel, LBN 2822/2782
CHART 1

PROGRAM CIVILIZATION

Military Space Reduction:

- Line by Line Substitution: (166 Units) 3445
- Inactivation With Contract Replacement: (7 Units) 851
- Inactivation without Replacement: (5 Units) 728

Total Military Space Reduction, Conversion to Type B: 630

CHART 2

PROGRAM CIVILIZATION

CONTRACTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FUNCTION</th>
<th>LOC</th>
<th>SPACES</th>
<th>EST ANNUAL COST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>QNH</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>$833,183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116 TC Co TS</td>
<td>CRB</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>340,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Tug Dets</td>
<td>CRB</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>102,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Crane Dets</td>
<td>CRB/QNH</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135 HEM Co</td>
<td>CRB</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>850</strong></td>
<td><strong>$2,275,418</strong></td>
</tr>
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</table>

Incl 1

V.10.1

229
### MILITARY SPACE STATUS — 28 Feb 69

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Spaces Withdrawn By Substitution</td>
<td>2907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Spaces Withdrawn By Inactivation:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract Replacement</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Replacement</td>
<td>487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Spaces Withdrawn</strong></td>
<td><strong>1337</strong></td>
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### HIRING STATUS — 28 Feb 69

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>4850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hires</td>
<td>4071</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(90% of Objective)
CIVILIZATION RECRUITMENT PROGRAM
As of 5 March 1969

I. The status of Program Six Civilanization is 1st Logistical Command
   is as follows:

   1st Logistical Command:

   **Total Objective**
   Forms 52: 4580 (5040)*
   5 March Objective: 4486 (98% of objective)
   Hires: 4082
   (99% of 5 March objective and 90% of total objective)

   **Saigon**:
   Total Objective: 1447 (1593)*
   Forms 52: 1396 (96% of objective)
   5 March Objective: 1192
   Hires: 1192 (100% of 5 Mar objective and 82% of total objective)

   **Cam Ranh Bay**:
   Total Objective: 986 (1086)*
   Forms 52: 986
   5 March Objective: 928
   Hires: 928 (103% of 5 Mar objective and 97% of total objective)

   **Cui Nhon**:
   Total Objective: 1584 (1744)*
   Forms 52: 1543
   5 March Objective: 1451
   Hires: 1392 (96% of 5 Mar objective and 88% of total objective)

   **Da Nang**:
   Total Objective: 524 (578)*
   Forms 52: 524
   5 March Objective: 471
   Hires: 492 (105% of 5 Mar objective and 94% of total objective)

II. Civilian spaces gained and military authorization lost are as follows
    (figures are cumulative):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>JUN</th>
<th>JUL</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>NOV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Spaces Gained</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>1052</td>
<td>1456</td>
<td>1871</td>
<td>2425</td>
<td>3018</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Spaces Lost</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>1062</td>
<td>1358</td>
<td>1759</td>
<td>2149</td>
</tr>
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</table>

   Incl 3
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th>JAN</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>MAY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Spaces Gained</td>
<td>3441</td>
<td>3756</td>
<td>4044</td>
<td>4273</td>
<td>4412</td>
<td>4580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Spaces Lost</td>
<td>2465</td>
<td>2705</td>
<td>2907</td>
<td>3094</td>
<td>3201</td>
<td>3336</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Total objective plus 10%.
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project Overhead

2. PURPOSE: To reduce assigned surplus overhead personnel.

3. DISCUSSION: 
   a. The Commanding General directed that an analysis be made to determine the ratio between overhead and touch labor personnel in 1st Logistical Command.

   b. In conjunction with ACofS, Comptroller's development of a unit efficiency indicator, ACofS, Personnel developed a four phase plan designed to reduce the overhead to touch labor ratio by identifying numerically overstrength units and requiring justification of their surplus. Units which do not justify their overstrengths will be directed to make strength reductions. In addition, informal manpower surveys will be conducted by ACofS, Personnel of selected units and a committee established to determine how to define and identify overhead and how to measure unit efficiency.

4. ACTION: Commanders at all levels must review their overhead to touch labor ratios to insure that personnel resources are utilized in mission essential activities.

SUBMITTED BY: ACofS, Personnel
Project Officer: CPT Grant, LBN 4181/4919
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project Prayer

2. PURPOSE: Program of getting across need for recognition of prayer and as a result: love of neighbor, teamwork, the golden rule.

3. BACKGROUND: As a part of "Know Your Men" program General Heiser wanted a project to bring about real understanding and mutual appreciation among men assigned to 1st Log Comd.

4. ACTION: General Heiser has sent out a Commanders letter and guidelines for the implementing of this program. (Inclosure 1)

SUBMITTED BY:
Chaplain
Project Officer: CH (LTC) R. J. Christoph
1. Our nation, and therefore our army, is founded on moral and religious principles. This is demonstrated especially well by the fact that the words (prayer) which we find on every U.S. coin are "In God We Trust". Certainly this trust is recognized in a combat zone by all of us.

2. Because of the essentiality of "Trust in God", Project "Prayer" has been inaugurated within the entire 1st Logistical Command. It is part of our "Know Your Man" program. The objective, of course, of this project is to strengthen the spiritual resources and moral fiber of this command. Through prayer, we can better know ourselves and our spiritual needs as well as the needs of our fellowman in arms. If we unite together in this project by praying together, we can assure ourselves and our fellow soldiers that we are in the greatest spiritual readiness condition practicable.

3. The cooperation of all commanders and chaplains is strongly urged in order to make available to our men of the 1st Logistical Command the maximum opportunities for prayer, fellowship, and mutual understanding. The moral fiber of every man of this command will be strengthened to a degree as Project "Prayer" becomes effective.
1. SUBJECT:  Project Street Corner

2. PURPOSE:  To make religious services readily available to troops.

3. BACKGROUND:  Troops working long hours every day and seven days a week sometimes find it difficult to attend religious services. Sunday can slip by without even adverting to it. Project Street Corner is a sustained effort to make religious services something more than an hour on Sunday morning. Under Project Street Corner any day can be Sunday and any place can be a chapel. Chaplains of 1st Log Comd will conduct services whenever and wherever the need demands.

4. ACTION: Chaplain will conduct at least one service per week in a place other than a chapel. Troop work areas such as motor pools, piers, etc. are especially suited to the convenience of the troops.

SUBMITTED BY:
Chaplain
Project Officer:  CH (LTC) E. J. Christoph
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project "Chit Chat"

2. PURPOSE: To increase the warm person to person relationship between the men of this command and their chaplains.

3. DISCUSSION: A close relationship between a chaplain and his men serves as a medium of direct, accurate communication. Problems can be freely discussed and quickly brought to light. This program provides the commander with another channel whereby he gets a feel for troop morale.

4. ACTION: Chaplains assigned to 1st Log Comd will spend at least 50% of their time with their troops in work areas and places of recreation.

SUBMITTED BY:
Chaplain
Project Officer: CH (LTC) E. J. Christoph
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Local National Safety Program "AN TOAN"

2. PURPOSE: To reduce Local National fatalities and injuries by coordination multiple efforts under a program named "AN TOAN" at the 1st Logistical Command.

3. BACKGROUND: As a result of an extremely large number of Local Nationals becoming casualties or fatalities, the Commanding General requested a Local National Safety Program be initiated. This program has been given the name "AN TOAN" which means "Safety" in Vietnamese.

4. DISCUSSION: The following safety plan has been adopted. ARVN has been contacted and is ready to launch a safety campaign. USAID has indicated that a separate Safety Education Program in Elementary Schools will begin immediately. Coordination has been established between USAID-GVN for the development of school safety patrols. The 1st Logistical Command has established a safety patrol of 1st Logistical's vehicles within areas administered by this command. The PIO has coordinated with the GVN regarding promotion of this safety program on GVN radio. CORDS has initiated a Safety Program with the Vietnamese Boy Scouts. The local mayors were requested to enforce the safety program within their jurisdiction. The Directorate of Elementary Education was contacted in regard to support from the Regional Education Chiefs. A Local National Safety Officer was borrowed from USASC, Saigon to draft Vietnamese safety posters. Safety Patrols and safety representatives from USARV and ARVN have joined 1st Logistical Command in combined safety patrols on the M.S.R.'s. Each support command is conducting a survey for safety hazards. The ACSPER at each support command has been encouraged to hire adult Local Nationals or ARVN veterans as Safety Supervisors. CTI has been alerted to prepare a safety program under Skills II. Ideas for safety equipment have been developed and ICC is screening their depot stock for safety equipment.

5. ACTION: The projects enumerated above have been implemented. Command emphasis at every level will be required to insure the success of the "AN TOAN" Program.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACofS, Personnel
Project Officer: LT Long, LBN 4081
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Civil Affairs Activities

2. PURPOSE: To provide information which pertains to the civil affairs activities of the 1st Logistical Command.

3. BACKGROUND: The objective of the military civic action programs is to improve the living conditions of the people so as to remove one of the underlying causes of insurgency and to assist the GVN in gaining and maintaining the support of the people. US Forces can assist the GVN in nation building activities by contributing towards good civil-military relations with the populace and by developing civic action programs which will assist the people in their social and economical development.

4. DISCUSSION: There are a total of 244 civil affairs activities being conducted within the four support commands. This is a 57% increase over the previous year. The main emphasis of the program is placed upon getting the Vietnamese to help themselves, to eliminate give-away type programs, to improve the image of the GVN and the US and to develop activities which both the local Vietnamese Government and the populace want and need. The key programs which have been developed are as follows:

   a. Support of the Animal Husbandry Program: This program is designed to encourage the organization of farmer cooperatives, to develop small scale animal farming and to encourage animal raising by institutions, such as schools and orphanages. The program is designed to provide a self-sufficient in earning their living.

   b. The Use of Edible Garbage and Condemned Foodstuffs: This program is designed to help develop the ARVN Military Farms, which are located within the support command areas, by providing food for their animals. The program will aid the Vietnamese in their development of hogs and poultry, thus allowing them to supplement their diets with proteins. The program also provides an outlet for condemned foodstuffs which have been generated at the ports and for the edible waste from the mess halls.

   c. Support of Vietnamese Scouting: By encouraging and helping the Vietnamese to develop their scouting program, we will promote the development of leadership, national identity and social consciousness amongst the Vietnamese youth. It will also involve the youth in constructive social action and nation building type activities.

   d. People to People Program: This program is designed to gain the
support of the Vietnamese people in the vicinity of Long Binh Post. The program is characterized by a concerted civic action effort on the part of the US Forces within the area. The objective is to encourage the Vietnamese people to support the GVN, isolate the Viet Cong, and to help develop the GVN Revolutionary Development Program. It will also show the Vietnamese flag as the civil affairs personnel are encouraged to work with the local GVN officials while at the same time improving the image of the US and GVN Forces.

e. Development of Project "Better Relations": Designed to improve the US image and the relationship between the Vietnamese populace and the 1st Logistical Command personnel, the program is characterized by the development of programs which will help improve the sanitation conditions of the cities in which the support commands are located by; developing a safety program that will involve both the US and the Vietnamese personnel; initiating a program which will educate the US personnel on the culture, customs and traditions of Vietnam; and through the establishment of a program which will improve the Vietnamese recreational areas, playgrounds, school yards and parks.

5. ACTION: Civil affairs personnel must be aware of the needs of the people so that they can assist them in the nation building activities which are needed to further the development of Vietnam.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACofS, Personnel
Project Officer: MAJ Culp, LBN 5779
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project "Sir"

2. PURPOSE: To reduce serious incidents and accidents in the command by closely examining causes and developing solutions through "brainstorming" sessions of officers, noncommissioned officers and other enlisted men.

3. BACKGROUND: Commanding General's Major Actions Chart of 21 April 1969, established Project "Sir".

4. DISCUSSION: a. The chairman for Project "Sir" at this headquarters will be the Command Sergeant Major who, together with the Provost Marshal, will schedule meetings and will work out solutions to serious incident problems in the command.

b. Because the tour in the command is relatively short for commanders and their men, continuity in command emphasis on solving serious incident and accident problems is essential.

c. Each type as well as any single serious incident has peculiar contributing factors, most of which can be controlled so as to prevent similar incidents/accidents from recurring.

d. Those closest to the problem can often see these factors and, when experienced in past controlling techniques, can contribute effectively to command programs to eliminate them. Noncommissioned officers and their men can make such contributions.

e. A method of gaining control over these factors is to create an interest in the control solution on the part of the individual soldier. Command Sergeants Major can provide the means for creating this vested interest through direct contact with the noncommissioned officer personnel of their commands.

5. ACTION: To insure continual and responsive follow-up action solving serious incident/accident problems. Command Sergeants Major should meet with officers, NCOs and other enlisted men and work out specific recommended command actions which will solve such problems in a positive and lasting manner. Action officers in a headquarters assist in providing information and work out techniques to overcome obstacles to the commander. NCOs may report to the Command Sergeant Major the success of applied techniques. Command Sergeants Major should communicate continually with the subordinate noncommissioned officers to insure their contributions to success.

SUBMITTED BY:
Provost Marshal
Project Officer: COL Keith F. Du Bois
1. **SUBJECT:** Project Equitable Standards

2. **PURPOSE:** To provide background and information concerning Project Equitable Standards.

3. **BACKGROUND:** 1st Logistical Command troops live under various conditions. At some installations there are American soldiers and members of other services living very well, while others - some of them soldiers of this Command -- are living under conditions which at best can be considered marginal. This situation undermines the morale of the command and hampers its logistical support mission.

4. **DISCUSSION:**
   a. Project Equitable Standards has been established to alleviate these inequitable living conditions. This project has as its ultimate goal the upgrading of living standards for 1st Logistical Command soldiers so that these men will live under conditions which are as good as their neighbors and comparable to those of all other members of the US and Free World Forces throughout Vietnam.

   b. To achieve this goal, a two-phase program was established. Under Phase I, action will be taken to upgrade living conditions so that 1st Logistical Command soldiers will all live at comparable standards in their immediate area. Accomplishment of this will lead to the second phase; raising these living standards so that they are uniform throughout the 1st Logistical Command, regardless of location within RVN, and comparable to the standards enjoyed by other troops.

   c. The goal for completion of Phase I is 31 December 1969.

5. **ACTION:** To initiate Phase I, commanders of 1st Logistical Command units will examine the present living conditions in their area, and take the necessary steps to upgrade these conditions to a common standard at their location. Where action can be taken locally, in accordance with regulations and statutes, that action will be initiated. Where construction requests must be submitted to achieve the necessary upgrade, they will be prepared and submitted as a package for each installation.

**SUBMITTED BY:**
ACofS, Services
Project Officer: MAJ Prothero, LBN 4118
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project Duty

2. PURPOSE: To provide information on the background and concept of Project Duty.

3. BACKGROUND: During July 1969, the Commanding General announced the "1st Logistical Command Offensive." This consisted of Phase I which was ended on 30 June 1969 with the completion of the Command and Control Improvement Program. Project Duty was announced as integral to Phase II which is aimed at overall logistics efficiency and effectiveness.

4. DISCUSSION: a. Project Duty focuses the attention of every member of this Command on getting the job done to the best of his ability, working as long as is necessary to do the job, and doing so conscientiously. Further, it is a concentrated effort to insure that a maximum workload of the highest attainable quality is achieved by the minimum number of people. It is considered a two-step operation.

   b. The current Projects Overhead, Align, and Smart II--the first step--are invaluable sources for measuring manpower requirements. In Project Overhead, personnel are physically observed on the job in order to ascertain whether a particular individual is doing his assigned job and if he is required full time in order to get the job done. Project Align is directed at achieving a more equitable balance and more efficient distribution of Command assets to actual requirements. Project Smart II is directed at measuring and identifying excess overhead labor. The end result of these projects is to insure that only the resources and personnel absolutely necessary to accomplish the mission are assigned to each unit, provided each individual conscientiously performs his assigned task. Excesses are eliminated by transfer to units requiring additional manpower.

   c. The second step is the application of leadership principles and instruction to reach the desired level of efficiency and conscientiousness.

   d. Instruction directed at the improvement of military personnel within the Command is implemented under the Skills I Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie projects. These orientation and training programs are directed at making each member of the Command a better logistical fighter.
e. In the leadership field there are several Command programs directed at making each soldier more conscientious and a better American. The Know Your Man program is directed toward knowing the capabilities and limitations of subordinates and the subordinates knowing their responsibilities, leaders and that they are cared for. The Pride 1st program is directed toward making each soldier a more conscientious person who will think before committing a foolish act and one who takes pride in his duty, his unit, and his mission.

4. Weekly commander's calls are held at all levels, with emphasis on the battalion and company level, where the senior officer imparts his experience and leadership techniques to subordinates, who in turn impart their knowledge downward, reaching all levels.

g. All of these programs, functioning concurrently, are Project Duty. Command letters directed at the overall ends of this program are published to give guidance in desired direction or special emphasis within the program.

SUBMITTED BY: ACofS, Personnel
Project Officer: LTC MASSARO, LBN 4181
SECTION VI

Ammunition
1. **SUBJECT:** Ammunition Stockage in Vietnam.

2. **PURPOSE:** To discuss factors contributing to large quantities of ammunition received in the theater and to highlight the management actions required and taken to reduce the amounts received.

3. **BACKGROUND:** There were four separate and distinct phases in the buildup of ammunition stockage in Vietnam since 1965. Initially ammunition came to Vietnam as a push system operated by the NICP in CONUS. The ammunition pushed to the theater was a balanced load of all items computed at the rates experienced during the Korean conflict. The push system provided ammunition on a timely basis but caused many imbalances in stockage due to the different usage factors and different nature of the conflict. The second phase consisted of a change from a push to a pull system and established a dual rate system of stockage. One rate, the theater stockage objective rate, was designed to raise the stockage to a planned level while the other rate, the theater Required Supply Rate, was designed to be the consumption rate. The third plan began in Oct 1967 with the establishment of a single rate system for both stockage and consumption, which is a single Required Supply Rate based on experience data on a six-month review cycle. In Dec 68, phase four consisted of a change to a dual rate system of stockage. One rate the Intense Combat Rate (ICR), the safety level, was based on the experience rate from Feb to Jul 68. The other rate Theater Sustaining Rate (TSR), the operating level, was based on the experience rate from May to Oct 68. This is the current system which the stockage objective is based on.

4. **DISCUSSION:**
   a. With consumption at a high rate, troop density increases, and a concerted effort to achieve the stockage objective, the emphasis was placed on requisitioning ammunition up to the maximum authorized levels. This emphasis plus the increased ability of the CONUS production base to satisfy these requirements resulted in large quantities of ammunition in the pipeline to the theater.

   b. Since the beginning of July the receipts of ammunition have been greater than consumption. The reduced combat intensity, plus command actions such as the MACV 5 X 5 plan and a program of eliminating unnecessary artillery fires have caused a steady increase in the balance on hand of all items of ammunition.

   c. Through detailed daily knowledge of status of all items in the inventory, visibility of all incoming items in the pipeline, and detailed status of all requisitions, this command was able to initiate
a program of coordinated action to control and thereby reduce the flow of ammunition into the theater. This program consisted of:

(1) Reduction of requisitions based on consumption experience and cancellation of requisitions (Incl 1).

(2) Diversion of incoming ammunition ships to ports outside the theater and diversion of cargo to ARVN and direct transfers to ARVN from depot assets (Incl 2).

(3) Identification of unserviceable and excess stocks for retrograde (Incl 3).

5. ACTIONS: a. Expedited action be taken to provide increased ADP capability in order that the knowledge and visibility of the manager may be further expanded. This will provide data which will enable managers to more accurately recognize trends in a timely manner and prevent shortages or excess situations from arising.

b. That continuing action be taken to review the Intense Combat Rate and Theater Sustaining Rate on a timely basis in order that the current stockage objective accurately reflects the combat situation.

c. That the stockage objective in country be the minimum level required to assure availability at a consistent rate until off-shore reserve stocks arrive.

SUBMITTED BY: ACofS, Ammunition
Project Officer: LTC Mallia, LBN 2983
### Analysis of Requisitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Items Analyzed</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>210</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. No action required</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>155</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Items Requisitioned at Current Rate</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>4. Items Requisitioned below Current Rate</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>54</td>
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<td>5. Item Requisitioned above Current Rate</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Total Tonnage Requisition</td>
<td>57,346</td>
<td>51,013</td>
<td>12,526</td>
<td>82,454</td>
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</table>

**Note 1.** Analysis is made of stock position on the 24th of each month and requisitions are submitted on the 10th of the next month. (I.E. Sep requisitions reflect stock position as of 24 August).

**Note 2.** In September, 86 back order requisitions over 90 days old were canceled.

**Note 3.** In October, 21 back order and 141 current requisitions were canceled.

**Note 4.** In November, 908 current and back order requisitions were canceled. This totaled 23,390 STONS of ammunition.

**Note 5.** Requirements for 82,454 STONS requisitioned for Dec are dictated by:

1. Imbalance in balance on hand against stockage objective of 201,350 STONS.
2. Receipts of 58,987 STONS versus issues of 75,223 STONS in November.
3. Forecast receipts of 42,432 STONS versus estimated issues of 75,000 STONS in December.
4. Forecast receipts of 28,933 STONS versus estimated issues of 60,000 STONS in January.

Incl 1

VI.1.2

248
SHIP DIVERSIONS

1 July to 30 Sep

Gainswill Victory 7,122
American Victory 4,164
Tulane Victory 4,872
Xavier Victory 7,286

23,444 STONS

1 Oct to 30 Nov

Hattiesburg 3,073
Antinous 2,120
Cornell Victory 1,543
Wild Ranger 4,000
American Importer 6,441
Longview Victory 6,555
Ames Victory 2,466
Berkeley Victory 2,401
Lane Victory 3,275
Selma Victory 4,385

1 Dec to 31 Dec

Boise Victory 2,191

TOTAL 61,894

TRANSFER TO ARVN FROM INBOUND VESSELS

American Pride 2,629
Yaka Victory 3,729
Belgium Victory 4,800
Hattiesburg 1,341
Cornell Victory 1,527
High Point 2,880
Berkeley Victory 3,077
Ames Victory 55
American Importer 40
Lane Victory 6
Selma Victory 232
Boise Victory 150

TOTAL 19,866 STONS

Incl 2

VI.1.3

.24/9
<table>
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<th>Month</th>
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<tr>
<td>Aug - Sep</td>
<td>1,379</td>
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<td>Sep - Oct</td>
<td>1,527</td>
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<td>Oct - Nov</td>
<td>2,934</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov - Dec</td>
<td>5,249</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,079 STONS</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>92,839 STONS</strong></td>
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VI.1.4

250
RETROGRADE PROGRAM

1. A continuing program is underway to identify and retrograde all serviceable excess and unserviceable ammunition which is beyond the in-country capability to repair.

2. Phase I of the Retrograde Program was to retrograde 14,800 STONS from 1 Sep to 31 Dec. This objective was exceeded by 1,167 STONS for a total of 15,967 STONS.

