<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNCLASSIFIED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**AD NUMBER**

AD504920

**CLASSIFICATION CHANGES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TO:</th>
<th>UNCLASSIFIED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
<td>CONFIDENTIAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LIMITATION CHANGES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TO:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 05 MAY 1969. Other requests shall be referred to Office of the Adjutant General (Army), Washington, DC 20310.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**AUTHORITY**

AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980
THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
SECURITY
MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.
22 September 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 52d Combat Aviation Battalion, Field Operating Base, 61-002-19

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

ROBERT E. LYNCH
Colonel, AG
Acting The Adjutant General
CONFIDENTIAL

DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)
US Army Signal School
US Army Southeastern Signal School
US Army Special Warfare School
US Army Transportation School

Copies furnished:
Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Research and Development
Assistant Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Engineers
The Surgeon General
The Provost Marshal General
OSD(SA) Assistant for Southeast Asia Forces
Director, Defense Research and Engineering
Office, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commanding Generals
US Army Materiel Command
US Army Weapons Command
US Army Flight Training Center
Deputy Chief of Staff, Air Force, Plans & Operations
Commandant of the Marine Corps
USAF Air Ground Operations School
The Air University Library
Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group
Defense Documentation Center
Security Officer, Hudson Institute
Commanding Officers
US Army Limited War Laboratory
US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center
52d Combat Aviation Battalion
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion For Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-I) (U)

See Distribution:


   a. (C) General. This report for the period 1 February through 30 April 1969 is submitted in compliance with AR 525-15, USARPAC Reg 525-15, USARV Reg 525-15 and 17th AG Reg 525-15.

   (1) Headquarters, 52d Combat Aviation Battalion, LTC Richard L. Stoessner, Commanding, remains at Camp Holloway, Pleiku, RVN. Inclusion 1 reflects organizational structure and station list of all assigned, attached and OPCON units, with location and APO, as of 30 April 1969.

   (2) There has been no change of mission during this period, however the battalion has greatly increased its aviation support of ARVN operations during this quarter. FLYING DRAGONS continue to provide aviation support to the US Fourth Infantry Division; Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; RVN II Corps Headquarters; Fifth Special Forces Group and other Free World Military Assistance Forces in the central highlands of Vietnam (see inclusion 2). Additionally, all operational and administrative functions and activities of Camp Holloway, Holloway Army Airfield and Kontum Army Airfield are controlled by the 52d CAB.

   b. (C) Personnel.

   (1) Awards and Decorations. During this reporting period, 871 awards were processed and 1000 were approved and received. This included the receipt of 1 Silver Star, 19 Distinguished Flying Crosses, 6 Soldier's Medals, 23 Bronze Stars, 2 Bronze Stars for Valor, 841 Air Medals, 24 Air Medals for Valor, 59 Army Commendation Medals, 16: Army Commendation Medals for Valor, and 9 Purple Hearts.

   (2) Command and Staff Changes. The following Command or Battalion Staff changes took place on the dates indicated:

FORT JU
692158
Inclosure
AV3AG1UJC (5 May 1969)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion Period
Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CS FOR 65 (R-1) (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>RANK. NAME. SVC NO</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BN XO</td>
<td>Maj Bloemsm, William A. 05307178</td>
<td>23 Mar 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LTC Burton, James 071159</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BN S-2</td>
<td>CPT Worthington, Gerald R. 02303599</td>
<td>26 Apr 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vacant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BN S-3</td>
<td>Maj Hood, John W. 05405944</td>
<td>27 Mar 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maj Aicken, Larry B. 074042</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BN S-4</td>
<td>Maj Stratton, Albert L. 05312211</td>
<td>23 Mar 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maj Bloemsm, William A. 05307178</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BN SIG OFF</td>
<td>CPT Wong, Owen Jr. 05340404</td>
<td>11 Mar 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CPT Gunter, Terry A. 05536250</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BN SFTY OFF</td>
<td>1LT Holloway, Ralph L. 02332795</td>
<td>21 Apr 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1LT Waggner, William E. Jr. 05431703</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BN PIO</td>
<td>1LT Parsons, Curtis C. 05253484</td>
<td>11 Mar 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1LT Manifold, James W. 05341940</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC CO</td>
<td>CPT Kobes, Eugene H. 0F103426</td>
<td>17 Apr 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CPT Cagle, Daryl R. 05406244</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57TH CO</td>
<td>Maj Kearns, James T. 05513055</td>
<td>4 Feb 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maj Williams, Robert M. 04009865</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119TH CO</td>
<td>Maj Fernald, John P. 0F102180</td>
<td>24 Apr 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maj Cary, Kenneth R. 0F113571</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>179TH CO</td>
<td>Maj Jones, Louis R. 0F102933</td>
<td>7 Feb 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maj Holroyd, Donald E. 076235</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>189TH CO</td>
<td>Maj Lincoln, Richard L. 099681</td>
<td>22 Apr 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maj Morrison, Robert N. 04063784</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>361ST CO</td>
<td>Maj Furney, Robert M. 088690</td>
<td>29 Mar 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maj Rogers, Robert J. 078611</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Personneal turnover for the reporting period was as follows:

CONFIDENTIAL 2

Incl
AVBAOB-CC (5 May 1969)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion Period
Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CS FOR-65 (R-1) (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>LOSS</th>
<th>GAIN</th>
<th>CHANGE</th>
<th>LOSS</th>
<th>GAIN</th>
<th>CHANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>-48</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>+11</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>+24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>+38</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>+9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>+38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) The Battalion Total Strength is 1769, short 136 enlisted men and 2 officers and warrant officers as of 30 Apr 69. Unit strength are shown in Inclosure 3.

(5) Public Information Office Activities:
(a) Printed Releases 16
(b) Pictorial Releases 265
(c) Hometown Printed Releases 265
(d) Hometown Pictorial Releases 45
(e) Taped Interviews 1

(f) The 52d Combat Aviation Battalion Newspaper "Dragon Fire" has been augmented by the daily publication of the "Dragon Flyer". The "Dragon Fire" is being published monthly and includes Battalion Commander's Column, a Chaplain's Corner and individual unit noteworthy accomplishments. The "Dragon Flyer" was initiated in order to disseminate important need to know information on a daily basis. The interest impact of the men of the Battalion has been gratifying and future plans are being made to publish the "Dragon Fire" more often.

(g) All companies within the Battalion have contributed to American-Vietnamese relationship with assistance in Civic Actions. In the village of Plei Ho Long, supplies and assistance have been donated to rebuild their school and other buildings. Presently, a church is being constructed in Plei Mon with the assistance of a Vietnamese Pastor of their faith from the Pleiku District. The Battalion is also in the planning process of building a Physical Therapy Section for the Area Leprosarium.

(h) MEDCAP's are continually being performed along with special trips for emergency cases. In one instance a woman had pains from an operation she had received in Pleiku. An Army doctor was immediately notified in order that the woman received treatment.

CONFIDENTIAL 3
(i) The major problem that exists in the Public Information Office is the supply channel through which photographic equipment is requisitioned. The Camp Holovsky Arts & Crafts Shop has been the primary source of assistance with all photographic coverage.

c. (C) Intelligence. The S-2 Section continues to publish a daily intelligence summary of significant activities in the Pleiku-Kontum area. Intelligence information is gathered from II Corps, and 4th Infantry Division G-2 offices, other supported units, liaison visits to other S-2 offices, and debriefings submitted by aviators and air mission commanders.

(1) Enemy activity. There were thirteen attacks by fire against the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion facilities during the reporting period. The enemy employed 122mm rockets in six attacks and 82mm mortars in the other seven. There were no ground attacks on any of the battalion's facilities during this quarter. From 23 Feb to 7 Apr 1969. Significant activities during the period:

032200 Feb: 52d Security Detachment patrol received sniper fire, fire returned. Negative casualties on either side.

040135 Feb: 52d Security Detachment of heard movement of 2 individuals north of their position and took them under fire. Negative friendly casualties, enemy casualties unknown.

041400 Feb: 52d Security Detachment patrol found a night position for 20-25 individuals used within the last 24 hours. Also found 1 bloody bandage and one personal letter of no intelligence value.

070130 Feb: 52d Security Detachment patrol ambushed 2 enemy with small arms. One enemy was hit with a tracer round, no friendly casualties. Area swept and found blood trail leading north. No further findings.

082130 Feb: SRP from 52d Security Detachment engaged a re-enforced enemy squad with small arms, hand grenades and M-79. Enemy fled north toward Plei Thung village. Sweep of the area revealed numerous footprints leading north. No further findings. Results: Negative friendly casualties, enemy casualties unknown.

152100-160100 Feb: 52d Security Detachment SRP engaged an unknown size enemy force with small arms fire. Enemy withdrew and patrol pursued until contact again established. Gunships fired on suspected enemy location. Contact broken and enemy fled in unknown direction. Sweep of area at first light found two places where bodies were dragged off. Results: Negative friendly casualties, enemy casualties unknown.
AVBACB-CC (5 May 69)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSPC-R-65 (R-1) (U)

230115 Feb: 52d Security mortars supported 2d RVN Rangers who were receiving small arms fire. Results: negative friendly casualties, enemy casualties unknown.

230940 Feb: 57th AC at Kontum Airfield received 11 122mm rockets with 3 landing inside the perimeter. Results: Friendly - 3 US WIA (returned to duty), 3 UH1C light damage, 1 UH1C moderate damage, 4 UH1H heavy damage, 2 UH1H moderate damage, 1 UH1H light damage and 1 AH1G light damage.

230805 Feb: Camp Holloway received 11 122mm rockets with 3 landing inside the perimeter. Results: Friendly - 3 US WIA (returned to duty), minor damage to runway, enemy unknown. Gunships, counter-mortar and artillery supported.

230815 Feb: 361st AC (E) gunships engaged unknown size enemy force that had rocketed Holloway AAF. They were directed by Headhunter aircraft. Fire team leader estimated 20 enemy KIA, unknown number WIA. At the same time 189th AC gunships in support of II Corps engaged an unknown size enemy unit resulting in 10 enemy KIA (estimated).

240202 Feb: 57th AC at Kontum AAF received 11 122mm rockets. Results: Friendly-2 US WIA (light), 4 UH1H light damage, 1 UH1H heavy damage, enemy-unknown.

240905 Feb: 57th AC at Kontum AAF received 2 122mm rockets resulting in negative friendly casualties or damage.

241300 Feb: 361st AC(E) gunships in support of 5th SFCA expended on a confirmed enemy location resulting in 2 enemy BBA (confirmed), 1 bunker destroyed and 1 secondary explosion (large fireball emitting black smoke).

272335 Feb: Camp Holloway received 9 82mm mortar rounds. Gunships were scrambled and placed fire on suspected enemy location. Results: Friendly-negative, enemy-unknown.

010530 Feb: 189th AC aircraft observed UFO's (possibly helicopters) vicinity of Camp Enari. UFO's disappeared when approached by aircraft. Aircraft observed rotating red beacon while following UFO's. Aircraft was unable to close on UFO at maximum air speed of approximately 115 knots. The altitude of the UFO was approximately 500 ft and the speed estimated above 160 knots.

021030 Mar: 361st gunships while making a LZ preparation observed 1 secondary explosion set off by flechette rocket. Suspected booby trap or land mine.

CONFIDENTIAL
030945 Mar: 361st gunships while in support of FOB II expended on a stalled 3/4 ton vehicle carrying 4 crates which resulted in 4 secondary explosions and destroyed the vehicle.

