## UNCLASSIFIED

### AD NUMBER

<table>
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<th><strong>AD504765</strong></th>
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</table>

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**FROM:** confidential

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30 Sep 1981, DoDD 5200.10; OAG D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

ROBERT E. LYNCH
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

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Best Available Copy
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters 199th Infantry Brigade (Sep)(Light)  
APO San Francisco 96279

AVEN-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade  
For Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65, UIC VFBDAB

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1. (C) Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities
   a. Command
      (1) Brigadier General Frederic E. Davison remained in command of the  
          Brigade during the three month period 1 February 1969 - 30 April 1969.
      (2) Changes in Command occurred in the 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry, 2nd  
          Battalion, 40th Artillery, 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, D Troop, 17th Cavalry,  
          313th Signal Company, 179th Military Intelligence Detachment, and Company M  
          (Ranger), 75th Infantry. These changes are listed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>EFF DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LTC John A. Mess</td>
<td>CO, 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry</td>
<td>21 Feb 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC Arthur C. Cassella</td>
<td>CO, 2nd Battalion, 40th Artillery</td>
<td>10 Mar 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC Robert J. Cottay</td>
<td>CO, 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry</td>
<td>5 Feb 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT Paul J. Peterson</td>
<td>CO, D Troop, 17th Cavalry</td>
<td>19 Mar 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT Edward D. Winstead</td>
<td>CO, 313th Signal Company</td>
<td>22 Feb 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT Gerald J. Heisman</td>
<td>CO, 179th Military Intelligence Det</td>
<td>7 Feb 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT James E. Lewis</td>
<td>CO, Company M (Ranger), 75th Infantry</td>
<td>27 Feb 69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   (3) Changes of primary and special brigade staff officers were made  
       as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>EFF DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LTC Roy J. Harte Jr.</td>
<td>Brigade Executive Officer</td>
<td>5 Feb 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC Garrett D. Buckner Jr.</td>
<td>Brigade S3</td>
<td>1 Feb 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ Edward Jents</td>
<td>Brigade S4</td>
<td>15 Mar 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ Jack F. Gaulvert</td>
<td>Brigade Chemical Officer</td>
<td>29 Apr 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT Daniel H. Lucy</td>
<td>Brigade Provost Marshal</td>
<td>9 Apr 69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Personnel
   (1) The following table indicates assigned brigade strength as of 30  
       April 1969:

| 692289 | CONFIDENTIAL |

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECCLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS. DOD DIR 5200.10
During the three month period, February through April, the club system incurred expenditures of $35,725 for entertainment. Fixed assets of the club system increased from $87,085 to $90,781. It is noted that the club system is operated on a fiscal period ending the 25th day of each month.

The American Red Cross processed 997 new cases during the three month period. 19 loans totalling $2,695.00 were made during the period. The American Red Cross allocated $3,512.00 during the period and received $669.20 in cash for loan repayments. A total of 688 messages were received during the period with the Red Cross sending 608 messages. The American Red Cross acted as a collecting agency for the DOD Overseas Terminal Federal Fund Campaign, in which members of the Brigade contributed $3,270.85. A short orientation has been initiated as part of Red Cross Training. This orientation was begun on 17 March 1969. The WRN girls from 2 Field Force (2IFFF) continued to visit units in the field on a weekly basis assisting in maintaining high morale in the brigade.

For the months of February through April AG Awards and Decorations were as follows:

| UNIT | OA | LC | CM | PC | H/C | PSS | AMV | AWA | ADM | ...
|------|----|----|----|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----
| 2/3  |   |    |  3 |  0 | 17  |  50 |    |  7  | 15  | 165 |
| 2/7  |   |    |  2 |  0 | 10  |  45 |    |  1  | 17  | 207 |
| 4/12 |   |    |  2 |  1 | 12  |  68 |    |  0  | 21  | 180 |

Incl

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During the period 1 February to 30 April, Special Services arranged several shows for the morale of the personnel of the brigade. On 8 Feb 69, the "Jimmy Snow Show" was presented at Fire Support Base Horseshoe Bend, Fire Support Base Stephanie and at Camp Frensell-Jones. On 21 Feb 69, the "Australian Concert Party", was seen at Fire Support Base Stephanie and at Fire Support Base Horseshoe Bend. On 29 April 69, the "Byran Show" was seen at Fire Support Horseshoe Bend. The SSQ Photo Lab Craft Shop was opened on 18 April 69. Magazines were distributed on a weekly basis during the period. The Special Service Swimming Pool and Miniature Golf Course had an average attendance of 200 per day for the period. R&R utilization was as follows:

(a) Out-of-Country R&R Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>ALLOCATIONS</th>
<th>UTILIZED</th>
<th>PERCENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RHC 199th</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Spt Bn</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/3 Inf</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/7 Inf</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/12 Inf</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/12 Inf</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/40 Arty</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/17 Cav</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>856 RRD</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>179 MID</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87th Engr</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>313th Sig</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>1373</td>
<td>1376</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(b) In-country R&R participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>FM ALLOCATIONS</th>
<th>OFF ALLOCATIONS</th>
<th>PERCENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC 199th</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Spt Bn</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/3 Inf</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/7 Inf</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/12 Inf</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/12 Inf</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/40 Arty</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/17 Cav</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>856 FPD</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87th Engr</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>179th MED</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113th Sig</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) Losses during the period:

(a) Battle losses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>VO</th>
<th>FM</th>
<th>100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Killed Hostile Action</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Died of Wounds</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Wounded Hostile Action</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Missing Hostile Action</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Captured</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 TOTALS</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>466</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Non-battle Losses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>VO</th>
<th>FM</th>
<th>100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Disease</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Non Battle Injuries</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Non Battle Missing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Non Battle Dead</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 TOTALS</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(1) Generals: By late January, it had become very obvious that the enemy was frantically preparing for a large offensive. The 101D NVA Regiment arrived from I Corps to join its parent unit, the 1st NVA Division (325C). The 320th NVA Regiment (and several other units) provided cadre for a newly activated regiment in Sub-Region 3. The 185th NVA Regiment arrived from II Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) to rebuild the 320th Regiment. The 95A NVA Regiment moved from II CTZ to War Zone D to join the 5th VC Division. Two regiments (334 and 274th) and a COSVN Sapper Battalion (525th) became subordinate to Military Region VII. U-1 Province (SR-8) was sub-divided into a "Wagon-Wheel" of tactical AO's much the same as Saigon-Cholon (SR-6) had been prior to TET, 1968. Hundreds of tons of ammunition were being moved into prepositioned areas around the Long Binh/Bien Hoa Complex. PWs had been told that no matter what the coat, they would be able to spend the 1969 New Year Festival (17 Feb) in Saigon.

(2) Military Region VII: On several successive nights the rocket storage area (YT 1707) was strafed by AC-47's, and hit by artillery. Over 100 secondary explosions were observed. On the night of 22-23 Feb 69, the 4th Offensive began in MR-7 with 107mm Roco, mortar, and ground attacks against Bien Hoa, Long Binh Post, Bear Cat, and Camp Frenzell-Jones. The 1st Bn/274th VC Regiment attacked southern Long Binh Post while the 3d Bn attacked Bear Cat. Both contacts resulted in very heavy losses for the VC. The 334 NVA Regiment attempted to move toward the Long Binh Complex from the east but were hit by artillery several times, and thoroughly decimated. On the morning of 26 Feb 69, while 1/275th and D4 (heavy weapons) 275th Regiment attacked Bien Hoa Airbase, 3/275th Regiment was to attack Ke Sat Hamlet, while the Regiment was moving into attack positions many of the soldiers became lost and many deserted. C12/D3 Company entered Loc Lam Hamlet, Ho Nai Village at 0500 moving toward Camp Frenzell-Jones. Villagers spotted the VC and attacked the enemy company's mortar squad, capturing the mortar and using it against the VC. The remainder of the company was engaged by the 199th CRIP (Combined Reconnaissance and Intelligence Platoon) who were reinforced immediately by popular forces, civilian defense groups, and volunteers. ARVN Marines rushed to the area. C12 and D3 were rendered combat ineffective. The remainder of D3 Battalion was surrounded after they reached Ke Sat, and was completely destroyed. The D3 Battalion was engaged before it reached the airstrip and suffered very heavy losses. The 174th NVA Regiment, having been decimated by B-52 strikes on several occasions, never reached its staging area for the offensive. The 95A Regiment was held in reserve. After this abortive offensive, the decimated enemy units retreated into sanctuaries to prepare for the May Offensive. Allied Forces pursued the enemy and continued to inflict heavy casualties on them. A brush fire, north of Loc Lam Hamlet, caused 17 large secondary explosions. The area from TT 0517, to TT 0917, to TT 0913, to TT 0513 was completely cleared, exposing numerous bunkers, trenches, and base camps. This ammo cache, near base, Fire Support Base (FSB) and staging area has now been denied and the enemy can no longer approach Bien Hoa from the east, or Long Binh and Loc Lam from the north, without crossing 3,000 meters of open
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Terrain. With assistance from the 199th CRIP and 179th MID, the hamlet of Tra Co has finally joined the other hamlets of Ho Nai village in establishing a perimeter and mobilizing a hamlet militia. This closed the gap in Ho Nai’s 12 kilometer, East-West perimeter north of the Long Binh Complex. On 5 April the 1st Australian Task Force overran military Region VII Headquarters and captured numerous documents and a large amount of supplies and ammunition. On 11 April GVN National Police captured Tu Hai, the U-1 Province (SR-8) Military Intelligence Detachment Commander. Numerous other Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) were captured. The VC continued to plan for a May/June Offensive but emphasized attacks by fire and sapper activity rather than conventional attacks.

(3) Military Region IV: Military Region IV’s forces attempted to initiate an offensive against Saigon in late February but were thwarted by Allied forces. While RVN and US Forces in the outlying areas continued to inflict heavy casualties on the VC/NVA Main Force units, the units in and near Saigon concentrated on anti-intrusion/spoiling, and VCI eliminations to assure lack of guides and local support in any future offensive. In early February (with the VC Offensive in its final stages of preparation), the 199th Light Infantry Brigade (LID) conducted detailed systematic searches of the two most Pro-VC Villages (Hung Long in SR-3 and Tan Nhut in SR-2). The results of these two operations (dubbed "STRANGLER I" and "STRANGLER II") appear in the chart at the end of the paragraph. Contact with elements of SR-6, during their attempts to move towards Saigon, coupled with elimination programs brought the enemy's efforts to create a viable fighting force in Saigon to a virtual standstill. The enemy's morale declined so rapidly in the brigade area of operation (AO) that high-ranking VC began to rally. On 18 Feb, the security commissar of SR-2 rallied at Binh Chanh. On 10 Mar, at XS 743243, LTC Nam Xuan, Chief of Staff of the SR-2 Forward HQ's was killed by C/5/12th of the 199th LIB. The death of Nam Xuan was a severe blow to SR-2 because he had lived and operated in the Pineapple for ten years and possessed extensive area knowledge. He was also a key man for the VC, and when critical tasks or attacks needed to be consummated, it was Nam Xuan who was chosen to execute them. Captured documents revealed that Nam Xuan was preparing for an attack on the 199th Brigade Forward Command Post at the time of his death. The capture of SOI's and detailed operation plans from Nam Xuan's body surely disrupted the planned attack on Saigon. A PW captured on 30 March stated that the 6th Battalion's companies had been reduced to 15 men each. On 3 April the 199th LIB located the 6th Bn Headquarters and killed the battalion XO, a Company CO and a platoon leader. On 11 April, documents found on a VC killed in action (KIA) at XS 642901 identified him as the new battalion commander. 94 enemy were eliminated by the end of April.