3. Phase II of the Retrograde Program began on 1 Jan 69 with an objective of 35,000 STONS to be retrograded during 1 Jan - 28 Feb. Included in the objective of 35,000 STONS are:

   (a) Excess for transfer to ARVN

   (b) Excess per disposition instruction

   (c) Suspended and unserviceable ammunition
## ANALYSIS OF REQUISITIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SEP</th>
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<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th>JAN</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Items Analyzed</td>
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<td>210</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>194</td>
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<td>200</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. No action Required</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>126</td>
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<td>105</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Items Requisitioned at Current Rates</td>
<td>33</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Items Requisitioned below Current Rate</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>61</td>
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<td>5. Items Requisitioned above Current Rate</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Total Tonnage Requisition</td>
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<td>51,013</td>
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<td>82,454</td>
<td>68,283</td>
<td>67,098</td>
<td>82,566</td>
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**NOTE 1.** Analysis is made of stock position on the 24th of each month and requisitions are submitted on the 10th of the next month. (I.E. Sep requisitions reflect stock position as of 24 August).

**NOTE 2.** In September, 86 back order requisitions over 90 days old were canceled.

**NOTE 3.** In October, 21 back order and 141 current requisitions were canceled.

**NOTE 4.** In November, 908 current and back order requisitions were canceled. This totaled 23,390 STONS of ammunition.

**NOTE 5.** Requirements for 82,566 STONS requisitioned is dictated by:

1. Receipts of 49,303 STONS versus issues of 80,173 STONS in February.
2. Forecast receipts of 79,777 STONS versus issues of 80,000 STONS in March.

VI.1.6

252
### DIRECT TRANSFER TO ARVN

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug - Sep</td>
<td>1,379</td>
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<td>Sep - Oct</td>
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<td>Oct - Nov</td>
<td>2,934</td>
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<td>Nov - Dec</td>
<td>5,249</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec - Jan</td>
<td>1,447</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>96,825</strong></td>
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VI.1.7

253
CCIP-RETROGRADE AMMUNITION

1. A continuing program is underway to identify and retrograde all serviceable excess and unserviceable ammunition which is beyond in-country repair capability.

2. Phase I of the retrograde program was to retrograde 14,800 STON from 1 Sep to 31 Dec. This objective was exceeded by 1,167 STON for a total of 15,967 STON.

3. Phase II of the program began on 1 Jan 69 with an objective of 35,000 STON to be retrograded by 28 Feb 69. A total of 33,568 STON were credited towards this program, for 96 percent accomplishments of the objective.

4. Phase III covers period 1 Mar - 30 Jun 69. The objective of the Phase III program is to retrograde 2,500 STON per month during this time for a total of 10,000 STON. Ammunition components will be credited towards the Phase III program, an action which was not credited during Phase I and II.
AMMO STOCKAGE VIETNAM (SERVICEABLE)
(Project)

Cognizant Activity  ACofS, Ammo

Project Officer  ILT Aykroyd

Report for Period Ending  10 Mar

Project Starting Date  25 Dec

Implementation Date

% Project Completion

TASK DESCRIPTION /
UNIT OF MEASUREMENT

Reduce on hand serviceable
tonnage from 230,000 STONS
to less than 200,000 STONS
by 24 Jan 69. Thereafter,
bring on hand balance in
line with management level
of 175,000 STONS.

Peri End

000 STONS

Projection (Black)
Completed (Blue)
Shortfall (Red)

21 Dec  10 Jan  21 Jan  10 Feb  24 Feb  10 Mar  24 Mar

NOTE: Explain shortfalls or deviations on reverse side
APMO STOCKAGE VIETNAM (UNSERVICEABLE)
(Project) (and SUSPENDED)

Cognizant Activity AGoFS, Ammo
Project Officer 1LT Aikeyord

TASK DESCRIPTION/
UNIT OF MEASUREMENT

Reduce on hand unserviceable and
suspended stocks from 4,766 STONS
to less than 5% of the stockage
objective (APSA goal, based on
experience is 15%)

Period Ending

000 STONS

Projection (Black)
Completed (Blue)
Shortfall (Red)

AVCA Form 80R (14Sep68)

NOTE: Explain shortfalls or deviations on reverse side
APQO STORAGE VIETNAM (RETROGRADE)
(Project)

Cognizant Activity ACofS, Ammo
Project Officer II T. Aykroyd

Report for Period Ending 10 Mar
Project Starting Date 1 Jan
Implementation Date
% Project Completion

TASK DESCRIPTION/
UNIT OF MEASUREMENT

Phase II - Retrograde
35,000 lbs of unserviceable
and excess ammunition during
Jan and Feb.

Phase III - Retrograde
2,000 lbs of unserviceable
and excess ammunition each
month through June.

NOTE: Change in scale from
Phase II to Phase III

Projection (Black)
Completed (Blue)
Shortfall (Red)

AVCA Form 80R (14Sep68)

NOTE: Explain shortfalls or deviations on reverse side.
SECTION VII

Financial Programs
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project Account

2. PURPOSE: To present the goals and scope of Project Account.

3. BACKGROUND: A number of deficiencies in the preparation and transmittal of documentation evidencing reimbursable support furnished non-Army agencies, non-USARV/US Army agencies, and certain FWNAF have been reported to this Headquarters.

4. DISCUSSION: Deficiencies noted are primarily: inability of non-Army customers to identify billed items with unliquidated supply obligations and/or improper/incomplete preparation of reimbursable documentation at the issue point. Adding to these problems is the unfamiliarity of the overall supply support program by some personnel in various field assignments, and the difficulty in identifying reimbursable customers at the field level.

5. ACTION: a. Establishment of a Task Force consisting of representatives from required staff elements of this Headquarters to periodically visit support commands to provide latest information and guidance on reimbursable documentation procedures and to assist the support commands in identifying and eliminating problem areas.

   b. Establishment of procedures to perpetuate the requisitioner's document number when a DSU cannot fill the requisition and initiates a requisition to the depot.

   c. Strengthen controls on issue documents returned to this headquarters from USARPAC CPMA for additional information/corrective action to insure complete audit trail.

   d. Expanded distribution within the 1st Logistical Command of material useful as aids in the identification of reimbursable customers. Included are the Activity Index File (V100A) and the ISSA List (V106) published monthly by USARPAC CPMA; the Activity Address Codes within RVN (POID) (TMO5R) Report published monthly by TMA, HQ, MACV; and the Quarterly Listing of Interservice and Interagency Support Agreements etter published quarterly by this headquarters.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACofS, Comptroller
Project Officer: James F. Suddath Jr., CPT, LBN 4187
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Financial Summary of 1st Logistical Command and Control Improvement Program.

2. PURPOSE: To summarize the savings that can be identified from available information.

3. DISCUSSION: The projects in the Command and Control Improvement Program have increased 1st Logistical Command's combat service support efficiency. Some of these projects have generated identifiable dollar savings. These are summarized at inclusion 1. It should be noted that, as these projects are researched for submission under such programs as the Army Cost Reduction Program, the savings figures may be revised. All actions which qualified were submitted for validation under the Army Cost Reduction Program.

a. Supply Improvement Program:

(1) Clean I/NCR 500 was a manual review of the stock control ledger cards used in the NCR 500 accounting system at the Direct Support Unit level. This intensified management action resulted in the cancellation of requisitions valued at $30.0 million. The potential net savings under the Army Cost Reduction Program is $21.7 million (cancellation minus new requisitions and DSU units that could not reconstruct data). $14.1 million has been validated under the cost reduction program and $7.6 million is presently under review at higher headquarters.

(2) Clean II/NCR 500 is a cyclic procedure for the manual review of the NCR 500 stock control ledger cards. It is a continuation of the Clean I/NCR 500 concept. One-third of the ledgers are reviewed each month. Consequently, a 100 percent review is completed each quarter. Clean II/NCR 500 was initiated in April 1969, and has produced realized savings to date of $23 million.

(3) "Stop" was a program designed to prevent unneeded supplies from being shipped to Vietnam under the automatic push system. Under this program, cancellations of supplies valued at $93.0 million were confirmed at the appropriate NICP.

(4) "Stop/See cancelled certain commodities that were determined to be beyond current requirements. The items involved
are office furniture, office supplies, paper products and bulky engineer items. Under this program requisitions valued at $56.1 million were cancelled and confirmed at the appropriate NICP. A recent effort was made to reconcile with CONUS the unconfirmed cancellations also generated by this action. Cancellations worth $42.7 million were reconciled.

(5) During the period September 1968 through January 1969 COUNT I was a perimeter to perimeter inventory conducted throughout Vietnam to improve the accuracy of the supply data base. This identified supplies in terms of gains in excess of $331 million and losses of approximately $262 million.

(6) COUNT II is a program for maintaining and further improving the results of COUNT I, and was begun at all Command depots and DSU's/GSU's during the month of February. The concept of COUNT II requires an accelerated 100 percent cyclic inventory to be conducted throughout the Command every 6 months. To date this project has identified supplies in terms of gains of approximately $188 million and losses of approximately $108 million.

(7) Reduction of the Direct Support Unit's Authorized Stockage List (ASL) was accomplished by deleting the non-demand supported mission essential items from the ASL. The lines eliminated totaled 67,712. One unit's submission is currently undergoing review by higher headquarters for validation under the Cost Reduction Program.

(8) The Director of Subsistence after a volume-value study of the requisitions for the Meal Combat Individual (MCI) changed his procedure of processing these requisitions. The priority handling of MCI requisitions reduced the Order Ship Time by 10 days and saved $1.6 million. This is a validated cost reduction for FY69.

b. Section II - Maintenance Improvement Programs

(1) Because of limited military capability, a large quantity of repairable fatigues were being destroyed. By contracting a local firm to repair this clothing, the Army saved approximately $2.3 million in FY69 by returning these fatigues to the supply system.

(2) Armored vests that needed repair were also being destroyed. The Director of Maintenance through the United States Army Procurement Agency Japan is obtaining repair capability for
these armored vests. This action should save an estimated $100,000 in FY69 by returning these vests to the supply system.

(3) The Assistant Material Officer at the 79th Maintenance Battalion implemented a differential road testing procedure that identified by test, which differentials actually needed repair. The system consists of road-testing each differential for serviceability utilizing a salvaged M151 which was modified to allow the quick change of its differential. This action saved over $51,9 thousand in FY69.

c. Section III - Ammunition Supply Improvement Program

(1) Project Stop/See involving Class V supplies was aimed at reducing the incoming pipeline flow so that on-hand excess stocks would be returned to the level dictated by the requisitioning objective. These cancellations were valued at $42.1 million.

(2) The ACofS, Ammunition by the implementation of a new two rate requisitioning procedure - one rate for normal operation, and the other for intense combat - was able to reduce the ammunition requisitioning objective. This saved approximately $75.4 million by reducing the requirement for ammunition.

(3) The ACofS, Ammunition, is automating the requisitioning process for ammunition. It is expected that this program will be implemented during the Qtr FY69. It is estimated that this new procedure will reduce the ammunition Order Ship Time by 10 days and save approximately $50 million.

d. Section IV - Other Improvements

(1) Prior to FY69, war risk insurance for third country nationals was purchased from a commercial firm. In FY69, the war risk insurance is being administered by the US Army Procurement Agency. This self-insurance plan saved over $4.1 million in FY69.

(2) The majority of the savings reported resulted from the cancellation of requirements. Since these supplies were never shipped, the cost of transportation has been avoided. The cancellations of supplies from Project Stop, Stop/See, Project Clean/NCR 500 and Ammunition Stop/See total $269.4 million. It is estimated that the transportation cost avoidance on this amount of supplies is $13.7 million.
(3) An intransit storage yard contract was eliminated at Cam Ranh Bay by implementing the "Thruput" concept. Intensified management of port operations and transportation resources enabled cargo to be shipped directly to its destination. Therefore, the requirement for the intransit storage yard was eliminated. The contract was cancelled saving the 1st Logistical Command $65.3 thousand in FY69.

(4) The 5th Terminal Command at Qui Nhon uniquely manages its resources to reduce the cost of the ammunition discharge of the USNS Bland and saved $42.9 thousand in FY69 by reducing demurrage costs.

SUBMITTED BY: ACoS, Controller: J.J.W.
PROJECT OFFICER: CPT R.C. GOETZ, LBN 4423
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MANAGEMENT ACTION</th>
<th>ADDITIONAL DATA</th>
<th>SAVINGS IN MILLIONS</th>
<th>STATUS</th>
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<td>Section I - Supply Improvement Program</td>
<td>8 DSU's saved $14.1 million--Validated Cost Reduction. $7.6 million under review at higher headquarters.</td>
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<td>Clean II/NCR 500</td>
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<td>Stop</td>
<td>Requirement cancellations confirmed by NICP</td>
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<td>Count I</td>
<td>Inventory Gains: $331.3</td>
<td>Losses: $261.8</td>
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<td>Count II</td>
<td>Identification Gains: $187.7</td>
<td>Losses: $108.3</td>
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<td>Reduction of DSU ASL</td>
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<td>Reduced OMT for MCI</td>
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<td>Validate Class V Requisitioning Procedures</td>
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<td>Cargo Discharge at Qui Nhon</td>
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<td>Section V - FY 60 Improvement Programs</td>
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<td>Removal of Wrap-around Cover from .5 mm Ammunition Mallet</td>
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Total: $457.0 $369.2
COST REDUCTION PROGRAM
(Project)

Cognizant Activity AC of S, COMPTROLLER

Project Officer 1LT R. J. O'MALLEY

Report for Period Ending 30 JUN 69

Project Starting Date 1 JUL 68

Implementation Date 1 JUL 68

% Project Completion 208%
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: FY 70 R&U Contract

PURPOSE: This Fact Sheet is to provide information about the FY 70 R&U Contract.

3. BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION: In January 1968, ASA (I&L) advised that DOD had directed that the FY 70 R&U Procurement Plan be completed and presented in Washington, D.C., in the latter part of Calendar Year 1968. In-depth briefings were presented in November 1968 to the Head of Procuring Activity (HPA - CINCUSARPAC) and in December 1968 to ASA (I&L) and ASD (I&L). Such briefings and plan included the providing for additional competitive contracts over that of FY 69. In FY 69 competition was reintroduced in the Qui Nhon area with Pacific Architects and Engineers (PA&E), the incumbent contractor, receiving the competitive award in the initial estimated contract amount of $10,404,013.00. While the FY 70 Plan provided the means and technique which could be utilized to compete separately the Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay areas with sole source to be continued for the Saigon area, an alternate plan involving sole source procurement of the entire FY 70 R&U effort with PA&E was submitted and its adoption was recommended by USARV, 1st Log Command, USAECAV, and USARPAC and subsequently approved by DA. The main factors considered to justify the alternate sole source plan were (i) the possible phase down of US Forces in Vietnam during FY 70 based upon President Johnson's North Vietnam bombing halt and the portent of de-escalation, (ii) and amount of estimated startup and demobilization costs the Government would suffer due to contractor changeovers, (iii) the avoidance of interruption in the performance of R&U service, and (iv) flexibility. The plan as approved by DA and HPA calls for the utilization of a cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF) contract with increased Government contract supervision and sole source negotiation with PA&E. Negotiations with PA&E on the base fee, award fee and evaluation factors to be utilized in determining the amount of the award fee commenced in the first part of January 1969 and agreement was reached between this Agency and the contractor in February 1969. It was agreed that the base fee would be .5 percent of the negotiated estimated cost of the contract and that the maximum available award fee would be 2.0 percent of the negotiated estimated cost of the contract. The evaluation criteria was also agreed upon. As of early March, this Agency was awaiting the receipt of the technical data from USAECAV. A solicitation will be issued to PA&E within two weeks after receipt of the technical data.
It is anticipated that the contractor will need 30 days, after receipt of the solicitation, to prepare and submit its proposal. DCAA audit of the contractor's proposal and the Government technical evaluation and preparation of negotiating position should be accomplished 30 days after receipt of the contractor's proposal. Final negotiations to consummate scope of work, base data, total contract estimated costs, and contract terms should commence in May 1969. Approval of the award of contract by the Head of the Procuring Activity (CINC - USARPAC) is contemplated for June 1969.

4. ACTION: Issuance of solicitation upon receipt of technical data, evaluation of contractor's proposal, negotiations on contract cost and terms and subsequent approval of award by the HPA is required. As of early March 1969 the DOD BALPRO approval had not been received and the PR&C for R&U work in I, II, III and IV Corps areas was being staffed through HQ USARV.

SUBMITTED BY:
Aceofs, Procurement Project Officer: William J. Thompson, MACV 4431
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Program Budget Advisory Committee (PBAC)

2. PURPOSE: This Fact Sheet is to provide information concerning the 
organizational structure within the 1st Logistical Command for accomplishing financial management under the Army Command Management System (ACMS).

3. DISCUSSION: a. The Army Command Management System is a method for 
directly and continuously relating program, budget, accounting, manpower 
and supply management systems in administering nontactical operations of 
the Army.

b. In the ACMS structure, the flow of information works both ways. 
Directives and guidance received from higher headquarters or established 
by the Commanding General are funneled through established channels to the 
General/Special Staff Offices. They, in turn, prepare estimates of re-
quirements and reports of their accomplishments which are reviewed and/or 
consolidated at various levels prior to presentation to the Commanding 
General or higher headquarters.

4. ACTION: Duties and responsibilities of those responsible for financial 
management within this command are as follows:

  a. Program Budget Advisory Committee (PBAC):

     (1) Convene on all matters pertaining to new programming and budget-
ing requirements.

     (2) Periodically review all programs prior to formal presentation to 
     the Commanding General.

     (3) Coordinate planning and budgeting actions to insure proper bal-
     ance between activities.

     (4) Develop and update as necessary a plan for the utilization of 
     resources based on guidance and priorities expressed by the Commanding 
     General.

     (5) Develop a coordinated staff position for the presentation of 
     recommendations to the Commanding General.
(6) Establish financial management policy.

(7) Review Financial Inventory Reports for management actions that will improve the Command's inventory position.

b. Program Budget Working Committee (PBWC):

(1) Convene on all matters pertaining to new programming, budgeting and reporting requirements.

(2) Review all programs prior to presentation to the PBAC.

(3) Coordinate programming and budgeting actions within guidance furnished by higher headquarters and/or the PBAC.

(4) Based on budget guidance received, develop programs and budget actions for presentation to the PBAC. Prepare documents containing recommended actions for considerations to be made at the major activity level based upon detailed review of requirements at the lowest activity level.

(5) Review programmed and actual costs and performance no less than quarterly.

c. General and Special Staff Offices.

(1) Development of programs for their assigned activities and for providing timely guidance on schedule changes.

(2) Receiving and approving activity programs and effecting balance between activities in terms of workloads and costs.

(3) Budgeting for the dollar value (cost) of resources, labor, supplies and services needed to accomplish the programmed workload.

(4) Reviewing and analyzing, on a continuing basis, the execution of approved programs with a view toward operational effectiveness and efficient utilization of all resources.

(5) Periodically review financial reports emanating from the logistical systems and the Centralized Financial Management Agency (CFMA) for adequacy, accuracy and managerial information and recommend courses of action to improve the management of resources (funds) required to support operations in the Republic of Vietnam.
(6) Review financial management related to this command's logistical responsibility for budgeted and non-budgeted items. This includes expenditures related to MPA procurement of subsistence, PKM, A procurement of ammunition, principal and secondary items and all OMA procurements funded by USARPAC CPMA:

SUBMITTED BY:
ACofS, Comptroller: H. D. SMITH, Colonel, GS
Project Officer: J. W. Foreit, GS-12, DAC, LBN 4187
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project Liar

2. PURPOSE: The project was established to make a liar out of budget estimates by providing better logistical support for less money than was forecast so the amount required. It was established on 10 July 1969 to promote actions by all elements of the 1st Logistical Command to increase effectiveness and reduce FY 70 OMA fund requirements for both the in-country and out-of-country Budget.

3. DISCUSSION: During Logistical Operation Control Center (LOCC) Meeting on 10 July 1969 the Commanding General established Project Liar and charged each staff section with the responsibility of taking vigorous action to reduce In-country Contract Dollar requirements, order and ship time and all other expenditures related to the in-country 1st Logistical Command Budget. Staff section chiefs and Commanding Officer of ICCV were charged with the responsibility to take vigorous actions to purify the Command's Logistical records and further take action to reduce the dollar amount of requisitions placed on out-of-country supply agencies. This action was to reduce the out-of-country FY 70 Budget cut of $376 million dollars. The critical point is that this be done without reducing the level of combat essential support.

4. ACTIONS: A weekly report to the ACofS, Comptroller was established as a means of identifying the actions taken to effectively implement resources management of OMA funds in FY 70.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACofS, Comptroller: J.J.W.
Project Officer: LTC William T. Mitchell, Ch, Budget Div, LBN 4187
SECTION VIII

OPERATIONS IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS
1. **SUBJECT:** Project Alert

2. **PROBLEM:** To maintain a high state of readiness throughout the 1st Logistical Command.

3. **DISCUSSION:** There is a natural tendency to relax and become inattentive to carrying out normal security measures as enemy activity diminishes. To prevent this, Project Alert was established on 24 October 1968 to stimulate personnel at all echelons to develop and sustain the high level of alertness required to minimize the effects of enemy initiated activity. The enemy is capable of employing a variety of measures to harass or interrupt 1st Logistical Command operations. Project Alert is intended to meet this enemy threat by having each command institute a program to reach every man in the command.

4. **ACTION TO BE TAKEN:** Commanders at all levels stress the following on a continuing basis: Installation security; strengthening of perimeters; convoy training and discipline; qualification in drivers training; alert procedures, and related matters geared to instilling a sense of urgency in each individual throughout the command.

**SUBMITTED BY:** ACofS, SP&O  
Project Officer: LTC R.E. Littlefield, LBN 2979
1. **SUBJECT:** Project Ready

2. **PURPOSE:** This project was developed to insure that each Program 6 unit arriving in the Republic of Vietnam is properly received, and assigned a sponsoring officer as well as a sponsoring unit to assist them in training. This includes the development of administrative areas and the provision for general assistance in achieving a responsive mission capability as soon as possible.

3. **BACKGROUND:** A total of 41 Program 6 units were assigned to the 1st Logistical Command. The assignment by support command is Da Nang-25, Qui Nhon-1, Cam Ranh Bay-3, and Saigon-12.

4. **DISCUSSION:** An ad hoc team from HQ, 1st Log Comd was organized for the purpose of conducting a detailed inquiry into each Program 6 unit upon its arrival in country. To date thirty eight units have been inspected. The results of these inspections reveal that all units received adequate pre-deployment training, had been deployed with at least 95% of authorized strengths, were being adequately trained to perform their missions, and had no major supply or maintenance problems. The facilities into which the units were located were adequate. Particularly noteworthy during the inspections was the eagerness of the personnel to perform their mission. It was noted that Reserve and National Guard units have a high percentage of college trained personnel. Efforts are being directed toward assigning these highly skilled personnel to duties commensurate with their training and experience. (Project Talent)

5. **ACTION:**
   a. Conduct Project Ready staff visits for three units which have not been visited. Continue to identify personnel with particular skills and assign them to positions where their talents can be best used.
   
   b. Monitor Project Ready II Staff Visits to be conducted by the support commands. These visits are to follow-up on actions taken to correct deficiencies noted previously and render other assistance as required.

