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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to AGSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 Apr 69

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SECTION I - OPERATIONS

1. (C) INTRODUCTION: This Operational Report - Lessons Learned covers the period 1 February through 30 April 1969. During this period, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment continued Operation TOAN THANG (Phase II) until 172000H February 1969 and initiated Operation TOAN THANG (Phase III) on 180000H February 1969. The 11th ACR participated in Operation ATLAS WEDGE during the period 17-21 March 1969 and on 12 April initiated Operation MONTANA RAIDER which continued through the reporting period.

The Blackhorse Regiment conducted operations within III CORPS TACTICAL ZONE with the Regiment(-) under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division (AM). The Regiment conducted operations within its Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR), Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI), and elements of the Regiment conducted operations in the provinces of BINH DAI, BINH DUONG, BINH LONG, GIA DINH, HAHN NGHIA, LONG KHANH, PHUOC LONG, PHUOC TUT, and TAT NINH.

Squadrons were OPCON to BIEN HOA TACTICAL AREA COMMAND, 1st Infantry Division, and DS 18th ARVN Division at different times throughout the reporting period. Troop and platoon size units conducted operations with the 1st Australian Task Force, 18th ARVN Division, 5th ARVN Division, 1st Infantry Division, CAPITAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, and BIEN HOA TACTICAL AREA COMMAND.

During portions of the reporting period, elements of the following 1st Infantry Division units were OPCON: 1-18th Infantry, 2-38th Infantry, 1-4th Cavalry, B/2-34th Armor, 1-16th Infantry (Mech), 1-28th Infantry, and 964th Land Clearing Company. During the same period, elements of the following 1st Cavalry Division (AM) units were OPCON: 1-6th Cavalry, 2-7th Cavalry, 2-12th Cavalry, 1-5th Cavalry, and 2-5th Cavalry. Both
A and B Troops, 1-9th Cavalry (ARVN) were GS to the Regiment. The following Vietnamese units were DS to the Regiment during the reporting period: 36th Ranger Battalion, 4th Battalion, 9th Regiment, MINH THANH CIDG Company, 28th River Assault Group, 2nd Battalion, 7th Regiment, 8th Regiment, and 4th Battalion, 7th Regiment.

Operation TOAN THANG (Phases II and III) was characterized by cordon and search operations on selected villages, reconnaissance in force missions, and night ambush patrols. The 11th ACR uncovered numerous base camps and caches during the course of the operation. Significant actions in the campaign were the insertion of the 1st 11th ACR and B/2-28th Inf in a B-52 strike area on 6 May, which resulted in 23 NVA KIA and 12 NVA PW's, Operation TWINKLETOES during the period 14 - 16 March, the F Troop contact in the KA WOODS on 28 February, Operation ATLAS WEDGE (17 - 24 Mar), which resulted in 335 NVA KIA (BC) and 11 PW's, Operation OMEGA (25 - 27 Mar), and Operation MONTANA RAIDER, which accounted for 226 KIA (BC) and 6 PW's. This operation continued into the next quarter.

The Blackhorse Regiment was responsible for Blackhorse Base Camp security, ground, rocket, and mortar defense of the LONG BINH - BIEN HOA Complex, security for ROME PLOW operations in the LAM SON and BIEN HOA Areas, opening and securing LTL 16 from TAN YEN (XT9622) to the SONG BE Bridge (XT92542), prevention of exfiltration from the CATCHERS MITT toward SAIGON, and the destruction of elements of the 1st and 7th NVA Divisions.

2. (C) ORGANIZATION: The basic structure of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment remained the same throughout the reporting period (See Incl 1).

3. (C) INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES:

   a. General: During the reporting period, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment operated primarily in VC Sub-Region 5, VC BA BINH Province, and VC Sub-Region 4. In March and April, limited 11th ACR operations were conducted in VC Sub-Region 1 and WAR ZONE C.

   b. Order of Battle:

      (1) General: In the last week of February and early March, enemy forces in III Corps Tactical Zone conducted a significant movement out of secure bases to conduct a Corps-wide offensive. The 5th VC Division suffered the heaviest losses at BIEN HOA on 26 February. The 7th NVA Division began its movement toward the SAIGON CORRIDOR in early March, but its movement...
was halted in the Michelin Area when 1st and 3rd Squadrons killed 335 NVA of the 7th Division in Operation ATLAS WEDGE. The 4th Division was uncommitted in the offensive, while the 1st NVA Division performed as a screening force for the movement of the 7th NVA Division. The majority of the enemy's actions took the form of indirect fire attacks. As the quarter ends, enemy combat elements are again located deep in secure base areas refitting and avoiding contact.

(2) VC SUB-REGION 5: SR-5 forces played an extremely limited role in the 1969 TET Offensive. Offensive activity within the Sub-Region culminated in an indirect fire attack on 11th ACR and 1st Infantry Division NDFa at HOLIDAY INN and LUK'S CASTLE which took 12 and 15 rounds of 82mm mortar fire respectively on 23 April.

The DONG MAI Regiment remained inactive, maintaining one battalion in the AN SON Area, two battalions north of Highway 301, and one battalion in the CATCHERS MITT during February and March. Local force elements remained inactive during the period, because their ranks have been decimated through VCI operations directed at AN HOA, AN LOI, and TAN BINH. SR-5 Headquarters remained north of the SONG BE River in jungled areas south of PHUOC VINH.

Operation TWINKLETOES, conducted by the 11th ACR from 14 to 16 March, was targeted at the Sub-Region 5 Headquarters (vic XT9512). The operation netted 23 VC KIA and documents identifying the Sapper Reconnaissance Company and C612 Rocket Company. As a result of Operation TWINKLETOES, SR-5 Headquarters was forced to relocate to western WAR ZONE D, hampering its administrative control of sub-region political and logistical activities.

Local force units in Sub-Region 5 remained generally inactive. During February and March, a heavy concentration of Allied forces in the LA SON forced these elements to remain dispersed in jungle areas far from local villages. With the movement of the 11th ACR from SR-5 in March and April, however, enemy activity around the villages has increased. In BINH MT, increased evidence of supply and propaganda activity has been reported, and it is evident that a high level of Allied presence must be maintained in SR-5 to protect populated areas from Viet Cong political and logistical activity.

The DONG MAI Regiment maintained one battalion in the AN SON Area and three battalions in north-central SR-5. The K2 Battalion with attached platoon size elements from K1, K3, and K4 Battalions operated in the AN SON Area (XTH108) during the quarter. The K1 Battalion remained in the western CATCHERS MITT where it conducted supply operations while avoiding contact. During February and March, the K1 Battalion was located in the area south of PHUOC HOA, but after an engagement with L/3/11th ACR on 4 April at XT91039B.
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in which 25 K1 personnel were killed, the unit relocated south to the TAN UYEN Area.

The K3 Battalion was contacted sporadically during 11th ACR operation in the BAU CO Base Area (XT8712) north of TAN BINH. On 18 February, a PW from C2, K3 Battalion, located his unit in the vicinity of XT8743. When 2nd Squadron began operating in the area in late February, the K3 Battalion relocated north and was last identified on 9 Mar from documents captured at XT880490 by M Company, 3rd Squadron.

The K/ Battalion, DONG NAI Regiment, was the only element of the Regiment to conduct offensive operations during the quarter. K£ Battalion was responsible for the 11 April attack on FSB RILEY (XT830322) in which two US were killed and ten wounded. In late February, 2nd Squadron was targeted against the K4 Battalion base area north of TAN BINH. The Battalion defended its positions and took substantial losses. Noteworthy encounters during the reporting period occurred on 25 February at XT819419 when nine NVA from K4 Battalion were killed and one captured and on 28 February at XT830430 when 20 NVA from C1, K3 Battalion, were captured and seven captured. By mid-March, the K4 Battalion relocated north of Highway 301 where it has been subjected to extensive B-52 strikes.

In mid-April, it was found that an increased number of prisoners from the DONG NAI Regiment were recently assigned personnel. The DONG NAI Regiment had received approximately 400 replacements from Infiltration Group 4010 in March. With these replacements, the Regiment effectively replaced losses sustained since July 1968 and is at its previous strength of approximately 1,200 men.

With the initiation of the 1969 TET Offensive, several significant unit movements in SR-5 were detected by the 11th ACR and OPCON units. The pattern of enemy attacks during the Offensive took the form of indirect fire attacks on US bases. One of the hardest hit was PHUOC VINH. On 4 March at XT96427, Air Cavalry Troop and elements of 3rd Squadron captured or killed 35 NVA from C3, K33 Battalion, 96th Artillery Regiment. Interrogation of the twelve PW's revealed that the K33 Battalion had left TAT NINN Province in early February with the sole mission of bombing PHUOC VINH during the offensive. This information was the first developed on the K33 Battalion in six months and served to redirect the efforts of US forces in the PHUOC VINH Area.

In the eastern CATCHERS WATT, elements of the 5th VC Division were contacted as they moved into forward staging areas to attack BIEN HOA Airbase. The
first indication of this movement was found on 17 February in documents,
taken from two NVA KIA by Recon/2-28th Inf (OPCON to 11th ACR) at TT91350,
which identified the 174th NVA Regiment. Two battalions of the 174th sub-
sequently moved into the Southern CATCHERS MITT where they remained until
mid-March. In conjunction with the arrival of the 174th NVA Regiment,
elements of the D1 Sapper Battalion of U-1 Region were identified in the
southern CATCHERS MITT on 14 February. It is likely that elements of the
D1 Battalion served to guide the 174th Regiment.

(3) VC BA BIEN Province: Two significant developments in the
enemy situation have developed in the VC BA BIEN Province during the quarter—
the reactivation of Military Region 7 (MR-7) Headquarters and the redeploy-
ment of 5th VC Division elements into the Province after the 26 February
attack on BIEN HOA. In early 1969, MR-7 Headquarters was reactivated to
established control of Sub-Region 4, U-1 Region, and BA BIEN Province.
MR-7 also took control of the enemy forces available in the area to include
D1 and D2 Sapper Battalions, D440 and D445 Local Force Battalions, the
33rd NVA Regiment, the 274th VC Regiment, and the five independent battal-
ions of SR-4. This military region headquarters continues to coordinate
the military efforts of the VC combat elements in southeastern III CTZ.

After heavy losses in the BIEN HOA Area in late February, the 275th and
33rd Regiments swung eastward and relocated in BA BIEN Province. The 275th
Regiment established itself in the northern portion of the province and was
last contacted at T2351 on 25 March. The 33rd Regiment moved into central
BA BIEN Province, east of Blackhorse Base Camp, and was last identified
on 22 March in a contact at T24901.

The local force battalions of BA BIEN Province played an active role in
the 1969 TET Offensive and committed their assets in the XUAN LOC and BA
RIA Areas on 22 February. The D440 Local Force Battalion was involved
in a heavy contact with 43rd ARVN Regiment at Y56098 on 5 February, but,
by 22 February, the Battalion had redeployed to the XUAN LOC Area where it
took part in localized attacks.

The end of the quarter finds the D440 Local Force Battalion located south
of XUAN LOC in its traditional base area. The D445 Local Force Battalion
attacked ARVN positions at BA RIA on February 22nd and withdrew to base
areas in southern BA BIEN Province where it remains located at the end of
the quarter.

(4) VC SUB-REGION 4: With the buildup of enemy forces in the
LONG BINH - BIEN HOA area in mid-February, TASK FORCE PRIVETTE (A and B
Troops, 1st Squadron) was incorporated into the BIEN HOA TACTICAL AREA
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COMMAND (BHTAC) on 23 February. On 23 February, A and B Troops, while operating south of LONG BINH encountered the heavy weapons and mortar companies of the 274th VC Regiment at T647026, resulting in 55 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 6 CIA. This contact alerted BHTAC to the northward movement of the 274th Regiment from the HAT DICH and effectively halted the further infiltration of 274th Regimental elements into the LONG BINH Area.

(5) VC SUB-REGION 1 (17 - 22 Mar 69, Operation ATLAS WEDGE): In early March, the 7th NVA Division began deploying its Regiments from the FISHHOOK Area toward the Michelin Plantation and along the SAIGON River Corridor into the CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT (CMD). When the 11th ACR entered northern SR-1 on 17 March to initiate Operation ATLAS WEDGE, little information on the enemy situation was available. In order to fill this void, the Aero Scouts of the Air Cavalry Troop began extensive reconnaissance of the assigned AO just east of the Michelin Plantation. The aircraft flew over the Michelin Plantation and drew heavy ground fire from groups of NVA sighted through the trees.

The heavy activity detected in the Michelin produced a recommendation to the 1st Infantry Division that the 11th ACR acquire an area of operation in the rubber plantation. The AO request was granted and on 18 March 1st and 3rd Squadrons began operations in the Michelin. By 22 March, the NVA forces had suffered 335 KIA (BC) and 9 PW’s. The enemy unit involved in all the engagements was the 209th (formerly the 320) NVA Regiment.

The significance of the operation was discovered through subsequent interrogation of PW’s. The operation fixed the locations of the 141st and 209th NVA Regiments and the forward headquarters of the 7th NVA Division. The 209th was rendered combat ineffective, and the 141st Regiment was forced to relocate north of the Michelin. The threat to Allied installations along the SAIGON River Corridor was diminished, and the southward movement of the 7th NVA Division toward the CMD was halted.

(6) WAR ZONE C (13 Apr - 1 May 69, Operation MONTANA RAIDER I, III): During the period 13 - 20 April, 1st and 2nd Squadrons and 1-8th Cavalry, 1st Air Cavalry Division, conducted Operation MONTANA RAIDER (Phase I) in the jungled region northwest of DAU TIENG. Heavy contacts with entrenched enemy elements produced 129 enemy KIA (BC) and 6 PW’s. Intelligence gathered during the first phase of the operation revealed that the enemy units contacted were elements of the 82nd Rear Service Group and the 16B NVA Regiment of the 1st NVA Division.

