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SUBJECT: Operational Report- Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division(I) Ending 30 April 1969

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to AGCSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

ROBERT E. LYNCH
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-69 (R1) (U)

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1. (C) Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities.
   a. (C) Introduction.
      (1) The 1st Infantry Division, during the reporting period, continued in
      the performance of its general missions:
         (a) Destruction of main force VC/NVA forces, equipment, and base camps.
         (b) In conjunction with GVN forces, the identification and destruction of
             local force VC and infrastructure in order to provide a secure environment to
             further GVN control over the area and people.
         (c) Overwatch of the TAOI.
         (d) Assistance in the training and improvement of GVN forces.
         (e) Area preparation (construction and destruction).
      (2) Within the overall framework of these general missions, the principal
          missions for the reporting period have been:
          (a) Reinforce An Loc/Quan Loi/Song Be area.
          (b) Target against base areas 359, 360, and 356.
          (c) Detect and destroy enemy forces approaching Saigon through the Iron
              Triangle-Phu Cong-Di An-Tan Uyen Zone.
          (d) With a minimum of one battalion, protect the Capital Military Dist-
              rict from the east and northeast (infiltration and rocket attack).
          (e) Within the TAOI, coordinate the security of US installations, rein-
              force Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces security of key bridges and installa-
              tions, respond to VC/NVA attacks against allied installations, camps, and hos-
              pitals.
          (f) Support the Government of Vietnam Revolutionary Development Progra
              by conducting military operations within the TAOI in coordination with and
              support of the 5th ARVN Division, Capital Military District, and respective
              provinces.
          (g) Maintain security of major lines of communications within the TAOI
              (Hwy 13-RI Iron; Hwy 314, 16-RI Lead; Hwy 7B, 1A-RI Zinc; Saigon By-Pass).
      (3) The operational trends of the period, based on command guidance, ex-
          perience factors, and the changing tactical environment, remain the same as in
          the previous reporting period:
          (a) Night operations.
          (b) Maintaining contact.
          SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
30 April 1969, USCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

(c) Small unit operations.
(d) "Pile-on" Tactics.
(e) Thorough search.
(f) B-52 exploitation.

b. Personnel and administration.

(i) Personnel:

(a) Strength

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(b) Gains, qualifications, and status:

1. Enlisted:
   a. Replacements received: 4514


   c. Credits: None

   d. Qualifications: None

2. Officer:
   a. Replacements received: 21A

   b. Outstanding requisitions: 0

   c. Credits: Ample replacements were received for losses, however, a shortage of Captains still exists in Combat Arms, particularly Infantry.

   d. Qualifications and status: Lieutenant fill being received for requested Captain requirements in Combat Arms.

(e) Losses:

1. Enlisted: There were 1048 losses during the quarter due to reassignment within Vietnam, rotations, ETS, and board action.

2. Officers: There were 231 losses during the quarter due to reassignment within Vietnam, rotations, ETT, and board action.

(d) Losses due to casualties were as follows:

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSPFR-65 (R1) (U)

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(e) Maintenance of Morale:

Awards and Decorations:

- Medal of Honor: 0
- Distinguished Service Cross: 4
- Distinguished Service Medal: 0
- Legion of Merit: 6
- Silver Star: 86
- Distinguished Flying Cross: 35
- Soldier's Medal: 15
- Air Medal Valor: 16
- Air Medal Merit: 1750
- Bronze Star Valor: 275
- Bronze Star Merit: 1224
- Army Commendation Medal Valor: 187
- Army Commendation Medal Merit: 1597
- Purple Heart: 1104
- Certificate of Achievement: 0
- TOTALS: 6279

(2) Discipline, Law and Order:

(a) There were 15 serious incidents and 30 AWOLs reported to the PM during the period and 13 individuals were apprehended.

(b) There were 9 General Courts-Martial tried during the quarter. A total of 125 records of trial for Special Courts-Martial and 13 records of trial for Summary Courts-Martial were received for review.

(3) Graves Registration: During the quarter there were 171 remains processed and evacuated.

(4) Development and Maintenance of Morale:

(a) Chaplain: During the quarter there were 2087 religious services conducted with a total attendance of 50,284.

(b) During the quarter 4,152 out-of-country R&R allocations were utilized.

(5) Civilian Personnel:

(a) As of the end of the quarter the Division employed approximately 66,000 temporary hire local nationals on a daily basis.

(b) There were 1022 permanent hire local nationals employed at the end of the quarter.

(6) Personnel Management:

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1969, MACVSOR-65 (RI) (U)

(a) Infusion: In the month of Mar 69 the Division conducted an infusion program to alleviate a DEWOS hump in the 1st Bn. The 1st Bn supplied the field units within the Division with 36 EM who will DEOS in Sep 69 in return for 11 W-t with a DHOS after Sep 69. Replacements from the replacement stream were also provided to 1st Bn to correct the problem of heavy losses in the month of Sep 69.

(b) Infantry Personnel: To alleviate the command-wide shortage of CM holding a PKiS of 11B/CM, USAV has directed a 5 increment levy of CM holding these PKiS from support commands throughout RVN. The 1st Infantry Division to date has received 102 EM in the 1st and 2nd increment. It is anticipated that the 1st Inf Div will receive a total of 250 EM in this levy.

(c) Operations:

1. General: The 1st Infantry Division concluded its participation in Operation Toan Thang (Complete Victory), Phase II, on 16 Feb 69. Phase II had begun on 11 Feb 68. Operation Toan Thang, Phase III, began on 17 Feb 69 and continues as of the close of the reporting period. All organic units and those OPON to the Division are involved. Tactics have consisted of both unilateral and combined reconnaissance-in-force and night ambush operations designed to destroy enemy military forces within the TAOI and to control land areas to include population and resources. Extensive land clearing operations continue in the vicinity of Lai Khe and along the Phuoc Vinh-Phuoc Binh Road. Route security operations continue along Hwy 13. Responsibility for overwatch of ARVN activities and Vietnamese government installations in the Division's adjusted TAOI continues through this reporting period. Pacification missions assigned in conjunction with the Accelerated Pacification Program and its follow-up program, both GVN efforts toward accelerated improvement of territorial security and elimination of the VC Infrastructure, continue to be of high importance in the period.

2. Force Disposition: (a) Major adjustments in force disposition occurred in Mar 69 when operational control of the 11th ACR was transferred from 1st Infantry Division to 1st Cav Div (AI) and on 12 Mar 69 with return of the 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div, to the Quan Loi/Song Be area of operation. See 1. C. (5) (d) and 1. C. (5) (e), respectively, for discussion of these adjustments.

(b) The 1st Bde generally provided 1 US battalion and 1 ARVN battalion to Song Be road opening operations in Feb 69 and 1 to 2 infantry battalions to operations in the Trapezoid, also in Feb 69. In Mar and Apr 69 the brigade employed 1 infantry and 1 mechanized battalion in operations in the Quan Loi/Song Be area. One mechanized battalion was committed to Song Be road opening operations in mid-April 69.

(c) The 2d Bde generally employed 3 battalions in the southern portion of the TAOI. The battalions supported the pacification program in the form of population control and rice denial operations in the 141 An Phu Loi area in coordination with ARVN/GVN forces in the area, (2) the hampering of enemy activities in the area, and (3) neutralization of VC in the area.

(d) The 3d Bde generally employed 3 to 4 battalions in the vicinity of Khe, Ben Cat, An Dien, and Chanh Luu in Feb 69. The brigade conducted offensive operations in these areas to detect and destroy VC/NVA forces and caches, extensive ambush operations to interdict infiltration, combined operations with 3d ARVN Regt, and pacification, rice denial, and VC elimination operations particularly in An Phu/Chanh Luu. In Mar 69 the brigade employed 1 armored and 1-2 infantry battalions in Operations Atlas Wedge in the Nichol Plantation. In early Apr 69 the brigade provided 1 armored and 1 infantry battalion to Operation Atlas Power in the Nichol Plantation and in late Apr 69 4 infantry battalions to Operation Plainsfield Warrior in the Trapezoid. Security along Hwy 13 was provided by an infantry company (-) and a mechanized infantry and armor platoon.
(a) The 11th ACR in Feb 69 provided 2 cavalry squadrons and 1 infantry battalion to searching out and destroying enemy troops, base camps, and caches in the Catchers' litt area; interdicting infiltration routes from the Catchers' litt and war Zone D; conducting aggressive pacification programs in the Lam Son area; securing and outposting La-Toral area May 16 and 14; and conducting VCI neutralization in the Lam Son area. In May 69 the 11th ACR provided 2 cavalry squadrons to Operation Atlas, node to the Miinh Co plantation. In Apr 69 1 cavalry squadron and 1 infantry battalion were employed in the same manner as in Feb 69.

(b) Inclusions 3 provides a detailed description of force disposition by battalion size unit.

(c) Land Clearing Operations:

(a) During the period the 60th LCC and 984th LCC from 62d Engineer Battalion, 20th Engineer Brigade, were in direct support to 1st Inf Div for directed land clearing operations. The following acres and areas were cleared:

1. Phuoc Binh-Phuoc Binh Road: 267 acres - 60th LCC; 1187 acres - 984th LCC.
2. Lai Khe East: 4464 acres - 984th LCC; 581 acres - 984th LCC.
3. Lai Khe West: 6192 acres - 60th LCC.

During the same period the 1st Engineer Battalion cleared 1726 acres in the Division area.

(b) Phuoc Binh to Phuoc Binh Road Operations:

1. Road opening operations from Phuoc Binh to Phuoc Binh continued during this period. Phase 2 of the operation, land clearing and road repairs, was completed to Dong Xoai on 6 Feb 69. 1st Bde exercised overall control of the operation. Security was provided by 1-28 Inf and 1/7th ARVN Battalion. The road upgrade was performed by the 301st ARVN Engr Bn from 30th ARVN Eng. Grp.

2. On 18 Apr 69, units began moving to Dong Xoai to resume the road opening operation. Again 1st Bde provided command headquarters, and security forces were 1/28 Inf and 1/7th ARVN Battalion. The road upgrade was performed by the 301st ARVN Engr Bn from 30th ARVN Eng. Grp.

3. At the end of the reporting period, the operation was about 5 KM below Buord, and the forward positions were preparing to displace from Dong Xoai to Buord.

(d) Operation Toan Thang, Phase II: (a) At the close of the previous activity within the TAOI was described as light and sporadic. This condition continued through the early part of Feb 69 as enemy activity continued with scattered exceptions. This was attributable to force conservation tactics by the enemy as he prepared for future offensive action.

1. One of the few exceptions to the situation described above was the uninitiated attack against FSB Orin on 1 Feb 69. Early in the morning there were indications of the activity which was to come when Recon/1-1 sighted 100 VC whom they engaged with artillery, light fire teams, and Gempack aircraft. Later search of this area located 1 VC KIA, 1 82mm mortar bipod, and 1 50 cal M2 tripod. At 0010 hours the contact intensified when the FSB began to receive fire, later estimated to be approximately 150 rounds of mixed 82 and 60mm mortar fire and 100 rounds of RPG and rifle grenade fire. At 0120 an 11th Avn Bn gunship was shot down while supporting the contact. Contacts in and around the position continued sporadically throughout the night with 8/1-25 Inf being inserted into the area at 0300 hours to reinforce elements of 1-28 Inf. In addition to the results previously mentioned there were a total of 2 US KIA and 33 US WIA.
On 3 Feb elements of the 11th ACR OPCON to the 1st Division engaged in a series of productive contacts while operating in the Catchers Mitt. Contact was initiated by the Aero Rifle Platoon at approximately 1230 hours vicinity X087457 with an unknown size enemy force. As the contact developed it was reinforced, initially by a cavalry troop and later by 0–10 Inf. The contact broke at 1815 hours with cumulative results being 1 US KIA, 5 US WIA and 15 VC KIA, 3 VC KIA, 7 VC PNs, 1 NSG rifle, 1 CHICOM LMG, and 2 AK47s captured.

Another engagement of note occurred on 8 Feb 69 with the 1–16 Inf while operating in the Iron Triangle. A small contact initiated with 2 VC vicinity X 712250 in a tunnel complex continued throughout the afternoon culminating in discovery of a regimental size hospital and a large quantity of medical supplies vicinity X713246. There were 7 US WIA in the engagements while the enemy lost 2 VC KIA, 3 VC PNs, and 6 detainees. A total of 3 AK47s, 1 SKS, 2 7mm pistols, and miscellaneous documents and food supplies were captured.

A significant cache was uncovered by 2–18 Inf on 12 Feb 69 while conducting reconnaissance-in-force operations vicinity X504914. It contained 4 French MAS-36 rifles, 1 US carbine, 1 CHICOM K50 SMG, 1 Thompson SMG, 1 French MAT 49 SMG, 13 CHICOM type 53 rifles, and 30 German Mauser plus munitions and documents.

On 14 Feb 69 elements of and OPCON to the 11th ACR enjoyed a lucrative day while conducting operations in the Catchers Mitt. A mid-day contact of the Aero Rifle Platoon vicinity X098322 was developed with reinforcement by elements of the 2–28 Inf and 3–11 Cav and resulted in 10 VC KIA and 2 VC WIA. The 2–28 Inf, OPCON to the 11th ACR, engaged an unknown number of VC in a night ambush action with a subsequent search of the area revealing 4 VC KIA and 2 AK47s, 1 CHICOM carbine, and 1 RPG-7 launcher captured.

In another successful ambush action on 17 Feb the 2–28 Inf engaged a small enemy force vicinity X703314. The contact broke quickly and an area search revealed 2 VC KIA, 3 AK47s, 1 RPG-2 launcher, and munitions and personal equipment.

At the direction of II Field Force, Vietnam, the 1st Inf Div concluded Phase II of Operation Toan Thang effective 162200 Feb 69. The cumulative results of Operation Toan Thang, Phase II, were as follows:

1. US: 396 KIA, 2600 WIA, 2408 WIA (evac), 71 tanks, 81 ACAVs, 2usters, 4 howitzers, 21 towed guns, 3 VVVs, 3 5 ton trucks, 3 5 ton trucks, 1–105 Howitzer, 2 AVLBs, 34 helicopters, 1 CAU, 7 –24 ton trucks, 1 Zippos, 181mm mortar, 1 50-ton truck, 1 7-ton truck, 1 4.2mm mortar, 1 81mm howitzer damaged; 10 helicopters; 2 AVLBs, 99 ACAVs, 2 ammo carriers, 2 towed guns, 2 5/6 ton trucks, 1 60-ton truck; 22 tanks, 6 (0–1) aircraft, 2 81mm mortars, 2 155mm howitzers destroyed.

2. Enemy: 2605 KIA (30), 979 KIA (30), 262 captured, 59 rollers, 198 documents, 1556 individual weapons, 231 crew served weapons, 319399 SA rounds, 5236 at mines, 4281 grenades, 1879 500 rounds, 2915 HE rounds, 4304 mortars, rounds, 481 tons rice, 11967 bunkers, 1130 lbs explosives, 38.9 tons food at 65 rockets captured/destroyed.

3. Operation Toan Thang: Phase III: (a) The third phase of this operation commenced effective 170001 Feb 69 with the same organization, mission, and area of operation as the preceding phase.

A significant engagement occurred with the 1–28 Inf at FSB Oran on 21 Feb 69 when a Co D ambush patrol engaged in the early morning hours vicinity X665895 a small VC force. The 5 minute contact resulted in 7 VC KIA and 5 AK47s, 2 60mm mortar tubes, 1 RPG launcher, and several pounds of munitions captured. Later in the morning Co D engaged and killed another VC in the same location, activity at
On 22 Feb 69 and protracted events to follow, at 1400 hours vic XS904366 G Co engaged 15 - 20 VC with artillery. The ensuing enemy unit was engaged by another column of G Co with a result of 4 VC KIA. Contact continued sporadically in the area throughout the afternoon and evening with a total of 5 US WIA and 2 VC KIA with 2 AK47s captured.

(b) The long awaited enemy offensive was initiated on 23 Feb 69 as enemy activity increased sharply along with attacks by fire against US base camps and installations. The 1st Infantry Division Headquarters at Lai Khe was one of the first targets as, between 0235 - 0300 hours on 23 Feb 69, the camp received 10 rounds of 107mm rocket fire and 30 - 40 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in US KIA and 12 US WIA with moderate damage to several buildings and vehicles. Three additional 107mm rocket rounds and 8-62mm mortar rounds were received at 0630 hours resulting in 2 VC KIA. The largest contact of the day occurred approximately the same time as Co A initially received fire from 7 or 8 VC. Lasting approximately 3 hours and reinforced by Co C, this sporadic action vic XS978967 resulted in 3 US KIA, 16 VC KIA, 6 VC captured, 1 recoilless and 3 individual weapons captured.

The earlier mentioned activity around FSPB Oran continued on 23 Feb 69 as ambush positions engaged small size enemy forces at various times with total results being 7 VC KIA with 1 AK47 and 1 SKS rifle captured.

2) Again on 23 Feb the 2-18 Inf, while operating vicinity of Thu Duc with G/2-16 Inf and A/1-18 Inf OPON, achieved very satisfactory results in a series of daylight engagements. At 1100 hours Co D engaged a small force vic XT883026 resulting in 2 VC killed and the capture of 1 AK47 and 1-60mm mortar base plate. At 1400 hours Recon/2-18 Inf located a small cache of 3 .303 rifles, 1 carbine, and 3 SKS rifles at XT884031. The largest contact of the day occurred approximately the same time as Co A initially received fire from 7 or 8 VC. Lasting approximately 5 hours and reinforced by Co C, this sporadic action vic XS978967 resulted in 3 US KIA, 16 VC KIA, 6 VC captured, 1 recoilless and 3 individual weapons captured.

4) The 2-18 Inf again found itself actively engaged in the Thu Duc area on 25 Feb 69 with a concentration of contacts and sightings occurring vic XS902949. Ambush patrols from the unit, located on tributaries off the Bang Hia River in this area, engaged late the 23 Feb and early 24 Feb 69 a total of 5 sampans resulting in the capture of several weapons and sizable amounts of explosives. Contacts throughout 24 Feb 69 vic XS908725 with VC forces attempting to move supplies, both by water and along overland routes, resulted in destruction of significant amounts of equipment along with capture of 5 AK47s, 1 RPG Launcher, and 1 Browning .38-cooled MG.