**SUBMITTED BY:** ACofS, SP&O
Project Officer: MAJ William J. Hickey, Jr., LBN 2978
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Trim Down and Tuck In.

2. PURPOSE: To:

   a. Reduce stockage objectives/days of supply at LSA's, FSA's, and supply points.
   b. Develop a movements control program.
   c. Reduce personnel requirements.
   d. Reduce security requirements for material and personnel to be protected.
   e. Consolidate and/or phase out activities where feasible.
   f. Reorganization to enhance support capability.
   g. Examination of methods of support.

3. DISCUSSION: a. It was determined that stockage objectives and levels of supply in 1st Logistical Command support activities in forward areas should be reduced with only demand supported items being stocked.

   b. A responsive transportation program is essential to insure timely resupply of rapid stock turn-over. This program will reduce requirements for personnel, equipment, convoys, stockage and security by keeping minimum essential stockage on the ground and transporting demand supported items only as required.

   c. Stockage objectives are under continual review by commodity managers to further analyze, reduce and control on the ground stocks and to improve support given. This program will be a continuing one with monthly stockage reviews to analyze progress and determine methods of improvement.

   d. Programs are in progress to consolidate and/or phase out activities where feasible. This program is directly associated with changes or redeployment of supported units and their capability to provide logistical support for themselves. Areas currently under study for reduction in 1st Logistical Command forces include Dak To, An Khe, Tuy Hoa/Vung Ro Bay and Ban Me Thuot.
e. Improvements in support capability that can be made through changes in organizational structure are continually under study. In line with this each support command headquarters has recently undergone organizational changes. In Cam Ranh Bay Support Command, major changes were made command wide.

f. Changes in methods of support designed to reduce personnel requirements and enhance support performance is a continuing program. Some of the more recent accomplishments were made in the method of providing support to MACV advisors in III CTZ by Saigon Support Command. Improvements were made primarily in the areas of Class I and Maintenance.

4. ACTION:  
   a. Stockage objectives in Classes I, III and V in several locations have been reduced to conform with demands and other are under study.
   
   b. The support activity at Dak To has been reduced in scope and studies will continue for consolidating and/or phasing out others.
   
   c. Continue efforts in areas mentioned above and look for new methods to enhance support provided by this command.

SUBMITTED BY: ACofS, SP&O  
   Project Officer: Major Byrd, LBN 2977
1. **SUBJECT:** Project Align

2. **PURPOSE:** To achieve a more equitable balance and more efficient distribution of command assets to actual requirements.

3. **BACKGROUND:** The Commanding General instructed the ACofS SP&O in November 1968 to initiate a comprehensive analysis of comparative command capabilities in the four support commands. He indicated that he had serious doubts regarding the need for all of the military civilian and contractual resources presently committed to 1st Logistical Command operations and desired that a painstaking and objective analysis be completed without delay.

4. **DISCUSSION:** This problem was approached on the basis that ACofS, SP&O would work through the staff divisions of the headquarters, from existing reports and available information. Requests for additional data from the commands would be kept to a minimum. The first step was assignment of responsibility for contacting specific staff officers within the headquarters to each officer assigned to ACofS SP&O and the development of a Logistics Operations Control Center with complete graphic displays covering key aspects of 1st Logistical Command operations. Concurrently an analytical briefing was developed to facilitate comparison of all command activities. In January the CG established a Resources Review Board headed by the Deputy Commanding General and the ACofS, SP&O was designated as Recorder. The first Project ALIGN briefing was presented and favorably received by the support command commanders on 20 January and an updated version was presented to the Resources Review Board on 3 March. Concurrently, the Force Development Division of ACofS, SP&O was tasked to assist in preparation of a detailed staff study into the whole area of space distribution and control; this was favorably received by the Resources Review Board on 24 February. These and related activities involving all staff divisions and the commands are moving this command closer to major economies in the number of military and other assets required to perform the mission and to the optimum distribution of available resources among the four support commands. They have also facilitated the review and analysis of the need for several PR&Gs for service type contracts which have been submitted to the Resources Review Board.

5. **ACTION:** Continue detailed analysis and comparison of command resources, and make timely recommendations for redistribution and other dispositions as appropriate.

SUBMITTED BY: ACofS, SP&O  
Project Officer: Major Byrd, LBN 2977
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project Clarion

2. PURPOSE: To provide information relative to the improvement of the quality of communications within Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command and superior, parallel and subordinate headquarters.

3. BACKGROUND: A need was identified to improve the quality of communication within this headquarters and with superior, parallel and subordinate headquarters through upgraded briefings, improved publications and more effective dissemination of information in all forms.

4. DISCUSSION: The quality of the quarterly Operations Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL), the monthly Logistical Summary (LOGSUM), the Daily Intelligence Summary (DISUM), the command briefings, and special briefings for distinguished visitors was questioned by the Commanding General in November 1968. He did not feel that sufficient, accurate information was being provided in lucid and interesting form in these publications or that the overall level of inter-headquarters communication on logistical and security matters was acceptable.

5. ACTION: The problem was analyzed in the Office of the ACoS, SP&O and the Presentations and Publications Division was established in conjunction with the Office of Military History. Two qualified officers with experience in communications were assigned and major improvements were made in the format of all of these reports. In addition, a Weekly Activities Report covering ACoS, SP&O operations was initiated in late November and the first ACoS, SP&O Conference held in February 1969. These changes have resulted in major improvements in the quality of these media and in favorable comments by higher and subordinate headquarters. In addition, a major effort has been made to improve the quality of spot-reporting by subordinate commands. This has not been as successful as the publications effort.

SUBMITTED BY: ACoS, SP&O
Project Officer: Major Jacobson, LBN 4839

VIII.5.0
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1. SUBJECT: Project Secure

2. PURPOSE: To provide information concerning Project Secure.

3. BACKGROUND: Project Secure, established in November 1968, is designed to seek improvement in security and defensive measures for logistic facilities and installations to preclude loss of combat essential supplies and services.

4. DISCUSSION: The continuing effort by the enemy to harass or interrupt vital combat support and combat service support operations constitutes a source of concern for logistic unit commanders at every echelon. Logistics operation and facilities are prime targets for enemy sapper and stand off attacks; pipelines and convoys have repeatedly been interdicted. When the enemy has been thwarted on the battlefield, he can be expected to seek "soft" targets where he can create major damage and destruction at relatively small cost to himself. Project Secure is aimed at:

a. Reduction of both the incidence of enemy attacks and the losses resulting therefrom through improved intelligence and counterintelligence measures, continuous coordination with tactical forces and intensified individual and unit responsiveness to emergency situations.

b. Timely collection of any dissemination of intelligence.

c. Improved defensive planning for passive and active defense.

d. Analysis and evaluation for use of improved equipment; e.g., hardened vehicles, night vision equipment; RFG stand off screens, etc.

e. Improved measures for command, control and coordination for security of logistic facilities and installations.

f. Evaluation and dissemination of "Lessons Learned" as they apply to security and defense of logistic facilities and installations.

5. ACTIONS: a. Within the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, SP&O, the Security and Intelligence Division was established. The functions of this staff office include a continuous program of staff supervision for security and intelligence matters having application to all 1st Logistical Command units; monitoring of security and defense drills and exercises; evaluation of security and defensive preparations; preparation of graphic records and displays; monitoring of spot reports and INTSUMs; preparation of a daily intelligence summary (DISUM) for distribution to all 1st Logistical Command units; preparation, coordination and dissemination of Project Alert messages; monitoring of perimeter and bunker inspections and rear area damage control procedures.
b. Security surveys have been conducted at the following 1st Logistical Command installations: Vung Tau, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Tuy Hoa—Vung Ro Bay and Cam Ranh Bay. Surveys of other installations are to be conducted.

SUBMITTED BT: ACoS, SP&A
Project Officer: LTC Sawyer, LBN 5822
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Project Foresight

2. PURPOSE: To improve the quality and expand the coverage of logistical contingency plans.

3. BACKGROUND: In November 1969, the Commanding General directed the ACofS, SP&O to initiate an overall program for the review and updating of logistical contingency plans.

4. DISCUSSION: Within the Office, ACofS, SI&O, the planning responsibility was upgraded to division level. This system places the responsibility for the review and updating of contingency plans on the Chief, Plans Division, who reports directly to the ACofS, SF&O. This has placed a higher priority on contingency plans and has resulted in an imaginative approach to the entire subject. Plans personnel make coordination visits to the support commands during the development of plans. The appropriate 1st Log Comd staff sections also tasked to provide information and prepare annexes which requires them to coordinate within their areas of responsibility. Draft plans are then published which are sent to the support commands to be used as a basis for a CPX to insure all problems have been explored and instructions for overcoming these problems are included in the plan. As a result of these CPX's this command was in a vastly improved contingency planning posture to cope with exigencies of the post-TET enemy offensive.

5. ACTION: Continue to review all plans presently in existence and initiate new plans as required. Review and planning procedures will employ close coordination visits, staff in-put, annex preparation and review, and CPX's to insure detailed planning has been accomplished and that all possible ramifications have been planned for.

SUBMITTED BY: ACofS, SP&O
Project Officer: Maj Chester A. Stengrim

VIII.7.0
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Cognizant Activity:

Report for Period Ending

Project Starting Date

Implementation Date

% Project Completion

TASK DESCRIPTION/
UNIT OF MEASUREMENT

Number of OPLAN reviews or Reports required.

Period Ending

Projection (Black)
Completed (Blue)
Shortfall (Red)

NOTE: Explain shortfalls or deviations on reverse side.

AVCA Form 80R (14Sep68)
SECTION IX

Other Improvement Programs
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Reduction of Property Disposal Inventories

2. PURPOSE: To discuss factors which contributed to the increase in disposal inventory from fourth quarter fiscal year 1967 to the end of the first quarter fiscal year 1969, and to outline actions which have been taken to counter this increase.

3. BACKGROUND: Communist offensives in January and May 1968, inability of contractors to obtain sufficient port facilities at some disposal locations, and ineffectively written sales terms and conditions all combined to increase the disposal inventory. Additionally, lack of trained personnel and proper equipment within the RVN disposal system prevented correct response to the situation as it developed.

4. DISCUSSION: a. Because of the many problems that contractors faced in the removal of property, interest on the part of buyers was slight. Recognizing an increase in the amount of tonnage being generated, the Foreign Excess Sales Office negotiated a term contract with the Government of Korea, who was represented by General Pipe and Supply Company. This was done in an effort to provide a responsive contractor in each area where property was being generated. The project proved to be too much for one contractor and as a result inventories continued to mount.

b. Individual contracts were then made for each disposal location. Shortly after signing of the contracts, the Tet Offensive occurred which caused each contractor to fall behind in removals. Following the offensive the contractors once again organized their machinery, only to be faced with the May Offensive. Once recoupment of resources was made after this offensive each contractor, to a greater or lesser degree, experienced difficulties in such areas as little or no commercial port facilities, lack of specialized handling equipment, difficulties with GVN customs and port officials, and lack of transportation suitable for hauling scraps material to the port.

c. While the contractors were experiencing difficulties, the RVN disposal system suffered with its own internal problems. The fact that there is absolutely no existing pipeline for trained military disposal personnel, each disposal yard faced these mounting problems with, in most cases one Department of the Army Civilian and a crew of untrained military and local national personnel. The results, of course, were predictable in that property was not properly received and segregated, nor was it reported for sale on a timely basis. The Foreign Excess Sales Office also was not geared to handle the many and diverse problems encountered and, as a result, could not respond to the increased demands. All of these conditions are the main factors which brought disposal inventory in September 1968 to the position of "bursting at the seams".

IX.1.0

28/
Through the very expensive trial and error method, individual contractors eventually were able to ease some of their own problems through personal acquisition of specific types of equipment and personal appeals to certain GVN officials. However, many internal problems remained to be resolved. On 1 October 1968, specific actions were initiated in an effort to reverse the trend of the past several months. Some of these actions are temporary in nature as they are not considered to be the solution over a long period. Other actions are permanent and will remain in force.

e. As a result of these actions the on hand inventory of property has been reduced by 23,000 tons. In order to do this a total of 84,000 tons was disposed of during the period 1 October 1968 to 28 February 1969.


(1) Six of the seven existing term contracts were renegotiated to provide for more stringent terms and conditions which resulted in the purchasers accelerating their rate of removal of scrap property from the Property Disposal Yards.

(2) Leasing U.S. Government owned storage areas to contractors for staging and preparation of property for shipment.

(3) The negotiated sale method is being used more frequently in those cases where expedited action is an absolute necessity. This reduces administrative sale time from approximately sixty-seven days to thirty days and allows for the selection of purchasers who have proven to be responsible and capable of moving large volumes of property in relatively short periods of time.

b. Permanent:

(1) A continuous training program was initiated at all operating levels for all personnel.

(2) Property disposal conferences are being conducted periodically for the purposes of discussing problem areas and other matters of mutual interest.

(3) Invitations for bids on future contracts now contain a stringent removal schedule which requires the purchaser to remove the on hand quantities within 60 to 120 days in addition to removing all generations during the same period.

IX.1.1

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(4) All invitations for bid on term contracts now require the bidders to submit a prospectus in advance of the bid opening. Included in this prospectus is the bidders plan for removal, available equipment assets, statements from their bank indicating financial backing, the names of supervisory personnel, shipping capabilities and dates on which work will begin. All bids are evaluated and awards made to highest responsible bidder which may or may not be the bidder offering the highest bid. The first of these invitations for bid was opened on 6 March 1969 and resulted in a two year scrap contract being awarded for the sum of $1,260,860.00.

(5) On 9 November 1968, a country to country agreement was signed and although this is not a cure-all, it does, for the first time, permit official discussion of problems directly between sales personnel and representatives of the Republic of Vietnam.

c. A request for the purchase of specialized handling equipment, such as baling machines, alligator shears, metal presses and magnetic crane attachments was approved on 1 November 1968. Procurement was initiated and awards have been made. With the exception of one large metal press, all of the equipment will be airlifted to RVN. The receipt of this equipment will permit better utilization of storage space, easier handling of scrap and increase returns to the government.

(1) Where possible, contracts have been written which require the contractor, under the supervision of FDO personnel, to receive and segregate property which he has purchased, thus reducing FDO workload in these two areas.

(2) At those locations where U.S. Government storage areas have been leased, new generations of property are being received and weighed by property disposal personnel and diverted for delivery direct to the contractors storage areas.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACofS, Services
Project Officer: Mr. LAROCK, LBN 2920
Report for Period Ending 28 February 69
Project Starting Date 1 October 69
Implementation Date 1 October 69
Project Completion 46.4

To reduce the Property Disposal Inventory in RVN.

Unit of measure: Thousands of short tons.

NOTES: Explain shortfalls or deviations on reverse side
1. SUBJECT: Retrograde

2. PURPOSE: To discuss factors that highlight the retrograde of material out of RVN.

3. BACKGROUND: The evacuation of material, both serviceable and unserviceable, from an active theater of operations is unique in the history of the US Army. The need for such a retrograde movement was recognized and an intensive program was initiated in the summer of 1967 to insure the evacuation of certain excesses and unserviceable reparaibles from the theater. A total of 4,322,492 S/T of material has been retrograded from RVN for the thirteen month period ending Dec 1968.

4. DISCUSSION: a. The retrograde program in the 1st Logistical Command covers seven categories of material: depot excess, station returns, reparaibles, suspended and excess ammunition, reusable ammunition components, Army Marine equipment, and material shipped to property disposal.

b. Identification of excesses is a function of physical inventories, the reconciliation of material due into the inventory and the material due to the customer, updating of stock records, and validation of requirements. These are hard core features of a managed supply system. In each area projects, such as Project Count, Project Stop/See, Project Rags and Fill, have been initiated in order to purify our stocks and data base. The outcome of these and other like projects will result in the nomination and evacuation of excesses from RVN. The objective for the remainder of FY 69 is to average approximately 15,000 S/T per month.

c. Unit/Station Returns consists of material in units in excess to their authorized needs. Retrograde tonnage has averaged approximately 1700 short tons per month. Currently a program for the reporting and retrograding of excess stocks from division and separate brigade DSU has been instituted. HQ, USARV teams supported by support command personnel inspect unit for excess. A list of serviceable items is provided to the ICCV for disposition instructions. These are forthcoming within 24 hours. Material designated for retrograde is processed and offered for shipment from the DSU thus by-passing the supporting depot. Project Through-Put should expedite movement of station returns.

d. In Vietnam, using units generate unserviceable equipment that is evacuated through the maintenance pipeline. The collection, classification and salvage (CC&S) activity is the focal point for the retrograde of reparaible to off-shore overhaul facilities.
e. Inadequacies in CC&S Company TO&E were in part overcome by incorporating the CC&S activity into the depot TDA's. Commercial steam cleaners have been provided in order to improve our capability to pass US Department of Agriculture regulations. Hydra-jet high pressure water cleaners have been ordered by T-Day Planning Office to be tested by CC&S. This will increase the cleaning capability to pass US Department of Agriculture regulations. Thus a reorientation of the shipment of reparables is in the offering, whereas previously much of our retrograde was shipped to Okinawa, the future should see most of the reparables going directly to CONUS.

f. Reusable Ammunition Components involves primarily brass 105mm cartridge cases and propelling containers. The use of Sea-Land Vans has been a tremendous aid in the retrograde movement of these items to CONUS. Retrograde tonnage of these components have averaged 1200 short tons per month over the past 13 months.

g. Marine retrograde involves items in the Army Transportation inventory for overhaul at facilities in Taiwan, Singapore, and the Philippines. The density is low and marine items represent only a small portion of our retrograde tonnage.

h. Property Disposal is discussed in a separate paper.

5. ACTIONS: The retrograde program is a result of many coordinated actions taken in the functional areas of supply and maintenance. The command has taken aggressive steps to enhance the theater's supply and maintenance posture. These actions should be continued and be supported by all agencies concerned.

SUBMITTED BY:
Maintenance and ACofS, Transportation
1. SUBJECT: Project 525

2. PURPOSE: To orient new commanders on the purpose of the 525 Inspection/Training Team whose purpose is to study and recommend corrective action of deficiencies contributing to cargo diversion and larcenies within the 1st Logistical Command.

3. BACKGROUND: Reference DF, subject as above, dated 31 Dec 68, this office is currently tasked with LC Reg 525-2 inspections of all support command installations on a quarterly basis.

4. DISCUSSION: a. The 525 Team is composed of representatives from the Provost Marshal Office, Transportation, Comptroller, General Supply and Procurement Agency, and serves as a management "tool" of this command in safeguarding US supplies and military property. This horizontal review of procedures serves as an internal audit check and also furthers the "Two-man Rule" concept of control.

b. Progress attained as a result of 525 Team efforts measured by: The monthly reports received by this headquarters from each support command and Operation Overtake which presents the quantity and dollar value of losses and recoveries occurring in each area; evaluation of corrective actions taken as a result of 525 inspections; and by CID reports of investigation concerning larcenies of government property/supplies. This team effort has been expanded to include petroleum products.

c. Security is a command responsibility, Commanders responsible for the operational management and control of installations and activities have a direct responsibility to provide adequate security to insure the successful performance of their mission.

d. Inspections conducted by the 1st Logistical Command 525 Inspection/Training Team is a means of assisting commanders with expert recommendations to improve the control and security procedures over US Government supplies and equipment.

SUBMITTED BY:
Provost Marshal
Project Officer: MAJ Polk
**Task Description/Unit of Measurement**

**UNIT OF MEASURE:** Monthly reports rec'd by this Hq from each Sup Com & Operation Overtake which presents the quality & dollar value losses & recoveries occurring in each area. Evaluation of corrective actions taken as a result of 525 inspections & by CID reports of investigations concerning larcenies of gov't property & equipment. This chart depicts losses & recoveries from July 68 to July 69.

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**NOTE:** Explain shortfalls or deviations on reverse side.

**AVCA Form 80R (14Sep68)**

**Projection (Black)**

**Completed (Blue)**

**Shortfall (Red)**

**Top curve indicates losses.**

**Bottom curve indicates recoveries.**
**525-2**

**Project**

Cognizant Activity: Provost Marshal

Project Officer: MAJ Folk, Ch, PP&A

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**Task Description/Unit of Measurement**

Task Description: Inspections conducted by the 1st Log Comd 525 Inspection/Training Team is a means of assisting commanders with expert recommendations to improve control and security procedures over US Gov't supplies and equipment.

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**Period Ending: 31 Jul 69**

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**AVCA Form 80R (14Sep68)**

- Projection (Black)
- Completed (Blue)
- Shortfall (Red)

**NOTE:** Explain shortfalls or deviations on reverse side

Dotted line indicates projected inspections
Solid line indicates completed inspections
SHORTFALLS: The shortfall experienced during the month of Feb 69 was due to a reconstitution of the 525-2 Program in order to encompass the security and control procedures of POL products, and the recent enemy offensive.
FACT SHEET

1. SUBJECT: Zero Defects Program

2. PURPOSE: To provide information concerning development and implementation of the Zero Defects Program.

3. BACKGROUND: The Zero Defects Program was established in the 1st Logistical Command as a motivational tool to improve the quality of operations within the command. The program is designed to eliminate mistakes attributed to human error by inspiring personnel at all levels in the command to do their job right the first time. On 21 September 1968, the Commanding General initiated the Zero Defects Program in the 1st Logistical Command to include quality control and quality assurance wherever practical. A Zero Defects Regulation (LC Reg 5-1) has been published to provide the basic guidelines for implementing the program; this regulation was written in accordance with AR 11-30. The program was established on a decentralized basis to meet the varying needs of the support commands. In accordance with LC Reg 5-1, paragraph 5b, Zero Defects coordinators were appointed at all major subordinate commands. Also the Commanding General directed that six (6) individuals be placed in each depot to implement and sustain a vigorous Zero Defects Program.

4. DISCUSSION: Presently, the Zero Defects Program is well underway. All support commands have initiated the program and are in the process of expanding it throughout all levels of the command. The expansion of the program was stressed during the Comptrollers Conference. The program to date is in operation at the depot level, and is now being expanded to all other units within each support command. Also stressed throughout the conference was that a method for measuring progress must be developed and documented to prove the success of the program. The conference afforded an excellent opportunity for the support commands to exchange and to formulate ideas. Placards, signs, and various other news media (television and radio at some locations) throughout the command are being used to publicize the program.

5. ACTION: To insure further progress and coordination of the program, staff visits will continue to be made. At the present time our main concern is to properly sustain the program in the depots and expand it throughout the command. In order to follow the progress of the program each support command will submit to the ACoS, Comptroller, a Quarterly Zero Defects Program Progress Report (RCS: AVCA GF-19). These reports will be consolidated and made available to the Commanding General for review.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACoS, Comptroller
Program Manager: 1LT Robert Glenn Matheny, LBN 4423

IX 4.0
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1. SUBJECT: Project Garbage Disposal

2. PURPOSE: To outline current actions and future plans with respect to disposal of garbage.

3. BACKGROUND: To date no contracts have been let by the Foreign Excess Sales Office (FESO) for the sale of garbage produced by the US Armed Forces in Vietnam. When the economy of a particular locale is such that garbage may be sold as opposed to paying for the services of a contractor obviously it should be sold. The US Government is presently paying a contractor (PA&E) for collecting garbage throughout Vietnam in those locations in which the tactical situation permits collection.