(a) Results of STRANGLER I:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INNOCENT CIVILIANS</th>
<th>VCI</th>
<th>VC SUSPECTS</th>
<th>VC GUERRILLAS</th>
<th>VC MILITARY</th>
<th>DRAFT DODGERS</th>
<th>DESERTERS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2,655</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2,713</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(b) Results of STRANGLER II:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INNOCENT CIVILIANS</th>
<th>VCI SUSPECTS</th>
<th>VC GUERRILLAS</th>
<th>VC MILITARY</th>
<th>DRAFT</th>
<th>DODGERS</th>
<th>DESERTERS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2,552</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,584</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) COSVN Divisions: The main force and NVA Divisions continued to attempt to open corridors into the Saigon areas by attacks on FSB's along their Lines of Communication (LOC). All these attacks were unsuccessful and severely depleted the enemy's strength. The flow of replacements reduced to insignificant amounts. The 9th VC Div conducted reconnaissance in the 199th AO and infiltrated small advance parties into SR-2. However, attempts to create diversionary attacks in Tay Ninh Province and attempts to break-out of Cambodia into SR-2 all proved very costly to the 9th VC Div. Enemy plans for the May/June Offensive appear to have been drastically altered, and captured documents indicate that COSVN does not expect a military victory.

(5) Contents of enemy caches discovered during the reporting period:

- AK-47 Rifles: 7
- AK-47 Magazines: 17
- AK-47 Ammunition: 14,104 (rounds)
- B-40 Rocket Rounds: 96
- B-41 Rocket Rounds: 82
- 60mm Mortar Rounds: 262
- 82mm Mortar Rounds: 272
- 82mm Mortar Charges: 67
- 82mm Mortar Fuses: 29
- CHICOM Hand Grenades: 300
- Grenade Fuses: 7
- CHICOM Mines: 58
- Explosives (lbs): 101
- Blasting Caps: 550
- Gasoline (Gals): 105
- Medicine (lbs): 16
- Rice (lbs): 11,900
- Radios: 3

(6) Cumulative enemy losses during the reporting period:

- VC KIA (Body Count): 183
- VC KIA (Probable): 54
- Prisoner of War: 23
- Hoi Chanh: 1
Detainees: 190
VC Infrastructure Eliminated/Neutralized: 3/4
Small Arms Captured or Destroyed: 6
Crew Served Weapons Captured or Destroyed: 6
Small Arms Ammunition Captured or Destroyed: 18,658
Crew Served Ammunition Captured or Destroyed: 918
Fortifications Destroyed: 1,535
Grenades Captured or Destroyed: 502
Sampans Captured or Destroyed: 69
Rice Captured or Destroyed (tons): 5,505

(7) VC Eliminated Within the Brigade AO:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VILLAGE</th>
<th>COORDINATES (Center of Mass)</th>
<th>NUMBER ELIMINATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An Lac</td>
<td>XS 7686</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binh Chanh</td>
<td>XS 7279</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binh Tri Dong</td>
<td>XS 7789</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tan Buu</td>
<td>XS 6780</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tan Kien</td>
<td>XS 7484</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tan Rinh</td>
<td>XS 7083</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tan Tao</td>
<td>XS 7489</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tan Tuc</td>
<td>XS 7482</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td></td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hung Long*</td>
<td>XS 7878</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My Yen*</td>
<td>XS 6979</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thanh Ha*</td>
<td>XS 6479</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td></td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Outside, but contiguous to Brigade AO.

d. Operations, Plans and Training:

(1) The brigade, continuing under the operational control (OPCON) of Capita1 Military Assistance Command (CMAC) participated in Operation TOAN THI Mot II and III in AO Jane. Operations in AO Jane were directed primarily against traditional base camps and staging areas of the 308th and 6th Local Force Battalions. Objectives were to preempt these areas from use, interdict lines of communications and prevent enemy rocket/mortar and ground attacks against Saigon. Operations in the Pineapple were designed to locate VC cache sites and disrupt supply operations. All elements of the
brigade continued aggressive offensive operations and night ambushes on all likely western and southwestern land and water approaches into Saigon.

(2) Operations Conducted:

(a) 1 - 7 February 1969: 2/3 Infantry was released from OPCON to 25th Division on 3 February '69. On 4 February A/B/D/2/3d Inf became OPCON to Operation STRANGLER I. 3/7th Inf continued operations in AO Jane. On 4 February, D/3/7th Inf was released from OPCON to 3/82nd Airborne, C/D/3/7th Inf were placed OPCON to TF KAY in support of Operation STRANGLER I. 4/12th Inf continued reconnaissance-in-force (RIF) and patrolling operations in AO Jane. 5/12th Inf continued interdiction operations in AO Swordfish III. Throughout the week, elements of 5/12th Inf, using Navy boats, conducted extensive defoliation operations along the Van Co Dong River.

(b) 8 - 14, Feb: 2/3d Inf (-) continued OPCON to TF STRANGLER. Upon termination of STRANGLER, on 12 Feb, all elements moved to staging areas in preparation for STRANGLER II. 3/7th Inf continued operations in AO Jane. C/D/4/12th Inf, OPCON to TF KAY, participated in Operation STRANGLER II, effective 12 Feb 69. 5/12th Inf continued operations in AO Swordfish III. A/D/5/12th Inf became OPCON to TF KAY for Operation STRANGLER II on 12 Feb.

(c) 14 - 21 Feb: 2/3d Inf initiated operations in AO Jane upon termination of Operation STRANGLER II on 16 Feb. On 19 Feb, 2/3d Inf conducted a 3 company sweep vicinity XS 7285 (COM). The 553d RF Company, participating in the operations accounted for 6 VC KIA. A cordon was established around the area and a search conducted on 20 Feb resulted in the discovery of several B-40 rounds, and sleeping positions for 40 personnel. 3/7th Inf continued RIF and combined operations with elements of 3/50th ARVN Regiment in AO Jane. 5/12th Inf, continuing interdiction operations in AO Swordfish III, had several contacts with small groups of VC. 5/12th was OPCON to Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command (BITAC) for operations in AO Hardcharger, effective 15 Feb. Operation STRANGLER II continued.

(d) 22 - 28 Feb: 2/3d Inf continued RIF operations, daylight patrolling, and night ambush positions in AO Jane. 3/7th Inf continued operations in AO Jane with company-size sweeps and Cav/Inf team RIF. 4/12th Infantry continued RIF operations and platoon-size combat patrols in AO Jane. Several combined operations with the 646th, 662d and 754th RF Companies were conducted. 5/12th Inf continued interdiction operations in AO Swordfish III. On 23 Feb, C/5/12th Inf, OPCON to BITAC, engaged a platoon of VC in vicinity YT 057023, resulting in 6 VC KIA (BC) and 3 VC PW.

(e) 1 - 7 March 1969: 2/3d Inf continued operations in AO Jane. C/2/3d and D/4/12th Inf, OPCON to TF BEHRHARDT, conducted riverine and air mobile assaults into AO Hardcharger, vic YT 0703, (COM). TF conducted RIF operations on 2-3 March and was extracted. During the period 4-5 March, 2/3d Inf exchanged 40s with 5/12th Inf. On 6 March, A/2/3d Inf began operations in AO Swampy, vic XS 9075 (COM), under brigade control. 3/7th Inf conducted burn off operations, company (-) RIFs, and platoon combat patrols in AO Jane.
4/12th Inf continued operations in AO Jane conducting four combined operations with RF and PF elements (Regional Forces and Popular Forces). Three of these were cordon and search operations. On 6 March, 4/12th Inf conducted a combined operation with the 569th, 754th and 106th RF companies and four PF platoons. Operations consisted of establishing blocking positions along the Ben Luc River, via XS 6881, COM, and a multi-company sweep north into the blocking position. 5/12th Inf continued operations in AO Swordfish and AO Jane exchanging AOs with 2/3d Inf, effective 5 March.

-(f) 8-14 March: 2/3d Inf l-4 conducted interdiction operations in AO Swordfish III. A/2/3d and B/2/3d continued OPCON to the Brigade and BHTAC, respectively. 3/7th Inf continued cordon and search, RIF, and burn-off operations in AO Jane. 4/12th Inf conducted cordon and search operations, area searches and defoliation missions in AO Jane. 5/12th Inf continued platoon patrols, sweeps and burn-off operations in AO Jane. During the period 12-14 March, D/2/3d, A/3/7th, B/4/12th and D/5/12th, all OPCON to 4/12th Inf, participated in Operation LULU. Operation was a combined independent area search operation with elements of the 9th US Div, 5th ARVN Ranger Group, and 46th ARVN Regiment participating in the Long Thung area (XS 7576). Operation LULU concluded 14 March with a cordon and search of Long Thoi (XS 7476) and Loc Trung (XS 7973).

-(g) 15-21 March 1969: 2/3d Inf continued interdiction operations in AO Swordfish III. A/2/3d concluded operations in AO Swampy and returned to battalion control on 16 March. RIFs along the Kinh Cau Ha Canal, XS 625927, resulted in the location and destruction of 26 bunkers, and the capture of 3,600 rounds of AK-47 ammunition and 20 RPG-7 rounds. On 21 March, B/D/2/3d Inf conducted an exchange of positions; B Company returning to battalion control and D company OPCON to BHTAC in AO Hardcharger. 3/7th Inf continued operations in AO Jane. On 18 March, D/3/7th Inf inserted into 2 Landing Zones (LZ), sweeping areas where Long Range Patrol (LRP) teams had sighted VC activity. On 20 March, A/C/D/3/7th and D/17th Cav conducted cordon and search of Binh Tri Dong #1, resulting in the apprehension by National Police (NP) of 10 detainees. 4/12th Inf conducted operations in AO Jane. On 21 March, D/5/12th Inf conducted a cordon and search of Dai Thanh, vic XS 703805. The search was conducted by the 156th PF Platoon, 107th RF Company, NP and Binh Chanh Intelligence Squad. C/4/12th, OPCON to 3/82d Airborne, effective 17 March. A/4/4/12th conducted a RIF toward a blocking position established by D/4/12th, vic XS 6880. 5/12th Inf continued operations in AO Jane. Combined operations with district RF and PF elements were conducted on 17 and 18 March. Battalion continued burn and destroy operations along canals and streams vic XS 7082, and platoon-size combat patrols throughout the AO.