5) On 25 Feb 69 Lai Khe base camp received 1-107mm rocket and 8-10 rounds of 82mm mortar at 0200 hours resulting in 11 US WIA.

Still on 25 Feb 69 the 11th ACR A/B Platoon, reinforced by a column of F/2-11 Cav vic XS923412 engaged an unknown size enemy force for two hours resulting in 10 VC KIA and 1 VC WIA.

7) The 2-18 Inf continued to experience significant contact in its area of operation vicinity of Thu Duc on 26 Feb, the fourth active day in this normal quiet area. In three separate contacts - Co A at XS906955, Co A at XS927839, and Co D at XS977987 - there were a total of 11 VC KIA(7C) and 2 VC KIA(Foes), 2 VC WIA, and 2 AK47s captured.

8) On 27 Feb 69 the 1-28 Inf again executed one of its many successful ambushes during this period. At 2100 hours a Co D ambush sprung on an estimated enemy squad with a search locating 7 VC KIA, 2 individual weapons, and blood trails indicating 4 additional VC KIA(Foes).
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WDR-7 (SPD) 15 May 1969
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
30 April 1969, RSC (SRK)-65 (R1) (U)

9. Skillfully on 27 Feb the 2-28 Inf with D/1-11 OPUON, uncovered one of the more significant caches of the period in the western Catchers Hitt vic XT95/3100. It contained 29 AK47s, 12 29mm rounds AK7 ammunitions, 2 CHICOM MGs, 2 ID carriers, 3 VC barbels, 2 RPG launchers, 9 CHICOM carbines, 3 SKS rifles, and sizable amounts of rocket and mortar ammunition.

10. In the evening of 27 Feb Long Range Reconnaissanc3 Patrol Team #8, under OPUON of the 3d Bn, experienced a grueling and difficult evening when damage to radios resulted in loss of communications throughout the night. The initial VC attack against the team, which caused the damage to the radios, also inflicted 3 US KIA and 3 US WIA on the 7 man team. Aircraft attempted to establish contact with the team throughout the night. At 0800 hours an aircraft on low-level reconnaissance sighted signal mirrors and smoke signals by the badly mauled team. A radio was dropped to the team which requested extraction which was accomplished during the morning under enemy fire. The team was credited with 3 VC KIA.

11. Finally this period of intense activity of late February was marked by a 26 Feb F/2-21 Cav engagement with 25-30 enemy in a base camp. Light fire team and tank and air strikes supported, along with reinforcements by H & L/2-21. Final results were 20 VC KIA and 7 VC WIA with 175mm RA, 12 AK7s, and munitions and foodstuffs captured. Later search of the general area located an additional 6 individual weapons. There were 4 US wounded in the engagement.

(a) The entire month of March was marked by sizable increase in enemy activity as the VC and NVA attempted to sustain their winter-spring Offensive. This increased level of activity was particularly notable in the number of attacks by fire against base camps and installations. For example, 1st Bn's base camp received 11 separate attacks by fire in Mar 69. Attacks by fire also increased significantly at Quan Loi, as might be expected from the increased level of activity, enemy body count credited to the 1st Division leaped to 720, a figure which has not been achieved since the early months of 1968.

(b) The first half of Mar 69 resembled very much the previous month in type of tactics employed by the Division. Tactics consisted of aggressive reconnaissance-in-force and extensive night patrol operations to: (1) deny enemy base areas utilization, (2) interdict VC/NVA infiltration routes, (3) disrupt enemy logistical operations, and (4) harass enemy rocket and mortar activity in the Bien Hoa - Saigon dock area.

1. On 4 Mar 69 the 11th ACR, while operating in the Catchers Hitt, encountered elements of the 96th Artillery Bn in a bunker complex vic XT95/3120. The contact initially established by Aero Rifle Platoon, was reinforced by D/2-21 Inf and L & F/2-11 Cav and lasted through the major part of the day. Cumulative results for 11 units were 7 US WIA with 23 VC killed and 12 VC captured. In addition, 2-8 mortars tubes were seized.

2. On 5 Mar 69 the 1-11 Cav (-) moved overland from Bien Hoa to the Catcher area to join elements of the 3-11 Cav in their OPON status with 1st Infantry ACR. The 2-11 Cav, in this exchange, moved to an area of operation vic.

3. Throughout this period of early Mar the 1-28th Inf, operating in and FSPB Oran, continued to inflict casualties on enemy forces with numerous ambush contacts on an almost daily basis. Characteristic of such days was the 1-11 on 5 Mar when a C D ambush patrol engaged and killed a 3 man VC group at 0300 vic XT97/387 and captured a 9mm pistol and 2 AK7s. On the same evening a Co 0 patrol ambushed 3-5 VC vic XT95/329, killing 3 and capturing 1 AK7 rifle.

4. However, on 9 Mar 69 enemy activity around FSPB Oran reflected a solid decrease from the previous pattern of movement in small elements. At 0005 hours a C ambush sighted and engaged approximately 100 VC vic XT91/339 with artillery and tank and air strikes. Later at 0400 hours the patrol perimeter was 20 VC moving from north to south to enter the kill zone of the ambush. This extremely successful operation resulted in 17 NVN KIA with 5 AK7s, 2-9mm pistols, 1 SKS rifle, and

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misconduct documents and equipment captured. The results were achieved without
the loss of a single US soldier and are testimony to the well refined tactics which the 1st
Infantry Division had developed in this extended period of operation at
FSPB Oran. On 9 Mar 69 the 1-28 Inf commenced disestablishment of FSPB Oran and
began establishing FSPB Lorraine via 2X70689.

5 A sizable cache was uncovered on 9 Mar 69 by elements of 3-11 Cav at X5
882499. It contained 11 RPG rounds, 15-2.75" rockets, 12-107mm rockets, 11 RPGs,
3 AK-47 rifles, 1-82mm mortar tube, 24-60mm mortar rounds, plus munitions and small
arms ammunition.

6 Another smaller cache was discovered on 11 Mar 69 by 2-16 Inf vic 2X793198
containing 4 US carbines, 1 SKS rifle, and 1-82mm mortar tube with sight and bipod.

(c) Major adjustments in T/OI boundaries occurred within the 1st Infantry Divi-
son in mid-March. During the previous reporting period, the arrival of the 1st
Cav Div (A) in the III CTZ resulted in 1st Infantry Division boundary adjustments
(see 1. c. (4), 2. (b) of 1 Nov 68 - 31 Jan 69 CII). On 12 Mar 69, the 1st Bde,
7th NVA Division in the area in and around the Michelin Rubber Plantation.
Meanwhile 6 of the 1st Cav Div (A) battalions were being controlled by a
single brigade headquarters in the Tay Ninh-Dau Tieng-Nhan Ninh area. In order to
establish a more normal distribution of control headquarters the 3d Bde, 1st Inf Div
assumed responsibilities for a portion of the battalion force previously mentioned and established its command post temporarily at Lai Khe. The
1st Bde, 1st Inf Div, moved from Lai Khe to Quan Loi and assumed control of 2-2
Inf which reverted from OPON to 1st Cav Div (A) and 1-2 Inf (-) which reverted
from OPON to 1st Inf Div.

1 On 14 Mar 69 one of the more successful single engagements of the month
occurred with 1-2-28 Inf in the Catchers Mitl area. A night ambush patrol from
the unit engaged an enemy force on a trail vic 2X70979. The force was later
identified as an element of the 174th Regt, 5th Div. The contact broke quickly
as the enemy attempted to evasive; however, an ambush site search uncovered 13 VC
KIA and 12 NVA KIA. There were no US casualties.

(f) The later part of March 69 was marked by one of the largest operations
mounted by the 1st Infantry Division in several months. Named Operation Miami
Wedge, this was to be a combined 1st Infantry Division, 1st Cav Div (A), 25th Infan-
try Division operation commencing 18 Mar 69 and directed against elements of
7th NVA Division. The operation involved 1-3rd Bde's in and around the Nga Nam Rubber Plantation. Participating units were the 3d Bde with 1-4 Cav, 1-28 Inf, and 1-18 Inf
with supporting elements including artillery. The OPON 11th ACR comitted
most of its 1-1 Cav, 3-11 Cav along with portions of 2-28 Inf under its C
from 1st Inf Div.

2 The starting date of 18 Mar 69, a day earlier than the scheduled op
date of 19 Mar 69, was dictated by contact in the Michel on 17 Mar 69.
ACR Air Cav Trp while reconnoitering the operational area on this date sighted
2 estimated two enemy companies vic X5.105641. After permission to engage was
sought the target was hit with light fire teams, artillery, and tactical air strike.
Throughout the morning resulting in 30 US KIA and 15 NVA KIA (Poss).

2 Participating units moved into the operational area on 18 Mar 69 with
several heavy engagements occurring almost at once. The first unit in contact was
1-3rd ACR Air Cav Trp which, in working throughout the area and north-
west Michel, engaged sporadically through the day various large groups of enemy.
The final result in body count being 29 NVA KIA and 12 VC KIA (Poss). In addition
twenty tactical air strikes were flown in support of contacts resulting in 10 US
KIA (Poss). Also on this date N/3-11, while moving through an area vic X5.105555,
met and engaged an unknown size enemy force. There were 34 NVA KIA and 5 NVA KIA.
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In the contact while 2-58 cal MGs, 1 CHICOM LG, and 1 RPG-2 launcher were captured. The enemy was identified as elements of the 320th Regt., 7th NVA Div. Still on the same day B, C, D/1-11 Cav engaged in a brief but intense 10 minute contact vic XT50851 with friendly forces killing 2k of the enemy at a cost of 4 US WIA. The final act of significance on 18 Mar was a successful ambush engagement by C/1-18 Inf. south-west of the Michelin via XT596470. Enemy forces walked into the killing zone of a platoon from this unit, were engaged, and immediately began counter ambush techniques by assaulting. The abortive effort cost the force 13 VC KIA with 8 KIA's and 1 RPG launcher captured. There was 1 US killed and 7 wounded.

The day of 19 Mar 69 saw two significant engagements, both involving elements of the 11th ACR. In the late afternoon B/1-11 Cav again encountered groups of the 320th Regt., 7th NVA Div., vic XT52521 and killed 23 of them while capturing 1 who identified his unit. Also B/3-11 Cav encountered an unknown number enemy vic XT52876 at approximately 1800 hours. Contact was maintained into the early evening hours of darkness with 24 NVA being killed and 1 captured.

Activity reached its most intense level on the following day 20 Mar 69 as heavy fighting broke out at approximately noon vic XT53375 and involved the 11th ACR's 4-3-11 Platoon, M & N/3-11 Cav., and A/1-5 Cav OPCON from the 1st Cav Div (AG). Cumulative results for this 6 hour engagement were 74 VC KIA with 46 individual weapons captured. US forces suffered 1 killed and 12 wounded.

Activity subsided in the operational area with only scattered small size contacts until 28 Mar 69. On this date the enemy launched an indirect fire and ground attack against FSPB Doc vic XT613520. The field location was established for supporting artillery and was being secured by 1-4 Cav at the time of the attack. The ground assault by an enemy force estimated to be in excess of 1 company in strength cost 10 VC KIA with 2 RPG launchers captured. Friendly forces suffered 5 killed and 24 wounded from all causes.

Finally on 30 Mar 69 the 1-4 Cav, which had moved into the Michelin Plantation after departure of 11th ACR elements, engaged various size enemy forces in bunkers who attempted to evade throughout the day. Contacts centered vic XT56555 with cumulative enemy losses being 79 VC KIA and 2 VC captured. A total of 22 AK 47's, 1 CHICOM MG, and 1-60mm mortar complete were captured. Total US casualties, to include those suffered by D/1-11 OPCON to 1-4 Cav, were 12 killed and 19 wounded.

Operation Atlas wedge was terminated on 2 Apr 69 with departure of the 1-4 Cav from the area, although the 1-28 remained in the vicinity of the Michelin at FSPB Picardy vic XT59692 for some time after termination. Official results from the operation were: US: 20 KIA, 100 WIA, VC: 121 KIA, 16 PWA, 115 KIA (Pose), captured: 12 RPG launchers, 1 KIA rifle, 1 M1 carbine, 80 AK47's, 21 SKS rifles, 3 heavy MG, 1-12.7mm AA MG, 1-120mm mortar tube w/tripod, 1-60mm mortar complete, 1-60mm mortar tube, 13,500 lbs of rice, and miscellaneous documents, small arms and equipment.

Although the 1st Infantry Division's attention did center on Operation Atlas wedge during the latter half of March, there was one engagement of note. 1-18 Inf. in performing its Thu Duc installation security missions. On 28 at noon vic XT54948 an estimated 30 VC were encountered and later identified as members of the 4th Bn. 4th Inf. 7th Inf. Regt. The 3 hour fight resulted in 10 VC KIA w/ 2 CHICOM pistols captured.

The first part of April was characterized by a low level of enemy while enemy main force units remained in a standoff posture. Current intelligence assessment of the Winter-Spring Offensive and a captured document provided the following on their findings. The offensive was reviewed as a political success with only limited military achievement. In the enemy's words one of the major successes was to "encourage the anti-war movement in the U.S." Current intelligence of the day indicates that the main force units are preparing to increase their offensive operations, and this is borne out by several occurrences in late April described below.

One of the last significant engagements of the enemy's offensive occurred
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on 4 Apr 69 after the close of Operation Atlas Wedge. Trp L/3-11 Cav while con-
ducting reconnaissance-in-force operations in the Catchers Mitt via X798388, en-
gaged an enemy force of sizeable proportions. The mid-afternoon contact was rein-
forced by Trp K/3-11 Cav and resulted in 25 enemy killed with 4 AK47s, 1 LMG, and
1 ID card printing press among the more noteworthy items captured. There were 2
US KIA.

2. The remaining actions in early April were small scattered contacts resultin
from extensive ambush and the uncovering of small caches. As an example of this
type activity, the 10 Apr 69 contact of Trp A/1-11 Cav in the southeastern Catcher
Mitt via X859329 lasting some 20 minutes resulted in 1 enemy killed, 3 FIA, and
the uncovering of a small cache containing 2 AK47s, 2 RPG launchers, 2 US carbines,
1 BAR, 3 SKS rifles, and 1 shot gun.

3. On 10 April the 1st Infantry Division launched Operation Atlas Power, age
in the Michelin Plantation, with major maneuver elements being 1-28 Inf and 1-4 Cr
under OPCON of 3d Bn. The enemy had shown a propensity to return to an area of
operation immediately upon departure of US forces; this was particularly so in the
Michelin during Operation Atlas Wedge in late March. Operation Atlas Power was
launched in an attempt to once again take advantage of that propensity on the part
of the enemy. This had been done successfully during the previous Atlas wedge whe
forces moved out of the Michelin briefly to allow it to refuel with enemy forces.

4. The operation commenced with the 1-28 Inf occupying blocking positions
northeast of the Michelin in an attempt to intercept enemy movement. At 1400 hrs
with Co B/2-34 Arm under its operational control, conducted reconnaissance-in-
force in the area. The 1-28 Inf operated in the area with a CIDG company from the
Ninth Thanh Special Forces Detachment. This tactic continued until 12 Apr 69 whe
enemy force was engaged in an attempt to intercept enemy movement. This had been done successfully during the previous Atlas wedge whe
forces moved out of the Michelin briefly to allow it to refuel with enemy forces.

5. Operation Atlas Power terminated on 15 Apr 69 with cumulative results as
follows. There were a total of 1 US KIA and 9 US WIA, 14 enemy killed, 3 enemy leasts
with 14 individual weapons, 3 crew served weapons, and 1100 lbs of rice captured.

6. Simultaneous with this operation was a major shift in task organization
in the 1st Infantry Division on 12 Apr 69. The 11th ACR transferred to the opera-
tional control of the 1st Cav Div (AN) effective 120000 Apr 69. TF Recluse was re-
signated, including 3/11 Cav and 2-28 Inf (-), and assumed responsibility for
the 11th ACR area of operation in the Catcher Mitt (40 Mustang).

7. Another event of note was the departure of the 1st Infantry "Divid
by Commanding General, MG Gravin C. Talbott, on leave 15 Apr 69. BG Albert H.
Kaye, Assistant Division Commander for Maneuver, assumed the command of
the Division and remains in that position as of the close of this report.

8. Only three days had lapsed from the conclusion of Operation Atlas
when the 1st Infantry Division launched its third multi-battalion operation
reporting period. Named Plainsfield Warrior, the operation was directed ag-
US/MVA main forces and elements of RSG63 and SR-1 reported to be located in
Trupesoid. The operation opened on 18 Apr when four battalions, the 1-28 Inf,
2-26 Inf, 2-16 Inf, and 1-4 Cav, launched air and ground assaults into areas in an
around the Trupesoid.

9. Although meeting with only moderate success in terms of enemy killed, the
operation was successful in that the presence of the force did deny the enemy the
use of this traditional area of operation for the period. The event of greatest
significance was the seizure of Binh Chua village via X755359 from southeast of the Mich
elin by the 2-16 Inf, 1-26 Inf, and the equivalent of 1 ARVN Bn. The seal broke
25 Apr and resulted in the elimination of 25 VC through capture or killed in a
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2. The second event was the first convoy ambush on 13 Feb 69 in the 1st Infantry Division TOI since prior to the 1968 TET offensive. At 1100 hours on 28 April 69 in X7764, northeast of Minh Thanh, the northbound convoy was engaged by an unknown size enemy force. The thirty minute contact was reinforced by the 1st BCT 2-2 Inf and a 1 Plt/B/2-2 Inf and supported by artillery, light fire teams, and tactical air strikes. After the contact broke CO 1/2-2 Inf and CO C/2-28 Inf were inserted into blocking positions to the west of the highway in an attempt to intercept the evading forces. There were 3 US KIA and 11 US WIA in the ambush. All of the killed and 6 of the wounded were members of the 1st Inf Div. There were 4 Ful tennis, 1-3 ton trucks, 1 APC, and 1 armored car damaged by enemy fire. In addition 1 helicopter was destroyed and 1 helicopter heavily damaged as they flew in support of the engagement. Known enemy losses were 11 NVA KIA, 1 NVA WIA, 1 KIA, and 1 RPG launcher captured. The enemy force was identified as an element of the 209th Regt, 7th NVA Div.

