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Operational report for period ending 30 Apr 69

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Period Ending 30 April 1969 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

THRU:

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (ACSFOR), Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (C) SECTION 1. Operations; Significant Activities

a. (C) Command:

(1) (C) The United States Army Support Command, Saigon (USASUPCOM, SGN) and its subordinate commands continued combat service support operations during the eighty-nine (89) day reporting period, 1 February 1969 through 30 April 1969. The mission of the command remained unchanged, although supported strength showed an increase to a current total of approximately 240,000. COL Frank B. Case, TC, Chief of Staff departed 12 March 1969. COL John E. Murray, TC, replaced COL Donald H. Greely, Ord, as Deputy Commander on 19 April 1969. In addition, COL Murray is presently Acting Chief of Staff until an officer is assigned to assume that position.

(2) (U) Distinguished visitors to the command are listed at enclosure 1.

b. (C) Personnel, Administration, Morale and Discipline:

(1) (C) The command strength on 1 February 1969 was 868 officers, 268 warrant officers and 18,030 enlisted men (total 19,166). On 30 April 1969 the strengths were 917 officers, 265 warrant officers, and 18,764 enlisted men (total 19,946). Significant shortages of enlisted men continue to persist in vehicle drivers (64A and 64B), duty soldiers, cargo handlers and ammunition apprentices (57A, 57H, and 55A), general vehicle repairmen (63C) and pay specialists (73C). It is recognized that many of these MOSs are short world-wide.
(2) (U) On 14 April 1969 the staff responsibility and operational control of the seven (7) Army Postal Units was placed on the Adjutant General, USASUPCOM, SGN. At this time, authorization for a staff postal officer was obtained.

(3) (U) Special Services: (Inclosure 2)

(4) (U) Chaplains: During the quarter, three new projects, Street Corner, Chit Chat, and Prayer were initiated by the staff chaplains office. Street Corner provides for USASUPCOM, SGN Chaplains to conduct brief weekday services in work and activity areas. Under Chit Chat the Chaplains spend a minimum of 50% of their time with the troops. Project Prayer requires the chaplains to conduct prayer services during the week to emphasize the need for prayer individually and collectively and to seek opportunities to offer invocations at various social and command functions. In March, the first month of operation there was a 20% increase in the number of religious activities and a corresponding increase in attendance at religious services.

(5) (U) Inspector General:

(a) During the quarter, the Inspector General conducted thirty two (32) annual general inspections. Of the 32 inspected 31 units were rated satisfactory, one was rated unsatisfactory. USARPAC conducted a Special Inspection of this headquarters during the month of February and awarded a satisfactory rating.

(b) One hundred forty three (143) requests for assistance and thirty one (31) complaints were received by the Inspector General during the period with fourteen (14) complaints justified. The trend of requests for assistance was in the areas of reassignment and disciplinary problems and those of complaints were in the areas of prejudice, harassment and promotion.

(6) (U) Provost Marshal: A 525 Inspection of Saigon Port Security by the 1st Logistical Command during the period 15 - 20 January 1969, aided in the performance of operations at the port. The deficiencies noted were corrected and follow-up inspections to check corrective action have been completed.

(7) (U) Safety:

(a) In March, the Central Welfare Fund Committee approved a request for $2,500.00 for the purchase of insulated ice chests and towels to be used by line haul drivers. The driver will be given a chest filled with
ice each day prior to commencing convoy operations. The towel and cold drinks stored in the chest will provide periodic refreshment for the driver and improve his efficiency.

(b) From the beginning of the fiscal year, the number and rate of Army motor vehicle accidents in the command has shown a steady decline. At the same time, the total mileage driven by personnel of this command has shown a marked increase from 10,681,331 miles during last quarter to 12,158,810 miles during this quarter. Similarly, the number of military injuries has made a significant drop while showing an increase in the number of man days worked. The downward trend in the accident rate indicates strengthening of a mission oriented safety effort throughout the command.

c. (C) Operations:

(1) (U) There were no significant support operations planned or conducted during the quarter.

(2) (U) During the reporting period, an extensive revision was made in the organizational structure within the command in order to provide for increased effectiveness of support. Basically, all general support responsibilities were given to one general support group, all direct support to another, all watercraft under the control of the 4th Transportation Command and all task vehicles responsibilities were given to the 48th Transportation Group. This concept allows each major organization a more specialized mission and all assets available to perform this mission without regard to CTZ boundaries.

(3) (U) A comprehensive SOP concerning watercraft operations in the Delta was published during the past quarter. A team comprised of personnel from this headquarters along with a representative from the 4th Transportation Command performed an inspection of watercraft operations during this period to insure compliance with the new SOP. Of further interest in this area, a radio net was established between command elements, harbormasters, and watercraft, has been successfully tested and is in operation.

(4) (U) Coordination between this headquarters and MACV Advisory Teams continued during the quarter. A plan to provide mobile contact teams to remote areas was published and implemented. The teams were well received by advisory personnel. Liaison visits were made to ten provinces to discuss advisor support and to identify and eliminate problem areas.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Period Ending 30 April 1969

(5) (U) The Vung Tau Sub Area Command (VTSAC) was until 6 April 1969 attached to the 53d General Support Group. The Group Commander had a dual function as commander of the Group and as Commander of VTSAC. On 6 April, the 53d General Support Group relocated from Vung Tau to Long Binh. Prior to the move, TDA was initiated to make VTSAC a separate command and personnel were assigned to perform the full functions of a sub area command and installation coordinator. On the basis of a manpower utilization survey conducted in April 1968 and the recognized need of VTSAC being a separate command, a TDA was forwarded to the 1st Logistical Command on 28 April 1969.

(6) (C) Significant operation plans developed for the quarter were:

(a) OPLAN S134-69 (Operation Helping Hand) Movement of Certain Units to I or II CTZ for assistance.

(b) OPLAN S135-69 (Operation Move Out) Reconstitution of an FSA or LSA.

(c) OPLAN S136-69 (Operation Pacific) Movement of a division out of country.

(d) OPLAN S137-69 (Operation Buddy) Transitional training and operations of ARVN.

(7) (C) All contingency plans were "War Gamed" and updated as required. Plan now being developed is OPLAN S139-69 (Emergency Evacuation of Non-Combatants).

(8) (U) Ten letters of Instructions were written or updated and published during the quarter to reflect changed responsibilities under the new reorganization.

(9) (U) T-Day planning continued and all work requests for proposed projects were submitted to 1st Logistical Command. A series of briefings and meetings were conducted to plan for T-Day operations. OPLAN "Pacific" which ties in with the T-Day plan was "War Gamed", and a number of problem areas were surfaced.

(10) (C) The realignment of units throughout the command caused some relocation and reassignment. The 53d General Support Group was relocated to Long Binh from Vung Tau and received assignment of the 79th Maintenance Battalion, 64th Quartermaster Battalion and the 3d Ordnance Battalion. The 29th General Support Group assumed command of the 2d Maintenance Battalion, 91st CS Battalion and assumed the additional responsibility for Direct Support of Delta Operations.