-(h) 22 - 28 March: 2/3d Inf continued RIF and Star team interdiction operations in AO Swordfish III. D/2/3d Inf continued OPCON to BHTAC in AO Hardcharger. C/2/3d Inf was OPCON to 5/12th Inf, 26-28 March, for operations in AO Lexington. 3/7th Inf continued operations in AO Jane. On 23 March, A/B/3/7th, D/17th and A/5/12th conducted a cordon and search in An Lac #1 and #2. On 27 March, C/3/7th Inf conducted sweeps to the southeast, towards a blocking position established by B (-)/D (-)/3/7th Inf and D/17th Cav, vic XS 750559. During the period 28-29 March, D/3/7th Inf was OPCON to 3/82d Airborne at FSB All-American. 4/12th Inf continued operations
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in AO Jane. On 24 March, B/D/4/12th, the 662nd and 553d RF Companies conducted a four company cordon and search of My Yen #3. Another combined operation on 26 March, consisted on D/4/12th, with D/5/12th Inf OPCON to 4/12th Inf, establishing a blocking position vic XS 693830 for a sweep from the east by the 896th and 754th RF Companies. On 28 March, responding to an intelligence report, A/4/12th established a block in XS 750796, with two RF Companies blocking on the east and west flanks. B/4/12th Inf conducted a sweep north to the block, resulting in 6 VC KIA and 2 FV captured. 5/12th Inf continued operations in AO Jane. On 23 March, B/5/12th Inf, conducting a RIF to the east, set several haystacks afire, vic XS 744545, resulting in five large secondary explosions and several small arms explosions. On 25 March, B/5/12th and the 553d RF Company conducted a cordon and search of Tan Kien #1. During the period 26-28 March, A/C/5/12th and C/2/3d, OPCON to 5/12th Inf, conducted operation HUNTER in AO Lexington, astride the Bo Bo Canal. A/5/12th Inf conducted an airborne assault vic XS 491832 and established a FSB for B/2/10th Arty, which was lifted in to support the operation. C/5/12th and C/2/3d conducted airborne insertions and RIF to northwest along the Bo Bo Canal. All units were extracted 28 March.

(1) 29 March - 4 April 1969: 2/3d Inf continued RIF and star team interdiction operations in AO Swordfish III. On 2-3 April, battalion conducted an exchange of AOs with A/12th Inf. D/2/3d returned to battalion control from OPCON to BHTAC on 3 April. On 2 April, A/B/3/7th Inf and Recon/2/3d conducted an extensive airborne RIF in the central Pineapple. Thirty bunkers and twenty-six homemade grenade booby traps were destroyed as a result of this operation. On 4 April, A/B/3/7th Inf and B/17th Cav conducted a cordon and search of Tan Tau Village. Cav/Inf/RIF were conducted on a daily basis. A/12th Inf continued operations in AO Jane. On 30 March, A/4/12th Inf conducted a combined sweep and block operation with the 662nd and 646th RF Companies, resulting in 4 VC KIA (BC). On 3 April, A/12th Inf assumed responsibility for AO Swordfish III. A/4/12th Inf became OPCON to 2/3d Inf in AO Jeri (XS 7680). B/4/12th Inf and C/4/12th Inf, OPCON to BHTAC and 3/82nd Airborne respectively. 5/12th Inf continued operations in AO Jane. On 30 March, B/5/12th, conducting platoon size RIFs out of PB Chris, killed 3 VC (BC) and took 1 FV. On 31 March, B/5/12th Inf with the 754th and 869th RF Companies conducted a cordon and search of Tan Nhut #5. Remaining elements conducted platoon size patrols and security missions in the AO.

(j) 5-11 April: 2/3d Inf continued operations in AO Jane. Battalion conducted platoon size combat patrols throughout the AO and continued area searches in AO Jeri, vic XS 7680. On 11 April, 2/3d Inf, B/5/12th, 662nd and 646th RF Companies, and the 192d PF Platoon conducted a combined block and sweep operation. C/2/3d, 1 platoon B/17th Cav, and the 646th RF Company blocked vic 7579. All other elements swept to the south-southwest into the blocking position. 3/7th Inf continued operations in AO Jane. Battalion conducted platoon size combat patrols and Cav/Inf RIF throughout the period 8-10 April. On 9 April, A/3/7th, B/17th Cav and one company of the 55th RF Battalion conducted combined operations on Kinh Cau An Ha Canal, vic XS 6093. A/12th Inf (-) continued interdiction operations in AO Swordfish III. B/4/12th continued OPCON to BHTAC in AO Hardcharger and C/4/12th con-

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continued OPCON to 3/82nd Airborne. A/4/12th initially OPCON to 2/3d Inf in AO Jari, went OPCON to 5/12th Inf for Operation HUNTER II, 8-10 April. On 17 April, A/4/12th was inserted by LCM8, vic XS 553893, and swept to the southwest. RIP continued the following day. 5/12th Inf continued operations in AO Jane. On 8 April, A/B/5/12th Inf, A/4/12th Inf and D/2/40th Arty conducted combined air mobile operations in AO Lexington with elements of the 1/50th ARVN Regiment. D/5/12th and A/4/12th Inf inserted via XS 520790 and XS 469783, swept northwest to the west of the Bo Bo Canal. The 1/50th ARVN Rgmt operated to the east of the Bo Bo Canal. All units were extracted 10 April.

(k) 12 - 18 April: 2/3d Inf continued operations in AO Jane. On 13 April, C/2/3d Inf and 2 platoons from D/2/3d Inf conducted RIF from vic XS 689824 to XS 656823. On 16 April, C/2/3d Inf with the 646th RF Company, conducted combined RIF in AO Jari. On 18 April, A/B/2/3d Inf conducted air mobile insertion via XS 659778, sweeping southeast along the canal at that location. Persistent CS dispensing operations were conducted in vic XS 7280. 3/7th Inf continued operations in AO Jane. On 14 April, C/D/3/7th conducted combined operations in AO Jari and swept to the west of the Vam Co Dong River. Units conducted area searches and were extracted. On 15 April, A/3/7th, B/17th and one company of the 55th RF Battalion conducted RIF and block operations along Khinh Cau An Hia Canal. On 17 April, A/C/D/3/7th Inf and B/17th Cav conducted a cordon and search of Tan Tao Hamlet. Persistent CS dispensing operations were conducted in the "Five Fingers" area. 4/12th Inf (-) continued interdiction operations in AO Swordfish III. B/4/12th and C/4/12th remained OPCON to BITAC and 3/82nd Airborne respectively. On 15 April, A/4/12th conducted RIF to the north in AO Charlo. Ambush positions that night sighted and engaged approximately 15 VC, resulting in 2 VC KIA (PC) and 1 AK-47 captured. 5/12th Inf continued operations in AO Jane. On 15 April, elements of the battalion conducted cordon and search of Tan Mutt #2. The 5/12th Inf conducted area destruction operations in AO Jari and persistent CS dispensing operations via XS 7283. On 16 April, C/5/12th Inf conducted RIF south into block by the 869th RF Company via XS 683676. Remainder of units conducted platoon patrols and squad security patrols around permanent installations.

(1) 19 - 25 April: 2/3d Inf continued operations in AO Jane. D/2/3d continued CS dispensing operations via XS 721816. On 22 April, A/D/2/3d conducted search and destroy operations in grids XS 6877, 6877, 6677, and 6777. Also on 22 April, C/2/3d Inf with the 170th RF Company and 158th PF Platoon conducted RIF in AO Nancy. From 23-25 April, elements of the battalion conducted platoon patrols and security operations via XS 6822, 6779, 6879, 6878, and 6877. Remaining units conducted local patrols and security operations via of FSBs and PBs. On 20 April, A/3/7th Inf conducted air mobile snatch operations, resulting in the capture of 3 VCI. On 21 April, B/3/7th Inf conducting Eagle Flights in AO Nancy, engaged the enemy, via XS 768782. Contact resulted in 7 VC KIA (BC), 4 VC KIA (Probc), 4 PWs and 1 VCI with negative US casualties. On 25 April, 3/7th Inf conducted cordon and search of Binh Tri Dong Village. B/4/12th continued OPCON to BITAC until 21 April. C/4/12th continued OPCON to 3/82nd Airborne and D/4/12th became OPCON to 3/82nd Airborne effective 20 April. A/4/12th OPCON to 3d Bde, 9th US Div at Rach Kien, effective 23 April. 5/12th continued operations in AO Jane. From 21 to 25 April, A/5/12th conducted star team interdiction operations via XS 7188. Area destruction and CS dispensing operations were conducted Vic
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XS 708830 and 745866. On 25 April, A/5/12th established block from XS 719885 to 713848, for sweep by the 553rd and 754th RF Companies. B/5/12th conducted airmobile snatch operations.

(m) 26 - 30 April: On 26 April, A/2/3d Inf, A/3/7th Inf, and one company 3/46th ARVN Rgmt began a three day area search operation in AO Marble, to the south of the brigade AO. On 28 April, C/2/3d Inf conducted day and night interdiction operations north of PB Elvira. A/D/5/12th infantry were placed OPCON to 2/3d Inf on 29 April, during Operation STRANGLER III. 3/7th Inf continued platoon patrols and RIF operations in AO Jane. Remaining units conducted local security of FSB and PB. A/4/12th continued OPCON to 3/9th Div at Rach Kien. D/C/4/12th Inf continued OPCON to 3/82nd Airborne. B/4/12th conducted riverine, airmobile and RIF operations in AO Swordfish III. On 29 April, 5/12th Inf (-) with A/2/3d and C/3/7th began Operation STRANGLER III, in conjunction with the 4/50th ARVN and 3/1st RF Battalion. Cordon was established around Tan Buu Village and surrounding area during the early morning hours of 30 April.

(n) Two major combined cordon and search operations were conducted and a third started during the reporting period to destroy and neutralize VC, VCI and VCG elements; and to enhance pacification:

STRANGLER I: 4-12 February 1969; Hung Long; vic XS 8077.

STRANGLER II: 13-16 February 1969; Tan Nhut; vic XS 7083.

STRANGLER III: 29 April-; Tan Buu; vic XS 6679.

1 Task organization for STRANGLER I consisted of:

a. Cordop forces:

2/3d Inf (-)
D/3/7th Inf (TF KAY)
C/3/7th Inf (TF KAY)
B/5/12th Inf (TF KAY)
5th Ranger Group (-) ARVN
30th Ranger Bn (-) ARVN
33d Ranger Bn (-) ARVN

b. Search Forces:

3/1st RF Bn (-)
NPTF Company
1 RF Company
Task organization for STRANGLER II consisted of:

a) Cordon Forces:

- 2/3d Inf
- C/4/12th Inf (TF KAY)
- D/4/12th Inf (TF KAY)
- A/5/12th Inf (TF KAY)
- D/5/12th Inf (TF KAY)
- 557th RF Co (-) ARVN
- 754th RF Co
- 869th RF Co
- 662nd PF Plat
- 470th PF Plat

b) Search Force:

- Recon/2/3d Inf
- 167th RF Plt
- 156th RF Plt
- 157th RF Plt
- 553d RF Plt
- NFFF Company

Task organization for STRANGLER III consists of:

a) Cordon Forces:

- 5/12th Inf (-)
- B/5/12th Inf
- C/5/12th Inf
- A/2/34 Inf
- C/3/7th Inf
- 3/50th ARVN Reg
- 3/1st RF Bn

b) Search Force:

- 2 RF Companies
- 2 NFFF Platoons

Specific techniques which proved effective in the conduct of large scale cordon and search operations were as follows:

- The NP were utilized as the search force combined with US/ARVN forces. The NP were a thorough, well disciplined, and very effective organization.
b. The placing of cordons within the cordon insured population control and prevented freedom of movement by the VC from one locale to another.

c. The cordons were in place and all units linked up prior to RMT to seal off the area and prevent exfiltration.

d. The area to be searched was divided into sections in order to conduct a detailed and systematic search. Phase lines or check points were established to assist in the control of the search element.

e. Liaison teams were exchanged with the participating ARVN units to coordinate the link-up points during the hours of darkness.

f. The cordon operation must last at least four days in order to starve the VC to a point where they must come out of their hiding place.

