<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASSIFICATION CHANGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TO: UNCLASSIFIED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM: CONFIDENTIAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIMITATION CHANGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TO: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Document partially illegible.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTHORITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ago, d/a ltr, 25 jun 1975</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECURITY MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.
THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST QUALITY AVAILABLE. THE COPY FURNISHED TO DTIC CONTAINED A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF PAGES WHICH DO NOT REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310


SEE DISTRIBUTION

This document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, United States Code, Sections 793 and 794. Its transmission or communication of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

Operational report for quarterly period ending 30 April 69.

ROBERT E. LYNCH
Colonel, USA
Acting The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

Commanding Generals
CommandingGenerals
US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command

Commandants
US Army War College
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army Air Defense School
US Army Armor School
US Army Aviation School
US Army Engineer School
US Army Field Artillery School
US Army Infantry School
US Army Ordnance School
US Army Quartermaster School
US Army Signal School
US Army Transportation School

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.

CONFIDENTIAL

003 650
CONFIDENTIAL

DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Research and Development
Assistant Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Engineers
Director, Defense Research and Engineering
Commanding Generals
US Army Materiel Command
US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay
Commandant of the Marine Corps
Defense Documentation Center
Security Officer, Hudson Institute
Commanding Officers
US Army Limited War Laboratory
US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center
AVCA CRB-00-0

15 May 1969


THRU: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA 00-0, APO San Francisco 96384
Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO San Francisco 96375
Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: CPOP-OT, APO San Francisco 96550

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 20310

1. (C) Section I - Operations: Significant Activities

   a. ACofS, Personnel and Administration

      (1) Personnel Management:

         (a) Command Military Strength: The authorized strength of the command increased during the period. This was primarily attributable to the assignment of the US Army Marine Maintenance Activity, Vietnam (USAMMAV) to the Support Command. Assigned personnel strength showed a significant decrease. Officers and Warrant Officers remained stable, however, approximately 600 enlisted personnel were lost without replacements. The command is critically short 582 enlisted men in three of its mission essential MOS's: Ammunition Handlers (176); Cargo Handlers (151); Drivers (255). The summary below reflects only a decrease of 200 personnel rather than 600. The reason for this is the assignment of USAMMAV with approximately 100 personnel. All authorized strength figures have the positions civilianized under Program 6 deleted.

         | 1 Feb 69 | 30 Apr 69 | Net Change |
         | Auth | Asgd | Auth | Asgd | Auth | Asgd |
         | OFF  | 452  | 437  | 490  | 439  | +48  | +2   |
         | WO   | 131  | 115  | 115  | 150  | +14  | +35  |
         | ENL  | 8245 | 8792 | 9013 | 8577 | +565 | -215 |
         | TOTAL| 9051 | 9341 | 9618 | 9168 | +507 | -188 |

         (b) Local National Civilian Programs: On 28 March 1969 a Department of the Army hiring freeze was placed on all local national civilian positions. As of 30 April 1969, the freeze was still in effect. It has had no appreciable effect on Program 6 civilianization because the hiring of civilians under that program had already been completed. However, it did have a significant effect on the authorized strength figures for local civilian personnel.
cant impact on the US Army Depot, Cam Ranh which had only hired 911 of 1328 local nationals authorized at the time the freeze went into effect.

(e) Program 6 Civilianization: The Support Command attained 100% of its Program 6 hiring objective (986) on 15 March 1969. On 25 February 1969, the command was authorized to hire up to 1086 local nationals for Program 6. The purpose of this 10% overhiring was to provide for turnover of personnel and still allow the units to keep all local national civilian positions filled. By the date of the hiring freeze on 28 March 1969, 1028 employees had been hired for Program 6 positions. Numerically, Program 6 civilianization was highly successful, but the overall skill level of the employees is very low. Another major problem encountered was the civilianization of positions in areas where local nationals cannot be used for security reasons: The 191st Ordnance Battalion (Army) has 114 Ammunition Handler positions in ASF; the 262d Quartermaster Battalion (POL) has 129 tank farm worker positions; and the 155th Transportation Company (Terminal Service-Amph Pier) has 67 Stevedore positions which cannot be utilized as intended. The local national civilians have been hired for these positions but they cannot be utilized to replace the military positions that were withdrawn.

(d) Local National Direct Hire Civilian Employees: There were no significant changes in the command's Local National Direct Hire personnel program. The inability to fill the 1328 local national civilian positions in the US Army Depot continues to be a major problem. On 1 February 1969, 863 spaces had been filled. When the local national hiring freeze was put into effect on 28 March 1969, 911 positions were filled and on 30 April 1969, the number of employees had dropped to 896. 39% of the Depot's labor force authorization is civilian, therefore, Depot is heavily dependent on local national labor for successful mission accomplishment. However, more than 400 jobs have remained constantly vacant. The large majority of these positions require skilled employees who are not available in this area (equipment operators, drivers, and mechanics).

(e) Local National Civilian Training Programs: The Support Command's local national civilian training programs (Project Skills II) have progressed satisfactorily. As of 30 April, 21 classes had been conducted and 171 employees had completed formal training courses. 7 classes with an enrollment of 130 employees are in progress. Although these programs have been successful in terms of employee productivity, additional training by professional instructors is needed. In March 1969, the USARV Civilian Personnel Director visited this command and agreed to establish permanent training programs in language development and several hard skill areas.

(f) Department of the Army Civilians: The Support Command is authorized 83 DAC's and had only 52 assigned on 30 April 1969. 22 of the 31 vacancies are in the US Army Depot and are supervisory positions of a grade level comparable to a commissioned officer. This shortage definitely has an adverse impact on mission accomplishment. During the past 3 months, the command gained a net total of only 2 DAC's and at this time there are only 2 known DAC projected gains. Recruitment action on the majority of the DAC vacancies was initiated in June 1968. Based on information received from the USARV Civilian
Personnel Director's office, there are insufficient DAC's willing to come to Vietnam to fill all of the available jobs in-country. It therefore appears that several of the positions will remain permanently vacant.

(2) Personnel Services Division:

(a) On 31 March 1969, the US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay Chapter of the 1st Logistical Command Association was formed as a private nonprofit organization to foster the spirit of comradeship and esprit de corps among its members. The Association will construct a memorial to those members of the 1st Logistical Command who have died in Vietnam as a result of hostile action and establish a scholarship fund for their dependents.

(b) In April 1969, the Ton Trong 1st (Pride 1st) Program was implemented throughout the Command. The program consists of taped speech by the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command followed by a speech by the unit commander on avoidable courts-martial and Article 15 and continuing publicity on the objectives of the program. The objectives of this program are to improve morale, reduce incident rates and develop in each individual a deeper pride in himself, his unit and his country.

(c) Control of nonappropriated funds was an item of vital command interest during the quarter. On 1 April 1969, new Support Command Regulations were published on other sundry funds and Open Mess' (USASUPCOM-CRB Regulations 230-1 and 230-2, respectively). Additionally, command letters were published on Unit Clubs, Sundry Funds and Clubs and Mess'.

(d) On 31 March 1969, this command established an Honorary Membership program by which military and civilian personnel, not members of the command, may be recognized for their outstanding contributions and support to the command.

(e) In order to control sale of alcoholic beverages and serious incidents involving alcohol, a revised USASUPCOM-CRB Regulation 210-2 and a command letter on Alcoholic beverages were published to enforce ration card control procedures at unit owned and at beverage sales outlets.

(f) Venereal disease, unsanitary conditions in local restaurants, continued troop education on marijuana and drug abuse were significant command actions undertaken with respect to Command Health during the quarter. Additionally, Field Sanitation Team training was conducted for all units within the command.

(3) Civil Affairs:

(a) During the period 1 February 1969 through 30 April 1969, a total of 46 units of this command participated in 173 projects; 32 of these projects were completed with the majority being of a continuous nature. The average number of projects monthly was 58.

(b) USASUPCOM-CRB contributed $24,625 in supplies and equipment in
direct support of the GVN Recovery Program. This included direct support to the victims of aggression and support to the GVN in their pacification and nation building efforts.

(c) In addition to the conducting of English classes for 352 Vietnamese, the following additional training skills were offered to the Vietnamese: MRE, Basic Typing, Advanced Typing, Card Punch Operation, Hygiene Training, Interpreter Training, Nurses Aides, Forklift Operators, Cooks, Painters, etc. A total of 260 Vietnamese enjoyed the advantage of the above instruction.

(d) During the period of this report, 350 feet of the fishing pier in Cam Ranh Village was completed. Material to extend the pier an additional 100 feet is presently on hand.

(e) Through the efforts of the 61st Medical Battalion, the rat/flea index has declined. Sanitation is improving. Discarded drums (55 gal) have been dispensed throughout Cam Ranh Village as trash receptacles. Garbage disposal service is being supplied by the command. Plans have been formalized and materials gathered to build a market place with a washable cement floor.

(f) The Village Council enthusiastically endorsed a plan to beautify the Village Meeting Hall, the local school and to build semi-permanent quarters for the Civilian Irregular Guard in Cam Ranh Village. At this point a cement wall has been erected at the village hall; the frame of a ten (10) family unit is up. A wooden, unpainted fence was erected to protect the school children.

(g) During this period an OB-GYN Clinic was started and is 90% completed. MEDCAP is averaging 150 patients per weekly meeting in Cam Ranh Village.

(h) Adjutant General:

(a) Awards and decorations: During this quarter, the following awards were processed by this command and forwarded to 1st Logistical Command for approval, except Certificates of Achievement, which are approved at this headquarters:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Medal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver Star</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legion of Merit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple Heart</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certificate of Achievement</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>530</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Reenlistments: See Inclosure 1.
CONFIDENTIAL


(c) Testing Status: See Inclosure 2.

(d) Casualties: See Inclosure 3.

(e) Promotions: See Inclosure 4.

(f) Congressional Inquiries received within the command by month:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Number Received</th>
<th>Interim Replies</th>
<th>Final Replies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(g) Visitors: See Inclosure 5.

b. ACoFS, Security, Plans and Operations

1. Security and Intelligence:

(a) Clearance Actions: During the reporting period, a total of 395 requests for personnel security actions were received and a total of 401 clearances were granted or validated. As of 30 April 1969, 50 clearance actions were pending.

(b) Document Security: The semi-annual 100% inventory of secret documents maintained in the ACoFS, SPAO repository was conducted during the month of April 1969. A change in document custodians was concurrently accomplished. Scheduled 100% inventories of secret documents were conducted on 25 February 1969 and 26 March 1969.

(c) Ground Defense: The ground defense and installation defense coordination functions assigned to Cam Ranh Bay Support Command were inspected by higher headquarters on three separate occasions during the reporting period. From 28 December 1968 to 8 February 1969, the First Field Force Vietnam Artillery Joint On-site Survey Committee conducted a survey of actions taken by this command to correct deficiencies noted by a September 1968 MACV Board of Inquiry. From 10-14 March 1969, a MACV Inspector General team surveyed ground defense improvements within the Army sectors of responsibility on Cam Ranh Peninsula. A team from the office of the MACV Inspector General inspected Peninsula ground defense coordination from 17-23 March 1969. Inspection reports prepared by each of the three teams noted substantial improvement in the Peninsula ground defense effort and recommended priority support for installation coordinator requests for defense equipment.

