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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96370

15 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period ending 30 April 1969; DES GHQOR-65 (El) (U)

Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVPC-88-H, APO 96266
Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVQG(DT), APO 96375
Commanding General, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPO(DT), APO 96538

1. (O) Section I. Operations; Significant Activities

a. (O) Introduction:

(1) During this reporting period 1 February - 30 April, the 9th Infantry Division continued operations in support of missions and tasks either specified or implied by the following Plans and Operational Instructions:

(a) JGS/MAOV Combined Campaign Plan 1969, AB 144, dated 30 September 1968.
(b) II FFORCIV/I Corps Combined Campaign Plan 1969, dated 1 December 1968.
(c) IV CTF Dry Weather Campaign Plan, dated 13 November 1968.

(2) The mission of the 9th Infantry Division is to conduct sustained, coordinated combined air and ground operations to destroy Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese (NVA) main and local force units and their installations and infrastructure in the TAOL in close cooperation and coordination with Task Force 117, execute ground and riverine operations to interdict enemy land and water lines of communication and deny the use of their base areas and to destroy targeted main and local force units; conduct consolidation and pacification operations to identify and destroy VC guerrilla units and infrastructure and secure population centers and lines of communication in close cooperation and coordination with the Government of Vietnam (GVN) Forces; conduct supporting operations to further the GVN pacification program by enhancing the capability of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), Popular Forces (PP) and Regional Forces (RF), and to contribute to the health and welfare of the civilian population. The 9th Infantry Division has successfully accomplished this mission by conducting operations in Gia Dinh, Long An, Go Cong, Dinh Tuong, Kien Tuong, Khan Hoa, Vinh Binh, and Kien Phong Provinces.

(3) The 9th Infantry Division was involved in combat during every day (89 days) of this reporting period while conducting four major operations which com-
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May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RG3 GSPOR-65 (R1) (U)

reconciled, terminated, or continued during the reporting period. Operation TOAN THANG II terminated on 17 February and Operation TOAN THANG III was initiated on 18 February. Operation TOAN THANG continued as part of Operation QUAG THANG.

(4) In addition to the above listed operations an element of the 9th Infantry Division, the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry, participated in combat operations in the I Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ). The squadron conducted mounted and dismounted patrols in areas as designated. Troop D remained at Dong Tam and participated in missions as assigned by division headquarters.

b. (2) Organization

(1) The 9th Infantry Division reorganized two brigade headquarters, seven infantry battalions, and two artillery battalions to a Riverine MTOE configuration during the period July 1968 - November 1969. During the initial period of the Mobile Riverine Force, excellent results were achieved—particularly during THE 1968. However, the VC progressively adapted their tactics to counteract riverine operations until in recent months success in pure riverine operations has significantly reduced. At this time, of the seven infantry riverine battalions, only two are afloat.

(2) Experience conclusively indicates that riverine units cannot conduct extended land based operations without additional equipment and personnel. Conversely, standard units can conduct both riverine operations from afloat bases and land operations without significant problems. Because of the reduction in operational effectiveness it was considered essential to reorganize the riverine units.

(3) The 9th Infantry Division requested authority to reorganize one brigade headquarters, five infantry battalions, and one artillery battalion to standard artillery and light infantry MTOE. Although the reorganization has been approved by CONUSMACV, tabular authority has not been received as of this date. In the interim the following units are being provisionally reorganized:

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15 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1969, BCS OGPOR-65 (E1) (U)

UNIT         OFF  WO  EM  AGO
5th Bn, 60th Inf  43  2  875  920
1st Bn, 11th Arty  44  3  477  526

(4) Additionally, Company B (Ranger), 50th Infantry has been reorganized as Company B (Ranger), 75th Infantry, under the provisions of USARPAC GO 66, dated 27 January 1969. There were no changes to MTCE 07-1579, PAC 3/68. Strength authorization is as follows:

UNIT         OFF  WO  EM  AGO
Co B (Ranger) 75th Inf  3  0  115  118

(5) Under the provisions of USARPAC GO 124, dated 13 February 1969, the following unit was organized to provide a fourth firing battery for the 2d Bn, 4th Arty.

UNIT         OFF  WO  EM  AGO
Btry D, 2d Bn, 4th Arty  8  0  107  115

(6) Under provisions of USARPAC GO 34 dated 16 January 1969, the following units were updated from the "E" series to "G" series MTCE 07-1579, PAC 1/68.

UNIT         OFF  WO  EM  AGO
43d Inf Plt (Scout Dog)  1  0  27  28
45th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)  1  0  27  28

(7) Under the provisions of USARPAC GO 43 dated 17 January 1969, the following unit was updated from the "E" series to "G" series MTCE 07-1579, PAC 1/68.

UNIT         OFF  WO  EM  AGO
9th Arvn Bn (Inf Div)  47  58  318  423

(8) Under the provisions of USARPAC GO 93, dated 31 January 1969, the following unit was updated from the "E" series to the "G" series MTCE.

UNIT         OFF  WO  EM  AGO
3d Sqdn, 5th Cav  50  36  963  1049

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25 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending
30 April 1969, ROC-650 (R1) (U)

(a) Under the provisions of USARPAC 00 220, dated 19 March 1969, the 9th
Army BN (Inf Div) was redesignated 9th Army BN (INF) (Inf Div).

(10) Organizational Structure - Encl 1.
(11) Roster of Key Personnel - Encl 2.
(12) Division TAOI - Encl 3.

(c) Personnel and Administration

(1) General Data: See Inclosure 4 for information and statistics concerning
the following:
(a) Maintenance of unit strength
(b) Personnel Management
(c) Development and Maintenance of Morale
(d) Maintenance of discipline, law and order
(e) Significant activities

(a) Headquarters Commandant: The Headquarters Commandant Section continued
its normal functions within the Division Headquarters Area of building maintenance,
landscaping, parade and ceremony preparation, officer billeting, and VIP billeting.

(b) Staff Judge Advocate

(1) On 1 February 1969, a Correctional Holding Detachment was established
by the Commanding General, USARV. All individuals with approved sentences of more
than 30 days confinement at hard labor are automatically transferred from their
divisional unit to the Correctional Holding Detachment. Implementation of Divi-
sion policy was affected by the Staff Judge Advocate by briefings with battalion
commanders and through publications and explanations in the SJA Bulletin. The
new policy was further explained and implemented by frequent visits to the bat-
talion S-1s by various JAG officers assigned to the office of the Staff Judge Ad-
vocate.

(2) A provision of legal assistance to the combat soldier in the field con-
tinued through the use of circuit riders. In addition, the SJA was made a member
of the new contact team wherein a JAG officer went to combat field locations in
order to provide immediate close support and assistance to individuals with legal
problems.
A division claims disaster procedure was established. Under this program, investigations of major losses of personal property due to enemy action were made, with immediate assistance given to individual soldiers who wished to file claims for their lost or damaged property.

(4) The Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969, became effective 1 January 1969. During this period the Staff Judge Advocate, by staff visits to all subordinate units, provided a smooth transition from the use of the old manual to the use of the new manual. In addition, supplies of the new manual were obtained and distributed in sufficient quantities to all units to enable them to continue the administration of military justice without undue interruption.

(5) The Chief, Military Affairs, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, through utilization of the SJA Bulletin, individual counseling, and staff visits to various units materially contributed to the more expeditious processing of various administrative actions such as line of duty investigations, reports of survey, and investigations by boards of officers.

(6) Initial studies and preparations were made for the implementation of the Military Justice Act of 1968. While this act does not become effective until 1 August 1969, a great deal of prior planning and coordination, training, and instruction are necessary due to major changes in military justice which will be effected by the new act. The SJA in conjunction with commanders, executive officers, and adjutants of divisional units, prepared a basic plan of implementation, made requisitions for new personnel, and trained court reporters and legal clerks as needed.

d. (C) Intelligence

(1) Discussion

(a) General: This reporting period includes three distinct phases of enemy activity. The first phase was a continuation of a period of increased infiltration and build-up which began January 1969. This phase was terminated on 22 February with the initiation of widespread offensive activity known as the Post-Fest Offensive. There were continuing high points of enemy activity until the end of March. This is generally accepted as the date of the close of the enemy's Winter-Campaign which began in early December 1968. The third phase, which has extended from the beginning of April to the present, could be classified as a near stand-down. During this period of decreasing contact, agent and P/Soi Chanh reports have indicated that the enemy has entered a period of re-evaluation and self-critique for his failure to achieve established goals. Indications have been received that the enemy is planning now for another offensive. Since the initiation of discussions in Paris, the enemy has continually geared his activity toward operations having the most political impact such as capturing US servicemen, attacking weaker Vietnamese outposts, com-
Operational Import of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1969, ESC G5F0R-65 (R1) (U)

During the first stage of the Winter-Spring Campaign in Long An, it was obvious that the enemy was attempting to lay the ground work for another attack on Saigon, and other population centers within the province. Their main objectives were to tie down US forces and to disrupt successful pacification efforts. The principal Communist goal within Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa Provinces was to inflict maximum losses on US forces. Some specifically stated objectives were to attack My Tho, Gia Lai, Gia Lai, Ben Tre, and Ho Chi Minh cities and to interdict the "People's Road" (Highway 4). Captured enemy documents stated the enemy's overall objectives within the division TAOD were "to annihilate 60 per cent of the enemy troops and destroy 50 per cent of the enemy outposts, to liberate half of the district seats and province capitals and destroy the remaining half so that we can eventually control them all." An NWPW message, dated 29 January 1969, urged a strong Winter-Spring Campaign in order to strengthen the VC bargaining position at the Paris Peace Talks. Intelligence indicated that the Viet Cong considered a major military effort essential in order to support his peace delegation in Paris.

Long An Province: Activity remained relatively moderate during the first two weeks of February with isolated attacks by fire comprising the enemy's main effort. However, indications continued to be received reflecting a major enemy buildup. On 1 and 2 February 1969, the 2d Battalion, 60th Infantry, made contact with a new infiltration group, the 4010, north of Thu Thua. The contact resulted in 55 NVA killed, four PWS captured and two Ho Chans. The prisoners stated that they had been sent to SB-III to reinforce units for the coming offensive. Enemy activity continued to increase and there appeared to be little question that the enemy was planning a show of force following his self-imposed, though often violated Tet Truce. On the night of 14 - 15 February, the enemy attacked Binh Phuoc with 107mm rockets, mortars, RPGs, automatic weapons, and small arms fire which resulted in two US KIA, 22 US WIA, and 9 VC KIA. On 19 February a Ho Chanh rallied to Military Advisory Team Number 69. He reported that he was the political officer for the 6th Battalion of SB-11 and stated that the general offensive would begin on 22 February at 2200H. As predicted, a surge of activity in the form of intense mortar and rocket attacks on military installations and population centers throughout South Vietnam on the night of 22 - 23 February marked the start of the final phase of the Winter-Spring Campaign. The most significant attack within the province on that evening was the attack on Tan An City in which 22 107mm rockets were fired into the city. On 24 February a Ho Chanh from the 1st Long An Battalion stated that his unit's mission was to move into Saigon and attack the "Y" Bridge. On the following day, 25 February, elements of 2-47 Infantry and 6-31 Infantry engaged an estimated VC company approximately five kms SW of Thu Thua resulting in 3 1 VC KIA. The following week activity decreased, but reports continued to indicate that the 2d Long An Battalion would move against Saigon during this offensive period.
Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending
30 April 1969, BUS CSFOR-65 (R)(U)

11 March 1969, approximately 2 kms north of Minh Phong, 1/2-47 Inf contacted an
unidentified VC force and killed 20. On 24 February, C/5-60 Inf apprehended
22 detainees, 10 of whom were classified PW. Three of the PWs were believed
to be from the 23 Long An Battalion, one from the Dong Phu Battalion, one from
the 521 Sapper Battalion and one from a 220 Battalion. The number of pris-
oners from different units indicated the importance still attached to the
area by the enemy. During the first two weeks of March, the enemy continued
to suffer heavy losses while awaiting orders from COSVN to start the final
"Peak or Pulse" of activity. These losses the VC could ill afford. High
ranking members of the main and local force battalions were beginning to rally
to the side of the government, a sure sign of deterioration of VC morale. A
key member of the SR-III Rear Services Organization (Moi Hung) was killed
during this period. Large caches were uncovered, some containing new weapons
and supplies which further hampered the VC effort. There were indications
that his goals remained the same as before, to make a show of force. Infil-
tration of replacements and supplies continued. On 18 - 19 March, 13 kms
north of VC Island, elements of the 3d Brigade contacted an unknown size unit
attempting to move along the Bo Bo Canal into Long An. Following this con-
tact, 41 VC bodies littered the battlefield. On 16 and 18 March, PWs were
captured from the K-5 and L-4 Battalions, 1st NVA Regiment, confirming the
location of all three battalions of that unit in Long An. On 25 March, approx-
imately 7 kms southwest of Can Duc, 3d Brigade contacted VC elements of
the 516 Battalion with results of 22 VC KIA and 1 PW captured. On 3 April,
5 kms south of Ben Long, the 2d Battalion, 50th ARVN Regiment made contact with
the L-5 Battalion of the 1st NVA Regiment. This contact resulted in 36 VC
KIA. Weapons captured included two EGCs, one EGC-2 RL, one 12.7 AMD, and one
AK-47. Although activity within Long An greatly decreased within the third
period of the quarter, the enemy gave ground reluctantly. On 8 April, the
2-47 Infantry Battalion contacted the K4 Battalion, killing 47 VC/NVA. Pri-
oners of War captured during this period continued to report that several
SR-III and NVA units were located within the Gia-Dinh and Long-An-border area,
however, major units were reported widely dispersed and attempting to avoid
contact. Between 1 and 18 April, 17 107mm rockets were captured. The enemy
fired another 18 on US and ARVN positions. On 14 April, the enemy initiated
over offensive action against allied forces when the K4 Battalion, 1st NVA
Regiment attacked the 4th Battalion, 50th ARVN Regiment, killing 18 ARVN and
wounding 22 ARVN and 20 civilians. There were subsequent attacks with the
K5 and K6 Battalions on the 18th and 26th of April respectively, however,
enemy-initiated activity decreased noticeably. As the reporting period drew
to a close, intelligence continued to be received which indicated that in-
creased activity has been scheduled for the period between April and mid-July.
Any increased activity allegedly depends on the Paris Peace Talks.