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The 4th Transportation Command assumed command of the 159th Transportation Battalion and the responsibility of port clearance and port operation of Vung Tau, Vinh Long, Dong Tam and Binh Thuy. The realignment places port/boat operations under the 4th Transportation Command, General Support to include POL under the 53d General Support Group and all truck transportation under the 48th Transportation Group. US Army Depot, Long Binh will continue its wholesale mission as in the past. USASUPCOM, SGN Troop Command (Prov) was formed and controls those small units that were attached directly to this headquarters.

(11) (C) Increases in enemy activity prompted 1st Logistical Command to establish more strict storage criteria for drum POL products than those listed in TM 10-1101 and LC SB 700-3. Subordinate units plans to meet the criteria will be furnished to this headquarters NLT 15 May. Since Long Binh Class III is the major POL Depot in III and IV CTZ, the Director of Petroleum, this headquarters, outlined the plans for this area and submitted them to 1st Logistical Command for approval.

(12) (C) In addition to changing the requirements for storage areas, the 1st Logistical Command directed that chain link fencing be used to protect POL storage areas from RPG fire as well as from sappers. Again since Long Binh Class III is a major depot, the staff Engineer requested operational support for this fence construction and the matter is at USARV for final approval.

(13) (U) A portion of the pipeline near the perimeter bunker line on Long Binh Post has been lightly covered with dirt to reduce the possibility of perimeter personnel being injured by a fire as a result of the pipeline being hit by friendly or enemy fire.

d. (U) Organizations:

1. (U) The organizational structure of the command is reflected at inclosure 3. A troop list is at inclosure 4.

2. (U) Unit assignments, in-country activations, attachment, inactivations and reassignments are shown at inclosure 5.

e. (C) Intelligence:

1. (C) During the quarter, USASUPCOM, SGN experienced nine convoy ambushes, eight of which were minor, with only light enemy fire and one resulting in heavy damage and casualties. There were 17 vehicles damaged and 14 vehicles destroyed. Resulting casualties to personnel of this command were 1 KIA and 5 WIA. The convoy drivers reacted properly in each instance by continuing to move out of the "kill zone" while directing the
maximum amount of fire on the enemy positions. Land mines continue to hazard our convoys. The past three months have seen ten convoy vehicles strike mines wounding four personnel and causing considerable damage to organizational equipment.

(2) (C) During the reporting period there were considerable losses of POL and ammunition due to enemy attacks by fire. On 21 March, a 10,000 barrel POL tank at Vung Tau was hit by a 107mm rocket with loss of 326,000 gallons of NOGAS. Again on 26 March, the Dong Tan basecamp came under enemy attack by fire. UGASUPCOM SGN losses from this attack included five pads of ammunition, the LSA headquarters and ASP office destroyed. Casualties suffered in the attack were 2 KIA and 65 WIA. Of those injured, one was from this command.

(3) (U) Emphasis on security awareness of the units within the command continued. Close coordination has continued with USARV, and Naval intelligence agencies to insure accurate and timely intelligence to our units in III and IV CTZ. Increased attention has been given to, timely and accurate reporting of incidents, and to insuring alertness and security of the command. Personnel security clearance actions processed during the quarter totaled 693.

f. (C) Logistics:

(1) (U) Ammunition:

(a) (U) There continues to be a command shortage of Fuse, Point-Detonating (C335), 81mm HE (C256), eight (6) inch Propelling Charge (D675), 155mm Propelling Charge CB (D540), 175mm Projectile (D572), 81mm Illumination (C226), owing to increased expenditures, combat losses and HDD slippage. The posture of these items is expected to improve during next quarter FY. These are intensive management items.

(b) (U) Many irregularities were noted in the quantity of ammunition items manifested on incoming ships, and the quantities received. For almost every ship off loading at Cat Lai/Cogido, the receipts had to be reconciled. An example is the Merrel Victory which arrived at Cat Lai on 19 April 1969. There were 440 each, (C710) (4.2 inch, CS) offloaded, none were manifested; 480 more rounds of (A071) 5.56 mm Ball were offloaded than manifested; (D540) 155 mm Prop Charge was 1,481 rounds less than quantity manifested. In addition to the problem of receipts versus manifested quantities arriving on incoming ammunition vessels, there has been a problem of difference in quantities carried in transit between LB ASP and receiving ASPs. The first problem is being studied.
by the AGofS, Ammunition, 1st Logistical Command. To correct the irregularities of intransit items, a command letter was transmitted to subordinate commands for corrective actions. The letter emphasized the importance of supervision and attention to detail while issuing, transporting, securing and accounting for ammo shipments. There has been no solution yet.

(c) (U) The command ammunition stock record card (Master Deck) has been transferred from 3d Ordnance Battalion (Ammo) to the Director of Ammunition at this headquarters. The Director of Ammunition will have at hand the information needed to manage more directly the command Class V Stock. This eliminates the previous communication problems.

(d) (U) To determine the accuracy of ammunition inventory, spot inventories of selected items continued to be performed on a regular basis at Long Binh Ammunition Supply Depot. Results revealed that more emphasis must be placed on training of pad checks and inventory personnel to increase the accuracy of sub-depot reports received by stock control section.

(e) (U) Thru-put of Class V from Corido barge site has resulted in reduced ammunition lifts. During this period 7% of receipts were thru-put for a total of 10,167 STON. Continued effort is being applied in this area.

(f) (U) The retrograde of Class V items continued. Of 13,000 STON available, 11,000 STON were offered to transportation for retrograde. Of the amount offered, 9,458 STON were shipped. 2,000 STON previously offered as excess were subsequently issued because of local demands in items not having activity over extended period of time and units put in requests for issue. Inventory adjustments for excess were submitted to correct accounting.

(g) (U) Ammunition issues averaged 62,920 STON per month, with a FY high of 72,664 STON in March, while receipts averaged 55,371 STON. Loss of Class V stocks to enemy action caused no critical shortages within the command.

(h) (U) During the month of April, USAFRFORCOM SGN assumed control of Ch. Chi and Lai Khe ASP's, increasing the command stockage by 600 STON. The command now has one ammunition control depot and 11 ammunition supply points.
(a) (U) Construction of the sheet pile barge wharf at Cogido was started by Engineer Troops and was 70% complete by the end of the reporting period. Half of the wharf is in use. Completion of the wharf will permit the working of three barges, as required, rather than the working of two barges which wharf space permitted prior to the construction.

(b) (U) Vertical construction of the 6 million dollar logistical facility at Binh Thuy was started during the reporting period. Construction of troop billets was given high priority in order to move military personnel out of substandard leased facilities in Can Tho. The troop housing portion of the project is 35% complete and troops will relocate into the barracks as they become available.

(c) (U) The new Long Binh CC&S Facility was completed, with the exception of the raw water and potable water system. Two temporary pumps have been installed in the raw water line pending arrival of the permanent pumps. The capacity of the new facility will be 15,000 STON per month versus a best month output of 12,300 STON at the old facility.

(d) (U) Materials for the installation of four deep draft and five barge mooring buoys at the Cat Lai Discharge Site have arrived in sufficient quantity for the contractor to begin to place marker buoys. The state of the current deep draft buoy mooring system does not assure safe mooring of vessels during the monsoon season. The new system provides the necessary assurance. An additional buoy to anchor a fourth vessel will permit the working of three vessels while the fourth is prepared for discharge (hatch opening and removal of shoring).