On 24 April, Operation MONTANA RAIDER (Phase III) began in eastern WAR ZONE
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C with the task organization consisting of 1st and 2nd Squadrons and 2-7th
Cavalry, 1st Air Cavalry Division. US forces were targeted at the major
rear service and trans-shipment area along the FISHHOOK – Michelin Supply
Corridor. Six large caches were located, and the enemy was deprived of
over 38.2 tons of rice and several tons of ammunition, explosives, and
weapons. Documents captured during the third phase indicated that units
encountered were elements of the 82nd and 83rd Rear Service Groups and the
Headquarters of the 96th Artillery Regiment. Enemy personnel losses during
Operation MONTANA RAIDER (Phase III) were 96 KIA (BC).

c. Major Engagements:

(1) On 3 February at XT818457, a UH-1C from the Air Cavalry Troop
received ground fire. The Aero-Rifle Platoon (ARP’s) was inserted and
made contact with an enemy element. They were reinforced by E Troop and
supported by Tac Air and light fire teams (LFT’s). The engagements pro-
duced the following results: 15 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 3 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 7
NVA PW’s, 1 VC PW, and 2 US KIA. The following equipment was also captured:
2 AK-47’s, 1 M-16, 1 Chicom IMG, 1 radio receiver, assorted small arms
ammunition, medical supplies, and explosives. PW’s captured during the
action were patients at a field hospital supporting the K4 Battalion,
DONG NAI Regiment, or members of C7, K4 Battalion.

(2) In an area north of THAI HONG Village, three separate contacts
were made with squad-size elements on 10 February. At 0825 hours, the
ARP’s engaged a small force in a base camp at TT132244, resulting in 4 VC
KIA (BC). At 1646 hours at TT128250, the Air Cavalry Troop engaged three
VC, killing 2, and at 2000 hours B/2-28th Inf engaged and killed one VC
with web gear at TT129248. Documents taken from these encounters ident-
ified local force elements of TAN UYEN District.

(3) On 14 February at 1000 hours, the Regimental command and
control (CAC) ship received ground fire from 12 VC at XT893324. Fire was
returned with 3 VC KIA (BC) resulting. At 1007 hours, the Aero Rifle
Platoon was inserted and contact was made with an unknown size enemy force.
Platoons from N Company, 3rd Squadron, and B/2-28th Inf reinforced. The
 ensuing contact resulted in two additional VC KIA and 2 VC PW’s. One of
 the prisoners was assigned to C2, K4 Battalion, DONG NAI Regiment, and the
 other was from the TAN UYEN Local Force unit.

(4) On 20 February, an ambush patrol (AP) from N Troop engaged
10 VC at XT894266. LFT and Spookies supported. The contact resulted in
8 VC KIA and 1 VC PW. The contact identified the rear service company
supporting the DONG NAI Regiment.
A and B Troops, 1st Squadron, engaged two enemy companies at XTO67026 on 23 February. Results of the engagement were 55 NVA/VC KIA (BC) and 6 VC WIA’s. Interrogation of the prisoners found that the units contacted were the heavy weapons and mortar companies of the 3rd Battalion, 274th VC Regiment.

On 25 February at XTS19419, the Aero Rifle Platoon engaged an unknown size enemy force in a base camp complex. Nine VC/NVA were killed and one WIA was taken. Also found in the camp was a cache consisting of 23 75mm RR rounds, 60 82mm mortar rounds, 3 RPG-2 rounds, and 5 bangalore torpedoes.

On 28 February, F Troop found a RF who had escaped from the VC. The RF directed F Troop to a base camp where C1, K4 Battalion, was contacted. The base camp was located at XTB30430. As the contact progressed, E Troop and H Company reinforced. The four-hour engagement resulted in 20 VC/NVA KIA and 7 WIA’s. US casualties were 1 US KIA and 3 US WIA. Several members of the LAI THIEU local force unit were also captured in a field hospital.

The Aero Scout Platoon of the Air Cavalry Troop received ground fires at XTS44427 while conducting a BDA of a B-52 strike on 4 March. The ARP’s were inserted into the area and established contact with an enemy company. Platoons from I Troop and M Company and two platoons from D/2-28th Infantry reinforced. Results of the engagement were 23 NVA/KIA and 12 WIA’s, 2 82mm mortars, assorted weapons, and one Chicom radio captured. US losses were 7 WIA. The enemy contacted was C3, K33, 96th Arty Regiment.

On 9 March, the ARP’s were inserted into an enemy base camp at XTS60430 and was engaged by an unknown size enemy force. D Company and I and K Troops reinforced. Results of the contact included 5 VC KIA and 1 VC WIA. US losses were 4 US WIA and one LOH downed.

On 14 March at XTO03773, A/2-28th Infantry engaged 15 VC who were attempting to cross the SONG BE River. The engagement resulted in 13 VC/NVA KIA and 5 AK-47’s captured. Documents taken from the bodies originated at the 174th NVA Regiment.

On 16 March, I Troop and M Company entered a large bunker complex on the eastern edge of the Michelin Rubber Plantation. The series of contacts began at 1600 hours and continued until 1800 hours. The results of the engagements are as follows:
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<tr>
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<td>XT870550</td>
<td>34 NVA KIA, 5 NVA PW's</td>
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<td>Michelin</td>
<td>36 NVA/VC KIA</td>
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The five PW's were identified as members of C18 (Anti-Aircraft Company), 209th NVA Regiment.

(12) On 20 March at XT591580, the ARP's were engaged by an estimated company size force during the BDA of a B-52 strike. LFT and Tac Air supported while L Troop and M Company reinforced. The area was swept the following morning and 70 NVA KIA (BC), 24 AK-47's, 4 AK-50's, 20 SKS's, and 10 lbs of documents were found. The units contacted were the medical and mortar sections of the 209th NVA Regiment.

(13) C Troop engaged an unknown number of VC at XT600620 on 23 March. D/2-28th Infantry reinforced. The engagement resulted in 9 VC/NVA KIA (BC).

(14) While conducting a RIF in the IRON TRIANGLE on 25 March, C Troop engaged an entrenched enemy force at XT713246. The contact resulted in 8 NVA KIA (BC) and 1 NVA PW. Equipment captured included 1 12,7mm MG, 1,200 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, and 1,500 lbs of rice. The unit contacted was probably an element of the K2 Battalion, 2727 Regiment.

(15) L Troop engaged 20-30 VC/NVA at XT912932 on 4 April. LFT and Tac Air supported. Captured equipment included 4 RPG-2 rounds, 1 Chicom claymore, 1 AK-47's, 1 RPD MG, one printing press, and 600-lbs rice, and the enemy suffered 18 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 7 VC/NVA KBA. Documents taken from the bodies identified the K1 Battalion, DONG NAI Regiment.

(16) On 13 April at XT428577, Air Cavalry Troop, reinforced by A
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Troop, D/2-12th Cavalry, and C/1-8th Cavalry, engaged an unknown size enemy force in a bunker complex. Results of the contact were 14 US KIA, 16 US WIA, 11 NVA KIA (BC), and 1 AK-47, one 60mm mortar, and 10 rounds 60mm mortar ammunition captured.

(17) On 15 April at XT247558, C Troop engaged an unknown size force. The enemy returned fire with S/A, RPG, and CS gas. Results of the contact were 2 US WIA and 13 NVA KIA (BC).

(18) On 17 April at XT255577, HWT/1/11th ACR, while moving to establish an NDP, engaged an enemy force in a base camp. C Troop and the 919th Engineer Company reinforced. The two-hour contact resulted in 1 US KIA, 6 US WIA, 29 NVA KIA (BC), and 6 enemy PW's. Three of the PW's were identified as members of the 18B NVA Regiment, and three as members of C20 (procurement company of the 82nd Rear Service Group).

(19) On 29 April at XT267922, C Troop with elements of M Company and A and D/2-7th Cavalry received small arms and RPG fire from an unknown size enemy force. Fire was returned with organic weapons, artillery, LFT, and Tac Air. Results of the engagement were 55 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 2 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 2 AK-47's, 1 LMG, 1 B-40, and miscellaneous web gear. US losses were 4 KIA and 5 WIA.

(20) On 30 April, B/2-7th Cavalry engaged an enemy force at XT278722. D/2-7th Cavalry reinforced and ARA supported. Results of the contact were 1 US KIA, 3 US WIA, and 14 VC/NVA KIA (BC).

d. Intelligence sources: During the quarter, the following sources have been exploited by the 11th ACR in its intelligence collection effort: human sources, captured documents, visual reconnaissance, electronic detectors, and aerial photography.

(1) Human Sources: Human sources include prisoners of war, ralliers, and agents. PW's and ralliers are the most useful of these sources. Information provided by these sources, if immediately exploited, can produce significant results on the battlefield. During the quarter, this information has been used to redirect ground elements into enemy positions and to select targets for air operations. With the Regiment moving frequently during the three-month period, it has often been found that PW's and ralliers are the only accurate and available sources of information on new areas of operation.

Information provided by agents has been of no tactical use to the Regiment. Agent reports are often too exaggerated, conflicting, and untimely to permit accurate assessment or tactical response.
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(2) Captured documents: Captured documents have been useful in supplying order of battle information. They are essential to identification of enemy units and gaining insight to enemy personnel, logistical, and administrative procedures. Documents, however, have rendered themselves unacceptable to tactical exploitation.

(3) Visual Reconnaissance: The air assets of the Air Cavalry Troop have been employed to maintain constant air surveillance of the jungled portions of the AO, to perform preparatory reconnaissance in new areas of operations, and to direct combat elements in contact to enemy positions. Visual reconnaissance has proved to be the most useful source of intelligence for tactical exploitation and has provided targets for airstrike, B-52 strikes, and artillery.

(4) Technical Detectors: Technical detectors include SLAR, Red Haze, Personnel Detectors (Sniffer), ground sensors, and ground radar. SLAR, Sniffer, and Red Haze have been of little use in Regimental operations. Faulty equipment and the condition of the jungle during the dry season (numerous fires caused by H&I artillery fire) have made these sources difficult to analyze. Ground sensor use was limited during the quarter, and assessment of its value is not possible. Ground radar has proved useful in a perimeter defense role.

(5) Aerial Photography: Aerial photography is less useful as a tactical tool than the visual reconnaissance capability of the Air Cavalry Troop. Aerial photography has been used to align B-52 strikes and to select landing zones for combat assaults.

e. Enemy losses during the reporting period credited to the 11th ACR:

VC/NVA KIA (EC) 754
VC/NVA KIA (POSS) 33
VC/NVA PW's 97
HOT CHANCH 13
Detainees 288
Individual Weapons Captured 453
Crew-Served Weapons Captured 29
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RCS GSP0R-65 (R)

Mines 115
Structures 113
Fortifications 2,285
Documents (Lbs) 169
Grain Captured/Destroyed (Tons) 29.3

4. (C) COMBAT OPERATIONS AND TRAINING:

e. Analysis and Evaluation:

(1) The 11th ACR applied heavy pressure on the enemy during the reporting period. The Regiment conducted reconnaissance in force, cordon and search, and night ambush patrols which uncovered base camps, numerous supply caches of ammunition and weapons, and resulted in a large number of enemy KIA's and WIA's. Combat elements of the Regiment operated in conjunction with the 1st Australian Task Force, 5th ARVN Division, 10th ARVN Division, 1st Infantry Division, 1st Air Cavalry Division, CAPITAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, and 5th Special Forces Group. Troop and squadron (-) size elements were OPCON to BHTAC for RRF missions.

b. Area of Operations: Operations this quarter were conducted within III CTZ and covered nine provinces (BIEN HOA, BINH DUONG, BINH LONG, GIA DINH, HAU NGOAIA, LONG KHANH, PHUOC LONG, PHUOC TUT, and TAY NINH).

c. Operations: Operation TOAN THANG (Phase II) began this reporting period with Regimental Headquarters located at BIEN HOA (TR024147). 1st Squadron (-) was DS to the 10th ARVN Div and continued to secure Blackhorse Base Camp (TA409560) and provide RRF for the Blackhorse TAOR. One platoon D/1/11th ACR was OPCON CKAC via TAN SON NHUT (TR581897). 2nd squadron (-) was conducting RIF and NAP operations in the LAM SON. H and G/2/11th ACR were OPCON 1ST Inf Div. D/1-28th Inf was OPCON 2nd Squadron. 4th BN, 8th ARVN Regt., was DS with one platoon M/3/11th ACR DS to the battalion. 3rd Squadron (-) was also conducting operations in the LAM SON with L/3/11th
DS to the 8th ARVN Regt. D/1-18th Inf and one platoon A/2-28th Inf were OFCON 3rd Squadron. The 2-28th Inf (-) was OFCON to the Regiment and conducted RIF and NAF operations in the CATCHERS MITT.

On 2 Feb, D/1-28th Inf was released OPCON. H/2/11th ACR was released OPCON 1st Inf Div and returned to 2nd Squadron and A/1-26th Inf (-) was placed OFCON to 2nd Squadron. On 3 Feb, C/1-18th Inf was placed OPCON 2nd Squadron. One platoon H/2/11th ACR was placed DS 4th Bn, 8th ARVN Regt, while one platoon H/3/11th ACR was released DS of the same unit and returned to 3rd Squadron. C/1-18th Inf was released OFCON 2nd Squadron on 4 Feb.