(n) The total results for Operation Toan Thang, Phase III, which began on 17 Feb 69, for the 1st Infantry Division assigned and Opcon units as of the close of the reporting period were:

1. US: 105 KIA, 770 WIA, 685 WIA (ovwe), 27 ACAV/APCs, 7 generators, 2-21 ton tankers, 2 Zippoos, 34 helicopters, 19 rosy plows, 20 tanks, 11-28 ton trucks, 3-3/4 ton trucks, 3-1 ton trailers, 1 cold storage unit, 1 M60 (155mm), 1 KIA damaged; 1 Zippo, 6 tanks, 1-3 ton truck, 1-3/4 ton truck, 19 ACAV/APCs, 6 rosy plows, 1 duster, 1 helicopter destroyed.

2. Enemy: 1777 KIA (80), 1966 KIA (609), 1062 captured, 800000 bullets, 522 hand grenades, 63 crew served weapons, 163,6.466 rounds, 80 AT mines, 13791 spares mines, 727 grenades, 576 RPG rounds, 227 mortar rounds, 3100 bunkers, 27,5 tons of rice, 60 rockets, 547 lbs of explosives captured/destroyed.

(o) During the reporting period, 106-52 strikes were employed in conjunction with general operations. Combined operations Red Lightning I and II with the 29th Div in Mar 69 in the Trapezoid area highlighted the period. The concept of this type of operation was to plan multiple B-52 strikes on confirmed hard intelligence targets; integrate tactical air, naval, and artillery fire support to channelize VC/NVA forces into B-52 kill zones; perform low level bomb damage assessment missions and selective ground follow-ups simultaneously in separate ADs. The follow up operations were designed to exploit the effects of the combined fires. Successful in destroying larger enemy base and staging areas, Red Lightning I and II were felt to be instrumental in disrupting the effective initiation of the enemy offensive.

(6) Accelerated Pacification Campaign: (a) The date of 17 Feb 69 marked the successful conclusion of the 1968 Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) wherein a total of 63 hamlets targeted for pacification were brought under effective GVN control. II Corps Command again provided pacification guidance for the Ist Div in 1969. One of the documents included as guidance was a retransmission of a ...nt to all Corps Commanders from COMUSMACV establishing pacification as the ... concern of US forces throughout Vietnam.

(b) In late Feb 69 the Big Red One published a Letter of Instruction (LOI) providing necessary guidance to organic and Opcon units. The pacification plan stated in this LOI, directed that "pacification in calendar year 1969 will be considered an extension of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign. Tactics, ..." US advisors, assist in upgrading and preserving the security of all targeted units; provide building materials and other supplies as needed to GVN forces; protect existing non availability in supply channels; conduct resource control operati
establish a system whereby target hamlets can effect immediate notification to US sponsor units of VC casualties; provide a ready reaction force (RRF) for target hamlets; maintain continuous liaison with District Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers (ID MCCs) and Province Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers (PIMCCs) in the TADI to identify, target, and eliminate the VC Infrastructure (VCI); conduct vigorous PSYOP and Civic Action programs; support the training of Popular Self Defense Forces (PSDF); support village and hamlet elections by providing security to the voting population; and, establish troop information programs to explain the purpose and techniques of pacification to newly arrived personnel in the Division.

(d) Division forces in support of pacification were reduced to 11 battalion equivalents after the loss of a battalion equivalent to the 1st Cavalry Division. Due to expansion in the area of operations of the 1st Inf Div, responsibility for pacification support was assumed in two additional provinces, Binh Long and Phuoc Long. Responsibility was retained for districts within Bien Hoa, Gia Dinh, and Binh Duong Provinces.

(u) The total number of hamlets targeted for pacification in 1969 as recommended by the Province Chiefs, and approved by the Central Pacification and Development Council in Saigon, totaled 109. After adding those hamlets already upgraded in the 1968 APC, the 1st Division was responsible for a grand total of 172 hamlets within the TAOI. By the end of April, only 38 of the targeted hamlets remained in a contested or VC controlled category. Following is the list of target hamlets, with security ratings as of 31 March 1969, in the 1st Infantry Division TAOI.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS OGOR-65 (R1) (U)

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Toy Hoa C X925997
Long Tan My Long Tan My C X996987
Long Hoa C Y9006993
Lo Lu C X993973
My Thanh C X9787947
Phu Huu Organ Luu C X983943

3d Brigade: Binh Duong, Ben Cat

Long Phu Hoa Ben Cat C X828322
An Phu Kien Binh C X732232
Long Nguyen Long Ca C X732335
Thoi Hoa Thoi Hoa D X777778
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Chea Thanh Hoa Loi An Loi WC X822899
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Xo Hung C X860245

Binh Hung (Tan Uyen) Uyen Hung Tan Hung C X968223
Binh Hung C X968225

d. (U) Training.

(1) Replacement Training:

(c) The Division Training Command started classes at Di An on 15 Feb 69 with the first group of replacements to attend the Division consolidated school...
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
30 April 1969, RCS CSSOR-65 (R1) (U)

(b) The updated objectives of replacement training in the new school are:

1. To provide an initial briefing and orientation to all Captains and below, except for Sergeants Major who receive a special program similar to the one for field grade officers.

2. To accomplish all individual annual training requirements for personnel of the Division.

3. To provide a four day course of instruction on general aspects of Vietnam and guerrilla warfare for all captains and below, except Sergeants Major, and two additional days of tactics used in the Division for combat arms personnel.

(c) There have been 3672 replacements trained by the Division school during this reporting period.

2) Mobile Training Teams: (a) This Division employs Mobile Training Teams made up from instructors of the Division Training Command.

(b) The mission and concept were explained during the previous reporting period.

(c) Special teams were formed this quarter to conduct training for all maneuver units of the Division on 81mm mortars, M79/G11, and helicopter load preparation.

(d) The following amounts of training were conducted by MIT during this period:

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</table>

3) Kit Carson Scout Training: During the reporting period the Division Training Command established a ten day formal training program for Kit Carson Scouts. The concept of training was to install basic training concepts in the scouts to eliminate disciplinary problems, disease, and loss of equipment which were becoming a matter of concern to the commanders of scouts. Twenty five scouts have completed this course and initial reports coming from Division units are most favorable.

4) ARVN Training: (a) Infantry Battalion Refresher Training was completed for the 2d Battalion, 9th Regiment, 5th ARVN Division on 5 Feb 69. A revised program of instruction was approved in late Feb 69 which presented 90% tactical training and only 10% technical training. This was based on the needs of the ARVN as suggested by the advisors of the 5th ARVN Division. The 4th Battalion, Regiment, 2nd ARVN Division, began training on 10 Mar 69 and completed training on 7 Apr 69. The 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry, 5th ARVN Division, began training on 10 Mar 69 and should complete their concluding evaluation exercise on 19 Apr 69.

(b) The 1st Infantry Division sent 5 NCOs to the 5th ARVN Division NEC in early Feb 69 to assist in construction and instruction of the new NCOs from 5th ARVN advisors are enthusiastic about the success of this program.

(e) In Apr 69 a new program of attaching 5th ARVN Officers and NCOs to Division maneuver units was started, and at present twenty five Vietnamese commanders are attached to Division companies for one week training.

5) TDY Schools: Schools and number of personnel attended are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>NCO OF STUDENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recondo</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T6</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Transition</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-6 Transition</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period ending 30 April 1969, HGS CRF7-65 (A1)(U)

The estimated strength of the main enemy force military units operating in the 1st Division Tactical Area of Interest (T/AI) is approximately 8,000 personnel with an additional 2,000 Local Force personnel. This figure represents a combat strength of about 10,000 personnel, with an additional 4,000 personnel providing logistical support. The known rates of infiltration, in retrospect, appear to have been adequate to maintain strength in III CTZ and to increase enemy strength in the 1st Division T/AI. Known infiltration into III CTZ dropped to approximately 6,000 personnel during Feb, Mar, and Apr 69. Exact current figures for infiltration into the 1st Infantry T/AI are not known.

Specific reinforcements available from outside the Division T/AI are from the 9th FE Division and the SR-1 forces. All units within the Division T/AI can be expected to have artillery units in support.

The accepted locations of confirmed enemy units within the Division T/AI and along its periphery are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>EFFECTIVENESS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7th NVA Div</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>PEG</td>
<td>Vic Phishhook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th NVA Div</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>BS</td>
<td>Vic Phishhook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141st NVA Regt</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>GS</td>
<td>Vic Phishhook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165th NVA Regt</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>GS</td>
<td>Vic Phishhook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>209th NVA Regt</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>GS</td>
<td>Vic Phishhook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEPARATE REGIMENTS</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>MSG</td>
<td>Minh By Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Song Binh Bs</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>GS</td>
<td>NW of Phong Binh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST-4 Forces</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>MSG</td>
<td>Vic 9594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>574th 105th Art Bn</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>GS</td>
<td>Dispersed 5th 105th Art Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96th 76th Art Bn</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>GS</td>
<td>NW of Hanoi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>133 134 Art Bn</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>GS</td>
<td>XT 890555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>332 Art Bn</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>GS</td>
<td>NW of Dien Bien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>333 Art Bn</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>GS</td>
<td>Foss vic Hanoi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KRAL FORCEN UNITS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C61 Bon Cat Co</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>CE</td>
<td>XT 6934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C62 Chu Than Co</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>CE</td>
<td>XT 8230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C63 Lai Thieu Co</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>CE</td>
<td>XT 8100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C64 Duong Co</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>CE</td>
<td>XT 8200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C65 Phu Quang City Pl</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>CE</td>
<td>XT 8210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C66 Co</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>CE</td>
<td>XT 1634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C68 Co</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>CE</td>
<td>ME 1st Ind Ctr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Co</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>CE</td>
<td>XT 3077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111 Co</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>CE</td>
<td>XT 2510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>136 Co</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>CE</td>
<td>XT 1614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Co</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>CE</td>
<td>XT 5815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>167 Co</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>CE</td>
<td>XT 9785</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS SHORAD-65 (SI) (U)

#### CONFIDENTIAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>EFFECTIVENESS</th>
<th>CURRENT FROM LOC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>K18 Co</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>ME2</td>
<td>YU 4225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K19 Co</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>CE</td>
<td>YU 5510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C300 Dong Nai Co</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>ME2</td>
<td>XT 9321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C301 Phu Tinh Co</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>CE</td>
<td>XT 9411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C302 Tan My Plat</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>CE</td>
<td>XT 9427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C303 Co</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>CE</td>
<td>XT 9926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B1 An Plat</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>CE</td>
<td>XT 9938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C55 An Loc Plat</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>CE</td>
<td>XT830970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C65 Chon Thanh Plat</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>CE</td>
<td>XT698680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81st Rear Service</td>
<td>Approx 1800</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Logistic area &quot;C&quot; Long Prov, w/border of Phuoc Long Prov and Cambodian Border.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83d Rear Service</td>
<td>Approx 1200</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Logistic area &quot;C&quot; Long Prov, w/border of Phuoc Long Prov and Cambodian Border.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85th Rear Service</td>
<td>Approx 700</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Logistic area &quot;C&quot; Long Prov, w/border of Phuoc Long Prov and Cambodian Border.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### (d) The accepted locations of Confirmed Enemy Units considered available as reinforcements are:

| 5th VC Division | 3500 | ME2 | War Zone D |
| 27th VC Regt | 1200 | ME2 | Vic TT 5942 |
| 17th VC Regt | 1200 | ME2 | War Zone D |
| 9th VC Regt | 1200 | ME2 | Vic TT 1620 |
| 7th NVA Division | 5000 | ME2 | Da Nang - Hue City |
| 10th NVA Regt | 1000 | ME2 | Boi Long - Truc Phong |
| 27th VC Regt | 800 | ME2 | 54 of Xuan Loc |
| 26th VC Regt w/AKA | 300 | ME2 | Truc Bang - Cu Chi area |

#### LOCAL FORCES UNITS

| 1st VC MP Inf Bn | 279 | CE | Iron Triangle |
| 2d VC LF Inf Bn | 236 | CE | Iron Triangle |
| 4th Grp Mh Song Sapper Bn | 250 - 250 | CE | Phu Cong - Saigon River |
| Go Linh Plat | 125 | CE | XT799067 |
| 7 VC LF Inf Bn | 202 | CE | 5W of Cu Chi |
| 6 VC Art Bn | 239 | CE | Filhol Area |
| D2 VC LF Sapper Bn (UL) | 200 | ME2 | TT 1222 |
| D2 VC LF Sapper Bn (UL) | 125 | ME2 | TT 1816 |

#### (e) Main Force Combat Units Within the 1st Infantry Division T/O:

1. **7th NVA Division**: During Feb 69 the 7th NVA Division was located in the vicinity of the Fishhook. The unit did not attempt to move south to Saigon as done in both Tet and May offensives of 1968. Then in mid-March the division's 165th Regt moved into the Michelin Plantation. This indicates a mission to utilize the area as a haven. Severe losses incurred in Operation End Run forced the division to move the plantation south to and the Fishhook area. The division remained at this location throughout the month of April and up until the present time.

2. **165 NVA Regiment**: Throughout the months of Jan and Feb 69 the 165th Regt remained in the vicinity of the Fishhook. During the month of Mar the 229th Regt 

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AVGB-2 (196)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
30 April 1969, RCR FOR-65 (R1) (U)

Rogt along with the division HQ moved into the Michelin Plantation, but the 165th
remained unscouted in the Fishhook. Information obtained from POWs of the 25th
and 141st Regts indicated the 165th Rogt would move into the plantation and replace
the 141st Rogt which had suffered heavy losses during the month of Mar. A series of
domestic reports captured from the 23rd to the end of the month of March identified the 165th
Regt north of the Michelin Plantation. Identifications continued through early April with a climax being reached around 10 Apr. On 10 Apr C/2-22 Inf killed 9 NVA
victims X571513 from the 2d Bn, 165th Rogt. In two separate contacts on 10 Apr
A-332 from Bien Tanh killed 17 NVA of the 2d Bn, 165th Rogt via X79255. Rapid contact
continued into the next day with 2/2-3d Arty killing 11 NVA of the 2d Bn, 165th Rogt
via X562537 and A-332 killing 7 later that day in the area. Contact and
identification of the Rogt dropped drastically after this time until the end of the
month and the Rogt was felt to have withdrawn north of the Michelin.

b 141st NVA Regt: During the first three weeks in Feb the 141st Rogt was
sporadically identified in the vic of the Michelin Plantation. Then on 25 Feb the
Rogt was identified by a POW as the unit which attacked FSB Mahone via X522410.
Results of the contact were 54 KIA. Following this contact the 141st Rogt was not
again identified until 15 Mar via X521417 when elements of the 1st and 2nd Bns
were identified in contact. Results of the contact were 21 NVA KIA (BC). On FI
of the 2d Bn, 141st Rogt stated his unit was located 1 km N of village 13 in the
Michelin Plantation. On 17 March a POW captured by H/1-22 Inf identified his unit
as the 2d Bn, 141st Rogt. Source stated the 141st Rogt was near village 13 (X585521)
and had been there for a week. Source further stated his unit would be replaced
by V15(165) and would move to Binh Long (P). Source stated the move was unsuccess-
fively ordered because significant losses were suffered in the attack on FSBB Mahone II, artillery, and B-52 strikes. Contact with the 141st Rogt tapered off at this time and the unit withdrew
from the Michelin north of the Fishhook. All through Apr the 141st Rogt remained
there resting, resupplying and reorganizing.

c 209th NVA Rogt: The 209th Rogt did not engage in any significant activity
during the month of February. The unit continued to avoid contact during the first
half of Mar. During the second half of Mar the 209th Rogt was identified in a series
of engagements in the Michelin Plantation. On 16 Mar via X5652, C/1-5 captured
a volume of documents and several POWs which identified the 209th Rogt. The
following day US forces engaged an unknown enemy unit in N Michelin. The
contact resulted in 61 KIA and 5 WIA. POWs stated their unit (C18 Co) and the K7 Bn
with a strength of 250 was located with the Rogt HN. The K8 with a strength of
30 and the 83 Bn with a strength of 250 were also in area. POWs captured on 19 Mar via
X5651 stated the 209th Rogt moved from Cambodian to their present location on 8
Mar. They stated the 209th had a mission to defend the Michelin and was to stay in
the plantation "at all costs." The Rogt continued to be contacted for the next few
days and then contact with the 209th was almost completely broken. It was at this
time that the Rogt withdrew from the Michelin to the vic of Tong Le Co (X761682).
The Rogt stayed in this area during most of April. The 209th received
Interrogations revealed the unit in contact was C/3-25. The PIA from
another mission was to collect rice in the Buon Co area. The K2 Bn remained
in the An Son area. A 29 Jan PW and 9 Feb rogu described the visit
of the 7th Div there. A 29 Jan PW and 9 Feb rogu described the visit
of the 7th Div there. He added that the 7th Div will follow the DMR from the An Son area south
out to the Buon area. When they reach the Buon area, the 7th Div will begin the attack.
and the 7th Div will attack Saigon. Nguyen Van Thanh, last PLF leader from C3/K3 captured by ARVN on 15 Feb 69. On 25 Feb 69, he and 9 others had infiltrated to Di An District via An Son. Their mission was to help supervise building of tunnels. The village chief of Tan Dong Hap (XG920708) was captured on 16 Feb. He thought it would be impossible for the K3 Bn to move to Di An because there were no places to hide. 20 and 25 Feb contact identified C3/K3 and K4 Bns, DNS. The 20 Feb contact resulted in 8 VC KIA and 1 FI. The K4 was identified as To Van Tran from C3/K4. He located the K4 Bn in the Bo La area vicinity XT855361. The 25 Feb contact identified both the K4 and K3 Bns at XT823245. 9 VC KIA and 1 FI were taken in the contact. The area of contact had apparently been used as a rest area by elements of both the K3 and K4 Bns. The Pws located elements of both Bns in the same general area of contact. They also pointed out that many of their men were ill with malaria. A major contact on 28 Feb by 11th PLF elements at XG80430 resulted in 18 KI. and 8 Pws, one of whom was identified as To X0 of C3/K4. Activities during the month of Dec indicated that the Bn's move south was not planned to relocate to the An Son-Khe area for full scale offensive operations or to secure a route for the possible movement of the 7th Divison. The focal point for future regimental operations appears to be the Chan Lai-Kho area. The K4, 13, and probably the 14 Bns. The focal point for future regimental operations appears to be the Chan Lai-Kho area. The K2, 4, and probably the 13 Bns. The preferred route for the possible movement of the 7th Division probably sometime in June.