(e) (U) The Saigon ISA has moved all military activities out of leased facilities in Saigon and has been consolidated at Camp Davies. Remaining to be moved are two (2) civilian contract activities (Supply and Maintenance).

(f) (U) Construction of the new headquarters for the command was started 17 January 1969 and a completion date of 1 June 1969 is anticipated.

(g) (U) The contractor has started work in Area IV, Long Binh Ammunition Supply Depot (Inclosure 6). An operational support request has been submitted to the 20th Engineer Brigade to repair certain sections of the interior roads and culverts and maintenance support has been requested from USAECAV.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Period Ending 30 April 1969 RCS CSFOR-65 (Rl) (U) (Cont.)

(h) (U) Significant R&O projects completed during the quarter were: operational lighting at the Ho Nai Rail Unloading Site in the 208 area; extension of the concrete slab for washing retrograde vehicles at the CS&S Wash Rack; a 100,000 square foot hardstand for CONEX storage at the Depot; and the installation of two commercial ovens in the Long Binh Bakery.

(i) (U) A total of 23 new Military Construction, Army (MCA) projects were requested during the reporting period, and as a result of a review of old projects, 10 were cancelled.

(3) (C) Petroleum:

(a) (U) On 28 April 1969, approximately 120,000 gallons of JP-5 were delivered to the Navy at one location. It was the largest delivery of JP-5 ever made in the Republic of Vietnam according to the records of the Navy and this command.

(b) (U) Improvement/rehabilitation of the 29th General Support Group petroleum facilities at Vung Tau has progressed slowly. Some off-site prefabrication of the new pier/jetty was begun, on-site work is scheduled to begin on/about 15 May 1969. Construction of the permanent manifold has not yet begun. A request has been initiated urging construction of the manifold on or before 30 August 1969, to coincide with the scheduled completion of the pier/jetty. Utilization of the pier/jetty for the discharge of T-2 tankers will be highly impractical due to the long discharge time and high demurrage fees that would result due to the limitations of the temporary manifold. Completion of the facilities at Vung Tau will limit the very expensive backhaul of fuel from Nha Be to Vung Tau and decrease reliance upon the Nha Be commercial terminals.

(c) (C) During the reporting period, two (2) 10,000 barrel tanks were removed from service at Vung Tau because of extensive rust damage to the bottoms of the tanks; two (2) tanks of the same size were returned to service thru self-help effort. Engineer support to repair the badly rusted tanks has been requested. On 21 March 1969, another 10,000 barrel tank of MOGAS was destroyed by enemy action. The impact on the ability of the Vung Tau Class III facility to perform its mission was negligible. The present capacity for MOGAS at Vung Tau remains 840,000 gallons, as a 10,000 barrel DF tank was switched to MOGAS. A storage capacity of 2,040,000 gallons of DF is more than adequate to meet daily and reserve requirements. A new tank has been requested.

(d) (C) Enemy destruction of three (3) 3,000 barrel tanks and a large quantity of fuel at the 9th Infantry Division Dong Tam Camp on 26 March 1969, had a temporarily significant impact on the effort required
to support that location. Within twenty-four hours after the destruction of the storage facilities, ten 10,000 gallon collapsible bags and a Y-tanker were on location. A special convoy, dispatched within hours of the incident, insured that sufficient quantities of fuel were on hand to meet immediate requirements. A 90,000 gallon Dracone was also made available to the division seventy-two hours after it was attacked. During a large portion of the time between 23 February and 25 April 1969, a 4,100 barrel barge was stationed at Dong Tam to provide the large amount of JP-4 needed by the division. Because of the reduced storage capacity, tankers had to be scheduled into Dong Tam more frequently. When they were delayed or there was insufficient ullage at Dong Tam/Vinh Long to permit their release, special convoys were scheduled. As of the close of this reporting period, most of Dong Tam's fuel storage capacity has been temporarily reconstructed or replaced.

(e) (C) After repeated requests to both of the major commercial petroleum companies, Shell has initiated a plan to transfer a large amount of bulk fuel from their terminal at Nha Be to the large military terminal at Vung Tau. Although the cost per trip is high as compared to shuttling fuel by military vessel, movement of the fuel by Shell will enable this command to fill the Vung Tau terminal to more effectively disperse III/IV CTZ bulk fuel, and to more efficiently utilize limited military petroleum vessel assets.

(f) (C) In a continuing effort to tighten petroleum accountability controls, twenty-three credit card imprinters were placed at key III and IV Corps Class III supply points. The imprinters are being used in conjunction with especially designated fuel receipt cards to authenticate fuel deliveries made by sub-contractors employed by the commercial petroleum companies. The fuel receipt cards are changed frequently at random intervals to preclude criminal elements from making a successful copy of one of the cards. A Commercial Delivery Ticket received at one of the twenty-three imprinter locations which does not have the imprint, is immediately reviewed and withdrawn for investigation. Tickets having the required imprint are further scrutinized by matching the ones presented by the commercial companies for payment against a second copy forwarded through military channels to the officer responsible for authentication. Metering devices have been ordered so that receipts into 10,000 gallon collapsible bags may be more closely monitored, and a special authentication ink is being studied by 1st Logistical Command.

(4) (FOUO) Maintenance:

(a) (U) On 19 February 1969, this command was directed to perform a technical inspection of 100% of the TOE equipment of the 6th Battalion, 77th Artillery, and to repair to Condition Reservation Code I.
or B as much of this equipment as possible as part of an operation to turn the equipment over to ARVN. Advance notification had permitted a preliminary inspection of wheel vehicles to be completed on 12 February 1969. Although this inspection was not in sufficient detail to make an accurate parts determination, it was in enough detail to judge the overall condition of the equipment and provide the base for a shopping list of repair parts to be obtained from cannibalization and fabrication.

(b) (FOUO) The 100% technical inspection was actually initiated on 18 February 1969, utilizing a composite 20 man contact team of personnel from the Headquarters and Main Support Company, 2d Maintenance Battalion (DS), the 51st Light Equipment Maintenance Company (DS), and the 238th Maintenance Company (DS) (DIV). Equipment of the 6/77th was inspected on-site in order to maintain operational capability of the firing batteries. This project (Switch) was identified early as a much greater problem in the area of supply than in maintenance due to the fact that a large portion (about 50%) of the equipment was beyond repair. This detailed inspection of all equipment was completed 25 February 1969.

(c) (FOUO) All DA Forms 2404 were reviewed by this headquarters to determine if the item of equipment could be repaired within the time frames imposed. A listing of repairable equipment was furnished the 6/77th on 27 February 1969. Concurrently, repair parts were requested and processed through the US Army Depot, Long Binh by Materiel Readiness Expeditors from the 53d General Support Group. An initial fill rate of approximately 80% was obtained by screening depot assets. Lateral supply actions with all technical supply activities within USASUPCOM, SGN, and the Cannibalization Point. The remaining requisitions were passed to the Inventory Control Center, Vietnam for referral to other in-country and CONUS sources. Only 17 of 211 requisitions passed have been filled to date and prospects for early satisfaction of demands are dim.