031245 Mar: 361st gunships expended on an unknown number of personnel moving in a wooded area. 219th RAC visual recon pilot estimated 10 enemy KIA and 5 WIA.

031700 Mar: 57th AC gunships in support of 5th SFGA engaged unknown number of personnel resulting in 4 VC KIA.

032143 Mar: 52d Security Detachment patrol made contact with 4 personnel. Small arms fire exchanged. Area swept at daylight revealed signs that something had been dragged away from contact area. Results: Friendly-negative, enemy unknown.

050200 Mar: Camp Holloway received 11 82mm mortar rounds. Gunships fired on suspected enemy location. Results: Friendly - 1 maintenance tent light damage, enemy - unknown.

051910 Mar: 57th AC at Kontum AF received 4 122mm rockets. Artillery fired on suspected enemy location. Results: Friendly - negative enemy unknown.

061920 Mar: 57th AC at Kontum AF received 4 122mm rockets. Artillery fired on suspected enemy location. Results: Friendly - POL pumping equipment destroyed, enemy unknown.

081200 Mar: 1/69 CP on LZ Bass received 5-6 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 1 aircraft from 169th receiving damage and 1 US WIA (slight).

121215 Mar: 361st gunships in support of FOB II engaged and destroyed 1 3/4 ton truck. No secondary explosion observed.

121350-1405, Mar: 3/12 CP on LZ Swinger received 16-20 rounds of 32mm mortar fire. Aircraft from 355th AC and 179th AC were landing and coming into the LZ at the time of action. Negative damage to the aircraft.

150300 Mar: Camp Holloway received 13 82mm mortar rounds. Small arms fire employed on suspected enemy location. Results: Friendly - 2 UH-1H light damage, 1 Tank truck moderate damage, 3 connexes light damage to control tower, enemy unknown.
AVBABC-CC    (5 May 1969)
SUBJECT:    Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion Period
Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CS FOR-65 (R-1) (U)

152123 Mar:    Camp Holloway perimeter bunker on NE side of perimeter
reported movement of 4-5 personnel to their front. Personnel engaged
with M-79 fire and received unknown number and type of small arms fire
resulting in 1 US WIA. Personnel withdrew. Enemy casualties unknown.

182220 Mar:    52d Security Detachment patrol made contact with 1-3
personnel and engaged them with small arms fire. Contact broken with
negative friendly and unknown enemy casualties.

201100 Mar:    361st AC (E) in support of 4/2d ARVN while making an
LZ preparation destroyed 1 straw building and caused 1 secondary explo-

210240 Mar:    Camp Holloway received 24 82mm mortar rounds. 20th
Engineer (ARVN) saw flashes from tube and engaged the enemy. Results
Friendy-negative casualties. 1CH47 heavy damage, 1CH47A moderate
damage, 4 CH47 light damage, enemy unknown. Suspected enemy unit
responsible for attack-C1/K31 Bn.

211120 Mar:    119th AC UH1H enroute to aid downed OV1 took direct
hit from 37mm AA fire, aircraft lost transmission and hydraulics
forcing it to land with 3 US WIA. UH1H later recovered.

221150 Mar:    361st gunships engaged 35 NVA wearing green uniforms
and carrying packs resulting in 3 NVA KIA (confirmed) and 10 NVA
KIA (estimate).

222335 Mar:    170th AC perimeter bunker received sniper fire. Received
fire again at 230115. Mortars and gunships employed on suspected
enemy location. Results: Negative friendly casualties or damage,
enemy unknown.

232045 Mar:    57th AC at Kontum AAF received 122mm rockets all of which
landed outside the perimeter. Negative friendly casualties or damage
enemy unknown.

240004 Mar:    52d Security Detachment patrol made contact with 8-9
personnel. Flareship and gunships supported. 0146, contact broke,
negative friendly casualties, enemy casualties unknown. Area swept
with negative findings.

291015 Mar:    119th gunship while in support of 4th Inf Div expended
on a confirmed enemy location resulting in an estimated 7 NVA KIA.

300930 Mar:    119th gunship in support of 1/8th Inf expended on suspected
enemy mortar position producing 1 secondary explosion with black smoke
150' high.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBACEMX:


041500 Apr: 361st gunships expended on NVA troops sighted by Headhunter 19 with the result of 3 NVA KBA (confirmed).

070002 Apr: Camp Holloway received 20 82mm mortar rounds. Results: Friendly-negative casualties, 3 AH1G light damage, 5 UH1H light damage, 6 UH1C (4 light, 1 moderate, 1 heavy) damaged, 5 CH47 light damage, 1 3/4 ton truck light damage and 1 21/2 ton truck light damage. Mortars and gunships fired on suspected enemy location with unknown results.

111345 Apr: 57th AC slicks, going in to pick up 16 enemy suspects detained by 23d ARVN Rangers Bn, received small arms fire and took six hits resulting in 1 US WIA.

142105 Apr: 189th perimeter bunker received small arms sniper fire resulting in negative friendly casualties. Illumination and M-79 employed with unknown results.

150810 Apr: 361st gunships in support of FOB II, sighted 15 enemy trucks at a truck park in dense woods. Fire team expended resulting in 10 enemy KBA (confirmed by SPAF). SPAF unable to determine if any trucks were damaged due to smoke and dust.

211500 Apr: 170th gunships, during extraction of LAP 2H, spotted an unknown number of individuals moving north, expended and had 1 NVA KBA. Cider 20 employed airstrike resulting in 9 more NVA KBA.

211745 Apr: 361st gunships expended on a known enemy location in support of a downed AF aircraft which was receiving small arms fire. Fire team suppressed the ground fire resulting in 10 NVA KBA and 13 NVA WIA (estimate).

220910 Apr: 189th and 361st gunships expended on confirmed enemy location after receiving a call from Headhunter 17 that he had spotted the enemy troops in the open. Results unknown.

221030 Apr: 119th in support of 5th SPGA expended on a confirmed enemy location resulting in 8 VC KBA.

240545 Apr: 361st gunships expended on a known enemy location in support of a Dust Off aircraft. Fire team expended on area when ARVN troops started receiving fire from 3 sides. Fire suppressed. Results unknown.

251500 Apr: 361st gunships, in support of FOB II, expended on a known enemy location when a recon patrol team received fire. Results of mission unknown.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFlOeHTfQ*-

AVBACB-CC

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion Period

261700 Apr: 361st Gunships, in support of FOB II, expended on enemy troops sighted walking along a trail and a bunker area. Results unknown.

271330 Apr: 361st gunships, in support of FOB II, expended on a confirmed enemy location when a slick leaving an LZ received fire. Results unknown.

291500 Apr: 361st gunships expended on a confirmed enemy location when a slick from the 170th received fire. Results unknown.

(2) Movement. The NVA units moved back to the Tri-border area to resupply. This was substantiated by the Red Haze and IR missions undertaken in the Tri-border area along with the absence of contact with either the 21st NVA Regt or 66th NVA Regt on the area of their prior operations.

(3) New Units. There were two new units confirmed in the Kontum/Pleiku Provinces during the last 3 months. They are the K-25A Engr Bn and the K-25B which are both in the Plei Trap area. The following four new units are carried as probable in the Kontum/Pleiku Provinces: K-41 Arty Bn (possible 105mm howitzer unit), K-42 Arty Bn (possible 105mm howitzer unit), K-35 Arty Bn (possible 222 mm rocket unit). All of these units were in the Tri-Border area.

(4) New Weapons. During the reporting period on 3 Mar 69 Ben Het SF Camp was attacked by the enemy using tank. LZ's and FSB in the II Corps area received 105mm artillery and airstrikes. On the 13th of Mar, the first report in II Corps of the enemy using CS mortar rounds was reported from LZ Swinger. On 10 April 69 a UFO was identified as an M-1-6 HOOK (Soviet helicopter flying without lights vic ZA 065190. On 20 Apr vicinity ZA 049133 another UFO was identified as an M-1-4 HOUND (Soviet) helicopter.

(5) Situation. NVA units have pulled back to the Tri-border area. The local force units are doing most of the harassing at the present time. The chief targets are RF/PF units, OP's and poorly defended villages. The enemy is generally avoiding contact to reserve his strength and stores.

(6) Capabilities

(a) Kontum Province: The enemy has, perhaps, the greatest and most varied set of capabilities within the II Corps. He can conduct standoff attacks or combination standoff/sapper attacks against US/Allie installations and Kontum City employing mortars of up to 120mm 75mm RR and rockets up to and including 122mm, 85mm, 100mm, 105mm. Artillery may also be employed against installations up to 40 kilometers from the Cambodian border.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CS POR-65 (R-1) (U)

Ground attacks may be conducted against friendly installations in up to multi-battalion strength supported by standoff fires and limited armor in the vicinity of 16 lei Kleng and Ben Het, and he may interdict friendly air activity with fire from small arms, automatic weapons, 12.7mm, 14.5mm, and 37mm anti-aircraft weapons.

b. Pleiku Province: Pleiku Province is also confronted with a variety of enemy capabilities to include: selective attacks on Pleiku City, Plei Djereng, Plei Mrong, Duc Co CIDG camps or Edap Enang, Thanh An and Le Truhung in reinforced battalion strength, supported by mortar, rockets, RR and 105mm Artillery fire; attack at Pleiku City, US/ARVN bases, CIDG camps, District Headquarters and resettlement areas, using 82mm mortar recoilless rifles and 105mm artillery fire. Employ battalion size NVA/VC forces against friendly convoys and installations along QL 19E and QL14, supported by 75mm RR and 60/82mm mortar fire. The possibility of a limited armor and artillery capability exists in the vicinity of Duc Co.

(7) Miscellaneous. During the reporting period all crew members were shown the film on how to detect the 122mm rocket when it has been fired at night time. The film showed the difference between the 122mm rocket and artillery firing so they would be able to distinguish between the two. There were 3 information sheets on VC/NVA weapons and tactics distributed to the battalion during the past quarter. One of them dealt with the new enemy rocket emplacement tactics. It told about the way the VC/NVA emplaced and camouflaged the rockets for an attack. Another one told about the new type CS grenade used by the enemy. It gave the general characteristics of the grenade. The last one dealt with the PT-76 tank which was employed by the NVA against Ben Het. It gave the characteristics and other information about the tank.

d. (C) Operations. Combat, support and pacification operations throughout the II Corps Tactical zone have been supported by the 52d CAB during this reporting period. The FLYING DRAGONS accumulated over 29,407 hours of flight, including 12,669 hours of combat assaults in support of ARVN and Free World Military Assistance Forces. Tabulated data of operational results are shown in inclusion 4.