1. Communication. The JDC Army sector FM radio net was established on 1 February 1969 with nine (9) outstations. The Peninsula ground defense radio net, which links principal Army, Navy and Air Force units on Cam Ranh Peninsula.
Operational Report of the US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay for Period Ending 30 April 1969

Peninsula, was activated on 30 April 1969. This net was operational 24 days after the receipt of eight (8) AN/VRC-49 radios, five (5) RC-292 antennas and ten (10) PRC-295 power packs on a temporary loan basis. Wire communication between the JDOC switchboard and 10 stations was established on 16 February 1969. An additional six (6) stations were added to the communication network by 3 April 1969. On 26 February 1969, one additional Class A telephone and two Class C telephones were installed in the JDOC.

2. Ground Defense Plan. Three changes to the Peninsula Ground Defense Plan were published during March 1969. On 4 March 1969, Change 1 updated the communication annex and the alert notification chart. Change 2, published on 15 March 1969, updated the enemy situation and reflected the assumption of mainland ground defense responsibility by the Dong Ba Thin Tactical Operations Center. On 25 March 1969, Annex 5 (Medical Treatment and Evacuation) was completely revised to prescribe procedures for requesting aeromedical evacuation and responsibilities for tri-service medical treatment on Cam Ranh Peninsula.

3. Defense Equipment. On 2 April 1969, two 81mm mortars and four M-79 grenade launchers were received on a temporary loan basis. By 4 April 1969, the mortars were employed to provide illumination for critical facilities in Defense Sector II. The four grenade launchers were placed to cover critical avenues of approach into Army ammunition storage areas. A total of 84 starlight scopes (PVS-3) were received on a temporary loan basis and issued to Army units in Defense Sectors II and IV for use in the defense of redesignated critical areas.

4. Perimeter Defense Line. Implementation of the Defense Sector II perimeter defensive lines specified in the Peninsula Ground Defense Plan was begun on 6 February 1969. By 31 March 1969, a total of 216 bunkers and fighting positions comprising the perimeter lines were constructed. As a result of a 5 April 1969 review of these defensive lines, 15 additional bunkers were constructed by 30 April 1969.

5. JDOC Site. Interior and exterior protection for the temporary JDOC site was completed on 25 February 1969. An eight-foot, sandfilled wooden retaining wall was placed around the exterior wall of the site and interior plywood panels were placed over exposed window areas. On 26 April 1969, floor plans for a hardened site for the JDOC were finalized and forwarded to the 35th Engineer Group for expeditious approval and construction.

6. Perimeter Guards. Two actions were taken during April 1969 to provide a more equitable distribution of rostered guard requirements and to enhance guard support for Cam Ranh Army ammunition storage areas. On 12 April 1969, elements of the 191st Ordnance Battalion, Cam Ranh Security Guard Company, performing security missions within the ammunition storage areas were attached for all purposes to the 191st Ordnance Battalion. These elements will become part of the 191st Ordnance Battalion upon approval of a modified TOC. Commencing 20 April 1969, Cam Ranh Post and US Army Depot Cam Ranh provided a total of 64 rostered guards per shift for ammunition storage area security. This levy assisted in equalizing roster and guard commitments for
units subordinate to the US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay and slowed a declining operational capability within the 191st Ordnance Battalion.

7. Alert Notification System. A crash alert telephone system for Defense Sector II was activated on 8 February 1969 with ten subscribers. Six (6) additional units joined the system by 5 April 1969. This telephone override system provides instantaneous notification of the principal units of Defense Sector II and is supplemented by the ground defense radio net, dial telephone service and the JUNC switchboard. On 25 April 1969, standardized alert status boards were erected within Defense Sector II company areas, Post Exchange Facilities, officer and NCO clubs and major road intersections.

(2) Plans and Training:

(a) Replacement Training

1. Average monthly attendance of Replacement Training is 650. Continuous Command interest is being stressed to insure that all incoming personnel are scheduled for Replacement Training.

2. The following courses of instructions were conducted during the past quarter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COURSE</th>
<th>DATES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AN/GRC 106 Maint Tng</td>
<td>15 Jan - 3 Feb 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN/GRC 106 Test Set Equip</td>
<td>12 - 16 Feb 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN/GRC 50 Maint Tng</td>
<td>17 Feb - 3 Mar 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone Key System Maint Tng</td>
<td>27 Feb - 5 Mar 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone Key System Maint Tng</td>
<td>30 Mar - 11 Apr 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation of Freight for Air Shipment</td>
<td>14 Apr - 18 Apr 69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Force Development

1. During the reporting period the 135th Engineer Detachment returned from attachment to Qui Nhon Support Command to this command.

2. During the reporting period the following units were gained by this Command:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>AUTH STR</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>ASO TO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>235th Trans Platoon</td>
<td>1-0-49/50</td>
<td>CRB</td>
<td>12th Trans Comd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59th AG Co PerSvc</td>
<td>2-3-68/33</td>
<td>CRB</td>
<td>5th Gen Spt Op</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th Fwy Mat Stor Det</td>
<td>0-1-9/10</td>
<td>CRB</td>
<td>USAD-CRB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>136th Lt Mat Co</td>
<td>5-6-217/228</td>
<td>CRB</td>
<td>5th Gen Spt Op</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAMMAV</td>
<td>9-11-176/508</td>
<td>CRB</td>
<td>USAMMAV-CRB</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. During this period the following units of the Command were inactivated:

- 116th Trans Co (Tal Svc)
- 135th CS HN Co
- 276th TC Det
- 358th TC Det
- 617th TC Det
- 258th TC Det
- 627th TC Det
- 358th TC Det
- 532nd TC Det

3. During the reporting period the following units were attached to this Command:

- 329th Engineer Det (UIC MP)
- 17th Engineer Det (UIC DZU)
- 95th Engineer Det (UIC DZU)
- 525th Engineer Det (UIC RSP)
- 570th Engineer Det (UIC DZU)

(c) Plans:

1. T-Day Planning. During the reporting period, two major planning documents were received from higher headquarters. These documents reflected minimum essential personnel and equipment required for this command. Projects for facilities required for T-Day operations have been identified and appropriate work request forwarded for action to higher headquarters.

2. Reorganization. During the period 1 February through 30 April there were no reorganization within the Headquarters, US Army Support Command CRB or Subordinate Commands. This period was primarily occupied with improvement of operation within the headquarters under the TASTA-70 organization and within the major subordinate commands under the reorganization of 1 January 1969.

3. Resources Review. A Resources Review Board was established on 18 March 1969 to evaluate the use of command resources and to present recommendations to the commander in areas of personnel utilization, allocation of missions, and organizational alignment. The scope of Board endeavor included a detailed review of the mission, functions, capabilities, and performance of all elements of the command with the goal of achieving more adequate and efficient personnel utilization. Approved and implemented recommendations of the board are as follows:

   (a) Reduction in the staffing of Cam Ranh Post by 70 spaces.

   (b) Transfer of Cam Ranh Post direct support missions to 5th General Support Group (this will align all direct support missions, less POL, under single management).

   (c) Reassignment of the 59th Field Service Co (-) to the 5th General Support Group (179 spaces) to provide staffing for Cam Ranh direct support mission.
CONFIDENTIAL


(d) Transfer of Cam Ranh Bay post, camp, and station mission to 500th Transportation Group.

(e) Discontinue Cam Ranh Post (Provisional) and activate Cam Ranh Special Troops under 500th Transportation Group for accomplishment of Cam Ranh Bay post, camp, and station activities.

(f) Establish a permanent guard detachment as TDA augmentation to the 191st Ordnance Battalion with authorization of 115 spaces derived from discontinuance of Security Guard Company, USAD Cam Ranh.

(3) Operations: The following tactical operations were supported by USASLTCOM-OHN during the period of this report:

(a) Operation Sheridan: Formerly known as Operation McClain which terminated on 31 January 1969, is a search and destroy operation which began 1 February 1969 and continues in the Southern Provinces of II CTZ, with Headquarters, Task Force South, located in Dalat, by the 3d Battalion, 503d Infantry Brigade and 3d Battalion, 506th Infantry Brigade supported by the 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery. This operation was supported by the following logistical operations:

1. LSA Phan Thiet. This Logistical Support Activity continues to provide supply distribution of Class I, III and V supplies; unit distribution of fast moving II and IV items; laundry, bath, and graves registration services and direct support maintenance for 3d Battalion, 506th Infantry Brigade.

2. LSA Bao Loc. It continues to provide the same type of services as LSA Phan Thiet for 3d Battalion, 503d Infantry Brigade.

(b) Operation Wainwright: Formerly known as Operation Boiling which terminated on 31 January 1969, is a search and destroy operation which began 1 February 1969 and continues in Phu Yen and Khanh Hoa Provinces by the 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry, 173d Infantry Battalion (Abn). USASLTCOM-CRB provides back-up logistical support of all types of supplies for USASLTCOM-QHN.

(c) Operation Henes: Formerly known as Operation MacArthur South which terminated on 31 January 1969, is a search and destroy operation which began 1 February 1969 and continues in Daklak Province. This operation is supported by LSA Ban Me Thuot with supply distribution of Class I, III and V supplies; unit distribution of fast moving II and IV items; laundry, bath and graves registration services and limited direct support maintenance.

(d) Americal Division: During the reporting period, this command continued to serve as the primary depot for Class V and bulk Class IV supplies in support of the Americal Division operating in Northern II Corps Tactical Zone while USASLTCOM-QHN supported other commodity requirements.

(e) Republic of Korea Army Operations in II Corps Tactical Zone (South) continues to be supported primarily by supply point distribution of Class II and IV items from US Army Depot Cam Ranh.

9 CONFIDENTIAL
Air Drop Operations: During the reporting period the 109th Aerial Delivery Company continued its mission in support of tactical units throughout RVN by air dropping critically needed supplies. During this time, the 109th and the Air Force continued their joint training with the 1528 LAPES System. This is a new type of Air Force Aerial Delivery System that enables the aircraft to come in low over the drop zone to avoid enemy fire. The requirement for the pre-rigged stock needed for Liberty canyon was withdrawn, items designed and turned in as requested by 1ST LOGCOM Command. Operation Massachusetts required only a minor change in present pre-rigged stock. These additional items requested for the operation have been rigged and earmarked.

The 109th became involved in assisting the Air Force on project Commando by allowing rigging of these 10,000 pound bombs in the 109th Company’s rigging area. This bomb is known as an Instant 17. It is proving to be quite effective and an increasing number is being dropped. The Air Force is withdrawing from using the 109th Company’s rigging area and will assume total control of rigging these bombs. Six emergency air drop missions were executed in support of 109th Forces. A total of 89,99 short tons of Class I, IV and V were air dropped using the 1528 LAPES Container delivery system and the standard 4-22 Container. A total of six Helilift Inspection teams were dispatched to various units. Each team consisted of one NCO and two enlisted personnel. The pressing factor involved in conveying air items were lack of proper storage area which resulted in causing considerable damage. Numerous calls at frays indicated lack of proper use by these units.

Logistical Operations: USAGCOM continued its assignment mission of back-up support of all classes of supplies to the other Support Commands in 1ST LOGCOM.