(3) Training Activities:

(a) The following personnel were trained at Redcatcher Combat Training Center (RCTC) during the period 1 Feb-30 Apr 1969:

<table>
<thead>
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<th>UNIT</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>159th LIB</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>54th Arty Gr</td>
<td>273 EM</td>
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<tr>
<td>IIPFV</td>
<td>17 EM</td>
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<tr>
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<td>500th Ingr</td>
<td>31 EM</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
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15
(b) The Mobile Training Team (MTT) trained D/17th Cav from 1-20 Feb on the 81mm mortar. Training was conducted at HMB through 15 Feb and live fire exercises were conducted at FSB Stephanie during the remainder of the schedule. 22 Feb - 1 March was spent in preparation and actual instruction to all elements of the 4/12th Infantry. On 3 March, two NCOs and the OIC of the MTT moved to Signal Mountain and conducted mortar training for signal and infantry personnel. The remainder of the team initiated the first sniper school on 7 March and were joined by the other team members on 9 March. The first school graduated 5 personnel on 15 March. During 16-19 March, preparation was made to conduct another sniper school. The second sniper school was conducted 20-28 March with 6 personnel successfully completing the school. Refresher training was given to the mortar crews of D/17 Cav from 2-8 April. The MTT started preparation for the Brigade BBT course, on 9 April. This included preparation of all lesson plans and the actual construction of two demonstration courses. The course opened on 16 April and was turned over to a committee of NCOs representing each battalion on 20 April. The MTT then moved to FSB Horseshoe Bend and began instruction for all elements of the 5/12th Infantry, on 22 April. On 29 April, the team returned to Brigade Main Base due to STRANGLER III operational commitments.

(c) On 3 February, the ARVN Mobile Training Team continued training the 52d ARVN Regiment. The team trained each unit for one week and then conducted a three day operation to grade unit effectiveness. During the period 16-23 February training was disrupted because of the ARVN TET break. During this period the ARVN MTT improved their security by building new bunkers. On 24 February, training resumed with the 1st, 2d Bn, 52d Reg. The ARVN MTT did not conduct training during the period 16-22 March due to the Xuan Loc Alert status. During the period 23-30 March, training was conducted for the 1st Company, 1st Bn, 52d Reg. In addition, special weapons training was conducted for instructors from the 52d ARVN Division, Training Center. The ARVN MTT completed training the 1st Bn, 52nd Reg on 10 April. An operation was conducted with this unit to check effectiveness. Training continued with the 52d ARVN Reg on 16 April at Xuan Loc. Instruction on the starlight scope and refresher training was conducted.

(4) Chemical Operations:

(a) Personnel Detector: During the period ending 30 April 69, 91 People Sniffer missions were flown. Three missions were flown in UH1-D model Helicopters and 88 missions were flown in OH6 Observation helicopters. The transport of M7 CS grenades (as reported in the last report) was supplemented by an M79 grenade launcher and E24 40mm CS cartridges. These munitions were used on areas of interest as detected by the APD, flushing the enemy from hidden positions and/or denying him use of these positions. The grenade launcher provides more precise delivery and accuracy, the effective range of the weapon provides more of a safety factor for the crew members. During the period a system of trail studies was developed to supplement information gathered during normal area sniffer missions. The procedure includes first, flying a high level visual
reconnaissance over a given area to determine the general layout of trails, canals and waterways within the area. Then, with gunship cover, those trails which indicate activity above the background level of condensation nuclei are plotted. Upon completion of the mission, the results are plotted on a 1/25,000 map to show detail and topography, and color coded to indicate dates detected. The results are subsequently forwarded to S2 for evaluation and information/action. The 503d Chemical Detachment is maintaining records of all sniffer missions and the trail studies operational map is daily updated and shows all known trails and enemy activity (as detected by APD). This information is maintained for the command group, S2/S3, use at all times.

(b) Herbicide Operations: During the quarterly period ending 30 April 69, seven waterborne and eight aerial herbicide operations were conducted by the 503d Chemical Detachment. 3300 gallons of herbicide "white" and 2000 gallons of herbicide "blue" were disseminated on two areas bounded by the following coordinates: X5 587925, 640925, 587900, 596907, 640900, 639907, 603800, 625865, 660865, 605810, 640810, 653835. The herbicide was disseminated through an aerial Agavelco Spray apparatus. Although herbicide "white" was found to work well for waterborne herbicide operations, it was found to be ineffective against nipa palm in aerial herbicide operations. "Blue" herbicide proved to be effective and would cause dying to begin after three days of contact.

(c) Riot Control Agent: 1-30 February, thirteen persistent CS operations were conducted within the 199th Inf' Bde AO. Two of the operations were aerial and eleven were ground operations. The aerial CS operations were flown in a UH-1D helicopter provided by the 199th Brigade Aviation Section. The Persistent CS was used to cover canal lines and areas of suspected enemy concentrations along the Kinh Can An Ha Canal. 400 pounds of CS were expended during the operation. The 8 pound packs of CS were wrapped with detonation cord with an 8 second delay blaster being used to destruct the pack. The missions were flown at 100 feet, at 50 knots to give good area coverage. The ground operations consisted of implanting 7720 pounds of CS II along canal lines and known areas of enemy activity at the following locations: "Five Finger" area, Hung Long River, Ung Han Canal, Ung Com Canal, and Ung Do Canal. The CS munitions now used in support of the 199th Inf' Bde are E-158 CS Bomb Cluster, E-8 CS Rocket Launchers, M-7 CS Hand Grenades, and 55 gallon drums of bulk CS. These munitions are maintained in a constant state of readiness for instantaneous support of the brigade.

(d) Flame Operations: During the quarterly period ending 30 April 69, the 503d Chemical Detachment conducted one flame mission. A flame perimeter was set up along the north side of Brigade Main Base, in each of the Battalion's areas of responsibility. The flame weapons consisted of 55 gallon drums containing a 6% mixture of thickened fuel. M-4 burstners and electric blasting caps were used to arm the weapons, with the detonation under the control of a command bunker. The drums have a range of 40-50 meters and a width of 10-20 meters, giving the north side of HMS the protection of a complete flame wall. The 503d Chemical Detachment is
capable of extended flame operations, and is prepared to assist the brigade with the employment of various types of flame weapons and field expedients.

(e) Chemical Training: During the last quarter the 503d Chemical detachment conducted ten chemical training classes. The types of classes are as follows: four classes on the construction, emplacement and employment of flame field expedients, four classes on the care, cleaning and fitting of the XM-28 Riot Control Agent Protective Mask, and two classes on the maintenance and operation of the M2A1-7 Portable Flame Thrower. These classes of instruction were designed to enlighten the knowledge of the equipment and capabilities of chemical operations within their respective units. The personnel who attended the instruction are now capable of performing a chemical mission, under the supervision of a trained chemical specialist.

(f) Chemical Inspections: During the reporting period, the 503d Chemical Detachment conducted twelve inspections. These inspections covered the M17 and M17-A1 Protective Mask, the M15-A2 Detector Kit, and the M11 Decontaminating Apparatus. These inspections enabled the line battalions of the Brigade to maintain a readiness standard of over 90 percent on the above mentioned equipment. Further inspections are planned to cover the other chemical equipment within the Brigade so as to maintain a continuous readiness standard of over 90 percent on all chemical equipment.

(5) Air Operations:

(a) United States Air Force: During the past quarter the USAF has supported the 199th Light Infantry Brigade with close air support, primarily destroying bunker complexes, enemy infiltration routes, and LZ preparations. In March, the brigade increased its air power by three new programs started by its new Air Liaison Officer, LTC Lewis. The three programs are as follows:

1 Divert Program: The Divert Program functions by having the brigade clear daily certain grid square areas for the entire day. Capital Military Assistance Command (CMAC) is then notified that certain areas are pre-cleared and that the Headquarters will accept any diverts. The net results of this program is an increase in the number of air strikes in the Brigade area of operations from a daily average of 1-2 to an average of 2-4.

2 Spooky Program: The Spooky Program consists of clearing certain grid squares nightly, based on current intelligence. When Spooky has completed its nightly mission, there is an area to unload its ordnance. The results of this program have been an increase in air interdiction and disruption of enemy infiltration throughout the Brigade AO.

3 20 millimeter handoff program: Under the third program, the Brigade has been successful in eliminating many booby traps. Areas known for a heavy concentration of booby traps are cleared on a daily basis.
with 20mm ordnance are permitted to fire into the cleared areas; the net result has been the destruction of many booby traps.

(b) USAF has flown the following missions:

1 Air strikes requested:

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<tr>
<td>Immediate</td>
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2 Air strikes flown:

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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 Bomb Damage Assessment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
<th>Uncovered</th>
<th>Cut</th>
<th>Killed by Air</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting Positions</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampans</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trails</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>475 Meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot Bridges</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Structures</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunnels</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy Personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Explosions</td>
<td></td>
<td>131</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustained Fires</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Army Aviation: The Brigade Aviation Section performed missions during the period 1 February to 30 April 1969 as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Hours flown</th>
<th>Sorties flown</th>
<th>Passengers</th>
<th>Tons Cargo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UH1</td>
<td>1101</td>
<td>3905</td>
<td>4827</td>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH6A</td>
<td>1198</td>
<td>4249</td>
<td>3524</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The section continued to provide Command and Control, day and night visual reconnaissance, resupply and various other tactical and administrative missions. During the month of March the section performed extensive defoliation spray missions in the Brigade AO. The Brigade was additionally supported with aviation assets in the form of aviation companies, gunships and combat support aircraft from the 1st Aviation Brigade. Missions performed were:
1. Command and Control
2. Airmobile Assaults
3. Eagle Flights
4. Troop Extraction and Repositioning
5. Aerial Reconnaissance
6. Artillery Fire Adjustment
7. Medical Evacuation
8. Radio Relay
9. Resupply
10. People Sniffer
11. Psychological Warfare Operations (PSYOPS)

During the past quarter, the 2nd Battalion, 40th Artillery has increased its role of direct support of the brigade. The battalion has expended approximately 72,500 rounds. This can be attributed to the increased number of radar sightings and airmobile operations. In addition, the firing batteries have been displaced a total of eleven times. Four of these displacements have been in support of brigade operations in the area of the Bo Bo Canal.