On 5 Feb, 1st and 2nd Co, 36th ARVN Bn were placed DS to 2-28th Inf. On 6 Feb, D/1/11th ACR (-) was placed OFCON to 2nd Squadron and C/2/11th ACR (-) was released OFCON 1st Inf Div and returned to 2nd Squadron. I and one platoon H/3/11th ACR were placed OPCON 2-28th Inf. On 8 Feb, one platoon H/2/11th ACR was released DS 4-8th ARVN Regt and one platoon E/2/11th ACR was placed DS to the same unit. One platoon C/2/11th ACR was released OPCON 1st Inf Div and returned to 2nd Squadron. 2-28th Inf released OPCON of I/3/11th ACR and one platoon H/3/11th ACR and released DS of 1st and 2nd Co, 36th ARVN Ranger Bn.

On 9 Feb, 2nd Squadron released from OPCON A/1-26th Inf. 3rd Squadron placed its How Btry and one platoon I/3/11th ACR under Regimental control. One platoon of H/3/11th ACR became OPCON to CHAC. On 10 Feb, B/1/11th ACR was placed OPCON to BHTAC as RRF for the BIEN HOA - LONG XUAN Area. On 11 Feb, one platoon D/1/11th ACR was released OPCON CHAC and placed OFCON 2nd Squadron. On 13 Feb, D/1/11th ACR and D/1-28th Inf was released OPCON 2nd Squadron. One platoon C/2-28th Inf was placed OPCON 2nd Squadron. On 14 Feb, A/1/11th ACR was placed OPCON BHTAC and one platoon D/1/11th ACR was released OPCON 2nd Squadron and returned to 1st Squadron. One platoon E/2/11th ACR was released DS 4-8th ARVN Regt and returned to 2nd Squadron. 4-8th ARVN Regt was released DS 2nd Squadron and placed DS 3rd Squadron.

I/3/11th ACR (-) was placed DS to 4-8th ARVN Regt on 15 Feb. On 16 Feb, D/1/11th ACR (-) and one platoon D/2-28th Inf were released OPCON 2nd Squadron and placed OPCON 2-28th Inf. On 18 Feb, B/1-18th Inf, one platoon A/2-28th Inf, and one platoon K/3/11th ACR were placed OPCON to 2nd Squadron. On 19 Feb, B/1-18th Inf was released OPCON 2nd Squadron. One platoon A/2-28th Inf was released OPCON 2nd Squadron and returned to 2nd Bn, 28th Infantry. One platoon A/1-18th Inf was placed OPCON 3rd Squadron.

On 21 Feb, one platoon C/2-28th Inf and D/1/11th ACR (-) were released OPCON
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2-28th Inf and was placed OPCON 2nd Squadron. On 22 Feb, one platoon C/2-28th Inf was released OPCON 2nd Squadron and returned to 2-28th Inf. D/1/11th ACR(-) was released OPCON 2nd Squadron and placed OPCON 3rd Squadron. L/3/11th ACR was released OPCON 2nd Squadron and returned to 3rd Squadron. K/3/11th ACR was placed OPCON BHTAC. 4-8th ARVN Regt, was released OPCON 2nd Squadron, and one platoon L/3/11th ACR was released OPCON 3rd Squadron and returned to 3rd Squadron. L/3/11th ACR(-) was released OPCON 4th BN, 8th ARVN Regt, and returned to 3rd Squadron.

On 25 Feb, D/1/11th ACR(-) was released OPCON 3rd Squadron and placed OPCON 2nd Squadron. On 26 Feb, D/1/11th ACR(-) was released OPCON 2nd Squadron and placed OPCON 3rd Squadron. One platoon D/1/11th ACR was placed OPCON BHTAC. B/2-28th Inf was released OPCON 2nd Squadron and returned to 2-28th Inf, and A, C, and D/2-28th Inf were placed OPCON 3rd Squadron. On 27 Feb, 1st Squadron(-) was placed OPCON 3rd Squadron and returned to 2-28th Inf. One platoon B/2/l1th ACR was released OPCON 1st Inf Div, and on 2 Mar, 3rd Squadron(-) was released OPCON 1st Inf Div and returned to 2nd Squadron.

On 1 Mar, 1st Squadron began moving into the LAM SON after being released OPCON 2nd Squadron. B/2-34th Armor(-) and one platoon B/2-28th Inf were placed OPCON to 2nd Squadron. One platoon E/2/11th ACR was placed OPCON to 1st Inf Div, and on 2 Mar, F/2/11th ACR was placed OPCON to 1st Inf Div. On 3 Mar, D/1/11th ACR(-) was released OPCON 2-34th Armor(-) and one platoon B/2-28th Inf was released OPCON 2nd Squadron and placed OPCON to 2-28th Inf, while one platoon G/2/11th ACR was also placed OPCON to 2-28th Inf. F/2/11th ACR was released OPCON 1st Inf Div and returned to 2nd Squadron.

On 4 Mar, 1st Squadron began moving into the LAM SON after being released OPCON BHTAC, and 2nd Squadron began moving to Blackhorse Base Camp. A/1/11th ACR was placed under Regimental control and one platoon of D and B/1/11th ACR were placed OPCON 3rd Squadron. L/3/11th ACR was placed OPCON to 2nd Squadron, and one platoon A/1-18th Inf was released OPCON 2nd Squadron. On 5 Mar, A/1/11th ACR was released OPCON to BHTAC. D/1/11th ACR and one platoon A/2-28th Inf and B/1/11th ACR were released OPCON 3rd Squadron and placed OPCON 1st Squadron. L/3/11th ACR was released OPCON 2nd Squadron and returned to 3rd Squadron, and one platoon G/2/11th ACR was released OPCON 2-28th Inf and returned to 2nd Squadron. 2nd Squadron became OPCON 18th ARVN Div and assumed the security mission for the Blackhorse TAOR, B/2-34th Armor(-) and one platoon B/2-28th Inf was released OPCON 2-28th Inf and placed OPCON 3rd Squadron, while C/2-28th Inf was released OPCON 3rd Squadron and returned to 2-28th Inf. E/2-7th Cav was placed OPCON to 2-28th Inf.

On 6 Mar, B/2-34th Armor(-) was released OPCON 3rd Squadron. One platoon E/2/11th ACR, released from OPCON 1st Inf Div, returned to 2nd Squadron. On
7 Mar, A/1/11th ACR was released OFCON BHTAC and placed OFCON CMAC, and
E/2/11th ACR was released OFCON BHTAC. K/3/11th ACR and one platoon H/3/11th
ACR were released OFCON CMAC and returned to 3rd Squadron. On 9 Mar, A/1-16th
Inf was placed OFCON 1st Squadron. On 10 Mar, F/2/11th ACR was placed OPCON
BHTAC, and on 11 Mar, one platoon C/2-28th Inf and H/2/11th ACR(-) were
placed OFCON 1st Squadron. One platoon H/2/11th ACR(-) was placed OFCON
BHTAC, and on 12 Mar was released OFCON BHTAC and placed OPCON to 1st
Squadron. On 13 Mar, H/2/11th ACR, D/1/11th ACR(-), and one platoon of
A and C/2-28th Inf were released OFCON 1st Squadron and placed OPCON
3rd Squadron. On 14 Mar one platoon D/2-28th Inf released OFCON 1st
Squadron returned to 2-28th Inf control, 2nd Squadron(-) was placed
OPCON BHTAC, and H/2/11th ACR and G/2/11th ACR were placed OPCON to
TF MAXON, which assumed responsibility for security of Blackhorse Base
Camp and RRF for the Blackhorse TAOR.

On 15 Mar, one platoon B/1/11th ACR was placed OFCON to 3rd Squadron.
On 16 Mar, D/2-28th Inf (-) was released OFCON 1st Squadron and returned
to 2-28th Inf, and C/2-28th Inf was placed OFCON to 1st Squadron. K/3/11th
ACR was placed OPCON to 2nd Squadron, and one platoon each from A, B, and
c/2-28th Inf and one platoon B/1/11th ACR were returned OFCON of parent
unit. On 17 Mar, one platoon H/2/11th ACR was released OPCON 3rd Squadron
and placed OPCON to TF MAXON. D/1/11th ACR was released OPCON 3rd
Squadron and returned to 1st Squadron, and A/1-16th Inf was released OPCON 1st
Squadron and placed OPCON to 3rd Squadron.

On 18 Mar, 1st and 3rd Squadrons deployed to the Michelin Rubber Plantation
for Operation ATLAS WEDGE. 2-28th Inf assumed responsibility for the LAM
SON. C/2-28th Inf was released OPCON 1st Squadron and was replaced by A/2-28th
Inf. A/1-5th Cav was placed OPCON 3rd Squadron, and H/3/11th ACR was released
OPCON 2nd Squadron and placed OPCON 2-28th Inf. I/3/11th ACR and one platoon
K/3/11th ACR and A/1-16th Inf were released OPCON 3rd Squadron and placed
OPCON 2-28th Inf. On 19 Mar, C/2-28th Inf was placed OPCON 1st Squadron.

On 21 Mar, H/2/11th ACR(-) was released OPCON 3rd Squadron and placed OPCON
1st Squadron. A/2-28th Inf was released OPCON 1st Squadron and placed OPCON
3rd Squadron. On 22 Mar, 1/4th Cav, C/1/11th ACR, one platoon B/1/11th ACR,
and A/1-28th Inf were placed OPCON to the Regiment, and A/2-28th Inf was
released OPCON 3rd Squadron and placed OPCON 1/4th Cav. 3rd Squadron was
released OPCON A/1-5th Cav, and L/3/11th ACR and B/2-28th Inf were released
OPCON 2-28th Inf and placed OPCON 3rd Squadron. The 3rd Squadron was re-
placed by 1/4th Cav in Operation ATLAS WEDGE and returned to the LAM SON.

On 24 Mar, F/2/11th ACR was released OPCON 3rd Squadron and placed OPCON
TF MAXON. One platoon H/3/11th ACR and L/3/11th ACR were placed DS to
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8th ARVN Regt, 1/4th Cav, C/1/11th ACR, one platoon B/1/11th ACR, A/1-28th Inf, and A/2-28th Inf were released from OPCON Regiment and were placed OPCON 1st Inf Div. On 24 Mar, the Regiment terminated Operation ATLAS WEDGE and began Operation OMEGA in the IRON TRIANGLE on 25 Mar. On 25 Mar, B/2-28th Inf was released from OPCON 1st Squadron, and F/2/11th ACR was released OPCON 2nd Squadron and placed OPCON TF MAXON. One company of 4-7th ARVN Regt and the 28th River Assault Group were placed DS 1st Squadron, and one platoon A/1-16th Inf was placed DS to the 5th ARVN Div.

On 26 Mar, E/2/11th ACR was released OPCON 2nd Squadron and placed OPCON TF MAXON, F and G/2/11th ACR were released from OPCON TF MAXON and placed OPCON 2nd Squadron. 4-7th ARVN Regt was placed DS to the Regiment. 1st Squadron moved back into the LAM SON, and the 2-28th Inf (-) was released from OPCON to the Regiment. C/2-28th Inf remained OPCON. K/3/11th ACR was released from OPCON 2-28th Inf and returned to 3rd Squadron control. 2nd Squadron was released from OPCON BHTAC and placed under Regimental control, and H/2/11th ACR(-) was released OPCON 1st Squadron and placed OPCON 3rd Squadron. F and G/2/11th ACR were placed OPCON to 1st Australian Task Force (1st ATF), and I/3/11th ACR was placed OPCON to BHTAC.

On 28 Mar, one platoon C/1/11th ACR was released OPCON 1st Squadron and placed OPCON 3rd Squadron. D/1/11th ACR(-) was placed OPCON 1st Inf Div. One platoon each from L and M/3/11th ACR were released from DS 8th ARVN Regt and returned to 3rd Squadron control. 984th LCC was placed DS to 3rd Squadron. On 29 Mar, C/1/11th ACR(-) was released from OPCON 1st Inf Div and returned to 1st Squadron. D/2-28th Inf was placed OPCON 3rd Squadron.

On 31 Mar, B/2-28th Inf was placed OPCON to 3rd Squadron. I/3/11th ACR was released BHTAC and returned to 3rd Squadron. On 2 Apr, one platoon C/1/11th ACR was released OPCON 3rd Squadron and returned to 1st Squadron. F/2/11th ACR was released OPCON 1st ATF and placed OPCON TF MAXON. E/2/11th ACR was released OPCON TF MAXON and placed OPCON 1st ATF. H/3/11th ACR was placed OPCON to 1st Inf Div. 1-18th Inf with A and C Companies OPCON was placed under Regimental control for EAGLE FLIGHT missions in the CATCHERS MITT.

On 3 Apr, A/1/11th ACR was released OPCON CIVAC and returned to 1st Squadron control. B/1/11th ACR was placed OPCON CIVAC. One platoon H/3/11th ACR was released from OPCON 1st Inf Div and returned to 3rd Squadron. The 1-18th Inf was released from OPCON Regiment. On 4 Apr, one platoon B/2/11th ACR was placed OPCON to 3rd Squadron. I/3/11th ACR(-2 pl't's) and one platoon H/3/11th ACR were placed DS to the 8th ARVN Regt. On 5 Apr, one platoon
H/2/11th ACR was released from OPCON 3rd Squadron and returned to 2nd Squadron. B/2-28th Inf and D/2-28th Inf(-) were released from OPCON 3rd Squadron and returned to OPCON 2-28th Inf, which came under Regimental control with its headquarters and recon platoon.