(1) The US 4th Infantry Division continued to receive more support than any other single unit. Aviation companies of the battalion supported the following 4th Division Operations for the indicated periods.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PUTNAM PANTHER</td>
<td>(4 Div)</td>
<td>01 Feb 69 - (continued)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREEN THUNDER</td>
<td>(2/35 Inf)</td>
<td>01 Feb 69 - 17 Feb 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREEN CYCLONE</td>
<td>(4 Div)</td>
<td>07 Feb 69 - 04 Mar 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAYNE GRAY</td>
<td>(4 Div)</td>
<td>01 May 69 - 14 Apr 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREEN HURRICANE</td>
<td>(1/35 Inf)</td>
<td>18 Mar 69 - 14 Apr 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREEN THUNDER II</td>
<td>(2/35 Inf)</td>
<td>28 Feb 69 - 02 Apr 69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
WAYNE JAVELIN (1st Bde) 13 Apr 69 - (continues)
GREEN ORANGE (2/35 Inf) 14 Apr 69 - 22 Apr 69
WASHINGTON GREEN (4 Div) 15 Apr 69 - (continues)
GREEN PURPLE (2/35 Inf) 14 Apr 69 - 20 Apr 69
GREEN TIT-HOON (1/35 Inf) 18 Apr 69 - 1 May 69
PUTNAM TIGER (3/8 Inf) 22 Apr 69 - 25 Apr 69
GREEN LION (3d Bde) 22 Apr 69 - 25 Apr 69
GREEN QUEEN (3d Bde) 23 Apr 69 - (continues)

Primary support of the 1st Brigade was provided by the 119th Aviation Company (AML) during the entire quarter. Upon initiation of Operation Wayne Javelin on 13 Apr 69, 119AC (AML) forward CP was established at An Khe, RVN to control 6 UH-1H and 2 UH-1C aircraft in support of 1st Brigade, Highway 19 coordinator and 41st Artillery Group Operations. 52d CAB Liaison Officer was established with the Aviation Officer in the Brigade TOC.

The 2d Brigade received habitual support from the 57th Aviation Company (AML) from 1 February through 6 March 69, and from the 170th Aviation Company from 7 March through the end of the quarter. 52d CAB Liaison Officer to the Brigade is established at the Brigade TOC at FSB Mary Lou.

Other division units, staff sections and command groups were supported by 52d CAB assets scheduled by the Battalion Movement Control Center and 4th Aviation Battalion S-3. Those included Division Artillery (command and control) Division Chemical (CS drops, defoliation, A&P) G-3 and Chief of Staff (Liaison, reconnaissance), G-2 (LRRF) insertions and extractions, armed and visual reconnaissance, and G-1/G4 (replacement transportation, inspection teams, logistics, resupply).

FOB II (CCC) clandestine operations were supported by the 189th Aviation Company (AML) from 1 February through 6 March 1969 and by the 57th Aviation Company (AML) from 7 March through the end of the reporting period.

On 15 April, the 189th AC (AML) was tasked to provide aviation support aid a Liaison Officer to the 24th Special Tactical Zone (ARVN). Since that date, aviation support to 24th STZ has been comparable to that of one of the U.S. Infantry Brigades. Command and staff liaison visits with 24th STZ and subordinate headquarters has continued throughout the quarter.

Other units receiving daily or frequent aviation support include IFV Artillery; RVN II Corps Headquarters; Pleiku, Kontum, Phu Bon and Darlac Sector Advisors; 5th US Special Forces Group; 20th Engineers,

45th General Support Group (Pleiku Sub-Area Command) Headquarters, and USAF units.

(2) Cargo Helicopter support throughout the II Corps Tactical Zone has been provided by the 179th Aviation Company (Medium Helicopter) CH-47 Chinooks. Employed in a general support role under direction of the unit operation, the 179th flew 2792 hours, delivering 16,363 passengers and 13,168.5 tons of cargo during February, March and April. Other 17th CAG Chinook units provided 772 hours of additional support through the 52d CAB Air Movement Control Center. Centralized control and effective Area Movement Control Center procedures have greatly reduced flying hours while increasing efficiency of CH-47 support. Input of CH-47C model aircraft has reduced turn-around time and offered increased support capability. CH-54 support by the 1st Platoon, 355th AC (Heavy Helicopter) OFCON to the 52d CAB, has been excellent in every respect. Although misutilization of cargo helicopters still occurs (paralleling C-123, C-130, and C-7A flights, for example) much improvement has been noted in employment of CH-47 and CH-54 assets. Supported units now rig two CH-47 sling loads side by side on their helipad to enable one CH-54 to haul these loads if the situation requires.

(3) The 361st AC (Escort) has provided two AH-1G Cobras daily to support POF II operations. Other daily assets are committed to 17 CAG directed missions and to reinforce gunships throughout the Battalion. The speed and armament capability of the AH-1G provides appropriate response to units in contact, visual reconnaissance pilots, and defense of allied installations.

(4) Operational highlights of the quarter include the following:

28 Feb 69 - 52d CAB aircraft repositioned three US Infantry Battalions and supported artillery in Western Pleiku and Kontum Provinces.

27 Apr 69 - 52d CAB aircraft Air Assualted 2 ARVN Ranger Battalions into blocking positions and emplaced supporting artillery in Darlac Province.

Other daily activity has been scheduled by the supported unit, with no aviation planning in effect prior to the operation. Frequent repositioning of units within an AO occurs, however these missions are considered routine.
AVBACE-CC (5 May 1969)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1969, MOS CS FOR-65 (R-1) (U)

(5) 52d Pathfinder support continued throughout the period. One team was withdrawn from Dak To in March and one team dispatched to An Khe in April to provide Pathfinder capabilities in the expanded 4th Division AO.

(6) The 52d Security Detachment continues to provide observation, illumination and fire support to the perimeter of Camp Holloway, conducts patrols and ambush operations in the Holloway AO (Sector Blue of Pleiku Defense) and maintains a force at Kontum Airfield to reinforce the 57th Aviation Company compound defenses.

(7) The Area Movement Control Center (AMCC) has provided a flight following, communications relay, flight consolidation and standby passenger and cargo service throughout the AO. Increased use of the consolidated flight and standby services has been accomplished through constant education and liaison visits with non-tactical headquarters and combat support units. Closer coordination with USAF and Army Units allocated Air Force assets has eliminated some requirements for helicopter flights originally submitted to 52d AMCC.

e. (C) Training. All battalion units and headquarters sections continue to use on-the-job (OJT) training due to tactical and administrative mission requirements. Individual training required by 350 series regulations and directives is scheduled and conducted, however makeup classes must be conducted after normal missions to insure acceptable attendance.

(1) Army Aviation Refresher Training School quotas are an invaluable asset in affected MOS training areas. During this quarter, 31 quotas were requested, 3 were cancelled, one officer and 26 EM attended and completed this training.

(2) On 25 February, generator operators and their supervisors from all units on Camp Holloway received refresher training in care and maintenance of generator equipment. The training was broken down to benefit personnel assigned large or small capacity generators.

(3) CWO Waugh, 655th TC Det, and WO Cranney, 189th Avn Co, completed the 17th CAG Test Pilot School on 3 March.

(4) Personnel of the 52d Security Detachment mortar section have been sent to the 4th Inf Division for 81mm gunnery and crew drill training. Results of this formal instruction have been highly satisfactory and allow increased proficiency during OJT and actual firing.
AVBAQ-OC
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CS FOR-65 (R-1) (U)

(5) Ground school for aviators has been conducted on Instrument Flight Regulations and Procedures; Survival, Escape and Evasion; Aviation Safety; MAC-V Rules of Engagement; USARV Reg 95-26; Weapons Familiarization and other military subjects.

(6) A Boeing-Vertol Technical Representative presented a four hour block of CH-47C systems training to the 179th Aviation Company aviators during this reporting period.

(7) Other aviation training is included in Paragraph 1, Flight Standardization.

f. (C) Logistics:

(1) Class I: Garrison messes have encountered problems due to the use of electrical appliances for refrigeration and preparation of food. Power sources within the installation are not stable or regulated resulting in damage to mess equipment and at times, inferior food quality. Recent containment mess surveys conducted by supporting activities in this area have resulted in a program to obtain gas operated refrigeration and food preparation equipment.

(2) Class II: Significant improvement has been noted in the processing of high priority requisitions by the direct support units. Some difficulties are being experienced in obtaining expeditious release and transportation to depot by the unit of this command, however; many shortages still exist for initial issue of flight safety items such as Namex clothing.

(3) Class III:

(a) There has been a marked improvement in the quantity and quality of JP/4 since the last reporting period. No fuel contamination has been reported and the quantity on hand has been sufficient to sustain operations at a safe level.

(b) Total JP/4 dispensed by the battalion during the reporting period was 4,200,000 gallons of which 1,200,000 gallons were dispensed at Kontum Airfield by the 57th Aviation Company (AML). In addition to the JP/4, 73,000 gallons of Avgas were dispensed at Kontum to transient aircraft and other tenant units.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDACB-OC (5 May 1969)


(4) Engineer Support: Engineer support provided to this installation has been unsatisfactory. Numerous vertical construction projects have been delayed or left incomplete due to low priority or lack of materials. This organization was able to obtain material and complete some unfinished projects by directing numerous manhours toward nonmission projects.

(5) Class V: Ammunition expenditures by the battalion during the period January through April 1969 averaged 3,090 2.75" rockets (FFAR) per month compared with 2,630 average expended during the last four months of 1968. Increase in expenditures was due to extensive enemy activity west of Kontum City during February and March. A total of 1,152 2.75" rockets, 7,200 40 mm grenades and 14,000 rounds of 7.62mm minigun ammunition were airlifted to the 52nd CAB forward arming point in Dak To by CH-54's operating out of Camp Holloway.

(g) (U) Aircraft Maintenance.

(1) During the quarter, the 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion hosted the bi-monthly Maintenance and Supply Seminar. Units attending were the 604th Trans Co (DS) and all units receiving direct support from them. The 604th Trans Co (DS) alternates hosting the bi-monthly meetings with supported units. Each unit participating requires the attendance of the maintenance officer, tech supply officer, and key maintenance personnel. Many problems areas can be resolved thru these meetings and with continued emphasis will do much to improve the maintenance posture of all units attending. Topics of discussion were as follows:

(a) Quality Control
(b) Production Control
(c) Technical Supply
(d) Aircraft Armament
(e) Maintenance Management
(f) Aircraft Scheduling

(2) Task Force 17: During the month of April, an unusually heavy work load was encountered in aircraft maintenance. Tactical considerations required aircraft to exceed programmed flying hours and missions varied to such an extent that daily aircraft scheduling could not effectively spread scheduled maintenance. At the request of the battalion commander, Task Force 17 was formed by the CO, 17th CAG using available group assets.
AVBBC-CC (5 May 1969)

Work schedules, operational guidelines and coordination with individual companies were established by the Battalion Maintenance Officer prior to deployment of the task force, which began operations on 13 April. Augmenting unit organic capabilities at both Camp Holloway and Kontum Airfield by 25 April the 23 members of the task force accomplished 12 periodic inspections on UH-1C(A) and UH-1H helicopters of the battalion. At this time the scheduled maintenance workload was reduced to normal and Task Force 17 was released from battalion control.

(3) Aircraft Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>AH-1G</th>
<th>UH-1C</th>
<th>UH-1H</th>
<th>CH-47</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Authorized</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Aircraft Assigned</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Aircraft Per Co</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability Rate</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>69.5%</td>
<td>74.6%</td>
<td>70.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIM Rate</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Accident Prevention:

(a) During the quarter, the 52d Combat Aviation battalion experienced 8 accidents while flying 31,958 hours for an overall rate of 2.96%. The following is a summary of occurrences during this period.

(i) 10 Feb 1969, HHC, 52d CAB, UH-1C SN 64-14124, Major Accident. Training flight. Aircraft hit stinger and landed hard on skids during practice autorotation. CAUSE: Instructor Pilot waited too long to take corrective action after realizing pilot was having trouble controlling the aircraft.