(e) Minh Tuong Province: Enemy activity decreased slightly in Minh
Tuong during the first week of February. Scattered contacts throughout the
Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

Confidential

15 May 1969

Subject: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

During that week, approximately 10 km SW of Cai Lay on 10 February provided information of planned attacks on Cai Be and Cai Lay Districts, the 514C Battalion being the major unit mentioned. An "Official Message" from the VC by Tho Cac, dated 10 February, directed all forces in Dinh Tuong to be prepared to attack Ny Tho and US base camps in Dinh Tuong as follows: (1) To mortar Ny Tho and American bases on 15 and 16 February, (2) To attack Cai Lay on 21 February and other district towns on or after that date; and (3) to destroy and kill all GVN and Americans. The VC self-imposed truce started on 15-16 February. On 20-21 February, Dong Tam had three separate attacks by fire with only light friendly casualties. Then on 22-23 February, enemy offensive attacks by fire erupted throughout the province and Division TAOI with Dong Tam and Ny Tho receiving 84 and 100 rounds of mortar fire respectively. According to a Hoi Chanh and a PW from the 261B Battalion, elements of the Dong Thep I and II Regiments, which were to participate in an attack on Ny Tho that night, had their plans disrupted by friendly operations. Another PW reported that the 550 Battalion had crossed the Ny Tho River into Dinh Tuong and joined with the 514A and the 263 Battalions for that attack. The presumptive operations conducted by the 9th Infantry Division and the 7th ARVN Division north and northwest of Ny Tho are believed to have thwarted the enemy attacks. Even as these plans were set aside, however, the enemy continued to resupply and regroup for further offensive operations. On 6 March, contact developed with the 4th Company of the 514C Battalion and 43 of the enemy were killed. The 1st Brigade continued to press the enemy and several contacts developed which resulted in significant enemy casualties.

On 11-12 March 1969, 1st Brigade contacted elements of the 261B Battalion near Thanh Phu Village. Originally this contact was believed to have resulted in 57 VC KIA, but according to a prisoner of war captured by elements of the 7th ARVN Division in April, the battalion (with a strength of 200) suffered 100 KIA and 20 WIA and another 20 deserted or were missing. In addition, most of the unit's heavy weapons were lost. The unit reportedly withdrew into Kien Phong Province at this time to regroup and recruit new members. Another large contact occurred on 16 March when 32 VC were killed 6 km west of Cai Lay. The 4th Battalion, 39th Infantry pounded the 261A marlessly on 23-24 March. A sweep of the battle area revealed over 140 enemy bodies. On 31 March, 11 km east of the Wagon Wheel, the 1st Brigade contacted scattered VC elements and killed 34 of the enemy. Throughout this period, intelligence reports were received which indicated that the enemy was entering a period of increased activity and a reorganization and re-evaluation phase. By the end of March, it became less likely that the enemy could initiate a final "high point" to close out his campaign. Likewise, it appeared unlikely that a coming "large scale" summer offensive would develop. More credible were Agent Reports which indicated a resumption of "Post May 68" evasion tactics (referred to as the "Two Decisions") coupled with an attempt to inflict maximum casualties on US personnel and damage the GVN's cause as much as possible. On 9 April 1969, contact was made with the Kien Tuong 504 Battalion seven km northwest of Ny Phuoc Tay which resulted
in 31 VC killed. This was the last contact with a major unit in Dinh Tommy during the reporting period. One of the most significant developments of this period was the reorganization and realignment of enemy forces. Documents and Pves confirmed the reassignment of the 267B Battalion to the Dong Thap II Regiment. Although the exact date of this organization is not known, it probably took place early in February 1969 in preparation for the Post Tet Offensive. Pves have also reported that the 5140 Provincial Battalion has been upgraded and made part of the Dong Thap I Regiment; however, there is no corroborating evidence at this time. Equally significant as to enemy intentions was the consolidation of NB-II artillery units under the Binh Dan Artillery Unit and the formation of a Binh Dan front in the Dong Tam area. A similar consolidation was affected by the organization of the 341 NF Sapper Battalion of NB-II with the 33XX, 334X, and 336X Sapper Companies forming subordinate elements. The lack of contacts with major units and the significantly decreased activity further confirmed reports that this phase of the offensive was one of a near stand down. Enemy forces remained generally dispersed in company size or smaller units attempting to avoid contact.

(d) Kien Hoa Province: As the first phase of the reporting period began, reports were received from Kien Hoa that civilian laborers were being forced to assist the VC units in their pre-offensive movement of supplies. Reports indicated that the 516, 540, and 550 Battalions and the 550 NF Company would be used in an attack on Ben Tre City. No Cay was also reported to be a major target of the VC. On 11 February, a 120 - 200 man unit of an NVA Battalion was reported four kms southwest of Dong Tam. A report was received which indicated that the VC were massing for an attack scheduled to begin before Tet and last until 29 February. On 20 February 1969, elements of 3-47 Infantry operating in northwestern Giang Tram District contacted an unidentified enemy force of unknown size. Contact continued for five hours resulting in 9 US KIA, 10 US WIA, and 90 VC KIA. It was later determined that the contact had been with the main body of the 516 Battalion. Interrogation of Pves revealed that the 516 Battalion, on contacting US forces, had been completely surprised in its movement toward Ben Tre for the offensive which was to begin 22-23 February. The 580 NF Company which had come into the area to support the 516th withdrew into its own area of operations (Binh Dinh District) because, as a PW later stated, the 516 Battalion fled to the west along the Ba Le River and another moved to the southwest in an attempt to avoid the 2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. Reports continued to be received, however, that the enemy, with a new front organization of the 1st Battle Group, was continuing plans for the final phase of the Winter-Spring Offensive. Intelligence reports continued throughout March to indicate the presence of several new units in Kien Hoa Province. The C66 Artillery Company was one new unit mentioned. In this area enemy contact was at an all-time low; however sporadic contacts continued throughout the area. Prisoners of War, almost all of whom were local guerrillas, indicated that a major attack upon Ben Tre was imminent; however, this attack failed to materialize.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending
30 April 1969, ROC CHSP-65 (R1) (U)

In lieu join, as the second phase ended and the third began, terrorism again became the major enemy tactic. Ben Tre City experienced several acts of terrorism during late March and early April. A bomb planted on a bicycle was discovered by an ARVN sergeant near the fence which protected the helipad and 0/1-84 artillery headquarters. As the bicycle was thrown into a nearby ditch it exploded, injuring a small child. Later, near the lake in front of the Second Brigade Command Post, another bicycle loaded with 0-4 was found. On 21 March, the 2d Brigade contacted a VC element north of Ben Tre along the Ba Lai River which resulted in 40 VC KIA. It is believed that the unit contacted was the 516 Battalion. On 22 and 24 March 2d Brigade elements contacted VC elements which resulted in 40 and 17 VC KIA respectively. No unit was identified. As the second phase ended on 31 March, 3-47 Infantry killed 27 VC in sporadic contacts northeast of Ben Tre near the Ba Lai River. On 9 April 1969, a command detonated 750 pound bomb mine exploded only minutes after US elements passed over it on Route 175 in Trua Giai District. No one was injured. Reports indicated that the enemy would avoid contact while continuing his harassment against US and SVN forces. After 1 April 1969, there were no major units contacted. During the week of 14 April intelligence reports were received placing the 516 Battalion in Giang Tran District with the mission to harass small outposts and disrupt US river traffic. On 25 April, RF elements moving along a road in Ham Long District were ambushed by an estimated 500 VC. Results of the contact were as follows: 1 US Advisor KIA, 25 RF KIA, 55 RF WIA. Friendly losses were one 60mm mortar, 6 radios, and 37 individual weapons. Enemy losses were 14 VC KIA and one machine gun captured. The enemy continued to choose the place, the time, and the conditions of battle.

Go Cong Province: Go Cong Province was relatively quiet at the beginning of the reporting period. Reports were received that the 263B Battalion and the 514B Battalion were operating with local forces, with the mission of attacking district capitals and ARVN outposts. On 22-23 February, Vinh Binh received 22 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Mortar fire and small arms fire as well as automatic weapons fire were received by numerous PF outposts throughout the province on that night. Throughout the remainder of February and the first of March, reports continued to indicate Hoa Dong District as a principal target for the VC. On 21 March six rounds of 82mm mortar again fell on Vinh Binh. Countermortar was fired, killing five VC. Two Pws from the 514B Provincial Battalion were captured. They stated that the unit was understrength and had only 150 men. On 8 April 1969, a VC platoon attacked a Popular Forces outpost at Xom Hoang Su (w) resulting in 9 PF killed, four wounded and two Vietnamese civilians killed. One of the dead civilians had been a village chief. On 13 April 1969, 2d Brigade inserted into the Coconut Grove in Hoa Dong District. In a series of contacts, US elements accounted for 12 VC KIA. Operations continued for two days in Hoa Dong District by elements of the 2d Brigade. The month closed without significant enemy offensive operations. The enemy continued to harass small outposts and use direct fire weapons against stronger positions.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending
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(C) Vinh Dinh Province: Elements of the 9th Infantry Division entered
base area 487 on 31 March. This operation was in response to intelligence which
indicated that the 501 and 510 Battalions were refitting and resting for further
operations. Contact which was sporadic and lacked firm identification con-
tinued through the next few days without decisive engagement. Operations con-
tinued intermittently through April with total estimated 130 body count. In-
telligence reports continue to indicate that the 501 and 510 Battalions and
several unidentified guerrilla units operate in Vinh Dinh Province.

(2) Recapitulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LAST LOCATION</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9th Inf Div</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>271 Bn</td>
<td>NW of Angel's Wing</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>MCI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>272 Bn</td>
<td>Vic of Angel's Wing</td>
<td>1250</td>
<td>MCI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>273 Bn</td>
<td>SW of Tay Ninh City</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>CE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Ind Bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>K4 Bn</td>
<td>W of Rach Kien City</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>CE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K5 Bn</td>
<td>Eastern Thu Thu Van</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>MCI</td>
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<td>310</td>
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<td>SR-II</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2642 Bn</td>
<td>Vic of Sugar Cane</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>MCI</td>
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<td>6th Bn</td>
<td>N of Dau Hoa City</td>
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<td>MCI</td>
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<td>267 Bn</td>
<td>Southeast of Tra Cu City</td>
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<td>MCI</td>
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<tr>
<td>308 Bn</td>
<td>Southern Pineapple</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>MCI</td>
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<tr>
<td>269 Bn</td>
<td>N of Tra Cu City</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>MCI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SR-III</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1st Bn (506)</td>
<td>NW of Rach Kien</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>MCI</td>
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<tr>
<td>2d Bn (508)</td>
<td>Long An—Gia Dinh Border</td>
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15 May 1969

**SUBJECT:** Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending as of April 1969, and November (H) [H]

**UNIT** | **LAST LOCATION** | **STRENGTH** | **ACTIONS** | **EFFECTIVENESS**
---|---|---|---|---
**SB-III (cont)**
Bong Phe Bn | Long An-Gia Dinsh Border | 300 | CE | 
263 Bn | SE of Can Gioc City | 200 | MCB | 
520 Bn | Southern Tan Tra | 200 | MCB | 
**DINH TUONG PROVINCE**
1st Regt | Southern Base Area 470 | 200 | MCB | 
261A Bn | Eastern Base Area 470 | 150 | MCB | 
261B Bn | N of Cai Lay City | 150 | MCB | 
5140 Bn (Para) | | | | 
21 Regt | | | | 
263 Bn | N of My Tho City | 300 | CE | 
5144 Bn | NE of My Tho City | 200 | MCB | 
267B Bn | NW of My Tho City | 250 | MCB | 
Binh Duc Artillery Bn | Western San Gioc and Ham Long (D) | 350 | CE | 
**GO CONG PROVINCE**
5146 Bn | Go Cong Tri Border Area | 150 | MCB | 
**KHEM HOA PROVINCE**
516 Bn | Gioc Triem (D) | 250 | MCB | 
518 Bn | Co sized elements in Khe Hoa | 200 | MCB | 
550 Bn | SE of Ben Tre City | 200 | MCB | 
560 Bn | No Cay (D) | 175 | MCB |
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**AVN-3H**

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1969, MSG CSFOR-69 (HI) (V)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LAST LOCATION</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>VUNG VIEN PROVINCE</td>
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<tr>
<td>501 Ba</td>
<td>Long Toan (D)</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>MCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>510 Ba</td>
<td>Can Le and Tien Cam (D)</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>MCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIM PHONG PROVINCE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>502 Ba</td>
<td>SE of Kien Phong (P) W of Base Area 470</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>MCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIM THANH PROVINCE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>504 Ba</td>
<td>N Central Kien Thong (P)</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>MCE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: MCE: Moderately Combat Effective; MCE: Not Combat Effective.

(3) Enemy Tactics and Techniques

(a) During the reporting period the enemy continued to respond to friendly operations by dispersing his units into platoon and squad size elements. The enemy increased his use of mortars and indirect fire within the Division AOI during this period. Recent information indicates that the VC/NVA are planning to employ a chemical long delay fuse with 82mm mortar projectiles. This would present a significant threat to allied positions and installations. The North Vietnamese 82mm Chemical Long Delay Fuse, model HG 6a, is the only known long delay fuse employed with projectile munitions. The fuse provides four standard long delay periods through selection of color-coded glass ampules containing different concentrations of acetone. A yellow ampule produces a delay of 2.5 hours; red, 3.5 hours; blue, 5 hours; and violet, 6 hours. All times are plus or minus 20% at 86 degrees F. Fragments of an 82mm HEF round of this type fired from a Soviet 82mm Recoilless gun D-10 were found following an attack on Dong Tam Base. This weapon is a smooth bore gun mounted on a tripod. Use of this weapon may well explain the ineffectiveness of counterbattery operations on some occasions, since it leaves a crater resembling that created by a mortar round, but which can be fired at an angle below the counterbattery radar scan. Reports were also received that the VC are constructing bunkers near the 82mm mortar firing positions so that when counter mortar is fired the mortar can be taken into the bunker with the crew. After the counter mortar ceases, the crew leaves the bunker with the mortar and hides each of the three parts of the mortar (tube, tripod, base plate) in different locations so that no one member will know where all three parts are located. The crew normally
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fires seven or eight rounds of 82mm mortar at base areas and towns. When engaging troop targets, approximately five rounds are fired, retaining two or three rounds to fire at helicopters evacuating the wounded. The VC have emphasized using the 107mm rocket in a direct fire role in Long An Province. They move as near to their target as possible, set their rockets up on their "X" mounts, then collapse the mount and cover the rocket with rice straw. The rockets appear as piles of straw and can be erected and fired in seconds.

(c) A tactic frequently used by the VC to determine the locations of US/GVN operations is the reconnoitering of Fire Support Bases in the early morning hours to determine the direction in which the artillery tubes are pointed. The VC consider this a reliable indication that US/GVN troops will operate in that general direction and they will go in the opposite direction.

(d) Recently the VC have initiated raids against outposts, district installations, supply and transportation depots, and headquarters sections. The VC disguise themselves in ARVN uniforms wearing various branch and rank insignia. They take advantage of poorly disciplined guards to infiltrate camps and perform terrorist activities. The VC have started planting mines so that after detonation of one mine, a second is in position to catch any traffic swinging around the crater. These are placed approximately 15 meters apart.

(e) The Chieu Hoi program and the increasing number of deserters have apparently cost the VC sufficient number of weapons to cause him not to trust young recruits until after six months service. Indications are that all weapons are collected between operations.

(f) A recent PW revealed the following VC tactics to his captors:

1. The presence of a light Observation Helicopter (AOH, which the VC call a Staff Officer's Helicopter) closely reconnoitering an area is a definite indication of future US operations in the area. The VC have definite orders not to fire on LDBs.