The majority of the brigade airmobile operations have been in the Pineapple. This area is ideal for artillery fire because of the limited civilian population. River operations on the Vam Co Dong and adjoining canals have resulted in several contact missions fired in support of naval and army craft. As a result of these contacts, waterway target lists have been prepared and forwarded to the liaison sections with the maneuver battalions and the firing batteries. A continuing increase in acquired targets reflects the high state of readiness of the AN/TPS-25A Radar located at FSB Barbara. The "block clearance" procedure, implemented last quarter, has continued to be utilized with increased success. Large areas are pre-cleared in the Pineapple prior to darkness, thus enabling the immediate delivery of fires on acquired or confirmed targets.

A new Defensive Target (DEFTAR) and Defensive Concentration (DEFCON) target list was prepared this quarter. It has eliminated the excessive number of previous targets and has given the battalion the increased ability to deliver timely and accurate fires in support of the brigade.

Logistics, Transportation and Engineer Operations.
I4.

(1) Logistical support remains centered at the HMB at Camp Frenzell-Jones with daily resupply being accomplished to each battalion's forward FSB. The units organic resupply capabilities continue to be augmented by the attached 151st Transportation (Light Truck Platoon) from the 48th Transportation Group.

(2) The Brigade recently received a total of 6 new Boston Whalers to be used on tactical waterborne operations within the Brigade AO. These boats were issued by the Brigade S-4, and will be transferred from unit to unit based upon the tactical requirement.

(3) Ground transportation continues to be a critical problem due to the scheme of deployment and the nature of operations conducted in the AO. Task force size Combined Holding Interrogation Center (CHIC) operations have necessitated drawing from truck support elements located at Transportation Corps Hill. During the reporting period, no major subordinate units were displaced outside the Brigade AO.

(4) Issue of Command Control Items by G-4 USAV is being made based upon the Equipment Density Report, submitted to the Brigade S-4 not later than the 17th of each month. Accuracy in reporting cannot be overemphasized, in order for the brigade to receive its fair share of controlled communications and electronics equipment.

(5) The following supplies were issued by the 7th Support Battalion:

(a) Class I:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Tons of &quot;A&quot; ration issued</td>
<td>1,009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Tons of &quot;C&quot; ration issued</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly Average</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Pounds of Ice</td>
<td>5,450,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Sundry packs issued</td>
<td>3,245</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Class II and IV:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Requisitions received</td>
<td>21,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Requisitions Filled from stock on hand</td>
<td>12,144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Demand Accomodations</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Average number received per week</td>
<td>1,780</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(c) Class III:
1. Gallons issued: 1,223,410
2. Average weekly issue: 102,000

(d) Class V:
1. Tons drawn: 3,559.1
2. Average tons drawn weekly: 298

(6) There has been no change in the supply status of the Brigade, from the last reporting period.

(7) Major items of supply obtained for the Brigade:
(a) Weapons:
1. Rifle M-16 91
2. Rifle M-14 8
3. Pistol .45 cal 11
4. Revolver .38 cal 8
5. M-79 36
6. Howitzer M102 1
7. 81mm Mortar 5
8. 4.2" Mortar 1
9. Machine gun M-60 6
10. Machine gun and Tripod 50 cal 6
11. Recoilless rifle 90mm 1
12. Bayonet Knife 325
(b) Mobility
1. Boston Whalers 6
2. 2½-ton dump Trucks 8
3. Truck tank, M49CA2, 1200 gal 2
4 1 ton Jeep
2 1 ton Field Ambulance
6 Tank Retriever
2 Tractor 5 ton
8 6 Ton Rough Terrain Forklift
(o) Communications
1 Antenna 292
2 Generator Sets
3 WD1/TT Wire (rolls)
4 PRC-77 Radio
5 PRC-25 Radio
6 Radar Set AN/PPS-5

(o) The following is a list of Engineer Construction Activities in the RRB from 1 February to 30 April 1969:

(a) Completed pouring concrete foundation, vertical construction, electrical installation of the following buildings:
1 20x60 Maintenance building for D Troop, 17th Cavalry.
2 30x70 Brigade Snack Bar.
3 20x96 BEQ and a 30x84 BOQ for Brigade Aviation.
4 MARS building in the 4900 block.

(b) Hauled laterite fill and poured concrete foundation for the following buildings:
1 5 each 20x116 BEQ pads for the 3/7th Inf Bn.
2 20x116 BEQ pad for 5/12th Inf Bn.
3 20x116 BEQ for 87th Engr Co.

(c) Buildings presently under vertical construction:
1 40x100 Post Chapel.
2. 20x96 BEQ for 5/12th Inf Bn.

(d) 1205 job orders were processed through the R&U and Operations section.

(e) Water heaters were installed in the Brigade Officer's, NCO and EM Clubs.

(f) Constructed bunker towers at the Hawk Site.

(g) Replaced concertina, building bunkers and constructing berms for the Brigade perimeter defense.

(h) Graded and shaped ground area at the site of the Brigade water facilities.

(i) Installed air conditioning in the Brigade dispensary.

(j) Electrical installation and finish work for the PX Concession.

(k) Poured concrete pad for refrigeration unit for NCO Club.

(l) Moving the Brigade POL into a new area at the Hawk Site.

(m) Surveyed location for 3 BEQ's in the 5/12th area.

(n) Grading, shaping, rolling, and peenpriming road sections in the BEQ; repairing and replacing culverts; and cutting and cleaning ditches for drainage.

(o) Working on the secondary electrical system and preparing buildings in the BEQ for tie-in with Vinnell Power.

(p) Prefabbing building components, showers, latrines, and bunker kits in the R&U Yard. 91 bunker kits were issued to units in the Brigade during this period.

(q) Hauled sand, rock, and laterite to work sites in the BEQ.

(9) Operation Support in Forward Areas: Various squads and pieces of heavy equipment in continuous direct support of the 2/3d Inf, 3/7th Inf, 4/12th Inf, 5/12th Inf, 2/40th Arty, Trp D, 17th Cav, 199th Inf Bde. Providing demolition and mine detector teams and performing general engineer support. Constructing and repairing bunkers, bridges both foot and vehicle, mess halls, billets, revetments, perimeter defense, and landing pads. Clearing firing lanes, upgrading and constructing forward roads, constructing berms, and swelling ground materials to forward areas.

g. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations.
During the reporting period, the Brigade’s Civic Action effort centered on supporting already established GVN programs and further implementing these programs with numerous short term, high impact civic action projects. As a result of the Communist attacks following the TET season, February 1969, the Brigade once again was requested to support housing reconstruction in the village of Ho Nai, Bien Hoa Province. Brigade support was provided to 80 families who had their homes completely destroyed during the Communist attacks. This support consisted of 10 sheets of roofing tin, 10 bags of cement and one truck load of scrap lumber, provided to each family. As of 1 May 1969, reconstruction of all homes had reached 50% completion with 20 homes completed. The 199th Inf Brigade only provided materials, all construction work was accomplished by home owners.

During the reporting period a civil affairs block of instruction was established at the brigade’s in-country training center “Redcatcher”. During the class period, a general orientation on Vietnamese Culture and Customs is provided. Discussion on problems that the GI may encounter during his contact with local civilians are also discussed. Classes at the training center provide all newly arrived Brigade personnel with a US-Vietnamese Relations orientation during their first week in-country.

English language classes for civilian employees were also established during the reporting period. It was found that the job efficiency of many civilian employees was being restricted as a result of their limited usage of the English language. Presently, English language classes are provided to all interested civilian employees twice per week during duty hours. Approximately 85 persons attend classes on a regular basis.

There were 37 incidents involving US personnel and Vietnamese civilians during the reporting period. These incidents resulted in the payment of 45 individuals. Broad categories of incidents are:

(a) Firearms accidents: 3.
(b) Motor vehicles: 8.
(c) "Civilians injured as a result of response to hostile fire": 15.

The Psychological Operations conducted by the brigade during the reporting period continued to support three main programs: The Chieu Hoi Program, and a program designed to install in the civilian populace confidence in the Government of Vietnam. In addition to aerial and ground speaker utilization and dissemination of leaflets, the brigade distributed patriotic T-Shirts bearing the colors of the Republic of Vietnam.

Statistical Summary:

(a) Civic Action Projects conducted and items distributed:
1. MEDCAPS:
   a. Loc Lam Dispensary: 858.
   b. Brigade AD: 22,276.
   c. Total: 23,134.
2. Schools:
   a. Constructed: 0.
   b. Repaired: 2.
3. Homes:
   a. Constructed: 5.
   b. Repaired: 80.
4. Roads:
   a. Constructed: 0.
   b. Repaired: 2.
6. Bridges:
8. Lumber: 545,130 board feet.
9. Tin Roofing: 2,276 sheets.
11. Foodstuffs: 17,210 pounds.
12. Health items: 5,559 pounds shap.
Whitewash: 200 pounds.
Whitewash Brushes: 9.
Candy: 644 pounds.
School Kits: 30.
Hygiene Kits: 300.
T-Shirts: 1,200.
Used Clothing: 1,035.
Shower Shoes: 10 pair.

(b) Psychological Operations:

1 Leaflets aerially distributed by supporting units/by organic assets:
   a Chieu Hoi: 8,500,000/675,000.
   b Safe Conduct Passes: 0/8,000.
   c Volunteer Information Program: 5,600,000/150,000.
   d Support GVN: 912,000/340,000.

2 Leaflets distributed by hand:
   a Chieu Hoi: 150,000.
   b Volunteer Information Program: 7,000.
   c Cordon and Search: 200,000.
   d Health Tips: 3,960.

Aerial speaker message by supporting unit/by organic assets:
   a Chieu Hoi: 42 hours/15 hours.
   b Volunteer Information Program: 0/6 hours.
   c Cordon and Search: 0/7 hours.
   d Support GVN: 15 hours/5 hours.

Ground speaker messages:
   a Chieu Hoi: 280 hours.
b. Cordon and Search: 73 hours.

g. Volunteer Information Program: 7 hours.

d. JUSPAC News: 10 hours.

h. Signal.

(1) The Brigade CP remained stationary during the period. Infantry Battalions rotated between fire support bases. The overall communications systems remained relatively fixed in nature.

(2) The communications posture on 31 January 1969 for the Brigade was as follows:

(a) Radio Relay Systems.

1. The Radio Relay and Systems Diagram (Incl 1) shows the systems utilized to provide command and control communications.

2. CMAC operated the Terminal at their site and the 199th LIB operated the remaining stations.

(b) Radio

1. Brigade Forward at FSB Horseshoe Bend.


b. Brigade Secure-Net-FM (Secure).

c. CMAC Command Net-FM (Non-Secure).

d. CMAC Secure Net-FM (Secure).

e. Spare Net-FM (Non-Secure).


g. ALO Net FM, AM and UHF (Non-Secure).

h. Brigade Command Net SSB (Non-Secure).

2. Brigade Rear TOC at Camp Frenzell-Jones.

a. II FFORCEV Command Net FM (Non-Secure).

b. II FFORCEV Secure Net FM (Secure) on-call.

Brigade Secure Net FM (Secure).