(b) 14 Feb 1969, 119th Aviation Company, UH-1H, SN 66-16533, Major Accident. Aircraft was descending vertically into a confined area to discharge IRRP'S. Tail rotor struck tree or bamboo and failed. CAUSE: Pilot error: selected landing zone was marginal for helicopter operations and pilot did not execute proper anti-torque system failure procedures.
CONiNt/9 (May 69)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion Period
Ending 30 April 1969, ROSS 65 For-65 (R-1) (U).

(c) 24 Feb, 1969, 179th ASHC, CH-47A, SN 66-19091, Major
Accident. Cyclic and pedal control was lost on approach into
a landing zone. The aircraft went into a left flat spin and crashed
and burned. CAUSE: Unknown. Suspect that the forward pivoting
actuator extended due to a control input not controllable by pilot.

(d) 26 Feb 1969, 119th Aviation Company, UH-1C, SN 66-685,
Major Accident. Engine failed at 400' feet and pilot autoretated
to a field. Aircraft hit hard and severed tail boom and flattened
skids. CAUSE: Material failure of engine and improper technique
used by pilot during autorotation.

(e) 16 April 1969, 57th Avn Co, UH-1H SN 66-16534, Major
Accident: Field jacket blew out of cargo door and became entangled
in tail rotor. Tail rotor and 90° gear box separated from aircraft.
CAUSE: Improper stowage of material and cargo in cargo compartment.

(f) 17 April 1969, 361st Avn Co (Escort), AH-1G SN 67-15565,
Major Accident. Main Rotor of AH-1G struck main rotor of UH-1H
that was starting. CAUSE: Pilot attempted to take off without
adequate clearance.

(g) 20 April 1969, 170th Avn Co, UH-1H SN 66-16530, Major Accident.
Test pilot was performing maximum power check when engine
failed. Pilot autoretated to rice paddy and aircraft sustained major
damage due to hard landing. CAUSE: Engine failure and improper
technique used during autorotation.

(h) 23 April 1969, 189th Avn Co, UH-1H SN 66-16162, Major Accident.
Engine failed on 1½ mile final to Holloway Army Airfield. Autoreta-
tion was made to highway 19 but aircraft landed hard with low rotor
rpm. Cause: Fuel was exhausted and improper technique used.

(2) Experience chart; Aviation Company (AML) consisting of 17
Officers and 52 Warrant Officers. One Officer and One Warrant Officer
are on a second tour in Viet Nam

(a) MONTHS IN COUNTRY AVERAGE

OFFICERS 5.375

WARRANT OFFICERS 7.625

Officer NS four months or less in country 6

Warrant Officers four months or less in country 12

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

LV/AC-CC (5 May 1969)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion
Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CS FOR-65 (3-1) (U)

(b) AVERAGE FLYING HOURS Number under 200 hours in country

OFFICERS
284.2   9

WARRANT OFFICERS
488.6   6

COMPANY
386.4   15

(3) Dust is still a major area of concern. Most approaches
and takeoffs are partial IFR due to dust. Soil stabilization agents
are possible but equipment shortages in tankers with spreaders
reduce their availability.

(4) Monthly Flight Safety meetings have been held by all units.
The Battalion Safety Officer, Flight Surgeon, an Air Force Weather
Officer, Unit Commander and other actively participate in open
discussions with unit aviators.

1. (C) Flight Standardization.

(1) The Battalion Standardization Officer flew 207 hours
qualifying new instructor pilots, administering 90 day standardi-
zation rides, Aircraft Commander check rides and in-country
orientation rides for newly assigned aviators.

(2) Rotation of instructor pilots continues to be a problem.
1 pilot has attended the 1st Ave Dco Instructor Pilot course in-
country. All others have been trained within the unit.

(3) There are no facilities within reasonable flying dis-
tance to accomplish touchdown autorotations. Requests have been made
to asphalt the Hover Test area but facilities and resources are
not available at this time. This has required flying to Kontum
(20 minutes one way) and training there. Kontum is also unsatisfactory
due to the high number of fixed wing aircraft using that facility.

(4) Actual and simulated instrument flight training has in-
creased due to the incoming Monsoon Rains. This training is done in
conjunction with normal missions. Very little practice is devoted
to approaches because the only published approach to Holloway
Army Airfield is a Non-directional Beacon. The minimum approach
altitude is 650 ft AGL and 1 mile visibility. With the low flight
experiences in this battalion, the individual aviators prefer to
go low level rather than enter instrument flight conditions.
Part of this could be alleviated by the installation of a Ground
Controlled Approach (GCA) radar set at Holloway.

CONFIDENTIAL
(5) The battalion does not have an assigned Rotary Wing Instrument Examiner. Therefore most aviators who are instrument qualified have allowed instrument tickets to expire.

j. (c) Organization.

(1) All phases of the battalion reorganization under provisions of USAR/AC General Order 771, which was begun on 21 January 1969, were completed during this reporting period.

(2) The continuing requirement for administrative support to Camp Holloway non-tactical activities has not abated. No additional personnel have been authorized, assigned, or available to the Post Headquarters section. Plans to create a Provisional Airfield Operating Detachment have been completed and staffed during this quarter. The provisional unit will receive both personnel and equipment necessary to provide Air Traffic Control, Base Defense, Crash Rescue, Firefighting, Airfield Refueling, Post Exchange, Social Services, Post Development, Repair and Utility services and related functions to Camp Holloway and tenant units. Assets provided from the 344th ASD and other battalion units will be employed under the command of the 344th ASD Commander.

k. (U) Other.

(1) Chaplain.

(a) A new Protestant Worship Service was begun during the quarter by the Battalion Chaplain at the 57th AC Compound in Kontum. Services are being held in the Enlisted Men's Club each Sunday morning. Both Catholic and Protestant services continue to be gratifying. Unit sponsorship of worship services has the 52d Battalion leading 17th Combat Aviation Group in attendance.

(b) Through Civic Actions Program, the 52d CAB Consolidated Chaplain's Fund designated special offerings to the local Catholic Parish, Catholic orphanage, and the Christian and Missionary Alliance Leprosarium for a total of $686.15. The fund donated an additional $515.70 to the American Bible Society during the quarter.

(2) Surgeon

(a) Emphasis on training exercises and discussion meetings have continued. Once more, special emphasis was placed on mass casualty care and treatment to insure peak medical efficiency.

(b) In order that both the mission and organization might more efficiently be served many improvements on the Physical Plant have been implemented.
Office areas have been redesignated, painted, illuminated, and made more functional. An outside area beautification program has progressed by planting grass and nine banana trees. Crushed rock and a concrete patio have been placed over the bare areas. These improvements have aided the dispensary to better serve the needs of aviation personnel and Camp Holloway tenants.

(3) Signal.

(a) The Battalion Signal Office has assumed operations of the Message Center from the 5-1 Section, as of 15 April 1969. Message Center operations included the handling of distribution flow within the battalion and between adjacent units, as well as the processing of incoming and outgoing message traffic. This change has improved the efficiency of message traffic and increased the speed of routing and delivery of distribution.

(c) Due to the shortage of personnel and test equipment, the avionics sections of the 170th, 119th, and 189th Aviation Companies have been working together in order to consolidate personnel and equipment to meet an increased workload. The increased workload was due to the need for minor adjustments of ZYR/ZYS modifications left out of aircraft by retrofit teams. These adjustments have been completed, except for the addition of one 150 ohm/1 wall resistor to each system.

2. Section 2. Lessons Learned; Commanders Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. (C) Personnel.

(1) Critical MOS Shortages.

(a) OBSERVATION: Some vacancies are not being filled with school trained personnel.

(b) EVALUATION: Supervisory effectiveness is reduced by extensive OJT Programs which must be conducted to maintain combat effectiveness and mission accomplishment.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Place higher priority on CONUS trained replacement personnel. Continue OJT program until CONUS replacements arrive in sufficient numbers to fill critical MOS’s.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Personnel records have been searched to select intelligent individuals in related fields for OJT in critical MOS’s.

(2) Military Justice.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBACB-CC (5 May 1969)


(a) OBSERVATION: There is no simple means of disposing of more serious criminal problems by confinement in USARV.

(b) EVALUATION: The usurpation of the power of the Special Court Convening Authority to confine on first offenses has caused frequent recurring criminal problems, specifically with marijuana users. The well known "first offense: no confinement" policy weakens the deterrent effectiveness of military justice.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Restrictions placed on confinement of first offenders be eased, and such confinements be approved based on the recommendations of the convening authority.

(b) OBSERVATION: There is no simple means of disposing of more serious criminal problems by confinement in USARV.

(b) EVALUATION: The usurpation of the power of the Special Court Convening Authority to confine on first offenses has caused frequent recurring criminal problems, specifically with marijuana users. The well known "first offense: no confinement" policy weakens the deterrent effectiveness of military justice.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Restrictions placed on confinement of first offenders be eased, and such confinements be approved based on the recommendations of the convening authority.

(3) Junior Officer Career Development.

(e) OBSERVATION: Junior officers who are given additional formal schooling immediately following flight training are not adequately prepared for either troop or staff duty.

(b) EVALUATION: Recent graduates of the USC Safety Course and AMOC at Ft Eustis who do not have aviation experience other than initial flight training create difficulty in assignments to either staff or command positions. When utilized as a staff officer in his specialty, the relative youth and lack of practical experience, military knowledge, organizational ability and supervisory capability places the junior officer in an awkward position, requiring excessive supervision. The same lack of experience is evident when he is assigned to troop duty. The four to six months seniority he has acquired surpasses that of experienced section and platoon leaders in the unit, therefore he again presents unnecessary problems to his commander. The lack of practical experience equal to his contemporaries offsets the technical advantages gained by formal schooling in both situations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Assign newly rated aviators directly to the field to fill cockpit positions; gain experience and acquire adequate military knowledge prior to additional formal training. Select only experienced individuals with career potential to attend aviation-related specialist training courses.

(b) OPERATIONS

(1) Quality of Door Gunner Applicants.

(a) OBSERVATION: Individuals from non-aviation units who have extended RVT tours to serve as helicopter door gunners are not qualified for the job and often possess a record of misconduct and minimum standards as a soldier.
CONFDENTIAL

AVRACB-OC (5 May 1969)

(1) EVALUATION: Assignment of these individuals to an aviation company for specific duty as door gunners presents an undue hardship upon the Aviation Unit to train the individual. Individuals have been assigned for duty as door gunners with their primary MOS's as a clerk or motor maintenance mechanic, when the unit has been short several clerks and motor mechanics. To be an aircraft gunner, this individual should have the basic weapons knowledge prior to being assigned to an aviation unit. Many of these individuals are sources of trouble with a higher proportion of extendees given unit punishment or referred to trial by Court Martial.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: 1st Aviation Brigade screen the records of individuals desiring to extend for aviation assignments, eliminating less desirable and unqualified, at a central location in-country with 1st Aviation Brigade assets.

(2) "Hot" Fire Support Base Landing Techniques.

(a) OBSERVATION: Landing at Fire Support Bases which are under fire requires special techniques.

(b) EVALUATION: When landing at a Fire Support Base or LOC area which is known to be under fire, special techniques must be applied to reduce exposure time. As most of the Fire Bases in our area of operation are on high ground, a low level approach climbing up into the Fire Base is often effective. An aircraft, executing false approaches with a go-around, then quickly circling into the Fire Base often confuses the enemy indirect fire team. What over the method used, time on or near the ground must be minimal.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The various methods used by aviation units to avoid enemy fire should be consolidated and made available to all units.

(3) Foreign Object Damage.

(a) OBSERVATION: This unit is still experiencing a great deal of foreign object damage to aircraft rotor blades.