This Command moved an unprecedented amount of cargo by long line haul operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. Convoys</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>S/T Dry Cargo</th>
<th>Gallons POL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Ron. de Thoat</td>
<td>12,092</td>
<td>1,655,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Dan Lac</td>
<td>4,505</td>
<td>495,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Phu Tho</td>
<td>10,021</td>
<td>550,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Phu Tho</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>NONE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This represents an increase of over 50% over the previous reporting period in S/T of dry cargo moved by line haul assets. All convoy planning, to include security, cargo priorities, monitoring and challenging of all bookings, allocation of transportation assets were controlled from the Logistic Operations Control Center (LOCC). Each convoy was inspected by a member of this headquarters prior to departure. Sectors and end destinations were notified telephonically for security purposes to insure smooth offloading to create a rapid turnaround.

During this reporting period, the LOCC coordinated a total of 16 Combat Essential and 3 Emergency Resupply Air Missions which represents a moderate reduction in the number of missions from the previous quarter (27). This can be primarily attributed to the leveling off of requirements for all LSA’s and
CONFIDENTIAL

An improved management of resources.

(c) The DRC continued to monitor all shipments and receipts of Duffel Bag Equipment, advise the Commander on Duffel Bag operations, and determine the solution to problems which develop in the program. The Duffel Bag Facility will experience a major increase in workload to begin immediately and be at maximum output by July 1969. Expansion of the building is being taken to accommodate the increase in workload. There will be three (3) 12,000 square feet buildings added providing a total of 36,000 square feet work area. Present existing buildings will be used for in/out equipment processing. One of the additional buildings will be a controlled environmental area for cooled storage. Another building will have a slight over-pressure for a dust free maintenance area. The remaining building will be used for ambient storage. Personnel shortage is being solved with submission of a proposed TM for a total of 98 personnel as compared to the approved MOS of the 128th Signal Company authorizing only 19 personnel. Currently assigned are 4 officers and 32 enlisted personnel. The equipment provided by this increase will be requested on a 180 day temporary loan basis. The 128th Signal Company will continue to provide the support needed until the TDA is approved. A Special Technical Inspection (STI) was conducted on 7 March 1969 with an overall satisfactory rating given to the Duffel Bag Facility. As a result of the STI, SOP's are being rewritten, lesson plans formalized, and a general up-dating of all paper-work aspects. Repair parts are a continuing problem with the availability of these items being less than desirable. Cannibalization of defective units does not satisfy demands. However some parts are beginning to arrive on a push basis. Defense Communications Planning Group (DCPG) has advised that initial stockage will be available as meaningful demand experience is provided and items are manufactured. In April, a team consisting of OIC, Duffel Bag Facility, SUPCOM-CRB Project Officer and 1st Logistical Command Project Officer were dispatched to NKP, Thailand for a liaison visit. Work flow arrangements, interior designs and other essential data were obtained for incorporation in the new facility.

c. ACofS, Comptroller

(1) Maj Boddie was assigned as Comptroller on 21 February 1969. Maj Behrens departed ACofS, Comptroller to become CO, 92nd Finance Section and Lt Geche was assigned to the Internal Review Division on 3 March 1969.

(2) A revised Operations and Functions Manual was published during the reporting period.

(3) A Logistics Improvement Evaluation Committee to process ideas submitted under Project Smart was established.

(b) Capt Mink was assigned as Chief, Management Analysis Division on 25 March 1969.

(5) Lt Carter departed the command for CONUS on 12 April 1969.

CONFIDENTIAL
(6) Gut Akers was assigned as Chief, Financial Services Division on 19
April 1969.

(7) This office also conducted an annual audit of Cam Ranh Bay Officers' Open Mess and provided a courtesy audit of TFR-50 NCO/M Open Mess in March.

(8) Special audits were conducted of the Nha Trang Central Post Fund and the Nha Trang Army Emergency Relief Fund in April.

(9) Three terminal audits were conducted of miscellaneous funds during the quarter.

d. ACofS, Maintenance

(1) At the beginning of this reporting period the 135th Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company was inactivated. The 69th Light Maintenance Company (Provisional) was organized from the personnel of the 135th HEM Company to continue support until suitable replacements were found.

(2) During April the 136th Light Maintenance Company was transferred to this Command from Qui Nhon Support Command. Upon arrival, the 136th LM Company assumed the mission of the 69th LM Company (Prov) which was then disbanded.

e. ACofS, Transportation

(1) Impact of Tet on Transportation: Transportation related activities utilizing local national labor were halted or reduced during this period. Driver availability for port and beach clearance and local haul was reduced by the necessity of filling K.P. positions, normally handled by local nationals. Due to the forecast of enemy activity planned against convoy operations, no convoys were sent out during the holiday period.

(2) Highway Operations: Central Loading Organization. In late February, 500th Transportation Group initiated a program of daylight loading for convoy operations. Units were found to be unable to successfully meet this requirement. The 36th Transportation Battalion organized a central loading organization in late-March to operate in conjunction with the battalion S/P trailer park. Fifteen tractors which had marginal convoy readiness were dedicated to this operation. The successful implementation of this central loading organization now permits loading completion of all convoys a day in advance of convoy departure. Units dispatch tractors to the trailer staging area where they each pick up loaded trailers and the appropriate TOE the afternoon prior to departure. Loads and equipment are given a final inspection by the driver and unit truckmaster. This operation has reduced vehicle failure at convoy lineup sites and has resulted in cargo delivered in better condition and more accurately documented. Also by using the marginal tractors for loading, these vehicles cannot cause costly convoy delay by breaking down on the highway.

(3) Terminal:
(a) The RO/RO barge pier (consisting of 2 RO barges that marry to the stern ramp of the Comet and Sealift) was moved from the north side of pier 2 to the north side of pier 1. Movement of the barge permits simultaneous loading and/or unloading from the stern ramp, 2 side ramps, and all hatches of the Comet and Sealift. Due to the short length (300ft) of pier 2, hatches and side ramps aft of the housing on the RO/RO vessels cannot be worked when the stern ramp is on the RO/RO barge pier. Relocating the RO/RO operation to pier 1 increased greatly the efficiency of RO/RO operations at CRB.

(b) A purchase agreement was finalized with the Kilaco Barge Co during March to provide potable water to CRB harbor craft, thereby freeing US transportation assets and personnel for mission requirements.

(c) A 60 ton floating crane departed Cam Ranh Bay on 9 March 1969 for repairs in the Okinawa shipyard. CRB port now has only one 100 ton floating crane operating, with no backup. With the increase in backloading of retrograde vehicles and movement of heavy equipment to and from other RVN ports, this command is faced with a severe shortage of heavy lift handling equipment. During April the need for two heavy lift floating cranes was apparent. Three vessels were in port requiring heavy lift service of the floating crane. To heighten the urgency, the 100 ton floating crane was deadlined for 20 hours for a brake solenoid.

(d) During April the backloading of the ships Comet and Short Splice was delayed due to zero balance of shackles. All types of lashing gear had been requisitioned for over two months and none received. The increase in tonnage outloaded in this port rapidly depleted existing stocks. The vehicles backloaded on the ships were blocked and braced with dunnage.

(4) Rail (Flying Flatcars):

a. On 16 March 6 flat cars and 13 sets of flat car trucks were loaded aboard the AVCA barge 6h6, stationed at Phan Thiet outport, by a flying crane. These cars had been stranded at a siding near the village of Muong Man due to enemy activity which destroyed the tracks on both sides of the town. The cars were discharged at Vung Tau and put into the Phan Rang-Qui Nhon rail system.

b. During the period 10 to 12 April, 11 rail cars isolated near Phan Thiet were air lifted out by flying crane to an AVCA LST hull offshore. The LST hull was towed to port and the cars discharged and placed in the rail system.

(5) Port: Work was completed on the cargo staging area at South Beach. This will allow better utilization of equipment and personnel.

f. ACOF5, Ammunition

(1) Class V Stockage Objectives, management levels, and quantities on hand at the beginning and end of period in short tons.
CONFIDENTIAL
AVCA CRP-70-0
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay for
Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS: CSFOR-65) (U)

(a) General:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Reg</th>
<th>End</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phan Thiet LSA S/O</td>
<td>869</td>
<td>877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/L</td>
<td>654</td>
<td>643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O/H</td>
<td>785</td>
<td>744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban Me Thuot LSA S/O</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/L</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O/H</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bao Loc LSA S/O</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/L</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O/H</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay ASD S/O</td>
<td>29,636</td>
<td>15,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/L</td>
<td>24,488</td>
<td>36,966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O/H</td>
<td>29,649</td>
<td>10,666</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Discussion:

1. Stockage objectives are based on weapons densities, usage rates published in USARPAC Rec 710-15, issue experience, and storage capacity. The Cam Ranh Bay stockage objective includes 15 days of I Corps 60 day requirement.

2. The stockage objective for the Phan Thiet LSA consists of a 7 day safety level computed using weapons densities and the Intensive Combat Rate (ICR) based on issue experience gained during the period Feb - July 1968, and on 8 day operating level. The operating level is computed using weapons densities and the Theater Sustaining Rate (TSR) which is based on issue experience of May - Nov 68. The Phan Thiet S/O is expected to increase during the coming quarter.

3. The stockage objective for the Ban Me Thuot LSA is based on a 6 day safety level and an 8 day operating level. It is expected to decrease during the coming quarter.

4. The Bao Loc LSA stockage objective is computed utilizing a 5 day supply at the ICM and an 8 day supply at the TSR. It is expected to remain stable during the coming quarter.

(2) The total storage capacity at the beginning and end of period in short tons:

(a) General:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Reg</th>
<th>End</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phan Thiet</td>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>1,750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

ARCA GRP-CO-C


Ban Me Thuot 2,500 2,500
Bao Loc 2,201 2,201
Cam Ranh Bay 76,127 76,127

4. Discussion. Storage capability is based on the planning factor of 1 short ton per 11 square feet of storage space. This planning factor is used upon direction of 1st Logistical Command, and represents a change from the factor of 1 short ton per 11 square feet used in previous reports. Planned construction in ASA "CHARLIE" at Cam Ranh Bay during this fiscal year, will increase the storage capacity by approximately 19,000 S/T.

5. Quantities of Class V received and issued in short tons:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rec</td>
<td>Iss</td>
<td>Rec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phan Thiet LSA</td>
<td>1,333</td>
<td>1,567</td>
<td>1,178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban Me Thuot LSA</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>741</td>
<td>605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bao Loc LSA</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay ASD</td>
<td>4,225</td>
<td>11,191</td>
<td>17,251</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. ACofS, Supply

(1) In January the condition of PAAE R&U support in the Cam Ranh area of support responsibility, came under intense criticism. After several conferences between personnel of this Command and personnel of PAAE, it was determined that more effective R&U support could be obtained if the material support requirements of PAAE could be met by the supporting logistical system. Two primary areas of concern were investigated and mutual actions were taken to correct existing deficiencies.