On 8 Apr, C/1/11th ACR was placed OPCON 1st Inf Div, and E and G/2/11th ACR were released from OPCON 1st ATF. B/2/11th ACR was placed OPCON TF ANJIER, and G/2/11th ACR returned to 2nd Squadron. I/3/11th ACR(-2) and one platoon H/3/11th ACR were released from DS to 6th ARVN Bde and returned to 3rd Squadron. On 9 Apr, C/1/11th ACR was released OPCON 1st Inf Div and returned to 1st Squadron. B/2/11th ACR was released from OPCON TF ANJIER and returned to 2nd Squadron. H/2/11th ACR(-) was released from OPCON 3rd Squadron and returned to 2nd Squadron. On 10 April, TF ANJIER replaced TF MAXCN as controlling headquarters at Blackhorse Base Camp. H/2/11th ACR was placed OPCON TF ANJIER, and D/2-28th Inf was placed OPCON 1st Squadron. On 12 Apr, C and D/2-28th Inf were released from OPCON 1st Squadron and returned to 2-28th Inf. B/1/11th ACR was released OPCON CHAC and returned to 1st Squadron control, and H/1/11th ACR was placed OPCON 3rd Squadron. H/2/11th ACR was released OPCON TF ANJIER and returned to 1st Squadron.

On 12 Apr, 1st and 2nd Squadrons and the Regimental CP also moved to DAU TIENG (X947) to begin Operation MONTANA RAIDER (Phase I). The Regiment(-) was placed OPCON 1st Cav Div (AN) and 3rd Squadron was placed OPCON 1st Inf Div. On 13 Apr, 1-8th Cav was placed under Regimental control. B/1/11th ACR was placed OPCON 2nd Squadron. C/1-8th Cav was placed OPCON 1st Squadron. A/1-8th Cav was placed OPCON 2nd Squadron. C/2/11th ACR, one platoon H/2/11th ACR, D/2-12th Cav were placed OPCON 1-8th Cav. H/3/11th ACR was placed under Regimental control and moved to DAU TIENG.

On 15 Apr, C(-), A(-), and two platoons D/1/11th ACR and B/2-7th Cav were placed OPCON to 1-8th Cav. On 16 Apr, D/1-5th Cav was placed OPCON to 1-8th Cav. On 17 Apr, B/1/11th ACR(-) was released from OPCON 2nd Squadron and returned to 1st Squadron. One platoon each from A and C/1/11th ACR with D/1/11th ACR(-2) were placed OPCON 2nd Squadron. A(-), C(-), and D/1/11th ACR(-2) were released from OPCON 1-8th Cav and returned to 1st Squadron control. C/1-5th Cav was placed OPCON 1-8th Cav.

On 20 Apr, the Regiment(-) closed into laager positions vicinity of DAU TIENG. 1st Squadron had OPCON of A, B, C, and D/1/11th ACR, H/3/11th ACR, and B/1-7th Cav. 2nd Squadron had OPCON of E, G, H, and H/2/11th ACR and A/1-8th Cav. On 22 Apr, the Regiment(-) moved from DAU TIENG to
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QUAN LOI. D/1/11th ACR was placed OPCON to 3rd Squadron and M/3/11th ACR was placed OPCON to 1st Squadron. On 25 Apr, 2-7th Cav was placed under Regimental control. On 26 Apr, C/1/11th ACR and one platoon M/3/11th ACR were released from OPCON 1st Squadron and placed OPCON 2-7th Cav. On 27 Apr, C/1/11th ACR and one platoon M/3/11th ACR were released from OPCON 2-7th Cav and returned to 1st Squadron. On 26 Apr, B and D/1-7th Cav and Recon/2-7th Cav were placed OPCON 1st Squadron. On Apr 28, C(-) and one platoon A/11th ACR and M/3/11th ACR were released from OPCON 1st Squadron and placed OPCON 2-7th Cav. On 27 Apr, C(-) and one platoon A/11th ACR and M/3/11th ACR were released from OPCON 1st Squadron and placed OPCON 2-7th Cav. One platoon from D/1/11th ACR was released from OPCON 1st Squadron and returned to 2-7th Cav. On 30 Apr, G/2/11th ACR(-2) and one platoon M/2/11th ACR were placed OPCON to 2-7th Cav.

Throughout the reporting period, one platoon of the 519th Engr Co was attached to each Squadron.

Training:

(1) Replacement training throughout the quarter prepared new replacements to assume their duties as cavalry troopers. Monthly attendance during the quarter was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>ATTENDANCE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Specialized Training:

(a) Jungle Survival School: A 1½-day survival course is conducted at Clark Air Force Base, Philippine Islands. Three aviators from the Regiment attended this course.

(b) Aircraft Maintenance: The Army Aviation Refresher Training School (AARTS), 765th Transportation Group, VAMO MAV, trained five mechanics from the Regiment and attached units during the quarter.

(c) Signal Maintenance: AN/ORC-106 Maintenance Courses were conducted by the 1st Signal Brigade, LONQ BIDN. Two individuals from the Regiment attended.

(d) AN/ORC-163 NET: An AN/ORC-163 New Equipment Training School at the US Army Training Facility, 1st Signal Brigade, LONQ BIDN, trained two personnel from the Regiment during the quarter.
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(e) Audio-Visual Courses: Five personnel from the Regiment attended the Audio-Visual Training School at the US Training Facility, 1st Signal Brigade, LONG BLOB.

(f) AN/PPS-5 Radar School: The AN/PPS-5 Operator and Organizational Maintenance Course, US Army Training Facility, 1st Signal Brigade, LONG BLOB, trained 17 personnel from the Regiment.

(g) SSB Radio Operators Course: An AN/GRC-106 SSB Radio Operators Course at US Army Training Facility, 1st Signal Brigade, LONG BLOB, trained 14 personnel from the Regiment.

5. (c) COMBAT SUPPORT:

a. Army Aviation:

(1) Organisation and Employment:

(a) Aviation Platoon, HHT/11th ACR:

1. Organisation: The Aviation Platoon consists of a command and control section with two OH-6A and two UH-1H aircraft and a transport section with six UH-1H aircraft.

2. Employment: The Aviation Platoon operates from a location near the Regimental Command Post and performs command and control, liaison, resupply, courier, and limited troop transport for the Regimental Headquarters and subordinate organic and OPOON units of the Regiment.

(b) Squadron Aviation Sections:

1. Organisation: Each of the three Squadrons has an organic aviation section consisting of two OH-6A and two UH-1D or UH-1H aircraft.

2. Employment: The aviation section operates from a location near the Squadron Command Post and performs command and control, liaison, observation and reconnaissance, limited troop transport, resupply, and emergency medical evacuation for the Squadron.

(c) Air Cavalry Troop:

1. Organisation: The Troop consists of a Troop Headquarters with two OH-1C aircraft, an Aero Scout Platoon with nine OH-6A aircraft, an Aero Rifle Platoon with six UH-1H aircraft, and an Aero Weapons Platoon with nine AH-1G aircraft.
2 Employment: The Troop operates from a forward base area in or near the Regimental Area of Operations and performs combat operations in an assigned AO or near the Regimental AO in support of subordinate organic or OPON units of the Regiment.

When operating in an assigned AO, the Troop uses the pile-on concept. First, the Aero Scouts perform visual reconnaissance. When a target is located and developed, the Aero Weapons and Aero Rifle Platoon elements are employed. A ready reaction force (RRF) is available for immediate commitment. Experience has shown that during the dry season a tank unit provides the most effective reaction force; whereas, during the rainy season infantry troops are most effective due to trafficability. During the pile-on, direction and control are transferred to Regimental control until necessary forces are built up to accomplish the mission.

When the Air Cavalry Troop supports a Squadron or OPON unit, it is generally given a mission-type order. A mission-type order allows the Troop Commander flexibility in tailoring his unit to accomplish the mission. Missions involving the Air Cavalry Troop in the AO are closely coordinated between the S-2, S-3, and Troop Commander.

The Troop is the primary intelligence gathering element of the Regiment, employing aerial research reconnaissance, ground reconnaissance, bomb damage assessments, sensor ("Sniffer") missions, night observation devices, and firefly missions. Employment of the Troop is based on intelligence or enemy contact. It can be employed to fight and destroy enemy forces as well as to develop the situation or gather intelligence information.

(2) Training: Command emphasis has been placed on orientation checkouts, in-country orientations for newly assigned aviators and quarterly proficiency checks. An intensive transition program to cross-train aviators on the OH-6A is still in effect. This program allows greater flexibility in assigning aviators within the Aero Scout Platoon of the Air Cavalry Troop.

On-the-job training was conducted by the 398th Transportation Detachment to qualify crewchiefs and improve the proficiency of mechanics. Personnel were sent to formal courses in various maintenance fields as quotas became available.

(3) Construction: Construction of a maintenance hangar is still underway at Blackhorse Base Camp. The anticipated completion date is early June 1969. Since most of the aircraft operate out of HBWM HDA to support the Regiment, extensive work has been accomplished to facilitate
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operations in the area. Continued grading and maintenance of the landing area and revetments is planned.

b. Chemical:

(1) General: The Chemical Section consisting of one officer and one enlisted man, and the 33rd Chemical Detachment consisting of one officer and four enlisted men, provided defoliation, personnel detection, CS gas, and chemical staff support to the Regiment during the reporting period. On 10 Feb 69, the 33rd Chemical Detachment was reassigned from XXIV Corps to the 11th ACR. This augmentation materially increased the chemical capabilities of the Regiment.

(2) Personnel Detection:

(a) Ten "Sniffer" missions employing the XM-2 Personnel Detector, were flown in support of 11th ACR operations. Verified "hot spots" were engaged immediately and all results forwarded through S-2/G-2 channels for complete analysis and target planning.

(b) During the latter part of April, the 33rd Chemical Detachment received the Airborne Personnel Detector (APD). Operators were trained by the New Training Team and the new system readied for use. At the end of the quarter, no missions had been flown using the APD.

(c) Due to higher priority missions for aircraft, and several mission changes for the 11th ACR, personnel detector missions were kept to a minimum. In addition, smoke from numerous fires set during the dry season caused the abortion of three missions.

(3) Defoliation Operations:

(a) No significant defoliation operations were conducted by Regimental chemical personnel during the reporting period.

(b) Nine RANCH RIND (USAF) defoliation missions, totaling 67 sorties, were flown in the CATHERS MITT during the reporting period.

(c) CS Drops: The Regiment continued its use of burning CS munitions in a reconnaissance by fire role. ABCM7-41 grenades were used extensively by C&C ships and the Air Cavalry Scouts. In addition, the Air Cavalry Troop made 14 CS drops expending 200 E-158 clusters.

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(5) Flame:

(a) "Fire-bug" missions continued to be flown frequently by the Air Cavalry Troop in an attempt to burn off terrain. A lack of sufficient incendiary grenades during March limited operations during that period.

(b) Eighty-nine hectares around the perimeter of Blackhorse Base Camp were burned off during the reporting period, using the XM45 Service Unit to spray a mixture of gasoline and diesel fuel. This proved to be an easy, acceptable method of terrain burning, while being much safer than many jury-rigged methods.

c. Signal:

(1) Command and Control Communications: The Regiment was issued four ASC-15 Airborne Command and Control Consoles in February. Two consoles were allocated to the Regimental Commander and one each to the Air Cavalry Troop and the Squadrons.

The ASC-15 Console, a configuration of avionics control and radio/transmitter equipment, replaces the ASC-11 Consols, which is now allocated as back-up equipment. The console is presently mounted in two UH-1H helicopters and provides the Commander reliable and flexible communications capability.

(2) New Equipment:

(a) AN/GRC-163 Radio Terminal: This four channel multiplex equipment was tested during Operation ATLAS WEDGE and provided communication between Blackhorse Forward at BIEN HOA and the Forward CP in LAI KHE. Further tests will be made before full implementation of this equipment.

(b) AB-864(1) Launcher Antenna: USARV C&E Test and Evaluation Branch issued the Regiment two AB-864(1) launcher antennas in March. They were issued in turn to the 1st and 3rd Squadrons for testing in a tactical environment. The new antenna is similar to the AB-577, but, as yet, has not proved to be as efficient.

(3) Signal Training: Regimental personnel attended signal training courses at the US Army Training Facility, 1st Signal Brigade, LONG BINIT, during the quarter. Statistical information follows:
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15 May 1969

COURSE

Radar Surveillance Maintenance (AN/TPS5) 14
Radar Surveillance Operator (AN/PPS5) 15
SSB Radio Operator (AN/GRC-106) 14
SSB Radio Maintenance (AN/GRC-106) 2
Audio Visual Training 5
Radio Terminal (AN/GRC-163) 2

ENG: 1st Engineer:

(1) Introduction: During the reporting period, elements of the 919th Engineer Company (Armored) participated in Operations TOAN THANG (Phases II and III), ATLAS WEDGE, TWINKLE, MONTANA RAIDER, and OMEGA, while providing direct combat engineer support to elements of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. One operator and a 30kw generator were dispatched to the SONG BE Bridge for light security in support of the 1st Infantry Division.

(2) Operations:

(a) 1st Platoon: 1st Platoon was stationed at Blackhorse Base Camp from 26 January to 4 March. During this period, the platoon conducted daily mine sweeps between Blackhorse Base Camp, XUAN LOC, and CAM HI. On 15 February, the platoon discovered a 10-lb command detonated AP mine at TS47916 and on 23 February encountered 10 mines, one of which was detonated by a Vietnamese Lambretta and resulted in 3 Vietnamese casualties. Five mines were blown in place while four were removed. These mines were 10-15 lbs of C-3 or C-4 with diesel, Chicom or Russian electric caps with slapstick detonators. Due to the neatness of the pattern, these mines were believed to have been emplaced by an NVA engineer squad. A 5-ton truck belonging to 551st LDMCO was also destroyed by a mine located at TS449999.