(d) (FOUO) Expeditious delivery of repair parts to the location at CAN THO posed serious problems until the 6/77th made arrangements with IV Corps Headquarters to provide air transportation on call. This dedicated air transportation, greatly assisted delivery of required repair parts within time frames. All required maintenance actions were accomplished on 24 April 1969 and the entire battalion transferred to ARVN on 26 April 1969.

(e) (FOUO) The MHS deadline reached a peak of 24.8% during April. This is a reduction of 4% from the previous quarter and efforts continue to reduce the deadline rate to the level of 15% or below. The main pro-
Problems continue to be the lack of repair parts in the supply system, lack of operating maintenance and a lack of supervision of MHE operations.

In order to reduce the deadline rate, the program to identify and retrograde DOGS was continued, and an intensive program for training of both operators and supervisors has been initiated and has proven successful thus far. A "DOG" is defined as items of equipment that takes an excessive amount of maintenance effort to maintain in operable condition. The failure rate and subsequent non-operational time of multifuel engines continued to be a problem. Factors contributing to this failure rate are the complexity of maintenance actions, requirements for additional operator training and the requirement for filtering sand and other particles from all fuel and air. Operating units still do not have, or are not using, diagnostic test equipment to completely inspect incoming work. In spite of repeated training sessions, army operators do not understand the RPM driving ranges best suited for the various conditions to be found in RVN. Driver training and education continues.

(c) (U) Effort continues to identify aged and worn out equipment which is difficult to maintain and requires more effort than it is worth. All equipment thus identified (DOGS) is reported for replacement planning purposes. If the item is supported under the Closed Loop Support Program, an attempt is made to retrograde the item of equipment. This program is helping to reduce the maintenance backlog and, if replacement is available, will upgrade the overall condition of equipment supported by the command.

(g) (U) During this past quarter, information was received that 85% of the 90 electronic organs used by the Chaplains in the III and IV Corps Tactical Zone were inoperative. An immediate survey confirmed this. At that time, there were no organizations designated for maintenance of this equipment. This situation was remedied and each Chaplain in III and IV Corps Tactical Zone was notified by personal letter who his support unit was and where it was located. The deadline of electronic organs is now practically non-existent.

(h) (U) A study of the general support maintenance program pertaining to communications electronic (C-E) equipment revealed a definite need for specific guidelines on the evacuation of unserviceable repairable equipment. Procedures were developed and distributed to supported and supporting units on 13 February 1969. These procedures specify that all C-E equipment, regardless of classification, will be evacuated to the General Support Maintenance Facility for disposition determination, i.e., retrograde, salvage, repair, and return. The only exception being that equipment for which specific disposition instruction have been issued such as Closed Loop Project Items. Once the GSU has received the equipment it will make maximum utilization of
operational equipment and/or repair and return programs in removing 
equipment from deadline. Serviceable equipment in the GSU serviceable 
account is first issued to DSUs to fill their authorized maintenance 
float levels. All remaining equipment is returned to depot stocks. To 
properly monitor and evaluate the program, a bi-monthly report has been 
established. However, due to the large quantity of components involved 
and the establishing of accounting procedures, the full impact of the 
program cannot be determined for at least another 30 days.

5) (U) Supply:

(a) (U) During this period the situation on five (5) ton tractor 
shortages in the command greatly improved; a total of 286 were issued to 
USASUPCOM, SGN units. At the present time there is a shortage of 87 
five (5) ton tractors in the command. Forklifts and 20 ton cranes con-
tinued to be in short supply. Presently there is a shortage of 388 of 
all types forklifts and a shortage of 37, 20 ton cranes.

(b) (U) Deprocessing and issue of the M551 Sheridans received dur-
ing Phase I of Project JCN was accomplished ahead of the projected sche-
dule. The intensive management of this new item and its repair parts 
was found to be highly successful. The method of regulated storage and 
separate stock control instituted by the Depot proved to be an efficient 
method of insuring the availability and immediate issue of needed support 
items.

(c) (U) A Depot operations branch was established within the 
Directorate of Supply to provide accurate and timely statistical data 
to the Commanding General on the overall operation of the US Army 
Depot - Long Binh.

(d) (U) During this quarter, a stringent program to eliminate 
excess in Vietnam was initiated by USARV. The concept of this program 
involved the concerted efforts to collect, identify, classify and 
accomplish immediate evacuation of excess supplies. This command 
supported the program by providing a highly knowledgeable repre-
sentative to accompany the USARV team during inspections of the divisional 
units for excesses.

(e) (U) Two units of this command (490th GS Co and 185th Mainl Bn) 
were "Stripped" of their excesses. Copies of the excess items were 
forwarded to the Inventory Control Center to obtain disposition in-
struction for the reporting unit within ten days. Experience has 
shown that this program was useful to the direct support units who 
sometimes unknowingly become burdened with excess items.
Continued emphasis was placed upon the Direct Support Units to provide maximum logistical support to the supported units. The realization of an 80% fill by the Self Service Supply Centers did not materialize due primarily to numerous zero balances at the beginning of the period. As of 30 April, 119 items were at zero balance with the percent of fill having improved from 33% to 49%.

To satisfy the surge of requirements initiated by the combat units in III and IV Corps during TET, daily telephonic contacts were established between the Director of Supply and the supported combat units. Information and data were received concerning the immediate as well as long range requirements for supply Classes I, II, IV, VII, and IX. As new requirements were identified, close coordination was effected with the various activities within this command to provide maximum supply support to the combat personnel. The total supply effectiveness of the command was increased and the logistical system strengthened.

On 23 February 1969, USARV assumed full responsibility for the release of cantonment mess equipment. The release of cantonment mess equipment had previously been a responsibility of the support commands.

During the months of March and April, five more USASUPCOM, SGN Class I Points were placed on a seven day requisitioning cycle for non-perishable rations. The shortened requisitioning cycle (previously fourteen days) enables the seven (7) Class I Points in the III CTZ to requisition smaller quantities more often. The system increases the paperwork load at the depot but provides for a faster rotation of supplies at the Class I Point.

The Director of Supply has received aRecordak machine and army master date file tapes. This piece of equipment has saved considerable time in researching Federal Stock Numbers, prices and item nomenclatures.

Plans were formulated to move the Special Services Depot from Saigon to the Long Binh Depot. It is planned that Federal Stock Numbered items will be stocked at each of the supporting Direct Support Units. Non standard numbered items will be requisitioned through the supporting Direct Support Unit directly to the USA Depot Long Binh.

New five (5) ton Diesel tractors are being issued to the line haul units in an effort to have each unit maintain one type of vehicle. Concurrently, the older multi-fuel tractors are being laterally transferred to non-line haul units. Maintenance problems should decrease with the unit having to maintain only one type.
AVCA SGN GO S

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Period Ending 30 April 1969 RGSPOR-65 (R1) (U)

(6) (U) Retrograde and Disposals:

(a) (U) Repairables evacuated during the period totaled 33,515 STON, of which 217 STON was shipped by air and 33,298 STON by surface transportation. This was a 7,276 STON increase over the last reporting period.

(b) (U) 15,920 STON of Depot Excess and Station Returns were evacuated during the period, an increase of 1,358 STON over the last quarter.

(c) (U) In the area of Property Disposal operations, 12,790 STON were generated while 15,407 STON were disposed of by sale or issue. On 30 April 1969, a total of 17,052 STON was on hand.