4. DISCUSSION: Invitations to bid have been distributed covering the sale of garbage at Da Nang and Tan Son Nhut on 29 May and 1 July respectively. Additionally, preliminary steps have been made toward the sale of garbage and scrap lumber generated at Long Binh, Bien Hoa, Camp Davies, Cat Lai, and Newport. The success of these sales will determine the feasibility of entering into garbage contracts throughout Vietnam in those areas where the tactical situation permits collection. Criteria for determining success of Project Garbage Disposal essentially encompasses two factors i.e., performance of the contractor and monetary benefits to the U.S. Government. Performance cannot be measured at this time since no garbage contract is currently active.

5. ACTION: Additional definitive data will be required before "going out on Invitations to Bid" for the sale of garbage in most locales. Coordination must be made with PA&E to insure uninterrupted service and Contracting Officer Representatives must be selected and oriented regarding their responsibilities.

SUBMITTED BY:
ACoFS, Services
Project Officer: MAJ Smith, LBN 2887
Section X

Glossary of Intensified Management Projects
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## SECTION I - SUPPLY IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS

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<tr>
<td>Castle/Flags I: Prescribe policies and procedures for intensified management review of requirements and requisitions for Engineer and Signal construction material.</td>
<td>Supply, Services</td>
<td>In-country referrals to fill construction material requisitions; dollar value of construction material requisitions cancelled at ICC level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCIL - Commander's Critical Items List: Provide intensive management of items critical to commanders of major units.</td>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>Number of intensively managed items.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clean I (NCR 500): A 100% manual review of NCR 500 ledger cards to purify DSU stock records and to take action on back orders and dues-in. Should be a continuous cyclic action.</td>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>Lines reviewed, number of back orders, number of dues-in dollar value.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clean Phase II &amp; III: A program to retrograde stocks from forward areas. Now incorporated in Project Thru-Put.</td>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>Short Tons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clean Phase IV: Each item the computer adds to the stockage list (repair parts/secondary items) is &quot;red lined&quot; for review by the commodity manager with technical assistance from ACOFS, Maint. ACOFS, Supply reviews in summary and presents to Supply and Maintenance Councils and CG on a monthly basis.</td>
<td>Supply, Maint</td>
<td>Line items, &quot;drops&quot; and &quot;adds&quot; to TASL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closed Loop: An integrated supply and maintenance program to manage selected items of equipment. Designed to provide sufficient assets for the overhaul-rebuild program, replacement of unserviceable items and combat losses, and depot maintenance float stocks.</td>
<td>Supply, Maint</td>
<td>Number of items meeting or exceeding the incoming and retrograde scheduled program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Essential: Part of stockage criteria for depot ASL that is not demand supported but necessary to assure combat units of the ability to support items determined essential. Determined by review with commodity managers, technically qualified personnel and combat technical coordination.</td>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>Line items</td>
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<tr>
<td>Project/Purpose/Scope</td>
<td>Proposition</td>
<td>Management Criteria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Count I: A 100% location survey and inventory of all 1st Logistical Command supplies in depots, DSU's and GSU's goal of 95% accuracy in the locator system and inventory.</td>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>Locations surveyed, lines inventoried and counted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count II: Effective 1 Feb 69 to 31 Jul 69. Same as Count I.</td>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>Same as Count I.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depot Excess: Reduce dollar value of excess stock in depots to USARPAC standard of no more than 10% of total inventory dollar value.</td>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>Number of lines, dollar value, short tons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edit: Develop supply edit criteria for an edit program to be used at all command supply echelons to purify the ASL. Precludes requisitioning of nonessential items, inordinate quantities, and submission of requisitions with invalid data.</td>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>Number of requisitions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended Demand Analysis: A program to compare lines stocked with demand accommodation stratified by the number of demands. Provides guidance for the determination of stockage criteria. Allows identification of items demanded most frequently for intensive management.</td>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>Demand satisfaction, demand accommodations, customer satisfaction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fill I &amp; Fill II: Identify ASL items which continuously reflect a zero balance and which are frequently on high priority requisition and/or high demand or are identified through reports as being critical. Items are forwarded to 2d Log, DCSLOG, AMC, DSA, LCOP, and NICP's with a request that every action be taken to improve the supply and delivery of these items. Project Fill was expanded to specify the top 2% items of highest number of dues-out. This expansion is Fill II.</td>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>Demand satisfaction, demand accommodation, customer satisfaction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Find: A project to determine how requisitions get lost and what can be done to prevent lost requisitions.</td>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>Number of lost requisitions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**PROJECT/PURPOSE/SCOPE**

Financial Inventory Accounting (FIA):
FIA is a reporting system for financial management of USARV supply operations and provides, through dollar disclosures, a common denominator for more effective determination of supply requirements and highlights those areas of supply management requiring improvement. Implementation within USARV is programmed for 31 Mar 69, at which time the first Quarterly Stratification Report (CSGLD 1438) will be prepared and submitted.

**IMI - Intensive Management Items:** Intensive management of selected secondary items, to improve the stockage condition. DSU's perform a 100% inventory of IMI and forward to depots for further review and inventory. ICCV reviews and consolidates and forwards to NICP's for inclusion in supply letters. Fill and IMI contain the same items. A continuation of IMI Program will include en route following with the application of IMI project code on requisitions submitted to CONUS. As the item is received at the port this will allow screening of the manifest to determine receipt of critical IMI items. Upon final phase-in of the program the need for lists will change to recommended list for IMI actions.

**Key Depot:** To reduce the number of in-country locations where low density, low mortality items are stocked by consolidating at a key depot.

**Level I:** A study to determine if DSU on-hand stocks can be reduced while supply support remains constant. Phase I consists of an order-ship time analysis. Phase II will utilize an actual order-ship time to compute the requisitioning objective.

**Levels II:** A test at depot level to reduce the stockage levels while maintaining satisfactory supply support.

---

**PROPOINTER**
Supply

**MANAGEMENT CRITERA**

For Financial Inventory Report: Percent of completion. For Financial Inventory Management: Dollars.

Number of FSN's

Number of line items reduced from non-key depots ASL's W/O reducing the depots demand satisfaction.

Ability to operate without significant detriment to demand satisfaction.

Same as Level I.
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<td>Manifest: A test project between 2d Log Comd and US Army Depot CRB to furnish cross referenced supply and transportation data on ocean shipments. Purpose is to determine what benefits can be gained by having advanced detailed information on supplies prior to their arrival.</td>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>Line items, in/out country diversions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OST: A study of in-country order-ship time to determine the time required to pick up stock on the Availability Balance File after the ship arrives at the port.</td>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>Reduction in required times at the various stages of processing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Time Fill: The initiation of action to meet Milstrip on-time criteria within phased targets. Actions involved include receipt pick-up times, initial fill times and MRO issuing times.</td>
<td>Supply, Compt</td>
<td>Targets are assigned and performance is measured against these targets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Punch - Phase I: The furnishing of pre-punched requisitions to units who submit requisitions to mechanized DSU's Phase II - the furnishing of prepunched requisitions for ASL items to non-mechanized DSU's.</td>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>Number/% of units supplied. Number/% of DSU's supplied.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Condition: A project to purify condition data of materiel assets at each depot. Phase I will separate stock counted in Count II into two categories. Phase II will condition code all incoming depot stocks.</td>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>All J&amp;K coded materiel will be inspected by quality control personnel and materiel not immediately required by customers will be reported to the USAICCV.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rages: A reconciliation and cancellation of back orders at DSU and Depot levels. Required mandatory reconciliation with strict control to insure the elimination of &quot;nice to have&quot; items.</td>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>Due-outs, rescinded and cancelled, dollar value.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same: An ongoing project to standardize depot operations.</td>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>Number of operations standardized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See/X: A project to insure that other services and agencies in Vietnam screen all USARV prominent Stop/See LSTs prior to taking procurement action. Replaced by PURA-V.</td>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>Dollar value of excess offered and accepted.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PURA: Removal of excess stocks from country at fastest possible rate.</td>
<td>Supply, Trans</td>
<td>Short Tons of excess supplies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PURA-V: Screening excess stocks by AF, Navy, Marines, ADI, MACV and Navy Contractors using stop/see list plus bulk lot material listings, prior to out of country requisitioning.</td>
<td>Supply, Trans</td>
<td>Comparison of dollar value of excess stock offered by other services with dollar value of stocks accepted/received from those services.</td>
</tr>
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Stock Record Support: The assumption of responsibility for stock record support by the USAIPGV and in-country depots.

Stop/See: The selective cancellation and frustration of certain commodities being received in Vietnam which are beyond current requirements and beyond the ability of USARV/1st Log Comd to handle and store.

Thru-Put: A project to assist combat commanders in identifying and retrograding excess material. Includes shipment of excesses from a unit to a designated location in or out of country.

Update: To install a disciplined and command emphasized program to update and maintain on a current basis all catalog change data in stock records of the depots, DSU/GSU and TOE units, on a monthly basis and to insure that the complementary requirement to maintain current catalog data in locator files on containers and bin locations is effectively accomplished.
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<td>Care &amp; Preservation I: A program to maintain or return all material to a &quot;ready for issue&quot; condition, i.e., Condition Code A.</td>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>Number of items repaired and returned to operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Support: A program to intensify efforts to provide responsive and flexible support to supply and maintenance customers.</td>
<td>Maintain/Supply</td>
<td>Improved customer service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand Analysis and Requisitioning Supply Objectives Computations: To standardize to one system within the US Army Depots and ICCV so that all demands are reported and recorded by the depots in exactly the same manner, and interface with the USAICC.</td>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>Improved customer supply service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Support to ARVN through US Logistics System: To maximize utilization of excess and long stocks, to decrease order and shipping time for ARVN customers, to build up ARVN stocks to their authorized BO, to reduce transportation cost incident to shipment of supplies into or out of Vietnam and to preclude shipment from CONUS of items which are presently available in the theater.</td>
<td>Supply</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asset Control: To insure the proper handling of unserviceables by managing them as Theater assets with strict accountability and audit trails being established and maintained.</td>
<td>Supply</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer III: A project to insure proper management and storage, identification, cataloging, etc., of engineer set assemblies such as bridge sets, generator sets, end items and accessories, etc.</td>
<td>Supply</td>
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## SECTION II - MAINTENANCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS

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<td>Dog: To identify &quot;war weary&quot; equipment which may not meet retrograde criteria of mileage, hours, rounds fired, etc. To select equipment items having frequent maintenance problems. To perform technical inspections to confirm &quot;Dog&quot; classification.</td>
<td>Maint</td>
<td>Number and type of equipment reported; frequency count of maintenance problems per type of items.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DX: A supply maintenance method of &quot;repairing&quot; an item by replacement.</td>
<td>Maint</td>
<td>Number of lines stocked in a DX Number of demands for DX stocked items.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Maintenance I: A continuing program to insure operational readiness of reconditioning, renovation, and other necessary actions for in-the-field maintenance.</td>
<td>Maint</td>
<td>At DSU: Number of job orders, repairs completed and backlog. At GSU: Number of scheduled repairs completed; backlog.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generator II: To retrograde all generators and military standard unserviceable engines in collecting points and retrograde channels to CONUS depots or Okinawa in order to provide unserviceable assets to the Close Loop Program.</td>
<td>Maint</td>
<td>Number of generators shipped. Number of engines shipped. Number of unserviceable assets in-country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Craft: A continuing program of supply and maintenance to insure repair and renovation of Army water craft.</td>
<td>Maint</td>
<td>Number of self-propelled and towed vessels repaired or overhauled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our Life: In general a program to follow-up products of the overhaul system so as to determine what the &quot;life expectancy&quot; may be for overhauled items.</td>
<td>Maint</td>
<td>Item performance for overhaul items compared with similar new item.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part I: Analyze overhaul products to determine renewed or life of such equipment thru sampling techniques using TAERS processes to follow-up on life of specific pieces of overhaul equipment.</td>
<td>Maint</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part II: Using TAERS processes to determine life of an item or parts mortality on new equipment like M551 and all new items in specific units.</td>
<td>Maint</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
R&R Artillery: A maintenance program to improve the OR rate of M107/M110 weapons. The weapons are to be removed to DCU locations for a week of intensive servicing. Intensive crew training is to be held to improve every day maintenance of these weapons.

Direct Support: A program to intensify efforts to provide responsive and flexible support to supply and maintenance customers.

Engineer III: To improve support of heavy construction equipment by improved DGU support, better demand analysis and use of IMI/FILL/FIND procedures to improve OR rates of engineer units.

PM:

R&R Artillery

Prop: Maint

Mgmt Criteria: Number of weapons serviced and the number of weapons in the process of service.
## SECTION III - OPERATIONS IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alert:</strong> To insure a high state of readiness is maintained throughout. Constant effort at all levels to make certain security is not relaxed and that personnel are continually alert to actual or suspected enemy activity.</td>
<td>SP&amp;O, all elements of command.</td>
<td>Development and evaluation of internal security standing operating procedures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Buddy:</strong> Transitional training and operations in logistics between US Army and ARVN modernization and provide ARVN with a capability to assist in retrograde operations connected with T-Day planning. Program is awaiting conceptual approval from higher headquarters.</td>
<td>SP&amp;O</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Program 6 Civilianization:</strong> Part of a DOD Directed program to civilianize military spaces in RVN during the period 1 Jun 68 through 31 May 69. Methods used are line by line substitution, inactivation with contract replacement, and inactivation without replacement.</td>
<td>SP&amp;O</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ready I:</strong> To assist newly arrived NG and reserve units in training, developing working and administrative areas, and provide general assistance in achieving a responsive mission capability as soon as possible. Includes examination of the personnel and equipment readiness to determine ability to perform assigned mission.</td>
<td>SP&amp;O</td>
<td>Number of civilians hired and performance of replacement civilians. Spaces to be eliminated are programmed by HQ, USARV based on schedules submitted by subordinate commands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ready II:</strong> To follow-up successful and productive staff visits from Ready I. Includes re-examination of personnel and equipment. This program relates to all other Program 6 actions.</td>
<td>SP&amp;O</td>
<td>Evaluation of scheduled inspections and assistance visits through use of preplanned inspection check lists.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Evaluation and comparison of results of Ready II inspection with Ready I inspection.**
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<th>MANAGEMENT CRITERIA</th>
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<tr>
<td>Trim Down/Tuck In: To reduce materiel stockage on the ground at LSA's, FSA's and supply points. When support requirements become less, reduce personnel and security requirements through the reduction of materiel. Provide information (tonnage, by class) to Trans so that a movements control program is developed to insure only essential convoy movements. Controlled through a periodic review of stockage levels and corresponding cross leveling of stocks which considers personnel strengths, equipment, tubes supported and mission assignment.</td>
<td>SP&amp;O, Trans, Supply, Personnel, POL, Ammo, Compt, and Maint.</td>
<td>Number of personnel and stocks reduced at LSA's, FSA's and supply points. Short tons, number of locations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Align: A program to achieve a more equitable balance and more efficient distribution of command assets in relation to actual command requirements.</td>
<td>SP&amp;O</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarion: A program to improve the quality of communications within Headquarters and with superior, parallel and subordinate headquarters.</td>
<td>SP&amp;O</td>
<td>Number of upgraded briefings; improved publications; effective information dissemination procedures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foresight: A program to improve the quality and expand the coverage of logistical contingency plans.</td>
<td>SP&amp;O</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure: To improve security and defensive measures for logistical facilities and installations to preclude loss of combat essential supplies and services.</td>
<td>SP&amp;O</td>
<td>Reduction in supplies lost; Reduction in delay in service time.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### SECTION IV - MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECT/PURPOSE/SCOPE</th>
<th>PROponent</th>
<th>MANAGEMENT CRITERIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Account: To detect and eliminate deficiencies in the preparation of reimbursement documentation and to insure that collection is effected for all reimbursable support furnished. Implemented by periodic visits to subordinate commands to provide guidance and information on current documentation procedures and to assist in identifying and eliminating problem areas.</td>
<td>Compt, all staff elements, all subordinate commands.</td>
<td>Compt, all staff elements, all subordinate commands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clean V: The perfecting of command and control techniques to establish or re-establish short and long range goals; chart performance against operations and projects established during the period 1 Aug - 30 Nov 68.</td>
<td>Compt, all staff elements, all subordinate commands.</td>
<td>Number of lost requisitions, reduced time for processing requisitions, reduced time for issuing supplies, new supply processes for requisition handling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Find II: A program to trace the processing of supply requisitions to determine the adequacy of an audit trail and document control. Also, the project should determine the time necessary to process a requisition and to issue material from stock.</td>
<td>Compt</td>
<td>Number of active recurring reports, manpower expended (not available at this time), and frequency of submission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reports Control: An ongoing Army-wide program to purify management data and to obtain it by the least possible expense in manpower.</td>
<td>Compt</td>
<td>Number of standardized charts, reports etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same II: Standardization of management data on standard charts. Develop standard briefing charts by title and content at all levels. These charts will include such topics as quality control assurance of the inventory of Count II, number of lines on FILL at each level of command, performance against FILL requirement, demand accommodation/demand satisfaction at ICC, depots and DSU's, STOP/SEE, Intransit, and other management operations and projects as covered in the results of the Command and Control</td>
<td>Compt, all staff elements, support commands.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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3/0
Same II (Con't): Improvement Program - Phase II. These standard charts are to be used as management tools on a daily, weekly, monthly, and quarterly basis. They have the dual purpose of assuring that progressive objectives are met and also serve as a means of updating visitors and inspectors. These are to be used as a standard command management approach to answer questions as to where we are going, when we will get there, and what is our performance to date in meeting objectives of the command mission.

Smart II: A program involving a system to specify capacity and general requirements of each unit in the 1st Logistical Command. It is to be tied in with the efficiency index system.

Zero Defects: To improve the quality of operations within the command eliminating mistakes attributed to human error by inspiring personnel to "do their job right the first time."

Specific target areas are selected. Goals (reductions in errors) are established and stated in quantitative terms. Exact criteria varies according to target area.
### SECTION V - PERSONNEL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECT/PURPOSE/SCOPE</th>
<th>PROPONENT</th>
<th>MANAGEMENT CRITERIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Castle/Flags II:</strong> A program to identify and get specific TDA spaces for military stocks control, storage and maintenance specialists in heavy constructions, equipment and materiel, and the communications/electronics field.</td>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>TDA spaces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Log Leadership Training:</strong> An analysis of senior service school lists and the NCO Logistical Program to identify and justify to DA positions which require this training.</td>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>Positions identified and approved by DA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Men (Know Your Men):</strong> To increase the effectiveness of 1st Log Comd personnel by utilizing each man's talents to the maximum extent. Insure that each supervisor knows who his men are, what they are doing, what they can do, and looking for their men's welfare.</td>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>SIR's, Morale surveys, Morals, Character Guidance, Equal Opportunity, NCO Advisory Council and Watch Committee minutes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Skills II:</strong> A program for setting up training courses for Local National employees using 1st Log Comd resources. Designed to achieve maximum effectiveness of the influx of civilians hired as a result of the civilianization of military spaces under Program 6.</td>
<td>Personnel, SP&amp;O</td>
<td>Number of training courses; number of students trained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Smart:</strong> The purpose is to encourage the submission of ideas from employees using as a goal improving the logistic processes throughout the command. To implement this, councils have been appointed at HQ, 1st Log Comd, support commands, group and battalion levels.</td>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>Number of ideas submitted, adopted, and/or forwarded to the Incentive Awards Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Talent:</strong> System to identify specially skilled personnel in reserve organizations so that their talents can be effectively utilized.</td>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>Personnel identified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Skills II A:</strong> Identification of Vietnamese civilians who have the ability to supervise and putting them in supervisory positions.</td>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>Number of LN civilians in supervisory positions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT/PURPOSE/SCOPE</td>
<td>PROPOINENT</td>
<td>MANAGEMENT CRITERIA</td>
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<tr>
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<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prayer</strong></td>
<td>Chaplain</td>
<td>Improved attitudes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Improved moral atmosphere.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Improved attendance at religious services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Street Corner</strong></td>
<td>Chaplain</td>
<td>Number of services conducted outside chapel buildings in work areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>&quot;Chit - Chat&quot;</strong></td>
<td>Chaplain</td>
<td>Percentage of time spent by chaplain with men in work and recreation areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increased Church Attendance</strong></td>
<td>Chaplain</td>
<td>Percentage of personnel attending chapel services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fill III</strong></td>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>Number of persons working in PMOS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Skills I</strong></td>
<td>SP&amp;O</td>
<td>Number of training courses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overhead</strong></td>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>Reduction of the ratio of touch labor to overhead strength.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### SECTION VI - TRANSPORTATION IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECT/PURPOSE/SCOPE</th>
<th>PROPOSHET</th>
<th>MANAGEMENT CRITERIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Challenge:</strong> This project consists of challenging, by supply and transportation agencies, of all questionable shipments sponsored by the US Army within RVN with special emphasis on inter-depot shipments, air shipments, convoys, and large amounts/tonnages which obviously cannot be used in a short time frame, i.e., cement, asphalt, and other construction material.</td>
<td>Trans, Supply</td>
<td>Number of shipment offerings successfully challenged compared to the total number offered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Flow:</strong> To have visibility of all items in the surface pipeline from CONUS to RVN by specific item identification. This permits positive management over final destination disposition of supplies, and reduction of in-country stockage levels.</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>Tonnage by class, IMI by noun nomenclature indicated by specific port and approximate location of cargo between CONUS and RVN expressed in time frames of 1-7, 8-14, 15-21, and 22+ days out of port.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intransit:</strong> A comprehensive traffic management program to detect bottlenecks and improve the flow of Army-sponsored cargo within RVN. Consists of Movement Control Centers (MCC) challenging shipments, cargo backlog reporting system, and report of shipment system (REPSHIP).</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>Total cargo on hand, cargo not booked, cargo within 5 days of RDD and cargo past RDD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Docrite:</strong> A project to insure that proper documentation procedures are followed for MILSTAMP within RVN.</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>Reduction in number of faulty documents; Increase in speed of document processing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iceberg:</strong> A program to identify and minimize the hidden degrading factors which reduce vehicle availability in truck units.</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>Increase in number of available task vehicles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Logmove:</strong> A program to help the Support Command develop an effective movement control organization through the development of MTDE/MTDA which will give them added personnel and equipment for the job.</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>Increase MTDE/MTDA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT/PURPOSE/SCOPE</td>
<td>PROFONENT</td>
<td>MANAGEMENT CRITERIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
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<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoRoRo: A program to maximize the use of cargo semi-trailers for intra-coastal RO/RO service.</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>Increased utilization of semi-trailers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rugs: A program to reduce the delay in receipt of unaccompanied baggage through the use of single management of all unaccompanied baggage activities in II, III, IV Corps Tactical Zone.</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>Increased movement of baggage; reduction in baggage processing time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uptight: A program to increase the Command's capability to monitor transportation contracts.</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterdat: A program to provide guidance to the support commands for the improved compilation of vessel/lighterage and port operation statistics; for validation of port capabilities; for the improvement of command objectives and goals; for the validation of equipment requirements.</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>More accurate data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT/PURPOSE/SCOPE</td>
<td>PROponent</td>
<td>MANAGEMENT CRITERIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Advance Procurement Planning Program:</strong></td>
<td>Procurement, all requiring activities</td>
<td>Scheduled dates of submission noted in the Advance Procurement Plan and compared with the dates PR&amp;C's are actually received.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To emphasize and facilitate the delivery of a complete Purchase Request and Commitment package to the U.S. Army Procurement Agency sufficiently in advance of the services or supplies are required. This allows the development of a satisfactory package, maximum competition is achieved and the selected contractor is allowed adequate mobilization time.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ammo Stockage, Vietnam:</strong></td>
<td>Ammo</td>
<td>Tons of Class V transferred, retrograded, and shipped. Tons of Class V received and issued. Objective is to manage Class V stocks between the safety level and the stockage objective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To purify and reduce Class V theater stocks by retrograding unserviceable and suspended stocks, transferring to ARVN, or shipping as directed to other commands stocks in long supply.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disposal:</strong></td>
<td>Services</td>
<td>Tonnage on hand compared with earlier time periods. Status of personnel and equipment on hand in comparison with those on hand prior to initiation to &quot;Disposal&quot; and with levels determined as essential to successful operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To isolate problem areas affecting the removal of scrap and salvage material from disposal yards; plan and execute actions to solve the problems; plan for anticipated changes in mission. Covers all existing and planned property disposal holding and sales activity in RVN.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ensure:</strong></td>
<td>USARV, G3</td>
<td>Number of items on Ensure Number of items added to Ensure. Number of items deleted from Ensure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A management technique used to expedite non-standard urgent requirements for equipment. Items not otherwise available are maintained by commanders to meet particular requirements of combat. The project is controlled by USARV, G3.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**PROJECT/PURPOSE/SCOPE**

**Plant:** To encourage increased planting and harvesting of fresh fruits and vegetables by Vietnamese farmers. This allays inflationary pressures by increasing the supply and lowering unit prices. Requires publicizing US Army offshore produce requirements so that parties whose mission is to directly stimulate or participate in the actual planning will be aware of market potential for various produce.