2 Brigade Command Net SSB (Non-Secure).

3 Infantry Battalions:

a Each Infantry Battalion operated a Command Net and a Logistical Net-FM.

b Each Infantry Company operated a Command Net-FM.

c Artillery Battalions:

a The 2/40th Artillery Battalion operated a command net and monitored each firing battery's net.

b Each firing battery operated a Fire Direction Net.

c Wire:

1 Wire lines were limited to local distribution within the CP's and from battalion to company level when possible.

2 Switchboards:

a Redcatcher FWD TOC Switchboard (AN/MTC-10) of which 50 jacks were filled, with a 60 line capacity.

b Redcatcher Rear TOC Switchboard utilized an AN/MTC-7 Switchboard with a 60 line capacity, of which 43 jacks were filled.

c Each Infantry Battalions and the Artillery Battalion utilized the SB-22/PT Switchboard stacked for a total of a 29 line capacity.

d Communications Centers:

1 The Brigade Rear Communications Center at Camp Frenzell-Jones, utilizes two each AN/MGC-17's Teletype Central Office dismounted. The Comm-Center terminated one FDX from II FFORCEV and one HDX to Brigade FWD TOC.

2 The Brigade Comm-Center at FSU Horseshoe Bend is an AN/MGC-34 dismounted. It terminated one HDX on line circuit to Brigade Rear CP and one HDX on line circuit to CMAC.

3 Messenger service was provided to units at Camp Frenzell-Jones, Bde FWD and Bde Rear with a stop at CMAC twice daily.

e Radio Teletype: A CMAC Radio Teletype Team provides backup for the CMAC-199th Inf Bde Teletype System.
1. Public Information.

(1) During the reporting period, the 40th Public Information Detachment and attached personnel maintained a high level of information coverage for the Brigade. During the quarter, the main area of interest centered on continued publication of the Brigade newspaper. In addition, work was completed on the annual Brigade magazine. Projected distribution date is around 15 May 1969. A special effort was also made during the quarter to effect greater assistance to the battalion information specialists and provide better liaison between them and the Information Office. In addition to a thorough briefing by the Information Officer and printed guidance, the information specialists requested and received advice of a more technical nature from all personnel in the Information Office. The Information Office continued to maintain its interest in the Army Hometown News Release Program and showed a significant improvement in that area. The Information Office continued to assist the press when possible. There was a continued decrease in press visits due to a decreasing emphasis on the war by the various agencies. The following is a breakdown of the 40th Public Information Detachment information activities during the reporting period:

(a) News Releases - 53.
(b) Picture Releases - 178.
(c) Hometown News Releases - 1,064.
(d) Hometown Picture Releases - 79.
(e) Hometown TV Film Clips - 1.
(f) News Media Visits - 54.

J. Staff Judge Advocate.

(1) During the reporting quarter, this command paid $1,494.27 in personal property claims to U.S. military personnel. The breakdown is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>CLAIMS</th>
<th>AMOUNT PAID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>$1,078.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>84.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>330.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>$1,494.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
(2) The breakdown of Nonjudicial punishment imposed during the reporting period is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2/3d</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/7th</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/12th</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/12th</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/40th</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Spt</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC 199th</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87th Engr</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Rcp, 17th Cav</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>313th Sig</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75th Inf</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bde TOTALS</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Emphasis is being placed on unit commanders to exercise their authority under Art 15, UCMJ, to maintain discipline within their command. Special emphasis must be given to the expeditious processing of charges involving pre-trial confinement. The breakdown of Courts-Martial is below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2/3d</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/7th</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/12th</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/12th</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/40th</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Spt</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

31

CONFIDENTIAL
87th Engr 0 0 1 1
17th Cav 0 0 0 0
HHC, 199 0 0 2 2
75th Inf 0 0 0 0
313th Sgr 0 0 0 0
TOTALS 15 3 20 38

Summary:
2/3d 2 0 0 2
3/7th 0 0 0 0
4/12th 0 0 0 0
5/12th 0 0 0 0
2/40th 0 1 0 1
7th Spt 0 0 1 1
87th Engr 0 0 0 0
17th Cav 0 0 0 0
HHC, 199 0 0 0 0
75th Inf 0 0 0 0
313th Sgr 0 0 0 0
TOTALS 2 1 1 4

(4) A complete breakdown of legal assistance cases handled during the reporting period are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Type</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adoption and change of name</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Rights</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Relations</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depositions</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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## CONFIDENTIAL

### Non-Support
- 0 1 0 1

### Notarizations
- 0 0 0 0

### Personal Finances debts
- 3 4 2 9

### Personal Property
- 3 5 4 12

### Power of Attorney
- 12 12 12 36

### Real Property
- 2 5 0 7

### Taxation
- 1 4 3 8

### Torts
- 0 0 0 0

### Wills and Estates
- 2 6 2 10

### Miscellaneous
- 52 59 59 170

### TOTALS
- 99 126 106 331

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(1) During this period, four additional guard towers were installed in the Old Hawk Site area in order to establish sufficient security in that recently opened area. This addition resulted in a need for more Security Guards and equipment for this added commitment. The need was promptly met and security was established in this sector of Camp Frenzel-Jones.

(2) During the post-TET Offensive of 23 February 1969, the use of Scout Dogs was initiated to enhance the security of the base camp with emphasis being placed on critical areas such as ammunition dumps, helipads, and Petroleum, Oil, and Lubrication points. The dogs and their handlers were effective and as a result no enemy intrusion was recorded, resulting in no injuries or damages.

(3) Anti-intrusion devices were also installed at this time. Three seismograph machines were placed into operation at various points on the perimeter. These devices record any vibration within a 30 yard radius and proved to be a valuable aid in detecting foreign movements.

(4) Two combined police Marijuana Raids were conducted during a critical drug-abuse period in the Forward area. The raids resulted in the confiscation of 4½ pounds of marijuana and a vast assortment of United States Government property. The raids were also effective in discouraging Off-Limits area violators, in that six United States personnel were apprehended in these areas during the searches.

(5) In conjunction with these raids, marijuana classes were organized by this office and instruction periods were presented to unit commanders and
troop leaders by Criminal Investigators from the 8th Criminal Investigation Group, Long Binh. The instruction centered around narcotic use, procurement, identification, and recognition.

(6) A Staff Study was drawn up by this office for the purpose of establishing an "Amnesty Day" within the 199th Infantry Brigade. This "Amnesty Day" would afford individuals a one-day chance to dispose of narcotics and/or privately owned weapons without fear of any disciplinary action. It was further stressed, however, that after "Amnesty Day", strict surveillance and disciplinary reprisals would be taken against any offenders.

(7) Highway TL-10, a greatly traveled thoroughfare, running from Highway QL-94 to the Korean Road, north of Fire Support Base Horseshoe Bend was placed off-limits to all 199th vehicles, 3/4 ton and over, by this office. Up to this time, this road had been a primary convoy route leading from Saigon to FSB Stephanie, and because of its congestion and narrow driving lanes, many traffic accidents resulting in injury, death and serious damage were regularly occurring along this roadway. The convoy route was re-established from Tan Son Nhat Air Base directly down the Korean Road to FSB Stephanie, resulting in a major reduction of serious traffic accidents in the forward areas.

(8) A proposal was submitted by this office to begin a changeover within the Security Guard Platoon. The objective stressed in this changeover would be to release 11B MOS personnel to their respective units and replace them with qualified 95B MOS personnel. The suggestion was approved and at this time, USARV is routing 95B MOS personnel to this Brigade for assigned duty with the Security Guard Platoon. A Military Police Officer in the rank of Captain was placed in charge of the Security Guard with his additional duty as Physical Security Officer for the RMB.

(9) An aggressive shakedown policy was initiated at the Brigade Civilian Labor Point in an effort to curb an increasing amount of Military Payment Certificates and rationed items leaving this base camp. A policewoman was procured for a club girl shakedown at night, which proved very successful. Also, very thorough spot checks on Concessionaires uncovered hundreds of dollars of rationed and Post Exchange items, which are sold on the Black Market.

(10) A Kit Carson Scout was assigned for duty with the Headquarters Platoon (Military Police) for use in the forward areas. He will assist the Military Police in patrols, checkpoints, cordon and searches, and the handling of PWs. He is also a valuable asset to the MPs during convoy and escort duty through critical tactical areas.

(11) A Staff Study was initiated by this office for the purpose of establishing controls over Vietnamese civilians either living or employed at FSB Horseshoe Bend, the idea of establishing a civilian labor point pass system in accordance with USARV Reg 190-20. A cordon operation was also suggested, by this office, in order to round-up any Vietnamese personnel not authorized in that area and to confiscate any government or other
unauthorized property. The Staff Study was approved and a cordon was executed within the Fishnet Compound. It resulted in the detention of two draft dodgers and confiscation of a vast assortment of government property.

1. Chaplain Activities.

(1) The Chaplains of the 199th Infantry Brigade continue to conduct more services per week than the average of any other unit in II Field Force. The average number of services per week per Chaplain in USARV was 6.5 for Feb, Mar, and Apr 1969. The average number of services per week per Chaplain for the 199th LIB was 10.2.

(2) The religious coverage for the 199th LIB includes the reports of assigned Catholic and Protestant Chaplains. Additional coverage is provided by Chaplains in the Long Binh and Saigon area. This includes Jewish services and numerous Protestant denominational services. Whether in base camps or in the field, brigade personnel have an opportunity to attend a Protestant or Catholic service each week. Special emphasis was given to religious coverage during the Easter Season. By coordination with Brigade Aviation, helicopters were made available to Chaplains. A total of 38 services were held on Easter Sunday. Each company size unit had Catholic and Protestant services Easter Day. Memorial Services were held in each unit sustaining losses of personnel as a result of combat. Counselling, orientations, visits to hospitals and stockade facilities and active participation in field exercises by unit Chaplains increased the rapport between the Chaplains and their men. The Easter and Passover Season gave great emphasis to the religious program. Each Chaplain participated in a Sunrise Easter service and continued with religious services throughout the day. Military guests were Chaplain (COL) Joseph Gefell and Chaplain (LTC) John Logan both of II Field Forces.

(3) Statistical report for period 1 February - 30 April:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ATTENDANCE</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Services</td>
<td>584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memorial Services</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientations</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counselling Cases</td>
<td>1,058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letters to Churches</td>
<td>456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letters of Condolence</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Surgeon Activities.

(1) The health of the command shows an average admission rate of 131/1000/annum and a daily non-effectiveness in respect to sick days as an average of 270 per month. These rates are considerably lower than last quarter. The primary decrease was noted in the decline of skin and cellular tissue disease.

(2) The malaria rate has decreased sharply to an average of 8 cases per month. This reflects the efforts of commanders to insure that their personnel take the malaria tablets provided for their use.

(3) The incidence of diarrheas increased from an average 19/1000/annum last quarter to 25/1000/annum this reporting period. To reduce the diarrhea rate, more emphasis must be placed on improvement of sanitation conditions in the field.

(4) During this quarter the venereal disease rate decreased from 191 cases per month to 104 cases per month. This decline can be attributed to command emphasis on means of reducing the incidence of V.D., such as making certain areas "off-limits" to troops, the use of V.D. lectures by the Battalion Surgeons in the field and by making certain that mechanical prophylactics (condoms) are made available through unit facilities.