(7) (U) Others:

(1) (U) Comptrollers:

(a) (U) Sixteen (16) Sundry Funds were audited this quarter with major deficiencies being erroneous bookkeeping procedures, lack of inventory control and surplus cash on hand. Three (3) Visibility Center Funds were audited with major deficiencies as TST bonuses improperly paid and lack of workmen's compensation insurance. This audit program has greatly improved the control over the funds.

(b) (U) GAO review of Inventory Control procedures began on 22 February. An Entrance Conference for reviews on movement control of cargo in Sea Land Service, Inc. containers and on Transportation of Ammunition were held on 5 March and the review on Reefer Vessels on South East Asia started on 28 January. These reviews primarily concern Vung Tau and Saigon Port.

(c) (U) A USARV Internal Review of Port Operations began 19 February and gave attention to report of audit No. PH 67-69: Requisitioning, Processing and Related Flow of Material. The team visited Saigon/Newport, Vung Tau and Can Tho. Internal Review of Maintenance Activities and of Excess Programs both were completed and Exit conferences were held in February. The USARV Internal Review of Management of Subsistence report was received and the reply prepared.

(d) (U) The loss of five (5) funds were reported by the finance section during the quarter with all but one caused by Class A Agent Officers. Total losses were $5,619.00. The movements of both the 7th and 292d Finance Sections were postponed because of a lack of facilities at the proposed locations. The headquarters element of the entire 8th Finance Section will relocate to the MACV annex building at Ton Son Nhut AB when facilities become available.

(15)
SUBJECT: Operational Report – Lessons Learned for Period Ending 30 April 1969 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U) (Cont.)

(a) (U) A Contract Performance Review Board has been established at this headquarters. It will be the purpose of this board to review all existing contracts at least once every fiscal year. This board has met several times during the quarter to review contracts and USASUPCOM, SGN Memo 715-1 has been published in order to provide guidance in this area.

(f) (U) Cost Reduction Officers have been designated at all headquarters, battalion, and group levels. These officers will search out possible cost reduction actions and report them to this headquarters. Presently $6.5 million has been validated as cost savings in FY69. This command presently has several additional programs underway for possible validation under the Cost Reduction Program.

(2) (U) Communications: It was determined in the latter part of 1968 that boat communications in the Mekong Delta via SRC-32 AM Radio was unsatisfactory. Range was not satisfactory and SGN boats could not provide sufficient power. GRA-4 antennas were tested under 1968 with no appreciable improvement. A system utilizing TRC-12 series FM radios was designed, integrating a retransmission concept. During this quarter, the equipment was requisitioned, received and petitioned. On 25 March 1969 the system was reported operational and tests conducted by representatives of USASUPCOM, SGN, 1st Logistical Command and USARV proved that the system was operational and reliable. Operations during the monsoon season will determine the year-around operability of the system.

(3) (U) Public Informations:

(a) (U) A total of 3,768 releases were generated by this headquarters during the reporting period. Type and number by month are shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>Feb.</th>
<th>Mar.</th>
<th>Apr.</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>43</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
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<td>1217</td>
<td>1166</td>
<td>3768</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) (U) The Spring Edition of the quality magazine Hi-Lite was distributed within the command. Preparation began on the Summer Edition, which should be ready for distribution in August 1969. Publication of four unit newspapers continued during the period.
(4) (C) Training:

(a) (C) Project "BUDDY" was implemented at this headquarters on 1 April 1969. The purpose of this project is on-the-job training of ARVN logistical personnel to insure their readiness to assume certain responsibilities connected with T-Day and MACV RVNAF improvement and modernization program. The plan was implemented initially on a small scale basis with 26 ARVN personnel being trained in Marine and boat operations. Future plans are to expand the area of training in other logistical areas in July 1969. Close coordination is maintained with 1st Logistical Command and MACV Advisers in obtaining ARVN personnel for the training program and to discuss, identify, and eliminate problem areas.

(b) (U) Project Skills I: The program was implemented on 15 February 1969 and is separated into three parts.

1. (U) Project Skills I Alpha: This program begins at the 1st Logistical Command and is implemented down through battalion level. A detailed monthly orientation and indoctrination of all O-6s, DACs of equivalent grade, O-5s assigned to duties as battalion commanders or as principal support command staff officers, and SJPDM Command Sergeants Major is conducted at 1st Logistical Command Headquarters. A similar program of indoctrination and orientation is conducted by all subordinate units down through battalion level. Key personnel at a higher headquarters will orient and indoctrinate subordinate counterparts to enable newly arrived key personnel to have a working knowledge of command operations and policies.

2. (U) Project Skills I Brave: Entails formal courses of instruction or schools conducted down to company level.

3. (U) Project Skills I Charlie: A command wide formal on-the-job training program at each echelon of command.

4. (U) As of 30 April 1969 two reports have been submitted for program. The results show that 216 key personnel have been oriented and indoctrinated, 1,064 personnel have received training through schools of courses of instruction and 241 personnel have completed formal on-the-job training.
2. (U) SECTION 2 LESSONS LEARNED: Commander's Observations, Evaluation and Recommendation.

a. (U) PERSONNELS

(1) (U) ITEM: Data Processing Master File.

OBSERVATION: The data contained in the Data Processing Master File at the Personnel Services Center (PSC) and the USARV Data Services Center was extremely inaccurate. This was caused primarily by the lack of systems to insure that the manual flow of information actually reached the computer.

EVALUATION: The management reports furnished by the data processing activity were so inaccurate that they were totally unreliable as of 31 January 1969. The information at the Data Processing Master File at the Support Command Personnel Services Center appeared to be even more inaccurate. A review of the procedures indicated that the rosters which were required to be verified were in fact being verified, though not too accurately, but for some reason were not resulting in changes being fed into the Data Processing Master File. Those changes that did reach the Data Processing Master File were forwarded to the Data Services Center but were rejected because the unchanged data did not agree with what was in the Data Master File. However, rejected changes were not fully controlled at the PSC, and as a result, many were never returned, thereby creating greater discrepancies between PSC and USARV. To resolve this problem, manual systems were developed which placed additional responsibilities on data processing personnel to establish controls and suspenses to insure that all data returned to the Personnel Division for correction was in fact re-submitted after correction and was properly forwarded to the Data Services Center. As a result, the accuracy of the data from this PSC and the USARV has improved and will within the next two months result in an acceptable error rate of less than five (5) percent.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that the Data Services Center, USARV, evaluate the manual systems currently in use in all Personnel Service Centers specifically looking for controls which will insure the smooth flow of data and conduct a seminar for all Chiefs of Personnel Service Centers and Adjutants General.

(2) (U) ITEM: Emergency Data; Notification of Next of Kin, Department of Army Civilians.

OBSERVATION: That Emergency Data maintained at the Civilian Personnel Office does not cover instructions in case of hospitalization of DAC employees.

EVALUATION: Under the present system of Emergency Data as pertains
to DACs employed in-country, a supervisor does not know if the DAC would wish that his next of kin be notified in the event of hospitalization due to sickness or wounds received due to enemy action.