On 9 Apr 3 Pas who were from the K4 Bn said elements of K4 were dispersed out of contact. On 30 Apr, Tan Dinh, Company Commandr of C3/K4, said that K4 would move to An Son after receiving replacements. The K2 Bn which will apparently be left in An Son without substantial reinfor- cements will probably not initiate any major offensive actions in that area, nor will any contact be highlighted by the continued reluctance of the Bn's to initiate planned offensive operations or to attack. The Bn's remained out of major contact. On 9 Mar, Huynh Tan Long, Company Commander of C3, K1, was captured at XT976333 by B/1-16 Inf. He said C3/K1 base camp was located at XT810336. Its mission was to ambush and lure ARVN forces that operate in the area of their base camp. Previous to this date, elements of the K1 Bn had been located in the tunnels. One major contact took place in the An Son area during the reporting period. On 18 Mar 5 Pas were captured in a platoon sized contact at XT83278. Two of the Pws were identified as To Than of K3, K4 Bn, and Nguyen Van Quan, Co of C3, K4, DNS. Interrogations revealed that the K4 Bn had arrived in An Son prior to Tet to arrange for the Bn's move ashore. The capture of K4, To Thanh, said major attacks were to begin on the night of 22 KI. K1 was to attack Tan Uyen, K2; An Son; K3, K4 and K5 was to attack in Di An. On 5 Apr, Ngu Van, Bdn leader from C2/K4, said that K4 would move to An Son after receiving replacements. The K2 Bn was to move south after being replaced. Contacts were made with the K1 Bn on 24 and 31 Mar. Conflicting information given by Pws taken in these contacts indicates the possibility that K1 Bn may have received as many as 100 replacements during the month of Mar. However, this could not be confirmed. The month of Apr brought another apparent change in Dong Nai Regt plans. The planned attacks against Tan Uyen, Di An, and Thu Duc did not develop and the expectation that the K2 Bn would be replaced in An Son also lost its momentum. Major contacts identified the K1 Bn on 3 and 4 Apr in the vicinity of XT9041. The contacts resulted in 26 KIA and 9 Pws. On 9 Apr the K1 Bn was probably the K3 Bn on which the K1 Bn was dispersed out of contact. On 11 Apr the K4 Bn received replacements from the K3 Bn and elements of the K4 Bn were moved to Lai Khe, north of Highway 1370. On 13 Apr a large element of the K4 Bn was reported moving south on an unknown mission vicinity of Ong Loc (XG 8532). At 10 Apr a PW from the K4 Bn confirmed that K4 Bn was still in An Son. 5 Pws from the K3 Bn DNS were captured at XT9041. One of the Pws, Nguyen Van Ban, En X0, stated the K3 Bn was located in the area (XG855550). He said their future mission was to attack Di An City. The remaining elements of the K3 Bn had moved to Di An District prior to Tet with the mission of defender the battlefield. They were also to assist local forces in the area to regain the month of Apr the Dong Vi Regt attempted to remain out of contact by trying to reorganize, refit, and re-establish coordination among K4-3 units. The K1 Bn was to attack Di An City. The K2 Bn was operating north of Tan Uyen possibly receiving weapons and replacements. The K2 Bn with a strength of approximately 100 men apparently will remain in the Di An District. The mission of the K2 Bn is to maintain an outpost in the An Son area for pre-4/69 operations and to aid in re-establishing local strength in the area. The remaining elements of the K3 Bn in Di An District recently have the same mission. The rest of the K3 Bn remained out of contact in the vicinity northeast of Lai Khe. The K4 Bn is reported east of Lai Khe in the vicinity of XT8540. Current regimental strength is still held at 950 to 1000 men. The regimental mission is to refit and return in preparation for the next offensive campaign probably sometime in June.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1969, ROK CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

3 Thu Due Regiment: (SR-4 Rsm) Earliest identification of a new westward row of the Thu Due Regt came on 21 Jan when a Pk from the D4 Bn vicinity YS240055 stated his Bn was preparing to move into the Thu Due area to participate in the next offensive. In mid-February the D2 and D4 Bns apparently began their westward deployment, and elements of both Bns were identified on 24 Feb via YS978947. A series of contacts from 24 Feb to 2 Apr resulted in 46 KIA, 11 Ws, and 1 HiO. Interrogation of the raliers and Ws indicated that the Bns had received replacements in late Feb bringing them to a combined strength of approximately 600 men. The forces in contact were identified as elements from the D2, D4, and D8 Bns which crossed the Dong Na River via sampans on 23 Feb enroute to what one Pk referred to as the "Battle of Thu Due." The remainder of the Regiment had reached east of the Dong Na River, and the advanced elements were forced to disperse. Radar sightings in early and mid-March, as well as 6F contacts resulting in body counts on 4, 8, 9, 10, and 22 Mar, in the same area are probably attributable to Thu Due elements, though no firm identification was made. Documents found in the area identified D2, D4, and D6, though the units themselves were not contacted until 28 Mar. On this date 1/2 18 Invt YS940948 was engaged by an estimated 30 VC. A sharp contact resulted in 10 VC KIA and 2 Ws. The force was identified as an element of the D4 Bn. The Pk indicated the strength of the D4 Bn had fallen between 60 and 90 men. They also stated they had been given orders to hide and avoid allied troops when possible. One 6F also provided a strength figure of the D2 Bn as approx. 200 men and the D6 as 80-130 men. The Bns of the 1st VC Regt have not been contacted since 28 Mar and probably remain dispersed with elements both in the Thu Due District and east of the Dong Na River. Though they have sustained casualties these Bns are capable of limited action. Indications are now that the regimental headquarters was disbanded and that the Bns of the Thu Due Regt are under direct control of SR-4. The rationale for this view is as follows: 23 Feb Pk and former staff cadre of SR-4 captured in the Thu Due District stated that the 1st VC Regt was dissolved between Aug and Sep. 1968 with its Bns becoming directly subordinate to SR-4. This story has been corroborated by several batches of documents (Y339871) which list codes and LBNo of SR-4 with no entry for the 1st VC Regt. The main substantiation comes from 23 Feb documents via Y339821 by Thai forces including a letter to "BN" (NAM CSFOR). This letter indicated that the Regimental Headquarters (1st) at the D5 Sapper Bn had been deactivated. The D2 and D4 Infantry Bns were reorganized and two new units the D6 Artillery and D8 Sapper Engr Bns were formed as of 21 Mar 69.

4 Fifth VC Division: The Fifth Division completed its first relocation into War Zone D prior to the start of the reporting period and attempted to fulfill its mission in the "inter-Spring" campaign by sending its regiments against the Long Bien Hoa area in Mar. After a series of reverses, the Division withdrew back into War Zone D for refitting and resupplying, leaving one of its regiments, the 95th, to maintain a presence in the area south of the Dong Na River. It evaded significant contact in this base area during Apr and shows no signs of relocating from the area.

a 275th Regt: During the week of the 23rd through the 27th of Feb, the 275th Regt attempted to carry out its mission against the Long Bien Hoa. On the night of 22/23 Feb, a 60 man element from the 1st Bn/275th Regt went on an Inf attack against the Xuan Hoa Airbase, the 31 Bn, 275th Regt attacked a local hamlet, was engaged before it reached the airbase and suffered heavy losses. The 5 remaining elements were engaged in over 250 KIA, 50 KLA, and 60 Ws. Following this phase of the off remaining elements were believed to have withdrawn to War Zone D. On 11 Mar 69, 16 km NW of Xuan Hoa (VT 4226) received a ground attack from some of the 1st Bn, 275th Regt. The contact resulted in 49 enemy KIA and 5 Ws. For the 275th Regt lost another 34 KIA in the same area (VT 4122) when an HRA unit was contacted. On 17 Feb the 275th Regt lost another 34 KIA in a contact with VT 5126. At VT 3531 the 1st and 2nd Bns, 3 Mike Strike Force (SF) made contact with an estimated two enemy battalions on 24 Mar. The contact lasted two days and resulted in 200 enemy KIA. Documents found identified the 275th Regt. Documents picked up by 6F-1 on 3 Apr vicinity VT366405 identified elements of the 275th Regt. A 13 Apr rallier stated that the 95th Regt has replaced the 275th Regt and the 275th Regt has withdrawn to War Zone D. The 275th Regt has probably moved back to War Zone D to recuperate from losses suffered in Feb and Mar. Recent sensor activity in Apr may indicate heavy rear service unit activity and/or the arrival of replacements for the Regt.
b. 174th Regt: A PW taken in a contact on 24 Feb vicinity YT032204 identified his unit as Co, 174th Regt. According to the PW, the Regiment began moving toward Bien Hoa on the nights of 23/24 Feb. Documents captured on 20 Feb at YT110739 identified a company of the 174th Regt. A PW captured on 24 Feb said the mission of the Regt was to cross the Dong Mai River and move to Bien Hoa and then on to Saigon. However, the Regt was dispersed by artillery fire after crossing the river. A regimental recon company identified by 17 Feb documents captured at YT101350 had probably reconed avenues of approach. During Mar elements of the 174th Regt were believed to be located in base areas in the Catchers Mitt. Documents taken from 13 Vic documents captured at YT088705 identified C22 and C17 Co, 174th Regt. This unit appeared to be made up of wounded personnel who were moving east into War Zone D when they were contacted. On 17 Mar documents removed from 12 KIA following a contact vicinity YT038208 identified elements of the 2d Bn, 174th Regt. The 174th Regt was contacted again on 27 Mar vicinity YT523553 by two companies of 43d Regt of the 1st ARVN Div. The unit engaged was estimated as an enemy company. A PW taken from the contact identified his unit as 1 Co, U/I Bn, 174th Regt. He said his unit crossed the Dong Mai River vicinity YT502410 with 8 other companies. Mission of the units was to attack military trucks on Highway 20. During Apr the only significant contact made with elements of the 174th Regt was on 12 Apr vicinity YT 1037. Documents identified the Recon Co of the 174th Regt. Results of contact were 5 VC KIA. The 17 Mar contact would seem to indicate a major relocation of the 174th Regt but through analysis it is believed that the Regiment is located in the Catchers Mitt and southwestern War Zone D area. Its probable mission at this time is one of resupplying and refitting.

c. 95A Regiment: In mid-February the 95A Regt from II Corps entered southern War Zone D and later moved into U-1 Province. Documents captured on 19 Feb, and dated 29 Jan, were found at YT 2337. They identified the 18th Signal and 21st Recon Companies/95A Regt. The documents showed that the Regt CP was located at YT 1520. A rallier, who said he was the XO and Adjutant of the 12th Co/3d Bn/95A Regt stated his CP was located at YT 2337. Documents captured on 20 Feb at YT011200 identified elements of the 95th Regt (10 Mar). Documents were captured within 3 kms of contact which took place vicinity YT 2422 and YT 2520, on 9 and 11 Mar. On 24 Mar a 1st Cav Div NDF vicinity YT 2512 received an estimated two enemy platoons from an estimated NVA four vehicle convoy. Twenty NVA were killed in this encounter and document readouts identified the 2d Bn, 95th Regt. On 29 Mar vicinity YT 2218, 3-52 ARVN Regt contacted an enemy force. The results were 9 VC KIA. Documents identified the 1st Bn, 95th Regt. A rallier, Nguyen Van Winh, on 11 Apr stated his battalion was located vicinity YT 2414. He stated the mission of his unit was to attack Gau Han (vicinity YT 2610) and Hung Ngia (vicinity YT300) for the purpose of acquiring food for his unit. On 13 Apr vicinity YT 2511, Lt Nguyen Minh rallied to 2-52 ARVN. He identified himself as the CO of the Combat Training Section, HQ, U-1 Province. According to Minh, the 275th Regt received heavy casualties and withdrew north across the Dong Mai River. The 95th Regt replaced the 275th Regt and has a dual mission of operating in the Rach Dong area (vicinity YT 1620) and supporting HQ, U-1. 27 and 28 Bns are believed to be operating in the vicinity of YT 2717 to protect caches. The 95th Regt is expected to remain in the area of northwestern U-1 Province, dispersed between the Dong Mai River and Hwy 1, acting as a forward element of the Div. Its mission is probably to conduct attacks by fire on allied elements in their area and also to supply U-1 HQ.

(f) Local Force units within the 1st Infantry Division TAOI: During the reporting period local forces initiated contacts decreased to a low level. Although VC forces have continued to support main body forces by acting as guides, reconning for future missions, transporting supplies and wounded personnel as well as conducting harassing actions against allied installations and lines of communications, and has been conducted at a relatively low level because of the local forces being used to quickly replace personnel, train them and equip them during the reporting period. Local forces however have maintained their pressure at disrupting the GVN pacification program by conducting an extensive propaganda mission in an attempt to get the populace to demand a coalition government and to demand that the allies leave Vietnam. The following local force units have been active within the 1st Infantry Division TAOI during the reporting period.
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1. C61 Ben Cat District Company: During the reporting period the 1st Infantry
Division began operating in the normal area of operation of C61 and Ben Cat District,
causing C61 to move north along the Chi Tinh River and disperse along its tributaries
and in the northeastern section of the Trapezoid. During this period C61...
and harassed daily US Rome Plow operations operating west of Lai Khe in the jungle
base area of C61. This left only the dense vegetation along the Thi Tinh River as a
place to hide for C61, making it extremely difficult for C61 to establish base
area in this area and to move undetected. During the later part of Apr it became
increasingly more evident that C61 was having difficulty acquiring food. T
d and
rallies during Apr indicated morale was low because of the lack of sufficient food
supplies. Presently the strength of C61 is believed to be approximately 50 person-
nel. During the reporting period it was verified that C61 Ben Cat District Company has the
beige for and acted as security for artillery units subordinate to COSVN and SR-I which have been responsible for the heavy rocket and mortar attacks
Lai Khe and Phuoc Vinh received during late Feb and early Mar.

2. C62 Chau Thanh District Company: During the months of Feb and Mar C62
avoided contact and remained in its area of operation in Chau Thanh District. Because of
its heavy losses during the later months of 1968 C62 has avoided contact while it
resupplied and replaced its personnel and trained people. During Apr C62 was en-
gaged and identified frequently in Chau Thanh District. These frequent identifica-
tions and contacts indicate C62 is strong enough to venture outside its base areas
and attempt missions such as attacks by fire, harassing LOCs, and propaganda and
terrorist type activities. A contact at the end of Apr resulted in the death of ... Chau, the CO of C62 Chau Thanh District. This indicates the C62 may attempt to
retaliate for this loss by increasing its harassing attacks by fire and ambushes.

3. C63 Lai Thieu District Company: During the reporting period C63 Lai Thieu
District Company remained out of contact unless it was fired upon in an ambush.
C63 worked closely with the Dong Nai Regiment during the Spring Campaign, providing
the Dong Nai Regiment with food supplies and acting as liaison to coordinate main
force and guerrillas efforts in Lai Thieu District. C63 during this period played
the role of a commo-liaison unit in support of a main force element. During this
period C63 did not operate in its area of operation, thus creating a vacuum in this
area south of Thu Cuong City, which was eventually filled by C65 Thu Cuong City Pla-
toon. On 21 Apr the most significant contact with this unit in this reporting period
occurred. Three VC from C63 were killed and various items of equipment were captured.
This indicates C63 is no longer operating as a commo-liaison unit and is once again
operating as a local force element in the An Son area.

4. C65 Phu Cuong City Platoon: During the months of Feb and Mar C65 Phu Cuong
City Platoon avoided contact while remaining in its jungle base area in Phu Giao
District. Not until Apr did C65 move out of its base area down to its area of operation around Phu Cuong City. On 1 Apr, C65 was engaged and sustained
between 15-19 personnel lost in action, reducing the strength of C65 by approximately
1/3. Since this period C65 has avoided all contacts but is still believed to be
located in the area around Phu Cuong City, possibly carrying on propaganda and ter-
orist type activities.

5. C301 Thu Giao District Company: The C301 Thu Giao District Company
avoided contact during Feb, Mar, and Apr. C301 is believed to be responsible for
the interdiction of Highways 1A, 2A, and 1B, along with collecting taxes and sup-
plying within its area of operation. It is believed C301 is also conducting training
classes for the village guerrillas and organizing political groups in villages and
hamlets who will work toward the formation of a coalition government. C301 has
been known to operate frequently in the Phuoc Hoa and Phuoc Vinh areas.