(2) During this period the responsibility for the Stock Record Support Program was transferred from the 2d Logistical Command to US Army Depots in RVN. In the Cam Ranh Bay Support Command area this program was divided into two phases with the first phase scheduled for completion on 1 May 1969 and the second phase on 1 June 1969. A total of twelve DSU/GSUs are involved in the program with six DSU/GSUs in each phase. This program will provide monthly update information including Federal Stock Number and Unit of Issue changes to supported units. Units with machine capability will receive a monthly add/delete/change listing, response cards, and a quarterly printout of their authorized stockage list (ASL). Nonmechanized units will receive title inserts, prepunched requisitions for each ASL item, a monthly add/delete/change listing, response cards, and a quarterly ASL printout. On 7 April 1969 all Phase I subscribers were briefed at a conference held in Nha Trang by representatives of this office. On 25 April 1969 all Phase II subscribers were briefed at a conference held at this Headquarters. Both conferences stressed that the quality of the support received is fully dependent upon the feeder data sent to the US Army Depot by the customer, therefore effective Stock Record Support is the responsibility of the DSU/GSU Commander.
CONFIDENTIAL


(3) Representatives of the AGOC Supply made liaison visits to the following areas and customers in these areas on the dates indicated below:

- 13 February - Dalat and Rao Loc
- 26 - 28 February - Nha Trang
- 6 March - North Cam Ranh Bay and Dong Ba Thin
- 19 March - Dalat, Gia Nghia, and Tan Me Thoict
- 10 April - Rao Loc and Phan Thiet
- 18 April - Dalat

(4) Liaison visits were made to 1st Logistical Command on the following dates for the purpose indicated:

- 18 February - Records Support
- 28 February - Closed Loop Conference
- 23 March - Inventory Control Center Liaison
- 24 March - Self Service Supply Conference
- 10 April - Inventory Control Center Liaison
- 20 April - Liaison with Director of Petroleum
- 21 April - Project Count II Conference
- 30 April - ARVN Dependent Housing Conference (Qui Nhon)

(5) Special assistance visits were made to the following locations on the dates indicated:

- 12 March - Dalat
- 27 March - Dalat

(6) The General Supply Division conducted backorder requisition reconciliation with the Engineer Construction and Firepower and Mobility Commodity Managers at the US Army Inventory Control Center. After reconciliation, 350 major end items were released against valid customers due outs.

(7) The Mortar Carrier, 107MM (M106/M106A1) was added to the Closed Loop Support Program under Project Code MOJ. Twenty project codes are now included in the program for this Command.

(8) During this period the computer systems at the ICCV and all depots became overloaded with requests for status to the point where it seriously affected the processing of customer requisitions. To assure timely and effective processing of customer requests and still furnish status of requisitions a moratorium was declared on the submission of requests for status to the ICCV and all depots. The ICCV and all depots prepared printouts by customer of the status of all requisitions on hand. Subsequently the ICCV and depot will furnish status printouts to 30-day activities every 30 days.

(9) Planning was completed for the implementation of Project "Orange Ball". This is a new distribution plan for the supply of dry batteries. Effective in May 1969 dry batteries which have been held in deep freezes will be supplied to using units from Class I Supply Points. Using units will submit requests for batteries to the supporting supply point on DA Form 3161.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVCA CRB-00-0


at the same time as they submit their DA Form 2970 (Ration Request). These batteries will be available at the time of the unit's next cyclic pick up of Class I supplies. This procedure will be repeated on a normal 2-2-3 day cycle per week. The quantity requested will be based on the units estimated two or three day requirements as applicable. This distribution system will provide the user with a continual supply of fresh dry batteries with the maximum possible operating life. A reduction of back-up stocks and storage space at all echelons will also be realized.

(10) Bulk (LPG) liquid petroleum gas (propane) delivery was initiated in the Nha Trang area. Resupply is accomplished through the use of a United States government furnished LPG tank truck operated by ESSO Standard Eastern Inc. Bulk storage tanks at the user level have eliminated the necessity for units to handle and exchange twenty gallon cylinders.

(11) A more efficient resupply of petroleum products to engineer units operating in remote areas was instituted. Regular resupply convoys enroute to isolated units ensure on hand quantities required for engineer units. The product is discharge into collapsible storage tanks at the engineer location. Direct coordination is made with the Unit Engineer Group for requirements.

(12) Storage levels and storage criteria for drummed petroleum products were revised. The new storage procedures emphasize dispersion and fire control. Excesses have been identified. 7,133 drums of LAD II AV'TVL were retrograded to Okinawa. 2,160 drums of oil were redistributed to Saigon Support Command. Permission was received to decant up to 5,000 drums of JP-4. Economical utilization of the resulting empty drums is under study by this Headquarters. The starting on hand quantity of 55 gallon drums was 51,331. The drum yard was designed to accommodate 29,000 drums. The completion of all actions will reduce stocks to approximately 25,000 drums and enable adequate dispersion.

(13) During the reporting period, action was initiated to construct a Class I yard at the Dalat Logistical Support Activity. A 4,500 cubic foot reefer box was constructed to provide necessary storage facilities for perishable rations. Steel plank matting has been installed over the entire yard. Wooden storage facilities will be built in the near future for dry rations. This Class I yard will increase the quality of support furnished to troops in the Dalat area. The Subsistence Division has made several assistance visits to instruct Dalat Class I personnel in subsistence management and Class I records administration.

(14) Responsibility for resupply of the Tuy Hoa Provisional Class I Supply Point was transferred to Qui Nhon Support Command. This completed the transfer of all Tuy Hoa supply activities from Cam Ranh Bay to Qui Nhon.

(15) During this period the Nha Trang Class I Supply Point assumed the responsibility of supporting the Ban Me Thuot Logistical Activity.

(16) As a part of the program to remove the retail mission from the
CONFIDENTIAL


depot, a program was initiated to provide ration support for Republic of Korea troops located in the Ninh Hoa and Nha Trang areas from the Nha Trang Class I Supply Point rather than directly from the Cam Ranh Depot. Rations are now issued to these customers based on the authorized retail unit of issue rather than wholesale pallet lots.

(17) To provide a means of rapidly disseminating technical information to retail customers, the Subsistence Division and the Petroleum Division initiated publication of a monthly Subsistence Newsletter and a Petroleum Newsletter. These media provide Class I Supply Points, Class II Supply Points and customer units with useful information and helpful guidelines concerning Class I and II supply within the Cam Ranh Bay support area.

(18) The ACofS Supply hosted the 6th USASUPCOM-CRB Logistical Support Conference on 28 March 1969. Personnel attending were briefed on the latest information concerning Class I, II, III, IV, VII, Service, and Central Issue Facility supplies. Ten handouts were provided. Included in these were Misuse of Priority Requisitioning Procedures, Turn-In of Excess, MILSTRIP Follow-up and Requisitioning Procedures, Additions to Self Service Stockage, and Sources of Customer Assistance.

(19) During the period 9 - 11 April 1969 a representative of the ACofS Supply participated as a member of an AMOC committee at Headquarters First Field Forces, Vietnam which reviewed and studied MACC3RDS Advisory Team logistical support procedures in the II Corps Tactical Zone to provide comprehensive recommendations to the Commanding General, First Field Force, Vietnam on all aspects of supply, maintenance, and service support provided. The product of this committee was a 60 page final draft for an IFFV Regulation. Approximately 23 pages of this draft were furnished by the representative of ACofS Supply.

(20) During this quarter a new management procedure was established to monitor and place emphasis on chronic problem items of supply including repair parts. A current supply status is obtained and those items selected for attention are placed on "Asset Visibility Charts". The most critical items are placed on a "Status of Critical Items" Chart. Asset visibility charts are presented to the Commander on a monthly and on-call basis. The critical items chart is presented daily at the commander's briefing. Both charts are continuously updated with the most current information. This system enables the commander and staff to keep abreast of problem areas and take remedial action rapidly.

(21) The quality of technical edit was improved at all Direct Support Units. "Recordak" micro film readers and microfilm files were obtained and distributed for use in screening requests at the retail level. This will contribute to increased validity of requisitions forwarded to the wholesale level resulting in better support to the retail customer.

(22) The Cam Ranh Bay Class II & IV Supply Point converted from a "paper DSU" to a fully operational supply point receiving, stocking, and issuing supplies to supported customers. Previously this facility processed
requests and the US Army Depot, Cam Ranh physically issued the material. This completed the removal of retail Class I, II, and III customers support from the depot.

(23) As a result of Project "Update" commodity managers from the US Army Inventory Control Center, Vietnam have been making liaison visits to this Headquarters and the US Army Depot, Cam Ranh. These visits have proved to be of mutual benefit in resolving problems and establishing firm working agreements between elements of the wholesale supply system.

(24) Under the concept of supply control, the quantity of items stocked is based upon a fixed quantity, expressed as days of supply, which may be on hand or on order at any one time to support a current or projected mission. Still another basic concept includes the stockage of supplies which would be adequate to support customer requirements. In reviewing these concepts and in developing asset data in the form of Asset Visibility Listings, it was noted that several basic principles listed below were being violated.

(a) Requisitioning objectives were not being maintained accurately. In many instances the requisitioning objective (RO) was considerably less than the customers' requirements in a 30 day period.

(b) Unit PELs and DSU ASLs, when they were updated, were not forwarded to the next higher supply source for review and necessary action.

(c) Locator listings did not agree with the accountable stock records. Items were recorded on the balance files that did not have recorded locations. There were items at zero balance when supplementary locations were recorded. Inventory and locator samplings over the past 6 months revealed that 5-10% of the items sampled had neither a valid location nor were they recorded on balance files.

(d) There had been lack of customer assistance visits by supporting supply elements. Had these visits been made, the supply source could have ascertained what problems were being encountered both from a customer viewpoint and from the supporting supply element viewpoint.

(25) In view of the circumstances noted in paragraph above, the following programs were implemented:

(a) The US Army Depot, Cam Ranh was directed to make maximum use of the Stock Record Support Program. It is imperative that the DSU requisitioning objective (RO) be screened against the Depot RO and that adjustments be made as required.

(b) All supply echelons were directed to make customer assistance-liaison visits to supported customers at least once every 60 days. The US Army Depot, Cam Ranh visits were to be directed towards emphasis support to Direct Support Units (DSU). The DSU visits were to be directed towards assistance to units and organizations.
(c) Commodity managers at the US Army Depot, Cam Ranh and stock managers at DSUs were directed to review their assets on a continuous basis. Problem items, those items which require intensive management, were to be identified and receive special attention. These items are to be considered for inclusion on the Cam Ranh Bay Support Command Asset Visibility Listing. Nominations will be made monthly or as the problem occurs. Having identified the problem item, the managers will coordinate directly with their counterparts at the next higher level of supply. Initial coordination will be made verbally. If this technique fails, telegraphic methods will be used. Should this also fail to resolve the problem, the ACoFS will be advised and executive action will be taken if merited. These procedures will be employed in managing these problem items until the item ceases to be a problem.

(d) Depot commodity managers and DSU stock managers will assure themselves of the validity of inventories. In addition to spot checks, each manager will personally validate five line items each week. Discrepancies will be noted and corrected under procedures specified in 1st Logistical Command Project "Supply Control 54". Additionally, managers will compare locator files against asset files and discrepancies will be noted and corrections made.

(e) Depot commodity managers and DSU stock managers will insure that catalog data is current, particularly on problem items. The valid data will be recorded on all references to that item in accordance with 1st Logistical Command Project "Update".