RECOMMENDATION: That Emergency Data, kept by Civilian Personnel office, be annotated as to the wishes of the Department of Army Civilian in notification of next of kin in case of hospitalization.

b. (U) Training: None

c. (U) Intelligence: None

d. (U) Operations:

(1) (U) ITEM: Establishment of an Operations Control Center

OBSERVATION: Due to increased enemy activity directed against logistical installations in III and IV CTZs, this headquarters instituted an Operations Control Center (OCC) manned by representatives of ACoS, S&O, Directors of Supply, POL, Ammunition and Transportation. The OCC is manned during non-duty hours to insure continuity of logistical support when critical supplies or equipment are lost as a result of hostile action. Under the overall coordination of the representative of ACoS, S&O, each representative takes necessary action within his field to effect redistribution or replacement of supplies destroyed by hostile action.

EVALUATION: This concept has been utilized several times and has proven worthwhile. This concept was evaluated in an actual emergency situation. When the Dong Tam ASP was partially destroyed and several critical items of equipment lost as a result of enemy action, the OCC immediately established direct contact with the 9th Infantry Division. By proper utilization of the available management data and the prompt action of the Supply and Ammo duty officers who were called in, the situation was handled quickly and decisively. This incident underscored the value of having critical management data and key staff representatives in one central location thereby reducing duplication of effort and conflicting instructions to subordinate commands. This gives the customer a single point of contact to get all required actions thus saving him time and communications.

RECOMMENDATION: That all support commands establish and man operations control centers during periods of increased enemy activity.

(19)
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Period Ending 30 April 1969 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U) (Cont.)

e. (U) Logistics

(1) (U) Petroleums:

(a) (U) ITEM: Insufficient Fuel at the Commercial Fuel Terminals at Nha Be and Can Tho.

OBSERVATION: The level of fuel maintained by the commercial companies at Can Tho was barely adequate; quantities on hand averaged only 34% of capacity. During the later part of April, fuel levels at Nha Be dropped to unsatisfactory levels.

EVALUATION: There is no penalty clause in the commercial contracts in the event a scheduled tanker is delayed in arriving at Nha Be or Can Tho, although the military is forced to pay a demurrage fee for any commercial ships that are delayed due to insufficient ullage or pipeline failure.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that the time commercial companies are out of fuel at Nha Be be balanced against that time charged as demurrage in all other military terminals in Vietnam. This balance for demurrage and time-out-of-fuel can be negotiated in new contracts, or as amendments to existing contracts. Separate correspondence was forwarded to 1st Logistical Command on 19 February and 29 April 1969.

(b) (U) ITEM: Performance of Contract Tug/Barge.

OBSERVATION: On 9 December 1968, a contract tug/barge was obtained to supplement this command's barge/tanker assets. The Army Procurement Agency awarded the contract to a low bidder, who appeared to meet all terms of the contract. The company, however, had a record of default on previous US contracts. On 15 March 1969, a complete record of the company's failures were forwarded to USAPAV. USAPAV has stated that termination action would require considerable time and that they do not contemplate any action at this time, but that the contract failures are a matter of record and will be considered when FY 70 contracts are granted.

EVALUATION: That once a contract is granted, it is extremely difficult to terminate it, even if there are sufficient grounds to terminate for cause.

RECOMMENDATION: That low bids not be the final factor in determining the contractor when one is available that has successfully performed over a long period of time. In the same light the award should be very carefully considered if the low bidder is known to have previously defaulted on US contracts.

(2) (U) Engineer:
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Period Ending 30 April 1969 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U) (Cont.)

(a) (U) ITEM: Inadequate R&U Support.

OBSERVATION: The inability of local R&U activities to render responsive support in the area of "new work" serves to encourage unauthorized construction. Tight funds and shop backlogs result in inadequate and untimely response to the needs of units. The problem is frustrating to the point that many units have lost all faith in the R&U activity and resort to unauthorized construction.

EVALUATION: Unless the capability of R&U activities to respond to the needs of tenant units is upgraded, illegal procurement of materials and unauthorized construction will continue to be a problem.

RECOMMENDATION: That the manning level of skilled personnel authorized for R&U activities be increased and that additional money be allocated for performing the mission for which organized.

(3) (U) Retrograde and Disposal:

(a) (U) ITEM: CC&S Activity

OBSERVATION:

(1) Operations, and therefore tonnage output figures, have been improved immensely, due to revised methods of material handling and improvement of facilities.

(2) The enlargement of the wash rack and the receipt of two hydrojet cleaners has increased the output of the wash rack. At the present time the reduction of the backlog at the wash rack is now keeping pace with the turn-in of vehicles.

(3) The new CC&S area has been taken over by the CC&S Activity. At the present time they are in the process of moving their facilities to the new area. Both the old and new facilities will have to be used for a period of time until the present assets can be shipped from the old area.

EVALUATION: Presently the CC&S Activity has substantially reduced its end item inventory through hard work at the wash rack. The main problem area at the present time is the retrograde of components. The CC&S Activity's move to its new area is slowing their output due to the manpower diversion for use in the move. The move is scheduled to be completed the first week of May with the exception of the disassembly personnel who will remain in place until the old disassembly yards are clear. Every possible effort has been made to obtain additional MHE for use at the CC&S Activity but the equipment is not available for issue.
AVCA SGN GO S

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Period Ending 30 April 1969 RCS CSFOR-65 (RL) (U) (Cont.)

RECOMMENDATION: With increased emphasis being placed on the retrograde of components it is imperative that the authorized MHE and crane equipment be obtained so the CC&S Activity can retrograde the critical components with a minimum effort.

(b) (U) ITEM: Retrograde of Depot Excess.

OBSERVATION: USASUPCOM, SGN has continued to have trouble meeting excess tonnage goals. One of the primary causes is the low priority of processing excess documents. Depot Excess has a 12 priority which results in all other supply management actions being processed prior to excess actions.

EVALUATION: The present system of identifying locating and pulling depot excess material utilizing the priority system makes it difficult to meet tonnage goals established by 1st Logistical Command. In many cases the items designated as depot excess are shelf stock items which contribute little toward meeting tonnage goals.

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that a more comprehensive criteria be used to indicate the work being accomplished in this area. This can be done by comparing the number of lines pulled versus the number of lines identified as depot excess, or application of a dollar value goal.

(c) (U) ITEM: Increased PDO Sales.

OBSERVATION: The PDO yard at Vung Tau has sold 68% of its present on hand scrap. A term contract is presently being prepared for release by personnel at Vung Tau. The PDO yard at Ho Nai has had increased releases to allied countries and in addition, large amounts of material have been and are being advertised for sale.

EVALUATION: At the present time both PDO yards are doing an outstanding job. The PDO yard at Ho Nai in particular, with its vast quantities of input and output, is managing to keep pace with the flow of material. Through a continuous program of putting material up for sale and expeditious movement of material sold, Ho Nai PDO yard should continue to reduce its inventory.

RECOMMENDATION: a. That action be taken by 1st Logistical Command to encourage contractors to remove the materials they have purchased expeditiously.

b. That action be taken by this and higher headquarters to expedite installation of specialized scrap handling equipment so that processing methods may be modernized, thereby enhancing the operation.