**Strip:** A USARV program to identify excesses, determine disposition and move excesses out of division units.

**System:** Various SOP's, "Operations", "Projects," and procedural and policy changes have been made to achieve combat support required. System is the overall review of these changes/procedures to determine if they should be adopted into the logistics system of the Department of Defense/Department of Army.

**Verify:** Application of the two-man rule. All elements of in verifying statistical information reported to higher headquarters to insure valid data at all levels to assist in the improving of supply discipline. This is a continuing project which must have command emphasis to insure accurate statistical information at all levels.

**525 Inspection/Training Team:** To study and recommend corrective action of deficiencies contributing to cargo diversion and larceny. A horizontal review of procedures which serves as an internal audit check and furthers the "two man check" concept of control and safeguarding US supplies and military property.

**PROPOINTER**

Procurement, Food, US Agricultural Mission within USAID CORDS.

**MANAGEMENT CRITERIA**

Number of vendors and locations added since inception of the program (1966). Quantities by items procured. Number of vendors and locations added since 1 Jan 69. Price levels for produce CY 69: CY 68 Fill performance for CY69: CY68.

**USARV**

All-Special Assistant to CG.

**525 Inspection/Training Team:** To study and recommend corrective action of deficiencies contributing to cargo diversion and larceny. A horizontal review of procedures which serves as an internal audit check and furthers the "two man check" concept of control and safeguarding US supplies and military property.
LESSONS LEARNED

1. Attached is an inclosure entitled, "Basic Logistics Consideration" which was submitted by the undersigned to General Besson in March at his request as Chairman of the Joint Logistic Review Board, Department of Defense. Contained therein is an analysis of those logistic functions which require change, those in which considerable progress had been made but which required further implementation to solve continuing problems and those indicating superior logistic performance here in Vietnam.

2. With the inclosure as the basic point of departure, I would like to add some additional lessons learned as a supplement.

a. MAINTENANCE (Part II C)

(1) In the last several months the 1st Logistical Command has begun to gain experience in the intensive management of major components of end items of equipment through a closed loop/direct exchange system within Vietnam down to and including the DSU level. By maintaining a component replacement float in accordance with replacement experience and then proceeding to replenish the float on a direct exchange basis, a serviceable or an unserviceable component, the number of serviceable components to sustain operational readiness is minimized effectively and the control of unserviceables back to the point of overhaul is greatly facilitated. Of course this takes close management and control but it must be recognized that these are highly essential and high dollar value items which require intensive management. I believe that this system must be extended to all intensive managed items whether it be because an item is critically short, critical because of high dollar value or critical because it is highly essential for combat operation.

(2) One of the greatest weaknesses at the current direct support level in Vietnam is the lack of expertise in tech supply. Where a unit has an especially competent NCO or WO assigned who knows and is interested in tech supply, this unit can be depended upon to have a highly effective supply support program. However, in most units the lack of this expertise results in an inefficient and very costly tech supply operation. A review of instruction advisory team reports within United States Army Vietnam will indicate the need for greater professionalism in this fundamental area of responsibility. I believe what is lacking is a highly qualified career program for WOs in the tech supply field. I believe this backup by viable
logistic NCO program to train the type of personnel required will maximize supply efficiency and greatly reduce the cost, paper constipation, and other problems attendant with logistics in the field.

(3) As indicated in Part II C of the attached paper, we are replacing components rather than repairing same in the field. One of the primary reasons for inefficiencies in this regard is the lack of skilled inspectors to perform initial and final inspection in our field maintenance units. The rate of replacement of engines and combat vehicles is an outstanding example of this problem. Continuation of this fault must be avoided through increased emphasis on the training of WOs and senior NCOs to insure effective initiation and final inspection.

(4) Preventive maintenance must be "learned and re-learned" in the combat zone. We are replacing many engines because of lack of changes of air and oil filters. Greatest stress has to be placed on formalized preventive maintenance training for all operators, NCOs and officers. This preventive maintenance training must be incorporated into all skill courses and emphasized as a major point in determining performance and result in recognition for promotion, etc.

b. ADP (Part II D)

With increasing receipts into the depot system and pressure for reducing order ship time, the automation of certain depot operations and stock control functions is essential. The Air Force FASTRAND system using UNIVAC 1050 equipment provides an example of what is needed in order to facilitate rapid pick up of receipts and immediate reconciliation of receipts with dues in from CONUS and dues out to customers. In order to accomplish this, we need SOPs in the depot tied in with an automated system of computers which have remote stations which, using random excess capability in the computers, can get the necessary directives pertaining to proper allocation of stocks. We are having to put far too many resources in attempting to get a difficult job done which could be far more easily performed with greater efficiency if we had the above-described type of standard system. Likewise, we must standardize our definitions for management data which is necessary in order to assure efficient management. For example, we use a term "demand satisfaction" across the entire Army in terms of logistic performance indicated, yet there are many and varied definitions of what this indicator really means. Here in Vietnam, using a certain definition, we could be honestly indicating an 85% demand satisfaction by counting partial fills as a "fill". Because of this type problem, the command has refused to provide a figure on
demand satisfaction for the last two months until a proper definition could be determined and management standards of performance set accordingly. This should be covered in a standard ADP system.

c. **QUICK REACTION TEAMS** (Part II K)

Experience in the last several months has indicated more than ever that as we improve in implementing the basic fundamentals of the logistic system the requirement for a more sophisticated professional know-how is even more essential in order to maintain the standards of progress reached. Thus, quick reaction teams to bolster any significant weakness which shows itself are essential. If such expertise is not immediately available to bulwark a command for a relatively short period of time, a command with the personnel turnover such as in Vietnam can find itself flat on its back even though much progress has just been made. Therefore, I feel doubly certain that the Army Materiel Command must be authorized quick reaction teams available for this purpose.

d. **SUPPLY COMMUNICATIONS** (Part II L)

The basic continuing problem in the logistic system is that of communicating through the use of catalogs, tech manuals, the Army Master Data File and technical instruction. The biggest single continuing problem in this regard is the "numbers" problem. A large part of this is due to lack of updated manuals. Much of the "garbage" in the system is due to the fact that we are using outdated manuals with a change system which is too complex in order to assure proper maintenance of the basic manual itself. The use of microfilm master file changes and the Recordak have made a big improvement but are not enough by themselves. There must be an automatic pinpoint distribution of catalog changes which will hit all points in the system simultaneously with a time and date which will indicate when the change will be implemented simultaneously.

Further, we must have the ability to identify repair parts with the end item in which it is used. Management of this item can never be really performed until this fundamental information is available to managers at all levels.

e. **SUPPLY**

(1) **Reconciliation.** A regulation should be printed at DA level covering the absolute essentiality of insuring a continuous program for maintaining inventory accuracy, elimination of fringe and slow moving
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items at and below field army levels and a monthly reconciliation of all
dues in and dues out between depot, DSU and PLL level. Status reporting
adds to the "paper constipation" and is not efficient in the field. We have
begun a monthly print-out from depot to DSU level. This should be a
mandatory requirement between all levels of supply in a field army.
Utilizing this monthly print-out, a monthly reconciliation between the two
supply levels concerned must be effected in order to keep the dues in/
dues out and demand data files clean. Effective utilization of this technique
will save millions of dollars within the logistic system. This backup by
a monthly update of the requisition objective will go far to lessen the cost
and inefficiencies in the supply system.

(2) Depot Operations Data. Invariably, when closing a supply
installation, much tonnage remains after the estimated tonnage figure has
been removed or drawn down. A large part of this problem stems from
lack of adequate weight and cube data in the catalog. Here in Vietnam,
where we are dealing with hundreds of thousands of short tons and items,
it is a continuous problem to maintain accurate inventory postures utilizing
short tons data which are essential in managing depot operations. There
must be a continuous maintenance of weight and cube data by the supply
source so that field installations can maintain these essential data
accurately.

(3) The Army has experimented with the universal type PLL and ASL
in the past. I believe the history over here proves that we need standard
procedures for determining PLL and ASL which will provide a basic
mandatory group of supplies with some parameters within which other
supplies would be maintained based upon high volume demand. The PLL
flexibility must be determined by the commander, advised by his support
unit who will maintain demand data and provide him prepunched PLL
cards for his requisitioning purposes. We should definitely be able to
maintain the basic portion of a PLL and ASL for a type unit on a universal,
preposition basis. The flexibility can be added to this universal PLL/ASL
based upon specific density, environment, etc.

f. POL PIPELINE

Much attention is being paid to maintenance of an efficient POL pipe-
line capability. However, experience in Vietnam indicates that pipeline
must be buried if 24-hour control of the route along which it is laid cannot
be maintained. This control includes both friendly as well as enemy
action. The pipeline has proven itself of inestimable value in local areas
such as Saigon, Long Binh and Phan Rang even though in the latter location

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enemy action has caused considerable trouble. The percent loss due to such action is below 3%. I also believe security rendered there could be better. The pipeline in I Corps, as constructed by the Seabees, was buried but here we used poor materials and with the construction of the road we had much damage to the buried pipe. The toughest situation, though, was using flexible pipe above ground from Qui Nhon to An Khe to Pleiku. We have experienced considerable loss rate due mostly to "friendly" action between Qui Nhon and An Khe. The loss rate was also high from An Khe to Pleiku but this was because of enemy action in almost all cases. However, continual review by top command at 1st Log and U.S. Army Vietnam has so far proven that it was still better to use the pipeline now that it is there than to attempt to use truck, partly because of the simple fact that we didn't have that many 5,000 gallon tankers and partially because of the fact that attractive targets would be presented by convoys which would end with some loss of life and equipment as well as POL products. The pipeline between Vung Ro Bay and Tuy Hoa also presented a problem because of enemy and friendly action. However, we have just completed a "burying program" covering certain portions of the Vung Ro Bay - Tuy Hoa and Qui Nhon - Pleiku lines. We have not had enough experience yet but it does appear that the loss rate is starting to go down.

Nevertheless, there should be a greater "state of the art" which would provide us a greater capability to recognize POL leaks due to friendly, enemy, or other action, more quickly and with a greater capability to control the resultant loss. "Real time" automatic reaction should take place so as to minimize the problem. Without this, future use of new pipeline under a Vietnam type environment would be highly questionable.

1 Incl as

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Submitted by:
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Commanding General
1st Logistical Command
U.S. Army, Vietnam

PART 1 - INDICATED LOGISTIC CHANGES REQUIRED

A. Organization. The logistic organization is overstructured and
too much imbalanced toward functionalization with too little weapons
systems/commodity orientation.

Beginning at the Department of the Army and progressing out toward
the theater of operation, consolidation/elimination of superstructure must
take place. DCSLOG and AMC, for example, are functionally duplicating
command management of logistics without specific weapons system/
commodity intelligence at either level. The commodity command within
AMC presents the current fundamental basis for the materiel management
required. Currently, it is the commodity command level which must
supply the logistic intelligence necessary for high-level decision such
as budget making and for low level decision such as determination of
requirements in the theater of operation. Study should determine what
echelons of command management can be eliminated or changed in order
to facilitate logistical support of a theater of operation such as Vietnam. The role of the intermediate headquarters such as the "so called" theater headquarters at USARPAC is questionable in time of war. At least it appears questionable that it should be in the direct chain of the logistic structure between the source of intelligence and materiel and the particular logistic echelon in the actual zone of combat operation.

B. Logistic Philosophy and Doctrine. Far too many resources are placed on the ground far too forward within the zone of combat operation without the capability of effective and efficient command management - this includes the proper staffing of sufficiently trained people as well as the placement of facilities and materiel for the storage, care and maintenance of such materiel. A philosophy, its doctrine and techniques for its implementation must be drawn up which will provide "real time" intelligence to allow timely decisions so as to provide the combat troops with just the right amount of supplies required at time which he needs to use or consume it.

C. Logistic Intelligence Structure. A standard management information system is required which will provide the commander and manager the information he requires in order to provide the command management required at each level to assure effective and efficient management. Today's system depends too much on the initiative of the
individual commander/manager. A good man does a good job regardless of tools available, a lesser man does a far lesser job because the tools for managing are dependent upon his initiative rather than being placed there by standard design.

D. Logistics Techniques. Logistics techniques must be designed and used in training so that when the U.S. Army goes into a field operation it will have trained personnel with standard SOPs, who know how to get the job done. One significant example is "inventory in motion rather than inventory on the ground" in Vietnam today. (Should be included in Part III as Superior Logistics Performance). Class III and Class V, because of limitations on secure storage areas, have been reduced to a safety level and a minimum stockage which prevents building up a more attractive enemy target and at the same time require greater intelligence and management of those commodities which are in transit to the theater. Conversely, on the other hand, rations, repair parts and other secondary items and construction materials have been pushed/or ordered into the theater in far too great amounts for adequate management and control. Inventory in motion must be an applied technique in all classes of supplies with the attendant increased logistic intelligence available through intransit data from supply manifest, real time communications and rapid transportation facility. Coupled with this must be a
maintenance system based on direct exchange/closed loop modular concepts, not forward area piece-part repair. This and elimination of secondary items not combat essential will provide a manageable scope of responsibility.

E. Logistic Sustaining Base. A logistic sustaining base of expert military and civilian personnel must be established and maintained at all times. The cost of doing so prior to a war pales into insignificance compared with the unrecorded cost of attempting to support a war with untrained personnel. One single greatest problem today in logistics in Vietnam is that of obtaining the proper skills at the proper levels required. It is only through the ingenuity and intelligence of the individual American that the job gets done satisfactorily - but at a cost in effectiveness and efficiency.

F. Logistic Facilities in the Combat Zone. In Korea and in Vietnam we have become accustomed to fighting a war with the enemy having little or no airpower. This has led us into the establishment of facilities which could not be depended upon against an enemy with the ability to strike from the air. This is clearly brought out when we consider what the enemy has done in Vietnam with the comparative few, highly inaccurate rockets and mortars. Much study is required to determine the answer to this problem of inexperience since World War II, and
maintaining effective logistical support while fighting an enemy with an air capability. The conditions covered in paragraph D above certainly relate to this problem.

G. Logistics Structure for Multi-Service Theater. A system must be designed which will provide logistical support through a single pipeline from a source of supply in CONUS to a theater of operation supplying all military services with, as a minimum, common items of supply. We cannot support a multi-pipeline system supplying the same item(s) to each service employed in a theater. Today the common item supply support system is a mere trickle compared to what it should be. Experience under the recently implemented PURA Vietnam and Project STOP/SEE indicates the need for a permanent solution to this problem. This also emphasizes the need for standardized ADP systems across the services. A technique such as FURM-PURA has been handicapped because of types of management intelligence systems used by participating agencies.

H. Physical Layout of Logistics Facilities. A review of field storage directives must be made in order to assure more effective base development planning and establishment of logistic facilities. This applies particularly to such hazardous storage which must be maintained on the ground at minimum levels such as Classes III and V. We have too many
examples in Vietnam where the layout of installations was more highly influenced by normal CONUS type advantages (such as physical barriers to prevent damage to inhabited areas or to gain the advantage of gravity flow) rather than the effect of providing the enemy with tactical advantages such as:

a. high ground overlooking Class V storage from which he could observe and plan his attack for the destruction of the installation,

b. a POL tank at the top of a hill which he can "BLOW" causing the entire installation at lower levels to go up in smoke through "gravity flow".

I. Early Logistic Organization In Combat Zone. Probably the greatest weakness that occurred in Vietnam (recognizing the improvements needed in our system and in its management) was the fact that supplies and equipment poured into Vietnam in the early months without the logistical tail competent to receive and properly handle the supplies and equipment which arrived.

The Army Materiel Command and the transportation activities did a terrific job in getting all kinds of supplies to the theater but the theater was not constituted logistically to handle it. We had entire depots such as Qui Nhon being established by unloading ships and putting everything they carried on the ground, wherever space could be found, but there
was no logistic structure to manage it nor was there a sustained training base (to provide the trained people) for the logistic structure had it been established in principle. Because of this we are, in March 1969, still feverishly striving to overcome the problems that accrue through the fallacy of attempting to fight a war without an appropriate logistic tail.

PART II - SPECIFIC LOGISTICS OPERATIONAL, PROCEDURAL, OR MATERIAL PROBLEM AREAS.

A. Determination of Resources Required. A commander/manager is unduly handicapped today in Vietnam because he is not provided adequate tools for measuring the capacity of logistic units/installations/contractors. Through a Resources Review Board and a Contract Performance Board of Review, the 1st Logistical Command has been attempting to find the answer to this question. Today it depends too much on the intuition of the commander concerned.

B. Control of Supply Pipeline and Stockage. Management expertise and effective utilization of ADP is lacking especially when employing a nonstandard ADP system. More often than not the ADP program provides what it wants to the manager rather than the manager getting from the ADP program what he requires to manage.

Reconciliation of requirements and control of assets are most difficult leading to many inefficiencies, overage of what is not needed
and zero balance of what is. The Red Ball system attempts fairly successfully to keep the nonoperational ready rates low, yet we stock and fill the pipeline with many noncombat essential and or seldom required items. Like Project "FILL" - see Pink Book attached as inclusion 3 to letter, the system and pipeline should contain only those highly repetitively required items and depend upon fast OST to take care of those not stocked. This is somewhat a repeat of the Modern Army Supply System (MASS) which was approached but never implemented in the late '50s.

C. Maintenance. The maintenance system is too unwieldy and requires too much in the way of skilled personnel and material resources too far forward. A modern maintenance system is required whereby module assemblies can be pushed forward to a lower skill level of maintenance personnel. Reducing the requirement for piece-part repair which today requires higher levels of skill than we actually can find in sufficient quantity. Thus today we replace many components contrary to our current philosophy when only a piece-part repair job is required if we had the part and the skill. Thus we are uneconomically forced into a maintenance operation for which we are not properly structured and we fail to make use of the expensive structure in the skills and materials that we try but fail to sustain.
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Maintenance intelligence reported through such systems as TAERS must be simplified through sampling techniques both in terms of required reports on specific items of equipment as well as required reports from certain units operating specific items of equipment. The determination of sampling required must vary depending on the life of the equipment involved and the type of unit employing same in specific kinds of environmental conditions.

D. Standardization of ADP. In Vietnam, this 3d Quarter, FY69, we are beginning to see the great value of a standardized ADPS (3SVN) but we still suffer because of inadequacy of knowledgeable programmers and operating personnel. This can only be solved through world-wide standardization for each common echelon of management and its appropriate training.

E. Financial Management. Until recently logistics management in Vietnam was completely devoid of any financial management tools. The Army has properly maintained that there is no place for fiscal limitations within the combat zone. Vietnam has not lessened the proof of the correctness of this position. However, we have found that at the wholesale logistical level in the theater, financial management tools are required as a means of better management. Progress is being made in this regard though we should have started the war with the tools we
are gaining now, not three years later. However, it must be emphasized that financial tools such as financial inventory accounting is very valuable. Financial controls such as the Army stock fund can impede operations in the combat zone as can be verified through operations of other services here. In other words, financial control cannot be tolerated in a combat zone, but financial intelligence can be used as a tool of command management at wholesale level.

F. Weapons System Management. It is essential to provide for the effective supply of the weapons system itself and the personnel necessary to operate and maintain the weapons system under combat environment. End item identification of supplies and personnel with the weapons system itself must be axiomatic. In reality the stovepipe systems have filled the void so necessary to accomplish this. The philosophy of weapons system management must be extended into our doctrine, our organizational structure, our training and our procedures.

G. Intensive Management. Supporting weapons system management is a requirement for intensive management of our more significant items of supply to include especially repair parts, components, and other secondary items. Those items which are highly essential in combat, or very expensive, or critical due to shortage, must be intensively managed throughout the logistic system to include supply management,
asset control, receipts and issues, storage and maintenance. It requires a maximum degree of asset control, on the ground, in transit, and in hands of troops — i.e., throughout the system.

H. Asset Control. We have not yet perfected an appropriate system of asset control covering both serviceable and unserviceable items. A real time system of authorizations does not exist, thus a reasonable reconciliation of assets on hand (because they are required in combat) and assets authorized cannot be made in Vietnam today. This applies to major items of equipment but it also applies to secondary items. With the greater expertise of managing standard ADP systems this problem, on a real time basis, will become more easily solved.

I. Retrograde. Up until recently "retrograde" in logistics was considered somewhat in the same psychology as a "retreat" in tactics. No one really wanted to approach the problem. The job is made more difficult through the lack of adequate inspection, lack of collection, classification and salvage facilities and personnel, lack of battlefield adequate recovery equipment and lack of property disposal equipment, facilities and personnel.

J. Civilian Personnel. Vietnam has been most fortunate in obtaining the services of qualified civilian personnel volunteers from the Army Materiel Command and other organizations normally employing
civilians. However, depending upon volunteers among the Department of the Army civilians is risky and ineffective in many cases. Thus we have received volunteers who, while in most cases, dedicated and industrious, are not sufficiently skilled in the jobs for which they are required in Vietnam. The model presented by the ammunition inspector career field wherein overseas tours are required must be carried into other civilian career fields.