On 5 March, while sweeping 7,000 meters along MINE ALLAY, members of the platoon discovered a 30-lb plastic mine using pressure from the bottom as a means of detonation. When this mine was detonated, a five-foot by five-foot crater resulted.

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On 6 March, the 1st Platoon moved to FSB HOLIDAY INN in DS of 1st Squadron. They performed minesweeping operations between FSB HOLIDAY INN and FSB HARPER'S FERRY, averaging 13,000 meters of road a day with negative results. The 1st Platoon prepared ATLB launching sites at TAN UTEN and FSB HARPER'S FERRY. The AVLB launched at LUKE'S CASTLE was used to allow How/1/11th ACR to replace How/3/11th ACR at LUKE'S CASTLE. The other three bridges were used as detours to allow for repair and reinforcement of the existing permanent bridge.

On 18 March, the 1st Platoon closed out FSB LUKE'S CASTLE for members of 2-28th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division, and the platoon moved north to participate in Operations ATLAS WEDGE and OMEGA, providing direct support for the 1st Squadron. During these operations, 1st Platoon was responsible for destroying 171 bunkers and 70 fighting positions in the Michelin Rubber Plantation and the IRON TRIANGLE. On 27 March, the Platoon was ambushed while destroying a bunker complex and was able to fight their way out without casualties.

During ATLAS WEDGE and OMEGA, the 1st Platoon accompanied 1st Squadron on its missions rather than holding in an on-call status. The platoon provided security for damaged vehicles to insure the momentum of attack in "picks-up" operations. The proximity of the Engineers allowed them to do their job faster and more efficiently. The roads could be swept while the units moved into position. In addition, all bunkers encountered were destroyed immediately rather than being left behind intact.

At the conclusion of Operations OMEGA and ATLAS WEDGE, 1st Platoon moved back to FSB HOLIDAY INN to resume their minesweeping responsibilities. From 28 March to 25 April, the platoon swept an average of 17,000 meters of road daily with negative results. On 3 Apr, the WSP team was established at HARPER'S FERRY. This element supplied water to units of 1st Squadron, 28th Infantry, 4/8th ARVN Regiment, and 18th ARVN Division at the rate of 3,600 gallons a day. The excavator was a trailer-mounted 600 GPM model.

On 7 April, 1st Platoon was called upon by units of the 18th ARVN Division to breach an unmarked booby-trapped VC minefield. The following items were cleared by the platoon: 7 105mm rounds, booby-trapped; 9 60mm mortar rounds, booby-trapped; 6 82mm mortar rounds, booby-trapped; 13 hand grenades, booby-trapped; 9 AP mines; and 21 punji traps.

(b) During this reporting period, 2nd Platoon provided direct support for units of 3rd Squadron working out of NDP BANDIT HILL at TAN BINH. The platoon swept roads connecting FSB JIN, FSB OAKLAND, and BANDIT HILL.
daily. On 7 April, the platoon removed two 20-lb slapstick mines at XT801456. On 10 Apr, an ACAV of the 2nd Platoon hit a mine at XT796451, resulting in one KHA and one combat loss ACAV. Two other mines were found in the area. They were shaped charge detonated by slapstick devices. The mines were 20, 30, and 15 lbs in weight. While at BANDIT HILL, the platoon provided minesweep support, constructed a gate at BANDIT HILL, and provided security for 3rd Squadron units.

(c) 3rd Platoon: For the first part of February, 3rd Platoon was stationed at FSB JIM conducting daily minesweeps with negative results. Members of the platoon built bunkers around and provided security for the SONG BE Bridge. During March and early April, the Platoon moved to BIEN HOA and constructed five billets for members of Air Cavalry Troop.

On 12 April, the platoon moved to DAU TIEG with 2nd Squadron to participate in Operation MONTANA RAIDER. On 13 April, one 20-lb Chicom conventional mine was blown in place and a second one recovered. Three vehicles, including an AVLB, were recovered after suffering damage from mines.

The dozer attached to the 3rd Platoon pushed up 500 meters of berm and dug one powder sump and one drainage sump for 3/11th ACR. On 14 Apr, the platoon destroyed 26 bunkers and built 30 feet of corduroy road. The Engineers also swept 6,000 meters of road from XT344584 to XT390629, locating six conventional 20-lb Chicom AT mines. These mines were removed for observation and training purposes.

On 17 April, the platoon destroyed 17 8\'x10\'x5\' bunkers, 3 mess halls, and 800 lbs of rice. On 18 April, the platoon destroyed 48 bunkers, 1,200 lbs of rice, 4 B-40 rockets, and 300 rounds AK-47 ammunition. On the same day, the 1st and 3rd Squadrons and the CEB, operating alone on a RIF, uncovered a very large cache of NVA ammunition. Included and destroyed in this find were 125 82mm mortar rounds, 3 RPG-2 rounds, 3 RPG-7 rounds, 26 75mm RR rounds, 9 57mm RR rounds, 24 boxes of 82 and 60mm nose cones, 24 boxes of 82mm fuses, 27 cans of 60mm fuses, 1,000 rounds of 51-cal ammunition, 500 rounds of 3/4 ammunition, 3 62mm mortar tubes, and 20 lbs tetrytol.

(d) 4th Platoon: Throughout most of the reporting period, 4th Platoon was stationed at Blackhorse Base Camp. A daily minesweep of the road from Base Camp to XUAM LOC was carried out with negative results. During this period, the platoon performed general maintenance on the perimeter of Alpha Sector, Blackhorse Base Camp, repairing the perimeter road, reinforcing perimeter defenses, and burning vegetation around the area. The platoon constructed 20\'x70\' maintenance pads for A, B, and C/1/11th
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ACR, G, H, H-2/11th ACR, and 919th Engineers. A grader and a security ACAV from the 4th Platoon was employed in the construction of a 600x50m sniper range outside the perimeter of Base Camp. On 17 Apr, two squads of the 4th Platoon moved to QAN LOI DS 11th ACR. These squads built ten underground bunkers, a TOC area, showers, and latrines for Regimental Headquarters.

(3) Regional Force/Popular Force Upgrading and ARVN Training:
The 919th Engineers continued their upgrading of Vietnamese defense installations by releasing 300 sheets of corrugated tin roofing for the construction of maintenance pads by the National ARVN Police at XUAN LOC. They also released 18,000 sandbags, 26,000 BF 8x10 and 3,000 BF of 2x6 lumber for bunker construction. A number of village huts were also constructed by platoons while in the field.

(l) New Equipment:
1 600 CPH Grader
2 Bucket Loaders
1 250 CPM Pneumatic Tool Outfit
1 Rough Terrain Crane

6. (c) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT:

a. Logistics:

(1) General: The 29th General Support Group continued to provide logistical support to the 11th ACR during the quarter. The 551st Light Maintenance Company and the 506th Supply and Service Detachment at Blackhorse Base Camp were transferred from the 185th Maintenance Battalion to the BEAR CAT Logistical Support Area, thus splitting support for Classes I through IV between the 185th Maintenance Battalion, the 266th SM Battalion, and the BEAR CAT LSA. Class V support continued to be provided by the 3rd Ordnance Battalion in LONG BINH.

(2) Supply and Maintenance:

(a) Class I: Rations were drawn from the nearest Class I point. While conducting Operations ATLAS WEDGE, MONTANA RAIDER I, and MONTANA RAIDER II and III, rations were drawn from the 1st S& T Battalion at LAI KHU, the 25th S&T Battalion at DAU TIEU, and the 15th S&T Battalion.
at QUAN LOI. Direct coordination was made with each of these units at least three days prior to operations to ensure that adequate rations would be available. Despite prior coordination, ice became a problem in the QUAN LOI area and created some problems with food preservation.

(b) Class II and IV:

1. Barrier material and supplies were drawn from PA&E 206 Yard. Due to heavy demand, concertina was difficult to obtain during the TET period.

2. 1st Squadron, 11th ACR, drew twenty-seven M551 Sheridan Tanks in exchange for eighteen ACAV’s in January 1969. These tanks were among the first M551’s to arrive in-country, and came with factory representatives, instructors, evaluation teams, and “push packs” of repair parts. The Squadron was faced with training crews and maintenance personnel and had to establish a new FCL. The high level of interest in this vehicle also created a requirement for wide-ranging reports, and close checks of its maintenance status. The 1st Squadron Maintenance Section under Captain Todd E. Fischer adapted itself to the increased demands created by this vehicle and achieved an outstanding maintenance record.

3. The 11th ACR had a high vehicle turnover rate during the period 1 February to 30 April 1969. The primary combat vehicles are shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>MAINT/MILEAGE</th>
<th>CBT LOSS</th>
<th>FLOAT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M551</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1(0)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M68A3</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23(17)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M113A1</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>33(31)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures in parentheses show the number of vehicles lost to mines, and it is obvious that mine protection armor is a necessity, especially on the lighter M551 and M113A1.

4. Replacement vehicles were issued against both combat losses and maintenance turn-ins, but toward the close of the quarter, M113A1’s were carefully scrutinised prior to maintenance turn-in, because the closed loop pipeline was running short. For the most part, replacement vehicles were rebuilt vehicles, and, while the Squadrions would like brand-new replacements, the rebuilds have been satisfactory for the most
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In one instance, however, a replacement tank was returned to the depot because hull warp caused the engine to be misaligned and malfunction. In several cases, rebuilt M113A1's had to be completely rewired at squadron/troop level after receipt.

(c) Class III and V:

1. Class III was drawn from both the 266th SFS Battalion and BEAR CAT LSA during the quarter. On Operations ATLAS WEDGE and MONTANA RAIDER, the nearest supply and transportation battalion was used, the 1st at LAI KHE, the 25th at DANG TENG, and the 15th at QUAN LOI.

2. Class V was drawn from the 3rd Ordnance Battalion or from ASP's near the Regimental Area of Operations. During ATLAS WEDGE, the Regiment used the ASP at LAI KHE; and during MONTANA RAIDER II and III, the ASP at QUAN LOI was used. During MONTANA RAIDER I, however, the 3rd Ordnance Battalion shipped directly from LONG BINH to the 11th ACR at DANG TENG as there was no ASP in the area. Ammunition requests were submitted prior to the operation for the first three days of operation. Thereafter, it was requested as expended to maintain a three day level.

(d) Aerial Resupply:

1. The 11th ACR continued to effect maximum LLOC resupply in the LAM SON. Operations ATLAS WEDGE and MONTANA RAIDER, however, were totally resupplied by air and required 30 to 40 sorties daily. The CH-54 was used effectively during the last two days of MONTANA RAIDER III to resupply howitzer ammunition and to evacuate three inoperative M113's.

2. Blackhorse Base Camp continued to be resupplied by convoy from LONG BINH four days a week. The units continued to "free flow" organic vehicles.

(e) Maintenance:

1. The M551 brought some maintenance problems of its own with it. The two most troublesome were leaking rear seals on the recoil mechanism and rapid wear of aluminum fan belt pulleys used in the engine. Both problems were quickly identified and replacement seals and steel pulleys are in process of being installed on all vehicles.

2. In the preceding quarter, 11th ACR operations in the LAM SON were supported by a 20-25 man contact team from the 551st Light Maintenance Company. When the 551st LMCO was transferred to BEAR CAT
LSA control, most of the men and much of the equipment of the contact team was transferred to the 140th Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company, 165th Maintenance Battalion. During Operation ATLAS WEDGE, the contact team moved with the squadron trains to LAK KHE, taking an additional two S&P trailers with major assemblies. It became obvious during ATLAS WEDGE that the contact team was too small to effectively provide on-site maintenance and field maintenance in the trains areas, and that its lift capability of one wrecker was insufficient. For Operation MONTANA RAIDER, the team was increased to 36, and a VTR was added to provide heavy lift and recovery capability. The augmented contact team did an outstanding job of supporting Operation MONTANA RAIDER.

Recovery and evacuation of vehicles proved to be a difficult problem during Operation MONTANA RAIDER. Neither the Regiment nor its increased contact team had the capability to haul out retrograde vehicles. Requests had to be made to the 29th Group, and the reaction time slowed down evacuation. It took seven days to clear DAO TIENG and four to clear QUAN LOI after the 11th ACR had moved out.

b. Medical:

(1) General: The general health of the Regiment during the present reporting period continues to reflect improvement. Statistical data indicate a somewhat exaggerated decrease in all conditions, because March and April statistics are based only on initial visits for a given patient. Previously, every follow-up visit has been counted as a separate occurrence. Figures in future reports, however, should be comparable. Even allowing for this change in statistical method, there is a definite decrease in the overall Regimental rate of non-effectiveness. Continued emphasis has been placed on higher standards of sanitary discipline and control of venereal disease and malaria.