(4) (U) Supply:

(22)
AVCA SGN GO S
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Period Ending 30 April 1969 RCS CSPUR-65 (U) (Cont.)

(a) (U) ITEM: Equipment Transfer,

OBSERVATION: Deactivation of US units and transfer of their equipment to ARVN requires a concentrated effort, thorough planning and continuous coordination.

EVALUATION: The lateral transfer of equipment from US units to ARVN is a time consuming task. Every piece of equipment, to include all components of sets and kits, must be given a technical inspection. This must be followed by the submission of necessary requisitions and request for all echelons of necessary maintenance. To try to continue the normal mission during this critical period results in a poor job on both the mission and the transfer.

RECOMMENDATION: That teams be formed of personnel from units deactivated who will go to the new units to be switched in order to insure a coordinated and well directed effort.

(b) (U) ITEM: Receiving procedures for non-perishable subsistence at the USA Depot, Long Binh.

OBSERVATION: The results of a 100% formal inventory of Class I at the depot, 24-26 March 1969, indicated many discrepancies between actual balance on hand and recorded balances.

EVALUATION: In the beginning, it was thought that the discrepancies were caused by errors in posting receipts to the stock records. However, after a thorough review of receipt postings, it was determined that the majority of the discrepancies were caused by inaccurate tallying-in at the receiving warehouses. Checkers were making multiplication errors (i.e. multiplying numbers of pallets by an incorrect pallet lot quantity). An immediate on-the-job training program was initiated and warehouse supervisors are now insuring that the checkers are tallying-in the actual quantities received. Checkers have been instructed to check each pallet for the quantity marked on the outside of each pallet. Supervisors are also checking each tally sheet for mathematical errors. As the tally sheets are received in the stock control section, they are checked once again for mathematical accuracy.

RECOMMENDATION: The possibility exists that other depots are experiencing similar discrepancies between recorded and actual on hand balances. Therefore, recommend that all depots review "tallying-in" procedures as the possible sources of discrepancies.
(5) (U) Maintenance:

(a) (U) ITEM: AN/TPS-25 and AN/MPQ-4A Test Set Mock-Ups.

OBSERVATION: Radar support units cannot provide responsive and accurate radar support unless a float radar is available for use as a test mock-up.

EVALUATION: This command has the responsibility for providing maintenance support for all ground surveillance and counter mortar radar in the III and IV Corps Tactical Zone. In the past few months, one (1) AN/TPS-25 and one (1) AN/MPQ-4A float radar has been loaned out by direction of higher headquarters for the purpose of establishing new radar sites. This action has greatly reduced the maintenance capability for support of remaining sets. Without the float for use as a test mock-up, the check out time for a defective component is greatly increased and the immediate maintenance response required is lost.

RECOMMENDATION: That each radar detachment and Direct Support Unit supporting the AN/TPS-25 and AN/MPQ-4A radar sets be issued a float radar for the purpose of being used as a test mock-up and that these sets not be issued for the establishment of new radar sites.

(6) (U) Transportation:

(a) (U) ITEM: Ammunition Vessel Arrivals and Ammunition Claimant Mix — Cat Lai.

OBSERVATION: To efficiently employ the work force and equipment and barge discharge facilities, the ammunition claimant mix (USAAM, USAF, VNAF) of vessels arriving at Cat Lai, and/or the claimant mix of ammunition on a particular vessel, should be related and be proportionate to the tonnages shipped to the respective claimants over a period of time.

EVALUATION: Ammunition vessels free flow to RVN ports with consequent too frequent feast or famine situations involving vessels to be discharged at Cat Lai; too often, there are but two vessels being worked at Cat Lai which can accommodate three vessels, or, there are so many inbound vessels in RVN water that as many as ten (10) may be "put in hold" at Subic Bay or held at Cape St. Jacque waiting call forward. Too often, several successive vessel arrivals have cargo consisting of primarily ammunition for USAF or ARVN. This results in Cegido (the barge discharge site for USARV ammunition) not being worked to capacity and discharge tonnages keeping a large portion of the barge fleet under load for excessive periods of time because ARVN and USAF discharge site
AVCA SN GO S
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Period Ending 30 April 1969 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U) (Cont.)

operations (to include ASP receiving capabilities) are not normally geared for high tonnage handling. In fact approximately 75% of all ammunition handled through Cat Lai is for USARV, and the balance for ARVN, USAF, and VNAF. Two of the three vessels being discharged at Cat Lai should have ammunition for USARV. For a vessel containing ammunition for both USARV and ARVN, at least 75% of the tonnage should be for USARV. Adherence to these rules-of-thumb will optimize the overall efficiency of the whole water's edge ammunition handling system.

RECOMMENDATION: That this matter be a standing agenda item for the Joint Transportation Board in the search for coordination procedures to retain free flow and yet consider discharge capability efficiencies.

(2) (U) ITEM: Off-Loading of Cargo Carriers (Barges and S&P Trailers).

OBSERVATION: Theater consignees are not logically disciplined to appreciate the importance of prompt off-loading and release of cargo-carrying equipment.

EVALUATION: Mode operators in 1st Logistical Command Support Commands serve and deliver to a host of non-1st Logistical Command organizations in MACV, USARV and Free World Forces. Theater level regulations do not contain provisions prescribing mandatory off-load and release time periods for cargos delivered to consignees on cargo carriers as stake and platform trailers and barges. The net effect of prompt off-loading and release of cargo carriers is to maintain a relatively high available lift capability with no increase in equipment assets. Every attempt is made to ship cargo in accordance with the known off-load/discharge capability of the consignee.

RECOMMENDATION: That MACV publish a directive prescribing the off-loading and release of trailers within 48 hours, and the off-loading and release of barges within 5 days.

f. (U) Organization: None

g. (U) Other: None
AVCA GO-KH (31 May 69) 1st Ind
SUBJ: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the US Army Support Command
Saigon for period Ending 30 April 1969 RCS CPK-65. (U)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384, 27 JUN 1969

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHCG-DST,
APO 96275.

1. (U) The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters,
US Army Support Command, Saigon for the quarterly period ending 30
April 1969 is forwarded.

2. (U) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning Data Processing Master File, page
18, para 2a(1). Concur with recommendation. The Data Service Center
(DSC), USAIV, established a Field Assistance Team in mid-March 1969
to assist the Personnel Service Centers (PSC) in establishing proper systems
and controls for processing information into the Data Processing Master
File. A visit was made by the Field Assistance Team to the PSC, Saigon
Support Command on 15 May 1969 and is scheduled for another visit on
7 and 8 June 1969. In addition to the visit mentioned, the DSC has
provided the PSC, Saigon Support Command, with a listing of exceptions
(data and strength variances) as of 30 April 1969, which if properly
worked, should significantly reduce inaccuracies outlined in the ORLL.

b. Reference item concerning Emergency Data; Notification of Next
of Kin, Department of Army Civilians, page 18, paragraph 2a(2). Concur.
Recommend that the Civilian Personnel files be annotated with the
same NOK information as found in military records. This is a matter
for Headquarters, USAIV, ATTN: AVHCP.