(5) Skin and Cellular disease decreased from 247 cases per month during the previous period to 126 cases per month for the present reporting period. The reduction of inundated areas during the dry season can be directly responsible for the decreased rate of skin disease.

(6) The hepatitis rate remained stable since the last quarterly report. The average number of cases reported remained at 4 cases per month.

(7) Rodent control within the fire support bases and company areas in the field continues to be a problem. A total of 56 bites were reported this quarter. The bites consisted of 26 dog bites, 29 rat bites and one monkey bite.

(8) Improved mess facilities were constructed and were in the process of being constructed at all the artillery fire support bases during this quarter.

2. (C) Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel.

(1) Urinary testing for chloroquine in personnel contracting malaria often shows an absence of the drug.
(a) Observation: Troops in the field frequently "forget" or neglect to take their weekly Chloroquine-Primaquine tablet. Some individuals have stomach cramps and/or diarrhea when taking the tablet. By random testing of units for chloroquine residual, many units in Vietnam have reduced their malaria rate. Individuals will take the tablet for fear of the consequences of having a negative urine test.

(b) Evaluation: The use of the urinary chloroquine residual test has helped reduce the incidence of malaria in field troops.

(c) Recommendations: Commanders make use of the urine test for chloroquine residual as a means to insure that their personnel are taking the Chloroquine-Primaquine tablet.

(2) Purchase of locally prepared food and drinks from peddlers, vendors and camp followers has caused a considerable increase in the rate of hepatitis among US Personnel.

(a) Observation: Troops operating in the field have purchased food and drinks from peddlers, vendors and camp followers. Some of these peddlers are very ingenious and even use sampans to reach troops in isolated areas. Since these indigenous personnel are in many cases carriers of hepatitis and use non-potable ice or food, they are definite sources of infections for US Troops. There is no necessity for purchase of these items as the food and water supply is more than adequate and a little self-discipline on the individuals involved is required, as anyone can survive for several days without food and water and thus avoid the possibility of contracting hepatitis.

(b) Evaluation: The purchase of food and drinks from peddlers, vendors and camp followers is a real and potential hazard to US Personnel.

(c) Recommendation: That command emphasis be made to keep peddlers, vendors and camp followers out of F3Bs and FUs and inform all US Personnel of the hazard involved in purchasing food and drinks from the local economy.

b. Operations.

(1) Defoliation Spray Missions Utilizing UH-1 Helicopters.

(a) Observation: A method of preventing defoliant spray from fogging the windshield of the spray helicopter and causing dizziness and headaches among the crew.

(b) Evaluation: During defoliation missions utilizing the UH-1 helicopter, fogging of the windshield and the pilot's visors was a matter of great concern. The crews also complained of dizziness and headaches after about one hour of spray operation. A solution to the problem was found by mapping a poncho between the cockpit and the remaining cabin area. The mapps provided on the aircraft immediately back of and overhead of the pilot/co-pilot will accommodate the mapps of the poncho. This successfully prevented the spray from entering the cockpit area.

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(c) Recommendation: That the use of a poncho or other suitable curtain be a requirement on all spray missions involving UH-1 aircraft.

(2) Very High Frequency (VHF) Operations.

(a) Observation: VHF communications are point-to-point in nature.

(b) Evaluation: The AN/ARC-112, utilizing the ground plane antenna, obtains weak radio signals when receiving transmissions from a source located more than 20 miles away over flat terrain. Radio signals were much stronger when the ground plane antenna was replaced by a directional antenna. Use of the directional antenna with the VHF system on all operations outside the 199th AO has resulted in excellent communications.

(c) That the directional antenna with the VHF system be used on all operations outside the 199th AO.

(3) Electrical Circuits (Claymore).

(a) Observation: Electrical wires from claymore mines are frequently damaged by rodents.

(b) Evaluation: Recently a US ambush attempted to engage 3 VC with an emplaced claymore. The claymore would not detonate; consequently the VC were engaged with small arms fire. Once the engagement was terminated, the claymore was inspected to determine the reasons for the malfunction. It was discovered that rats had chewed the claymore wires in half.

(c) Recommendations:

1. That claymore wires be checked as often as the tactical situation will permit.

2. That the claymore wires be emplaced under water whenever possible.

3. That some type of rodent repellent be developed to deter wire chewing by rats.

(4) Reconnaissance Prior to Cordon and Search Operations.

(a) Observation: Cordon and Search Operations of large areas require detailed reconnaissance prior to initiating the operation.

(b) Evaluation: Elements of the 199th LIB and the 5th Ranger Group (ARVN) during Operations STRANGLER I, cordoned an area consisting of eight grid squares. A cordon force equivalent to four US Infantry Battalions was employed to seal off the area of operation. Plans for the cordon were developed within a limited time period and the selection of the initial operating positions had to be made from map reconnaissance alone. During the operation it was found that a large portion of the cordon area was
uninhabited and contained a wealth of hiding places for the enemy. A more comprehensive reconnaissance had been needed in order to effectively position the operating elements. A greater effective coverage of the area with a much reduced force could have resulted with a more intelligent selection of positions for the operating elements.

(c) Recommendations:

1. Areas targeted for Cordon and Search Operations be reconed by air one to three weeks in advance of operation.

2. Air photo missions be utilized to photograph numerous target areas and filed so as to be available for reference when a particular area is selected.

3. Cordon and Search Operations not be planned strictly from map recon.

(5) Ground Communications with Light Fire Team:

(a) Observation: That when employing Light Fire Team in support of a squad size or platoon size unit, the Light Fire Team should operate on the internal radio frequency of the unit on the ground.

(b) Evaluation: When a Light Fire Team is employed in support of a small unit on the ground (squad or platoon) the problem of what radio frequency the LFT should be on arises. Operating under the premise that the ground element should control the LFT directly, the question arises whether the LFT should be on the battalion frequency, or the LFT operate on the company internal frequency. Both methods have been tried and both work satisfactorily in controlling the LFT. However, when a unit in contact is on the battalion frequency it tends to tie up the battalion command net completely, and interfere with other operations that may be in progress. The best method is to have the LFT operate on the company internal frequency and talk directly to the unit on the ground. If there are units from more than one company in the area, the LFT should remain on the battalion frequency until all elements have been identified visually by the LFT and the LFT then goes to the frequency of the unit in contact. Should the battalion need to contact the LFT directly for employment elsewhere or to give other instructions, it can be contacted on the company internal frequency.

(c) Recommendation: That the LFT operate on the company internal frequency when small units are in contact. When elements of more than one company are involved, the LFT remains on the battalion net until identification of all units on the ground is established, and then goes to the frequency of the unit in contact.

(6) Field Artillery Digital Automatic Computer (FADAC).
(a) Observation: Constant operation of the FADAC for extended periods of time causes overheating and results in the production of incorrect data.

(b) Evaluation: The FADAC was giving wrong data on numerous occasions after long periods of continuous operation. It was determined by trial and error that the machine was overheating if allowed to operate continuously for time periods over four hours in duration. The overheating resulted in the production of incorrect data by the computer. When the FADAC was allowed to cool down for 15 minutes after every four hours of continuous operation, the machine cooled off sufficiently and functioned correctly.

(c) Recommendation: Field Artillery Digital Automatic Computers that are forced to operate continuously over extended time periods should be shut down to allow the computer to cool off after each four hours of operation. The cooling off interval should be at least 15 minutes.

(7) Booby Traps near Fire Support Bases:

(a) Observation: Patrols are initiated on a daily basis from each of the fire support bases.

(b) Evaluation: Patrols leaving and entering fire bases use frequently traveled paths and dikes that lie adjacent to the fire bases. Soldiers have triggered booby trap devices as close as 100 meters to the fire base. Booby trap devices are being placed by the VC on frequently traveled dikes and paths to catch the soldier who believes that these areas are free of obstacles since they are so close to the fire base.

(c) Recommendation: That local security patrols be sent out daily, at first light, to inspect the area around the protective wire and the trails that lead to and from the fire base.

(8) Communications:

(a) Observation: Excessive interference on the firing battery fire direction frequency.

(b) Evaluation: Many operations are initiated outside of the Bde's AO which require displacement of the artillery firing batteries in order to adequately support the ground troops. When the firing battery is collocated with other US units operating on similar radio frequencies, there is excessive radio interference and serious overriding which requires continuous changing of the battery's radio frequency in order to maintain communication with the battery supporting and supported elements.

(c) Recommendation: That at least two alternate frequencies be provided to batteries that are displaced outside of their main area of Operation, in order to increase their chances of being able to have a frequency that does not coincide with friendly units in the area.
(9) **Herbicide Operations.**

(a) Observation: Herbicide "white" was utilized to defoliate nipa palm growing in swampy areas along canals and streams.

(b) Evaluation: Herbicide "white" was applied to nipa palm in varying concentrations from 1% to 100%. Differentiation between the defoliation effect accomplished by the different concentrations of herbicide could not be established. It appears that the herbicide "white" acts very slowly on nipa palm in its defoliation function. The defoliation of nipa palm growing in swampy areas, with herbicide "white", is a slow process. Areas that were sprayed in the early morning just after daylight seemed to be affected by the herbicide much more than areas sprayed in the afternoon. Spraying operations are now being done in the morning. The heat of the day allowed too much of the herbicide to evaporate before it could have any effect on the nipa palm. Danger from enemy fire during hours of darkness precludes spraying herbicide in the evening or during the night.

(c) Recommendation: That herbicides be sprayed during the morning hours for greater effect on nipa palm. Further recommend that a faster acting herbicide be procured for use on nipa palm.

(10) **Emplacement of Trip Flares**

(a) Observation: When trip flares burn, their high intensity light makes it difficult to see anything behind them. Observation is best in the areas in front of the flare and out to the sides.

(b) Evaluation: Standard methods of emplacing trip flares call for the wire to run out to the side of the flare, parallel to the friendly position. Someone tripping the flare merely has to back up lie down, and detection is very difficult.

(c) Recommendation: Trip flares be emplaced with the trip wire running either diagonally toward the position or straight toward the position and then parallel to it. (See Figure 1)

![Figure 1](image)

(11) **Construction of Parapet Walls**:  

(a) Observation: Howitzer position walls built out of ammunition boxes often split and collapse under the shock caused by firing the howitzer.

(b) Evaluation: The boxes crack on the inside wall unless interlocked and braced to disperse the shock.
(c) Recommendation: Parapet walls be built in a square formation for maximum interlocking strength and the inside be braced with plywood, PSP, or separate boards.

(12) **Firing Platform for M101 Series Howitzer.**

(a) Observation: When an artillery battery utilizing the M101 series, 105mm towed howitzer, airmobiles into an unimproved area, it often finds that the condition of the ground is not suitable to support a weapon of this type under sustained operations due to high moisture content of the soil.

(b) Evaluation: During firing, the weapon will begin to settle through the dried crust of the soil, and the wheels will become so mired that the weapon will be forced out of lay or that, when a change in azimuth is required, the crew will be unable to shift trails. This condition greatly decreases the efficiency and reaction time of the firing battery.

(c) Recommendation: At least four pieces of perforated steel planking should be attached to the trails of the weapon during airmobile operations of this type to provide a firing platform immediately upon implantation of the weapon.