K. CONUS Quick Reaction Teams. Vietnam has proven that particular expertise is required on occasion to take care of special problem areas. The U.S. Air Force has organized teams to go to the field for a short period of time to perform necessary cured of logistic problems in specific locations. AMC, without being authorized a strength to accomplish this, has performed exceptionally well in supporting the theater with trained personnel. However, an organization like AMC should be given the mission and the resources and the Army should be trained in the use of teams to accomplish specific short term corrective jobs.

L. Cataloging. We must have "real time" information on cataloging changes. We have made some real headway through the improved army management data file system (AMDF) and the use of such equipment as the microfilm reader at the DSU level. However, we must control
cataloging changes far more effectively and we must distribute these changes to all levels of support on a real time basis. Of course, like almost all these comments, if we can reduce the number of items we stock and use in the forward areas this becomes a far simpler management problem and solution.

M. Level of Packaging for Field Army Use. Where a level "A" packing has been utilized, the condition of supplies and equipment contained therein has been protected in spite of the climatic environment. As a result the theater has been able to exist over here even though care and preservation program has been in a low priority. Without this protective packaging the loss due to poor condition of supplies and materiel would have been very great.

N. Materials for Base Development Programs and its Maintenance. The Engineer base development program in Vietnam, must certainly be classed as outstanding (assuming that the standard of facilities and equipment is that appropriate to a combat zone). However, we have massed at one time in Vietnam far too many thousands of tons of construction supplies to meet requirements of the construction program. It has been pushed/requisitioned in terms of complete programs or to cover R & U requirements covering many months ahead. Thus the logistic system has become bogged down with supplies far greater than
the immediate requirement necessitated. (A good example of this is the fact that we at one time had over two years' supply of M8A1 matting - this equaled approximately 180,000 short tons that were stored in our three major depots). This unnecessarily increases security requirements. The combat zone is not the place to store equipment and supplies that are not essential for any greater length of time than that required under an acceptable OST to maintain supplies as required. (This likewise applies to paper products and other bulk items which must be made available to theater in accordance with consumption requirements rather than bulk loading out of CONUS to be unnecessarily stored and secured in the theater).

PART III - SUPERIOR LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE. (NOTE: There are many superior logistic performances accomplished in Vietnam - many are linked with conditions covered in Parts I and II - the following are among those exceptional performances from which greater lessons for improvement can be drawn for future use).

A. Closed Loop System. While not perfect the closed loop system, especially covering combat vehicles and artillery, has proven of tremendous value. It is an outstanding example of a management technique employing intensive management, weapons system management
intransit controls and, as close as currently possible, "real time" communications and reporting.

D. **Red Ball System.** The use of fast transportation coupled with the technique mentioned in the previous item has contributed immeasurably to the outstanding operational readiness rates in Vietnam. This should be extended as indicated in paragraph B, Part II.

C. **Direct Exchange of Reparable Components.** Where direct exchange in the theater has been tied in with the closed loop system, the highest efficiency in the use of material has resulted. The T53 Engine asset control system inaugurated in 1967 exemplifies an outstanding model of this technique. This should be extended to cover major items and critical components, whether they be critical because of cost, because of combat essentiality, or because of insufficient quantities available.

D. **Stop/See.** Among the many techniques proven through outstanding performance was the cancellation/frustration of supplies not required, even though previously ordered/pushed. The project brings out what the system can do even though primed on an impromptu basis. Stop/See was the first wholesale effort to stop a pipeline of supply in the midst of a combat environment. Though slow in initiation, the results have been remarkable because of the cooperation and
coordination of all echelons of the system. However, it is more difficult than it should be because of the ineffective system of reconciliation, cancellation and frustration of requisitions/materiel in the "order-ship pipeline". In other words, Stop/See succeeded almost in spite of the system which is too unwieldly to facilitate such a procedural requirement.

E. Class V and Class III Control. As mentioned earlier in paragraph D, Part I, the management of these two commodities, partially brought about by necessity, has established a remarkable record of performance. As a result of this experience it has been proven that control of inventory in motion can be used effectively to replace stockage on the ground, at least that part of the stockage above the safety level which can be managed through "inventory in motion". This technique exemplifies the complete integration required between supply, maintenance and transportation functions over logistics.

F. People. In spite of lack of training, lack of facilities and lack of procedures, a remarkable job of logistical support has been done. Support of combat forces in Vietnam through people who were determined that the job would be done, no matter the difficulty. This is the basic logistic resources, namely people, from which we can draw the greatest lessons learned because there are outstanding examples of individuals who initiated actions which should be studied in order that they could be adopted as a part of a more effective system.
G. **Productive Capacity.** It would be remiss to forget that the remarkable record of logistical support to the combat soldier in Vietnam is based primarily upon the productive effort of our country in supplying materiel and supplies even in a "butter and bullets" economy. Effective review of logistics experience in support of Vietnam will provide great lessons to be learned so that in future combat this outstanding logistic support will be able to be rendered in the full sense of the term, "logistics economy of force in combat".

H. **Containerization.** The progress in containerization is one of the outstanding accomplishments of the logistic system in support of Vietnam. Beginning with the use of RO/RO and Sealand vans down to and including the containers which provide frozen ice cream to the troops in forward areas. Combining this containerization with "inventory in motion" so as to provide the user with just what he needs in the condition and in the amounts required will greatly alleviate current command management problems pertaining to the security, care and preservation, loss through stealing, inventory management, etc.
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EXIT INTERVIEW WITH MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPH M. HEISER, JR.
COMMANDING GENERAL, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND

This interview will be considered FOUO and any change in classification brought about by the interview will be so noted at the end of the interview. This exit interview with Major General Joseph M. Heiser, Jr., Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, is being conducted on 7 August 1969 by Major Howard C. Jacobson, Command Historian, in the office of the Commanding General. General Heiser was assigned as Commanding General from 2 August 1960 to the present, and is leaving the command for an assignment as DCSLOG DA. This interview will cover significant events, accomplishments, observations and problem areas experienced by General Heiser in the Command during his tenure as Commanding General.
Q. Are there any restrictions that you would wish to put on this tape at this time? I will ask you this question at the end of the tape as well.

A. No, I don't know of any restriction at this time, we may get into classification and also we may get into sensitive material and if we do, then at the end of the tape we'll so indicate.

Q. At the time you assumed command of the 1st Log Command, what guidance did you receive?

A. When I assumed command I came to this job from my previous job as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, Headquarters, DA. In this latter position I had been responsible at that level of supervision for most of the logistic operations in South Vietnam as well as other parts of the Army. Upon my departure from the US, the Secretary of Army, the Chief of Staff, General Johnson, the Vice Chief of Staff, General Haines, all in talking to me had really indicated one specific objective in my taking over command of the 1st Log Command. That objective was to get the logistic system working efficiently and effectively in Vietnam, reducing to the extent practicable the cost of supporting Vietnam without reducing the combat support required for the soldiers there. There was no attempt made to indicate to me the specific things that I should do but based upon my previous assignment I knew pretty well that we had to draw down what stocks we could, we had to move out what stocks were not needed, we had to shorten order time, we had to better utilize our maintenance capability, we had to be sure we didn't overdo air transportation where it was not necessary, we had to consolidate and economize on all transportation, both sea and air, coming from CONUS and within country, so that our budget could represent exactly what was needed to support the combat soldier, no more no less.

Q. What were the most pressing problems which confronted you at the start of your tour as CG and what steps did you take to solve these problems?

A. The single most pressing problem was the fact that we had a rapid personnel turnover rate based upon a one year short tour, the fact that we did not have a sustained logistic base in CONUS and that we had a greatly reduced training base for logistic MOSs in Europe so that our first job here was to provide guidance and motivate people to become more expert in their various assignments. Simultaneously we had to determine what the problems were in each of our functional areas and be sure that the men involved knew what these problems were. Then having recognized the problems we had to devise ways and means of solving them as expeditiously as practicable. Due to the normal environment of a combat zone there were many areas in which we needed to make progress in increased efficiency and effectiveness. For example, we needed to clean up our stock record accounts, we needed to make a 100% inventory, we needed to pick up receipts more rapidly, we needed to do rewarehousing in order that we could locate the stocks we had. We needed to establish a more effective maintenance plan, we needed to set up such things as challenges of supplies that were being shipped both into Vietnam from CONUS, as well as from base areas.
in RVN to forward areas. We needed to improve our security of logistics installations and activities. These are but a few quick examples of the kind of problems needing solving. As a result we devised a means of putting together special projects such as STOP/SEE, etc., that can be found in what is popularly called the "Pink Book". These projects were given a self-explanatory name and these were disseminated throughout the command in order to be used as a media of getting across to the commanders and their men what problems were being emphasized by the commander and the techniques within which we were going to accomplish them. There was really not a great deal of innovation in the procedures covered by these projects. It was simply a way of emphasizing procedures that had been standardized in the past but which had not been fully recognized due to the lack of trained and experienced background of many of the troops here in Vietnam. Thus, all we were doing was saying, "let's follow standard operating procedures", and the outlines of these procedures were contained in the projects involved in the Pink Book.

Q. The US Military Forces had to adjust and sometimes greatly change their basic concepts of waging combat in the Vietnam counterinsurgency environment to include the means of command and control. Could you discuss some of these changes and problems as they relate to logistical support?

A. Well, in the first place, this theater was not a theater in depth. Rather it was a theater which was made up of four logistical islands in support of combat units in the various corps areas throughout Vietnam. There was generally one main supply route by which logistic troops supported the combat troops. Generally, in I, II, and IV Corps areas the main supply routes ran from east to west. In the Delta in IV Corps many of the supply routes were waterborne. In I Corps the main supply route actually ran from south to north and in some few cases it actually ran from north to south. Because of the fact that these logistic islands did not exist and because of the fact that lines of communication between the logistic islands were either not available due to enemy action or limited in use due to the necessity for aerial transportation, an organizational structure was designed that placed four support commands in Vietnam, one in each of the logistic island areas. These four support commands were headed up originally by a general officer who was provided the mission of carrying out the full responsibilities of the Commanding General, 1st Log Command in the area for which each support command commander was responsible. Thus, each support command actually became a small 1st Log Command covering the logistic responsibilities of the 1st Log Command in his area of responsibility. Accordingly, the principal job at the Headquarters, 1st Log Command, was to coordinate these support commands as required into an integrated logistic system within country. This involved the establishment and supervision of an Inventory Control Center. It involved the coordination of integrated transportation requirements. It involved the establishment of standard operating procedures so that even though each logistic island support command was a separate entity we would be following the SAME procedures so that we would be standard throughout the entire command. This included such things as command management.
information data and other tools and techniques required for command management at the 1st Log Command level. This organizational structure has worked well, however, it did highlight the essential necessity of being sure that all four commands were given the philosophy, the principles, the techniques to be followed, all to be singing off one sheet of music and then to supervise so that all reached a level of satisfactory performance required within the combat zone.

Q. You have stated in the past that the distinction between combat, combat support, and combat service support troops in Vietnam is not nearly so great as it has been in the past. Could you elaborate on this as it related to this command?

A. In my experience in previous wars, the logistic soldier was generally regarded as a rear area soldier. As a result there was generally not too much of a rapport, not too much esprit de corps between the combat soldier and the logistic soldier. Over here in Vietnam this is completely changed. In the first place because of the very organization within Vietnam we find that in many cases the 1st Log Command soldier is actually forward of a large part of the combat division. Further, due to enemy ability to interdict highways, etc., the transportation troops that drive the trucks, that man the boats, etc., in carrying supplies forward are in many ways enduring greater hazards than some combat soldiers are likely to do on a sustained basis. The truckers of the 64th QM Battalion hauling POL to a place like Quan Loi can expect that day by day he will be shot at by the enemy, he will be ambushed, etc. His chances of day to day contact with the enemy are as great as many of the soldiers in an infantry division. As a result of this, we have I think, the greatest rapport between the logistic soldier and the combat soldier that has ever been experienced in the US Army and, perhaps, any other Army. There is no rear area soldier, as such. Because of this, more than ever before, the man in logistics has to be first, a soldier, in the full sense of the word, and yet at the same time he has to know his MOS so that he can do his logistics job. I think this is one of the greatest lessons that we must learn out of this war in Vietnam.

Q. What do you see as the role of the Comptroller in the combat theater?

A. I think this Vietnam war has begun something that must be recognized from now on in any war. And that is that the resources of our country must be husbanded in such a way that we are as efficient and as economical as we can be without interfering with the combat support of the soldier that is actually required. This highlights the mission of the Comptroller in the combat zone. While we may not need many financial controls in the combat zone, I think it is fair to say that at a summarization level, the dollar sign on inventories, etc., can be most useful in our command management practices. So the Comptroller is the office that would have to provide this kind of financial management information. In addition, inevitably, we must determine in the combat zone what our requirements are and this somewhere along the line must be translated into budget figures. The
Comptroller is the only man in the combat zone who should be involved in this. Finally, perhaps more than anything else, the Comptroller must provide not only the financial management expertise, but of even greater importance, he must provide the management know-how to assist the commander in assuring efficient management.

Q. What improvements do you feel should be made with respect to the management system employed by the 1st Log Command?

A. Of course, we could spend days and weeks on an answer to this question. I think, in order to make best use of both my time and the listeners who would have a definite interest in this answer, I would like to refer anyone interested to my Estimate of the Logistical Situation which is being prepared as my debrief as I leave this command position. Also attached thereto is a copy of lessons learned, and basic logistic considerations which I have submitted to General Besson for consideration of the Logistic Review Board at the DOD level. I believe that anyone interested would do better to take a look at these documents and select from such documents the areas wherein they may have a specific interest.

Q. What do you consider has been your most important management tool, aside from personal visits to the areas of operations?

A. Logistic intelligence made available through the command management information system which has been established using both age old criteria as well as those innovations necessary, particularly covering those command emphasized projects that have been mentioned before.

Q. Do you consider the present 1st Log Command organization the optimum for accomplishing the assigned mission? If not, what changes should be made?

A. I believe those that designed the current organization prior to my arrival have done a very fine job. I think it has answered the problem. I would not change the command organizational structure. I do think, however, that we have a perennial question concerning all logistic command structures having to do with the separation of, for example, supply and maintenance. At each staff level I believe we have difficulty by a separation of these two functions. I believe that further consideration must be given to establishing one of the key staff positions to combine supply and maintenance into what might be named the Assistant Chief of Staff for Materiel. In addition, I think that supply, maintenance and inventory control centers need to have a basic organizational structure that at the top level would be functional but, below that functional level it must be broken into weapons system management/commodity areas. I think this should then be carried right on down into the depots and into the GSU and DSU levels. We must maintain an ability to manage by weapons system and to identify training, people, repair parts, philosophy, etc., with the end item that must be maintained in the hands of combat troops.
Q. Do you think that the Medical, Signal, Aviation and Special Forces logistics could be improved by consolidating these functions under the 1st Log Command?

A. First, in principle, I think that we cannot afford to have more than one pipeline into a theater especially where this pipeline is of great length both in geography and in time and where this pipeline is subject to enemy action. However, that does not mean that under the present environment the 1st Log Command should take over the Medical, Signal, Aviation and Special Forces logistics. In fact, under the environment that existed in Vietnam, there were so many problems attendant with each of these specific areas that I think it was a wise decision to eliminate these special commodity areas from the 1st Log Command responsibility. I do believe in the future that there should be a review of this, however, to determine whether in the future there should not be, in other possible danger zones, a consolidation of these functions which are in reality the same, but which have only the peculiarity of the weapon system or commodity area of each. After all, within the 1st Log Command today we have different weapons systems, different end items, different commodities, different material categories, each with their own peculiarities. If we are well formed, well managed, well trained, then it would appear to me that the most efficient system would be the melding of all logistic functions into the one logistical command in this theater. Again I repeat, however, that under the circumstances found under the current and previous environment in the US Army Vietnam, I believe that it was wise to have the current separation and based upon what I know of the future I would not at this time recommend change during our period here.

Q. What is your philosophy behind managing by projects. Is this a new concept in the 1st Log Command?

A. I don't think it's a new concept in the 1st Log Command. In reality the use of projects was only a technique developed by me in order to quickly get the word down to the people who had to do the job what I considered those essential things that must be done. Then having established this understanding it provided us a way of charting the course, setting standards, and then determining what our performance was against such standards. It was really a management technique I don't think there was anything new to it. Of course, within some of the projects we perhaps did have some innovations in procedures or philosophy. For example, we certainly have pushed in our projects the philosophy of "Inventory In Motion". Projects such as FLOW, SUPPLY MANIFEST, CHALLENGE, etc., all play a part in this overall philosophy.

Q. To what degree does the organization of the 1st Log Command conform to the TASTA 70 concept?

A. I believe that the organization of the 1st Log Command conforms very closely to the TASTA 70 concept except that we are spread out horizontally across the theater rather than in depth as would normally be expected and
found in a continental land mass. I do believe, however, that we have somewhat a combination of TASTA 70 and its counterpart of a FASCOM in the field Army. Here in the 1st Log Command I compare the situation to a field Army and the FASCOM with the exception of three large depots. I believe our three large depots at Cam Ranh Bay, Long Binh and Qui Nhon are more representative of the type of wholesale depot that one would find in a TASCOM. On the other hand, we have deliberately kept the Da Nang Depot at a level that corresponds to a field Army depot. This I think is the primary consideration in regard to your question. In summary I think we have a combination of a FASCOM/TASCOM kind of mission here which may be peculiar to the Vietnam environment.

Q. Did the civilianization have any detrimental effect upon the flexibility of logistical support operations?

A. The civilianization program did have a detrimental effect on flexibility of logistical support operations as did our contractor program. Because of lack of the appropriate logistic tail, we went into civilianization and contract operation. Then, certain high level decisions required that we go into civilianization even more, replacing military strength and units. If this were a peacetime situation, this would be okay. But when we replaced military units with civilians, we reduced our ability to perform our job in forward areas. In base areas it was not too bad, especially, once we got local national civilians properly trained. In the long run this will be of great assistance to the government and the economy of Vietnam. In the short run, however, we could not move civilians into various locations such as forward areas, whereas we could do this with military units which had been replaced. Further, with the increased emphasis by the enemy on attempting to damage American strength through attacks on logistic installations and activities rather than headon assault with our US combat units, security of our logistic installation and activities became more important than ever before in the US Army. Our ability to secure these installations was certainly somewhat lessened by the fact that we had a reduced military capability in our logistic installations and units.

Q. Did the MTOE standardization program have any detrimental effects upon the flexibility of logistical support operations? What were the benefits?

A. I am a little at a loss to answer this question because I don't think we've ever reached the MTOE standardization program objectives that may have been originally intended. In the first place, the MTOE program works so slowly that we do not have MTOEs in time to do the job for which they were designed. By the time we get an approved MTOE the mission has already changed and we already wished we hadn't put the MTOE in months ago that is now approved for the operation. If we had a quick Real Time MTOE standardization program, there would be innumerable benefits beginning from what I mentioned earlier. We would have an organization that would be standard across the various functional and mission areas and having a standard organization we could then expect to follow standard
operating procedures and better run our business using people who were trained in such a standard organization and on such standard operating procedures.

Q. The Army has many contracts in Vietnam to assist in getting its job done. Do you feel that the scope and number of such contracts is at a desirable level or should they be increased or decreased with a view toward obtaining maximum efficiency with minimum cost?

A. I believe we have too much contractor effort. Most of these contracts are cost plus fixed fee contracts. The salaries paid to contractor personnel are high. The contractor has employed civilians, local nationals, third country and Americans. There is an inflexibility present as indicated in the civilianization program earlier, because with a contractor you do not have the flexibility that you have with a military unit. In the earlier days of the Vietnam conflict, contractors were hired to do certain jobs with the idea that they would be experts in the business in which they obtained the contract and that the Army, with less than the required logistic tail, could concentrate on doing the part of the job in which military were available. It was assumed that the contractor could be depended upon to provide efficient management in the area in which his contract covered. I think history has proven that this is not the case. In fact, to the contrary, most of the contractors came in and hired untrained people. They did not always have competent managers here at top levels of their contract management. And, in reality, until the military command took over close supervision of the contractor's operation, it was definitely less than efficient and therefore, more costly to the US Government. That does not condemn all contracts, but in the Vietnam environment there were more in this category than were not.

Q. In view of the large amount of training that 1st Log Command has had to do in-country to qualify personnel to do their jobs, what is your solution to the lack of an adequate CONUS training base in such areas as depot operations, stock control procedures, automatic data processing and similar areas?

A. The only solution is to get the adequate CONUS training base required, backed up by such other areas where military units are employed such as in the European Theater. We must, with the help of commands such as the Army Materiel Command, place military personnel in jobs that are required to be performed in the combat area. And they must do these jobs based upon standard operating procedures using the same type of equipment, so that when they go into a theater they will not be going into a new job. They will be going into one to which they are fully accustomed. A good example occurred last week when I visited Cam Ranh Bay Air Force Base. There I was taken through their ADP system. I met a sergeant and a major who had been there less than a week, yet they were fully cognizant of all management reports and all procedures and all equipment. They had been on the same job at another base in the States. There was no mystery, there was no orientation, all they had to do was get used to the weather.
Everything else was the same.

Q. Do you think the inadequacy of the CONUS training base for military personnel is the reason that we have had to rely so heavily upon civilian contractor personnel in areas such as stevedoring, port operations, office machine repair, etc?

A. Not necessarily. While it certainly contributed to it, I think the main reason we had to rely so heavily on civilian contractors here in Vietnam was due to the fact that the logistic tail just was not provided. I am not cognizant of what went on in the decisions which failed to provide the appropriate logistic tail early enough in this campaign. However, of course, part of the reason could have been that the logistic tail was just not available to the Army. If that were part of the reason, then, yes, the lack of a CONUS training base would certainly have contributed thereto. However, I am not sure that this was the reason. I think it was because of the number of troops authorized to be placed in Vietnam it was decided that they had to have more combat troops and that they would not have the proportionate amount of logistic troops but that they would make up for this through the use of contract performance.

Q. In a different type war than this one, do you think that civilian contract support will work or do you feel that we should have our own trained military capability?

A. As we become more sophisticated and as our materiel becomes more complex it appears to me that there will be a limited need for certain civilians who are especially expertise in handling and maintaining equipment which because of the length of time and experience it takes we may not have sufficient military know-how to handle this particular kind of thing. However, I think this will be in the minority. It better be, because we have to fight wars in the combat zone with military personnel and not civilians. The civilian experts should be limited to those required to do special maintenance on low density, highly complex, equipment or as technical advisors to the military.

Q. What has been the effect of the 1st Log Command's "Know Your Man" Program and what success was achieved towards the stated objective of the program to look out for the welfare of this command's personnel thereby increasing mission effectiveness and making each individual person a better person for his service in this command?

A. It is difficult to estimate the effect of the "Know Your Man" Program. There are such indications as higher morale, lowered numbers of disciplinary problems, a greater esprit de corps. For example, the 1st Log Command Association has been formed. This began in April, we now have over 30,000 members. I think this is a definite indication of morale, esprit de corps, etc., and I believe a large part of this is because of the fact that there is a recognition throughout the command that we are trying to assure that every American in this command who comes to Vietnam
leaves here a better American and with the satisfaction of having done his duty for his country.