6. Quyet Thang Regiment 273C: The 273C Regiment is presently composed of 3 batt-
alions: 1st Main Force Bn, 2d Local Force Bn, and the 4 Gia Dinh Sapper Bn, compris-
ing a strength of approximately 800-850 personnel. During the reporting period the
Quyet Thang Regiment moved out of its base area in the Trapezoid down along the east
and west banks of the Saigon River beside the Iron Triangle. Throughout this period
the regiment dispersed itself along the entire western side of the Iron Triangle
outside the Saigon River in company and platoon sized elements. At first it appeared
that the 273C Regiment was attempting to move south into the Hoc Ton area but this

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has been proven false. It appears the 273C Regt is staying in the Iron Triangle and has in recent weeks ventured across the Saigon River into the Phu Hu Bridge area where it has been in contact. This tends to indicate that the 273C Regt is in this area to present a show of force in the villages and hamlets and to act as a pressure point in the 1st Infantry Division TAOI causing the 1st Division to keep men in reserve should the 273C Regt decide to assume an offensive rather than defensive posture. The 4 Gia Dinh Sapper Bn is believed to be dispersed along the Saigon River Corridor in and around Phu Cuong City. It has been noted during Apr that agent reports indicated the Phu Cuong Bridge would once again become the target for the Gia Dinh Sapper Bn. An attempt in Mar to recon the bridge failed when one member of the recon element was captured. It is expected the Gia Dinh Sapper Bn will make another attempt at the Phu Cuong Bridge in the near future.

f. (C) Logistics

(1) During the reporting period a Supply and Logistics Assistance Team (SLAT) was established as part of the 1st Infantry Division, G4. The purpose of this team is to improve the logistics posture of units within the Division. Specific responsibilities of the team are:

(a) To conduct supply and logistics inspections for each divisional unit within each fiscal year as part of the unit AGI;

(b) To conduct courtesy inspections upon request and to instruct supply personnel through on-the-spot corrections, on-the-job training and practical experience utilizing the unit's supply records as a training vehicle;

(c) To research and conduct command inspections on areas of special interest;

(d) To make assistance visits to units upon request. Prior to formulation of the SLAT, the G4 and AGI sections were totally without qualified technical inspectors to conduct supply inspections at property book levels and had no method at their disposal to provide continuity on successive inspections. Accordingly, the division's logistics posture was suffering degradation due to a lack of standards and inspection criteria governing all areas of supply management and accountability. During the quarter, SLAT conducted inspections in all units scheduled for the USARV AGI during the period 30 May - 7 Apr 69 and courtesy inspections in other units. The overall satisfactory results attained by units on their USARV AGI has proven SLAT to be a very effective and beneficial tool in the division's logistics improvement program. Also during the quarter, SLAT completed a Division TOE/MTOE Equipment Recapitulation. Due to the Army's conversion to the Army Authorization Document System (TAADS), the division does not have a consolidated TOE/MTOE equipment recapitulation showing total division assets authorized, and the division had no method of determining how much or what each unit was authorized. In order to ascertain what each unit was authorized, SLAT initiated a project to manually post (utilizing a spreadsheet process) all divisional units' TOE's to basic TOE's, the resultant figure being what each unit is ultimately authorized. Upon completing all unit TOE/MTOE postings, a division recapitulation was formed showing line number of equipment authorized battalions and separate companies and the total assigned by each line item authorized the Division. Utilizing the individual unit spread during inspections, SLAT has saved several hundred thousand dollars worth of equipment by identifying and eliminating numerous excesses in the division. Further, by using the same process, SLAT has established all property book authorizations to considerable accuracy (in those units inspected thus far), and units now find that they are authorized equipment of which they previously had no knowledge. The SLAT actions enhance supply requisitioning, accounting and reporting and contribute to overall combat effectiveness of the division.

(2) During the reporting period, the 1st Infantry Division CMMI was attached to the IG Team for purposes of preparing divisional units for the USARV IG inspection. The USARV IG Inspection was conducted during the period 6-12 Apr 69. The purpose of this augmentation was to extend the scope and inspection areas of the Division IG to conform with the inspection areas of the USARV Team. The result proved most favorable as all 18 units inspected received an overall satisfactory score in the CMMI field of the USARV IG. More specifically, in the inspectional areas in

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Each unit (wheeled vehicles, trailers, signal equipment, small arms, engineer equipment, chemical equipment, field ranges, ammunition storage, and maintenance management) there was only one score below 70%. The attachment of the CMII Team to the IG Team will continue due to the satisfactory results to date. Additionally, the CMII Team will conduct independent CMII inspections in hopes of inspecting each divisional unit twice a year.

(3) During the reporting period, the 1st Infantry Division pathfinders, from the 1st Aviation Battalion, conducted inspections of aerial delivery rigging procedures in the infantry and artillery battalions. The purpose of these inspections was to preclude personal injury and loss of property due to faulty rigging and equipment. As a result of these inspections, the loss of property and personal injury have been kept to a minimum. The Pathfinder inspection team is attached to one of the brigades or DIVARTY for the purpose of inspecting all of their units at both the base camps and field locations. The complete inspection cycle of all division units takes approximately two months. Upon completion the cycle begins again.

(a) Organization: Several major organizational changes took place within the 1st Infantry Division during the reporting period.

(1) The Long Range Patrol Co, Company F (LBP), 52d Infantry, was inactivated by USARPAC General Order 66 dated 27 January 1969. Under the same General Order, Company I (Ranger), 75th Infantry was activated and organized. USARV General Order 557 dated 17 February 1969 assigned Company I (Ranger), 75th Infantry, to 1st Infantry Division. 1st Infantry Division General Order Number 2533 dated 9 April 1969 attached Company I (Ranger), 75th Infantry, to 3d Bde, 1st Infantry Division, with an effective date of 1 April 1969.

(2) The only major reorganization within the 1st Infantry Division that took place during this reporting period was the reorganization of the 1st Avn Bn and the Ist Sqdn, 4th Cav. Upon receipt of USARPAC General Order 93, dated 31 January 1969 the 1st Infantry Division published General Order 2031 dated 24 March 1969 reorganizing 1st Avn Bn and Ist Sqdn, 4th Cav with an effective date of 22 March 1969.

(a) The 1st Avn Bn was reorganized under MTOE 1-75G, with a strength level of 47 Officers, 58 Warrant Officers, 318 Enlisted Men, for a total of 423 men. Under the G-TOE the strength of Warrant Officers and Enlisted Men was increased by 4 Warrant Officers and 37 Enlisted Men. The equipment levels increased slightly. Hq is under MTOE 1-76G, Co A is under 1-77G, and Co B is under 1-78G.

(b) The Ist Sqdn, 4th Cav, was reorganized under the G-TOE with 50 Officers and 36 Warrant Officers, 962 Enlisted Men for a total of 1049 men. The G-TOE increased the over strength by 179 men: 1 Officer, 6 Warrant Officers, and 172 Enlisted Men. The units equipment levels increased in line with the personnel increases.

(2) With an effective date of 17 April 1969 Troop Delta (Air), 1st Sqdn, 4th Cavalry, was attached to HHC, 1st Aviation Battalion, 1st Infantry Division by 1st Infantry Division General Order Number 2738 dated 16 April 1969. The sqdn was attached to the 1st Aviation Battalion for all purposes but operational control is exercised by the ACoS, G3.

(4) On 25 April 1969, 1st Infantry Division General Order 3013 was published organizing the Division Training Command (Provisional) with an effective date of 15 February 1969. All equipment and personnel are furnished from local resources. The mission of the Division Training Command is to provide combat indoctrination training for replacement personnel, train Kit Carson Scouts, conduct sniper training, provide tactics and weapons refresher training through MFTs, and train designated ARVN units.

(5) During the reporting period the following attachments occurred. 1st Infantry Division General Order 2077 dated 26 March 1969 attached the 242d Chemical Detachment to HHC, 1st Infantry Division. 1st Infantry Division General Order 2078
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dated 26 March 1969 attached the 266th Chemical Platoon to 1st Infantry Division Support Command. 1st Infantry Division General Order 2826 attached Ground Surveillance Section, Combat Support Company, 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry; Ground Surveillance Section, HHC, 2d Bn (Mech), 2d Infantry; and Ground Surveillance Section, Combat Support Company, 1st Battalion, 76th Infantry, to HHB, 1st Infantry Division Artillery. The same General Order attached Ground Surveillance Sections from Combat Support Company, 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry; Combat Support Company, 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry; Combat Support Company, 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry, to Headquarters, Headquarters and Service Battery, 1st Battalion, 7th Artillery. Ground Surveillance Sections from HHC, 1st Battalion (Mech), 16th Infantry; Combat Support Company, 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry; Combat Support Company, 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry, were attached to Headquarters, Headquarters and Service Battery, 2d Battalion, 33d Artillery.

h. (C) Psychological Operations.

(1) Psychological operations this quarter were aimed at three general target groups:

(a) Civilians

(b) NVA/VC

(c) VCI

(2) During the quarter a total of 15,108,000 leaflets were disseminated and 233:30 hours of loudspeaker broadcast and 786:50 hours ground operations were employed in support of the division. The following is a breakdown, by unit, of support operations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LEAFLETS</th>
<th>BROADCAST TIME</th>
<th>GROUND OPERATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Brigade</td>
<td>1,997,000</td>
<td>28 hours 35 min</td>
<td>15 hours 20 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Brigade</td>
<td>8,476,000</td>
<td>120 hours 15 min</td>
<td>370 hours 30 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Brigade</td>
<td>4,125,000</td>
<td>65 hours 20 min</td>
<td>89 hours 30 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th ACR</td>
<td>510,000</td>
<td>19 hours 20 min</td>
<td>310 hours 30 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>15,108,000</td>
<td>233 hours, 30 min</td>
<td>786 hours 30 min</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

i. (U) Civic Action/Civic Affairs

(1) The MEDCAP program, now redesignated ICAP to reflect greater emphasis on the intelligence-gathering phase of the operation, has made significant progress in Ben Cat District, Binh Duong Province. The Ben Cat District Government has requested that American medical assistance to be reduced to a continuous advisory program for the Government's own medical personnel. Accordingly the division no longer conducted ICAPs in this district as such. The district government has assumed responsibility for treating its people. The division is encouraging other district governments increase their own medical care capabilities as well.

(2) One new program the division has found particularly effective is a... of educational trips for children. In these, school children are taken from the area of operation by fixed wing, Chinook aircraft, or by bus for a daylong trip to Saigon. There they visit the Presidential Palace, the National Assembly, the national and historical shrines. These children, most of whom have never seen Saigon, are subjected to the environment of a growing, modern, and free metropolis. The... all this is transferred back to the parents who hopefully will realize GVN is a true supporter of the people. Follow-up by GVN teams exploiting the GVN will make the people more receptive and their propaganda more meaningful.

(3) The division has made progress in establishing Friendship Councils to supplement the Community Relations Program. Each Sunday the 1/4 Cav invites Vietnamese government officials and private citizens from Di An District and the surrounding area to have lunch and attend a special briefing. The meetings have provided an opportunity to exchange ideas about improving community relations and making Civic Action Projects more effective.

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2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. (U) Personnel: None

b. (C) Operations:

(1) Land Clearing Operations.

(a) Observation: The enemy can deter the efficiency of a land clearing unit by the emplacement of anti-tank mines in the proposed area to be cleared. If the enemy is permitted to control the terrain until the land is cleared, personnel and equipment damages will be excessive.

(b) Evaluation: Reconnaissance in force operations must be conducted continuously throughout the area to be cleared, so as to root out the enemy and preclude his easy access into and out of the area. Ambushes in the prepared area for clearing will deter enemy mining parties from entering into the area. Further, artillery and tactical air preparations of terrain to be cleared can detonate emplaced mines and booby traps and discourage enemy units from remaining in the area.

(c) Recommendations: That units involved in land clearing operations conduct extensive RIF and ambush activities in the area to be cleared and that artillery and air preparations be used prior to cutting operations.

(2) Village and Hamlet Seals.

(a) Observation: Units involved in seal operations are frequently required to maneuver outside of the immediate seal area, so as to search out cache or base camp areas. Further, to effectively maintain the seal, units must ambush probable routes into and out of the village. Effective fire coordination cannot be achieved unless areas of operation or zones of responsibility beyond the seal are designated.

(b) Evaluation: Areas adjacent to villages must be designated as unit areas of operation in addition to unit responsibilities within the seal. The designation of AOs beyond the seal will insure that units are aware of their responsibilities beyond the immediate seal and will allow for effective fire coordination, planning and execution.

(c) Recommendations: That headquarters responsible for coordinating and effecting village seals designate areas of operation beyond the immediate periphery of the seal AO, so as to allow for effective fire coordination.

(3) Hunter-Killer Team/Forward Air Controller Joint Reconnaissance.

(a) Observation: Aerial reconnaissance by Hunter-Killer Teams has proved to be a most effective means of locating enemy base camp areas from the air. When joined with a forward air controller, the HKT provides an excellent means of pinpointing and marking areas for the PAC to direct tactical air into an enemy or base camp area.

(b) Evaluation: Tactical air strikes can be directed more effectively against targets initially detected by a Hunter-Killer Team for a forward air controller.

(c) Recommendation: That Hunter-Killer Teams work in conjunction with the air controllers in target selection for tactical air strikes whenever the aircraft are available.

(4) Long Range Patrol Techniques for Infantry Companies.

(a) Observation: The enemy is frequently provided early warning as to friendly locations due to the practices of US units conducting daily aerial resupply. Further, the technique of having units move constantly during daylight hours, so to attempt to establish contact with the enemy, often results in meeting engagement which cause unit locations to be revealed. The enemy has a decided advantage in
observing excessive moves by friendly units during daylight hours and in having the opportunity of establishing hasty and deliberate ambushes, or if he chooses, in avoiding contact. Enemy movements have been most frequent immediately prior to and during hours of darkness and reduced visibility.

(b) Evaluation: Engagements can be more effective by conducting operations during daylight hours which reduce movement, preclude enemy detection, and allow time during daylight hours for the deliberate establishment of ambushes along avenues of approach, thereby having ambushes well established when the enemy is most likely to be moving. Friendly forces are also given the opportunity for adequate rest during the warmest hours of the day. This enables them to be most responsive when enemy units are encountered.

(c) Recommendation: That units of platoons and squads conduct extensive long range patrol type actions which are characterized by minimum movement, deliberate ambush establishment and execution, and extended periods (3 days) of operation without resupply.

(5) Employment of Mobile Resource Control Teams.

(a) Observation: The resource control program has become extremely effective in the last reporting period.

(b) Evaluation: Mobile Resource Control Team operations have improved in effectiveness from an average of 250 detainees per quarter one year ago to 748 detainees in the last reporting period and 1024 detainees in this reporting period. Enemy reaction to the MRCT program has resulted in three incidents of enemy initiated actions during the period. On 6 Feb an MRCT observed a 35 lb tilt rod mine concealed at their normal checkpoint. On 21 Mar a MRCT was ambushed near Lai Thiu, resulting in two MPs KIA. On 11 Apr a boobytrap was detonated near a MRCT resulting in one MP WIA. Three important techniques have been utilized during the recent periods. First, Mobile Resource Control Teams have been stabilized, and team members have worked together for extended periods of time, increasing their team effectiveness and knowledge of the total area. Second, a continual evaluation and compilation of team results is being accomplished using team logs, daily SITREPs, and spot maps. Teams are now employed for specific periods at specific locations where past results have indicated a high probability for attempted VC/NVA infiltration. The experience and recommendations of Vietnamese team members is heavily relied upon. Third, teams are now utilized at times and locations not previously utilized. Through close support with maneuver battalions, MRCTs are now employed during the early morning and evening hours along prime avenues of VC infiltration.

(c) Recommendation: The above factors be considered MRCT employment.

(6) Floating Night Ambushes.

(a) Observation: The VC use sampans to move personnel and supplies along inland waterways.

(b) Evaluation: The 2/16 Inf and 2/18 Inf are now using engineer boats on night ambushes along waterways used by the VC sampan traffic. Three 20 foot aluminum boats are sent out each night with six infantrymen and two boat operators. Three of four ambush sites are selected during daylight, and the ambush moves from position to position during the night. Each boat has a PRC-25 radio and a machinegun, and boats are within supporting distance of each other. Three men placed on the shore to provide security for the ambush.

(c) Recommendation: That FWMAF operating in the vicinity of waterways employ the floating ambush.

(7) Daylight Ambushes.

(a) Observation: A daylight ambush program has begun where ambush patrols are deployed in small groups of three and four men, positioned so as to observe likely VC routes. A portion of these men are equipped with sniper rifles and sniper scope.
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It is felt that these techniques of “still” hunting will be effective against the small groups of two and three VC which are encountered in the nipa palm. The day APs have thus far eliminated 2 VC KIA and captured 2 VC PWs.

(c) Recommendation: That other US/ARVN forces consider the use of the daytime ambush.

(8) Day RIF against day AP.

(a) Observation: Small groups of 2-3 VC may avoid a RIF by moving away as the unit approaches.

(b) Evaluation: A RIF is conducted in the direction of the positions occupied by day AP. This technique may flush VC from their hiding places and into the AP positions. Close coordination and control is necessary to avoid shooting friendly personnel.

(c) Recommendation: None; the procedure is being tested at this time.

(9) Stealth day RIF.

(a) Observation: The VC often hear the RIF elements approach and are able to avoid detection by evading the unit.

(b) Evaluation: The stealth RIF employs the slow quiet movement of RIF elements through an area in order to move up on the enemy without his detecting the maneuver. This technique may have particular appeal to hunters.

(c) Recommendation: None; the procedure is being tested at this time.

(10) Detailed area search.

(a) Observation: A significant number of kills during the past six months have resulted from finding the VC in holes or tunnels. The VC have also employed the same nearby tunnels for caches more than once.

(b) Evaluation: Battalions begin by plotting on a map the locations of tunnels and caches found since 1 Jan 69 selecting locations to be searched. Emphasis is placed on detailed search, not on covering a large area. Commanders insure their men are proficient in ways to recognize a tunnel. As tunnel or spider holes are uncovered in the field, units study their characteristics to improve methods for finding additional underground hiding places.

(c) Recommendation: That other units employ this detailed search procedure in areas of suspected VC activity.

(11) Day radar operations.

(a) Observation: Radar may be able to spot enemy movement, which can be attacked by US elements.

(b) Evaluation: This concept employs daytime radar, hunter-killer or teams, and ARPs or heliborne troops in combination. Radar sightings in largely unpopulated areas are likely to be enemy movement rather than friendly civilians. The radar assists in pinpointing possible enemy locations.

(c) Recommendations: None; this technique is being tested at this time.

(12) Tower installation.

(a) Observation: All sides of a tower should be braced before installing the platform.