(2) Non-battle injuries reported through medical channels in the Regiment vary from abrasions and lacerations to injuries of a serious nature which require hospitalisation and evacuation out of the Republic of Vietnam. During the reporting period, total non-battle injuries averaged 156 per month, indicating a 33% decrease from the previous quarter. In addition, the number of injuries requiring hospitalisation decreased 27% from the previous period. Man-days lost as a result of non-battle injury and hospitalisation averaged 122 per month, a 43% decrease.
(3) Significant diseases diagnosed during the quarter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disease</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hepatitis</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diarrhea</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respiratory</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venereal</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dermatological</td>
<td>498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mononucleosis</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encephalitis</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Medical care facilities used during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hospital</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7th Surgical Hospital</td>
<td>LONG GIAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th Evacuation Hospital</td>
<td>LONG BINH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36th Evacuation Hospital</td>
<td>VUNG TAU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93rd Evacuation Hospital</td>
<td>LONG BINH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Field Hospital</td>
<td>LONG BINH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Convalescent Center</td>
<td>CAM RANH BAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th Evacuation Hospital</td>
<td>CU CHI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Surgical Hospital</td>
<td>LAI KHE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) A concentrated effort has been directed toward expanding the MEDCAP program in BINH DD Nh and BINH RDA Provinces.
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(a) BIDN IIIBO Province:

1. Daily outpatient care which is currently provided by the Squadron physicians will continue in BIDN II and TAN BIDN. In addition, regular bi-weekly or tri-weekly visits will be made to the village of BIDN CO. The Health Chief of PHU CMAO District has stated his intent to conduct supplemental visits to all three villages on a weekly basis.

2. Patients requiring more definitive treatment than 11th ACR medical facilities allow, will continue to be evacuated to appropriate GH or US facilities.

3. A maternity dispensary is under construction in a combined US - Vietnamese project in BIDN II. When this facility is staffed, we will continue to extend all possible technical assistance toward establishing a functioning GHW health facility. Plans are reportedly being made to include a maternity dispensary in TAN BIDN in the 1969 GHW building program. Accordingly, no US construction efforts are planned there.

4. The Health Chief of PHU CMAO District has agreed to provide a two-month rural health worker training program at his dispensary for two volunteers from BIDN II and BIDN CO. It is hoped that these trainees can then return and assist the GHW nurse in improving health standards in their communities.

5. Public health programs being planned include immunizations as well as water supply and waste disposal improvements.

(b) BIDN HIA Province:

1. Plans to undertake regular, bi-weekly medical visits to the TAN II A Orphanage to improve sanitation conditions have been established. Currently, there is a great incidence of diarrheal disease within the Orphanage which is attributable to poor sanitation.

2. Immunization programs in conjunction with health officials of DUC II District are also planned.

3. We are presently continuing the previous program of care in the CMO HIAO Hamlet near FSB CONCORD.

(b) The 37th Medical Company at Blackhorse Base Camp sends seven enlisted medical personnel and a medical repairman to the PHU LOC Province Hospital daily where they assist the Vietnamese in the emergency room.
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The 37th Medical Company is also contemplating regular MECAP visits to three villages near the Base Camp.

(7) Plans for converting Blackhorse Base Camp to a complete well water system has been approved. The four additional wells will be constructed at a rate of one well per quarter and will therefore require at least one year for completion of the project. Personnel in all three Squadrons and the 37th Medical Company have received Field Sanitation Team (FST) training. With the approach of the wet season, greater emphasis is being placed on the effective functioning of Field Sanitation Teams.

(8) Improvements on a previously initiated casualty mail system are presently being adopted. Upon reception of daily telephonic patient status reports on admissions, transfers, and final dispositions from hospitals treating 11th ACR personnel, the Regimental Surgeon's Office immediately notifies the respective postal clerks. Postal locator cards are also completed on each change in patient status.

The postal clerks are required to maintain a current ledger on hospitalized personnel, insuring that patient mail is pulled during sorting and returned to the APO to minimize delay. Patient mail is sent daily by helicopter to the 21st and 93rd Evacuation Hospitals, where the bulk of 11th ACR personnel are treated.

(9) The authenticity and meaningfulness of 11th ACR medical statistics are constantly being upgraded. The Regimental Surgeon's Office has been able to present a more realistic medical picture through closer coordination with the Medical Service Corps officers and unit medical personnel. For example, as mentioned earlier, follow-up visits previously had been counted as a separate visit for a given patient and not as initial visits. It is felt that the new method of counting reveals a clearer picture of disease prevalence and reflects a more accurate report on the health of the command.

(10) Dental: In the past, line personnel requiring dental repair had to return to Base Camp for treatment. The travel delay consequent to treatment placed a heavy personnel burden on deployed troops. To eliminate this unnecessary travel delay, the 11th ACR has adopted a policy whereby all incoming personnel are screened for salient dental repair. When this immediate dental work is completed, further treatment is precluded until the troop returns to Base Camp.
7. (FOOO) PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION:

a. General: During the quarter, the operational strength of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and its subordinate units ranged from a low of 1,455 in February to a high of 1,484 in March. At the end of the reporting period, the strength was 1,477.

b. Strength:

(1) Strength figures by month:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>ASOD</th>
<th>PDT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>1,375</td>
<td>1,520</td>
<td>1,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>1,375</td>
<td>1,458</td>
<td>1,302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>1,384</td>
<td>1,508</td>
<td>1,238</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Hospital returnees: During the quarter, 208 personnel were returned to duty after hospitalisation. This figure does not include personnel who were treated and released immediately.

(3) Casualties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>MND</th>
<th>NBW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. MOS Shortages: During the reporting period, a shortage of personnel in MOS 17K continued. The Regiment has previously been able to offset these shortages with 11-series personnel. During the latter part of this period, however, a shortage of 11-Series MOS developed as a result of an increase in casualties and a reduction in the flow of replacements. The Regiment was also short 35 personnel in MOS 11M4T at the close of this period. In addition, the Regiment continues to experience shortages in grades 25 and 85 in MOS 11H0, 11H20, 13H0, 13H20, 17H0, and 12M40. The following shortages exist by grade and MOS:
d. Replacements: The quality of replacements remained at an acceptable level. The training cycles conducted by the Replacement Training School provided a thorough orientation of personnel to their new environment. The training program gives refresher training in basic skills with emphasis placed on troop leading procedures, tactics and safety.

e. Services:

(1) Religious: During the quarter, a total of 382 religious services were conducted. 65 communions, 21 memorials, and 1 baptism were also conducted. The 382 services were divided as follows: 167 Protestant and 215 Catholic services.

(2) Red Cross:

(a) General: During the reporting period, the Red Cross Field Unit at Blackhorse Base Camp handled 617 cases. The reporting communications services totaled 544, including birth and death notifications, health and welfare reports, and verifications of emergencies for leave consideration.
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(b) Loans made for Emergency leave totalled $1,015. Total grants were $200. It should be noted that more than double this amount of loans were made at Travis Air Force Base for 11th ACR personnel on leave.

(c) A significant decrease in the amount of time required for transmission of messages to and from the Red Cross Communications Center in Washington, D.C., can be attributed to better service in the BIEN HOA Communications Center. In many instances, the drop has been from 15 to 20 hours to as little as 2 to 5 hours. The Washington Center reports handling a maximum of over 8,700 messages in one 24-hour period.

(3) Special Services:

(a) USO Shows: There have been three USO shows in the 11th ACR during the past quarter. The first was a country music show starring Jimmy Snow and his Band from Nashville, Tennessee. The second was a hand-shake tour by Sebastian Cabot. He toured the area and greeted approximately 1,000 troopers of the 11th ACR. The final show, the Melbourne Concert Party, appeared both at Blackhorse Base Camp and at the Forward Area in BIEN HOA.

(b) Movies: A movie is shown at the Special Services Amphitheater five nights a week and also movies are shown at nine different theaters at Blackhorse Base Camp five nights a week.

(c) For the first time, a full-time Special Services Officer has been authorized and assigned to the Regiment. This authorization and assignment are indicative of command emphasis on future Special Services activities.

(4) Information:

(a) General: The present Information Officer assumed his post at the beginning of the quarter, and immediately instituted changes to increase the outflow of news and photo releases as well as to insure coverage from Stateside media. Due to favorable responses from news correspondents and to a large number of highly newsworthy operations and events in the Regimental Area of Operation, news and pictorial coverage of the Regiment remained high during much of the period.

The use of the broadcast media, television in particular, has scored the greatest success in publicizing Regimental activities. ABC did several combat and feature stories on the Air Cavalry Troop during late February
and throughout March. During Operation TWINKLETOES, more than 20 newsmen were escorted to the field. All three major television networks covered this operation and Michelin counter offensive during the month of March. Coverage of the 11th ACR accounted for 184 minutes on national television, 42% of the total air time devoted to combat operations in Vietnam during that month.

During the reporting period, the Regiment received major coverage from Associated Press and United Press International as well as service and civilian publications, including Stars and Stripes, The Army Reporter, The Observer, Hurricane Magazine, and Time Magazine. The high points of this coverage were two full-page center spreads in Stars and Stripes and two stories with photos in Time Magazine.

Production of news and photo releases fell off during the reporting period due to the great amount of time spent coordinating and escorting newsmen. The Detachment maintained a high level of direct hometown news releases on members of the Regiment, with a favorable percentage of response. Production of Hometown News Releases through the Army Hometown News Center remained low. A plan for revising operation of this program has been submitted for the Commanding Officer's approval. The suggested plan would remove the responsibility for hometown news release forms from the replacement school and lodge it with the individual squadrons.

Plans for a Regimental newspaper to bolster the command information program were completed early in March. The original plan was to begin publishing in April, but due to the impending departure of the Commanding Officer, the plan was deferred and made contingent upon Colonel Laugh's approval. Manpower changes were effected with an eye toward publication of the newspaper.

During the month of March, the Information Office conducted briefings on the Sheridan Assault Vehicle for CBS, AP, and Time Magazine. A stock briefing supplemented with photos was prepared to cope with inquiries concerning the Sheridan. A directive was also circulated within the Regiment to refer all inquiries concerning the Sheridan to the Information Office.

The Information Office provided technical assistance and guidance to S-3 and S-5 on the preparation, release, and distribution of magazine articles.

The main emphasis of the information program has been to induce reporters to cover Regimental combat operations in person. The primary means of doing this is to foster friendly relations with as many correspondents as possible.
as possible and to inform them promptly when a major action occurs. The Detachment has encountered a few problems in arranging transportation in the field, but major problems with the news media have been surprisingly few.

(b) Statistical Summary:

- News Releases: 37
- Photo Releases: 114
- Hometown News Releases: 371
- Radio Hometown Interviews: 86


(5) Postal:

(a) The 7th Army Postal Unit is operating over TOE strength. Authorized strength is 1 officer and 15 enlisted men; present strength, 1 officer and 17 EM.

(b) The total value of money order sales, including fees, totalled $1,016,788.28 for the months of February, March, and April (through 25 Apr 69). The number of money orders sold was 12,838, while 845 money orders were cashed for a value of $56,140.89. The total stamp sales for the same period was $6,097.00.

(c) Breakdown of incoming and outgoing mail:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RECEIVED</th>
<th>DISPATCHED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pouches (Letter Mail)</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacks (Parcel Post, etc.)</td>
<td>4,068</td>
<td>987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside Pieces</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered Mail</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insured Mail</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>774</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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(a) During the period 1 February to 30 April 1969, airmail was received at the 7th AFU 79 days, and surface mail was received 5 days. The average transit time of air mail was 5 days; surface mail, 44 days.

(e) The parcel post, money order, and locator windows are now open from 0800-1200 and 1300-1630, seven days a week. The post office is working one 10-hour shift daily. The unit has two money order men in the field approximately five days a month to service 11th ACR personnel forward.

(f) The new unit, APO 96376, is still functioning under this command. Two men from the 7th AFU, APO 96237, operate the new unit.

(g) Two men are also attached to TAN SON NHUT Air Base. Their job consists of picking up and dispatching mail that is enroute to and from Blackhorse Base Camp by C-123 aircraft. This is done on a daily basis.

Post Exchanges:

(a) The Blackhorse PX has continued to show a decrease in sales as a result of low personnel density in Blackhorse Base Camp. The sale of soda is now being controlled and emphasis is being placed on ration cards as a result of an investigation of black-market activities in XUAN LOC.

(b) PX Statistical Summary:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sales</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Retail</td>
<td>$463,616.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>$21,891.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concessions</td>
<td>$97,838.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(f) Awards and Decorations:

(1) The following steps have been taken to insure the timely and accurate processing of award recommendations:

(a) Units have established a DEROS suspense file in order to ensure that the unit command can review the record of each member of his command in sufficient time to allow processing of awards for deserving
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personnel prior to their departure. The suspense file aims at having the commander initiate service awards between 90 and 75 days prior to the DEROS of the man being recommended.

(b) An awards and decorations log book is maintained by all units to include troops on every award forwarded to the Squadron and Regimental awards and decorations sections. Contained in the log book is the recommended individual's name, rank, unit, date forwarded to the next higher element, date of receipt of the approved award, and General Order number. This log will serve as the unit's awards suspense system.

(c) In addition to the awards log book, a file copy of the award recommendation form is maintained in the awards file and one is placed in the man's 201 file. When an award is returned approved, one copy of the orders will be stapled to the file copy of the recommendation for future reference. The orders will be annotated with the date the award was actually presented to the individual.

(d) All subordinate units furnish Regimental Awards and Decorations with a weekly Purple Heart Status Report.

(2) Statistical Summary:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AWARD</th>
<th>APPROVED</th>
<th>PENDING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CMH</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSC</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPC</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS(V)</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM(V)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACM(V)</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS(SVC)</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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AM 429 86
ACH 342 47
TOTAL 1,211 348

(3) Foreign Awards:

(a) With the increase in number of joint ARVN/US combat operations, there has been a corresponding increase in foreign decorations awarded 11th ACR personnel. Regimental Awards and Decorations Section handles all processing of foreign awards.