2. CS gas, thought to be very effective against the VC in his tunnel complexes, has been countered by the VC. His defense against CS gas includes the following countermeasures: Urinating on a towel and placing it over his face; using a Chinese oil to clear the agent from the face and skin after the attack; placing a wet cloth across bunker openings, then lighting a candle or burner to cause any agent which might penetrate the bunker to rise to the ceiling while individuals remain on the floor.

(f) During a contact if the VC are unable to remove their dead, they wrap them in nylon cloth and hide them in bunkers. A squad may return later and re-
Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 20 April 1969

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CRUIST civilian laborers to recover and bury the VC dead. The army has been ordered to make every effort to recover weapons of fallen VC. If the tactical situation requires rapid withdrawal, weapons will be hidden in the area of contact for pickups five or six days later. When withdrawing from a contact, they often use inflated nylon sheets to float clothes, weapons, and equipment across a stream or canal. Sampans are avoided due to ease of detection by US helicopters.

When VC are in an area being swept by US troops, they hold fire and remain silent and are told not to cry out even if wounded. Often US troops get to within one or two meters of occupied VC positions and never see them. VC recon elements conduct continuous and extensive recon during the course of contact to locate a gap in the US lines. (An area 30 meters wide is required for escape.) The VC report to the CO when a gap is located and the CO gives the order to withdraw at a time he deems favorable. Night withdrawal is much preferred. The headquarters and recon element secure each side of the gap and the companies infiltrate through the gap in small groups in single file.

Recapitulation of Enemy Losses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>8420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detainees</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMs</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chieu Bui</td>
<td>157</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crew Served Weapons</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms (34)</td>
<td>585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammo (Rounds)</td>
<td>152,156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines</td>
<td>6,624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grain (Tons)</td>
<td>19.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sappers</td>
<td>961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures</td>
<td>2,081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers</td>
<td>6,917</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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AVDP-MI
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1969, DES GSPER-65 (MI) (U)

(5) Intelligence Sources and Agencies

(a) Progress continued during the reporting period in the identification of Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCl) personnel operating within the Division TAOL. The target and filing system initiated during the last reporting period continues to develop, as village studies were recently updated for Dinh Tuong Province. The Chieu Hoi Program received 26 ralliers for the period, five of whom were VOI. The present requirements for all Third Party Inducement Program payments to be made through GVN channels are being modified to avoid the current problem of non-uniform procedures among different provinces. These changes will enable the unit commanders to develop a more extensive program of their own.

(b) The CI Section, 9th MI Detachment, through its contact with Provincial Phoenix Teams, is able to provide VCl targets for the division. These targets will normally take three forms: perishable; long range perishable; and collective. Perishable targets usually are based upon a single reliable report and must be acted upon rapidly. The collective target is based upon numerous reports and usually results in a combined operation with US/ARVN personnel. The target area will usually be a hamlet or village. Gathering intelligence on this type of target requires more time than that expended on other types. During this period, the CI Section has passed the following number of VCl targets to the brigades: 1st Brigade - 18 targets; 2d Brigade - 46 targets; and the 3d Brigade - 14 targets.

(c) The division Interrogation Section processed a total of 1738 detainees during this reporting period. Of this total 337 were classified Innocent Civilians, 613 were classified Civil Defendants, 340 were classified POW, and 185 were classified Ho Chi Minh. In addition, the section processed 243 batches of captured documents, 132 of which were of tactical value. The section also processed approximately 275 pounds of captured material, consisting primarily of Viet Cong clothing and equipment.

(d) Long Range Patrol Activities: During the reporting period, Company E, 75th Infantry (Ranger) continued its mission of harassing and interdicting the Viet Cong deep within Movement Area. Division Rangers were employed from forward locations in separate brigade areas. At present two six-man patrols are being employed from the 1st Brigade camp at Fire Support Base Danger in Dinh Tuong Province; three six-man patrols employed out of Dong Tam in support of the 2d Brigade in Kien Hoa Province; three six-man patrols employed from the 3d Brigade camp at Tan An; and four six-man teams are employed out of Dong Tam in support of Division operations. The company (minus) remains at the Division Main at Dong Tam. As of 1 February 1969, 244 patrols have been conducted with 111 contacts developed. Of the 134 sightings during the reporting period the division reacted with artillery and/or air or ground forces.

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AVDIE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending
30 April 1969, RGOS OROR-65 (11) (U)

May 1969
SWJEM, operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending
30 April 1969, RGOS OROR-65 (11) (U)

On 86 occasions, Long Range Patrols were credited with 169 VC KIA (M) and 5
North Vietnamese captured during the period.

(a) Aerial Surveillance and Reconnaissance

1. During the reporting period, utilization of infra-red and ELARR sensors
increased from a previous high of approximately 20 mission areas per night to
approximately 28 mission areas flown each night.

2. During this reporting period aerial photography of the TAOI has been
rapidly updated taking advantage of this period of minimum cloud cover. Hand
held missions and "spot" targets have been photographed to confirm, refute,
or enhance information gathered from other intelligence sources and to
provide a terrain study to engineering units throughout the TAOI.

(f) Significant Activities and New Techniques

1. The Imagery Interpretation Section, consistent with its basic mission,
accomplished the following activities during the reporting period. (1) 328
aerial photographic missions were received and processed. (2) Imagery Inter-
pretation Reports were prepared and distributed; in response to specific re-
quests the section prepared (3) 39 photo mosaics (4) 5 defense overlays; (5)
9 target folders (6) 14 special targeting readouts; and (7) 14 handheld
missions.

2. Photographic missions have been cut and packaged with field plots for
dissemination to 9th Infantry Division units.

3. Red Haze aircraft have been utilized to conduct a mortar overwatch of
the Dong Tam area during periods of likely enemy activity to assist in directing
countermortar fire on any active mortars detected.

4. The major innovation during this reporting period has been the instal-
lacion and operation of an infra-red ground terminal - AIR-TAG-1A. This station
permits infra-red imagery to be transmitted directly from the sensor aircraft
to the ground station where it is recorded on infra-red film and interpreted by
imagery interpreters. This direct transmission of the imagery permits more rapid
readouts of the emissions detected and eliminates the need for aircraft to re-
turn and off-load the film at a distant airfield for interpretation to the Di-
vision. In addition, a copy of the imagery is available at the Division for
further interpretation anytime during the film life (approximately seven days).
The necessary equipment and operators are furnished by the 73d Surveillance
Airplane Company in direct support of the 9th Infantry Division.

5. Personnel detectors - XM3 Airborne Personnel Detector (APD) and XM2

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Manpack Personnel Detector (MPD).

a) During the reporting period there were 1012 missions flown for a total flying time of 948 hours. All missions were flown utilizing the UH-1 with the exception of four missions and four hours flown in a JOH. The results of these missions were reported to G2 and to brigade and/or air cavalry units for inclusion in their compilation of intelligence reports. Total missions and flying time during the previous quarter were 942 and 962 respectively. This represents a seven per cent increase in missions and a two per cent decrease in flying time.

b) The MPD is being phased out of personnel detection operations. The section now has three MPDs and a fourth is due in at a future date. The new MPDs are superior in performance and require less maintenance. Several changes in the new models were incorporated in a two day instructional period presented on operation and maintenance by CONUS New Equipment Team.

g) During this quarter personnel detector operations have been hampered by high surface winds and dry conditions which resulted in brush fires, producing smoke which is detected by the machines.

(g) Weather and Terrain: During the reporting period, the weather continued to have little adverse effect on either friendly or enemy operations in the TAKI. The most adverse effects on friendly operations were the result of "buffeting" of aircraft and air-cushioned vehicles by winds of up to 30 knots. Some limitations were also imposed by early morning fog. However, these were generally negligible because the fog normally lifted by mid-morning. Waterborne operations in smaller canals and rivers must take the tides into account, especially if larger craft are being used.

(h) Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Probable Courses of Action.

1. The enemy has the capability to:

a) Conduct multi-battalion attacks on province and district seats, other major cities, and military installations.

b) Conduct attacks by fire and harassment on towns, villages, hamlets, outposts and other installations.

c) Conduct sniper and terrorist attacks on key bridges, roads, HD projects, and population centers.

d) Defend base areas and positions with local security forces and reinforce with personnel within a 4 km radius.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending
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1. Move multi-battalion forces to attack positions at a maximum rate of 14
   kms per night.

2. Disperse major units into company and platoon sized elements.

3. Withdraw and disperse his units at any time.

4. Wage political and psychological warfare and hold control of any area
   where there is no friendly security at night.

5. Position forces in forward base areas throughout the TACI in order to
   support his efforts to control the population of such areas. By doing so he
   can normally control these areas in the event of a cease-fire.

6. The enemy is vulnerable to:
   a. Loss of control/support of the population.
   b. Friendly superior artillery and air power.
   c. Interdiction of the LOCs and loss of cached supplies.
   d. Disclosure or capture of attack plans.
   e. Detection by friendly surveillance devices.
   f. A breakdown of his infrastructure by aggressive allied actions.

7. Probable Enemy Courses of Action:
   a. Intensify population control efforts by the use of terrorism.
   b. Continue to attempt offensive action against the Saigon complex.
   c. Continue interdiction efforts on the LOCs with emphasis on May #4.
   d. Attempt to avoid decisive engagement with US forces.
   e. Conduct up to multi-battalion attacks on minor targets for propaganda
      purposes.
   f. Harass and attack primary targets by fire.
   g. Continue efforts to secure base areas and LOCs.

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The 9th Infantry Division Duffel Bag Program was initiated on 4 March 1969, with the emplacement and activation of four target strings totalling 15 sensors. Since that time, the program has grown to its present level of 12 strings of 41 sensors. The division is employing four types of sensors currently within the Duffel Bag Program inventory: The Acoustical Boy (MOURBBOY), the Miniature Hand-emplaced Seismic Intrusion Detector (MINISID), the Magnetic Intrusion Detector (MAGID), and the Ground Seismic Intrusion Detector (GSID). The sensors are deployed in combination, forming target strings, in order to increase the probability of detection by exploiting the particular advantages of each type of sensor. The target strings are capable of providing "real-time" information on the number and direction of enemy personnel moving along the trail or canal route where the sensors have been emplaced. Tactical reaction to the "real time" intelligence provided by the activation of sensor target strings is controlled by the brigades through the Brigade Tactical Operations Center. Depending on the nature of the target detected and the assets available, the brigade can effectively react to sensor targets by troop insertions, artillery fire, air cavalry, or a combination of these means. The only limitation on tactical reaction is that the targets detected are moving and highly perishable.

The personnel who emplace and monitor the sensors are organized under a Sensor Platoon, assigned to the 9th Military Intelligence Detachment and under the staff supervision of the G2. A proposed Modified Table of Organization and Equipment, consisting of a three man headquarters element (total of 50 EX and one officer), was submitted 25 March 1969. Each of the 16 man sections is attached to a brigade for operational control. The targeting, emplacement, and employment of sensor assets, although monitored by the G2, is the responsibility of the brigade.

During the 52 day period the program has been operational, the Sensor Platoon has provided the division with "real-time" intelligence on the location (eight digit coordinates), number, and direction of movement of 1058 enemy personnel distributed among 105 targets. Tactical reactions have been made to 76 of these targets, attacking 586 enemy personnel.

Pattern Analysis

The G2 Plans Section initiated a pattern analysis technique in February 1969, to provide data on a continuing basis for analysis of activity. Selected items of information are plotted daily on transportation overlays for each province within the TAOI. By portraying these items of information graphically over
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By a base map, the analyst is able to correlate unit sightings with surveillance
data, contacts and incidents and to determine areas and trends of enemy activity. At present the following have been selected for plotting:

Unit sightings: All Main and Local Force units and unidentified units with
a strength of 50 or more.

Contacts: Contacts resulting in five or more enemy killed.

SLAR: Number and date of returns.

Red Base: Number and date of returns, excepting fires in fields.

Ground fire: Automatic weapons fire on aircraft or armored troop carriers.

Secondary explosions:

Mining Incidents (less command-detonated mining incidents).

Booby trap incidents.

Command-detonated mining incidents.

b. In addition to revealing patterns and locating base areas, the daily
and weekly correlation of this data with other intelligence information such as
URIRs and friendly operations provides an analytical basis for target selection.
Unit and area patterns are used to support the target decision process, in which
appropriate targets are recommended to the Commanding General for selection of
areas for future strike operations. Detectable movement patterns are used for
selection of areas for the emplacement of sensors and radars. Patterns or con-
centrations of mines and booby traps are used to select areas for denial opera-
tions.

c. The program is designed to assist in focusing intelligence and opera-
tional resources on areas where the enemy is most likely to be located. It
can be utilized or changed to meet a particular requirement.

d. (c) Operations

(1) Four major operations were initiated, terminated, or in progress by
the 9th Infantry Division during the period 1 February to 30 April 1969. The
enemy continued his resupply and reorganization missions with emphasis on re-
cruiting and winning the support of the local population in contested areas.
In addition to attempting the undermining of SVN Pacification efforts, he fur-
ther intensified his efforts to retain control of those areas which are under
his domination. On 22 February 1969, the enemy stepped-up his winter-spring off-

densive with an increase in attacks by fire. The enemy has been extremely re-

luctant to enter into decisive engagements with Free World Military Forces and

has remained in a fragmented configuration. Airmobile Assault, Eagle Flight,

Checkerboard, Bushmaster, and Cordon and Search operations continue to be the

Division's principal tactics for keeping the enemy on the defensive. The enemy's

offensive activity was characterized by harassment of outposts, mining of roads,

and extensive use of sapper units.

(2) The results obtained by 9th Infantry Division snipers since the pro-

gram began in November 1968 have been outstanding. Total VC killed by snipers
to date is 747, made during 448 separate contacts with enemy forces. During

February snipers killed 93 VC in 50 separate contacts. During March snipers
accounted for 211 kills, approximately six per cent of the total division kills
during the same period. For the month of April results were even greater with
a total of 339 VC killed in 213 separate contacts.

(3) Combat Operations

(a) TOAN THANG II. The 3d Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG II with
two infantry battalions (2-60, 5-60) and one mechanized battalion (2-47). The
2-47 Infantry (Mech) primarily performed the mission of road, bridge, and con-
voy security along Highway 4. On 1 February 1969, 2-5-60 Inf engaged an unknown
size enemy force seven kms north of Thu Thua, via VC 515798. Exploitation of
this contact over the period 1-2 February 1969 resulted in 63 VC (BC). Friendly
losses were two US KIA and five US WIA. The 3d Brigade continued to provide
support and assistance to the 1969 Pacification Program implemented on 1 Feb-

uary 1969. The following are the cumulative results for Operation TOAN THANG
III: US LOSSES: 216 KIA; 1308 WIA; ENEMY LOSSES: 2829 KIA; 195 PW; 44 HOI

GRAVES.