(26) At the close of the period, the following areas have been selected for initial or continued management study during the next quarter:

(a) Reduction of high priority requisitions.
(b) Reduction of rejected requisitions.
(c) Reduction of Class I condemnation losses.
(d) Reduction of zero balances in Self Service Supply Centers and Central Issue Facilities.
(e) Increase of demand satisfaction at Class II and IV Supply Points.
(f) Continuation of the reduction of excess drummed Class III products.
(g) Reduction of processing time for depot receipts.
(h) ACoFS, Services

(1) Engineer Division: During the period 1 February 1969 through 31 April 1969, this division has submitted the preliminary FY 71 MCA Construction Program to 1st Logistical Command to upgrade the Duffel Bag Facility. This division was also responsible for getting the operational support to repair
AVCA CRB-G0-0


the Breasting Dolphin at T-2 Jetty.

(2) Field Service Division:

(a) Graves Registration: The remains of 160 US Armed Forces personnel and Free World Military Assistance Forces personnel were processed through US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay collecting points during the period 1 February 1969, through 30 April 1969.

(b) Laundry and Bath: The Command considered expansion of the present contract laundry service provided by Modern Service Company. Proposed construction of an additional laundry plant on the Cam Ranh Peninsula has been operational control over all laundry facilities within the command.

(c) Food Service:

1. During the quarter, the 1st Logistical Command Best Mess of the Quarter was discontinued and replaced by a similar award by each support command. The 870th Transportation Company was selected as the Support Command Best Mess Facility of the quarter.

2. Seventeen (17) "Star Plaque Awards", were presented to outstanding mess facilities.

3. During the reporting period, thirty-eight (38) 1st Logistical Command facilities were evaluated by food service supervisors from this Headquarters.

(3) Property Disposal Division:

(a) Retrograde: During the period 1 February 1969 through 31 April 1969, the total short tons of retrograde material processed by US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay units were as shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MATERIAL</th>
<th>ON-HAND BEGINING</th>
<th>RECEIVED</th>
<th>SHIPPED</th>
<th>ON-HAND END OF QTR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Station Returns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depot Excess</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>34,791</td>
<td>36,203</td>
<td>14,610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repairables (less marine)</td>
<td>6,297</td>
<td>7,133</td>
<td>11,802</td>
<td>1,404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unserserviceable and excess ammo</td>
<td>2,406</td>
<td>3,573</td>
<td>4,053</td>
<td>1,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reusable ammo components</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine repairables</td>
<td>707</td>
<td>2,392</td>
<td>2,855</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>10,313</td>
<td>47,992</td>
<td>55,427</td>
<td>18,060</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes 15,182 s/t inventory adjustment.

(b) Disposal: During the period 1 February 1969 through 30 April 1969, the two property disposal yards within this command processed 17,731 short tons of usable property and approximately $618,731.00 of usable property was re-issued to various units within the command, while the remaining property was listed
for sale. At the present time, contracts have been awarded to Schiavoni - Chase Corp for a two year term scrap metal contract and Giant Tire Company for 700 short tons of scrap rubber per year.

1. Schiavoni - Chase Corp will remove monthly from Cam Ranh Bay:
   a. 14,000 lbs aluminium
   b. 8,400 lbs brass
   c. 7,000 lbs copper
   d. 14,000 lbs lead
   e. 13,500 lbs stainless steel
   f. 56,250 lbs cast iron
   g. 56,250 lbs light steel
   h. 112,500 lbs heavy steel

2. Saigon Steel contract for $5,380,00 is in effect.

3. Rivas Won Trading Co, $125,610.00 term contract for two years. Contract monthly removals are as follows:

   NHA TRANG:

   Item 1, Irony Aluminium Scrap. 70,000 lbs per month for the first month and 50,000 lbs every month thereafter.

   Item 2, Batteries, lead acid type. 76,000 lbs per month for the first month and 36,000 the following months.

   Item 3, Copper bearing scrap. 170,000 lbs the first month and 40,000 lbs every month thereafter.

   Item 4, Copper wire scrap. 30,000 lbs the first month and 10,000 lbs every month thereafter.

   Item 5, Cast iron scrap. 65 s/t per month for the first month and 24 s/t every month thereafter.

   Item 6, Steel, light, unprepared scrap. 105 s/t per month for the first month and 34 s/t every month thereafter.

   Item 7, Steel, light and heavy, unprepared scrap. 177 s/t for the first month and 298 s/t every month thereafter.

   Item 8, Stainless Processing Company no longer holds the term contract for
either yard; however, they are still authorized to remove scrap from the old Cam Ranh Bay yard.

5. Specialized equipment for both yards is arriving. Truck scales are presently being installed. Also, Nha Trang is in receipt of a bailer.

1. Signal

   (1) As a result of recent reorganization of the command, the communications responsibilities of the command were realigned to provide subordinate units with a more effective operational control.

   (2) The 500th Transportation Group assumed operational control of Single Side Band radio communications for its long haul convoy operations. To accomplish this, 2 ea M-151 ½ ton trucks equipped with 2 ea AN/URC-106 SSR radio sets and 2 ea AN/VRC-53 radio sets; 1 ½ ton truck and 1 ea M-151 ½ ton truck w/o radio equipment along with 1 ea AN/FRC-93 (KPM-2 Collins SSR radio) were transferred to 500th Transportation Group. AN/FRC-93 radio sets will provide communications to the convoy and IFPV, and the ½ ton truck radios provide the convoy commander with communications to 500th Transportation Group and IFPV.

   (3) The 56th General Support Group in Nha Trang, which has operational control of the LSA's assumed the responsibility of maintaining communications from their group headquarters and the LSA's. To accomplish this, SSR radios and RTT equipment located at the LSA's were transferred from HHD, USA SUPCOM-CR3 to 56th General Support Group.

   (4) This office continues to provide the following services:

      (a) Net Control Station for the USA SUPCOM-CR3 administrative phone patch net and the administrative radio teletype net.

      (b) Operate the SUPCOM-CR3 Communications Center which provides secure teletype communications with HQ 1st Logistical Command, Qui Nhon SUPCOM, Da Nang SUPCOM and Inventory Control Center-Vietnam, Long Binh.

      (c) Operate a station in the 1st Logistical Command administrative phone patch net.

      (d) Provide technical advice and assistance to subordinate commands in the fulfillment of their communications mission.

j. Provost Marshal

   (1) During the period 1 February 1969 - 30 April 1969 command emphasis was given to the reduction of Serious Incidents. Of one hundred thirty six (136) SIR's processed, forty (40) involved personnel or equipment under the control of the USA Support Command Cam Ranh Bay. This is a reduction of twenty six (26) Serious Incidents compared to the previous reporting period.
The overall Discipline, Law and Order experience of the command has shown improvement during the reporting period as shown below:

(a) Crimes against persons and property 79, a reduction of 15.

(b) Military offenses-incidents 210, a reduction of 113.

(c) Miscellaneous offenses 81, a reduction of 160.

(d) Traffic offenses 307, a reduction of 160.

Special command emphasis was given to the reduction of speeding offenses beginning in the last week of April 1969. Results of this effort will be evaluated for the next reporting period.

In an effort to limit access to unlawful weapons, a one time turn-in of unauthorized weapons was conducted in April 1969. This resulted in over fifty (50) firearms and more than sixty five (65) knives of various types being turned in voluntarily. The success of this one time turn-in lead to the initiation of policy providing for a monthly no questions asked turn-in for unauthorized weapons. It is expected that this action together with a vigorous campaign concerning safe handling of weapons and ammunition will result in reduced incidents involving dangerous weapons.

Physical Security. Construction of a new facility for pass control at the My Ca Checkpoint, entry point of the Cam Ranh Peninsula, was begun the first week of April 1969. Target date for completion of this facility is 31 May 1969. This facility will provide for the initiation of a pass exchange system for civilian employees entering the Cam Ranh Peninsula.

Improvements continue to be made in the repair and replacement of fencing around key and critical installations on the Cam Ranh Peninsula. This is a self help program and improvements have been made by operational personnel. Approved projects for contractor installed lighting were not started during this period, however, improvements have been made within the capability of units concerned.

Staff Judge Advocate

Military Justice. During the reporting period a total of 102 Special and 37 Summary Courts Martial cases were advised, processed and reviewed. 656 Article 15 punishments were checked for legal sufficiency and 68 appeals adjudicated.

Legal Opinions. A total of 29 written opinions were rendered.

Claims. A total of 66 claims under the Military Claims Act were received of which 41 have been paid. Dollar amounts of claims processed are as follows:

(a) Claims received: $8,132.56

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL


(b) Claims paid: $7,009,93

(l) Legal Assistance: Legal assistance to military and civilian personnel in the Cam Ranh Bay Area increased considerably from the last reporting period to 1,799 cases. The following is breakdown by category:

(a) Adoption and Changes of names: 32
(b) Citizenship and Immigration: 141
(c) Domestic Relations: 231
(d) Non-support: 16
(e) Personal Finances: 113
(f) Personal Property: 54
(g) Taxation: 223
(h) Torts: 2
(i) Wills and Estates: 81
(j) Miscellaneous: 1,003

1. Information. During the period 1 February - 30 April 1969, the Information Office submitted 69 News Releases, 67 Photo Releases, 1,892 Home Town News Releases and 320 Home Town Taped Interviews. Six correspondents representing various news media were hosted. A 700 Film Team Motion Pictorial coverage of the US John F. D. Page, the South Vietnamese Housing Development and Operations of 113 Army Divers of XMA were arranged and conducted.

2. (U) Section II - Lesson Learned: Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:

a. Personnel

(1) Civilianization:

(a) Observation: The command's military strength has decreased below its civilianized strength authorization, however, the planned civilian replacements have fallen far short of expectations. The educational and skill level of the available local national labor is inadequate for many of the positions civilianized. In the US Army Depot over 100 positions have been vacant for several months because of a shortage of skilled labor in the Cam Ranh Area. In the 191st Ordnance Battalion, 262d Quartermaster Battalion and the 155th Transportation Company the local national employees cannot be fully utilized for security reasons. The record on civilianizing with DAC's has been just as inadequate as with local nationals. The DAC's assigned to this command are professionally competent and a great asset, vacant DAC position at the grade levels involved
CONFIDENTIAL

AVCA CMB-07-66

is comparable to a commissioned officer vacancy.

(b) Evaluation: It appears that civilianization of the force structure in Cam Ranh Bay was planned and put into effect without adequate analysis of the positions being civilianized or available civilian manpower. In relatively unskilled jobs in non-sensitive areas, local national employees are performing adequately. However, effective mission accomplishment in the US Army Depot is impaired by a lack of qualified labor to fill vacant jobs. Compounding this problem is the hiring freeze on all local national positions which cannot be utilized to replace the military personnel lost to civilianization. The problem with DAC civilianization appears to be simply a shortage of applicants willing to come to Vietnam. Recruiting efforts by the USARV Civilian Personnel Directorate appear to be adequate but the positions remain vacant.

(c) Recommendations:

1. Establishment of permanent training programs in Cam Ranh Bay by the USARV Civilian Personnel Directorate for local national employees. This is especially critical for filling the vacancies in the depot and to a lesser degree upgrading the skill levels of selected employees in all Support Command units.

2. That consideration be given to returning military spaces to those units which cannot effectively use local nationals for security reasons.