(b) EVALUATION: The major cause of rotary wing damage is debris in LOC's and Fire Support Bases. The CH-47 unit experienced seven blade strikes during this reporting period, striking such items as tarps, ponchos, sand bags, plastic bags, pieces of cardboard and wood.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: deny CH-47 and CH-54 support to units with poor policies on Logistics Operations Centers, Fire Bases or other landing/pick-up zones.

(4) Logistics Operations Center (LOC) Operation:

(a) OBSERVATION: Many of the LOC areas do not have proper ATC and are improperly organized.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDAC-CC (5 May 1969)


(b) EVALUATION: Mary Lou and Buon Bloch LOC's are two examples of hazardous LOC areas. Even though both of these areas have TC, it is not adequate. Traffic patterns are not adhered to by many aircraft. Either they do not monitor tower frequencies or disregard the instructions. At Buon Bloch, C-130 aircraft land without tower contact because they have no FM. At both LOC's different type aircraft work in close proximity to each other, UH-1 loads and CH-47 loads are often on the same pad. Different elements are often working at the same time on the same pad. These conditions are hazardous and often delay mission accomplishment.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Major LOC areas should have a tower with UHF capabilities. Air Force tailpipe teams should be used for joint service operations and definite traffic patterns should be established and published. Each LOC should have an LOC officer, who controls LOC operations, assigning particular areas to units and insures that CH-1 loads are at a safe distance from CH-47 and CH-54 loads.

(5) Unservicable Air-delivery Equipment.

(a) OBSERVATION: Sling, dunnuts and cargo nets used by ARVN forces are often in poor repair, resulting in dropped loads or spilled cargo enroute.

(b) EVALUATION: Air-delivery equipment slings, dunnuts, and cargo nets belong to ARVN units are generally in poor condition. These units have informed us that they have extreme difficulty in obtaining these items.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Sling equipment should be made available to these units through logistics support channels.

(5) Effective Aviation Employments.

(a) OBSERVATION: Aviation assets for rapid reaction support are requested by several different headquarters for the same mission, with little or no adequate aviation support plan.

(b) EVALUATION: During recent operations in the central highlands, immediate response aviation assets have been requested by US Divisional Units, Special Forces Units and ARVN advisors to support the same troop lift. While all troops are working toward the same objectives, aviation assets are pieced and out to individual units instead of to the joint operation. There is very little pre-planning for maximum effective aviation employment. Cargo Helicopter employment is particularly marginal without joint planning and an air movement plan coordinating all CH-47 and CH-54 support. Aviator briefings are inadequate, and often do not allow time for even map reconnaissance by flight or section leaders.
AVANGC-0C (5 May 1969)


Radio Frequencies are unnecessarily congested by detailed last-minute instructions in lieu of proper briefing. On-Site liaison by aviation unit commanders and staff members provides planning guidance to ground commanders and facilitates centralized control of supporting aviation elements. Establishment of overall command or task force Headquarters with an Army Aviation Element provided by the aviation battalion allows proper integration of aviation support into the overall operation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Designate a single headquarters to request and control aviation support for joint operations. Request and employ aviation liaison officers at this headquarters to establish centralized control and assist in planning for supporting aviation units. Combat Aviation Battalions organize and employ a qualified liaison team to Brigade size headquarters to provide aviation planning assistance for quick reaction missions.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Daily aviation support to the 24th Special Tactical Zone in Kontum Province has been effectively requested, scheduled, and employed since the 52d C.5.3 established a full time on-site liaison officer at the Zone forward CP. The IWO has both HI and HIF radio communications available for aircraft requests, mission data, situation reports and other traffic for the battalion headquarters, supporting aircraft, unit advisors and the Pathfinder Detachment participating in this operation.

c. (U) Training.

(1) Inadequate Training Time:

(a) OBSERVATION: This unit has experienced difficulty in conducting training because of mission requirements and understrength personnel status.

(b) EVALUATION: Mission requirements often are such that it is impossible to get sufficient personnel to attend training to make it worthwhile. Mission requirements and reduced strength make it necessary for personnel to work late at night. Individual spare time is at a premium throughout the unit making it difficult to schedule training for all personnel.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: If the present training requirements continues, consideration should be given to a reduction in mission requirements at selected intervals, commensurate with tactical requirements, to properly conduct training.

(2) Emergency Procedure Training For Newly Rated Aviators.

CONFIDENTIAL
AVMCR-CC (5 May 1969)


(a) OBSERVATION: Newly rated aviators reporting in-country are not adequately trained in certain emergency procedures of the UH-1 series helicopters.

(b) EVALUATION: All newly rated aviators are requiring intensive training by Battalion instructor pilots in hydraulic failures, tail rotor failures and in touchdown autorotations to unprepared surfaces.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: Place more emphasis on these procedures during student flight training at the U.S. Army Aviation School.

4. Instructor Pilot Training.

(a) OBSERVATION: Instructor pilot training conducted within this Battalion uses resources which are needed for missions.

(b) EVALUATION: This Battalion is required, due to the turnover of personnel, to train new Instructor Pilots and Standardization pilots on a continuous basis. This reduces the mission ready fleet of aircraft and places an additional burden on all elements of the Battalion, also the instructor candidate is deprived of much formal classroom instruction.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Expand the 1st Avn Bde Instructor Pilot course to provide a continuous flow of instructor pilots to all units.

(d) (U) Intelligence. None

(e) (C) Logistics and Aircraft Maintenance.

1. Class II Issue

(a) OBSERVATION: Difficulty is being experienced in obtaining expediteous release and transportation of high priority items from depot sources.

(b) EVALUATION: Nonex flight safety items which are reportedly on hand in depot sources are due out to this organization on high priority requisitions 06 through 02. Numerous requisitions have been hand-carried to Qui Nhon Depot. Few of these items have been filled (Reference 1st Avn Bde Supply and Maintenance Newsletter, April #4.) Initial issues cannot be made to some of the crew members due to these shortages.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the status of on hand assets for these items be evaluated within each depot and existing due outs be filled to enable this organization to comply with flight safety directives by lateral transfers between depots.

25
AVBACB-CC (5 May 1969)


(1) COMMAND ACTION: 52d CAD obtained authority to hand carry requisitions to depot; coordinated status through area coordinators without satisfactory results.

(2) Engineer Support:

(a) OBSERVATION: Engineer Support provided by the Support Engineer Group has not been satisfactory.

(b) EVALUATION: Numerous vertical construction projects have been delayed or left incomplete due to low priorities or lack of materials. Various examples are tabulated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECT</th>
<th>USING UNIT</th>
<th>REASON NOT COMPLETED OR STARTED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>arming Point Improvement</td>
<td>52nd CAB</td>
<td>Lack of Soil &amp; Stabilization Material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Pool</td>
<td>119th AC</td>
<td>Building Material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Billets</td>
<td>119th AC</td>
<td>Electrical Fixtures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/C Maint Hanger</td>
<td>119th AC</td>
<td>Electrical Fixtures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Pool</td>
<td>170th AC</td>
<td>Building Material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Billets</td>
<td>170th AC</td>
<td>Electrical Fixtures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/C Maint Hanger</td>
<td>170th AC</td>
<td>Electrical Fixtures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOQ's</td>
<td>52nd CAB</td>
<td>Electrical Fixtures &amp; Building Materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/C Maint Hanger</td>
<td>179th AFSC</td>
<td>Low Priority</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In some cases this organization was able to obtain and complete unfinished projects. This utilized manhours that could have been used to help accomplish the aviation mission.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Higher construction priorities should be established for this organization and greater emphasis be placed on construction material procurement.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Attempts to obtain higher priorities through higher headquarters and by direct coordination with the Engineer Support units have met with negative results.
(3) Outdated and Unmodified Survival Equipment.

(a) OBSERVATION: Current Survival radios and strobelights have not been modified and are outdated.

(b) EVALUATION: The current survival radio (URC-10 and RT-10) are obsolete. The strobe light has not been modified to eliminate the muzzle flash effect it gives at night.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Department of the Army procure and issue enough AN/URC-64 survival radios to properly equip each crew of each tactical unit in Vietnam. Also, procure the flash shield and filter currently being used on the strobe light by the U.S. Air Force.

(4) Survival Radios.

(a) OBSERVATION: Survival radio maintenance in-country is inadequate.

(b) EVALUATION: Individual survival radios are vital in RVN. Although they are frequently inoperative, there is no local repair facility available. Direct exchange capability is very limited and replacement radios cannot be supplied on a timely basis.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Train sufficient avionics technicians (MOS 35L20) to repair the AN/URC-10, RT-10 and URC-64 emergency frequency radios on hand. Authorize repair of these radios at second echelon maintenance level. Provide necessary publications, tools and equipment to aviation units service platoon to accomplish these repairs.

(5) Inadequate Maintenance Facility.

(a) OBSERVATION: Inadequate Engineer support has been provided in completion of the 179th Aviation Company maintenance hanger.

(b) EVALUATION: Construction schedules and projected completion priorities are continuously changed. As a result, footings for the hanger have been completed for approximately ten months with no further construction efforts. Heavy rains associated with the Southwest Monsoon without covered maintenance facilities will severely deter efforts of this unit. Mission requirements for the II Corps area necessitate uninterrupted CH-47 support.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Provide the supporting Engineer unit with personnel and equipment necessary for adequate support. Establish to provide immediate completion of this facility prior to Monsoon season.
(6) Experimental Equipment Support.

(a) OBSERVATION: Experimental equipment is assigned to the field for test without providing ready access to technical representatives and repair parts.

(b) EVALUATION: Clark Model 1733384, forklift 4000 lbs, pneumadic tire, rough terrain is an experimental model being field tested. It has been assigned to this unit without this unit having access to a technical representative to instruct unit maintenance personnel in the proper maintenance procedures for the equipment. Parts manuals are not available and special requisitioning procedures must be followed to obtain repair parts.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Provide technical representatives or detailed manuals to instruct maintenance personnel on care and maintenance of experimental items. Issue parts lists and specific, detailed procedures to obtain speedy replacement and spare parts.

(7) Flight Equipment Shortages.

(a) OBSERVATION: Protective flight equipment remains critically short.

(b) EVALUATION: Ballistic helmets, nomex gloves and flight suits, leather boots, and small arms body armor protective plates are virtually impossible to obtain through normal supply channels. 0-2 priority requisitions for these items to our local DSU receive negative results. Hand carried 0-2 priority requisitions have produced some satisfaction at Quin Nhon, receiving APH-5 (Non-b ballistic) helmets and nomex gloves; however, none of the other much needed items could be obtained.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: A more effective method for distribution of protective flight equipment is necessary. Units near depot areas seem to have much less trouble obtaining these items. These items should be distributed through Aviation Command Channels with special emphasis to prevent selected units and individuals from hoarding the equipment.

(8) Low Engine Power.

(a) OBSERVATION: The aircraft assigned to this company experienced extremely low engine power during the months of February and March.

(b) EVALUATION: The problem is believed to have been caused by a new grade of oil MIL23699, which replaced the oil previously used, MIL7808. Upon investigation and engine overhaul, it was revealed that the compressor blades were coated with a clay-like substance; and the fuel manifold nozzles were partially clogged, apparently with a mixture of new oil and dirt. Attempting to clean the engines...
with walnut shells and abrasives failed. The only successful method found was PD680 solvent sprayed into the compressor section of the engine and allowed to remain in the engine for a twelve hour period. Apparently, when the type dust found in the Central Highlands of Vietnam is taken into our present engines serviced with MIL23699 oil, the compressor blades become coated with a clay-like residue which in turn causes a resultant loss of power.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When continued use of MIL23699 oil is anticipated, that an aircraft modification be devised to prevent the larger dust particles from entering the engine and the reoccurrence of the problem as stated.