(b) TOAN THANG III. The 3d Brigade initiated Operation TOAN THANG III
on 18 February 1969 with three maneuver battalions (2-60, 5-60, and 2-47 (Mech))
in Long An Province. The mission of the brigade was unchanged. On 25 Feb-

uary 1969/2-47, in night ambush positions east of Thu Thua, made contact
with an estimated VC company, vicinity XS 558705. After the initial contact
the enemy made contact with other 2-47 ambush patrols in the area. US artill-
ery, air cavalry and flareships supported. The VC broke contact at 0530. A

sweep of the area resulted in 31 NVA KIA (BG) and 13 weapons captured. US
losses were one WIA. On 18 March 1969/B/3-17 Cav, conducting a visual recon-

naissance mission vicinity of XS 46035, observed signs of enemy activity
along the Bo Bo Canal. Element of 2-60 Inf conducted an airmobile assault
into the area and reported sporadic contact during the sweep. As the situa-
tion developed, companies B, C, and H/17/2-60 were inserted to support the
operation. B/3-17 Cav, tactical air strikes, US artillery, and Spooky supported

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and sporadic contacts continued until 2120H. Contact was regained on 12 March 1969, and a PW reported large caches in the area. Final results were 42 VC KIA (BO), two PW captured, 14 weapons, 141 340 rounds, 76 107mm rockets, 33 75mm recoilless rifle rounds and 104,000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition captured. US losses were two KIA and three WIA. On 23 March 1969, vic XS868705, C/2-39 Inf reported in contact with an unknown size VC force at 2112H. A Light Fire Team and artillery supported the friendly force with contact breaking at 2300H. Results were 34 VC KIA (BO) at a cost of 3 US WIA. On 2 April at 1312H, vic XS 596602, C/2-47 made contact with an estimated platoon of VC. Tac Air and artillery supported the friendly force with contact breaking at 1512H. A sweep of the area found 11 VC KIA (BO). Friendly losses were 1 US KIA and 2 US WIA. On 3 April 1969 at 1022H, vicinity XS706954, B/2-60, supported by B/3-17 Cavalry and the 240 Assault Helicopter Company (AHC), conducted an air-mobile assault northeast of Can Duu. Sporadic engagements were reported in the area with friendly forces killing a total of 10 VC (BO). There were no friendly casualities sustained during the contact. On 8 April 1969, vicinity XS 645721, C/2-47 in night defensive positions made contact with an undetermined size enemy force at 2050H. Gunships from the 9th Aviation Battalion and artillery supported as contact continued until 2355H. A sweep of the area revealed 42 VC KIA (BO) and 9 weapons captured. There were no friendly casualties. On 18 April 1969, B and C/2-47 Infantry conducted a Gordon and Search operation in the vicinity of XS597313 and made contact with an unknown size VC force in a bunker complex. Upon completion of the seal, the bunker complex was attacked by air strikes, Spooky, and continuous artillery fire throughout the night. On 19 April 1969 an sweep of the target area revealed 31 VC KIA (BO). Friendly forces suffered 1 US KIA and 2 US WIA. On 26 April 1969, C/2-47 established contact in the vicinity of XS 591603 with an estimated two enemy Platoons in bunkers. Tac Air, artillery, and air cavalry supported and C/2-47 reinforced the contact. Final results were 63 VC KIA (BO) at a cost of 2 US KIA and 14 US WIA. The 3d Brigade continued to support the 1969 Pacification and Development Program. The following operations were conducted to upgrade the terrain, hamlets in Log An Province: 415 combat operations; 466 IOS/176 HWD/PC a/372 Psychological Operations missions. The following are cumulative results for Operation TOM THANG III: US LOSSES: 22 KIA; 37 WIA. ENEMY LOSSES: 1276 KIA; 80 PW; 46 VCI CHAMES.

(c) QUIET THANG: The 1st Brigade with four maneuver battalions (2-39, 3-39, 4-39, 6-31) and 2d Brigade with three maneuver battalions (3-60, 3-47, 4-47) continued Operation QUIET THANG. Operation SPEEDY EXPRESS continued as part of QUIET THANG. Initially contact was sporadic as the enemy remained fragmented. On 20 February 1969 the 2d Brigade made contact with a number of small enemy groups dispersed in the vicinity of US 6827. The initial engagement occurred at 1045H when B/3-5 Cavalry engaged and killed two VC. B/3-60 Infantry and B/3-47 Infantry were inserted into the area and air cavalry, artillery, and tactical air supported. Contact was sporadic throughout the night with units receiving enemy fire: 14, AW, BF/G, and mortar fire.
Total results for the operation were 90 VC KIA (BC). US losses were nine KIA and ten WIA. On 21 February 1969, while conducting a Night Search Operation, northwest of Da Nang, B/3-17 Cavalry and elements of 4-39 Infantry engaged an unknown number of VC in scattered contacts between 2000H - 2400H, resulting in 26 VC KIA (BC) and 4 sampans destroyed. On 22 February 1969, vicinity XS 3915, C/4-47 Infantry engaged and killed one VC who was taking evasive action. Sporadic contact continued throughout the day. A/4-47 conducted a watermobile assault at 1420H and established contact with the enemy force. Total results: 30 VC KIA (BC). On 24 February 1969, B/3-17 Cavalry established contact with an unknown size VC force in the vicinity of XS 3954. Elements of the 4-39 Infantry were inserted and air cavalry and tactical air supported. Results were 26 VC KIA (BC) at a cost of three US WIA. On 27 February 1969, from 1920H - 2130H elements of C/7-1 Cavalry and 4-39 Infantry conducted a Night Search operation and engaged an unknown number of VC in scattered contacts resulting in 36 VC KIA (BC) and 12 sampans destroyed. No friendly casualties were sustained during the operation. On the night of 5-6 March, A/7-1 Cavalry conducted a Night Search and in scattered contacts in the vicinity of XS 3958 killed 39 VC and destroyed 23 sampans. On 6 March 1969, B/6-31, supported by A/7-1 Cavalry and 191st ABN gunships, conducted an airmobile assault in the vicinity of XS 228553, while sweeping south, 191st ABN gunships killed and additional 32 VC during the day. No friendly casualties were sustained. On 11 March 1969, C/2-39 established contact with a VC company in the vicinity of XS 3561. Companies A and B 2-39 Infantry, A and C 6-31 Infantry and A/3-39 Infantry conducted airmobile assaults to reinforce C/2-39 and encircle the enemy force. The area was swept on 12 March 1969 resulting in 57 VC KIA (BC) at a cost of one US KIA and 18 US WIA. On 21 March 1969 at 1925H, vicinity XS 590138, A/4-47 Infantry reported contact with an unknown size force. Artillery and a light fire team supported. Results were 40 VC KIA (BC) at a cost of one US KIA and nine US WIA. On 27 March, A/3-50 Infantry and D/3-5 Cavalry conducted a Night Search in vicinity XS 412777. A Company killed 25 VC and D Troop accounted for an additional 13 VC in the area. On 23 March 1969, at 0345 northwest of Sa Dec (XS 8944) night positions of D/4-39 were attacked by an estimated VC platoon. Results were 35 VC KIA (BC) and two US KIA and four WIA. A pursuit was immediately initiated and contact was re-established with the enemy force. Sporadic contact continued throughout the night with the enemy now estimated at battalion size. Total results for the two day operation were 144 VC KIA (BC) and 53 weapons captured. US losses were six KIA and 26 WIA. On 31 March 1969, at 2105H, B/3-47 Infantry observed approximately 100 VC moving in front of their position at XS 553377. The VC were engaged with organic weapons: gunships, artillery, and Snipers supported. Contact broke at 2330H resulting in 35 VC KIA (BC). No friendly casualties were sustained. During the period 31 March 1969 to 2 April 1969, 3-60 Infantry conducted operations in Vinh Mihn Province (XS 3906, XS 3610, XS 4004). Total results were 90 VC KIA (BC) at a cost of four US WIA. On 2 April 1969, C/7-1 Cavalry with snipers from the 4-39 Infantry conducted a Night Search Operation from 2005H and 0005H southwest of Dai Lay (XS 2404). Twenty VC were killed and eight sampans were destroyed in scattered
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On 3 April 1969, elements of the 5-60 Infantry and 44-5-5 Cavalry conducted a Night Raid northwest of Tra Vinh (X3 390441). Contact was made as they inserted into the landing zone. The results of the raid were 15 VC KIA (BG). On 6 April a Light Fire Team from the 9th Aviation Battalion with elements of 44-5-60 Infantry conducted a Night Search southeast of Ho Cay (X3 4981). From 20OH-WY55, 11 VC were killed and 9 sampans destroyed during scattered contacts. On 7 April 1969, Companies B and C/3-39 Infantry made an air mobile insertion in the vicinity of X3 335540. At 1445H sporadic contact was reported and B/3-17 Cavalry and 191st ABC supported the infantry. There were no friendly casualties while enemy losses were 22 VC KIA (BG). On 9 April 1969, B/2-39 conducted an air mobile insertion in the vicinity of X3 1464. The 191st ABC gunships covering the insertion observed numerous enemy personnel escaping from the area and engaged and killed 30 VC. During the period 20-22 April 1969, elements of 3-60 Infantry and 4-47 Infantry conducted operations in Vinh Binh Province vicinity of X3 3907. Through a combination of riverine and air mobile operations 102 VC were killed at a cost of one US KIA and 15 US WIA. The 1st and 2nd Brigade continued to support the 1969 Pacification and Development Program. The following operations were conducted to upgrade the target hamlets in Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa and Quoc Cong Provinces: 878 combat operations; 767 NSFS; 549 MEDOPS; 830 PSOPS missions. The following are cumulative results for Operation QUyet THANG/SPEEDY EXPRESS: US losses 216 (178) KIA; 214R (1836) WIA. Enemy losses: 8758 (3055) KIA; 369 (302) PW; 149 (130) HC. Figures in parentheses are inclusive totals for Operation QUyet THANG.

(4) The 9th Infantry Division continued support of the 1969 Pacification and Development Program from 1 February 1969 to 30 April 1969. The goal of this program was to improve the security of target hamlets within the Division TAQI. Specifically this entailed the upgrading of selected hamlets with six Hamlet Evaluation Survey (HES) security rating of 5, E, or V to a security rating of "C" or higher. Support provided by the division is as shown under operations TOAN THANG III and QUyet THANG/SPEEDY EXPRESS. Hamlet status as of 31 January 1969 and 31 March 1969 is as shown.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>31 Jan 69</th>
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(q) Combat Support Activities

(a) Artillery Support:

1. Division Artillery firing elements continued to support division operations in Ninh Tuong, Kien Tuong, Kien Phong, Gia Cong, Kien Hoa, Long An, Vinh Long, and Gia Dinh Provinces. Fire support was also provided for Army of the Republic of Vietnam units, Civilian Irregular Defense Groups, and Regional Forces/Popular Forces. Three 155mm Howitzers from Battery B, 1st Battalion, 84th Artillery were placed OPCOM to Senior Advisor, IV Corps, and operated in the Mui Ne Long Mountain Area in Trich District, Chau Doc Province, supporting Mobile Strike Force operations for a period of one week. An additional firing battery, B Battery, 2d Battalion, 4th Artillery, was formed and attached to 1st Battalion, 11th Artillery supporting 1st Brigade operations. Two firing batteries from II Field Force Vietnamese Artillery were used to supplement the fires of the 9th Division Artillery, giving priority of fires to 2d Battalion, 4th Artillery supporting 3d Brigade operations in Long An Province. Paddy platforms were used by the 3d Battalion, 34th Artillery to provide a suitable firing platform for a 105mm Howitzer battery supporting 2d Brigade operations in Gia Long District of Kien Hoa Province. 9th Division Artillery also dispatched a firing battery to Kien Tuong Province to give artillery support for a joint operation with the 44th Tactical Zone Forces for a period of two weeks. The AN/TPS-25 radar was employed as an integral part of the overall division plan to search and detect enemy movement along major infiltration routes to Saigon and deep into enemy base areas. The AN/TPS-25 was also used as part of a coordinated team designed to seek out and engage the VC at night.

2. Artillery with the 9th Infantry Division fired a total of 232,593 rounds of 105mm Howitzer, 72,758 rounds of 155mm, and 5,732 rounds of 8 inch. A chart reflecting the breakdown of rounds is attached as Enclosure 6.

(b) Helicopter Gunships Support

1. The 9th Aviation Battalion flew 4,338 gunship sorties. Missions included escort for VIP flight, aerial displacement of supplies, personnel and equipment flights by cargo helicopters, medical evacuation, "people sniffer" convoys, insertions and extractions, and Firefly missions. The gunships provided support for units in contact and defense against rocket/mortar attacks at Tan An and Dong Tam. The gunships accounted for 270 VC KIA 268. They destroyed 126 structures and 94 sampans. Gunships damaged 56 structures and 15 sampans.

2. D Troop, 1-5 Cavalry, supported all division elements during this period, providing an average of seven armed helicopters daily. Missions included reconnaissance, screening, and blocking operations. The troop accounted for 308 VC KIA 268. They destroyed 329 structures and 233 sampans destroyed, and two structures damaged.

(c) Tactical Air Support: The number of air sorties increased slightly during this reporting period. A chart reflecting ordnance expended and results obtained is attached as Enclosure 7.
(d) Strategic Air Support: There were a total of three B-52 strikes conducted in support of the 9th Infantry Division during the reporting period.

(e) Naval Fire Support: Naval gunfire was effectively integrated with artillery fire in support of 2d Brigade operations.

(f) Statistical Summary - Enclosure 8.

(0) Training

(1) During the reporting period, the following training was conducted in the division:

(a) Replacement Training
(b) NCO Leadership Training
(c) Battalion Refresher Training
(d) Sniper School Training

(2) Replacement training consists of five days of intensive orientation in many of the skills necessary to prepare an individual for combat duty in Vietnam. The Reliable Academy, a provisional organization formed within the 9th Infantry Division, conducted all replacement training during the period. The Academy completed a move from Beavert to Dong Tam during the month of November 1968, and new classroom facilities and barracks were constructed to house the cadre and incoming replacements. In addition, new range facilities were completed and are presently in use by the Academy for instruction in weapon zeroing, grenade throwing, and demolition training. The following table shows the number of replacement personnel trained during the reporting period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>NCO</th>
<th>OM</th>
<th>HM</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FEB</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>2115</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>1809</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APR</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1734</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(3) Company grade officers and non-commissioned officers receive a six day operation keyed specifically to the situation in Vietnam. The latest equipment being used in Vietnam is demonstrated, when practical, and the capabilities and limitations of support elements are discussed.

(4) The 14 day NCO Leadership Course is designed to raise the proficiency level of small unit leaders within the division by presenting instruction in the principles of leadership as well as practical exercises in the skills required of junior leaders. The course is aimed at the specialist and junior NCO who have not had the benefit of prior leadership positions in combat. During the past three months, a total of 278 personnel have completed the NCO Leadership Course.

(5) Individual and small unit training is conducted by maneuver battalions.
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On a systematic basis in order to increase the effectiveness of their units, refresher training in new tactics and techniques enables the commander to better prepare his troops for combat. Lessons learned and other tactical information are incorporated into refresher training in order to derive maximum benefit from experience gained by other units in the field.