3. That increased emphasis be placed on recruiting DAC's for the vacant positions in this command (ACofS, Personnel).

(2) Publication of Orders:

(a) Observation: Late receipt of assignment orders has been causing a significant morale problem within the command, particularly among married personnel who are unable to make advance plans for the PCS movement of their families.

(b) Evaluation: A survey of the assignment instructions received was conducted for all enlisted personnel, E6 and below, who departed this command during the past seven months. The results of this survey are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>More than 30 days prior to DEROS</th>
<th>Less than 30 days prior to DEROS</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>No assignment</th>
<th>PRI</th>
<th>PRI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>(41.7%)</td>
<td>1144</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>(45.8%)</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>(53.6%)</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>(57.7%)</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>(52.8%)</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>(56.2%)</td>
<td>973</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>(57.1%)</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is apparent that the late receipt of assignment instructions has been
increasing over the past six months which are periods of relatively low turnover.

(c) Recommendation: It is recommended that a goal be established to provide assignment instructions at least 45 days prior to DEROS. It is anticipated that unless emphasis is placed on this problem by higher headquarters, the number of casualties shipped will increase significantly during the peak rotational months. (ACofS, Personnel)

(3) Disciplinary Offenders:

(a) Observation: A thorough screen of personnel records of this command revealed approximately 11% had a record of some type of disciplinary action.

(b) Evaluation: Many of the personnel identified by this screen had three or more Article 15 or court-martial offenses. The results of the survey were made known to major subordinate commanders who were asked to counsel and encourage those individuals who had been or could be rehabilitated. Commanders responded that a majority of these personnel were serving creditably. Initially the rate of elimination cases submitted rose sharply but leveled off in succeeding months.

(c) Recommendation: It is recommended that the periodic screening of personnel records for substandard personnel be required of each command having custody of personnel records. It is further recommended that personnel having a record of serious or repeated disciplinary offenses not be assigned to Vietnam. Assignments to Vietnam should not be used as a rehabilitative transfer under, or in lieu of action in accordance with AR 635-212. (ACofS, Personnel)

(b) Prisoners:

(a) Observations: The USARV policy of reassigning prisoners to the US Army Holding Detachment USARV became effective at the beginning of the reporting period, and its effects have been very favorable.

(b) Evaluation: The following are the principal benefits noted:

1. Prisoners no longer look with apprehension to the time of their release, anticipating discrimination in their old unit, but now have a second chance in proving themselves in a new unit.

2. Unit commanders feel relieved that those soldiers who proved unmanageable and were sentenced to confinement will not return to their unit.

3. Time consuming trips by unit commanders and appointed prisoner visitors from this area to the distant stockade are no longer required.

(c) Recommendation: NONE (Staff Judge Advocate)

b. Operations
(1) Harden Vehicles:

(a) Observation: hardened vehicles continue to prove an effective deterrent to enemy attack and ambush of highway convoys. The hardened vehicles utilized by this command are M54, five-ton trucks equipped with either a pre-designed hardening kit or with fabricated armor plate. Each vehicle is equipped with two mounted M-60 machine guns and one M-79 grenade launcher, with two cases of ammo for each machinegun and one case for the grenade launcher. Some trucks are additionally equipped with one mounted 50 cal. machinegun.

(b) Evaluation: The show of force demonstrated by the mere presence of the hardened vehicles within the convoy is an effective deterrent to attack and ambush. The mobility, protection and heavy firepower capability of these vehicles greatly enhances the security of the convoy. It is desirable that for an additional enhancement of convoy security two hardened vehicles are present in each march unit of the convoy.

(c) Recommendations: That commands responsible for operating highway convoys be provided vehicles and resources to equip each convoy march unit with two hardened vehicles per 20 to 25 task vehicles to give the convoy superior firepower and adequate defensive capabilities against hostile attack within the Republic of Vietnam. It is further recommended that commands responsible for convoys be provided the V-100 armored car to provide an additional internal deterrent to enemy attack. (ACofS, SPW)

(2) Convoy Air Covers:

(a) Observation: The use of dedicated visual reconnaissance aircraft (01) in conjunction with long haul convoys has proven to greatly enhance the security and highway safety factors.

(b) Evaluation:

1. The 183rd Aviation Company provides this command with a dedicated VR aircraft for convoys leaving Cam Ranh Bay to southbound locations at Dalat, Bao Loc and Phan Thiet. The aircraft is able to recon the road ahead of the convoy searching for possible enemy movements. Utilizing FM radio the pilot is able to alert the convoy commander to possible ambush sites and other hazardous objects or road conditions such as other oncoming convoys or civilian vehicle and pedestrian traffic. The pilot is also able to provide the convoy commander with valuable information concerning the posture of his own convoy. It is possible for the pilot to alert the convoy commander to mechanical breakdowns in the trail, march unit integrity and the location of all convoy vehicles. This is particularly advantageous when the convoy passes through terrain which is an obstacle to FM communications between the convoy commander and his march units. In the event of enemy attack the pilot is able to call artillery support and helicopter gunships.

2. Factors which limit the utilization of a single aircraft for the total distance of a convoy i.e., fuel, flying times for both the pilot and the aircraft and province boundaries necessitate close coordination between the command
responsible for the convoy, the aircraft unit, the tactical headquarters and province commanders, so that aircraft from several provinces can take over the mission from one another, maintaining coverage.

(c) Recommendations: That other commands use dedicated VR aircraft to accompany long haul convoys over roads in the Republic of Vietnam. (ACofS, SP&D)

c. Training: NONE
d. Intelligence: NONE
e. Logistics:

(1) Forced Issues of Subsistence:

(a) Observation: Forced issues should be substituted for regular scheduled menu items when possible rather than issued as items over and above menu requirements.

(b) Evaluation: It has been noted in several instances that forced issue items are issued to consuming units along with their regular scheduled menu items. By substituting, when possible, forced issues in lieu of regular menu items, a substantial savings will be realized in the cost of the weighted ration.

(c) Recommendation: That Class I Officers make a concerted effort to substitute forced issue items for regular scheduled menu items. (ACofS, Supply)

(2) Utilization of Locally Procured Fruits and Vegetables:

(a) Observation: Locally procured fruits and vegetables should be utilized only for menu requirements or as a substitute for menu requirements.

(b) Evaluation: Several instances in the past reflect a lack of knowledge of the proper utilization of procured fruits and vegetables. These fruits and vegetables are procured strictly to meet menu requirements or as substitutes for menu requirements.

(c) Recommendation: That Class I Officers insure that locally procured fruits and vegetables are issued for intended purposes only. (ACofS, Supply)

(3) Monthly Newsletters:

(a) Observation: The monthly Subsistence Petroleum Newsletters published by the ACofS Supply have provided useful information and helpful guidelines to all Class I and Class III personnel and customers in the USAVCOM Cam Ranh Bay area of responsibility.

(b) Evaluation: It was felt that the publication of monthly Newsletters could provide a useful source of information to Class I and Class III personnel and customers. These newsletters have proven to be very effective in providing

Information to all concerned. These Monthly Newsletters will be continued due to the favorable response received from all concerned.

(c) Recommendation: NONE (ACofS, Supply)

(b) Dalat Logistical Support Activity Class I yard

(a) Observation: That a Class I yard in Dalat would provide troops in the Dalat area with more effective subsistence support.

(b) Evaluation: The troops in the Dalat area were supported with Class I from the 362d Signal Company ration distribution point. Due to limited dry storage facilities and refrigeration, the 362d Signal Company could not effectively provide the Class I support necessary in the Dalat area. With the establishment of a Class I yard at the Dalat Logistical Support Activity, the mission of ration support was removed from the 362d Signal Company and became a mission normally assumed by an LSA. A greater variety of Class I items will be available for issue due to the additional refrigerated and dry storage capabilities. The Dalat Logistical Support Activity, when operational, will take over all Class I support in their area in order to provide the best ration distribution system available.

(c) Recommendation: NONE (ACofS, Supply)

(5) "S" Ration support to Nha Trang and Ninh Hoa Republic of Korea forces.

(a) Observation: The transfer of "S" ration support to Nha Trang and Ninh Hoa from USAD-CR to Nha Trang Class I has provided a valuable tool in taking the Depot out of the retail business and reducing the cost of the weighted ration to the Korean Army.

(b) Evaluation: Due to the inability of the Depot to break pallet lots for issue, the Ninh Hoa and Nha Trang Korean units were receiving "S" rations in bulk quantity rather than the authorized unit of issue. This lead to a high weighted ration cost and put the Depot in the retail business. The transfer of the "S" ration support to Nha Trang Class I Supply Point has alleviated the problem. (ACofS, Supply)

(c) Recommendation: That the Ninh Hoa and Nha Trang Korean Forces continue to be supported from the Nha Trang Class I Supply Point rather than the US Army Depot, Cam Ranh.

(6) Combat Essential Air Missions.

(a) Observation: During the last week of the quarter, three combat essential resupply missions were required to support combat operations in the Gia Nghia - Ban Me Thuot area.

(b) Evaluation: Missions were requested as a result of late notification of operational requirements. Normal air resupply can be scheduled with forty-eight (48) hours notice.

(c) Recommendation: When large quantities of product are expected to be consumed as a result of projected combat operations, effective coordination must be maintained between IFFV and this Headquarters in order to allow for routine scheduling thus precluding similar problems. (ACofS, Supply)

(7) Receipt of Dressed Packaged Products:

(a) Observation: A shipment of 2,500 pails of lubrication oil procured on an in country contract with a commercial firm was received in an unsatisfactory condition.

(b) Evaluation: Subject shipment arrived at Cam Ranh Bay stowed loosely on board the commercial Vietnamese ship transporting it. The pails had sustained damage and many developed leaks. Palletizing was required at receiving location.

(c) Recommendation: Responsible procurement activities should insure that commercial sources are required to properly prepare and stow cargo to preclude damage of this nature. Procurement activities should ascertain the contractor's ability to properly prepare products for shipment. (ACofS, Supply)

(8) Logistical Support to Pacific Architects and Engineers (PA&E):

(a) Observation: A review of the supply problems indicated that there was a failure on the part of both the requisitioner and the supplier to recognize each others problems and further to assist each other in mutual problem areas.

(b) Evaluation: Actions were taken to correct the following deficiencies which were found:

1. The conversion to the 3SVN system created considerable problem for PA&E who had been conducting their business on a "walk thru" basis after determining what assets were available to meet their requirements. Under 3SVN, "walk thru"s were limited to combat essential material. Several meetings were held with PA&E supply personnel to explain the new procedures being adapted and how PA&E should or would have to adapt themselves to meet the changes required.

2. It was found that the data files used by PA&E were to an extent inaccurate when compared to the skeletal AMDF used in Vietnam. When microfilm readers were acquired for our DSUs, a reader was also acquired for PA&E. Special classes were conducted to insure that PA&E personnel understood and could effectively utilize the RECORDAK. A complete set of microfilm was obtained for PA&E use which included a parts number conversion listing and a skeletal Army Master Data File. The use of these files prior to entry into the Army Supply system has increased the response to PA&E requirements and has provided them additional items to satisfy their requirements.

3. A reconciliation of all PA&E requisitions was conducted. Special emphasis was placed on this to insure that all requisitions still shown as open on PA&E records were effectively researched to insure that positive

31
supply action was in progress. Many outstanding requisitions were found
awaiting transportation and were subsequently shipped.