(13) **Fire Control of LZ Preparations.**

(a) Observation: It is of primary importance to be able to place the first element on the ground as soon as possible after completion of the Artillery Preparation. This requires very close coordination between the Arty Liaison Officer and the Airmobile Company. The length of the preparation may vary with different units and various other factors. Thus at best, only an estimation of total time for the preparation can be given. This is not satisfactory in maintaining continuity of the operation.

(b) Evaluation: Countdowns to "all rounds on ground and tubes clear" have been used recently by the 4/12th Inf and the supporting fire units on landing zone preparations. By using this method, the Arty Liaison Officer informs the fire units "4 minutes to all rounds on the ground from now". Time announced can be adjusted according to expected length of preparation. The firing element then controls the remainder of the countdown. Using more than one fire unit requires the LNO to designate the unit to continue the countdown. All other fire units will control their fires in accordance with the countdown of the designated unit. The last rounds fired will be at time of flight of rounds in the countdown. This enables a volume of fire to be sustained to the finalization of the preparation. The Airmobile Company can lift ships on final approach to the LZ at the proper time, thus enabling troops to be on the ground within a matter of seconds rather than a substantial time lapse existing.

(c) Recommendation: It is recommended that this method of firing of LZ Preparations be adopted throughout the Brigade. It has been proven effective with the infantry units and the Airmobile Companies that have had the opportunity to work with this system.
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14) Brigade Personnel should not talk to unaccompanied press.

(a) Observation: Seemingly harmless statements to the various media can and have had much wider and more harmful ramifications than imagined at the time.

(b) Evaluation: It is not a new lesson to be learned. Other units in Vietnam have had many chances to learn the lesson. The 199th is not often guilty of this breach of good sense. But in late January, 1969, the Brigade was involved in a contact in the area of "Parrot's Beak" of the Vam Co Dong River. A reporter from one of the major wire services heard about it and, being familiar with the area, drove to a 199th fire support base. Once there, he obtained entry and contacted the S-3 of the battalion involved in the contact. Although there was no escort from the Information Office, the battalion S-3 talked freely of enemy troop "strengths", unit designations, friendly strengths and on-going operations in the area of contact. The problem was that the newsman was talking of one thing and the staff officer was speaking in quite larger terms. If an Information Office escort had been there, a clarification could have been made. The Information Office had maintained constant surveillance of the contact. Information was updated hourly or as it became available by the Brigade S-2 and S-3. Without this clarification, however, the newsman published the information he had received from the battalion staff officer. The figures cited ranged from being relatively accurate to approximately twice the size of the best available intelligence estimates. The article was published by both wire services throughout the U.S. and in two of Saigon's largest papers. The results were phone calls from the Pentagon to MACV J-3 wanting to know why it had not been informed of large enemy forces moving on Saigon. Subsequent queries were made to MACO and the QMAC 10.

(c) Recommendation: All responsible individuals at all levels should become familiar with Brigade Regulation 360-1. The guideline is: Do not talk to the press at any time unless an Information Office representative is present.

15) Chaplains can reach more men if helicopters are made available to them.

(a) Observation: The period of this report, which includes Easter - the most important religious season of the Christian year, has been the most productive for chaplains' activities during the fiscal year.

(b) Evaluation: A principal factor in the success of the Chaplains of the 199th LIB has been the availability of helicopter transportation. Without such transportation it would have been impossible to reach so many men with services.

(c) Recommendation: That the program of Holy week services and Easter Services be duplicated next year. That a helicopter again be made available for Chaplains next Easter.
o. Training.

(1) Booby Trap Training.

(a) Observation: Booby trap training in the brigade AO is being conducted to acquaint individual soldiers with techniques of enemy employment, and methods of detection and destruction.

(b) Evaluation: Experience has shown that the response to instruction is more favorable and student participation more enthusiastic when instruction is oriented towards instilling confidence in being able to detect and neutralize enemy booby traps, rather than creating an atmosphere of fear.

(c) Recommendation: That instruction pertaining to enemy capabilities, particularly employment of booby traps, be given in areas similar to those encountered in the unit's AO, thereby enhancing the individual soldier's confidence in his ability to accomplish his mission.

d. Intelligence. None.

e. Logistics.

(1) Sampan Use.

(a) Observation: Sampans have been used by the Brigade units to move supplies, equipment, and personnel.

(b) Evaluation: The geographical location of the 199th LIB's present AO has required the use of water transportation during many of its movements of supplies, equipment and personnel. The brigade purchased a small number of sampans for study and evaluation. The following observations have been made:

1. Sampans are extremely valuable for use in searching canal banks, crossing small canals, silent insertions of APs along canal or small streams, and resupply in areas inaccessible to deep draught boats.

2. Sampans are not suitable for use in deep water or swift flowing streams, and rivers unless they have a motor. Sampans are extremely vulnerable to small arms fire and are easily capsized if not handled correctly.

(c) Recommendation:

1. That sampans be used in searching canal banks, crossing small canals, silent insertions of APs along canal and small streams, and resupply in areas inaccessible to deep draught boats.

2. That motors should be purchased for each sampan.
3. That new sampans should be:
   a. Painted a non-reflective color (green) to preserve the wood and provide some camouflage.
   b. Checked to insure that all seams are properly caulked.
   c. Modified such that a protective floor is installed in the bottom of each sampan to prevent damage from heavy equipment or rough treatment.
   d. Sunk with rocks for 2-3 days to allow the seams to swell and become watertight.

2. **Recurring stockpiling of certain Class V items.**

   a. Observation: Stockpiling of certain Class V items was causing shortages within the Brigade which could be alleviated by proper control and supervision.

   b. Evaluation: Recently this command has exceeded its monthly AAR on a recurring basis; a major contributing factor was the stockpiling of Class V assets during the last three days of the AAR period. Institution of proper control has successfully eliminated this problem.

   c. Recommendation: That units continue to draw AAR items from the 3d Ordnance Battalion only on an as needed basis, avoiding all attempts to stockpile, since depleting on hand assets at 3d Ordnance Battalion will only increase the number of Class V items for the following month, and decrease the Brigade's over-all allocation.

f. **Organizational:** None

g. **Other:**

1. **Static Electricity:**

   a. Observation: The brigade conducted burning operations during the period 8 March through 12 March 1969 in order to remove nipa palm from strategic areas along canals and streams. Fifty-five gallon drums of gasoline were lifted to the nipa palm areas by a CH47 helicopter. The individual responsible for engaging the loading sling with the helicopter was frequently knocked down by an electrical shock.

   b. Evaluation: The drums produced the dangerous shock only during hook up of the hanging with the aircraft. Only drums that had been heated up by the sun produced the electrical shock. The drums produced no shock when lifted early in the morning or late in the evening.

   c. Recommendation: Transportation of sling loaded drums of gasoline by helicopter should take place early in the morning before the gasoline
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Drums heat up, thereby eliminating the electrical shock and danger to personnel.

FREDERIC E. DAVISON
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

1 Incl
1. Radio Relay Diagram
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-RE-H 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade
For Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS USFOR-65, UIC WFBAB

DA, HQ II FORCENV, APO San Francisco 96266 15 JUN 1969

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-D, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report -
Lessons Learned of the 199th Infantry Brigade for the period ending
30 April 1969, with the following exception. Reference paragraph 2b(6).
Nonconcur. The TEMP indicator light blinks when the operating temperature
is not correct. Should any indication of overheating occur, the operator
should immediately turn off the computer and attempt to determine the
cause. Environmental tests were conducted during service tests of the
equipment and overheating should not occur if the computer is functioning
properly. The most common cause of overheating is dirty air filters.
These filters must be cleaned daily, or more often, in an extremely dusty
environment.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

B. G. MACDONALD

CONFIDENTIAL
AVHC-DST (30 April 1969) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65, UIC EFBDAB (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT

APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (C) Reference item concerning "Purchase of locally prepared food and drinks from peddlers, vendors and camp followers has caused a considerable increase in the rate of hepatitis among US personnel," section II, page 37, paragraph a(2); concur. It is the policy of this command that all indigenous food products, including ice, destined for consumption by US forces be procured only from approved sources. It is the responsibility of commanders at all levels to publicize the dangers of indiscriminate purchase and consumption of local food products from non-approved sources (USARV Reg 40-657). A USARV command letter on this subject is being prepared which will be given "A" distribution.

b. (U) Reference item concerning "Defoliation Spray Missions Utilizing UH-1 Helicopters," section II, page 37, paragraph 2b(1); concur. This information will be published in the weekly USARV Aviation Safety Summary. Care must be exercised in securely fastening the device to the helicopter, and in maintaining visual clearance while flying a helicopter with this device.

c. (U) Reference item concerning "Electrical Circuits (Claymore)," section II, page 38, paragraph b(3); concur with recommendations 1 and 3. Non-concur with recommendation 2. Any break in the insulation of the firing wire could cause the Claymore to malfunction upon attempted detonation. The malfunction could be caused by water, an excellent conductor, creating a short-to-ground. Further, lightning, or any other introduction of electrical energy to the water, could cause the untimely detonation of the Claymore. In general, the reliability of the mine is reduced by placing the firing wire underwater.

d. (U) Reference item concerning "Herbicide Operations," section II, page 41, paragraph 2b(9); concur. Herbicide "Orange" has proved to be more effective than "White" on Nipa Palm. The MACV Chemical section should be contacted for assistance whenever large areas require defoliation.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (30 April 1969)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade for
Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 UIC EFBDAB (U)

e. (U) Reference item concerning "Brigade Personnel should not talk to
unaccompanied press," section II, page 43, paragraph 2b(14); concur. One of
the fundamentals of public information is that media representatives are
escorted while in a unit's area.

f. (C) Reference item concerning "Static Electricity," section II,
page 45, paragraph 2g(1); nonconcur. The production of static electricity
is inherent to helicopter operation. The build-up of static electricity is
particularly severe when operating in a dry, dusty environment. The static
electricity produced by helicopters is particularly hazardous when sling load-
ing explosive loads (fuel and electricity sensitive ammunition). TM 55-450-11,
Helicopter External Loads Rigged with Air Delivery Equipment, dated June 1968,
and the Handbook on CH-47 (Chinook) prescribes procedures for neutralizing
static electricity during sling load hook-up operations. Two types of installed
static electricity dischargers for CH-47 aircraft are currently undergoing CONUS
tests to satisfy USARV ENSURE request #265, initiated in October 1968.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. Wilson
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy Turn;
199th Inf Bde
II FFV
CONFIDENTIAL

GPOP-DT (30 Apr 69) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 199th Infantry Brigade
for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 22 AUG 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]
CPT, AGC
Ass AG
Radio Relay Systems Diagram as of 30 April 1969

Camp Frensell-Jones  
XS 068125

QHAC  
(1)

FSB Horseshoe Bend  
XS 772271

FSB Stephanie  
XS 753902  
(1)

Binh Chanh  
XS 715789  
(2)

FSB Kathy  
XS 624387  
(2)

NOTES:
(1) 12 Channel VHF System
(2) 4 Channel VHF System

CONFIDENTIAL
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 199th Infantry Brigade

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb 69 to 30 Apr 69.

CC, 199th Infantry Brigade

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