(6) The 9th Infantry Division Sniper School continued its program of instruction at Dong Tam during the reporting period. A total of five classes was conducted and an eighth class began 27 April 1969. The outstanding results obtained by the 9th Infantry Division snipers have generated interest in the sniper program throughout USARV. As a result, the school has conducted training for snipers and cadre personnel from six US divisions and one separate brigade. These cadre will form the nucleus for sniper training schools in those units. Training conducted by the Sniper School has also included instruction given to ARVN personnel in the use of the starlight scope. Several more classes of this type are scheduled for the month of May 1969. During June 1969, the cadre of the school will rotate back to CONUS and will be replaced by another team from the Army Marksmanship Training Unit. These replacement personnel will continue with the present program of instruction, to include training for units outside the 9th Infantry Division which are establishing sniper schools.

(c) Logistics: Logistical planning, guidance, and support was provided for allorganic and attached units and units under the operational control of the 9th Infantry Division during the reporting period. The major tactical units supported were two land-based brigades and one riverine brigade organic to 9th Infantry Division. Support was provided to division units operating in Long An, Gia Long, Khanh Hoa, Kien Hoa, and Kien Tuong Provinces. Feasibility studies were conducted for support of brigade-sized operations in Chau Doc, Kien Phong, and Kien Tuong Provinces.

(1) Supply

(a) During the reporting period there was slight improvement in services and the flow of supplies. Toward the end of the reporting period some items of major equipment previously frozen entered the USARV supply pipeline and were released to US units. However, it does not appear likely that this gradual release of equipment will alleviate substantially the shortages of major items which continue to exist. Shortages are still critical in the Communication, Engineer, and COMREL categories of equipment.

(b) There has been no improvement in the availability of electrical supplies such as power cords, light fixtures, wall plugs, and other outlets which are essential to the operation of fire support bases.

(c) The 6th Battalion, 77th Artillery, was designated as the first USARV unit to participate in the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
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Improvement and Modernization Progress: During the period March 1969 through May 1969, the 6-77th Artillery transferred the bulk of its TOE equipment to the ARVN 213th Artillery Battalion. The transfer was accomplished by moving the equipment of one firing battery at a time. All equipment transferred met high technical standards of inspection before acceptance by the ARVN 213th Artillery Battalion. 82 line items of TOE equipment transferred. Equipment which was not available from 6th Battalion, 77th Artillery, was provided by USARV. The official deactivation of the 6-77th Artillery and activation of the ARVN 213th Artillery Battalion occurred on 26 April 1969.

(d) Logistical support for civil action programs has been provided throughout the reporting period. 9th Infantry Division logistical support was provided for Advisory Team personnel, Civil Operations, and Revolutionary Development Support (ORDS) and other units in Go Cong, Long An, Kien Hoa, and Minh Thuong Provinces when other support was not available.

(2) Services:

(a) The completion of the water distribution system at Dong Tam has freed some vehicles for use at outlying base camps. This is especially significant during the dry season because there are no suitable water sources near any of the brigade fire support bases.

(b) Shower/bath units, which normally would be available through the supply and transportation battalion, remain in short supply. Of the nine authorized for the division only five are available for use.

(g) There has been a noticeable improvement in the availability of items at Post Exchange facilities during this period. None of the essential troop comfort items such as soft drinks, toilet articles, and shoe polish has remained in short supply for a significant period during this quarter.

(5) Support:

(a) Supply Point Distribution continues to be the primary method of resupply for division units. Various battalion-size units are supported by unit distribution due to their location and the availability of transportation. Cargo helicopters are used extensively to augment land and water transportation means in order to provide unit distribution.

(b) To improve the maintenance support of tactical units, various classes have been conducted at division level under the supervision of the G4 Maintenance Officer. An analysis of Yorces Status Reports revealed definite weaknesses in the area of the Army Equipment Records System. Some classes were conducted in the division area and additional personnel were sent to

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Long Binh for a regularly scheduled course. Although it is too early to make a definite determination, evidence seems to indicate that these classes will be very beneficial.

(c) Generators providing power to outlying fire support bases have been a constant problem because of the shortage of repair parts and the age of the generators. In order to obtain maximum utilization of generators, increased emphasis has been placed upon training operators by means of generator/operator schools.

(4) Transportation:

(a) Transportation of ammunition from the 3d Ordnance Battalion at Long Binh to Moi Wo has been successfully accomplished during the month of January by air movement. At that time 1st Brigade of 9th Infantry Division was operating in Kien Tuong Province.

(b) Air lines of communication were used to transport rations from Binh Dao to Moi Hoa in support of the brigade.

(c) It is significant that the Division Support Command was able to provide all necessary support except fixed wing aircraft and cargo helicopters to support the operations.

(5) Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs

(1) Psychological Operations.

(a) During the reporting period approximately 50% of all PSYOP effort was directed specifically in support of the 1969 Pacification Plan, with the remainder in support of various 9th Division tactical plans. These tactical plans were directly or indirectly in support of pacification. It is therefore emphasized that PSYOP programs throughout the Division are primarily concerned with the various aspects of pacification as outlined in the 1969 Pacification Plan (OWB).

(b) Since the essence of pacification is Community Spirit, the major themes employed during the period were Dai Doan Ket (National Reconciliation), Chieu Hoi with supporting sub-themes, Phoenix, and OVN Image. The "National Rewards Campaign" (Third Party Inducement) continues to generate a high rate of Hoi Chams throughout the Division Tactical Area of Interest.

(c) Objectives:

1 Continue to inform the populace of the benefits connected with various

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GVN agencies and programs.

2. Thorough coordination of all PWSF effort by Division units through Province and District M1 offices. Such coordination would be the beginning of the "one war" concept of CONUSMACV.

3. Emphasize the "Community Spirit" concept of the GVN, developing cooperation among the people, cooperation between the people and the government, and cooperation among the government agencies.

4. A continued emphasis on bolstering the confidence of the people in their elected governments, whether it be at hamlet or national level. Particular attention should be paid toward increasing the confidence in the Village Council.

5. The use of the Chieu Binh Explanation Booklet, "Leading a New Life," is encouraged by all units. The Tiger Scout or interpreter with an ICAP team can utilize the booklet very much like an insurance salesman. He explains through pictures and few words what the Chieu Binh Program is. This explanation should be given to families of known VC, as determined from local "black lists."

6. Continued emphasis is to be placed on targeting specific units. For this purpose, the PWSF OH notebooks were prepared, with pre-positioned layouts at the supporting PWSF battalions. As soon as a unit determination is made during or after a contact, this information should be relayed as quickly as possible through 82/82 channels.

(a) During the period, PWSF Coordination Committees have been operational in Long An and Dinh Tuong Province, with resulting cooperation by all agencies in utilization of assets.

(b) 1,792 Ho Chi Chanks rallied in the Tactical Area of Interest. Of this total, 183 rallied to Division units. The 3d Party Inducement Program Inducees numbered 1,602. Although the percentage of 3d Party Inducees declined during the period, it seems to be leveling at about 60% of all ralliers to the Division.

(f) PWSF Activity Statistics (1 Feb - 30 Apr 69)

1. Leaflets Missions (total): 3,149
   Air: 1,740
   Ground: 2,409

2. Loudspeaker Missions (total): 2,300

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Civil Affairs/Civic Action program of the 9th Infantry Division continues to progress and is directed toward support of the 1969 Pacification program. In Long An Province, units of the 3d Brigade have teamed with the Provincial Advisory Team and the GVN to form Special Action Teams. These are composed of one US Med Team of 2 officers and 3 NVN from the Provincial Advisory Team; one US rifle squad from the 3d Brigade; and representatives of Vietnamese Information Service, National Police Field Force and Armed Propaganda Team from Long An Province. These teams are employed in hamlets in support of the Revolutionary Development Cadre and Popular Forces to accelerate the pacification efforts through concentrated team effort. The Special Action Teams are employed for a three to five day period in each hamlet and are providing valuable assistance to the Regional Development Cadre Team; they are a rejuvenating force to those hamlets which are not progressing at an acceptable rate. The US rifle squad, in addition to providing security, is conducting Medical Civic Action Programs and Civic Action surveys. An element of Company B, 5th Infantry and an RD Cadre team have recently set up shop in the Binh Hoa area. This Revolutionary Development camp arose from the desire to increase pacification of the area and induce the return of villagers who had moved away because of VC activity. The RD team is flexible in its operations and techniques and is concentrating on MHEPs and census operations. They visit each village in his home, building up the GVN image and offering assistance with any problems. They also show the government's good will by helping the people with any building projects which might be in progress.

This combined team operates like a tactical unit. They move into a village, rapidly setting up security as they go. Since they often operate in areas which are insecure, they must be sure the village is clear of VC before they set up operations. Tight security is maintained while members of the team move about speaking to the people and handing out leaflets. If a MHEP is planned, the medic sets up at a central point and the team members go from house to house telling people that medical treatment is available. The Binh Dinh RD team utilizes the 5-31st Infantry medic and one of their own team members, who is presently training. Combined pacification teams such as this are an example of a good cooperative effort by US units and RVN units and organizations and demonstrate to the people the sincerity of both governments.
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(b) Repair and construction projects have increased in both quantity and
quality during the reporting period. These are projects that are not GVN-planned
and budgeted and therefore do not require the lead time of the regular budget
projects. They have high impact and short term, filling a need quickly. The
repair and construction projects of the 9th Infantry Division have gained
the most acceptance of all Civil Affairs programs and provide tangible evidence
of the US Army's willingness to assist in the building of a nation.

The Binh Dao Village Buddhist population requested the assistance of the
Division Support Command in saving their pagoda, which was in danger of sliding
into the Nho Tho River. Since the structure was completed 40 years ago, the
river had steadily eaten away the bank, endangering the pagoda's foundation.
DISCOM responded with cement, aggregate, steel and lumber. The villagers
organized a construction committee which planned and conducted the work. A
sea wall was built and the pagoda repaired.

A project to aid education by providing school furniture was initiated by
the 2d Battalion, 4th Artillery. Desks and benches were designed for construc-
tion from used ammunition boxes. These were pre-cut by the men of the unit. The
instructions for assembly are written in Vietnamese so that the people can per-
form the actual construction. The plans for these desks have been requested
by several US divisions and by the Office of the ACE, 95, USAFR.

(c) Distribution of commodities both through construction projects and
assistance to social welfare continues to be an important and effective part
of the division's program.

1. Building materials.
   Cement: 255,680 lbs
   Tin Sheets: 1,261
   Lumber: 263,205 bd ft
   Paint: 21 gal
   Other: 225,900 lbs

2. Kits (includes health kits, school kits, and miscellaneous): 5,989

3. Food: 48,966 lbs

4. Clothing: 1,001 lbs

5. Health items (soap, toothpaste, etc): 18,377 lbs

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Operational Report of the 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1969, 791st Medical Detachment (MEDCAP). The program instituted during this quarter to insure complete coordination, including approval by the Province Chief, Health Chief, and Province Senior Advisor, has accomplished several objectives. It has precluded duplication of effort between 9th Infantry Division units and 7th ARVN Division units and sector operations and has targeted the operations where they would better support the GW 1969 Pacification Plan.

The first roadside MEDCAP was held in Long Quoi Village, Kien Hoa by the 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry. The new Civic Action Program involves inviting Vietnamese travelers to stop for a moment along the road for refreshments and medical aid if needed. The 2d Brigade FSTP team was on hand to lend support to the new program. They supplied Och Loc leaflets and broadcasted a musical talk program urging the villagers to vote in local elections. Medical treatment was provided by a team of medics from the 3/47 aid station. Many villagers stopped and took advantage of the American soft drinks and medical aid. Some stopped just to talk to the GI's through the interpreters present.

A unique innovation has been employed by the 9th Infantry Division MEDCAPs. PVC Jack Vaughn, a professional magician, has recently been assigned to Special Services and has been made available to each brigade to add entertainment to the 9th Infantry Division MEDCAPs. PVC Vaughn provided entertainment for a MEDCAP conducted by Division Artillery on 20 March and was a resounding success. The Vietnamese villagers have a high appreciation of slight of hand and gave the performer and the MEDCAP a tremendous reception.

Dental Civic Action, while still a small part of the overall medical program because of the limited number of dental personnel available, continues to make an important contribution. The need for dental care is great in the remote areas and the Dental Civic Action Program is well received by the people, many of whom have never seen a dentist. Immediate treatment is given to those who require it and instructions in oral hygiene are given to all. Leaflets on tooth care and disease prevention, along with tooth paste and tooth brushes are distributed. In the future, even more emphasis will be placed on Dental Civic Action.

Both ICF and NITCF, the overnight version of ICFs, are gaining the confidence of the people as the operations increase in number and quality. Both ICFs and NITCFs are bringing increased intelligence. During the reporting period, several successful operations have been conducted on ICF intelligence, and the amount of intelligence from these sources has greatly increased. Since these operations are conducted in contested areas, they provide the very best vehicle for psychological operations. VC propaganda can be answered to the satisfaction of the people and the news of government programs, accomplishments and aspirations for the people can be relayed. The greater the degree of inter-
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The greater the success of the operations, the greater the success of the operations.

(e) Transportation. Lines of communication were continuously stressed over the reporting period. Road and bridge construction made great progress. Twenty-four and one half km of roads were constructed and 88 km were repaired. Twenty-nine bridges were constructed and 17 repaired. One typical bridge construction illustrates the cooperative effort of the US forces and RVN forces on these projects. The bridge linking Vinh Kim Village with Dinh Quí Hamlet was constructed through the combined efforts of 9th Infantry Division Engineers, Navy Seabee Team 121-01, RVN Popular Forces and local civilians, with coordination by 9th Infantry Division Support Command. The bridge is 195 feet long and is capable of carrying small vehicles, allowing easy access to Vinh Kim markets. This structure will aid the pacification program in this area where many people have relocated into Dinh Quí Hamlet to escape the conflict.

(g) Community Relations. Community relations projects have been actively pursued by the 9th Infantry Division this quarter. The 3d Brigade has held Area Coordination Center meetings on a regular basis with representatives of the 3d Brigade, 25th ARVN Division, Long An Sector and US military advisors. They have provided a regular, scheduled meeting where joint plans can be formulated and problems solved.

On 15 April, English classes were organized at the My Tho high schools. This project was a coordinated effort by the 9th Infantry Division, 7th ARVN Division, and the 13th 1st Platoon, Dinh Tuong Province. Books were furnished by the Province and the 13th 1st Platoon, the course was organized by the 7th ARVN Division, and instructors came from the 9th Infantry Division. This project was started with five classes at the Girl's High School and five new classes were organized at the My Tho Vocational School. The project now teaches over 350 students in 20 classes each Tuesday and Thursday afternoon. The instructors are all soldiers from the Dong Tam units who volunteer their time. As enthusiastic as the students, these men are teaching, learning, and having fun simultaneously. This is a mutually beneficial project which is contributing much to better understanding between Americans and the Vietnamese people.

A Community Relations Committee has been formed in Dinh Tuong Sector of representatives of 9th Infantry Division Headquarters, 1st Brigade, D1300R and DIVARTY, 7th ARVN Division Advisory Team, and Dinh Tuong Sector Advisory Team. This provides an excellent means of reviewing Civic Action programs of the various elements as well as discussing various other programs that occur from time to time.