(9) CH-47C Technical Manuals:

(a) OBSERVATION: CH-47C Helicopters are being received by this battalion without the necessary reference manuals being available.

(b) EVALUATION: The requisition of replacement parts and FILL stockage for CH-47C cannot be accomplished in an expedious manner due to the non-availability of TM 55-1520-227-35P. The first CH-47C replacement aircraft was received in this battalion in March 1969 and as of 30 April 1969 the unit had received a total of ten. The unit has not been able to receive the appropriate -35P's thru either distribution or individual contacts in the theater.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Department of the Army insure that timely distribution of critically needed reference be made prior to the issuance of new aircraft.

(10) UH-1 Transmission Input Quill Leakage

(a) OBSERVATION: Excessive leakage of the transmission input quill has been noted in numerous cases after converting the UH-1 series aircraft to MIL-L-23699 oil.

(b) EVALUATION: After converting fleet aircraft to 23699, oil leakage around the transmission input quill has created much additional down time. During this reporting period this command has found it necessary to replace approximately 41/2 garlocks on the input quill. Failure to properly clean the engine after each case has also caused low power problems. The ingestion of the oil into the engine creates a build-up of oil and dirt on the compressor section of the engine which results in a disrupted airflow with a resultant loss of power. In some cases it was necessary to disassemble the entire engine to properly clean it.
AVBACB-OC (5 May 69)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CS FOR-65 (R-1) (U)

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That when converting to MIL-L-23699 oil in the UH-1 series aircraft, the transmission oil pressure be reduced to the minimum safe operating pressure, and A/C which has had input quill leakage have the engine checked immediately.

(11) Issue of CH-47C

(a) OBSERVATION: This unit received nine CH-47C aircraft and did not receive any parts to maintain them.

(b) EVALUATION: The CH-47C aircraft which were issued to this unit did not have any parts kits to maintain them while waiting for aircraft tech supply to catch up. Controlled cannibalization was necessary to keep many of the aircraft from going EDP.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The CH-47C aircraft should be issued with adequate parts supply to overcome minor difficulties until aircraft tech supply can obtain the needed parts.

(12) ZTR/ZYS Retrofit Program.

(a) OBSERVATION: Replacement aircraft have been assigned to the battalion without ZTR/ZYS modifications for secure voice operations.

(b) EVALUATION: Those newly assigned aircraft are required to be taken to Qui Nhon for modifications. There is a delay in the retrofit program when aircraft are needed to remain and support battalion operations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Aircraft be modified by a retrofit program before issue to units in-country.

(13) CONSEC Logistical Support

(a) OBSERVATION: Excessive time is spent for turn-in and receipt of CONSEC equipment.

(b) EVALUATION: CONSEC Secure voice equipment is required to be hand carried under guard when transported to the CONSEC Logistical Support Unit in Qui Nhon. Due to the distance traveled and the need for immediate service, excessive time is spent to transport defective equipment for repair.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: CONSEC logistical support be provided by another unit such as the 4th Inf Div CONSEC Logistical Support section.

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion
for Period Ending 30 April 1969

f. (U) Organization: None

g. (C) Other: Base Development Construction Time:

a. OBSERVATION: Construction directives were issued for construction of Kontum compound in May 1968. The compound construction directive included projects for construction of perimeter lighting and installation of a 300 KW power plant in addition to several other projects.

b. EVALUATION: An Aviation unit is dependent upon power in order to provide light to perform night maintenance and run the equipment utilized to repair aircraft. TOE generators can provide the required power but not over an extended period of time. Power is wasted also in maintaining and repairing the TOE generators. The inadequate power presently available has caused many electric motors to burn out due to low voltage and unbalanced phasing. Security lighting is necessary to secure the valuable aircraft assets on this compound. Inquiries as to why the excessive time period construction of the power plant and Security Lighting has been explained as a lack of materials.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Procedures should be established to make the materials available for approved projects to provide the power for the security lighting for maintenance of aircraft assets.

RICHARD L. STOesser
LTC
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
2 - CINCPUSA FAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558
3 - CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375
2 - CG, 1st Ave Bde, ATTN: AVBA-MH, APO 96384
7 - CO, 17th CAG, ATTN: AVBACB-SC, APO 96240
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (Rl) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 17TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP, APO 96240 24 May 1969

TO: Department of the Army, (ACSFOR, DA) Washington, D.C. 20310
    Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350
    Commanding Officer, 52d Combat Aviation Battalion, APO 96318

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the attached report, considers it to be adequate, and concurs with the contents as stated, except as indicated below.

2. (C) The following comments and recommendations are submitted:

   a. Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.
      (1) Paragraph If (2), Class II, Page 14: Shortages of Nomex clothing exist only in particular sizes, such as small-short. The 17th CAG is approximately 85% filled. Requisitions have been submitted for shortages.

      (2) Paragraph If (4), Engineer Support, Page 15: Numerous requests have been given to the engineers and higher headquarters requesting that a higher priority be placed on construction requests for aviation elements. These requests have had negative results. Self-help programs provided the only completed projects.

      (3) Paragraph li (3), Flight Standardization, Page 18: Requests to construct an autorotation area have been sent to PA&E and the supporting engineers but the project priority was very low and no results were obtained.

      (4) Paragraph li (5), Flight Standardization, Page 19: Only four helicopter instrument examiners are assigned within 17th CAG, one of whom is assigned to the 17th CAG Standardization Section. This examiner is available for instrument renewal rides; however, no realistic training program can be maintained for instrument renewals.

      (5) Paragraph lk (3) (a), Signal, Page 20: The consolidation of message center and commcenter tends to downgrade the responsiveness of the handling of electrically transmitted messages. Secondly, classified messages and unclassified material are handled within the same area in a volume which endangers the security of classified messages. Distribution, less messages, should be handled by administrative personnel.

      (6) Paragraph lk (3) (c), Signal, Page 20: Subparagraph b erroneously omitted. Consolidation of avionics sections is providing satisfactory avionics support to all units.

CONFIDENTIAL 32

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10
b. Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluation and Recommendations.

(1) Paragraph 2a (1), Critical MOS shortages, Page 20: Concur.

(2) Paragraph 2a (2), Military Justice, Page 20: Concur with recommendation. Each disciplinary problem must be considered individually and confinement resorted to, particularly on first offenders, in exceptional cases. Provisions are available to commanders to confine first offenders (USARV Reg 27-1) when the situation dictates.

(3) Paragraph 2a (3), Junior Officer Career Development, Page 21: Concur.

(4) Paragraph 2b (1), Quality of Door Gunner applicants, Page 21: Concur. This has been a recurring problem. Assignment of substandard individuals blemishes the aviation image. This headquarters concurs with recommendation of "screening action" at brigade level. In addition, some individuals are arriving at units of the 17th CAG without medical certificates for gunner duty. The recommended "screening action" should include a check for such a certificate prior to acceptance for gunner duty.

(5) Paragraph 2b (2), "Hot" Fire Support Base Landing Techniques, Page 22: Concur. Recommend consolidation be effected by the 1st Aviation Brigade and included as a supplement to Operational Procedures Guide.

(6) Paragraph 2b (3), Foreign Object Damage, Page 22: Concur that helicopters should not land in areas which are poorly policed. Aviation commanders within this command have been directed to periodically survey landing areas and effect necessary coordination with the appropriate ground commander.

(7) Paragraph 2b (4), Logistics Operations Center (LOC) Operation, Page 22: Concur. Deployment of forward command post teams has solved part of this problem. However, these teams do not have UHF capability nor does the Air Force transports normally have FM. MACV Directive 95-9 outlines responsibilities for Joint Operations at forward air strips and makes provisions for employment of control teams.

(8) Paragraph 2b (5), Unservicable Air-Delivery Equipment, Page 23: Concur with recommendation as stated.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBACB-SC (5 May 69) 1st Ind 24 May 1969
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(9) Paragraph 2b (6), Effective Aviation Employment, Page 23: Concur. The 17th CAG has established liaison officers at major supported unit headquarters which has aided in proper planning and utilization of aviation assets during airmobile operations and support activities. An effective system is now in operation and no further action is deemed necessary.

(10) Paragraph 2c (1), Inadequate Training Time, Page 24: Concur. While it is recognized that aviation units experience unique problems in completing mandatory training requirements, this headquarters does not consider the problem insurmountable. Although it creates an additional hardship on the unit training, commitments can be met by scheduling make-up classes.


(12) Paragraph 2c (3), Erroneously Omitted.

(13) Paragraph 2c (4), Instructor Pilot Training, Page 25: Concur. This is a recurring problem throughout the 17th CAG. Support of a continuous training program is difficult and creates extra maintenance problems. Recommend USARV expand the instructor pilot courses to provide additional quotas for all units.

(14) Paragraph 2c (1), Class II Issue, Page 25: Concur. Investigation by this headquarters shows that this problem does exist. Recommend that the 1st Logistical Command release and ship from the depot having the Nomex flight safety items, rather than laterally transferring items.

(15) Paragraph 2e (2), Engineer Support, Page 26: Concur: Recommend that higher engineer priorities be established for all aviation units. These units are not equipped with additional personnel or equipment to do construction type work. Aviation units are fully committed maintaining and flying organic aircraft so that even self-help projects detract from the primary mission.

(16) Paragraph 2e (3), Outdated and Unmodified Survival Equipment, Page 27: Concur. AN/URC - 64 radios have been procured and are being issued. Present stock of URC-10 radios is adequate, pending issue of adequate AN/URC - 64's. The flash shield and filter for strobe lights can be locally modified.

(17) Paragraph 2e (4) Survival Radios, Page 27: Nonconcur. Recommend that direct exchange stocks be increased so that radios...
can be exchanged on a timely basis. Also recommend that 2d echelon maintenance units be issued test equipment only and repair of these radios not be authorized at unit level.

(18) Paragraph 2e (5), Inadequate Maintenance Facility, Page 27: Concur. The 179th ASHC hangar was an approved project in January 1966. However, only the footings have been completed. The Engineer unit is now ready to build this hangar, but after 3 1/2 years they are awaiting parts that have been lost.

(19) Paragraph 2e (6), Experimental Equipment Support, Page 28: Concur. Proper evaluation of the equipment is not possible without normal support and publications. Recommend publications be provided and definite lines of support be established in future equipment evaluations.

(20) Paragraph 2e (7), Flight Equipment Shortages, Page 28: Concur. A more effective method of distribution is required for protective flight equipment. Inspections by this headquarters have not revealed any units hoarding flight equipment. Recommend that the initial issue of Nomex flight suits, Nomex gloves, and ballistics helmets be made at the Replacement Center with only replacement equipment handled at unit level.

(21) Paragraph 2e (8), Low Engine Power, Page 28: Nonconcur. Investigations have shown that this problem was caused by the failure of using units to properly clean aircraft engines during the period the oil leaks were being experienced.

(22) Paragraph 2e (9), CH-47 Technical Manuals, Page 29: Concur with the evaluations and recommendations as stated.