(b) Evaluation: Recently a 45’ Radar Tower was installed at Fort Seminole (SX980950) utilizing 3 telephone poles as legs. The tower had to be constructed as
expediamente as possible in order to put the radar in use immediately. The three poles were set 10 feet on center. Since this was to be constructed as fast as possible it was decided to brace only one side of the tower prior to construction of the platform. It was noted by the engineer platoon leader that by only bracing one side of the tower hazardous working conditions resulted. These unsafe conditions were multiplied by the length, weight, and bulk of the material used on the top. The tower was completely braced before installation of the platform.

(c) Recommendation: Tower emplacement is necessary for the successful observation of enemy routes and emplacements. Safety of personnel and ease of construction is enhanced if the tower is constructed from the ground on with all bracing complete before the installation of the tower platform.

(13) Culvert construction.

(a) Observation: Culverts have been lost due to crushing by vehicles.

(b) Evaluation: Recently at a Fire Support Base it was noted that the ends of culverts were being crushed by trucks because the ends of the culvert did not extend beyond the shoulders of the road.

(c) Recommendation: Increasing the length of culverts will enable vehicles to make turns without crushing the ends of the culvert and thereby continue proper drainage.

(14) Emplacing Airmobile towers.

(a) Observation: It is easier to emplace airmobile towers with footers attached.

(b) Evaluation: Experience in the 1st Engr BN has shown that it is easier and less time consuming to install 20 foot wooden airmobile towers with the footers attached. It is extremely difficult and time consuming to try to emplace an airmobile tower on footers while it is suspended in the air due to the constant motions of the Chinook helicopter. It is also a safety hazard. One preparation that must be made is a laterite pad to insure that the tower is level when lowered on the footers.

(c) Recommendation: Recommend that airmobile towers be emplaced with the footers attached.

(15) Use of 40HP outboard motors on LTR half pontoon.

(a) Observation: 40 horse-power outboard motors provide necessary power for search and defoliation river missions on the LTR half pontoon.

(b) Evaluation: It was found that repair parts for the 25 HP outboard motors were hard to obtain and that these motors were giving insufficient speed to avoid enemy ambushes. For this reason the newer 40 HP outboards were put into use and found more suitable for this type of mission. It was found that in order to run properly it was necessary to lower and brace the rear transom of the LTR half pontoon so that seven (7) inches of draft was added to the propeller.

(c) Recommendation: That the newer 40 HP outboard motor be used in RVN for all river and defoliation missions.

(16) Use of Trestle Assemblies in Bridge Work.

(a) Observation: Utilization of trestle assemblies in bridge work is slow.

(b) Evaluation: During the reconstruction of a French Eiffel Bridge it was found that the work required the construction of a three float raft-mounted with two (2) fifty-ton trestle assemblies to be used as a temporary intermediate span. This same system can be used in repairing long spans of Bailey Bridges.

(c) Recommendation: The raft trestle combination be used in repairing long spans of Bailey Bridges to save considerable time and trouble.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDO-T (NSID) 15 May 1969
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1969, ECS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

(17) Uncharted minefields.

(a) Observation: Clearing uncharted minefields poses a number of considerations.

(b) Evaluation: Several problems are encountered with every request to clear a minefield. The key to many of these problems is not having a complete and accurate record of the minefield. Generally the number, type and trace of the mines is unknown. As a result of the confusion, tankdozers have been used to scrape off and/or detonate mines by running over the suspected minefield. This practice has resulted in heavy damage to tankdozers and as they become combat losses, they are replaced by M48A3 tanks due to the unavailability of tankdozers.

(c) Recommendation: A decision to install a minefield should be carefully considered. Someone will have to remove the minefield eventually. (There should be a central control agency for minefields which can coordinate between ARVN and US units. It should be a policy that the installing unit will remove its own minefields, if feasible).

(1) Security of Rome Plow operations:

(a) Observation: Harassing and interdicting fire by accompanying security vehicles is beneficial to Rome Plow operations.

(b) Evaluation: The 60th Land Clearing Company has just completed clearing an area known to be an enemy base camp. Heavy mining and RPG activity was encountered. Reconnaissance by fire from tanks using 90mm cannister rounds, and ACAVs using machine guns was found to be quite successful in decreasing the number of incidents.

(c) Recommendation: Recommend that reconnaissance by fire from tanks and ACAV in conjunction with Rome Plow operations be used wherever enemy activity is present.

(19) VCI mining techniques.

(a) Observation: Mines have been found on AVLB bypasses.

(b) Evaluation: Enemy mines have been found on AVLB bypasses. These areas must be swept if it becomes necessary to use the AVLB. In the event of interdiction, it is recommended that ambushes be positioned at AVLB bypasses to counter the mining threat until the MSR is restored.

(c) Recommendation: That AVLB bypasses be swept when a mine sweep team sweeps the MSRs. Further recommend that when AVLBs are being used that an ambush be located on or near the bypass.

c. (C) Training:

(1) Radio Relay and Carrier Attendants (MOS 31E20):

(a) Observation: The personnel being received in the MOS 31M20 are not trained in four principle areas - Antenna Erection, Troubleshooting Procedures and Generator PM.

(b) Evaluation: 1. The personnel arriving in the 121st Sig Bn in the whole are severely lacking training in antenna erection. In some cases the personnel only witnessed a demonstration of antenna erection in school, and when the time arrives to erect an antenna they have no practical knowledge.

2. MOS 31M20 personnel are unable to correct circuit and systems outages effectively. Poor restoral procedures are due to the inability of the 31M20 personnel to troubleshoot the equipment effectively. The operators troubleshoot equipment by replacements of components, rather than by symptom. After the reestablishment of the system, no one knows what was wrong with the system. The result is that components are turned into maintenance that are not inoperable, causing additional burdens on the maintenance system. Their basic background in system background is good, but they have trouble with the proper system restoral procedures.

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15 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Ist Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

The 31M20s are required to operate and maintain their own equipment, to include the generators. Experience has shown that they are not familiar with the operation and maintenance of these generators, including TAERS.

(c) **Recommendation**: That the program of instruction for the 31M20 course be revised to allow more time in the areas of antenna erection, troubleshooting procedures, and generator PM/TAERS.

d. (U) **Intelligence**: None.

e. (C) **Logistics**:

(1) **Military Engines**:

(a) **Observation**: No spark has been observed on newly installed military standard engines.

(b) **Evaluation**: Investigation of the engine in each case revealed that the ignition coil had rusted.

(c) **Recommendation**: Immediately after unpacking a new military standard engine and before installing it, run a spark test on it. This will save much unnecessary work should the coils be rusted.

(2) **Compression Cups of 81mm Mortar**.

(a) **Observation**: There are a large number of unserviceable compression cups on the shock absorbers of 81mm mortars.

(b) **Evaluation**: Excess lubrication of the cup causes it to leak air and it quickly becomes unserviceable. Replacement of the cup is a time consuming direct support job.

(c) **Recommendation**: All using units should be advised to use a very sparing amount of lubricant on this item.

(3) **AN/PRC Operation**.

(a) **Observation**: AN/PRC radios become inoperative when used with the supply type pack frame.

(b) **Evaluation**: The exposed metal sections of the frame top can short out the radios' antennas. This can be prevented by wrapping black electrical tape around the top sections of the frame.

(c) **Recommendation**: All back packs used to carry AN/PRC 25s be taped in this manner.

(4) **Use of Military L23699 Oil**.

(a) **Observation**: The use of MIL L23699 high detergent oil in the L13 engine has prolonged engine life.

(b) **Evaluation**: MIL L23699 high detergent oil has proven very effective in reducing engine oil consumption in those L13 engines in which it is being used. Experience has shown that the oil should be converted at the time of engine installation or within 100 flying hours. Thorough flushing of the old non-detergent L7808 oil must be accomplished during the conversion.

(c) **Recommendation**: The oil in all L-13 aircraft engines should be converted to MIL L23699 as outlined above.

(5) **Driveshaft driver oil for AH-1G**.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(a) Observation: Numerous problems have been encountered with the drive shaft driver oil cooling system on the earlier version of the AH-10 aircraft.

(b) Evaluation: A bleed air oil cooler system is used on newer models of the AH-10 and has been far more successful than the older drive shaft system. This bleed air system can be applied to the older model AH-10s as an HWO and would greatly reduce the field maintenance hours presently being expended to repair the drive shaft system.

(c) Recommendation: This HWO should be applied to all AH-10 aircraft as soon as operational requirements allow it.

(6) Final Drive Failures.

(a) Observation: There is a high failure rate of final drives on track vehicles during heavy operations in heavy jungle.

(b) Evaluation: During these operations the primary factor in the high failure rate of the final drives is the requirement for the tracks to break through the thick underbrush encountered in heavy jungle. A resulting heavy demand is placed on the supply system when a major operation with track vehicles is conducted in this type of terrain.

(c) Recommendation: All necessary actions be taken to insure an adequate stockage of track vehicle final drives is on hand prior to any large operation in heavy jungle.

(7) 100KW Generator-Holt Brothers.

(a) Observation: Loss of power on Holt Brothers 100KW generator sets has been observed.

(b) Evaluation: Inspection of the generator set revealed that the fuel filter had not been changed at the proper interval, allowing them to become so clogged that not enough fuel could pass through them to keep the engine running at full power. After installation of new filters the generator set again operated correctly.

(c) Recommendation: Emphasis should be placed on changing fuel filters in the Holt Brothers 100KW generator sets.

(8) M79 Grenade Launchers.

(a) Observation: Cocking levers on the M79 grenade launchers become loose and unserviceable through normal usage.

(b) Evaluation: Rather than replacing the worn cocking lever, a simple shim can be placed between the receiver and the cocking lever. This satisfactorily tightens the lever, resulting in much time saved and fewer levers expended.

(c) Recommendation: Armament shops consider repairing worn cocking levers using a shim rather than by replacement of the lever.

(9) Installation of the M105 Telescope Mount.

(a) Observation: Improper installation of the M105 Telescope Mount can cause severe damage.

(b) Evaluation: The M105 telescope is mounted adjacent to the main gun in M68A3 turret and is supported in the rear by an "L" shaped mount which is located just above the manual firing mechanism for the main gun. If the mount is not properly secured to the telescope it will swing down to a position just below the firing mechanism. If the main gun is elevated with the mount in this position, the manual firing mechanism will be forced against the mount causing it damage.

(c) Recommendation: The M105 telescope mount must be secured in the proper
position at all times and checked frequently to insure that it has not become loose. If mounting bolts are not available, the mount should be completely removed and stored until the proper bolts are available.

(f) (c) Organization:

(1) Airborne Personnel Detector.

(a) Observation: The Airborne Personnel Detector is being used extensively as an intelligence collecting medium and can become more useful as refinements are developed to improve its reliability.

(b) Evaluation: The original concept of personnel detection was based on the machine's ability to detect human beings because of some product emitted solely by man (ammonia). Although there has been much doubt in the commander's mind concerning the reliability of the instrument, he was willing to accept it on the basis of its theoretical operating concept. A considerable effort has been made by the laboratory to disprove the basic theory of operation. Subsequently, a new model has been developed which is only more sensitive to the normal conditions that exist in a battlefield environment.

(c) Recommendation: Research should be continued in the development of a true human detector. The original theoretical concept should be explored to determine some other things that are solely peculiar to man and which can be detected by the machine.

(2) Defoliants.

(a) Observation: In the Vietnam environment a considerable effort is made to rid specific areas of vegetation. This is particularly true in any area involving security such as traffic routes and defense perimeters.

(b) Evaluation: Defoliants have been used around base camps to kill vegetation. The standard defoliants available in-country do not fulfill the commander's requirements. Approved projects have been obtained to defoliate base camp perimeters. Perimeters are sprayed with a defoliant and burned off. Within 30 to 60 days almost complete regrowth occurs. In addition to the standard defoliants inability to provide semi-permanent kill to foliage, there is the inherent danger of run off or seepage into the local waterways which can cause damage to crops during the rainy season which is also the growth season.

(c) Recommendation: A contact kill chemical spray should be developed. The spray must not possess any residual effects nor present hazard to vegetation other than that to which it is directly applied.

(3) Teletypewriter TT-4/7D, Reperforator - Transmitter TT-76/OGC, and typewriter TT-98.

(a) Observation: The TT-4, TT-76, and TT-98 teletype equipment are slow in speed, antiquated, and unreliable.

(b) Evaluation: The TT-4s, TT-76s, and TT-98s have been in the inventory too long a period of time. The teletype equipment presently on hand are the same items of equipment that were issued to this unit prior to its departure for RVN and have been in constant 24-hour service since arrival in RVN. The equipment has been repaired, adjusted, and readjusted numerous times; consequently it is now approaching a point of being almost unrepairable. Experience has shown that speeds above ... are prohibited due to a vast increase in maintenance requirements. The slowness of the equipment, in addition to the daily large volume of messages, produces an undesirable backlog.

(c) Recommendation: That a new generation of tactical teletype equipment be developed, with faster speed, ease of maintenance, and better reliability.

g. (C) Other:
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AVDD-T (MID)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (MI) (U)

15 May 1969

(1) PsyOps Directed at VCI and Local Village Guerrillas:

(a) Observation: Impersonal PsyOps is not an effective means of approaching VCI and local VC village guerrillas with the concept of Chieu Hoi.

(b) Evaluation: VCI and local village guerrillas are not usually affected by impersonal quantitative PsyOp such as that disseminated by aerial leaflet and loudspeaker missions. These impersonal media lack the impact needed to override their deep ideological beliefs and to achieve the desired response of rallying. The enemy personnel are not subject to the same pressures, i.e. air and artillery, lack of food, that their field units must endure. They do not have the same psychological vulnerabilities. The white envelope concept, originated by the 2d Bde 55 is an excellent media with which to communicate with local VC/VCI. This program reaches the VC/VCI through their families. Each family who has a relative in the VC/VCI is given a white envelope. The envelope contains a letter of amnesty from the local village or District Chief, a Chieu Hoi appeal, rally instructions, and a safe conduct pass. This system brings psychological pressure on both the family and the target.

(c) Recommendation: That OB sections and S5s establish a system where continual targeting of this nature can be employed. A thorough, comprehensive campaign of this nature should yield worthwhile results.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

3. (U) Section 3, Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information. None.

WILLIAM J. BRIDGES

16 incl.

16. Includes:

4. Operational Report: Lessons Learned
1. List of Psychological Operations
2. Force Disposition
5. 1st Inf Div Operational Report: Lessons Learned
6. 2d Inf Div Operational Report: Lessons Learned
7. Support Commissaries Operations: Lessons Learned
8. Division Chemical Section Operational Report: Lessons Learned
10. 1st Aviation Operations: Lessons Learned
12. 1st Cavy Operations: Lessons Learned
14. Support of Chieu Hoi
15. Mechanized/Cavalry Right Defensive Positions and Fire Support Patrols
16. Lessons Learned—VCI Operations

ASSIGNMENTS:

3-55, 255th, ATTH, 3rd Division
1-55, 255th, ATTH, 1st Bde
3-55, 255th, ATTH, 3rd Battalion
1-55, 255th, ATTH, 1st Battalion
2-84th, 255th, ATTH, 1st Battalion
1-69th, ATTH, 1st Battalion
2-17th, ATTH
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

DA, HQ II FFORCEN, APO San Francisco 96266  14 JUN 1969

THRU:  Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO:  Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 1st Infantry Division for the period ending 30 April 1969, with the following exception and comment:

a. Reference paragraph 1e(1)(e) 4.c, line 23. "Northwestern" should read "northeastern".

b. Reference paragraph 2b(17).

(1) Policies regarding mine warfare in II FFORCEV are announced in Annex M, II FFORCEV Tactical Standing Operating Procedure, dated 13 March 1969. Offices of record for minefields are as follows:

(a) US/FWMF: 517 Engineer Detachment (Terrain)

(b) ARVN: III CTZ Engineer

(2) A report is submitted periodically of all known minefields in III CTZ. This report goes to all assigned, attached, and OPCON units in II FFORCEV as required.