Q. In the early days of the buildup, 1st Log Command was receiving supplies at a greater rate than it could pick-up and put in the appropriate records. One result was the thousands of gray boxes that were later retrograded unopened. In your opinion what have we learned that may help us to avoid such a situation in the future?

A. There are many things that I think we have learned. I will only be able to mention a few. First of all, we must have proper catalogues. We must know what our current demand data are in support of certain kinds of equipment. We must have real logistic intelligence which indicates to us what exactly a unit will need in order to operate properly in the combat zone. We did not know this at the beginning of this war. Thus, we went to catalogues that had been long ago outdated and to the best ability of the entire Army Materiel Command we shipped all kinds of stocks over here to assure that the combat soldier would not go wanting for anything. Because of this, we had far too many items in stock but which could not be recognized because they were not on the record. And if we did have them on the record, they would have been in the way because at least sixty-six to seventy-five percent of all the items shipped over here were not really needed in the combat zone. Further, I think we should have learned by now that having plenty does not necessarily guarantee that the combat soldier will have what he needs. The saying attributed to General Forrest of the Confederate Army which goes something like "Who gets there firstest with the mostest will win the battle" is no longer pertinent in my opinion. It's not who gets there firstest with the mostest, it's who gets there first with exactly what he needs, no more, no less.

Q. During your period of command you have continually asked for information which resulted in the establishment of Project FLOW and Project IMI. Do you feel that the requirement for such data is unique to Vietnam or might such ideas be equally applicable to our current logistical operations in Europe, and other areas and in future wars?

A. I feel very strongly with regard to this question. In my logistic career I have been continuously hampered by not knowing what materiel was due in or arriving. There is nothing unique about this to Vietnam. The transportation function is an essential part of an integrated logistic system. We must know what items are in the transportation cycle. We can not be satisfied with such nomenclature as "general cargo". We have made much progress in recent months because of the projects named and others and through the cooperation of key personnel involved in transportation throughout the system. Because of this progress we are now able to put some real meaning into the philosophy "Inventory In Motion". As a result we do not have to have as much stock on the ground. We don't have to maintain it. We don't have to secure it. As an example, it makes a far less attractive target in this war to have less ammunition.
on the ground but to know exactly what rounds are enroute. Further, in
the last analysis, if we know what items are stored where, on what trans-
portation media, we can count this as stock on hand based upon the time
involved in getting it where we need it on time. We don't have to go
through the burdensome job of putting too much on the ground, then losing
it and having the difficult management job of finding it, picking it up
on the records and maintaining the proper accounting. In the last analysis
we will save much in efficiency, effectiveness and budgets by reducing
stockage all over the US Army and simply managing that which is necessary
to be transported to the place where it is needed on time.

Q. Through necessity, 1st Log Command's transportation truck units have had
to provide enroute protection far beyond the level envisioned by the
drafters of the current TOEs and doctrinal publications. The hardened
gun truck concept degrades 1st Log capability by almost two truck com-
panies daily. The V-100 commando cars are not authorized for truck units
although some are in use by Military Police units. The truck unit re-
quirement for gun trucks has not, therefore, materially lessened. Sir,
would you comment on the concept of the logistical element being tasked
for this level of enroute protection? How might our doctrine be rewritten
to clarify roles and mission in this area? Should TOEs be adjusted
accordingly?

A. Of course, the degree of protection required depends upon the enemy capa-
bility and desire to interdict our main supply routes. If such enemy
interdiction is at a high level then it appears to me that a transporta-
tion unit will never be self-sufficient in its ability to defend itself
but must depend upon combat units in the area to afford protection both
directly and indirectly within an area of operation. This is similar to
the environment here in most of Vietnam. However, I believe that whether
the enemy ability to interdict is of a high or a lower degree, there
should be a capability within transportation units to provide some internal
defense and security measures. I, therefore, believe that every transpor-
tation TOE should have a capability afforded by the V-100s or some other
type armored car which can protect the rest of the convoy and the materiel
being carried to the combat soldier. With the availability of V-100
armored cars in a transportation unit, if the degree of enemy interdiction
is low then the transportation unit can take care of itself. If the
degree is high, such as some roads here in Vietnam, then they will have
to be protected by combat units with combat equipment. The V-100 armored
car will still be of very great use in moving into the fire zone and pro-
tecting by fire the convoy as it passes through, because the one secret
of success I think we've learned here when ambushed, etc., is that we must
cover the convoy with fire in such a way that the convoy does not stop.
Once a convoy is stopped, we have considerable trouble. We lose lives
and we lose equipment and materiel

Q. The Cat Lai/Cogido ammunition system has presented many problems during
and before you tenure as 1st Log Command Commanding General. Would you
comment on some of the improvements made of the system during your tenure
and how this type of system should be handled in the future conflict?
CONRADINT

A. First of all, ammunition loading has improved in CONUS. This makes loading easier. Secondly, we're getting more advanced information on exactly what is aboard the ships that must be unloaded. Thirdly, we have gotten better facilities and our procedures have been refined. Finally, with improved command management, we have found alternatives that will provide us a capability of continuing an operation no matter what local problems may occur. This combination of factors has resulted in an improved situation.

Q. Would you express your thoughts on the present Army marine craft fleet—First, from the standpoint of the present employment of the fleet in logistics mission support. Secondly, would you comment on the need for replacement craft in the system to replace old equipment?

A. In Vietnam the Marine craft are essential. For example, we must operate the ports. In addition, we have to place heavy reliance on intracostal transportation. Thirdly, we must have marine craft in order to operate in the Delta utilizing the rivers and canals as the main supply routes. So the availability of marine craft was absolutely essential. A big difficulty was the fact that most of this equipment was over age and, therefore, this made it most difficult to maintain in operation. Secondly, it was difficult to obtain the overhaul of this equipment as it become essential to do so. We lost too much equipment by having to transport it to such places as the Philippines, Taiwan, etc., to have it overhauled. The equipment itself was obsolete. For example, we have tugs with engines which are no longer in production anywhere in the world. We have to go to all types of expedients to keep these tugs running. I believe the Army has to make a decision. Are we going to depend upon Army marine craft or are we going to be able to assure ourselves that we can get contractor craft to do the job? Contractor craft may not be applicable in all aspects of the situation. For example, I believe we could depend perhaps on contractor tugs to operate in the port area. The same goes for barges. However, I don't believe that we can depend entirely upon contractors to provide us with the LCU, the LCM, and the other boat facilities necessary in order to go to forward areas which happen to be along the shoreline. Once such basic decisions are made then I believe it is essential that we maintain an up-to-date fleet so that when it is needed it is ready just like all other equipment needed to defend our country.

Q. For a considerable length of time now, 1st Log Command has experienced much difficulty in expeditiously discharging and turning around CONUS loaded reefer ships. The main constraint seems to be a lack of adequate refrigerated warehouse space and depot reception capability. Would you comment on what has been done to improve the warehouse posture and what should be done in future conflicts to improve the delivery of reefer products? Do Army-owned containers with plug-in power packs offer a solution to this problem in future conflicts?

A. First, I think we have to consider what kind of food will be consumed in future conflicts. Here in Vietnam, because of the nature of the war, we
have considerable fresh food most of which requires refrigeration. I am not sure that we can support this kind of food in a combat zone of the future. However, if we can, then we must provide the refrigeration and the power needed for that refrigeration. Here in Vietnam this grew like topsy. We had the food, we didn't have the reefers, and we didn't have the power necessary to support such reefers. We have just about arrived now, about three years too late, with sufficient capacity to handle the food required for today's 28 day menu. The Army-owned containers with plug-in power packs do offer a solution to the problem if we are to be faced with the same logistic responsibilities in terms of refrigerated food. I honestly do not believe that we can afford the kind of food and the refrigeration and power that goes with it in all types of conflicts of the future. I am sure at least, that the Army must face up to this problem and if we are to use fresh food and if it requires refrigeration then we must be sure that we provide for it sufficiently in time so that we can meet requirements. The use of reefer ships to store food is certainly not the best answer.

Q. What is your opinion of TAERS in Vietnam? Do you feel that the system is responsive to the needs of a combat situation? Should TAERS be modified to a situation such as Vietnam? What changes would you recommend in TAERS for Vietnam in particular and world-wide in general?

A. I believe the Army has recognized that TAERS, as such, is too cumbersome. The objectives of TAERS are still necessary of attainment. The question is do we have to go to the large volume of data to be filled out by so many soldiers? I believe that the current studies within the Army will lead to the solution. I believe that we can use a scientific sampling technique to achieve the results required. I do not believe that we should continue to maintain, or try to maintain, the volume of data and reports that are now involved in the TAERS system. I do not believe that this is necessary, to the contrary, I believe it is unnecessary. I think we should concentrate on getting the information we need concerning the operational aspects of equipment in the field through a reduced sampling technique.

Q. In an effort to increase the capability and independence of ARVN units, especially in the area of logistics, what do you think of a program similar to the Korean Augmentation to the US Army (KATUSA)? Could such a program be undertaken by Ist Log Command to supplement the MACV effort?

A. The answer to this is an emphatic yes! We have proposed what we call the BUDDY Project over eight months ago in order to assist in the training of the ARVN in its logistical mission. Implementation of this can be accomplished within the Ist Log Command and will result in the same success that came out of the KATUSA type training operation.

Q. Do you feel that the performance of the Self Service Supply Center (SSSC) has been more effective than requisitioning of these items from the system?
A. There is one basic fault in today's operation that pertains both to the Self Service Supply Store and to the requisitioning of items from the system. This is lack of control. We need, as is contained in a project in the Pink Book, a real supply edit system which requires that the requisitioner justify why he requisitions an item. Now, in particular, in the self service operation, control is essential because there are too many attractive items, like items in a dime store, where if the customer is free to go in and take whatever he wants in whatever quantity, you can be sure that he is going to take more than he needs. This inevitably results in an increased demand which has not been provided for and which results in what is occurring today, too many zero balances. When a man who needs a few items goes in to look for some, there are none there because the guy before him has generally taken too many. We need to establish controls. We are in the process of establishing these in Vietnam now.

Q. Has the cleaning of the battlefield operation involving PDO been worthwhile as it has been accomplished during the Vietnam war?

A. The answer to this is an emphatic yes! The PDO operation here in Vietnam has been keeping up with the war itself. We have a comparatively clean battlefield and since the beginning of this calendar year we have started a sales program which has kept ahead of the accumulation both of scrap and reusable products.

Q. For future planning what are your recommendations regarding supply of common items to all military forces in a given theater of operations?

A. I do not believe that the US can afford more than one pipeline of common items. That does not mean that I think that any one service should necessarily support all other services. I believe that the service which has the predominant requirement for a common item should supply that common item to all services in a particular geographical location such as here in Vietnam. Today, in Vietnam, we have as many as 23 separate pipelines with many common items in most of the 23. I do not believe that we can afford such a system.

Q. What basically led you to the inventory in motion concept of Class V resupply? Should this concept become standard doctrine for Class V support?

A. Anyone who could have seen the chaos that existed in our inventories here on the ground in Vietnam would know that we had to find an alternative to piling so much on the ground. I have said earlier in this discussion that we had to know more of what was required before we filled a combat zone up with stock. However, knowing what is required still doesn't mean that we have to put large amounts of stockage on the ground. If we do, we inevitably make it most difficult to keep track of what's there and we provide more attractive targets for the enemy. Inventory in motion will allow us to put less on the ground because we know what is enroute and how long it will
take to get there. Now, of course, there are some of those who do not like the inventory in motion idea because it requires much greater management expertise. These people say, "Well, we can't control schedules of ships because of acts of God, such as storms, we can have our ships sunk." That is true. But we can provide for this both in time and in quantity. We have to become experts in management and the more expert in management, the better we can accommodate such acts of God, or acts of the enemy and still utilize inventory in motion to the greatest practicable extent. It certainly should be standard doctrine for Class V support and I believe it extends into other classes such as Class III. In fact, in the case of Class III we have a great example here in Vietnam wherein we transport twice as much in each month as we store in-country. This transportation actually represents inventory in motion. The stock in our storage tanks is really more a safety level than anything else. The more we can combine inventory in motion with direct delivery based upon our logistic intelligence knowing what the combat soldier needs, where and when and then managing our resources to get it to him in time in just the right quantity, the greater will be our degree of efficiency and effectiveness in the combat soldier.

Q. Organization for ammunition support in Vietnam did not follow organizational guidelines of the COSTAR doctrine. Do you feel that the ammunition brigade for Army-wide service should be retained or deleted? Is the COSTAR organization suitable for a Vietnam type conflict with no clearly defined battle lines and rear areas?

A. If I had been asked this question before my tour here in Vietnam, I would have said that the ammunition brigade was essential. However, my experience here in Vietnam indicates that under the environment here an ammunition brigade would have been ineffective. It would have been impossible for an ammunition brigade to have supervised properly all the ammunition battalions and ammunition depots in Vietnam. The organization of the support command commander with his ammunition battalion is certainly much better fitted to the current combat environment. However, with a field army echeloned in depth and with a somewhat integrated main supply route or line of communication I believe the situation would be sufficiently different so that an ammunition brigade could work effectively. Before I reply without a stutter, I would like to see the ammunition brigade CP's in order to determine, now that I have this experience behind me, what is the value of the ammunition brigade in a field army on a continental mass.

Q. Real estate for logistical support activities and particularly Class V is still an imposing problem today. Do you feel that a contributing cause to this problem was inadequate planning for logistical bases at the beginning of the conflict? Further, do you foresee plans of sufficient depth that would allow for acquisition of these logistical sites prior to opening the logistical pipeline?
A. This is a difficult area to talk about. In the first place, it seems inevitable that our country based upon national policy will not preplan a preventive war. Therefore, we have to assume that we’re not going to have a ready-made base development plan in every area of operation. If we do not then we can expect that we’re going to have problems in terms of establishing logistic installations. Such has occurred here in Vietnam. I think the planning that was done in the early days of this war has resulted in enabling us, here today, to do a far better job because I think that wise decisions were made. However, the enemy and combat environment always affects such things. Here in Vietnam, real estate was certainly limited upon which we could place such land eating operations as ammunition depots. The same applies to POL storage areas and pipelines. I believe the only thing we can do in the future is to learn from lessons here and in previous wars and establish procedures, and philosophies and doctrines which will tend to avoid the problems that we face here. For example, an ammunition depot should not be placed at the foothills of a mountain if we do not know that we will be able to control that mountain. If the enemy controls it, we can be sure that we’re going to lose that ammunition depot. We should not, in a POL tank farm, think that because we place tanks on the side of mountains that we will be better off because of the gravity flow. If the enemy controls the high ground, the enemy can certainly destroy the storage tank. If we cannot be sure that we’re going to control the highway then we cannot afford to put a flexible POL pipeline above ground along that highway. These are practical problems. These have to be foreseen and then we take the appropriate action in order to provide the logistical support required. I believe in Thailand today we have probably laid down the best base development planning and operation that the US Army has ever been engaged in. We did have a fairly good base development program in the LOC across France. The one in France is gone. The one in Thailand exists but whether we will ever find a need for using it, that is another question. If we do and it’s within an environment wherein it supports the operations required, we are indeed fortunate. However, there is no guarantee that this will be so.

Q. In determination of ammunition requirements, do you foresee requirements data based upon consumption rather than weapons densities as accurate density data has been a problem area? If requirements were based upon consumption, what risks do you foresee?

A. I don’t believe that we can base our ammunition requirements on consumption alone, because this could be entirely misleading. We do know that there are definitely perimeters within which ammunition can be assumed and that depends on densities of tubes in artillery, for example. I believe we will have to continue to base ammunition requirements on consumption and weapons densities. Then I believe that we will have to so regulate the pipeline so that we will adjust the ammunition coming through the pipe just as we adjust water going through a pipeline in a home or a factory. We must be prepared to have a production line which will fill the pipeline and we must likewise be prepared to establish a control at
the far end which will allow the ammunition in the pipeline to hit the combat theater in accordance with the requirement which is based partially on weapons density adjusted by recent consumption factors and further adjusted by forecast levels of combat intensity. Requirements based purely on consumption will inevitably result in ammunition being unavailable when needed because of unforeseen increased intensity.

Q. There have been separate services ammo pipelines into Vietnam. Do you foresee ammunition as a commodity destined for single DOD management?

A. I don't necessarily foresee it as a single DOD management. I do believe, like in other commodities, where more than one service uses common ammunition there should only be one pipeline. This pipeline should be run effectively and, therefore, would result in the most efficient ammunition supply available.

Q. During your command you established a Resources Review Board and a Contract Performance Review Board. What would be your estimate of the overall savings to the operations through the elimination of requirements by actions of the first board and through better contract performance by actions of the second board?

A. I'd like to reply to this question in the reverse order from which it was put. Because contractor performance was reviewed and supervised, we got more efficient and effective performance. This, therefore, in reality reduced our resources requirements. With this as a base, the Resources Review Board then could take a look to determine what contracts and what contract resources were further required. I don't have any specific dollar figures in terms of savings. I know we have specific dollar figures, this can be figured by the Comptroller. But I do feel, without question, that we have increased the effectiveness and efficiency of contract operations either through elimination of a contract or by increased efficiency in a contract which has, therefore, led to somewhere between 30 and 50 percent increased efficiency depending upon the specific contract. Of course, where we eliminated a complete contract, which we did in many cases, this actually took care of that 100 percent.

Q. You often hear people say things like these computers cause more problems than they solve or we should get rid of the computers and start all over manually. These statements are presumably made in jest. However, the command has had its share of computer problems. So I wonder how you feel about the real need for computers in the lst Log Command? In other words, do we really need computers?

A. To be honest, I've said such things as this myself. However, they must be in jest or in ignorance because we must use the best tools available to help us get the job done. There is no question but what computers are not only useful, but also essential, in certain management operations. This is particularly true in supply management wherein we must manage literally hundreds of thousands of items with many complex computations.
required in order to have what we need, where we need it, on time. Our biggest problem is lack of expertise in using this comparatively new and sophisticated management tool. We have invariably allowed a computer man to decide what will be provided the commander. This, of course, is the wrong end of the stick. The commander and manager must tell the ADP man what he requires to manage and how the computers should determine what the answers are. This is where we have made our big mistake. In addition, lacking know-how, we have made the grievous error of not standardizing our computer procedures and hardware and software. We have allowed all the non-experts in the Army to devise their own programs. As a result, we have a difficult job. We have nonstandard programs with untrained people and we're trying to get the job done, worldwide, covering the same functions. The only answer is to get a standard program with standard procedures which we train people so that no matter where assigned they can get the job done. I think the Air Force has done a great job in this regard in their 1050 Computer System at all their bases throughout the world. Of course, the System of the Air Force is now somewhat behind the times and they must come up with procedures covering the third and fourth generation of ADP equipment. We in the Army must learn from the Air Force and then adapt it to the better equipment now hitting the market.

Q. The 3S system is a standard system which is strictly controlled. Do you favor controlled standard systems? Do you think they deprive the commander of prerogatives of command?

A. I have just indicated that we need standard systems, otherwise we won't have any system at all. I do not believe that this deprives the commander of prerogatives of command. I don't think the commander will be deprived of his right to make decisions. I believe a standard system provides him with the necessary management data and intelligence within which he can make proper decisions. If he doesn't get intelligence from a standard system, then I do not believe that commanders and staffs can be sufficiently trained to really know what proper decisions to make because they will really not know how good the intelligence is that is provided them. In fact, today, I have difficulty determining what is our supply performance in terms of demand satisfaction. Why? Because I'm not sure what these nonstandard computer programs are giving me in terms of logistic intelligence pertinent to this necessary management intelligence.

Q. As you are well aware, under current Army doctrine Military Police support in a theater of operations is organized on an area support concept with some elements placed in direct support of certain commands. This concept poses difficulties to logistical activities in the area of physical security. The Army of the future will require security elements organic to logistical commands for security of installations and facilities, depots, ports and pipelines. From your command experience, what will the DA accept as justification to support a request for such security forces to be made organic to a logistical command and to its subordinate elements?
CONFIDENTIAL

A. This, of course, is a perennial question. Every commander wants to be self-sufficient. As part of this self-sufficiency he would like Military Police forces under his command and subject to his authority. However, in doing so the integrated MP service is well nigh impracticable. Experience here in Vietnam has indicated to me that a commander, such as myself, can get satisfactory MP support through coordination with the MP Brigade and its commander. Further, the way it is working here in Vietnam, for all intents and purposes, my subordinate commands have a counterpart in the MP Brigade, generally the MP Group or Battalion. For all intents and purposes, the MP commander is his Provost Marshal and does provide him with the MP support required. If he needs more, he can get more from the MP Brigade commander. I really don't think that this is quite as serious a problem as it sometimes may appear. Especially if the commanders and their staffs are working closely with the MP Brigade and its lower echelons. I feel that this job can get done through the current type organization and perhaps from the Commander-in-Chief of the forces in the theater. I believe he can justify more effective utilization through an integrated Provost Marshal system such as the MP Brigade reporting to the commander of the US Army Forces rather than splitting them up amongst all commands.

Q. What progress has been made from the point of combat security in conducting convoy operations?

A. We have learned plenty. We have learned such lessons as the fact that a convoy cannot stop in a fire zone or it is in real trouble. We have learned that we have to keep march serials down to a certain size with certain type protection for each march serial. We have learned the necessity for communications throughout the march serials and throughout the convoy itself. We have learned to tie together aerial cover and combat security on the ground. We have learned to vary the timing of our convoys so that we do not make it easy for the enemy. We know that we must prevent the enemy cover close alongside roads so that he will find it difficult to surprise a convoy coming along the road. When a convoy is hit, we have learned that we must quickly bring fire to bear at the point of the enemy attack so that we can make him keep his head down and in the meantime the convoy can go by. We have learned especially that the drivers must be highly trained and motivated to recognize that at a time of enemy attack, convoy discipline is essential to the well being of every individual in the convoy. These and other innumerable lessons have been learned and, as a result of this, the enemy has found it more difficult to do the damage that he thought he could do. As a result of this, we have many instances wherein we have not lost men, equipment and materiel and yet the enemy has taken such serious losses as losing half a battalion in a battalion attack.

Q. What progress has been made in the defense of logistical facilities against enemy attack?
A. We have improved locally, through better training of sentries, through better use of communications, through better use of barrier materials, through training logistic troops to be better soldiers so that they can put out ambush patrols. We have learned to better use lighting for night protection. We have also made better use of passive measures such as storing ammunition and POL in such a way as to provide a less attractive target. However, we must still spend too much of the logistic soldier's time in doing sentry duty and yet we cannot expect the combat units will be employed full-time in protecting logistic facilities. We need to make better use of such techniques as sentry dogs and other security measures. However, I believe that we have not made progress like we should in providing electronic and other measures that will take the place of employment of soldiers as sentries. It would seem to me that we must design some other techniques which will provide a security system which will alert a reserve force in time to offset any enemy attempt to attack a logistic installation.