(23) Paragraph 2e (10), UH-1 Transmission Input Quill Leakage, Page 29: Nonconcur. The transmission input quill leakage discussed is the result of using MIL-L-23699 oil to lubricate transmissions in which MIL-L-7808 oil has been previously used. Units are now using MIL-L-23699 only in new or newly overhauled components.

(24) Paragraph 2e (11), Issue of CH-47, Page 30: Concur. This headquarters is coordinating with 1st Avn Bde to determine status of CH-47C repair parts.

(25) Paragraph 2e (12), ZYR/ZyS Retrofit Program, Page 30: Concur with recommendation as stated.
CONFIDENTIAL
AVBACB-SC (5 May 69) 1st Ind 25 June 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(26) Paragraph 2e (13), COMSEC Logistical Support, Page 30: Concur. The 52d CAB has been advised to submit a request through channels recommending a shift of support responsibility.

(27) Paragraph 2g, Base Development Construction Time, Page 31: Concur. In the past 6 months base construction has all but ceased. The engineers are building and constructing roads and bridges which have higher priority than base development. On 11 May 69 the hangar at Kontum was destroyed by direct fire from 122 MM rockets fired from a range of less than 200 meters. This hangar and six aircraft may have been saved if the security lighting, which was approved in March 1968, had been installed. Recommend a higher priority be established for critical installation defense projects.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

MARC L. TUMAS
CPT, ADA
Adjutant

A TRUE COPY

LEONARD G. NOWAK
MAJ, GS

36
CONFIDENTIAL
TO: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO 96384

This headquarters has reviewed subject report and preceding indorsement and concurs except with respect to paragraph If (4) Engineer Support.

a. Comment presents desired unit priority but neglects to consider that all projects within II CTZ must be arranged in priority. Funding of base development projects is a function of USARV, with assignment of priorities accomplished at a conference held at this headquarters quarterly.

b. Combat and operational support missions compose an average of 25% of the 937th Engr Gp troop effort and take precedence over all base development projects. Shortages of critical construction materials are a perennial problem. When they occur, the constructing unit expedites requisitions and this headquarters renders whatever assistance possible in securing critical materials.

c. When the unit feels a particular project has been assigned too low a priority, it should supplement the original justification for the project and resubmit through prescribe channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

FREDERICK E. HOLLAND
1LT AGC
ASST AG

Cy furn:
2 - ACSFOR, DA
1 - 52d Cbt Avn Bn

A TRUE COPY

LEONARD G. NOWAK
MAJ, GS

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD Dir 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBAGC-O (5 May 69)  3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion For Period
Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-l) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384  30 Jun 1969

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,
APO 96375
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT,
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C., 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed this report, considers it to be
adequate and concurs with the contents as indorsed, except as noted below.

2. (C) The following additional comments are considered pertinent:


      (1) The general, continuing shortage of doorgunners led to USARV es-
      tablishing a special program whereby individuals throughout Vietnam could
      volunteer and extend their FST to be assigned to doorgunner duties. All
      such applications for assignment to 1st Aviation Brigade units are refer-
      red to brigade headquarters for review and acceptance or rejection.

      (2) Because of the recognized need for responsible, capable indivi-
      duals to enhance the effectiveness and safety of aviation operations,
      each application is carefully screened for record of previous misconduct
      or inefficiency, and all doubtful applicants are rejected. Difficulties
      previously experienced with accepted applicants failing to meet flight
      physical standards are expected to be eliminated by USARV's recent re-
      quirement that the appropriate medical certificate accompany each applica-
      tion. There have been some cases in which the applicant's poor record
      was not properly reflected in the application, resulting in acceptance of
      substandard personnel. However, in each such instance brought to the at-
      tention of this headquarters, presentation of the facts of the case to
      HQ USARV has resulted in the individual being returned to his former unit.

      (3) Training for assignment to doorgunner duties can be adequately
      accomplished in each aviation company.

      (4) Diversion of doorgunner volunteers to duties in other than MOS
      67A1F or higher skill levels of that MOS is not normally acceptable, par-
      ticularly in the case of those who have extended their FST specifically
      to serve as a doorgunner. Authorized exceptions are individuals who do
      not meet prescribed physical standards, request relief from flying dut-
      ies, or demonstrate inability to satisfactorily perform doorgunner duties.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion For Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-l) (U)

It is essentially a question of the Army honoring the commitment when extension of foreign service tour was approved.

(5) Recommend that current procedures continue in effect.

b. Paragraph 2b (4), page 22: Concur with the observation. 165th Aviation Group has forwarded a letter to USARV requesting that 17 additional control towers, AN/T SQ-70A, be obtained to support present ATC tower requirements. If this request is approved and the towers are issued, then tactical air traffic control teams (TATCT) presently located at those airfields requiring towers would be available to work at other locations such as Logistical Operations Center areas.

c. Paragraph 2b (5), page 23: Nonconcur with the recommendation. Due to the use of different supply systems used by ARVN it is not possible to issue sling equipment to ARVN units through US logistical support channels. It is recommended instead that this problem be addressed to Hqs, IFFV in order that it may be brought to the attention of the senior ARVN Advisors in that headquarters. A second recommendation is that the supporting Aviation unit send a liaison officer to the ARVN unit prior to the scheduled lift of supplies to inspect their air delivery equipment. Although this may slow down the movement of supplies because of a limited amount of serviceable air delivery equipment, it will help eliminate the loss or damage to valuable cargo through dropping and spilling.

d. Paragraph 2c (4), page 25: Nonconcur with the recommendation. Due to the nonavailability of aircraft, instructor pilots, and satisfactory training areas, it is not feasible to expand the 1st Aviation Brigade Instructor Pilot Course beyond its present level. This course was initiated only to supplement the training of instructor pilot replacements at unit level and to supply instructors better qualified to conduct this unit training. Availability of training aircraft at all levels of command is a problem; however, continued emphasis on the part of unit commanders and, in particular supported ground commanders is required to insure that adequate numbers of aircraft are made available for training. Recommend that whenever possible the 90 day standardization ride be given during and following single ship direct combat support (DCS) missions. This will reduce the number of training aircraft required to accomplish the training requirement of each unit.

e. Paragraph 2e (1), page 25: Concur with the comments contained in paragraph 14 of 1st Indorsement. It is not feasible to laterally transfer quantities of this equipment between depots. The procedure for the issue of NOMEX flight safety items is for the requisitions to be forwarded from the unit to the direct support activity. If the direct support activity has a zero balance the requisition is forwarded to the immediate depot.
Depot will fill the requisition or forward to USAICCV. USAICCV will screen the availability at other depots within country and out a release document to the depot which has the equipment. In the event the requested items are not available within country, USAICCV forwards the request to CONUS.

f. Paragraph 2e (2), page 26: Concur with IFFV comments contained in 2d Indorsement.

Paragraph 2e (3), page 27: Nonconcur. Action is presently in progress to procure these items. The URC 68 was returned to the manufacturer for modification prior to Defense Department Acceptance. Anticipated arrival date in RVN is Aug 69. Blue shields for strobe lights are on back order to USAICCV. Referenced AN/URC 64 cannot be identified.

h. Paragraph 2e (4), page 27. The availability of radios and parts within the supply system is critical. Original purchases of AN/UFC-10 and RT-10 radios did not provide an adequate number for the operation of a float system. Equipment was not purchased to provide maintenance below the depot level. These radios are presently being placed under the repair and return to user program. This will provide a 30 to 60 day repair time for a unit. There will no longer be a repair and return to stock program on these radios due to the insufficient number within the supply system. A number of RT-10 radios have been located in stock in CONUS and are due in-country during June to help alleviate the shortages. The new radio URC-68 is due to start arriving in country during August for issuance to aviation units. An inter-service agreement is being attempted to allow the repair of radios by in-country Air Force facilities.

i. Paragraph 2e (5), page 27: Nonconcur for the same reason as 2e (2). COMUSMACV has established the RVN construction priorities. This hangar will be started with the completion of the 604th TC Co hangar. Missing parts are on Red Ball requisition from CONUS and construction should start by 1 September 1969.

j. Paragraph 2e (6), page 28: Nonconcur. The Clark Model 1733384 Forklift, 4000 lbs, is not an experimental item. It is nonstandard. The item was shipped to Vietnam with a one year repair parts package. As a nonstandard item and to ease repair parts supply, repair parts have been stocked in the Nonstandard Repair Parts Depot, PA&E, APO 96307. Procedures for requisitioning these parts are Standard MILSTRAP exception (AOE) requisitions against the cited depot. Per fonecon G-4 Supply Officer and S-4 52d CAB, this entry was not submitted. The battalion is unaware of any problems in this area.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBAGC-O (5 May 69)  3d Ind  30 June 1969
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation For Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1)(U)

k. Paragraph 2e (7), page 28: Nonconcur. Presently all APH-6 Ballistic Helmets are being monitored by Hq USARV Aviation Logistics branch. This headquarters is informed when releases of Ballistic Helmets are made to Brigade units. The 52d CAB's latest Commander's Critical Items List (CGIL) did not indicate any shortage of other flight safety equipment. Fonecon with S-4, 17th CAG, indicated this is not a valid observation.

l. Paragraph 2e (9), page 29: This observation is a valid one and deserves attention of the project manager. Some TM 55-1520-227-35P manuals are in-country, however, in short supply. Customer Assistance Officer, 34th General Support Group called the project manager in St Louis on 28 May 1969, to have him mail copies of available changes and manuals to the CH-47C units in RVN. Some of the recent changes to CH-47A model helicopter TM-35P's include references to "C" model parts. These changes may prove helpful in the interim period.

m. Paragraph 2e (10), page 29. USARV letter, subject: Use of MIL-L-23699 and MIL-L-7808 Oils in Army Turbine Powered Aircraft, dated 3 May 1969, outlines the proper use of oil and changeover procedures. The complaint of leakage problems upon changeover to MIL-L-23699 in components which have been using MIL-L-7808 for some time is a general reported fault and appears to be valid. When problems are encountered the letter specifies requirements for submitting EIR's with certain information contained therein. Bringing attention to these problems through the use of EIR action is the most expeditious way of affecting a change in procedures. This headquarters is in agreement with a recommendation to changeover oils as new components are placed into use and to eliminate the requirement to changeover old components at the next periodic inspection. This would eliminate all problem areas and is a more logical procedure for executing changeover.

n. Paragraph 2e (11), page 30. The push packages containing initial parts issued for support of CH-47C helicopters in the 52d CAB were shipped on 18 June 1969.

o. Paragraph 2e (12), page 30. The Army Materiel Command has been unable to produce enough retrofit kits to modify all aircraft as they are completed on the assembly line. The decision has been made that as the kits are produced they will be shipped to Vietnam. Aircraft cannot be detained from shipment due to noncompletion of the retrofit at the factory. The 34th General Support Group does not have the authority to retrofit, nor fly these aircraft to a retrofit unit prior to acceptance by the gaining unit.

p. Paragraph 2e (13), page 30. The COMSEC Logistical Support Unit (CLSU) in Qui Nhon has been assigned to provide support to the 52d CAB.
The amount of float equipment and maintenance personnel available at Qui Nhon was based in part on the density of COMSEC equipment in the 52d CAB. The 4th Infantry Division's CLSU does not have float equipment nor an adequate number of personnel to support the 4th Division and the 52d CAB. A direct Support Repair Team for COMSEC equipment is programmed to be assigned to the Pleiku area within the next 60 days. This team will provide support to the units of the 52d CAB located at Pleiku.