(3) It is known that uncharted minefields exist throughout the area. Many of these date back to French operations in the area. The marking, recording, and reporting of these minefields is the responsibility of the unit discovering it, as outlined in FM 20-32.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

R. G. MACDONALD

III, AG

Assl AG
HEIM, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 22 JUL 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning "Uncharted Minefields," section II, page 34, paragraph b(17); concur that the decision to install a minefield should be carefully considered. MACV Directive 525-30, dated 8 June 1969, establishes policies and procedures for the employment of land mines in RVN, and adequately prescribes necessary records and reports for the transfer of minefield responsibility between US and RVNAF units. Nonconcur that it should become policy that an installing unit will remove its own minefields. If a minefield is removed shortly after being emplaced, the knowledge and experience of the emplacing unit would be a distinct asset in the removal operation. However, if the minefield has been emplaced for a considerable amount of time, this advantage is lost. In either case, a thorough and accurate minefield record, if available, is the key to a successful removal operation.

   b. Reference item concerning "VCI mining techniques," section II, page 34, paragraph b(19); nonconcur. Under circumstances requiring the employment of an AVLB, mining of the bypass should be suspected and a sweep conducted. Concur that ambushes be positioned near installed AVLBs. When feasible, an AVLB should not be left unsecured, and an ambush is recommended near any area of suspected mining activity.

   c. Reference item concerning "Radio Relay and Carrier Attendants (MOS 31M20)," section II, pages 34-35, paragraph c(1); concur. This matter has been previously recognized by Headquarters USARV. Action is currently in progress which will forward this matter to the US Army Southeastern Signal School at Fort Gordon, Georgia for appropriate resolution.

   d. Reference item concerning "Compression Cups of 81mm Mortar," section II, page 35, paragraph e(2); concur. TM 9-3064 and LO 9-260 apply. Authorized lubrication points are specified and only light lubrication of bearing surfaces is prescribed. Lubrication of the compression cup is not authorized because oil will cause the rubber to become unserviceable. Proper lubrication of 81mm mortars will be emphasized in the monthly USARV Maintenance Summary. No further action required at higher headquarters.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RL) (U)


f. Reference item concerning "Driveshaft driver oil for AH-1G," section II, page 35, paragraph e(5); concur. MWO 55-1520-222-30/11, Bleed Air Driven Cooler, has been in effect since 23 August 1968.

g. Reference item concerning "M79 Grenade Launchers," section II, page 36, paragraph e(8); nonconcur. The cocking lever is an authorized repair part, replaceable at field maintenance level. DSU's are authorized to stock the lever on an "as required" basis. Neither the cost of the lever nor the time required for replacement is prohibitive. The use of shims as a field expedient is acceptable but complete repair should be made as soon as parts and time are available. The unit will be informed of this and encouraged to submit an EIR. No further action required at higher headquarters.

h. Reference item concerning "Defoliant," section II, page 37, paragraph f(2). Nonconcur with recommendation that a contact kill chemical spray should be developed. Chemicals such as Soil Sterilants and Growth Retardants have been developed. Their use in RVN is restricted. MACV Directive 525-1 prescribes the policies, responsibilities and procedures governing the application of "Growth Retardants".

i. Reference concerning "Teletypewriter TT-4/TG, Reperforator-Transmitter TT-76/GGC, and Teletypewriter TT-98," section II, page 37, paragraph f(3); concur. This matter has been previously recognized and considered by USAV. It was submitted as an ENSURE requirement for Forward Area Tactical Teletype (FATT), and was subsequently disapproved by DA as being too costly. The development of an improved generation of teletype equipment is part of the normal equipment development process at DA. This recommendation should be brought to the attention of the USAECOM at Fort Monmouth, N.J.

j. Reference item concerning "PSYOPS Directed at VCI and Local Village Guerrillas," section II, page 38, paragraph g(1); concur. Selection of themes and media for the exploitation of a specific target audience is critical to the success of PSYOP. Local VC/VCI, because of their strong beliefs in Communist ideology and their position in the community and family, are not vulnerable to the same propaganda themes and media as are personnel in field units. Intelligence agencies and PSYOP personnel must continually attempt to identify VC/VCI and develop PSYOP media designed to exploit their specific vulnerabilities.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON
LT, AG

Assistant Adjutant General

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON
LT, AG

Assistant Adjutant General
GPOP-DT (15 May 69) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Inf Div for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSPOR-65 (R1) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 18 AUG 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]
C. L. Shortt
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
Fundamentals of Engineer Support

1st Engineer Battalion
1st Infantry Division
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CHAPTER 1

GENERAL

1. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE: This booklet is a ready reference to inform unit commanders in the 1st Infantry Division of engineer support available and how it is allocated to support combat operations.

2. GENERAL: This booklet is organized into 10 chapters. Each chapter is devoted to one type of engineer support and discusses what each type of support will accomplish, what it consists of, how it may be obtained, and responsibilities of the requesting unit to assist the engineer element in its support role.

3. ORGANIZATION OF ENGINEER SUPPORT: There are elements of four engineer battalions deployed in the 1st Division TAQI. The 1st Engineer Battalion, which is organic to the division, has four line companies, a Headquarters Company, plus a float bridge company. The other battalions represented are the 168th and 34th Engineer Battalions (Combat) and the 3rd Engineer Battalion (Construction). These battalions are part of the 20th Engineer Brigade. Other floating bridge, panel bridge, and construction equipment units as well as water point capability are available on request to support specific projects or operational requirements.

4. CONCEPT OF DEPLOYING ENGINEER SUPPORT: The engineer line companies of the 1st Engineer Battalion are normally placed in direct support of the brigades or in general support of the division. The companies are disposed as follows: A Co in direct support of 1st Brigade, B Co in direct support of 2nd Brigade located at Di An, C Co in direct support of 3rd Brigade located at Lai Khe, D Co in general support at Lai Khe, and E Co, the float bridge company, is in Di An. When the requirements for engineer support within the division exceed the capability of the divisional engineer battalion, additional non-divisional engineer support is requested by the Division Engineer from II MEF. Support is normally provided by the 168th or 34th Engineer Battalions.

5. ENGINEER EQUIPMENT AND SPECIALIZED TEAMS: The following are major items of engineer equipment and specialized teams available from the 1st Engineer Battalion to support the 1st Division.

EQUIPMENT:

5 ton dump trucks - 13 per line Co and 6 in Headquarters Company

Bulldozers - 2 per line Co

Rome Flows - 6 each (HQ Co)

20-ton Rough Terrain Cranes - 3 each (2 ea HQ Co - 1 E Co)
Graders - 2 per line Co and 6 each HQ Co
Scoop loaders - 3 per line Co and 2 HQ Co
Concrete Mixers - 1 per line Co
Tank Dozers - 4 each HQ Co
AVLBs - Class 60, 60-ft span
    Launchers - 4 each E Co
    Bridges - 6 each E Co

Bridging Capability - Class 12 and Class 60 rafts and bridges (E Co)
Water Supply Points - 1500 GPH - 5 each, 600 GPH - 4 each

SPECIALIZED TEAMS
Tunnel rats - 1 four-man team
Construction Survey Team - 1 team
Demolition Teams - 3 per line company
Mine Sweep Parties - 3 per line company
Landing Zone Teams - 3 per line company
Land Clearing Team (Rome Plows) - 1 each Bn HQ.
CHAPTER 2

ROAD OPENING AND MINEFIELD BREACHING

1. PURPOSE:

a. This chapter discusses road opening operations and minefield clearing. These activities become necessary when a unit or element plans to move using an established road or when a unit encounters a minefield in moving crosscountry.

b. Breaching a minefield will normally be accomplished by opening lanes to pass traffic and, in more deliberate manner, clearing the remainder of the field at a later time. Procedures for clearing lanes are similar to the procedure outlined below in clearing a route.

2. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT: The mine sweep party.

a. Personnel: The mine sweep party consists of 1 NCOIC and 3 mine detecting teams of 2 men each.

b. Equipment and supplies:

(1) 3 mine detectors w/spare batteries
(2) 3 mine probes
(3) 1 AN/PRC-25 radio
(4) 120 2-foot pieces engineer tape (40 per marker/prober)
(5) 3 rolls white marking tape (1 per marker/prober)
(6) 2 nonelectric demolition kits
(7) 3 hand smoke grenades other than white or red
(8) 3 white smoke rifle grenades
(9) 1 red smoke hand grenade
(10) 1 compass
(11) Appropriate maps

3. DUTIES OF PERSONNEL:

a. OIC or NCOIC: An OIC will accompany the parties when two or more are dispatched to the same location from one company. The OIC and/or NCOIC will
supervise the party and maintain communications with higher headquarters and
direct contact with the security element.

b. Mine detector operators 1, 2, and 3: Maintain echelon with 25 meters
separation between operators (See enclosed sketch). Sweep lane and call
marker/prober forward to mark suspected mines. Carefully observe area for
booby traps. Once a suspected mine is marked, move forward in lane.

c. Markers/Probers: Remain 10 meters from detector operators, move
forward only to mark suspected mines with a foot-long tape strip. Begin
probing when all personnel are at least 10 meters away. If mine is located,
notify NCOIC and prepare to destroy in place or anchor marking tape and
move on. If no metal is found, have operator recheck area. Destroy a
suspected mine by using one pound of demolition each. Clear area for 100
meters and inform security before detonating charge. Mines will not be
disarmed or removed without specific authorization from CO, 1st Engineer
Battalion.

4. PLANNING FACTOR: The mine sweep party can clear about 1-2 KM per hour.
The time to open a route can be reduced by putting additional sweep parties
along the route. The 1st Engineer Battalion is organized and equipped to
provide 3 mine sweep parties from each company. A total of 12 mine sweep
parties are on standby with 9 of these based in Lai Khe and 3 based in
Di An. Additional mine sweep parties can be obtained from the supporting
engineer units when these 1st Engineer Battalion parties are out of position
or already committed.

5. HOW SUPPORT IS ACQUIRED: A unit forced to move over an unsecured route
may obtain support from the brigade direct support engineer company and
additional support from the 1st Engineer Battalion by requesting it through
the division G3.

6. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SUPPORTED UNIT: The tactical unit designated by
division has responsibility for the following:

a. Conduct of the road opening.

b. Coordinating subordinate tactical elements.

c. Preparation of a plan for mine sweeping of roads.

d. Provision for emergency repair of roads.

e. Security along route.

f. Arranging for insertion of engineer mine sweep parties at NDP/RQN
positions on day prior to the road opening and transportation for their
return to base camp.
CHAPTER 3

LANDING ZONE CONSTRUCTION

1. PURPOSE: The Landing Zone Team supports tactical operations by cutting a landing zone in about 6 to 8 hours depending upon the size of the trees and amount of vegetation. The LZ will consist of approach and landing areas to support up to 5 UH-1s simultaneously. The LZ Team can be employed by air landing to improve an existing LZ or by ladder descent from a CH-47 to construct an LZ from virgin jungle. Landing Zone Teams are normally employed to develop an expedient landing zone. In addition, the team may be used to enlarge and expand the NDP position or a unit.

a. CH-47 delivered teams. (Standard Team)

(1) Generally used in heavy jungle, or when no UH-1 LZs are available. The team is delivered in one or two lifts: The first lift consists of personnel (20-25) and cabling load, kit #1, which is picked up by the hook or winch and lowered before personnel exit from the aircraft on the ground or by ladder. If conditions require, as many #2 kits as necessary are brought in. All kits must be equipped with a 100' cable, 1/4" or larger. Composition and features of kits are covered in Inclosure #2.

(2) Pilots must be thoroughly briefed on the following:

(a) Concept of operation.
(b) Pickup of kits.
(c) Location of LZ.
(d) Frequency, call sign of ground unit.
(e) Frequency, call sign of LZ Team, hookup team.

(3) A hookup team, equipped with goggles and radio, must be used.

(4) Procedure:

(a) Personnel load.
(b) CH-47 picks up kit #1 (if winch is used, detach 100' cable).
(c) Fly to LZ site.
(d) Pilot calls ground unit for marking of LZ and clearance to hover.
(e) CH-47 lowers kit #1 to ground.
(f) Troops exit or descend ladder, team leader first.
(g) Team leader evaluates LZ, tells pilot to pickup kit #2, if required.
(h) Pilot calls back to hook up team.
(i) Kits #2 are delivered by cable.
(j) Steps g thru i are best coordinated by an airborne commander in a C&C helicopter.

b. UH-1 delivered teams (Special Teams) - The tactical commander can have a standard team or a special purpose team delivered by UH-1 sorties if the landing area is sufficient and CH-47 aircraft are unavailable. Some of the planning factors involved are as follows:

1. Typical UH-1 load for personnel is 5 men with personnel gear, tools, chain saws, and mixed gasoline.

2. Typical UH-1 load for supply consists of 1000-1200 pounds of demolition of the type required by terrain and vegetation.

3. A standard team insertion by UH-1 would require eight (8) sorties. The first three would be personnel, the fourth and fifth sorties supply, and the sixth through eighth sorties carry the remainder of the personnel.

4. If any demolition resupply is needed, it will be airlifted by either UH-1 or CH-47. By the time resupply would normally be required, the LZ should be large enough to accept a CH-47.

2. How Support is Acquired: LZ Teams are on 30 minute standby in Lai Khe and Dai An. They are controlled by G3, 1st Infantry Division. Advising the direct support company of the requirement will start the 30 minute preparation time a little earlier.

3. Responsibility of the Supported Unit: The requesting unit must provide aircraft to lift the team of teams and the resupply kits is necessary. Security during the cutting operation is the responsibility of the tactical unit requesting the LZ. Finally, the requesting unit must provide aircraft to return the unit to their home base.
Inclosure 1 (Kit Composition) LZ Construction

1. GENERAL: This outline is a guide only. Allowance must be made for different make of chain saws (gas-oil mixture, type of chain, spark plug, starter assembly, etc), type of demolition (Tetrytol haversacks require C4 booster), etc.

2. Chain saw repair kit (packed in combat pack).
   - 3 ea 9/16 box end wrenches
   - 3 ea pliers
   - 3 ea 12" adjusting wrench
   - 3 ea flat files
   - 3 ea screw drivers
   - 3 ea files (chain saw), filing guides
*3 ea chain blades
*2 ea spark plugs
*2 ea starter assembly springs
*2 chain adjusting screws
*For each type saw

3. LZ Kit #1 (2000# Limit - initial kit)
1600# demolition (type determined by reconnaissance)
  - 5 gallons mixed gasoline
  - 10 gallons potable water
  - 5 gallons 0E oil
  - 3 ea brush books
  - 5 ea axes
  - 4 ea picks
  - 2 ea 2-man crosscut saws

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4 ea shovels
1 case detonation cord
1 case time fuse
1 small reel firing wire
1 ea blasting machine
1 ea galvanometer
2 e. hammers
1 sack nails, engineer tape
6 ea files

4. LZ Kit #2 (6000# Limit - Demolition resupply)
5200# demolition (type determined by reconnaissance)
2 cases detonation cord
1 roll firing wire
15 gallons mixed gasoline
15 gallons potable water
5 gallons OE oil
1 can time fuse
2 cases M60 ammunition
1 case M79 ammunition

5. The following material is required for each kit:
   a. 100' cable, 3/8" or 5/8" diameter (looped each end)
   b. 6 cable clamps
   c. 2 ea clevis, assembly FSN 1670-0905354
   d. 2 ea sling, endless, nylon webbing, 10,000# cap, 10" diameter
      FSN 3940-675-5001
e. 1 ea. sling, Cargo, ea. leg adjustable FSN 1670-242-9169

f. Net, Cargo, Rope, 10,000# capacity
Inclosure 2 (LZ Specifications)

1. **GENERAL**: LZs generally can be classified in two categories: Pioneer and Hasty. Pioneer LZs meet minimum standards and should be improved to Hasty as soon as possible.

2. **SPECIFICATIONS**:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UH1D</th>
<th>CH-47</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LZ width</td>
<td>100'</td>
<td>150'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>150'</td>
<td>200'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pad Size</td>
<td>12'x40'</td>
<td>20'x40'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum height of pad</td>
<td>6''</td>
<td>10''</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>obstructions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum height of approach</td>
<td>3'</td>
<td>3'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance between pads</td>
<td>100'</td>
<td>150'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glide path</td>
<td>1:5</td>
<td>1:5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1:10</td>
<td>1:10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Inclosure 3 (Construction Technique)

1. **GENERAL:** LZ construction is characterized by extremely hard work for a few hours. Positive leadership and good training required to minimize wasted effort.

2. **SEQUENCE OF CONSTRUCTION:**

   a. Immediately after landing, the OIC designates the azimuth of the LZ, decides if additional demolitions are needed, and coordinates with the tactical commander for any resupply needed.

   b. Crews are broken down to clear the central zone (LZ itself) and the approach zones.

   c. An aid point and chain saw repair point are established in a central location.

   d. Clearing of the central zone is done by clearing the large trees first, then the smaller trees and brush. Maximum height for vegetation in the central zone is 3'. The actual helicopter pad areas must be cleared to a height of 6" and be relatively smooth.

   e. Clearing of the approach zones is accomplished by first cutting the tall trees for the entire area of the zone. The glide path must be cleared as soon as possible to allow aircraft access.

   f. As much as possible, use demolitions to fell the larger trees in order to save time and allow the clearing of a larger area.

3. **RULES OF THUMB:**

   a. Use Bangalore Torpedoes on bamboo and thick brush. Set the charges in parallel lines 10 feet apart to get maximum clearing.

   b. Use shaped charges on ant hills.

   c. Use large ring mains, large charges, and fire as seldom as possible.

   d. Always dual prime, with electric caps if possible.

   e. Always coordinate closely with the security unit before blasting. Double check the blast area for personnel before detonating the charges.

   f. Coordinate with supported unit for extraction.

   g. Submit progress reports to the supported unit and to 1st Engineer Battalion if possible.
CHAPTER 4

TUNNEL SEARCH AND DESTRUCTION

1. PURPOSE: The VC have used their skills and the soft sandy soil to good advantage to move their facilities underground. To eliminate and destroy the enemy, these facilities must be explored, neutralized, and time permitting, destroyed. Engineer support is available to units operating in the 1st Division TAOR. This support consists of Tunnel Rat Teams. Like other forms of engineer support, the direct support companies respond directly to brigade requirements and the Tunnel Rats are tasked by the division G3.

2. COMPOSITION OF TEAMS:

   a. The demolition team is a part of the engineer company. Each platoon has 6 demolition specialists. The remainder of the platoon assists by positioning explosives and preparing charges. In a 4 hour period, this demolition team can normally destroy a VC base camp of 20 bunkers.

   b. Tunnel Rats: A Tunnel Rat Team consists of 4 men including a team leader. They are carefully selected soldiers, trained and equipped to go into holes and tunnels where they explore, map, confiscate, and destroy enemy material.

3. AVAILABILITY AND DISPOSITION: The Tunnel Rats are on 30 minute call. A unit having need of this support should initiate a request through higher headquarters to G3. The demolition team is also available in each brigade area from the direct support company and additional support can be allocated if necessary.

4. REQUIREMENTS: The requesting unit must provide transportation support for the Tunnel Rats and/or demolition team. In the field these units must be secured by a tactical unit. Finally, when the mission is complete, transportation is required to return these teams to their base camp.

5. DO'S AND DON'TS

   a. If you come across what appears to be a tunnel complex, notify your next higher command using your chain of command. The Tunnel Rats will be notified and flown to your location by helicopter.

   b. When approaching an entrance to a tunnel or bunker, stay out of the field of fire from that hole. Too many people have been killed by haphazard movement around a hole.

   c. Do not use smoke grenades to try to find out where the tunnel entrances and exits are located. This only hinders the Tunnel Rats when they investigate the tunnels.

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d. If pulling security for the Tunnel Rats while they are in a hole, be especially alert. If a VC or an NVA is in the tunnel, he may try to exit through your entrance/exit.
CHAPTER 5

RIVER SEARCH

1. PURPOSE: To control rivers and tidal areas, thereby eliminating their use by VC and NVA units as resupply and infiltration routes.