Q. What solutions do you envision for the security of pipelines against enemy action, theft and pilferage?

A. In the first place, I think we should think long and hard before we run a pipeline through territory that we know is subject to enemy interdiction to a high degree. Unless we are sure that we have full control of the countryside to include friendlies who might be tempted to steal, I do not believe that a flexible pipeline above ground is the practical solution. I believe that we must bury steel pipe. Further, I believe that our control measures on the flow of POL through the pipeline must be improved. I do not believe that we can afford to have a leak whether it be done deliberately by an enemy or friend or through failure of the pipe and its jewelry. I believe when pressure drops there must be some automatic way of shutting off the flow so as to conserve the POL in the pipe. I believe considerable attention must be given to improving the use of pipelines in order that the loss rate we presently are experiencing can be greatly reduced. Otherwise, I'm afraid the use of the pipeline under current conditions in Vietnam is not the answer.

Q. How can we improve communications in terms of the command information program with the man in the lower ranks?

A. This is a perennial problem. As the man in the legend on John Paul Jones' ship said, "some people never get the word." This continues to be a most significant problem, especially in a large command. It is most difficult to get the word passed from a commander down to the man at the lowest echelon who has to carry out the guidance provided. We have attempted to use various techniques in the 1st Log Command in order to quickly overcome this communications problem. We have prepared Major Actions Charts and LOCC Notes which have been distributed immediately to all levels of command. In order to short circuit the necessary chain of passing down, sequentially, from one level of command and staff to another. To some extent, this has worked well. But, in the last analysis,
we've got to get the word to the first line supervisor who then must get it to the man who has to get the job done. There is no one answer to this problem. I think we have to employ all the known techniques and we have to use our initiative and imagination to improve on those that have been used in the past. Again, we need standard operating procedures. We need officer calls, we need NCO calls, we need formations at which troops will recognize that they are essential in order that they can understand the signals by which our team will play the game. Just like in a football game, we still have the huddle. Many teams used to attempt to use signals alone, but they have discovered that signals alone won't do the job. It's too hard to remember the signals. It's too complex in order to determine what each man should do on each play as a result of signals provided before the game starts. The huddle is still the best way to get integrated action on the part of a football team. We need huddles, figuratively and physically, in order to overcome the communications problems in the Army. Any techniques which will provide this huddle capability will do the job for us.

Q. What security classification do you want assigned to this taped interview, sir?

A. Most of it is in the area of Official Use Only. However, there are several portions which should be classified Confidential. Since we can't mark it paragraph by paragraph on the tape, I, therefore, believe it must be classified Confidential.

This completes my answers to specific questions that have been provided. Of course, this tape does not contain, by any manner or means, all the lessons learned here in Vietnam. This has been a great opportunity, over here, not only to do good for the combat soldier in Vietnam, but also to learn, sometimes once again, the lessons necessary in order to be sure that we provide the best defense in the future at the lowest cost to America in terms of consumption of resources. I have prepared an estimate of the current logistics situation here in Vietnam to be distributed to those appropriate, including my successor. In addition, I have already contributed Basic Logistic Considerations to General Besson's Board as I earlier indicated. Within the next several days, I intend to more specifically dictate what I would call lessons learned. I hope that these would be attached to the estimate of the situation. Between these various media I hope to have provided the best information I can which will be helpful to those who come behind me here in Vietnam and to those who are attempting to improve our doctrine and our procedures and our techniques in the future.

Before closing I would just like to make one more statement. Discussions by me contained on this tape have been deliberately pointed to an honest appraisal of problem areas. It would be completely wrong for someone who listens to this tape to form a judgement that logistical support in Vietnam was very poor. Because of certain difficulties in the beginning,
Army personnel have been working hard and successfully to improve the logistics support provided the combat soldier in Vietnam. It is a matter of fact that no combat soldier has suffered from lack of appropriate logistical support. This is from the very beginning of this operation. I believe it can be truthfully said that at the present moment due to the work that has been done prior to this time the combat soldier here in Vietnam today is enjoying the highest level of logistic support ever provided by any Army at any time. I am sure that based upon lessons learned and based upon the progress made so far that logistic support will be continued at even higher standards and at lesser cost due to increased efficiency.
COMMANDER'S LETTER 7-2

4 July 1969

SUBJECT: 1st Log Command/USARPAC Review of 3SVN

1. Representatives of this headquarters will meet in the near future with representatives of USARV and USARPAC to review the status of 3SVN and develop recommendations for ways in which the system can be improved. The enclosed memorandum was prepared to provide our representatives with necessary guidance and to advise the representatives of the other participating headquarters of our position with respect to 3SVN. The memorandum is furnished to you for your information. It stresses certain aspects of 3SVN and the controls which must be exercised at all levels to insure the realization of the goal of system standardization embodied in Project SAME I.

2. I call to your attention the fact that there have been in effect since we introduced 3SVN as our system, adequate regulations and instructions to provide the necessary controls. Accordingly, the attached memorandum merely serves to reiterate my determination that the 3SVN system will be a disciplined one since we cannot operate properly otherwise.

I incl

as

M. HEISER, JR.
Major General, USA
Commanding

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through the use of the Cam Ranh Bay program as the prototype of any system changes, modifications, testing, debugging, etc. The other Depots and the interrelationship between the Depots and ICC should therefore be accomplished through assuring compatibility with the Cam Ranh Bay program. In other words, the standard model will be the program at Cam Ranh Bay and all other programs will get in line with it.

c. Due to exigencies of the service there have been instances wherein action has been taken within country at Depots and/or the ICC to correct problems or to make what were considered insignificant modifications of programs. This is partially due to systems design which, when implemented, did not provide the expected results partially because of the dynamics of supply management and command management requirements which necessitated quick answers. This has led to some idiosyncrasies in the various programs found in the Depots and the ICC today.

d. As indicated earlier in the implementation of 3SVN, the installation of the 3SVN system has led to considerable progress in supply performance as can be noted in demand satisfaction being achieved today which is certainly partially due to the improved ADP system. However, whether it be because the 3SVN is too sophisticated or whether it be that incremental, and of themselves insignificant, changes have been made, the current status requires sufficient expertise to determine the cause of current problems and to devise and implement corrective actions to make the current system more efficient, effective and timely. This is not to be interpreted that a major remodeling of the system is required at all. It is the position of the 1st Log Comd that this would be entirely improper. As a result of the USARPAC team's last visit, requested by this HQ in early spring, it was agreed that the problems involved could be solved without too much difficulty and in a relatively timely fashion. Some headway has been made but additional headway is required, particularly in cleansing our systems in the computers so that our productive capability in handling supply transactions can be expedited ASAP. For example, we have reduced the cycle time in each of our Depots but the cycle time at Long Binh is still too long. We are in the process of reducing cycle time at the ICC but here too we are still taking too much time to meet current requirements. Thus, we need the combined USARPAC/1st Log Comd team effort to correct the problem ASAP in
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: 1st Log Command/USARPAC Review of 3SVN

1. Key personnel of 1st Log Command have performed a management review of an estimate of the situation of where we stand in our implementation of 3SVN. As a result of this review, the following conclusions have been reached:

   a. Having arrived at a point in time where we can now observe the results of the implementation of the system at the Depot and ICC level, we believe that considerable progress has been made. There does not appear to be any need for a change of objectives and philosophy of command management involved which can be primarily summed up in the fact that we want a standard system at all Depots compatible with that of the ICC and to the extent practicable the ICC and Depot programs should be standard, in line with the 3SVN system. To achieve this, we have put in and strengthened our controls and disseminated this to all concerned.

   b. The 1st Log Command has depended upon Central Design Agency (CDA) of USARPAC to provide us systems design and to provide the capability by the implementation of such systems into the ADP of 1st Log Comd. This dependence must continue because 1st Log Comd has not attempted to establish a systems design agency of its own nor would that be appropriate in the light of the objective of standardization. Therefore, 1st Log Comd will continue to depend on CDA for this systems service. Recognizing this, we support the coordination of CSC contract unless USARPAC can provide this service without such contract. (It is suggested that consideration be given to the establishment of a USARPAC CDA Liaison Officer on the ground to facilitate coordination required.) It has been concluded as a result of the 1st Log Comd management review that future standardization at the Depot level will be facilitated greatly.

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order to achieve the minimum objectives of the command which are:
A daily production cycle at each depot; a minimum of three production cycles a week and a high priority cycle in the interim at the ICC.

e. With the arrival of the 360/50 (which could have been used much earlier) we are approaching the machine time necessary to do the job in terms of machine capability within Vietnam. Now we have to make the most economical use of what we have. There is a question of whether additional machine time is required, especially at the Long Binh Depot. This also is a problem which should be resolved jointly by the USARPAC/1st Log Comd team effort.

f. Commanders have adhered to a management philosophy of decentralized accountability and the maintenance of stock control at the Depots in Vietnam in order to assure timely combat support. This is, if the Depot had it and knew it and the combat soldier needed it, he could get it without time consuming reference to some other echelon. The progress made to date would allow reconsideration of this command management decision. However, the timeliness of any change in such a significant management concept at this time is subject to question not only because of the current national policy environment but also because of the current ADP environment pertaining to third generation equipment.

2. In view of the above, it is recommended that the meeting due to be held between USARPAC, USARV and 1st Log Comd concentrate its efforts on the above-stated situation and come up with a time-phased plan for arriving at the solutions required. Having arrived at such solutions, we should simultaneously come up with agreed upon procedures within the controls already established in order that any required changes will be approved only at the command levels appropriate prior to any systems changes being authorized. It would be expected that program design, implementation and maintenance will be accomplished by and under the control of the CDA or its representatives.

JOE M. HEISER, JR.
Major General, USA
Commanding

CF:
G4, USARV
Compt, USARV
G4, USARPAC
SUBJECT: BRIEFING FOR ARMY POLICY COUNCIL

REFERENCE YOUR WDC 12519 AND YOUR WDC 12062

1. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT YOUR BRIEFING ON RETROGRADE TO THE ARMY POLICY COUNCIL SHOULD BE MODIFIED TO SHOW WHERE WE WERE LAST FALL COMPARED TO WHERE WE ARE NOW IN TERMS OF OUR STOCKAGE ANALYSIS WHICH CAN BE FOUND IN THE CONFIDENTIAL PORTION OF OUR R&A (PAGE 3-1).

2. A COMPARISON OF SEPTEMBER 1968 COMPARED TO JUNE SHOWS: (LESS BULK POL)

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<th></th>
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<tr>
<td>OBJECTIVE TONS</td>
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<td>SEP 68</td>
<td>907 THS</td>
<td>1407 THS</td>
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<td>JUN 69</td>
<td>788 THS</td>
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NOTE: THE ABOVE REDUCTION IS BASED UPON A COMPARISON OF STOCKAGE IN SEPTEMBER COMPARED WITH THAT OF JUNE. NOT RECOGNIZED ARE THE INCREASED TONNAGES FOUND BY COUNT 1 AND COUNT 11 INVENTORY WHICH IN REALITY INCREASED EVEN MORE THE TONNAGE DRAWN DOWN AND/OR RETROGRADED.

FROM THE ABOVE IT CAN BE SEEN THAT:

A. WE HAVE REDUCED STOCK ON HAND BY OVER 600 THOUSAND TONS AND BY OVER $1 BILLION. (INVENTORY ADJUSTMENTS ADDED TO SPECIFIC DATA ABOVE WILL TAKE "OVER" THIS)
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B. THAT WE HAVE REDUCED OUR STOCKAGE OBJECTIVE BY 120 THOUSAND TONS.

C. THAT TOTAL STOCKS ON HAND ARE BARELY ABOVE THE STOCKAGE OBJECTIVE AND YET CERTAIN PROJECTS STOCKS SUCH AS CLASS IV MCA ARE NOT INCLUDED THEREIN (S/O).

D. OF COURSE, THERE ARE SOME IMBALANCES IN THESE FIGURES SUCH AS THE FACT THAT WE HAVE APPROXIMATELY 30 THOUSAND TONS UNDER THE CLASS V STOCKAGE OBJECTIVE IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR INVENTORY IN MOTION MANAGEMENT LEVEL. WE SHOULD REACH A SIMILAR MANAGEMENT LEVEL IN ALL OUR CLASSES IF WE HAD A PERFECTLY BALANCED SITUATION. WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO GET INTO SUCH A POSTURE. OF COURSE, WE SHOW AN APPROXIMATE 50 THOUSAND TONS OVER STOCKAGE OBJECTIVE IN CLASS IV BUT THIS TO SOME EXTENT IS DUE TO MCA PROJECTS STOCKS INCLUDED IN STOCKS ON HAND.

E. NOTE THAT THE STOCKAGE OBJECTIVE AND STOCKS ON HAND IN CLASS II AND IX IN JUNE ARE THE SAME, NAMELY 230 THOUSAND SHORT TONS.

3. THE ABOVE ANALYSIS PRESENTS OUR CURRENT SUPPLY MANAGEMENT/DEPOT OPERATION ENVIRONMENT. AS CAN BE SEEN, EXCEPT FOR IMBALANCES, WE ARE CLOSE TO THE STOCKAGE OBJECTIVES. THE DAYS ARE PAST WHEREIN WE COULD EASILY SELECT BULK TONNAGES FOR RETROGRADE. NOW WE MUST CLOSELY REVIEW ALMOST ALL RO'S, INVENTORY BALANCES, ETC., BEFORE RETROGRADING ANY STOCKS. WHILE WE WILL NEVER BE COMPLETELY CLEAN, THROUGH PROJECT CLEAN/STRIP WE HAVE RETROGRADED MUCH OF THE UNCLASSIFIED/UNIDENTIFIED STOCKS IN CONEXES, ETC., WHICH HAD BEEN PICKED UP IN BASE AND FORWARD AREAS. THERE WILL STILL BE SOME CONTINUING AMOUNT OF THIS TONNAGE FOR MOVEMENT TO OKINAWA TO BE IDENTIFIED AND CLASSIFIED. HOWEVER, IT WILL GRADUALLY REDUCE AND WILL CONSIST MOSTLY OF THAT WHICH IS BEING ACCUMULATED FROM DAY TO DAY. OF COURSE, AS UNITS ARE REDEPLOYED FROM VIET-
NAM, A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF THIS TYPE RETROGRADE CAN ALSO BE EXPECTED TO ACCUMULATE MORE THAN WOULD NORMALLY BE THE CASE.

4. WE HAVE JUST COMPLETED AN EXCESS RUN WHICH IS UNDER REVIEW AND WILL BE TRANSMITTED TO THE DEPOTS FOR MOVEMENT OUT OF COUNTRY BY 15 AUGUST. PRIOR TO MANAGEMENT REVIEW, THIS RETROGRADED EXCESS RUN SHOWED 70 THOUSAND LINES WITH EXCESS ON HAND AMOUNTING TO APPROXIMATELY $200 MILLION. MANAGEMENT REVIEW MAY CHANGE SOME OF THESE FIGURES. JUNE-JULY EXPERIENCE INDICATES THAT MANY OF THE FSN'S RETROGRADED WEIGHTED OUT AT LESS THAN ONE HALF TON A PIECE. THIS MEANS THAT MANY LINES MUST BE PICKED, PACKED, AND SHIPPED TO ACCUMULATE MUCH TONNAGE EVEN THOUGH CONSIDERABLE DOLLARS MAY BE INVOLVED.

5. IT IS WITHIN THE ABOVE THAT THE ARMY POLICY COUNCIL SHOULD RECOGNIZE THE FOLLOWING ANSWERS TO YOUR SPECIFIC REQUESTS. THEY MUST RECOGNIZE THAT GOALS ESTABLISHED WERE DESIGNATED BY ME WHICH WERE DELIBERATELY SET BEYOND THE ATTAINMENT REASONABLY EXPECTED SO THAT WE WOULD PRESSURE OURSELVES INTO DOING MORE THAN WE REASONABLY THOUGHT WE COULD. THAT IS WHY THE FIGURES ON PERFORMANCE AGAINST FORECAST SHOW THE DIFFERENCES INVOLVED. IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED THAT WE HAVE GOT TO PUT FIRST PRIORITY ON COMBAT CUSTOMER SUPPORT INCLUDING REDUCTION OF OST, PICKING UP RECEIPTS, MAKING CUSTOMER SHIPMENTS AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS PRACTICABLE, ETC. THIS DURING A TIME WHEN WE HAVE BEEN RECEIVING MORE INDIVIDUAL SHIPMENTS AND ISSUING MORE SHIPMENTS TO OUT CUSTOMERS WITH A RESULTING DECREASE IN BACK ORDERS WHICH HAVE BEEN ON RECORD FOR SOME TIME.

6. SIMULTANEOUSLY, WE HAVE UPDATED OUR REQUISITION OBJECTIVES, WE HAVE COMPLETED OUR COUNT 11 INVENTORY AND WE HAVE INAUGURATED PROJECT MOVE/SEE WHICH WILL ACT AS A DOUBLE CHECK TO ASSURE THAT WE DO NOT HAVE
UNNEEDED STOCKS ON THE GROUND. THE MOVE/SEE PROJECT, IN SUBSTANCE, REQUIRES THAT STORAGE PERSONNEL IN DEPOTS WILL PLACE STICKERS WITH QUESTION MARKS ON ALL SUPPLIES WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN "MOVING" AS FAR AS THE STORAGE MAN KNOWS. A MOVE/SEE TEAM COMPOSED OF ICG, SUPPLY AND TRANSPORTATION PERSONNEL THEN follows up on the question marks to determine why these items have not been moving and if they have not been moving why should they be retained in stock. This, as you can see, is somewhat a concept of our continuing stop/see. We began this last month and it is beginning to pay dividends as a double check on our normal assessing procedures. Further, we now have an inventory accuracy across the command of 90 percent plus. The move/see technique will help us insure inventory inaccuracies do not end up being excesses that should have been retrograded.

7. Further, in order that our reports on short tons do not deceive, we have started a specific review and analysis of our short tons reported in depot operating reports to insure that the tonnage actually reports the same total as do our asset balance file. As you know, depot tonnages began with a base figure some time in the past; the receipts were added and shipments were subtracted based upon the dynamics involved since the base figure was established.

We want to assure that today's balances report what is really there on the ground in terms of short tons. So don't be surprised at any changes which may occur as a result of this analysis. Further, as we consolidate/close our areas, I am sure that we will note a significant increase in field returns which are not on depot books at the present time. This must be recognized as a normal happening in the future and we must adjust our actions accordingly.
8. I BELIEVE AS PART OF OUR TOTAL JOB OVER HERE THE ARMY POLICY COUNCIL SHOULD RECOGNIZE THE PROGRESS MADE IN REDUCING OUR PDO TONNAGES. WE HAD 90,400 S/TONS IN SEPTEMBER LAST YEAR. WE ARE NOW DOWN TO 46,300 S/TONS IN SEPTEMBER LAST YEAR. WE ARE NOW DOWN TO 46,300 S/TONS ON HAND WHICH JOVERS THE ACTUAL SALE AND MOVEMENT OF 166,300 S/TONS SINCE LAST FALL.

9. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, THE FOLLOWING IS SUBMITTED AS PER YOUR REQUEST:

   A. THE DOLLAR VALUE OF EXCESS TRANSFERRED WITHIN VIETNAM HASDECLINED SUBSTANTIALLY DURING THE LAST QUARTER OF FY 69. OUR PROJECT PURA-V, WHICH IS DESIGNED FOR THIS PURPOSE, ENJOYED GREAT ACTIVITY THROUGH THE THIRD QUARTER OF THE FISCAL YEAR. HOWEVER, ALTHOUGH OVER $6.3 MILLION WAS OFFERED DURING MAY AND JUNE, ACTUAL TRANSFERS WERE VERY LOW. YOU HAVE THE FIGURES THROUGH APRIL. FOR MAY THE STATISTICS SHOW NO TRANSFERS TO US FORCES, FWF’S OR AID, HOWEVER, $337,682.21 IN EXCESS TRANSFERS WERE MADE TO ARVN. IN JUNE, $1,491.76 IN EXCESS WAS TRANSFERRED TO US FORCES AND $15,987.85 TRANSFERRED TO ARVN, WHILE NO TRANSFERS WERE MADE TO FWF’S OR AID.

   B. CLASS V SUPPORT TO ARVN WAS AS FOLLOWS. THESE FIGURES ARE NOT NECESSARILY EXCESS, HOWEVER. THIS COMMAND WILL ISSUE AMMUNITION TO ARVN BELOW THE EXCESS LEVEL AS LONG AS THE ISSUE WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT SUPPORT TO US ARMY UNITS.

   May $ 2,003,966.43
   June $ 1,869,436.69

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E. The dollar value of excess stocks on hand as of 30 July 1969 is currently being computed and analyzed and will be forwarded to you in the financial inventory report being transmitted from here on or about 15 August.

10. With regard to retrograde of unserviceables, note that this to showed a decline in July. This results from the fact that we have shipped out most of the items available in this category up through

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JUNE TO INCLUDE MANY CLOSED LOOP ITEMS WHICH WE SHIPPED OUT AHEAD OF PROGRAM. FURTHER, THE BATTLEFIELD IS RELATIVELY CLEAN AS NEVER BEFORE.

AS YOU KNOW, IN THE CASE OF THE M113A1'S WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO RESUME RETROGRADE OF HIGH MILEAGE VEHICLES UNTIL NEXT MONTH DUE TO COMBAT LOSSES IN THE PAST.

11. OUR CLASS V IS IN A VERY FAVORABLE POSITION AS FAR AS RETROGRADE IS CONCERNED, EXCEPT WE ARE RECEIVING NOW SOME FIELD RETURNS WHICH REQUIRE REPACKAGING AND MANY REQUIRE RETROGRADE.

12. IN ADDITION, WE STILL HAVE SOME OPERATING PROBLEMS TO SOLVE SUCH AS OFFERING OUR RETROGRADE TONNAGE EARLY ENOUGH TO OBTAIN BOOKINGS, EXPEDITING BOOKINGS, AND THE MANY OTHER PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN A MAJOR RETROGRADE EFFORT AT THE SAME TIME WE ARE ENGAGED IN COMBAT SUPPORT. HOWEVER, I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT THIS THEATER WILL CONTINUE TO GIVE MAXIMUM COMMAND EMPHASIS ON GETTING STOCKS OUT OF HERE THAT ARE NOT NEEDED. FURTHER, WE ARE WATCHING CHANGING STRENGTHS, DENSITIES, AND CONSUMPTION TO ASSURE THAT OUR SUPPLY CONTROL STUDIES ARE BASED UPON THE VERY LATEST INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE. WE HAVE JUST MET WITH BILL DURRENBERGER AND JACK FUSON IN ORDER TO ARRIVE AT DECISIONS WHICH WILL INDICATE WHAT WE DO ABOUT RETENTION LEVELS, PROJECT STOCKS, ETC., ALL IN AN EFFORT TO INSURE NO LOST TIME IN MOVING OUT THOSE ITEMS NOT REQUIRED FOR CONTINUED COMBAT SUPPORT. FINALLY, AS A COUNTERPART OF THIS WE HAVE ESTABLISHED AN RO BOARD OF REVIEW TO ASSURE THAT WE DO NOT ORDER SUPPLIES WHICH ARE NOT NEEDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LATEST LOGISTIC INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE.

13. THIS IS RATHER LENGTHY, JACK, BUT I HOPE IT GIVES YOU A MORE COMPLETE PICTURE OF OUR PRACTICAL SITUATION.

BEST REGARDS

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