(b) Statistical Summary:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AWARD</th>
<th>SUBMITTED</th>
<th>APPROVED</th>
<th>PENDING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Order, 5th Class</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Distinguished Service Medal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallantry Cross with Gold Star</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallantry Cross with Silver Star</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallantry Cross with Bronze Star</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces Honor Medal, 1st Class</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces Honor Medal, 2nd Class</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armor Badge</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

g. Maintenance of Discipline and Law and Order:

(1) Courts-Martial:

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RCS CSPOR-65 (RM)

(a) Status:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TRIED</th>
<th>CONVICTIONS</th>
<th>PENDING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) The seventeen courts-martial during the quarter involved the following offenses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UCMJ ARTICLE NO.</th>
<th>NO. TIMES CHARGED</th>
<th>NO. CONVICTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>86 (AWOL)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90 (Wilfully disobeying commissioned officer)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91 (Wilfully disobeying NCO)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92 (Failure to obey order)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108 (Loss or destruction of military property)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113 (Drunk and/or sleeping on guard)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134 (Marijuana)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134 (Careless discharge of weapon)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134 (Impersonating officer)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Serious Incidents: Several incidents involving the improper and malicious use of CS gas against friendly troops occurred during the quarter. Commanders have been instructed to insure that all personnel understand that misuse of gas agents will not be tolerated.

(3) Problems: The number of "OFF LIMITS" violations by Regimental
personnel constitutes a serious disciplinary problem. Commanders have been instructed to consider the imposition of more severe penalties, including trial by court-martial, in order to reduce the occurrence of such violations.

8. (FOUO) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS:

a. General: 11th ACR psychological operations during the quarter were concentrated primarily on pacification of the hamlets in the LAM SON AO. The effort was reinforced on several occasions by cordons to find, fix, and finish the extant anti-GVN elements. More than fifty HOI CHANH defected during the reporting period to the Allied cause, but VCI remnants often remained undetected. All PSYOPS capabilities were used during the quarter, including aerial and ground loudspeaker operations, movies, television, pre-recorded tapes, slides, leaflet drops, quick reaction loudspeaker missions, poster and newspaper dissemination, and most of all, face-to-face communications to develop all-important rapport with the Vietnamese people.

b. Several operations involved leaflet and broadcast missions during the reporting period, the majority being supported and conducted by the 6th PSYOP Battalion. No positive feedback as such resulted from these operations.

c. Ralliers: There were over fifty ralliers during the reporting period. According to feedback from detainees, B-52 strikes and artillery harassment were primarily responsible for the large number of defections. Most ralliers had been exposed to PSYOP material, but stated that such materials had little effect on their decisions to rally. This view, however, is questionable.

d. The general attitude of the people in the hamlets of our AO is for the most part candidly apathetic. They want to be left alone by both VC and Allied forces, looking toward the ultimate unification of Vietnam. They desperately want a cessation of war, but are not willing to sacrifice their lives to take a positive stand either way as a community. Consequently, they continue to coexist passively with the warring factions pushing them one way or the other depending on who has the upper hand. From all outward indications, the villagers strongly resent their government and the Allied forces. Both sides do their share of pacifying and irritating the populace, but due to the fact that the VC are indigenous and related to the villagers in some way, there is obvious sympathy for the VC and VCI.

The Allied presence and their continued presentation of material objects
to villagers is just a means of buying time and results in perpetuating a feeling of inferiority among the villagers. Support for the GVN cannot be bought in this way. A more positive stand should be taken to shift responsibility for the war effort and pacification to the Vietnamese people, giving them the direct incentives of peace and involvement in their government.

e. New Techniques and Equipment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESULTS</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exc</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. (FOO0) CIVIC ACTION:

a. General: During the reporting period, there were six significant civic action projects undertaken in the Regimental AO.

(1) In the village of TAN BHNN, a school was built and the village chief's office was restored. Both projects were completed by self-help, the local villagers providing the labor force and the Regimental S-5 the materials.

(2) A market area was erected in the village of BHNN MF, a village chief's office built, and construction of a dispensary initiated. Again, the labor force was provided by the village and materials by the Regimental S-5.

(3) In the hamlet of BHNN CO, a fish pond was dug from an old French swimming pool. The work was done by the local people and US troopers from a nearby FOB. The pond will be stocked by the Provincial Agricultural Committee.

(4) In all of the above-mentioned projects, the self-help method was used. Building materials and technical assistance were provided while the village took charge of construction. In TAN BHNN, for example, the village chief organized a rotating shift whereby the villagers could spend adequate time in the field or at home and still have time to work...
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on the school. The method instills in the people a feeling of accomplishment, pride, and ownership.

b. Commodities distributed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cement (Lbs)</td>
<td>1,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paint Powder Mix (Lbs)</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber (BF)</td>
<td>6,212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food (Lbs)</td>
<td>6,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plastic Hose (Ft)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing (Lbs)</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tin (Sheets)</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concertina Wire (Sleeves)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer Stakes</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ink Pans</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paint (Gal)</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nails (Lbs)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paint Brushes</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soap, Toothpaste, etc. (Lbs)</td>
<td>425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese Flags</td>
<td>1,002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. In BINH MY, a market was erected at no cost to the S-5 or the villagers. The materials were obtained through GVN channels and the builders were the villagers of BINH MY. In TAN HINH, a brick school was built at a cost of 30,000 VN$. The materials were purchased by the S-5 and procured by province officials. The work was done almost entirely by the villagers of TAN HINH.

10. (C) BASE CAMP DEVELOPMENT:

a. Pacific Architects & Engineers, Inc., Blackhorse Base Camp, completed 198 Maintenance Service Orders (MSO's) during the period 1 Jan 69 to 31 Mar 69. Individual Job Orders (IJO's) for that period totaled 53 completed and 13 in progress for a total cost of $61,567.49.

(1) Services:

(a) Water Treatment Operations $14,916.97
(b) Generator Plant Operations $31,433.44
(c) Ice Plant Operations $6,615.15
(d) Maintenance and Repair of buildings $31,425.13
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(e) Maintenance and Repair of roads $123,762.04
(f) Maintenance and Repair of Airfields $5,700.00
(g) Refuse Collection and Disposal $22,060.64
(h) Entomology Services $7,532.17
(i) Packing and Crating $866.92

Major Projects Completed:
(a) Construction, Paint Shop
(b) Construction, 16'x20' Extension
(c) Rewiring, Mess Hall
(d) Rewiring, Electrical Distribution
(e) Installation, Apron Fence
(f) Construction, Sump
(g) Construction, Fence
(h) Replacement, Roofing
(i) Replacement, Roofing
(j) Extension, Electrical System
(k) Construction, Garbage Rack
(l) Installation, Elect. Distribution Line
(m) Construction, Burn-out Latrine
(n) Construction, Burn-out Latrine
(o) Replacement, Elect. Distribution Line
(p) Repair and Rewiring, Training School

PAEI Yard
7th Surg Hosp
HBT, 3/11th ACR
2/11th ACR
409th HBD
169th Argr Bn
Nurse Qtrs
7/8 Arty
7th Surg Hosp
551st LMOO
7/8 Arty
I, How/3/11th ACR
551st LMOO
0/2/11th ACR
B/1/11th ACR
11th ACR
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(q) Construction, Burn-out Latrine PA&E Fire Dept
(r) Construction, Airfield Control Tower 323rd ASD
(s) Application, 11*,000 Drums Penetrune Base Camp

(3) Major Projects in Progress:
(a) Rewiring, Electrical Power System Base Camp
(b) Construction, Motor Pool, Equipment Maintenance Group Shop PA&E
(c) Renovation, Living Quarters PA&E
(d) Installation, Water Line 7th Surg Hosp 37th Medical Co.

b. 919th Engineers:

(1) The following are projects completed by the 919th Engineer Company for Blackhorse Base Camp:

(a) Construction, two towers (Tower 69 for perimeter security and Radar Tower on Route 92 to KHAN LOC at Tishi3014).

(b) Completion, two maintenance buildings, 1/11th ACR and four in 2/11th ACR area.

(c) Elevation, berm around Base Camp.

(d) Re-sandbagging, positions Tower 4 through through Tower 11.

(e) Upgrading, communications in Alpha Sector.

(f) Closure, security gaps in sanitary fill with concertina wire.

(g) Construction, two culverts near water point.

(h) Bulldozer work, sniper range.
(2) The following materials were released from the S-k yard and distributed to base camp units for self-help projects:

- Nails (Lbs) 730
- Corrugated Steel (Sheets) 394
- Lumber (BF) 39,477
- M8A1 Matting (Sheets) 316
- Steel Fence Posts 220
- Concertina Wire (Sleeves) 36
- Plywood (Sheets) 473

(3) An element of the 169th Engineer Battalion has been responsible for the following projects at Blackhorse Base Camp:

1. One platoon of the 169th Engineer Battalion completed 97% of the Aircraft Maintenance Hangar which will be used by the 396th Transportation Detachment. Final completion will require laying of hard surface around the hangar.

2. At present, work being done on the Service Club is being supervised by two or three personnel from the 169th Engineer Battalion with labor being supplied by units at Base Camp. The Club is 60% complete at this time with final completion expected by approximately the end of May.
SECTION II - LESSONS LEARNED

Commander’s Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations

1. (C) LESSONS LEARNED:

   a. Personnel: None

   b. Operations:

      (1) OBSERVATION: Clearing Bunker Complexes

      EVALUATION: Dismounted troops are needed to effectively clear and destroy bunker complexes. Armored vehicles are needed to cover the dismounted troops.

      RECOMMENDATION: That infantry be used in all bunker clearing operations.

      (2) OBSERVATION: The logistical tail often wags the tactical dog.

      EVALUATION: Often tactical operations are determined by logistical support. The planning of resupply missions greatly affects the time available for combat operations.

      RECOMMENDATION: That resupply procedures be reevaluated at Squadron level. A determination as to whether a resupply request is a necessity or something "nice to have" must be made and the latter eliminated from daily resupply.

      (3) OBSERVATION: Use of the M551 in jungle operations.

      EVALUATION: The main gun of the M551 Sheridan tank is effective against both personnel and fortifications while the vehicle has the same jungle busting limitations of the ACAV. The M551 main gun is superior to the 90mm tank gun when used against bunkers and personnel. The 152mm canister round is excellent when used to open up bamboo thickets. The Sheridan, however, cannot bust jungle as well as the M48.

      RECOMMENDATION: The M48 is needed to lead the way when busting jungle, but the M551 is a powerful weapons system and complements the tank when confronting personnel and/or bunkers.
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(4) OBSERVATION: Obtaining Artillery Clearance.

EVALUATION: There is great difficulty in obtaining clearance to fire artillery. There is also a lack of fire support coordination in the Regiment. The Regiment has the equivalent of a 155 SP Arty BN but no battalion headquarters.

RECOMMENDATION: That an artillery FSOE be established at Regimental level.

(5) OBSERVATION: Area versus Zone Reconnaissance.

EVALUATION: The enemy leaves stay behind forces to cover the withdrawal of the main body when superior forces enter the area. A zone reconnaissance pushes the enemy in front of the troops. While an area reconnaissance "floods" the area and chances of gaining contact are greater.

RECOMMENDATION: Area reconnaissance should be employed over zone reconnaissance in an area-type war in the jungle.

(6) OBSERVATION: Disposition of Disabled Vehicles.

EVALUATION: In most combat operations substantial forces are tied down to security of "fixed" installations such as bridges, AVLB’s or fire support bases. Protection of these installations is a necessity. During most operations there will be a considerable number of disabled vehicles in the unit AO. The consolidation of disabled vehicles at these installations provides protection for these points while freeing fully operational vehicles for combat operations.

RECOMMENDATION: That disabled vehicles be utilized to the utmost in the security of fixed installations.

(7) OBSERVATION: Crews of Disabled Vehicles.

EVALUATION: Many times the crews of disabled vehicles are used as fillers for operational vehicles. While keeping operational vehicles fully manned, this practice lengthens the time necessary to repair the vehicle. There has been one instance in which an automotively inoperative Sheridan that was being towed played a key role in repelling an ambush on a jump CP that was moving through the jungle.

RECOMMENDATION: Crews should be kept with disabled vehicles.
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(6) OBSERVATION: Priority of Manpower Distribution on Tanks, Sheridan's, and ACAV's.

EVALUATION: Tanks are necessary to "bust jungle" and tanks need a full crew to perform effectively when leading an element through the jungle. An understrength crew on an ACAV is also not as effective as a full crew, but the superior firepower and "jungle busting" capability of the M60A1 or M68, especially the latter, make it more desirable to place a priority on manning these vehicles.

RECOMMENDATION: The priority of manning combat vehicles within the Regiment should be tanks, then Sheridans, then ACAV's.

(9) OBSERVATION: CS7 Operations in Heavy Vegetation.

EVALUATION: The CS7 crews found that defense is limited in heavy vegetation due to the frequent inability to rotate the turret. In this type of terrain, the 105-mm HE round cannot be used due to its safety radius of 750 meters.

RECOMMENDATION: That a 105-mm canister round be developed to increase self-defense capabilities of the CS7 in dense vegetation.

(10) OBSERVATION: CS7 Operations in Marshy Terrain.

EVALUATION: In marshy terrain, the CS7 cannot maneuver as well as the M-60 tank. Once the vehicle sinks enough to cause the blade to anchor in the mud, the situation is hopeless. The limited maneuverability causes problems when accompanying an M-60 tank unit.

RECOMMENDATION: When the CS7 is operated in marshy terrain allowance must be made for its limited maneuverability.

(11) OBSERVATION: The .45-cal. submachine gun.

EVALUATION: The .45-cal. submachine gun has been found to be unreliable for use on the CS7.

RECOMMENDATION: That the CS7 be provided with one M-117 and one M-77 for the gunner and loader in addition to the .45-cal. sidearm.
AVIC-WE

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 Apr 69

RCS CSFOR (R1)

(12) OBSERVATION: 15-ton Trailer.