On 13 March 1969, General Trung, Chief of the General Political Warfare Department, Army of the Republic of South Vietnam presented the Vietnamese Civic Action Medal to 18 officers and men of the 9th Infantry Division. These were
presented at a special ceremony at Dong Tam. General Trung praised the Civic Action Program of the 9th Infantry Division as the most active and effective in South Vietnam.

1. (C) Regional Force/Popular Force Upgrading and ARVN Training

(1) The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Infantry Re-training Program continued during this period. During this period 5 February 1969 to 30 April 1969, the 3d Brigade conducted ARVN Battalion Refresher Training for the 2d Battalion, 50th Regiment and the 3d Battalion, 50th Regiment in Long An Province.

(2) The Regional Force/Popular Force (RF/PP) upgrading program continued to be supported throughout the Division TAOD on an emergency basis only. The IMPACT team in Kien Hoa Province was the last to be phased out and this was completed 28 February 1969. The amount of RF/PP IMPACT support provided is shown in Enclosure 9.

(3) Engineering Support

(1) Dry Weather Program

(a) During the reporting period, the majority of the engineering support was directed toward the dry weather program. The projects making up this program were the construction of fire support bases and roads, land clearing operations, and other construction which can only be accomplished during the dry season in the Delta. Early in the reporting period, planning was initiated by combining into a division plan the following projects: projects required to support tactical operations requested by the brigades or planned by the division; projects required to support expansion programs recommended by the provinces; and projects for which the 7th ARVN Division had requested assistance. The plan was staffed at division level, priorities established, and the entire plan approved by the Commanding General. The engineering effort required in excess of that available within the division, the 7th ARVN Division, and the Ministry of Public Works in each province was supplied by the 20th Engineer Brigade, the 86th Engineer Battalion, and the 93rd Engineer Battalion on a project basis.

(b) Actual construction was delayed on many projects due to the slow drying of the rice paddies. In order to expedite the starting date of the program, the paddies were flooded and the water pumped out using pumps fabricated from scrap motors. As the paddies became drier, the program accelerated. During the reporting period, upgrading was completed on two of the five support bases, with the project approximately 60 per cent complete. The enlargement of two fire support bases under construction are approximately 70 per cent complete. It is estimated that all of the fire support bases will be completed prior to 31 May 1969.
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(c) The road projects were initially divided into three phases. Phase I
opened roads to Class 12 military traffic and light civilian traffic; Phase II
up-graded roads to carry two-way Class 20 traffic; and Phase III provided an
all weather capability by surfacing the road with rock and laterite. At the
Commanding General’s direction, Phase II was halted and emphasis was placed
on completing Phase I and later Phase III. During the reporting period, 63
Kms of the total 105 Kms of Phase I work were completed. The remaining Phase
I work is scheduled to be completed by 30 June 1969 and all of Phase III work
is scheduled to be completed prior to 1 November 1969.

(a) Approximately 370 acres of the 1,950 acres of land to be cleared were
cleared during the reporting period. The shortage of Haloiders and Home Flows
continues to delay the completion of the land clearing projects.

(e) In addition, three ferry ramps, two semi-permanent bridges, and a
refusal and rearmament facility were completed.

(f) Planning for the 1969-1970 Dry Weather Program was initiated during
the month of April.

(2) Wet Weather Program

(e) Planning for the wet weather program began in early April. Primary
emphasis will be placed on maintenance of the BRE’s within the Division TAOC.
Tactical Bridges such as Bailey Bridges and HMC 40 dry spans are scheduled to be
replaced with semi-permanent timber bridges. In addition, some of the bridges
required to support future dry season projects will be constructed.

(3) Combat Support

(a) Combat engineer support to tactical units within the Division TAOC
was provided by the 15th & 86th Engineer Battalions during the reporting period.
Some of the support activities included demolition and booby trap clearing
missions on battalion and company size operations; numerous mine sweep and
road clearing operations; and construction and maintenance of protective systems
(pier protection, mine booms, lighting, protective minefields) for important
bridges on QL-4. In addition, the Engineers were responsible for the installation,
repair, and removal of various bridges and rafts; and the construction of 18-
story foot towers for the FPS-5 Radar. On one occasion, D Co, 86th Engineer
Battalion was committed as infantry in support of the 2/47 Infantry Battalion
in a contact east of Binh Phuoc on the 26th of April 1969.
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k. (c) Signal Support

(1) During this reporting period the areas served by the Division Communications System were as follows: Ben Lao, Rach Kim, Tam An, Minh Phong, Tuyet Tru, Vung Tau, PFB Tiger II, PFB Moore, Ben Tre, Dong Tam, PFB Danger, PFB Schroeder, and the floating portion of the Mobile Riverine Brigade.

(2) The month of February was a very active signal month. The Division's 1st Brigade went to Nho Boa for twenty four days of intensive operations. While at Nho Boa the brigade was provided with twelve channel VHF service which included VHF teletype. Radio teletype communications were also provided. The sixty-five "as the crow flies" kilometers distance between Nha Trang and Nho Boa made it necessary to employ a VHF relay station at Tuy Tinh Kheo. To further facilitate the operation an FM retransmission station was set up in conjunction with the VHF relay at Tuy Tinh Kheo. A survey was initiated on 6 February 1969 to determine the feasibility of a 75' tower at Tan Tru for installation in 2nd Bn/60th Infantry. The 75 foot tower was proposed to aid the reliability of their four channel VHF system to Tan An. The tower installation was completed on 22 February 1969. It not only aided the quality of VHF communications but also extended the range of their FM operation. It should be noted here that VHF communication down to battalion level is an operationally new idea. This was made possible in the 9th Infantry Division by a number of factors, two of which shall be mentioned here. First, the fact that the Division Headquarters, Division Support Command, and Division Artillery are located at the same base camp, Dong Tam. This ideal situation permits other units of the division to use the equipment that would normally be utilized by these three commands if they were set up at different locations. Secondly, since each maneuvers battalion has a relatively stable area of operation and is able to set up a fixed base camp, communications equipment is available to provide semi-fixed station communications service, i.e., VHF multichannel communications. All maneuver battalions presently have access to either 4 or 12 channel VHF communications system. On 9 February the Division Alternate VHF system was born. This system provided three "common user" circuits from Reliable Main to Reliable Alternate and two "common user" circuits from Reliable Alternate to each of the three brigades. Reliable Alternate switchboard was established at Vung Tau. The alternate system was completed and operational on 14 February 1969. Should the 204 foot AB 216 towers located at Dong Tam fall during an attack, telephone communications would be maintained by use of the alternate system. Vung Tau was selected because of its elevation. Even though not in the Division TAOL, each brigade can be reached directly with AN/HEQ-24 VHF equipment from Vung Tau.

(3) During the month of March few communications operations were initiated. The majority of the time was spent improving the existing facets of the
Division Communications Systems. However, two operations required additional communications support. On 1 March 1969, the USS Benewah left the Division for an estimated two and one half month maintenance period. It was consequently necessary to move the 2d Brigade command element from a base at Ben Tre City. The brigade support element then moved to the USS Collison. One 12 channel VHF system was installed from Dong Tam to the Collins. This system will remain active until the Benewah returns to operations in the Delta. On 30 March 1969, the 2d Brigade extended their operations considerably south of their normal area of operation. An FM retransmission station was established at Vung Liem to support the operation.

During the month of April the Division continued to improve upon the division communications system as well as to initiate several new operations and procedures. As the enemy prepared to advance to a new phase of his Winter-Spring Offensive the Division prepared to execute Crusader IV. Red Zone and SLAM readouts indicated an enemy buildup and movement toward Saigon from the south. Each phase of Crusader IV has distinct communications ramifications and the signal portion of Crusader IV had to be rewritten because of a tactical policy change within the Division. The well defined tactical area of operations, combined with more highly sophisticated, reliable communications equipment and extensive mobility within the division area have eliminated the practical need for a division forward command post. As a result, communications equipment requirements were cut in half. This enabled the battalions to retain their multichannel communications by using the signal assets made available by the deletion of the Forward CP. The reasons for this policy change are several. First, command and control can be maintained from any portion of the Division TAO. This is a direct result of the existing diversity of our present communications system and the tremendous mobility provided by the Division's phlegmless aircraft. Since Dong Tam is centrally located within the TAO, complete control of the Division is possible without moving the headquarters. Secondly, it is not advisable or necessary for a division command element to flitfrog around the countryside in a guerrilla type war. The end signal result is a more efficient multichannel VHF communications system to include VHF teletype, and high frequency radio teletype communications to all major subordinate units within the Division. On 6 April 1969, the Division implemented the new abbreviated radio procedure. After this date it was permissible to delete the use of all callwords, callsigns, and unnecessary procedure words after initial contact had been firmly established. This procedure saves considerable time during the course of a radio conversation and is clearly consistent with the principle "keep each transmission as short and to the point as possible". On 3 April 1969, the Division Signal Office published a letter, the "New Straight Line Encryption System". This system is designed for use with the existing KAC-Q series numeral codes and allows effective one line encryption. Hopefully this new system will eliminate the use of unorthodox, illegal straight line systems which have been used extensively in the past. On 18 April 1969, all of the Division's commanders heard the Division Signal Officer stress the importance of proper FM frequency interference reporting. This has remained a critical point during each ORR reporting period. The lack
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of a sufficient number of discrete frequencies combined with the unconventional sharing of all frequencies with ARVN forces creates an occasionally static environment. On 29 April 1969, the Division received notification that 24 AN/UCG-142s would be delivered to Dong Tam within the next month. Thus will bring the division up to its authorized number on-hand and will permit brigades to have their own RATT nets effective in May.

1. (C) Army Aviation

(1) The 9th Infantry Division, supporting two Corps Tactical areas, obtains its aviation assets from both II FFV and IV Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ). The 9th Aviation Battalion provides general support to the division. During the reporting period the 9th Infantry Division has been supported by the 214th Combat Aviation Battalion (CAB) with two Assault Helicopter Companies (AHC) per day in direct support of 1st and 2d brigades operating in Kien Hoa and Dinh Tuong Provinces respectively. The 3d Brigade operating in Long An Province has been supported by II FFV with an AHC on a mission basis.

(2) The division lift requirements supported by IV Corps with the 147th Assault Support Helicopter Co (ASE) have involved three CH-47s flying an average of 18 hours. II FFV has also supported with a CH-47 flying an average of 4.5 hours and 9 sorties per day.

(3) The division CH-54 requirements are supplied by II FFV. Division requirements for CH-54 arise two or three times a week for an average of three sorties per day and two hours blade time. A recapitulation of heavy lift support for the quarter shows that 10,789 tons of cargo and 21,605 passengers were lifted for a total of 2,091.7 flying hours in support of the division.

(4) Cavalry troop support for the division consists of D 3/5 Cav which is organic to the division and D 3/17 Cavalry in a direct support role. Additional cavalry troops are supplied to the division by both II FFV and IV CTZ on a mission basis as required.

2. (C) Chemical Support

(1) During the reporting period there were 4,012 missions flown for a total flying time of 948 hrs. All missions were flown utilizing the UH-1 except for 4 missions of 4 hrs flown in an Low Observation Helicopter. Results of these missions were reported to G-2 and to brigade and/
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(1) For inclusion in their intelligence reports. Total missions and flying time during the previous quarter were 942 and 96%, respectively. This represents an increase of 7% in missions and a decrease of 2% in flying time.

(2) Personnel Detectors: The Tampack Personnel Detector (PFD) is being phased out of personnel detection operations. The section now has three Airborne Personnel Detectors (APD) and a fourth is due in at a future date. The new APDs are superior in performance and require less maintenance. Several changes in the new models were incorporated in a 2 day instructional period presented on operation and maintenance by a OCONUS New Equipment Team. During this quarter and "ing operations have been hampered by the following factors: poor weather conditions, namely high surface winds; dry conditions resulting in brush fires producing smoke which is detected by the machines; and contacts developed by the Air Cavalry have made the use of the sniffer unnecessary.

(3) Riot Control Agent Operations: During the reporting period there were 3 missions flown utilizing Bulk CS. Over 6,520 pounds were dropped covering over 100 hectares. On 5 February 1969, a CS-2 barrel drop was completed at coordinates LS 3469. A total of 1,120 lbs of Bulk was expended for the purpose of flushing enemy positions. On 25 February 1969, a CS-1 and CS-2 barrel drop was completed at coordinates LS 365425. A total of 3,400 lbs of bulk CS was used for the purpose of terrain denial. On 26 February 1969, 2,400 lbs of Bulk CS was used for the purpose of terrain denial. During the reporting period there were 29 ML58 Tactical CS clusters expended. Of these only four were used on spontaneous point targets. This drop is usage is attributed to a HMO message prohibiting aircraft from carrying ML58s without one of the pilots being masked. This inconvenience resulted in the Air Cavalry rejecting the clusters for point type targets.

(4) Defoliation: During this quarter 13 defoliation requests were forwarded through channels. This number represents 16 different areas. Of these requests three have been approved and sprayed, three were disapproved and seven are pending. One project, representing 12 areas, submitted last quarter was approved and will be sprayed during the following quarter. During the reporting period 2,503 gallons of herbicide were dispensed. The waterborne herbicide delivery system devised last quarter
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has proved only slightly successful. The system, utilizing a decontamination truck on a LNG, has limited spray range and the system was abandoned in favor of a Navy derided apparatus using fire fighting equipment. The receipt of the ADVANCED helicopter spray systems adds two capabilities:

(a) The section is now able to spray with a proven helicopter spray rig resulting in superior results.

(b) The ground loading unit, a 24 horsepower pump, is easily converted into an expedient ground sprayer, motorized ground sprayer, or boat spray rig.

(5) MISUSE Items - One MISUSE item was evaluated this quarter. The XM-28 CS "Brown Bag" system has proved to be an unreliable method of delivering CS. Problems lie in the fusing-firing system and until the flaws are ironed out, the system will continue to have a high dud rate. The XM-28 is a device easy to load and when employed gives good area coverage. When perfected the XM-28 will greatly supplement the presently available CS weapon systems.
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2. (C) Section 2: Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. (C) Personnel

(1) (C) Personnel Protection from Small Arms Mortar Attack.

Observation: The 9th Military Police Company has sustained numerous casualties from mortar attacks at Dong Tam. On two occasions, first round hits in the Military Police area were responsible for the casualties.

Evaluation: During an attack on Dong Tam Base, hostile mortar rounds impacted directly in the MP Company area and gave impetus to the construction of additional personnel bunkers. Since casualties on two occasions resulted from first round hits in the MP area, bunkers were constructed with tiered sleeping platforms. Normally troops live in the barracks adjacent to the bunkers, but when intelligence indicates a potential enemy threat all MP personnel sleep in bunkers. Buildings manned 24 hours a day have sandbagged protective walls.

Recommendation: It is recommended that all units initiate a program to construct bunkers adjacent to troop barracks. Where possible, it would be beneficial to build sleeping platforms in bunkers. For buildings manned 24 hours per day, sandbag protection is essential.