2. COMPOSITION: E Co, 1st Engineer Battalion, is the division's organic bridge company. In addition to 4 sets of M276 float bridge (540 feet), the company has tools and equipment related to its bridge mission. For example, the Light Tactical Raft and outboard motors, and the bridge erection boats can be used to maneuver a patrol through a tidal stream area. The float bridge can be assembled into rafts to carry tanks, trucks, or artillery.

3. AVAILABILITY AND DISPOSITION: River search equipment is available for division support missions. The bridge company has 8 Light Tactical Raft half pontons. Outfitted with outboard motors, these have proven best suited to river search operations in the Mipa palm area east of Saigon. In more rapidly moving streams and rivers where there is always at least 40 inches of water, the bridge erection boats have been used. While these are very powerful boats, they are slow and have limited troop space. Nevertheless, they can be used to good advantage in the Dong Nai and other large rivers. Each of these boat assemblies should be armed with automatic weapons. These automatic weapons have provided fire superiority over the enemy forces when engaged. All this equipment is in Di An but it can be moved quickly by truck or aircraft to a field location.

4. REQUIREMENTS: Requesting units must be prepared to secure and provide transportation for resupply to these search units. The boats will be complete with trained operators and mechanics to perform limited repair. In searching river banks, it is desirable to have overhead cover and artillery fire on call. If engaged, the boats will require additional fire support to eliminate the enemy in his prepared position near the stream banks as the boats have limited maneuverability. River searches have proven highly successful in denying VC and NVA use of abandoned waterways for movement.
CHAPTER 6

ENGINEER ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE INTELLIGENCE

1. PURPOSE: To provide the commander with timely and continuing intelligence concerning geographic features of the terrain.

2. CAPABILITIES: The 1st Engineer Battalion collects and processes information on:

a. Existing routes and their physical characteristics
b. Bridges
c. Ford and ferry sites
d. Tunnels, underpasses, and other traffic obstructions
e. Artificial obstructions such as roadblocks, craters, blown culverts or bridges, and mined areas
f. Location of engineer materials

This unit has the personnel and equipment required to perform this mission with the exception of ground security forces for a ground recon and aircraft for an aerial recon.

3. REQUEST FOR SUPPORT: All requests for support should be referred to S3, 1st Engineer Battalion.

4. SUPPORT UNIT RESPONSIBILITIES: For special information requests, the supported unit will provide security if a ground reconnaissance is necessary and aircraft if an aerial reconnaissance is necessary.

5. REPORTING OF MINES AND MINE INCIDENTS: A special interest subject to his headquarters is the reporting of mines and mine incidents. Each mine incident should be reported to G2/G3 giving all information possible for study and evaluation to find a way to counteract these mines. This information should include as a minimum the following:

a. Location (six digit coordinates)
b. Date and time found
c. Method of detection
d. Origin of manufacture
e. Type firing device
f. Last friendly passage

g. Extent of damage

h. Total casualties

i. When possible, a diagram showing terrain features, to include a sketch of device, wires, depth buried, width and surface of road

j. Civilians in area

k. Warning indicators - VERY IMPORTANT

l. 1st Engineer Battalion maintains a mine density chart of all mines found in the TAOI, available to all interested users.

6. **INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITIES:** Intelligence is a two-way operation, and an effective intelligence program relies heavily upon timely input from subordinate units. In this regard, it is the responsibility of all personnel to report information on all items listed in paragraph 5 above.
CHAPTER 7

DEFENSIVE POSITIONS AND PERSONNEL BUNKERS

1. PURPOSE: To provide guidance to supported units requesting materials, plans, technical assistance for construction of bunkers and defensive positions.

2. CAPABILITIES: The 1st Engineer Battalion has on hand standard designs for a wide variety of facilities ranging from two-man perimeter positions to brigade headquarters sized TOCs. If a standard design for the requested facility is not on hand, the battalion has the capability to prepare specifications for special facilities.

3. REQUESTING SUPPORT:

   a. Units having a need for protective structures at base camps should submit their requirements on a DA Form 2496 through Base Development channels to the Installation Engineer for siting approval. Upon approval, the request is forwarded through the Div Arty S-4 (for units at Lai Khe) or DISCOM (for units at Di An) to the 1st S&T Battalion which issues the materials based on standard bill of materials. Protective structures should normally be constructed by the using unit with technical assistance from supporting engineer units.

   b. Protective structures at NDPs, FSBs, etc, are requested through operations (S3/G3) channels. Once approved, materials are obtained by the constructing unit (normally requesting unit) from the 1st S&T Battalion through supply (S4/G4) channels.
CHAPTER 8

WATER SUPPLY

1. PURPOSE: To acquaint the tactical units of the 1st Infantry Division with the capabilities of the 1st Engineer Battalion to provide water purification in field locations and how to request this service.

2. CAPABILITIES: The 1st Engineer Battalion is authorized five truck-mounted water purification units with a unit capacity of 1500 gallons of potable water per hour. These units are self-contained in a 2½ ton truck with cargo trailer. The battalion is also authorized and has available four smaller 600 gallon per hour purification units.

3. REQUESTS FOR SUPPORT: All units with a requirement for on-site water purification can obtain this support by requesting through the S3, 1st Engineer Battalion.

4. RESPONSIBILITIES: The units receiving this support are required to provide quarters, rations, and POL to the water supply section. The supported unit will also provide work site security and mine sweeping and clearing of the work site every day the water point is operational.
CHAPTER 9
REORGANIZATION OF ENGINEERS AS INFANTRY

1. SECONDARY MISSION: The secondary mission of the 1st Engineer Battalion is to reorganize and fight as an infantry battalion.

2. ORGANIZATION: When reorganized to fight as infantry, the engineer battalion will provide the following forces:

   a. Each squad will be organized as a 10-man squad.

   b. Each platoon will have 3 rifle squads plus a four-man command group for a total of 34 men.

   c. Each company will consist of three rifle platoons and a company headquarters. The size of the company headquarters will vary depending on type of mission assigned and relationship to the battalion headquarters.

   d. The battalion reorganized will consist of the battalion forward headquarters and four line companies.

   e. Battalion forward will consist of the command group, the complete S2 and S3 sections, representatives of the S1 and S4 sections plus the necessary support sections of Headquarters Company to insure full operation.

   f. Battalion rear will consist of the remainder of Headquarters Company, the bulk of the S1 and S4 sections plus all stored tools and vehicles of the four line companies. Also the rear detachment of the line companies and the bridge company will be co-located with battalion rear as to provide local security and resupply capability. Senior officer present will be in command of the battalion rear.

3. The commitment of engineers as infantry requires time to store the tools and special equipment, to relocate the personnel to provide the essential non-combat activities, and to establish the logistic support for the committed unit. In addition to the above, artillery liaison personnel, additional indirect fire weapons, and communication equipment should be provided to bring the unit to full effectiveness.

4. Divisional engineer units may be reorganized to fight as any type of infantry unit. Therefore, the divisional engineer unit has incorporated in its field SOP, plans to insure the proper transformation with a minimum elapsed time.
CHAPTER 10

AMMOBILE DOZER AND TOWERS

1. PURPOSE: To provide guidance to supported units requesting air mobile tower construction and movement and deployment of the air mobile tower.

2. CAPABILITIES:
   a. The 1st Engineer Battalion has the capability for construction, and rigging for air movement of 20' wooden towers. The 1st Engineer Battalion will provide a 4-man team to prepare a new site location for these air mobile towers.
   b. The 1st Engineer Battalion has one organic air mobile dozer available for deployment. Other air mobile dozers can be requested through II FFV.

3. RESPONSIBILITIES:
   a. Air mobile towers:
      (1) Request towers thru division G3.
      (2) Request rigging team for movement of tower thru G3.
      (3) Requesting unit request CH-47 lift for air mobile tower from ACC (H-hour).
      (4) Provide UH-1 transportation for materials and four man team at H-4 to the new site location to prepare location to receive tower.
      (5) Provide transportation back from site location to 1st Engineer Battalion for 4-man team after tower is emplaced.
      (6) Provide security for 4-man team while at site location.
      (7) Provide 1st Engineer Battalion with the call sign of the aircraft to make lift, and the time of lift.
   b. Air mobile Dozer:
      (1) Request for dozer submitted thru G3.
      (2) Inform 1st Engineer Battalion of time and place of pickup.
      (3) Provide 1st Engineer Battalion with coordinates of location where dozer will work.
      (4) Provide security for dozer and operator.
(5) Request CH-54 lift to transport dozer to field location.

(6) Provide transportation for operator to field location.

(7) At completion of mission, provide lift for operator and dozer back to the 1st Engineer Battalion.

(8) Provide shelter and meals for operator.

(9) Provide POL support for dozer (21 gallons diesel/8 hour operation).

(10) As the need requires, notify 1st Engineer Battalion of maintenance required and provide transportation for maintenance contact team and repair parts.

4. RESPONSIBILITY OF 1ST ENGINEER BATTALION:

a. Airmobile Tower:
   (1) Construct and transport all new towers to pickup point.
   (2) Rig all towers for airlift.
   (3) Provide 4-man team to prepare site and install towers.

b. Airmobile Dozer:
   (1) Provide dozer and operator.
   (2) Rig dozer for air movement.
   (3) Provide maintenance capability.
SUBJECT: Mechanized/Cavalry Night Defensive Positions and Fire Support Patrol Bases

1. With the approach of the rainy season, units must initiate planning to preclude turning mechanized cavalry NDP and FSPB positions into seas of mud by movement of tracked vehicles.

2. The two most important factors in preventing this problem are careful site selection and thoughtful planning of traffic flow.

   a. Sites should be selected, whenever possible, to take maximum advantage of high ground and natural drainage. Such damage can be supplemented by ditches dug by hand or bulldozer.

   b. The NDP/FSPB should be designed so that all traffic will move on an access road running inside the wire but outside the night positions of the tracks. The tracks can then be backed into their night positions in such a manner that when the ramp is lowered the necessity for troops to walk through mud is eliminated.

   c. Resupply vehicles moving from the helipad to artillery positions, mess halls and maintenance areas should also stay on the access road. The location of activities inside the NDP/FSPB requiring resupply should be carefully planned to avoid internal vehicular movement. Whenever possible, wheel vehicles should be used to move supplies.

   d. Command tracks and other vehicles which must be parked near the center of the NDP should move into position on a straight line and remain stationary. Departure routes should be planned to avoid bisecting the NDP.

   e. The imaginative preparation of positions currently in use, complemented with Peneprite, laterite, and other materials to prepare walkways and access roads, will help forestall the buildup of mud when the monsoon season starts.

Incl 15
3. Extensions to positions providing access roads for helipads should be part of the initial planning. The inclosed sketch illustrates a type NDP/FSPB which may be used as a guide in the development of future mechanized Cavalry NDP and FSPB.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl as

/S/LESTER E. SHOTWELL
/CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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5-CofS

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WILLIAM W. CAMPION
Major, Infantry
SUBJECT: Lessons Learned, VCI Operations (U)

1. (C) PURPOSE: This Intelligence Lessons Learned is intended to provide intelligence and operational tips to subordinate units in an effort to improve the effectiveness of cordon and search operations in the attack against the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI).

2. (C) GENERAL

a. The eventual objective in any cordon and search operation is the pacification of the hamlet, village or area. Pacification depends in large measure upon the identification and neutralization of the VCI, as well as elimination of enemy military forces.

b. Planning for a cordon and search operation is similar to any other combat operation; however, there are certain intelligence aspects that require special consideration during the planning and execution phases of a cordon and search operation directed against the VCI. The following items have been extracted from after-action reports and lessons learned for consideration when subordinate units are given the mission of conducting a cordon and search operation.

3. (C) DETAILED LESSONS: During the planning phase, consideration must be given to exploiting every available source of intelligence, compiling the intelligence in useful form and having it available, on site, during the operation. In addition to requesting information from US and ARVN S3s and S2s, the following GVN agencies can provide information on cordon and search targets:

a. Provincial and District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers include many agencies that compile intelligence specifically aimed at elimination of the VCI. Included in the PIOCCs and DIOCCs and what assistance each can render are:

   (1) Province and District S3s and advisors: General information concerning VC activity in the target area.

   (2) Phoenix Coordinators: Primary point of contact for information on VCI in the target area.

   (3) National Police: Blacklists and collated studies concerning VCI. Point of contact for National Police Field Force (NPFF), who will conduct the search portion of the operation, and Police Special Branch (PSB), for additional information on the VCI.

   (4) Census Grievance: Census overlays and hamlet books, which give house numbers and indicate where VC or VC sympathizers probably live.

b. Provincial Chieu Hoi Centers can select and furnish Chieu Hoi who are former VC from the target area to identify VC and VC suspects during the operation. When using Chieu Hoi or other informants from the local population to point out VC (suspects), arrangements should...
be made to allow them to observe without being seen by the persons being screened. Police or similar protection should also be provided. One of the best ways is to have the population move past the concealed identifier in single files for an ID card check or similar administrative process.

c. Mobile interrogation teams should be planned for and utilized to gain information from friendly civilians. The technique used should be one of interview, rather than interrogation, and superfluous questions should be planned to pad shorter interviews so that all are of about the same length. The interrogation teams should be composed of US and Vietnamese counterintelligence personnel; the number of teams should be tailored to population figures.

d. Aerial and ground reconnaissance of the target area should be coordinated to preclude repeated reconnaissance of the area and possibly disclosure of friendly interest in the area.

e. The wide use of aliases by the VC, incomplete blacklists and problems involved in attempting to identify enemy personnel from a blacklist without diacritical markings have often reduced the effectiveness of an otherwise well-planned operation. Information must be collected from all available sources, collated, and placed in a format usable by both GVN and US elements.

f. Dossiers on the key VC functionaries (about 20 in number, on the average) in the district containing the target area should be compiled and the information made accessible to assist in screening and interviewing inhabitants of the target area.

g. During the planning stages, a "blueprint" or line and block chart of the VCI organization in the target area should be constructed for the People's Revolutionary Party Executive Committee, the Local Liberation Committee, National Liberation Front, and the Military Affairs Committee. The names of known VCI should be added to the chart. During screening and interrogation of the population in the target area, the blueprints can be used to identify suspects. Names can be added to appropriate positions on the chart, and an accurate blacklist can be compiled.

h. Joint committees consisting of intelligence and operations personnel from US, ARVN and GVN agencies participating in the operation should be established during the planning stages in order to decide priorities of interest, assist in the collection of intelligence and the preparation of plans for the operation, and ensuring that all coordination is effected.

i. During the operation, representatives from the combined planning committee should be moved to the area of operations to establish a combined command post in a central location. The same location can serve as a central collection point for all documents and photographs and as the assembly area for a centrally-controlled reaction force for response to intelligence collected during the operation.

j. Immediate screening and interrogation can take place during the search of the target area or at a central collection point. Interrogations in the target area should be done either by the NPF conducting the search or by PSB personnel accompanying the NPF. A "typical holdings and interrogation center is shown at inclosure 1.

k. The NPF search teams should be discreetly supervised to insure that every house is searched thoroughly and systematically and that every possible concealment device is checked. US personnel, including at least nine detector teams, should accompany NPF teams throughout the search operation. One means of supervising the NPF is to include in the nine detector teams a few selected US supervisory personnel.

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Rough sketches and interior and exterior dimensions of dwellings and other buildings should be compiled as a check for any future search against alterations indicating the construction of possible concealment devices.

1. Conditions permitting, house-to-house distribution of leaflets and other psy-ops materials can be used as a cover for interviews with civilian population or as a method of making contact with informants or other persons known to be friendly in order to elicit information on the VCI.

4. (C) CONFIDENTIAL

A. Disclosure of operational plans for cordon and searches must be kept to the absolute minimum. Indiscriminate dissemination of operational data only increases the likelihood of compromise of the operation and loss of the element of surprise, the key principle in a cordon and search operation. Such disclosure necessarily occurs when liaison is made with GVN agencies for purposes of gaining intelligence prior to the operation, but care must be taken to limit the extent and effect of the disclosure.

B. The following are possible methods for avoiding compromises of a planned operation:

a. Plan over an extended period of time to build the intelligence picture and to determine the "rapport" of the target.

b. Plan several targets simultaneously so that no clear simple target emerges in discussions with GVN agencies.

c. Keep the number of individuals contacted in building the intelligence to a minimum. PFOC and DFOC personnel, as well as US advisor and Province/District Chiefs, are well aware of the security problem and will cooperate in your efforts.

d. Develop a cover plan to hit on target while you actually aim at another. This method can be carried to great lengths or kept very simple.

e. After the intelligence picture is developed, execute the cordon or seal part of the operation with US troops only, perhaps in hot pursuit of a fleeting contact or an intelligence report, and request the search forces only after the seal is complete. Cooperation by GVN agencies in this method depends completely on the support previously established between US commanders and District officials.

5. (U) SUMMARY: This list of tips is not exhaustive, and addresses will certainly have operational and planning methods derived from their own lessons learned. Comments and recommendations on VCI operations are solicited from all addresses, and should be sent to the ACofS, G2, lst Infantry Division, ATTN: G2 CI.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

GARY C. TUCKER
LT, AGC
Asst AG

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Inclosure 1, Lessons Learned, VCI Operations (U)

COMBINED HOLDING AND INTERROGATION CENTER

LEGEND:
= Concertina
-- = Controlled Entrance/Exit
\rightarrow = Route of Progress

1. Logging
2. ID Card Issue
3. Lead Form
4. Fingerprinting
5. Black List Check

Inclosure 1 to Inclosure 16
**UNCLASSIFIED**

**DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate Author)</th>
<th>2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310</td>
<td>CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. REPORT TITLE</th>
<th>3b. GROUP</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 1st Infantry Division</td>
<td>4</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb to 30 Apr 1969.</td>
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<tr>
<th>5. AUTHORITY (First name, middle initial, last name)</th>
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<td>CG, 1st Infantry Division</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>6. REPORT DATE</th>
<th>7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES</th>
<th>7b. NO. OF REPS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 May 1969</td>
<td>78</td>
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<tr>
<th>8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.</th>
<th>9a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)</th>
<th>9b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)</th>
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<th>10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT</th>
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<th>11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</th>
<th>12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY</th>
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<th>13. ABSTRACT</th>
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