EVALUATION: It has been found that having to haul 15-ton trailers with an ACAV prevents operation in rough terrain and lessens the efficiency of the track.

RECOMMENDATION: That one M-528 Cargo Carrier be issued to each engineer platoon to replace the cargo or ammunition trailers.

(13) OBSERVATION: Maintenance Support.

EVALUATION: During the reporting period, the majority of the 919th Engineer Company (Armored) provided combat engineer support to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. The Headquarters, Equipment, and Maintenance Support sections were left at Base Camp. This caused a large break in maintenance support and unit integrity.

RECOMMENDATION: That the Headquarters Section and the Equipment and Maintenance Section be based in a forward location easily accessible to the line elements.

c. Training: None
d. Intelligence:

(1) OBSERVATION: Base Areas in VC Sub-Region 5.

EVALUATION: During 11th ACR operations in VC Sub-Region 5, it has been found that enemy base areas are firmly established and are traditionally occupied by the same units. These base areas were found along supply/infiltration routes and are generally located near populated areas from which supplies are drawn. Experience has shown that Rome Plowing operations are the only effective means of destroying the base areas; in the past, the base areas have been reoccupied after defoliation missions and B-52 strikes. Even Rome Plow operations, however, will not permanently deny an area to the enemy. When the vegetation grows back, VC/NVA units will simply rebuild new base camps, as witnessed in the HEART SHAPED 3 (ATB023).

RECOMMENDATION: That, once established base areas are located, they be Rome Plowed, kept under constant surveillance, and eventually be replowed when new foliation appears.

CONFIDENTIAL
(2) OBSERVATION: Traditional Supply Villages.

EVALUATION: SR-5 leadership as carefully organized an effective system for securing food supplies in the LAM SCN. Through coordination with local Viet Cong, specified villages have been organized to supply rice and other food stuffs. Although some villages are used while others are not, the VC have relied on the same villages for several years and have persisted in entering these villages despite Allied occupation.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

(3) OBSERVATION: Supply/Infiltration Corridors.

EVALUATION: Supply/Infiltration corridors have been developed by the Viet Cong over a long period of time. Operations have shown that, if a route is blocked by Allied positions, another alternate route will show increased activity. The original route, however, is not abandoned, but rather is made dormant and will be reopened after the removal of Allied forces.

RECOMMENDATION: That once supply/infiltration routes are detected, constant visual reconnaissance be maintained on both active and inactive routes.

e. Logistics:

(1) OBSERVATION: Insufficient Ammunition Stockage at ASP's.

EVALUATION: ASP's in the III Corps Tactical Zone do not stock sufficient ammunition to resupply two armored cavalry squadrons in sustained operations. The 1st and 3rd Squadrons expended the entire stockage of .50-caliber armed and mini-gun ammunition at the LAI KHB ASP during the first two days of Operation ATLAS WHERE. Investigation revealed that this depletion occurred in spite of the fact that the ASP had tripled its normal three-day stockage objective for an infantry brigade and its supporting units.

RECOMMENDATION:

(a) That coordination be made with the ASP so that its stockage can be increased to handle the Regiment's requirements.

(b) That stockage levels be monitored throughout an operation to ensure that ASP personnel do not underestimate the rate of ammunition expenditure of regimental size units in contact.
AVIC-WK

15 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period
Ending 30 Apr 69

RCS CSFOR (R1)

(2) OBSERVATION: Disposable Food Containers.

EVALUATION: The disposable food container (PCN 7360-999-3860), introduced to the 11th ACR during Operation KOTANNA Raider, is a styrofoam-lined cardboard box which holds three polyethylene bags to keep food warm for serving in the field. It holds up well under normal handling and has the same capacity as the standard Har Mac insulated food container. Once it is used, it is thrown away or burned so it presents no cleaning or sanitation problems and requires no backhaul aircraft. It was first used extensively in Operation KOTANNA Raider and was enthusiastically accepted by mess personnel.

RECOMMENDATION: That all ground units, particularly those with limited air assets, requisition these items well in advance of extended field operations and in quantities sufficient to supply OPCON units.

(3) OBSERVATION: Air-droppable Water Container.

EVALUATION: The three-gallon air-droppable water container was introduced to the 11th ACR during Operation KOTANNA Raider. The container consists of a package of polyethylene tubes within tubes and can be dropped from tree-top level with little chance of breakage to troops who have no LZ. It was used to some extent by the Aero Rifle Platoon of the Air Cavalry Troop, but is of limited value to the tank and ACAV troops who can use their own LZ's.

RECOMMENDATION: That armored units use the air-droppable water container for resupplying OPCON infantry units and emergency supply.

(4) OBSERVATION: Evacuation of ACAV's with the CH-54 "Flying Crane".

EVALUATION: The CH-54 "Flying Crane" was used to evacuate three inoperative M113A1's during Operation KOTANNA Raider. To evacuate an M113A1 by CH-54, the vehicle must be towed to a secure LZ, the engine removed and the tracks taken off. This procedure necessarily takes some time and planning, but if the only alternative is to drag the vehicle over twenty miles of jungle roads with another combat vehicle, air evacuation is preferable.

RECOMMENDATION: That all mechanized units be briefed on preparation and slinging of the M113A1 for air evacuation.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 Apr 69

RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

(5) OBSERVATION: Evacuation of Damaged Vehicles.

EVALUATION: Evacuation of damaged vehicles to LONG BINH was one of the major maintenance problems of Operation MONTANA RAID®. The 11th AC3 does not have the organic capability to evacuate combat damaged vehicles. The 11th Maintenance Company Contact Team was not provided with this capability, although it did have SFP trailers to evacuate unserviceable assemblies. The 185th Maintenance Battalion provided "drag'n wagons" and lowboys for evacuation, but was required to use civilian contract trucks to complete the job after the completion of the operation.

RECOMMENDATION: That logistical support planning should include detailed provisions for extensive evacuation and should identify all assets available, convoy schedules, the availability of chocks and tie-down materials, and lift and winch capabilities.

g. Signal:

OBSERVATION: FM Radio Transmission in Highly Foliated Areas.

EVALUATION: The line of sight characteristics of FM radio transmission causes considerable signal loss when antennas are not above the tree canopy found in rubber plantations or other highly foliated areas. Regimental use of local major antenna towers (AB216), which will provide an increase in height of up to 150 feet, and employment of the AB577 mast with extension kit at Headquarters or Squadron level will increase available signal strength.

RECOMMENDATION: Use of local antenna towers (AB216) and the AB577 mast with extension kit in rubber or other highly foliated areas.

h. Medical: None.

i. Base Camp Development: None.

j. Psyops/Civic Action: None.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 Apr 69

RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

DISTRIBUTION:

3 ACSFOR, DA
2 CINC USARPAC
3 CG, USARV
1 CG, II FFV
1 CG, 9th Inf Div
2 CG, 1st Cav Div (AM)
2 CG, 1st Inf Div
1 G-3 Plans, 1st Inf Div
1 USAIS
1 USAARMS
1 USAAMS
1 Army War College
1 USAGSC
1 CO, 11th ACR
1 XO, 11th ACR
1 Staff, 11th ACR
1 CO, 1st Squadron, 11th ACR
1 CO, 2nd Squadron, 11th ACR
1 CO, 3rd Squadron, 11th ACR
1 CO, Air Cav Trp, 11th ACR
6 28th MHD, 11th ACR
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 Apr 69

INDEX OF INCLOSURES

1. Organizational Structure
2. Roster of Commanders and Key Staff Officers
3. COMPO Status of Units
4. Army Aviation Statistical Summary
5. Air Force Statistical Summary

Incls 2, 3 and 6 wd Hq, DA
This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report—Lessons Learned of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for the period ending 30 April 1969, with the following comment: The 11th ACR has initiated MTOE action to provide a 10 man Fire Support Coordination Element. As an interim measure, a Field Artillery major has joined the regiment and is assigned as the artillery staff officer. He has been supported with eight personnel from within the regiment and has organized a temporary FSCE. The grades and skills of these people are identical to those being requested in the MTOE.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

B.E. MACDONALD

Hi, A6C
Assl AG

57
AVANG-DST (15 May 69) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for
Period Ending 30 Apr 69 RCS GPOH-65 (R1)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 23 JUL 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPO-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "CEV Operations in Heavy Vegetation," section II, page 50, paragraph lb(9); concur. A canister round would increase the CEV's defensive capability in dense jungle. The 919th Engineer Company has been advised to initiate an ENSURE request for the canister round. The inability to rotate the turret, as mentioned in the ORLL, was caused by a mechanical failure in the power controls. The unit has been advised to submit an EIR, should the problem warrant such action.

b. Reference item concerning "The .45-cal submachine gun," section II, page 50, paragraph lb(11); concur. The proposed substitution of one M16 Rifle and one M79 Grenade Launcher for the submachine guns is realistic. A similar substitution has been made by MTOE in the cavalry troops of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. The unit is advised to initiate MTOE action in accordance with USARV Circular 310-44.

c. Reference item concerning "1/4 ton Trailer," section II, page 51, paragraph lb(12); concur. The unit is advised to initiate MTOE action in accordance with USARV Circular 310-44.

d. Reference item concerning "Insufficient Ammunition Stockage at ASP's," section II, page 52, paragraph lb(13); concur. The following comments are made for clarification: The allegation that ASP's in III Corps Tactical Zone do not stock sufficient ammunition to resupply two armored cavalry squadrons in sustained operations is not valid. The term ASP referred to here is used in a very broad sense, namely a place where ammunition is stockpiled. During the period covered by this ORL the Lai Khe ASP was a facility operated by divisional elements and not by ammunition personnel of 1st Logistical Command. The fact that divisional elements tripled their three day stockpile and it was consumed without resupply, indicates that
The facility was being operated beyond its capability. The 1st Logistical Command assumed operation of the Lai Khe ASP on 1 May 1969, thereby establishing it as a legitimate ASP. Supply and resupply of the Lai Khe ASP is now in the hands of the 1st Logistical Command. No further action required by this or higher headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. O. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (AI)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 13 AUG 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C. L. [Last Name]
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
Organizational Structure

11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
Air Cavalry Troop
919th Engineer Company (Armored)
506th Maintenance Battalion
506th Supply and Service Company
1st Detachment, Company B, 720th Military Police Battalion
5th Field Team, Company B, 6th PSTOP Battalion
7th Army Postal Unit
17th Public Information Detachment
25th Military History Detachment
52nd Chemical Detachment
12th Composite Support Maintenance Detachment
202nd Military Intelligence Detachment
398th Transportation Detachment
409th Radio Research Unit
51st Military Intelligence Detachment

1st Squadron

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
A Troop
B Troop
C Troop
D Company
Howitzer Battery

2nd Squadron

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
E Troop
F Troop
G Troop
H Company
Howitzer Battery

3rd Squadron

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
I Troop
K Troop
L Troop
M Company
Howitzer Battery

Attached support unit

Incl 1
### Army Aviation Statistical Summary

#### 1. Sorties Flown:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>OH-6A</th>
<th>OH-6A*</th>
<th>AH-1G</th>
<th>UH-1C</th>
<th>UH-1D</th>
<th>UH-1H</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command and Control</td>
<td>1,632</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1,243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop Lift</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>128</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cargo</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>80</td>
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<tr>
<td>Casualty Evacuation</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aerial Fire Support and Reaction Force</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>785</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>968</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1,176</td>
<td>499</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
<td>626</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>32</td>
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#### 2. Number Passengers:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Passengers</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td>560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>1,696</td>
</tr>
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<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>4,104</td>
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</table>

#### 3. Tons Cargo:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Tons Cargo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*OH-6A LOH armed with minigun*
4. Hours Flown by Aircraft:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>HOURS FLOWN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CH-6A</td>
<td>3,497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-6AA</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>1,556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td>1,411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>1,287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>2,821</td>
</tr>
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5. Results of Fire:

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VC/NVA KBA (BC)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC/NVA KBA (POSS)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures Destroyed</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures Damaged</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Ammunition Expended:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ROUNDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.62mm</td>
<td>474,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.75-in</td>
<td>8,557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40mm</td>
<td>22,055</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
# Aircraft Availability (% Operational Ready)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# Aircraft Non-Operational Ready (Supply)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>12%</td>
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</table>

# Aircraft Non-Operational Ready (Maintenance)

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<tr>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Percent of hours downtime due to supply.
2. Percent of hours downtime due to maintenance.
CONFIDENTIAL

INCLOSURE V

Air Force Statistical Summary

1. FAC and VR Sorties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>NUMBER OF SORTIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O-1</td>
<td>424</td>
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2. Tactical Air Sorties:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>NUMBER OF SORTIES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F-100</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-86</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-57</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A1E</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-37</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Ordnance:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mk-82</td>
<td>946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mk-117</td>
<td>693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAP</td>
<td>434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockets</td>
<td>12 (Pods)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBU-12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBU-24</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBU-29</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBU-49</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Incl 5

*DECOMMENCED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASIFIED AFTER 15 YEARS.
DO NOT RELEASE.*
## 4. Bomb Damage Assessment:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KBA</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBA (POSii)</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trucks Destroyed</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trucks Damaged</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trailers Destroyed</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ox Carts Destroyed</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampans Destroyed</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers Destroyed</td>
<td>735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers Damaged</td>
<td>395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers Uncovered</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting Positions Destroyed</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting Positions Uncovered</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trenchline Destroyed</td>
<td>1,830 (Meters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trenchline Uncovered</td>
<td>350 (Meters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures Destroyed</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures Damaged</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Explosions</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustained Fires</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment**

**Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations.**

CO, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

**N/A**
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