(2) (C) Improved Detention Facilities for US Personnel

Observation: Conex containers have been used for short term detention (less than 24 hours) of US personnel apprehended in the act of committing an offense or for those personnel enroute to United States Army Vietnam confinement facilities at the request of unit commanders. Detained personnel were put in either a modified conex detention cell or, depending on their condition and attitude, were allowed to sit on benches under the supervision of the Desk Sergeant. Those in the former category generally resented the conex and few really required it. Those in the latter category occasionally posed custodial problems when they momentarily stepped out of Desk Sergeant's line of sight.

Evaluation: Part of the area in front of the MP desk was partitioned off and a door installed. Two benches were installed in the room. The side of the room toward the MP desk is open from the top of the desk to the ceiling and provides a rectangular viewing area about 10' x 3'. This permits both the Desk Sergeant and clerk to watch the occupants. The door can be secured by the Desk Sergeant from his location behind the desk. The net result is improved custodial control in a more pleasant surrounding for the occupants.
RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that other Military Police units adopt a system similar to the one described above.

(3) **Vietnamese Civilian Laborers**

**Observation:** The availability of military personnel to perform unskilled manual labor is sometimes at a premium.

**Evaluation:** In many cases it is necessary to use civilian laborers to augment a military work force. Vietnamese laborers can greatly increase a unit’s productivity in operations if they are treated and utilized properly. If their friendship and respect are won, they will work hard and, through their knowledge of the area and the people, give advance notice of VC actions, point out booby traps, and give advice on easy ways of accomplishing certain tasks. Additionally, US military personnel are free to perform more skilled jobs.

RECOMMENDATION: Vietnamese civilian laborers should be used to augment US military work forces for tasks such as land clearing and any work which requires unskilled manual labor.

(4) **Disposition of Special Court-Martial Sentenced Prisoners**

**Observation:** During this quarter, the USARV Correctional Holding Detachment was formed. All Army personnel in Vietnam who are sentenced to confinement by special court-martial for more than thirty days are now required to be transferred to the United States Army Correctional Holding Detachment, USARV, if confinement (unsuspended) in excess of 30 days is approved by the convening authority. The transfer becomes effective on the date the convening authority signs the action approving the sentence. When individuals from the 9th Infantry Division are released from the Correctional Holding Detachment, they will normally be reassigned to another major unit in Vietnam and a corresponding number of individuals from other Divisions will be assigned to the 9th Infantry Division from the Correctional Holding Detachment.

**Evaluation:** The formation of the Correctional Holding Detachment did effect some change to the 9th Division Policy concerning confinement. The Division continues to utilize suspended confinement as a tool of rehabilitation, particularly in the case of first offenders. Division policy is to avoid transfer of personnel to the Correctional Holding Detachment except in extraordinary circumstances. It is now the policy of the Division to authorize executed sentences to confinement only for periods of 30 days or less, and then only in cases where good reasons exist to believe that a 30 day sentence to confinement...
will serve to rehabilitate an individual whose return to duty is contemplated or where elimination under AR 635-212 or AR 635-200 has been initiated and continued presence of the individual in the unit will result in a serious disciplinary problem or hazard to the military mission. Under this policy, undesirable personnel are eliminated by administrative action within the Division and replaced by replacement stream personnel rather than by assignment of restrained personnel from the Correctional Holding Detachment. The policy of approving confinement for periods of less than 30 days has been effective in the maintenance of discipline in the Division. It has provided units with an effective tool of rehabilitation, enhanced by the fact that unit commanders are familiar with the problems of the individuals returned to duty from periods of confinement. The policy has further made it possible for Divisional units more easily to identify personnel who are properly the subject of administrative separation and to eliminate these individuals through Division channels so that they may be replaced through normal replacement channels.

RECOMMENDATION: Continued emphasis on rehabilitation where possible and elimination where indicated, will contribute substantially to the quality of personnel and performance in the Division.


OBSERVATION: It has been noted during the past three months that reports of survey, line of duty investigation, and other reports of investigation are frequently submitted long after the date of the incident in question. These delays apparently are a result of the officer involved in the investigation not having sufficient time or experience to conduct the investigation efficiently and expeditiously.

EVALUATION: Generally, investigations of this type are conducted by young and inexperienced company grade officers. They do not know how to conduct the investigation; they do not know the objectives or purpose of the investigation; they do not know where to go for assistance; and frequently they do not have the time to conduct the investigation. The Staff Judge Advocate has consistently made the personnel of his office available to any investigating officer for assistance and advice on the objectives, procedures, and sources of information pertaining to the officer's assigned task. This service has been infrequently utilized, yet if the investigation is not conducted expeditiously it will become impossible to complete the investigation effectively. In a 30 to 60 day delay, witnesses may have been rotated, killed in action, or medically evacuated.
RECOMMENDATION: Unit personnel in charge of the initial investigation must act promptly in initiating the investigation. An officer must be appointed and briefed on his duties. If further assistance or advice is needed each should be requested of, and given by the appropriate general or special staff office.

b. (c) Operations

(1) (c) Martin Smoke

OBSERVATION: Units have been identifying their positions with green smoke during airstrikes in support of an operation.

EVALUATION: The three colored smokes available to ground troops for marking their ground positions are green, yellow, and violet. Green smoke used in the vicinity of vegetation diffuses and is virtually impossible to detect by pilots flying at high altitudes or at some distance from the marking area.

RECOMMENDATION: That yellow or violet smoke be used to mark friendly ground unit locations for easier identification by Air Force Forward Air Controllers (FAQ).

(2) (c) Search Techniques

OBSERVATION: Units have been unsuccessful in their efforts to capture or destroy weapons in percentages commensurate with the number of enemy killed or captured.

EVALUATION: The VC are known to conceal their weapons whenever US units place them in a possible compromising position. Reports from Hoi Chunks and Prisoners of War (POWs) indicate that on occasion caches and weapons are concealed in coconut and banana trees. A thorough search of bunkers and family shelters must be made, especially on the rear area where the VC will suspend equipment to keep it dry and to hide it from searches by US units.

RECOMMENDATION: That units be constantly made aware of existing techniques employed by the VC to conceal weapons and equipment.

(3) (c) Interrogation of Detainees

OBSERVATION: Reaction time on detainee readouts is not rapid enough.

EVALUATION: To effectively judge the nature of a contact area POWs should be interrogated as soon as possible, preferably at the contact site.

RECOMMENDATION: Interrogation teams should be assigned to Infantry Battalions in order to more rapidly exploit POWs.
(4) (c) Starlight Scopes

OBSERVATION: Starlight Scopes should be permanently mounted on rifles.

EVALUATION: When starlight scopes are mounted and aimed with a rifle, they cannot be removed without destroying the scope. When these weapons are used by soldiers moving to the field on daylight operations, the starlight scope is removed, thus destroying the scope.

RECOMMENDATION: That six additional rifles per company be issued to infantry battalions for the purpose of permanently mounting and serving the starlight scope and rifle.

(5) (c) First-light Sniper Insertion

OBSERVATION: A considerable number of enemy personnel move about during daylight hours in the more inaccessible areas. They become confident in their ability to move free of allied military observation.

EVALUATION: Insertion by helicopter of a trained sniper team, along with an infantry security element, at first-light has proved most successful. Remaining under cover, but in a position to observe large areas, the sniper team stays in one position all day and fires on targets of opportunity. In addition to their sniper role, this team has been used in Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol roles, reporting enemy movement and capturing prisoners of war.

RECOMMENDATION: That the first-light insertion of sniper teams be promoted in other units.

(6) (c) Air-mobile Night Raid

OBSERVATION: It is known that many guerillas and infrastructure members return to their homes or villages at night. Agent reports confirm times, locations, security measures, etc.

EVALUATION: A well rehearsed helicopter raid of not more than three helicopters can be most effective if supporting elements are coordinated. Artillery illumination of the target area must coincide with the touch down of the troop ships. All raiding personnel must be briefed in detail. Helicopter extraction is conducted after the snatch or kill has been accomplished, but time on the ground is critical and must be minimised.
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AVEL-NE
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending
30 April 1969, WPS C008-65 (EL) (U)

RECOMMENDATION: Night heliborne raids should be attempted only after detailed
intelligence and thorough preparations have been accomplished. This type of raid
should be attempted only by an experienced unit after a significant enemy
personality (military or political) has been targeted.

(7) (C) Deployment of Snipers on Navy Craft

OBSERVATION: Most enemy lines or communication are on or parallel to rivers
or canals in the IV Corps Tactical Zone (IVC). Snipers using night observation
device while positioned on stable water craft can eliminate many enemy personnel
during hours of darkness.

EVALUATION: Although river patrol boats and similar small craft are
relatively unstable gun platforms, the larger troop carriers (TANGOs) operating
at 3 to 5 knots at a distance of 75 to 150 meters from the shore line provides
a quiet and mobile means of supporting a sniper team. The snipers work in teams
and fire from a position on the flight deck just forward of the cabin. Voice
communication with the crew is possible and should a large target be detected,
weapons fire can be brought to bear on the enemy. Additionally, surplus radios are available to the sniper team. This operation was most
effective and experiments indicated that shore observers had little opportunity
to observe the boat before they were sighted by a sniper team.

RECOMMENDATION: Continued evaluation be made by other US units along major
waterways.

(c) (C) Civic Action Programs

OBSERVATION: Experience has proved that the duration of use of Vietnamese
aid and the level of medical treatment measurably affects combined Medical
Civic Action Programs, Psychological Operations, Intelligence Civic Action
Programs and Dental Civic Action Programs.

EVALUATION: Civic action programs, while beneficial to the Vietnamese people,
do not always produce the desired results. In an attempt to satisfy all aspects
civic action programs, longer MEDCAP missions, 3 to 5 days, and sophistication
of treatment have been implemented. Three Vietnamese aides have been trained to
assist in the treatment of the Vietnamese people.

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that more extensive use of Vietnamese
aides in civic action programs be implemented and that the level of medical
treatment and the skill level of Vietnamese aides be upgraded.

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AVIZ-96
15 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending
30 April 1969, ROE OSD-65 (II) (U)

(9) (C) Movement of Private Craft on Canals

OBSERVATION: While being towed to Ho Gay Canal, a mortar barge collided with
a Landing Craft Mechanical. The LCM pilot lost control and the craft was forced
into a mixed net, causing extensive damage to the LCM.

EVALUATION: During movements of LCMs and other water vessels through canals
with the tide, it is necessary to switch from a normal side tow to a stern tow.
The maneuverability of the craft cannot safely be assured when passing other US
and ARVN craft, since the swiftness of the tide will not allow the operator to
maintain positive control.

RECOMMENDATION: A selective time for such movements must be coordinated when
the tide is running against the movement of the craft. The current of the tide will
give some resistance to the tow, enabling the host operator to maintain control.
Should the boat need to stop, the normal flow of water will allow the barge and
assist the boat to hold the barge steady in the water.

(10) (C) Washout Criteria

OBSERVATION: The thirty day washout established for equipment does not allow
time for the repair parts cycle to become complete. This results in the
unnecessary washout of items and excessive in repair parts on hand. Average order
and ship time presently experienced in this theater (US Army) is thirty-five days
for priority 03 requisitions; sixty to seventy-five days for 05 requisitions; and
120 to 150 days for priority 12 requisitions.

EVALUATION: If the washout criteria is such that the equipment is retrograded
before the supply system can react, the supply system will become clogged with
repair parts ordered on high priorities for equipment which has already been
removed. This has resulted in needless expenditure for repair parts, shipping
costs, and handling costs. Many repair parts have been ordered for equipment
already retrograded, some of which were obsolete and had to be turned in as excess.

RECOMMENDATION: Every effort should be made to establish a washout criteria
consistent with the supply cycle. If the supply cycle for high priority
requisitions is thirty-five days, it is recommended that the equipment washout
cycle be set at forty-five days.

(11) (C) Selection of Ambush Sites

OBSERVATION: Ground radar can detect a pattern of enemy movement. After a
certain period of such movement, a rifle company should be tasked with setting
an ambush in the observed area.

EVALUATION: This ambush target selection technique has proved most effective

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in western Dinh Tuong Province. Enemy sampan traffic has been reduced considerably by employing multiple claymore mine killing zones at aquatic positions.

RECOMMENDATION: This method of targeting should be made known to all US forces having a radar capability.

(12) (c) Frequency Management

OBSERVATION: With the expansion of the 9th Signal Battalion VHF systems, frequency planning became very difficult. Frequencies were being selected on the basis of past experience. With the addition of an alternate system, frequency assignments for tactical operations were an exhausting process resulting in many errors.

EVALUATION: The solution to the problem was to use the ARM plan for frequency assignments. B, C, and D band frequencies were divided into six (6) blocks of frequencies. Separations between Block I and IV, Block II and V, and Block III and VI were 28 channels and between Blocks III and IV, each channel was 11 channels. A chart showing the plan was made so personnel with little or no experience could assign frequencies. In order to implement the plan, frequencies were changed on nine systems. Priority circuits on the primary systems were rerouted. After rerouting was completed, the frequencies were changed. All outages resulting from frequency changes were kept to a minimum by thorough planning. The outages had little effect on the Division Communications System as they were planned to occur at idle traffic times.

RECOMMENDATION: That all VHF frequencies be assigned according to the ARM plan.

(13) (c) Land Clearing with Heavy Equipment

OBSERVATION: Heavy equipment in many areas of the Delta cannot be supported by viscous subsoil. Many areas are crosscrosed with numerous closely spaced ditches. As a result, great difficulty has been experienced in the use of Rose Plows and bulldozers in land clearing operations.

EVALUATION: Whether Rose Plows or bulldozers are used in Delta terrain, it is imperative to insure that at least one piece of equipment capable of extracting dorners remains in a position where it will not get stuck. Of primary importance when using the D7M tractor in an area crosscrosed by ditches is keeping the tractor in the center of the dikes. Only those dikes which are wider than the tracks should be cleared and the tractor should not straddle a
ditches, the equipment should be worked along the longitudinal axis of the dikes and not across this axis except when moving from one dike to another. When a ditch must be negotiated, the chances of becoming stuck can be minimized. First, by cutting off the main source of water with a dam at low tide to keep the water level down and to allow a certain amount of drying to take place, second, by using trees already knocked down to fill in the canal and to provide a semi-stable base, and third, by stripping the top of the dike and pushing that fill into the gap on top of the trees. The bulldozer blade is much more effective at such a task than the Rome Plow. Although the Rome Plow is normally more effective at knocking trees down, it is heavier and more cumbersome than the bulldozer and in the Delta regions the bulldozer is capable of knocking over the shallow rooted coconut trees.

RECOMMENDATION: In the Delta region consideration should be given to the use of bulldozers in lieu of Rome Plows for land clearing. Heavy equipment should be employed in pairs and should operate in the manner described above to minimize the chances of getting stuck and to increase productivity.

(14) (6) Dry Span

OBSERVATION: Some canals in areas of land clearing are too wide to be crossed using the coconut tree/fill technique.

EVALUATION: On two occasions an M476 dry span was airlifted into land clearing areas to allow equipment to pass over water obstacles. The obstacles were too wide to be spanned by filling with the limited materials available and the areas were inaccessible to vehicular traffic of the type required to carry bridging. A 45-foot dry span was constructed at Dong Tam and was transported and emplaced by a CH-54 Flying Crane. The obstacle became passable and work continued with little delay.