q. Paragraph 2g, page 31. These materials are on order and are due in-country in July 1969. This project has a high IFFV priority and completion date is estimated to be 15 July 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER

DAVID R. ANDERSON
CPT, AGC
ASST. AG

A TRUE COPY

LEONARD G. NOWAK
MAJ, GS
AVHGC-DST (5 May 1969) 4th Ind

Subj: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1969, HGS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters, 52d Combat Aviation Battalion.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. (U) Reference item concerning "Engineer Support," section 1, page 15, paragraph 11f(4) and 1st Indorsement paragraph 2a(2); nonconcur. The base development priority for US Forces is number six of seven established priorities. Unfortunately, not all "customers" can be satisfied when there are higher priority missions to be accomplished by the available engineer effort. Three projects can be identified for this unit, each having an active construction directive. One project has not been started because of higher priority work. The second project is part of an extremely large cantonment facility. The constructing unit has accomplished 60 percent of the total scope, but the 52d Aviation Battalion's portion remains to be finished. The third project is 71 percent complete, and is being delayed because of material shortages.

   b. (U) Reference item concerning "Flight Standardization," section 1, page 18, paragraph 1i and 1st Indorsement paragraph 2a(3). This project was disapproved by USARV in the FY 69 MCA construction program. If the requirement is still valid it should be resubmitted IAW USARV Regulation 415-1. Priorities of construction for FAAR are established by the Base Development Board, not the engineers.

   c. (U) Reference item concerning "Military Justice," section 11, page 20, paragraph 2a(2); nonconcur. Paragraph 11a, USARV Regulation 27-1, requires the prior approval of the general court martial authority or his representative before placing a first offender, tried by special court martial, in confinement. Only serious first offenders will be confined. A review of the last two confinement rosters indicates that an average of 55 first offenders were confined in the USARV Installation Stockade out of an average Army population of 386. All were confined in accordance with the current policy. First offenders are normally more readily rehabilitable in the unit than in confinement.

   d. (C) Reference item concerning "Junior Officer Career Development," section 11, page 21, paragraph a(3); nonconcur. Because of the
accelerated junior officer promotion policy, it is necessary to program junior officers and warrant officers into both the Safety Course and AHOG before they gain experience in a unit. The highest grade authorized for either position in a company is captain.

e. (C) Reference item concerning "Logistics Operations Center (LOC) Operation," section II, page 22, paragraph b(4); concur. USAECOM has advised this headquarters that additional control towers are not currently available. New towers are not expected to arrive in RVN for at least one year.

f. (C) Reference item concerning "Emergency Procedure Training for Newly Rated Aviators," section II, page 24, paragraph c(2); concur. USAAVNS has recently modified their training program to place more emphasis on emergency procedures.

g. (U) Reference item concerning "Engineer Support," section II, page 26, paragraph e(2); nonconcur. Paragraph 2a of this Indorsement applies.

h. (C) Reference item concerning "Outdated and Unmodified Survival Equipment," section II, page 27, paragraph e(3); concur. The radio referred to in the basic correspondence is an AN/URC 68. The Army has procured 3800 of these radios, 120 of which have been distributed throughout USARV. The RT-10 radio will be issued in the interim to satisfy the critical shortage of survival radios.

i. (C) Reference item concerning "CH-47C Technical Manuals," section II, page 29, paragraph e(9); concur. This headquarters has apprised USAAVSCOM of this and other discrepancies associated with new aviation equipment arriving in RVN.

j. (C) Reference item concerning "UH-1 Transmission Input Quill Leakage," section II, page 29, paragraph e(10); concur; provided oil pressure remains within operating limits. USARV Letter, dated 3 March 1969, subject: Use of MIL-L-7808 and MIL-L-23699 Oils in Army Turbine powered Aircraft, outlines the proper procedures for the conversion and directs the action to take when problems arise. No further action is required by higher headquarters.

k. (U) Reference item concerning "Base Development Construction Time," section II, page 31, paragraph 2g; 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2b(27)
AVHGC-DST (5 May 1969) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

and 3d Indorsement, paragraph 2g; concur. CD 63-254-03, dated 3 May 1968, Security Lighting Kontum, is 31 percent complete but work has stopped due to a shortage of electrical wire and for higher priority projects. The wire is due-in from CONUS, but the ETA is unknown. CD 63-252-03, dated 30 March 1969, Airfield and Cantonment Facilities, which provides for three 100KW generators is 99 percent complete, lacking only the generators. It is anticipated that the generators will arrive in the October to December 1969 time frame.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cg furn:
52d CAB
1st Avn Bde
GPOP-DT (5 May 69) 5th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 52d Combat Aviation
Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1969,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 SEP 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

CPT, AGC
5th AG
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>COMMANDER</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>APO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>52d Cbt Avn Bn</td>
<td>LTC Richard L. Stoessner</td>
<td>Camp Holloway, Pleiku, RVN</td>
<td>96318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;FLYING DRAGONS&quot;</td>
<td>CPT Eugene H. Kobes</td>
<td>Camp Holloway, Pleiku, RVN</td>
<td>96318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Co</td>
<td>1LT Victor L. Coulter (None Authorized)</td>
<td>Camp Holloway, Pleiku, RVN</td>
<td>96318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52d Sec Det</td>
<td>MAJ James T. Kearnes</td>
<td>City Airfield, Kontum, RVN</td>
<td>96499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57th Avn Co (AML)</td>
<td>MAJ John P. Fernald</td>
<td>Camp Holloway, Pleiku, RVN</td>
<td>96318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;GLADIATORS&quot;</td>
<td>CPT Curtice T. Martin</td>
<td>96318</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>154th Med Det</td>
<td>MAJ Raymond L. Hardy</td>
<td>Camp Holloway, Pleiku, RVN</td>
<td>96318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>321st ASD</td>
<td>CPT Joseph F. Homann</td>
<td>MAJ Jacobson K. Schultz</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119th Avn Co (AML)</td>
<td>MAJ Louis R. Jones Jr.</td>
<td>Camp Holloway, Pleiku, RVN</td>
<td>96318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;ALLIGATOR&quot;</td>
<td>MAJ Robert M. Funisy</td>
<td>Camp Holloway, Pleiku, RVN</td>
<td>96318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94th Med Det</td>
<td>CPT David E. Sullivan</td>
<td>Camp Holloway, Pleiku, RVN</td>
<td>96318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170th Avn Co (AML)</td>
<td>MAJ Richard L. Lincoln</td>
<td>Camp Holloway, Pleiku, RVN</td>
<td>96318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;BIKINIS&quot;</td>
<td>MAJ Jacobson K. Schultz</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>755th Med Det</td>
<td>MAJ Robert M. Funisy</td>
<td>Camp Holloway, Pleiku, RVN</td>
<td>96318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>179th Avn Co (MH)</td>
<td>CPT Ralph E. Mullens (None Authorized)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;SHRIMPBOATS&quot;</td>
<td>MAJ Richard L. Lincoln</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>189th Avn Co (AML)</td>
<td>CPT Ralph E. Mullens (None Authorized)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;WORKHORSE&quot; (OPCON)</td>
<td>MAJ Robert M. Funisy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>361st Avn Co (Escort)</td>
<td>CPT Ralph E. Mullens (None Authorized)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Incl 1
OPERATIONAL RESULTS AS OF 30 APRIL 1969

1. (C) Results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>SORTIES FLOWN</th>
<th>TROOPS LIFTED</th>
<th>CARGO LIFTED (TONS)</th>
<th>ENEMY KBA</th>
<th>STRUCTURES DAM DEST</th>
<th>SAM TAMS' DAM DEST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>57th AC (AML)</td>
<td>26,256</td>
<td>35,232</td>
<td>951</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119th AC (AML)</td>
<td>20,693</td>
<td>26,946</td>
<td>917</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170th AC (AML)</td>
<td>20,332</td>
<td>32,979</td>
<td>1860</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>189th AC (AML)</td>
<td>23,534</td>
<td>33,330</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>179th AC (AML)</td>
<td>5,473</td>
<td>16,571</td>
<td>13,273</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>361st AC (E)</td>
<td>2,406</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

520 CAB

98,694 145,639 17,637 39 30

2. (C) Losses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>AIRCRAFT LOST TYPE</th>
<th>AIRCRAFT DAMAGED TYPE</th>
<th>NR</th>
<th>NR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>57th AC (AML)</td>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119th AC (AML)</td>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170th AC (AML)</td>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>179th AC (AML)</td>
<td>CH-47A</td>
<td>CH-47A</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CH-47C</td>
<td>CH-47C</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>189th AC (AML)</td>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>361st AC (E)</td>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

520 CAB

11 107

Incl 4
**AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE**

1. **(C) Aircraft Status (Authorized / On Hand) as of 30 April 1969.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>AH-1G</th>
<th>UH-1C</th>
<th>UH-1H</th>
<th>CH-47A&amp;C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>57th AC (AML)</td>
<td>8/7</td>
<td>23/20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119th AC (AML)</td>
<td>8/7</td>
<td>23/20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170th AC (AML)</td>
<td>8/7</td>
<td>23/19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>179th ASHC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16/18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>189th AC (AML)</td>
<td>8/6</td>
<td>23/18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>361st AC (E)</td>
<td>12/12</td>
<td></td>
<td>2/2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC</td>
<td></td>
<td>2/2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52d CAB</td>
<td>12/12</td>
<td>34/29</td>
<td>94/79</td>
<td>16/18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. **(C) Aircraft Availability (Daily Average).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>CRITERIA</th>
<th>CRITERIA</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>Availability</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>74.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mission Ready</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>63.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EIM</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EDP</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td>Availability</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>69.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mission Ready</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>61.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EIM</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EDP</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-47</td>
<td>Availability</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>70.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mission Ready</td>
<td>E/A</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>68.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EIM</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EDP</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>Availability</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>64.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mission Ready</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>55.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EIM</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EDP</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Incl 5
### Recapitulation of Flying Hours

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>AVG NO ON HAND</th>
<th>AVG HRS FLO wn</th>
<th>AVG HRS PER A/C</th>
<th>AVAILABILITY</th>
<th>% DA PROGRAM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td>57th AC</td>
<td>FEB</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>APR</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>119th AC</td>
<td>FEB</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>120%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>APR</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>170th AD</td>
<td>FEB</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>APR</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>189th AC</td>
<td>FEB</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>107%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>APR</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>103%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>52nd</td>
<td>FEB</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>1459</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>APR</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>1340</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>57th AC</td>
<td>FEB</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>100.6</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>135%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>98.5</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>133%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>APR</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>1720</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td>121%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>119th</td>
<td>FEB</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>1441</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>106%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>107.5</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>147%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>APR</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>1701</td>
<td>85.5</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>116%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>170th AC</td>
<td>FEB</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>1836</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>125%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>2457</td>
<td>122.8</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>166%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>APR</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>1865</td>
<td>96.1</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>130%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>189th AC</td>
<td>FEB</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>1777</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>120%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>1883</td>
<td>96.1</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>130%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>APR</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>1903</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>132%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>52nd</td>
<td>FEB</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>7037</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>122%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>8312</td>
<td>106.2</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>144%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>APR</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>7189</td>
<td>92.2</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>125%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>361st AC</td>
<td>FEB</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>789</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>APR</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-27</td>
<td>179th AC</td>
<td>FEB</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>938</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>120%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>APR</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Incl 5**
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 52d Combat Aviation Battalion

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb 69 to 30 Apr 69.

Co, 52d Combat Aviation Battalion