4. To insure a more effective internal supply operation at PAVN, it
was suggested that PAVN have the 1st Logistical Command Inspection and
Instruction Team give them an assistance visit. This suggestion was agreed
to and this command arranged for the visit.

5. Several hundred RUS items in depot stock were not readily identifiable
with a Federal Stock Number. PAVN provided technical assistance in identifying
these parts, locating acceptable substitutes for items not in depot stock, and
in other ways providing depot with assistance that has benefited not only PAVN,
but all other depot customers.

(c) Recommendation: That the close liaison and high rapport which have
been established between PAVN, Depot, and Support Command personnel be main-
tained to maintain effective logistical support to PAVN. It should be noted
that the quality of RUS support furnished by PAVN has increased in direct
proportion to the improved logistical support received. (ACofS, Supply)

(9) Movement of supplies to Pacific Architects and Engineers.

(a) Observation: It was found that PAVN transportation requirements in
most instances could not be met effectively. The priority for transportation
used by PAVN often was the last priority to be met in shipment. Material
and equipment requisitioned by military units in every instance was shipped
before PAVN supplies.

(b) Evaluation: An intensive effort was made to insure equitable cargo
space for PAVN material on any and all of our convoys. A determination was
made that the PAVN material was necessary for morale, health and welfare in
the repair, maintenance, and general operations of our facilities by the RUS
activity. The backlog of PAVN material awaiting shipment was eliminated.

(c) Recommendation: That PAVN continue to receive equitable cargo space
for required material used to support US Army installations. (ACofS, Supply)

(10) Use of Supply Directives (SD):

(a) Observation: The Logistical Support Activities (LSA) do not have
requisitioning authority. This has been repeatedly requested through 1st
Logistical Command, but has continuously been disapproved. LSAs have been
resupplied on a push basis by use of supply directives.

1. Normally the supply directives allow 15-25 days reaction time by the
supply system. As the accepted stockage for the LSA is 15 days it is necessary
to submit periodic supply directives. Additionally changing support require-
ments limit resupply action to the 15-25 period.

2. Emergency support requirements cannot be forecast. A fire at Bao Loc's
laundry point destroyed all clothing on hand. Mortar fire on the Ban Ma Thuot
City airfield destroyed the graves refrigeration unit. Delays in scheduled
transportation carrying our normal resupply supply directives are experienced when roads go red, bridges go out, storms, etc.

3. Emergency requirements for troops engaged in combat are forwarded through the LSA to the ACofS Supply for immediate supply directive action.

(b) Evaluation: Although a potential warehouse denial is possible, actions with supply directives have resulted in a 95% fill on all items requested. Since LMSs have no qualified supply personnel or reference documents, requirements are submitted to the ACofS Supply where the FSN is researched, substitutes are established if required, available quantities are determined, and the necessary supply directive is placed on the depot.

(c) Recommendation: That as long as the LSA has no requisition authority, the established supply directive system be utilized to provide the required immediate reaction to end stations for mission essential supplies. (ACofS, Supply)

(11) Critical Stock Position on Items Formerly in Excess Position:

(a) Observation: Several instances have risen where items which were in excess position several months ago are now in a critical position throughout RVN.

1. Paper plates used by field troops due to lack of adequate sanitary facilities were placed on Stop/See embargo in late 1968. During this period paper plates were placed under USATCCV control due to critical shortages.

2. Plywood was placed on Stop/See embargo in late 1968. Presently only 1/4 and 3/8 mahogany plywood is in stock at the US Army Depot, Cam Ranh.

3. One inch lumber of all widths was placed on Stop/See embargo. The US Army Depot is at zero balance on all but 1x3" lumber. Only a token quantity is currently due in with an estimated 100-200 day lead time.

(b) Evaluation: Depot stock levels have been allowed to reach zero and critical balances due to failure to program adequate resupply.

(c) Recommendation: That embargos placed on items in excess position be lifted in sufficient time to allow timely resupply prior to a zero balance or critical position being realized. (ACofS, Supply)

(12) Measurement of Retrograde Progress:

(a) Observation: Great emphasis on the retrograde of excess supplies was placed on all commands during this period. Fine efforts have been made in this program. However, there is an invalid criterion used to measure progress. Tonnage retrograded may at first seem to be an adequate yardstick, but the one important factor of dollar value has been overlooked.

(b) Evaluation: If priority was placed on shipping the most valuable rather than the heaviest items out of country, greater savings could be
realized in both equipment and transportation. After the high dollar items were retrograded then tonnage should be considered.

(c) Recommendation: That progress in the retrograde of excess supplies be measured by the yardsticks of dollar value, number of line items, and tonnage and not by tonnage alone. (ACofS, Supply)

(13) Engineer Support:

(a) Observation: During the period 1 February 1969 through 31 April 1969 this division was faced with a number of maintenance and construction operational necessities.

(b) Evaluation: Due to the lack of the necessary engineer support in this area, various facilities have deteriorated to the point of failure before support has been made available. This is an extremely costly way to operate. The quantity of material handled by the facilities at Cam Ranh Bay makes it an operational necessity to have engineer support readily available in the Cam Ranh Area.

(c) Recommendation: An engineer unit be made available in the Cam Ranh Bay area to accomplish the necessary maintenance and construction to keep this port operational. (ACofS, Services)

(14) Inter Service/Agency Support Agreements:

(a) Observation: This command has been assigned the organizational maintenance mission for a large number of items of equipment for which it can not provide adequate support.

(b) Evaluation: Inter Service/Agency Support Agreements are concluded without coordination with the Support Command designated to provide the support.

(c) Recommendation: That no Inter Service/Agency Support Agreements be concluded until an on-the-ground evaluation is completed and determination made as to the ability of the furnishing unit to provide the support requested.

(15) Return of Packing Material.

(a) Observation: Return of packing material for retrograde ammunition is a continuing problem. The 174th Ordnance Detachment (AR) erected roadside signs as a reminder for units to turn in all types of boxes especially sand bag boxes.

(b) Evaluation: A considerable amount of packing materials and boxes were turned into the 174th Ordnance Detachment as a result of erecting these signs.

(c) Recommendation: That this method of obtaining packing material be considered for adoption by other commands. (ACofS, Ammunition)
AVCA CRB-C0-0

(16) Floating Cranes:

(a) Observation: Floating crane support for heavy lifts was reduced to one crane in March 1969.

(b) Evaluation: It was not immediately apparent that ORB port could not operate efficiently with a single heavy lift floating crane. However, on several occasions port efficiency was seriously hampered by requirements beyond the capacity of a single crane to fulfill in the expected time frame. On one occasion with three ships requiring heavy lift services, the one crane was deadlined for 20 hours.

(c) Recommendation: That two floating heavy lift cranes be available to any port operation the size of Cam Ranh Bay, which utilizes four piers for general cargo, one pier for ammunition, and employs stream discharge operations. (AGofS, Transportation)

(17) Flatcar Operations:

(a) Observation: Several flatcars became stranded on track severed on either side by enemy activity. The cars were in critical supply and were needed in the active rolling stock.

(b) Evaluation: A situation existed which seriously hampered rail operations, with no apparent possibility of correction. In order to get the equipment back into the operating system, unusual corrective action was taken by moving them out through the use of a flying crane.

(c) Recommendation: When unusual circumstances exist causing a serious logistical problem, analyze the equipment and systems available in the military organization. An unusual, but valid utilization of available systems may solve a critical need. (AGofS, Transportation)

f. Other:

(1) Open Messes:

(a) Observation: The annual audit of the Cam Ranh Bay Officers' Open Mess revealed that there were areas of major concern in that there were no internal control procedures. The accounting records in the Central Accounting Office were also incomplete and in some cases inadequate.

(b) Evaluation: The staffing of open messes and central accounting offices with sufficient qualified personnel, and the proper supervision of these personnel are two of the most important measures in maintaining a sound open mess system.

(c) Recommendation: That special attention be given to the staffing of sufficient qualified personnel in open mess systems. Responsible commanders should familiarize themselves with appropriate DA and local regulations and use these...
along with a published Commander’s Check List in the active supervision of open mess systems. (ACofS, Comptroller)

(2) Central Post Funds:

(a) Observation: With the large number of unit funds being revised by the two central post funds in this command, it is exceedingly difficult for control to be maintained over monthly dividends. The possibility of an unauthorized disbursement exists.

(b) Evaluation: In any disbursing activity, it is of the utmost importance that strong internal controls are practiced to prevent the unauthorized disbursement of government funds.

(c) Recommendation: That to increase the internal controls of central post funds, only one monthly consolidated check payment of all unit fund dividends be made directly to a bank requesting that the various unit fund accounts be credited for their applicable amount. Further recommend that a control sheet be established that will indicate the current status of all unit fund monthly dividends. (ACofS, Comptroller)

(3) Religious Services:

(a) Observation: Personnel on the supply ships coming into the piers are not always able to attend regular scheduled chapel services in this command.

(b) Evaluation: Personnel on these ships are interested in attending the religious services of their choice.

(c) Recommendation: That Protestant and Catholic chaplains conduct religious services on the ships or piers as often as possible. (Chaplain)

3. (U) Section III - Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information: None.

FRANK A. OLSON, JR
Colonel, CE
Commanding
VCA 00-NH (15 May 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the US Army Support
Command Cam Ranh Bay for Period Ending 30 April 1969 RCS CSFOR-65.

(1)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384 25 JUL 1969

To Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, FDC: "VCA-DIV
APO 96385.

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters,
US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay for the quarterly period ending
30 April 1969 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning Civilianization, page 26, paragraph 2 a
(1). Concur. The Central Training Institute started a training program
in the Cam Ranh Bay area on 26 May 1969. Seven instructors will be in the
area until September on a pilot program. If successful, the program will
be continued. The units which have a restriction on the use of LNs imposed
because of security reasons are being advised to submit a request for the
military spaces lost through civilianization. Two teams from this command
are currently visiting 70 CONUS installations on a recruiting drive.

b. Reference item concerning Publication of Orders, page 26, paragraph
2 a (2). Concur. A study conducted by USAHR revealed that the
failure to report personnel to DA for reassignment at the proper time
was the most significant reason for late receipt of assignment instructions.
HQ, 1st Logistical Command has initiated a study of AOR reporting pro-
cedures within this command with the objective of identifying problem
areas and establishing a more thorough and accurate AOR reporting system
for the command.

c. Reference item concerning Disciplinary Offenders, page 27, paragraph
2 a (3). Concur. The difficulties generated by the assignment of
personnel with a record of disciplinary action to units of this command
were brought to the attention of HQ, USARV, by 3rd Indorsement, AVCA AG-
24, subject: "Personnel Assignment Policy", 16 May 69, to letter, HQ,
262nd QM BN, subject: "Personnel Assignment Policy", 19 April 69.

d. Reference item concerning Hardened Vehicles, page 28, paragraph
2 b (1). Concur. The use of hardened organic vehicles for escorting
military convoys in Vietnam has proved effective although the added
weight causes increased wear and tear and shortens vehicle life. There
have been no reported instances of shortage of hardening. Units requesting them.
The inclusion of V-100 armored cars, however, as organic items for transportation units requires a change in organizational
and doctrinal concepts at DA level. At the present time, V-100's have been
issued to some Military Police units in Vietnam. Due to overcommitment of
Military Police assets, use of V-100's to escort Logistical Command
convoy has been the exception rather than the rule. The use of hardened
organic vehicles continues to be the primary and most effective means for
providing convoy security.