RECOMMENDATION: The M476 dry span should be considered for use in land clearing operations in areas where water obstacles exist. It can be emplaced by the normal means from the ground or it can be airlifted to inaccessible areas.

(15) (0) Demolitions

OBSERVATION: Land clearing operations in the Delta consume an excessive amount of demolitions.

EVALUATION: The most common large growth in the Delta is the coconut tree
which, unlike the normal hardwood, is fibrous in structure. Consequently, the
amount of explosives required as calculated by the formulas specified in
FM 5-34 is more than enough to fell the tree. Experience has shown that
approximately one-sixth of the FM 5-34 recommended charge is needed to blow
a casuarina. This reduced charge will not work, however, if the charge is
placed at only one point on the tree trunk. An ear muff type placement,
a triangular pattern of placement, or placement in a notch cut out by a hard
axe will yield desirable results with a minimum of demolitions.

RECOMMENDATION: A reduced charge approximately one-sixth the size of that
recommended in FM 5-34 should be used to fell casuarina trees in land clearing
operations. The charge should be placed as indicated above.

(16) (C) Burning as an Aid to Clearing Operations

OBSERVATION: Some areas in the Delta must be cleared by hand because
of inaccessibility to heavy equipment.

EVALUATION: When clearing an area which will not support heavy equipment,
most units revert to clearing by hand, utilizing hand cutting tools and demolitions.
This work is slow and there is the added danger of personnel tripping booby traps. A method of burning thick brush is available with the use of the flame
track. By use of this capability not only is the thick brush burned but most
booby traps in the area are "cooked off" and neutralized. When the tracks are
not available use can be made of fuel trucks to spray diesel over a large area.
The diesel fuel can then be ignited and virtually the same effect is achieved,
although the flame is neither as hot nor as concentrated and sometimes does not
cause detonation of booby traps.

RECOMMENDATION: Consideration should be given to the use of a burning
capability (flame tracks or sprayed and ignited diesel) in land clearing operations,
especially when the area is inaccessible to heavy equipment.

b. (0) Training

c. (0) Panel Operator Training

OBSERVATION: It was noticed during some critical system outages that
patch panel operators were unable to route circuits quickly and efficiently.
The problem seemed to be due to a lack of training. Most of the experienced operators had completed their tours of duty and only inexperienced operators were available.

\textbf{EVALUATION:} On the job training was initiated. Utilizing spare channels of existing systems, Systems Communication personnel planned the circuits and instructed patch panel personnel in proper techniques.

\textbf{RECOMMENDATIONS:} That on the job training be initiated where necessary utilizing the method described above.

\textbf{(2) (U) Dermatology Training}

\textbf{OBSERVATION:} The dry season has very little consequences on the non-effectiveness rate resulting from skin disease in the Delta.

\textbf{EVALUATION:} The command policy of limiting combat operations to 48 hours remained the only effective control measure in reducing total skin disease. During the dry season, skin ulcers due to bacterial infections increased while inflammatory fungi infections decreased. While the dry season has afforded our forces temporary relief from the full impact of this health problem, the problem remains essentially as persistent as ever, and high combat incapacitation levels will still be inflicted upon ground forces in inundated areas.

\textbf{RECOMMENDATION:} That the command policy of limiting operations in "paddy areas" to 48 hours followed by a 24 hour dry utilisation period is the most important method of treating foot diseases. It is recommended that this policy be continued throughout the dry season.

d. (C) Intelligence

\textbf{(1) (C) Duffel Bag}

\textbf{OBSERVATION:} The key to a successful duffel bag operation is careful planning and coordination. Personnel involved must be thoroughly briefed to include the emplacement and monitoring team, the unit inserting the emplacement, artillery coordination personnel, and Air Force FACs.

\textbf{EVALUATION:} When reconnaissance of the target area is not conducted by
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AVIE-ME

15 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1969. RS OSMON-65 (R1) (G)

The unit providing security for the emplacement team two main problems arise. The security unit and the emplacement team may be inserted far from the proposed target and movement to the area involves undue troop exposure and a difficult walk for the emplacement team which must carry the equipment. Faulty equipment taken to the field can result in cancellation of the field emplacement. It is very important to know the exact location of each field emplacement. However, due to the topographic configuration of the Delta, the exact coordinates for each target to 8 digits is extremely difficult. Upon activation of one sensor in a field the artillery should be alerted. An activation of a second sensor in the same field should result in calling a Fire mission. An activation by a large number of personnel should warrant Air Cavalry/Night Hunter reaction.

RECOMMENDATION: Reconnaissance of the area by the unit which is going to provide security for the emplacement team is paramount. Insertion on the target is the ideal. Prior to insertion all sensors must be checked. This precludes faulty equipment being taken to the field. It is also important to check the sensors prior to physically placing them in the target. When determining the coordinates of the emplacement an Air Force FAC flying overhead is the best means of accurately locating the field. An artillery navigational round fired in the area while the team is on the ground can aid the correct positioning of the "gun to target" line. After the round is adjusted, the battery can plot the target, make the adjustments and use this information for laying the rest of the battery. When the sensors are activated, Night Hunter teams in the air should be directed to the area of the activation to observe and/or engage the enemy.

(2) (C) Isolation of Selected Detainees

OBSERVATION: Certain detainees of potential special intelligence value, or those who might exert undesirable influence over other detainees, should be segregated.

EVALUATION: Current central collection point facilities permit segregation of detainees in six-page areas. The chain link fencing used does not restrict communication verbally or visually. A detainee in one cage is visible to and could communicate with a detainee in any of the other five cages. A special holding facility was created immediately adjacent to but screened from, the current holding area. Using three conexes with sandbagged sides and tops, and sound absorbing baffle to further restrict sound passage, a highly satisfactory isolation area was created. Wire mesh was installed in the front door of the Conex and a wooden pallet built inside. Generally used only for short periods of time, the isolation facility requires close supervision by MP's but has proved

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1969. NRS 0101-65 (R1) (U)

1. RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that units which do not have a special holding facility for selected detainees construct a facility similar to the one described.

3. (C) Military Civic Action Program: Psychological Operation Recommendations

   OBSERVATION: Observations and changes of techniques are needed to keep up interest of Vietnamese civilians in the PSI/IN/POR portion of MILCAP.

   EVALUATION: Utilisation of LOTO games, raffles, and Health Records have increased interest and participation by adult Vietnamese civilians at MILCAP sites.

   RECOMMENDATION: Utilisation of unique ideas and various attention gaining devices during MILCAPs should be a continuing practice by all units.

4. (C) Explanation of Special Reward Programs

   OBSERVATION: The interrogator and interpreter personnel assigned to Interrogation of Prisoner of War teams are generally not familiar with the Chieu Hoi, 3d Party Inducement, or Volunteer Informant Programs (VIP).

   EVALUATION: The lack of interrogator knowledge of these programs has on several occasions caused a delay in the accumulation of useful intelligence.

   RECOMMENDATION: Use the 9th Infantry Division Implementation Booklet with bilingual explanation of Chieu Hoi, VIP, and 3d Party Inducement Programs and the result will be more timely intelligence.

5. (C) Road Interdictions

   OBSERVATION: On many occasions road interdictions recurred at the same location on roads which have been newly opened by the engineers.

   EVALUATION: The purpose of the dry season road program is to open areas now closed so that the Vietnamese may return to the areas of their livelihood. Their presence limits the Viet Cong's (VC) freedom, so the VC attempt to discourage return to the areas by increased interdiction. These interdictions are reduced if the portions of the road which are normally interdicted are observed and/or covered by fire at night.

   RECOMMENDATION: Whenever possible, roads which have a history of interdiction should be covered at night by observation and/or sniper fire, ambush patrols or any other means of discouraging the enemy's presence.
4. (c) Logistics

(1) (c) Lubrication Program

OBSERVATION: Components of military vehicles were failing due to a lack of adequate lubrication.

EVALUATION: Technical manuals and lubrication orders place the responsibility for lubrication on the operators. It has been found that in many cases the operators were inadequately trained to properly lubricate their vehicles. This has resulted in inadequate lubrication and early failure of component parts. A lubrication ramp was constructed by battalion personnel and lubrication materials and equipment were stored in specially built compartments in the ramp. Organizational maintenance personnel assist operators with lubrication services. As a result the rate of vehicles deadlined for minor repairs dropped 5% in the first month after the ramp was constructed and the lubrication services assistance program was initiated.

RECOMMENDATION: That lubrication ramps be constructed for all units down to battalion level and that a program of lubrication service assistance be initiated at these units.

(2) (c) Follow up requests on Requisitions

OBSERVATION: Follow-up requests for status on requisitions are clogging the supply system and preventing supply personnel from concentrating on the basic mission of supply of repair parts.

EVALUATION: The present system of following up on requisitions as prescribed in AR 735-35 has resulted in a spiraling workload on supply activities. AR 735-35 specifies that units will follow up priority O2 requisitions after five days if a status has been received and every five days after receipt of status. With an average order and ship time of thirty-five days for O2 requisitions, up to seven to nine follow ups will have been hand processed before there can be any reasonable expectation of receiving the part. After the validity of the requisition is established, these additional follow ups serve only to consume man hours and slow down the supply system.

RECOMMENDATION: That the system of follow up in USA RV be geared to the order and ship time so that unnecessary man hours are not consumed processing
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15 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1969, DOS OJFOR-65 (R1) (U)

unproductive status cards.

1. Organization: None.

3. Other: None.
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15 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RDS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

3. (c) Section 5. Lessons Learned from Employment of Tactical Cover, Deposition and Evasion.

OBSERVATION: The Viet Cong have been delaying their attempts at evasion until an airmobile insertion is complete.

EVALUATION: VC are often seen running for cover innipalms after the insertion has been made. In many instances when the airmobile insertion has been close to a hoctch complex the VC will wait until villagers rush out to meet the US Forces and then attempt to evade through the "back door" into the nippalms and canals.

RECOMMENDATION: That the gunships escorting the lift ships pay particular attention to the flanks of a target area. Secondly, that the cavalry be utilized to follow the insertion and screen the periphery of the target area. The insertion itself must be rapid with an absolute minimum of overflight.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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AVRO-EM-H (15 May 69) 1st Ind.
SUBJNET: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending
30 April 1969, ROG CSFOR-65 (M) (U)

DA: HQ II FORCEN, APO San Francisco 96266 14 JUN 1969

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVRO(NST), APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GFOP-IT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report-
Lessons Learned of the 9th Infantry Division for the period ending 30
April 1969, with the following exceptions.

a. Reference paragraph 1a(3)(a)2. This is VC propaganda rather than
fact. Evaluation of these techniques by CNEC proved them to be ineffective
against CS.

b. Reference paragraph 1a(5)(f)4, line 2. "AH-TAQ-4A" should read
"AH-TAQ-1A".

FOR THE COMMANDER:

B. B. MacDonald
111, ASC
Assl AG

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AVRGC-UST (15 May 1969) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period ending
30 April 1969, HQS CSPKk-65 (RL) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 19 JUL 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: wOP-DI,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (U) Reference item concerning "Improved Detention Facilities for US Personnel," section II, page 43, paragraph 2a(2); nonconcur. The standardization of detention facilities in military police stations throughout USARV is not considered practical in view of the material, manpower, and fund expenditures required. USARV Regulation 190-4 provides the guidance for the temporary detention of personnel to include the construction of detention facilities.

b. (C) Reference item concerning "Interrogation of Detainees," section II, page 46, paragraph b(3); nonconcur. While it is recognized that IPW resources immediately responsive to the battalion commander would be highly desirable, centralized management of the limited IPW resources is preferable. IPW personnel are presently assigned to the Military Intelligence Detachment in support of the division and may, at the discretion of the G2, be attached down to battalion level as required. No action by USAARPAC or DA is recommended.

c. (C) Reference item concerning "Starlight Scopes," section II, page 47, paragraph 2b(4); concur. Permanently mounting the scope to a rifle prevents the "zero" from being disrupted and will also reduce wear on the sight mount. This headquarters is preparing an appropriate MTOE to meet this requirement. At present the availability of M-16 rifles precludes the issuance of six additional rifles per infantry company. The initial issue of M-16 rifles will not be completed until calendar year 1970. As an interim measure the "zero" can be reestablished when a known distance range is not available by following the steps outlined in chapter 3, DA Training Circular 23/11, Starlight Scope.

d. (U) Reference item concerning "Civic Action Programs," section II, page 48, paragraph b(8); concur. This recommendation will be presented in an article appearing in the next USARV Medical Bulletin (July—August 1969).
e. (U) Reference item concerning "Washout Criteria," section II, page 49, paragraph b(10); concur. The unit recommends that a washout criteria be established that is consistent with the supply cycle. An examination of Change 1, USARV Regulation 770-1, reveals that this has already been accomplished. No further action is required by this or higher headquarters. The unit will be informed by separate correspondence.

f. (U) Reference item concerning "Frequency Management," section II, page 50, paragraph b(12); concur. The AUM method for the assignment of radio relay frequencies at division and higher echelons is fundamental doctrine and standard procedure within the Army. No further action is required by this or higher headquarters.

g. (U) Reference item concerning "Dermatology Training," section II, page 53, paragraph c(2); concur. The item will be published in the July 1969 USARV Commander's Notes.

h. (C) Reference item concerning "Isolation of Selected Detainees," section II, page 54, paragraph 2d(2); concur. The requirement to segregate various categories of POWs and civilian detainees is a long established principle. The type of collection or holding area, to include segregation facilities, will vary with local resources and circumstances. The requirement to segregate personnel of special intelligence interest or those who might exert undesirable influence over other detainees exists regardless of the physical facilities. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

i. (U) Reference item concerning "Follow up requests on Requisitions," section II, page 56, paragraph e(2); nonconcur. AR 735-35 prescribes, in paragraph 4-8, that follow ups will not be submitted prior to the anticipated delivery date provided by the DSU or prior to the anticipated receipt date reflected in card columns 62-64 of the latest status card. Follow up action is not therefore automatic after five days for an 02 requisition from the date of the original request. Further, if the requisitioner is a Direct Support Unit (DSU), AR 725-50 provides in Chapter Three that follow up will not be submitted until after the Uniform Material Movement and Issue Priority System (UMMIPS) Order and Shipping Time (OST) standards for the receipt of material has elapsed. The maximum OST by IPD for this command is presented in the following table:

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There is at the present time a question on the submission of follow up.
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AVHGC-DST (15 May 1969) 2d lnd
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period ending
30 April 1969, RGS CSPON-65 (H1) (U)

requests to both the depot and the ICCV. In lieu of follow up, both activities
provide a status printout by the 10th of each month of each requisition that
reaches either activity.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
9th Inf Dlv
II FFV
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 9th Infantry Division
for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R5)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 36558 22 AUG 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]
C. L. Short
CPT, AGC
Ass AG
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 9th Infantry Division

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb 69 to 30 Apr 69.

CG, 9th Infantry Division

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