c. Reference item concerning Establishment of an Operations Control
Center, page 19, paragraph 2d(1). Concur. This concept of collocating
designated staff sections in a center during critical periods does
provide immediate responsiveness to a situation. This also establishes
a central source of information which, if required, can be readily
coordinated by the appropriate staff member for timely presentation to
the commander for a decision. All support commands employ similar
centers but vary their operation to satisfy the requirements of the
commander.

d. Reference item concerning Insufficient Fuel at the Commercial
Fuel Terminals at Nha Be and Can Tho, page 20, paragraph e(1)(a).
Nonconcur. Commercial fuel contracts do not contain penalty clauses
to assess a monetary fee for failure to meet contract terms other than
the normal provisions of finding the contractor as having defaulted.
The possibilities of obtaining a new contract with a penalty clause
SUBJECT: Operational Report — Lessons Learned of the US Army Support Command Saigon for Period Ending 30 April 1969  RCS CSFOR-65(0)

The issue of time out of fuel was discussed and may be included in the new contracts. However, it should be noted that at no time has a fuel shortage developed nor has it been proven to be a problem area. It is desirable to have full tanks at Nha Be as they contain both military and civilian products in the same tank. Total tank capacity is allocated on a percentage basis to US, ARVN, and civilian use. Regarding the unsatisfactory fuel levels at the end of April, neither the Sub Area Petroleum Office nor AGSF, SUPCOM received any complaints concerning inability to obtain fuel.

e. Reference item concerning Performance of Contract Tug/Barge, page 20, paragraph 2e(1)(b). Concur. Before a contract in excess of $10,000 can be awarded, a positive determination of responsibility must be made. In making such a determination, several factors must be considered such as past performance, experience, operational controls, technical skills within the organization or the ability to obtain the necessary skills, and financial resources.

f. Reference item concerning KU Support, page 21, paragraph 2e(2)(a). Concur. This headquarters recognizes the need for strict austerity in the expenditure of O&M funds, however it has become increasingly evident that the manning and equipment levels authorized the KU contractor often do not provide the responsiveness necessary to carry out authorized minor new construction projects on a timely basis.

g. Reference item concerning CCRS Activity, page 21, paragraph 2e(3)(a). Concur. The CCRS Activity of the Long Binh Army Depot was issued additional commercial 10,000 lb forklifts to relieve the MEB problem. The remaining MEB is on requisition through USAID/C and upon arrival it will be issued.

h. Reference item concerning Retrograde of Depot Excess, page 22, paragraph 2e(3)(b). Concur. The recommendations made are valid and under study by this headquarters. The need for a more comprehensive criteria of measuring the volume of retrograde excess is being considered for implementation in the near future. However, until a new criteria is adopted, the old criteria must continue to be the basis for reaching assigned goals.

i. Reference item concerning Increased PMO Sales, page 22, paragraph 2e(3)(c). Concur. Continuing aggressive action is taken by the Foreign Excess Sales Office (FESO) to insure that property, once purchased, is removed timely. Storage charges are levied as appropriate and extensions
for the removal of property are granted only upon determining that cogent reasons exist. Status of the installation of the swap handling equipment is as follows: (1) Ho Nai: The LBN Base Development Board has approved the installation of the equipment. The Job Order Request (JOR) for the installation was approved by the LBN Installation Planning Board on 22 May 69. As of 4 June 69, the JOR is awaiting a cost estimate by the Installation Engineer. This headquarters will assist in expediting this project. (2) Vung Tau: The JOR is currently being prepared by the AD LB. Expediting of the installation of this equipment is within the capability of the support command.

j. Reference item concerning Equipment Transfer, page 23, paragraph 2e(4)(a). Nonconcur. The majority of equipment transferred is not from units which are inactivated but from unit draw-downs and from depot assets. As these transfers continue, the depot personnel involved are becoming more proficient in the operation. In the case of units which were or are being inactivated to provide equipment to ARVN, i.e., artillery units, the personnel are redistributed to fill critical shortages in like units. A Transportation unit which is to be inactivated is a reserve unit and the personnel will be returned to CONUS.

k. Reference item concerning Receiving Procedures for Non-perishable Subsistence at the USA Depot, LBN, page 23, paragraph 2e(4)(b). Concur. All depots have been directed to review "tallying-in" procedures as a possible source of discrepancies.

l. Reference item concerning AN/TPS-25 and AN/TQ-4A Test Set Mock-Ups, page 24, paragraph 2e(5)(a). Concur. Maintenance float/test mock-ups for units supporting the AN/TPS-25 and AN/TQ-4A radar sets will distinctly improve maintenance support responsiveness. The use of test mock-ups is an accepted practice in the check-out of repaired components of complex communications and electronics equipment. The AN/TPS-25 radar set referred to in this OCLL has been returned to maintenance float status.

m. Reference item concerning Ammunition Vessel Arrivals and Ammunition Claimant Mix- Cat Lai, page 24, paragraph 2e(6)(a). Concur. This subject has, in the past, been an agenda item for the Joint Transportation Board and will continue to be until the desired ammunition mix is achieved at Cat Lai.

n. Reference item concerning Off-loading of Cargo Carriers (Barges and S&P Trailers), page 25, paragraph 2e(6)(b). Concur. Requests have been directed to higher headquarters to implement country-wide off-loading time limits. This action would materially assist this Command's efforts in achieving prompt return of transportation assets for increased utilization.
AVCA 00-MH (31 May 69) 1st Ind

7 JUN 1969


availability.

3. (U) Concur with the basic report as modified by this indorsement. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 4839

CF:

USASUPCOM, SGN

LANNY K. KELSEY
1Lt, AGC
Asst Adjutant General
AVHGC-DST (31 May 1969) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Period Ending 30 April 1969

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Saigon.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning "Data Processing Master File" section II, page 18, paragraph 2a(1) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2a; concur. The USARV Data Service Center (DSC) established a field assistance team which has concluded its initial visits to all personnel management, cost accounting procedures (PERMACAP) units. The efforts of this team plus seminars for operating personnel should significantly reduce the inaccuracies outlined in the basic correspondence.

   b. Reference item concerning "Emergency Data; Notification of Next of Kin, Department of Army Civilians," section II, page 18, paragraph 2a(2); concur. The emergency next of kin data is maintained by the Civilian Personnel Office for each DAC. This information is on file in the employee's official personnel file (201). The next of kin data includes the name(s) of the person to be notified in case of serious illness or accident and the name(s) of the person to be notified in case of death. In both instances the relationship, address and telephone number is recorded. No further action is required by this or higher headquarters.

   c. Reference item concerning "Off-loading of Cargo Carriers (Barges and S&P Trailers)," section II, page 25, paragraph 2e(2); concur. Headquarters MACV has been advised by message of the delay problem. This message recommends that a MACV directive be published establishing the maximum off-loading times as outlined in the ORLL.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cy furn:
USA Spt Cmnd Sgn
1st Log Cmnd

C. D. WHISON

30

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 22 AUG 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]
C. L. Short
CPT, AGC
Air AG
OPERATIONAL CONTROL IS RETAINED WITH PARENT UNIT.
**Report Title**
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, US Army Support Command, Saigon

**Descriptive Notes**
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb 69 - 30 Apr 69.

**Author(s)**
CG, US Army Support Command, Saigon

**Report Date**
31 May 1969

**Total No. of Pages**
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**Abstract**

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