e. Reference item concerning Convoy Air Cover, page 28, paragraph 2
b (2). Concur. The use of visual reconnaissance aircraft (rotary and
fixed wing) with highway and water convoys has proven to be an valuable
aid in increasing the security and control of these operations. All
support commands in coordination with tactical forces, presently employ
visual reconnaissance and armed aircraft with convoys as required. The
action taken by the forwarding headquarters is adequate. There is no action
required by higher headquarters.

f. Reference item concerning Forced Issues of Subsistence, page 29,
paragraph 2 e (1). Concur. This recommendation is as directed by this
headquarters in letter dtd 4 May 69, from CG, 1st Log Cmd to CO, Cam
Ranh Bay Support Command. No action required by higher headquarters.

g. Reference item concerning Utilization of Locally Procured Fruits
and Vegetables, page 29, paragraph 2 e (2). Nonconcur. Recommendation as
stated is not always feasible due to shipping, storage, handling and general
condition of the product when received. Class I Officers should use
produce in accordance with condition of item, capability for storage, and
requirements by location. CONUS procured items and WESTRAC shipments of
fresh fruits and vegetables should also be taken into consideration.

h. Reference item concerning Combat Essential Air Missions, page 30,
paragraph 2 e (6). Concur with following exception. The recommendation
did not describe all coordination and liaison actions which should take
place to preclude the need for combat essential missions. It is agreed
that coordination should take place, in this case, between the Support
Command and Headquarters, I FFV. Coordination should also be effected,
however, at all echelons of command between supported and supporting units
to obtain an exchange of information on projected combat operations. If
this is done on a continuing basis, sufficient quantities of all supplies
can be programmed into specific support locations to keep the requirements
for priority airlift at an absolute minimum. Action has been taken by
this headquarters to make all support commands aware of this problem and
the actions necessary to control airlift requirements. On 27 April 1969,
confidential message 574C, subject: Special Mission Airlift Requirements,
was dispatched to support commands over the Commanding General's signature.
This message stressed the need for coordination and liaison at all echelons to insure proper management of resources and keep priority airlift missions at a minimum. No action is required by higher headquarters.

1. Reference item concerning Receipt of Damaged Package Products, page 31, paragraph 2 e (7). Concur with exceptions. It should be noted that commercial supply of packaged POL products in II CTZ is an exception. Normally these supplies are provided through MILSTRIP in II CTZ. Future contracts will include a provision for preparation of supplies for up country movement in the event that necessary arises.

2. Reference item concerning Use of Supply Directives, page 32, paragraph 2 e (10). Concur. This method is most suitable to ISA operations due to the lack of trained supply personnel. This method has been proven to be more responsive to customer demands than normal supply channels.

3. Reference item concerning Critical Stock Position on Items Formerly in Excess Position, page 33, paragraph 2 e (11). Concur. This is being done prior to reaching the reorder point which is one month below the Requisition Objective (30).

4. Reference item concerning Measurement of Retrograde Progress, page 33, paragraph 2 e (12). Concur. Previous study was made by the Return Materials Division which recommended changing retrograde yardstick to dollar value and line items beginning with 1st quarter FY 70.

5. Reference item concerning Engineer Support, page 34, paragraph 2 e (13). Concur. A major port, such as Cam Ranh Bay should have responsive engineer support readily available. This support should include a port construction capability. At the present time the construction contractor, HHH-BRJ, is mobilized for waterfront work in the Cam Ranh Bay area; an engineer light equipment company is being assigned to the Cam Ranh Bay area during the period 1 July through 1 November 1969 to provide additional horizontal construction capability.

6. Reference item concerning Inter Service/Agency Support Agreements, page 34, paragraph 2 e (14). Concur. All proposed ISSA's in which the 1st Logistical Command is the supplying activity, are forwarded by CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHGD-SD, to this headquarters for review and comments prior to formalization of the agreement. The proposed agreement is forwarded to the staff section exercising General Staff supervision over the actual supply activity who will be providing the support. The General Staff Section is required to answer three questions for each proposed agreement:

(1) Whether the 1st Logistical Command is capable of providing the requested support.
AVGA GU-MH (15 May 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay for Period Ending 30 April 1969 RCS CSFOR-65. (U)

(1) If the support can be provided, what is its effect, if any, on the 1st Logistical Command’s support to US Army units?

(2) Estimation of monthly dollar value of proposed support and manhours to be spent in providing the support.

The above response from the responsible staff section forms the basis of this command’s position on each proposed ISSA and a reply to CG, USARV, is made accordingly.

o. Reference item concerning Return of Packing Material, page 34, paragraph 2 a (15). Concur. The erection of roadside signs will be a subject for the Ammunition Technical Information Letter, ACOFS, Ammunition, 1st Log Comd for all concerned. Cooperation in this area will ultimately result in significant dollar savings to the US Government. This approach has experienced some success as noted in an ORLL submitted by the 536th Ord Bn (Ammo). No action required by higher Headquarters.

p. Reference item concerning Floating Cranes, page 35, paragraph 2 a (16). Concur. Two floating cranes (one 100 ton and one 60 ton) are assigned to Cam Ranh Bay in accordance with the 1st Log Comd policy of keeping two cranes at each port. Regular scheduled maintenance requires one crane in maintenance continually, but with one replacement crane available, normal operation would keep the assigned number of cranes at each port. The present situation is unusual in that two cranes are in maintenance which causes a temporary shortage. Based on port workloads, the decision was made that the loss of a crane would be least damaging at Cam Ranh Bay. This situation will be corrected with the return of a 60 ton crane to Cam Ranh Bay on 15 Aug 69.

q. Reference item concerning Central Post Funds, page 36, paragraph 2 f (2). Concur with recommendation. Action is required by higher Headquarters.

r. Reference item concerning Religious Services, page 36, paragraph 2 f (3). Concur. "Project Street Corner," a part of the 1st Logistical Command Management Improvement Program, provides guidance to 1st Log Comd chaplains in implementing this type of "out of chapel" service to the men in places where they are working.

3. Concur with the basic report as modified by this indorsement. The report is considered adequate.
AVCA GO-MH (15 May 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay for Period Ending 30 April 1969 RCS CSFOR-65. (U)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 4839
CF: USASUPCOM, CRB

LANNY K. KELSEY
1Lt, AGC
Asst Adjutant General
AVHGC-DST (15 May 1969) 2d Ind


HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 2 7 JUL 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters, US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. (C) Reference item concerning "Civilianization," section II, page 25, paragraph 2a(1) with 1st indorsement. The following numbered comments pertain to the similarly numbered recommendations contained in the ORLL:

      (1) Concur. The establishment of a personnel training program for Local National employees at Cam Ranh Bay (CRB) by the Central Training Institute is a critical adjunct to the effective use of the civilianized workforce. It is the intention of the Civilian Personnel Field Office to make the present training course in CRB a continuous one and to design it for both current employees and prospective employees (i.e., refugees).

      (2) Nonconcur. The return of military spaces withdrawn under Program 6, would require, in effect, the raising of the USARV Force Structure Ceiling. This would require the receipt, by USARV, of additional force packages from OSD. Because the trend is now definitely to further reduce the authorized ceiling, no relief from military space withdrawals accomplished under Program 6 is contemplated.

      (3) Concur. An imaginative and purposeful DAC recruiting program is essential in civilianized units. The adverse effect of the hiring limitations under Public Law 90-364 cannot be minimized. The full impact of the hire freeze on the completion of Program 6 Civilianization cannot be determined. It is also recognized that Local National labor cannot be fully employed in sensitive areas or units. Further, one of the recurring problems throughout the Civilianization Program has been that indigenous personnel contributed nothing to the security of an area or unit. These and other problems bearing on Civilianization have been duly noted and stressed in after action and lessons learned reports submitted to higher headquarters.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHNC-JST (15 May 1969) 2d Ind

b. (C) Reference item concerning "Disciplinary Offenders," section II, page 27, paragraph 2a(3); nonconcur. The continuous evaluation and elimination of substandard enlisted personnel is a command responsibility. Evaluation may be accomplished by, but is not limited to, a periodic review of the individual's personnel records and consideration of the individual's duty performance. An individual's assignment to an overseas command, including Vietnam, is based upon grade, MOS, and date and place of last overseas tour, if any. Assignment to Vietnam as a rehabilitative measure is not within the purview of DA assignment policies.

c. (C) Reference item concerning "Harden Vehicles," section II, page 28, paragraph 2b(1), and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2d. Concur that commands responsible for operating highway convoys be provided with materials to harden organic vehicles. If additional hardening kits are required, they may be requested through the ENSURE program. Nonconcur that additional vehicles and V-100 armored cars be provided to commands responsible for operating highway convoys. Vehicles to be modified with hardening kits should be organic vehicles. Present assets of V-100 armored cars are being issued to US Army Military Police units and will be employed primarily for convoy and line of communication security. In consideration of the increased convoy security that will be provided by military police units equipped with the V-100 armored cars, it does not appear feasible to issue V-100 armored cars to transportation units.

d. (U) Reference item concerning "Utilization of Locally Procured Fruits and Vegetables," section II, page 29, paragraph 2e(2), and 1st Indorsement. Concur with paragraph 2e, 1st Indorsement. In addition, the condition of the on-hand inventory may require the force issue of fresh fruits and vegetables in excess of menu requirements. No further action is required by higher headquarters.

e. (U) Reference item concerning "Movement of supplies to Pacific Architects and Engineers," section II, page 32, paragraph 2e(9). Concur, provided that all requirements for the transportation of critical cargo continue to be given immediate consideration. No further action is required by higher headquarters.

f. (U) Reference item concerning "Measurement of Retrograde Progress," section II, page 33, paragraph 2e(12); concur. The expression of retrograde performance in terms of dollar value and lines shipped, in addition to tonnage, will be considered for inclusion in the USARV retrograde reporting program. No further action is required by higher headquarters.

CONFIDENTIAL
g. (U) Reference item concerning "Engineer Support," section II, page 34, paragraph 2e(13); concur. A port construction unit will be assigned to the 18th Engineer Brigade to supplement the capability of the construction contractor, R.K.-SHJ. The 18th Engineer brigade has responsibility for the Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay areas. This added effort should be assigned to the projects at both locations according to established priorities.

h. (U) Reference item concerning "Central Post Funds," section II, page 36, paragraph f(2); concur. The recommended system can be established by direct coordination between the CPF custodian and the military banking facility. No further action is required by higher headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cy furn:
US Army Spt Comd, CRB
1st Log Comd
GPOP-DT (15 May 69) 3d Ind (U)


HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 25 AUG 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]
CPT SHORT
CPT, ASC
Asst AG
### Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay

#### Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb 69 to 30 Apr 69.

**CG, US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay**

**Report Date:** 15 May 1969

**Total No. of Pages:** 48

**Originator's Report Number:** 692309

**Sponsoring Military Activity:** OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

---

**Distribution Statement:**

**Supplementary Notes:** N/A

---

**Abstract:**

N/A