<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNCLASSIFIED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AD NUMBER</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD504689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CLASSIFICATION CHANGES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TO:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FROM:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LIMITATION CHANGES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TO:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FROM:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AUTHORITY</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oag, d/a ltr 2 may 1975 ago ltr</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.
DISCLAIMER NOTICE

THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST QUALITY AVAILABLE. THE COPY FURNISHED TO DTIC CONTAINED A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF PAGES WHICH DO NOT REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

ROBERT E. LYNCH
Colonel, Adj
Acting The Adjutant General
DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)

Copies furnished:
Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Research and Development
Assistant Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Engineers
Commanding Generals
  US Army Materiel Command
  US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon
Commandant of the Marine Corps
Defense Documentation Center
Security Officer, Hudson Institute
Commissioning Officers
  US Army Limited War Laboratory
  US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
  US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, QUI NHON
APO San Francisco 96238

AVCA QN-GO-H

25 May 1969


THRU: Commanding General
1st Logistical Command
ATTN: AVCA GC-G
APO 96384

Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVICO-DST
APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief
United States Army Pacific
ATTN: GPOP-UT
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C., 20310

The Operational Report of this headquarters for the quarterly period ending 30 April is forwarded in accordance with Army Regulation 525-15, USAV Regulation 525-15 and 1st Logistical Command Regulation 525-15.

D. H. RICHARDS
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

FOR OT UT
692316
Inclosure

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL
SECTION I, OPERATIONS

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES (U)

1. (U) Throughout the 89 days of the reporting period the United States Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, continued its logistical operations supporting combat units within the II Corps tactical zone. In the course of these support operations, the command underwent a series of concerted enemy attacks on its installations during the post-Tet offensive and overcame a number of interdictions of its supply lines.

2. (C) The most successful of the enemy attacks were directed against the Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot (ABD) in Phu Tai Valley and against the tank farms, particularly Tank Farm No. 2 near Qui Nhon, which was heavily damaged by a sapper attack in March. The most serious interdictions of supply lines were directed against the railroads to Tuy Hoa (Vung Ro Bay) and Phu Cat. During the period when rail connections were broken, Tuy Hoa was resupplied primarily by sea and Phu Cat by convoy.

3. (C) In response to these attacks, particularly the sapper attacks on installations, the command became involved in a major security effort. Inspections in this regard were conducted by the Provost Marshal, Headquarters 1st Logistical Command and the Inspector General, Headquarters United States Army, Vietnam (USARV) and also by a security inspection team from Headquarters, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). In March, a committee under the chairmanship of Major General Hollis, Deputy Commanding General, I Field Force, Vietnam (IFFV) investigated security problems in depth and provided the support command with a number of detailed recommendations for security improvements. During the following month, a new staff section, the Special Assistant for Combat Security (SACS) was created to further consolidate and intensify the command’s security effort. By the end of the quarter a Tactical Operations Center (TOC) had been collocated with the Binh Dinh Province TOC and plans are underway to establish a Joint TOC in the Qui Nhon area.

4. (C) The security surveys led to an intensive program for increasing security measures within the command. Guard towers and lighting systems are being improved and defoliation efforts have been accelerated in the areas surrounding critical installations such as the tank farms and the ABD. Guard forces and artillery support for critical areas were also increased. Security measures for motor vehicle convoys were increased and improved, leading to a noticeable decline in the number of ambushes during the quarter.

5. (U) Pilferage by local nationals continued to be a major problem in pipeline operations. A conference in March on the security and operation of the pipeline dealt largely with the pilferage problem, but no appreciable success has yet been achieved in reducing the pilferage rate. The relocation of the Red Beach pipeline, which had been frequently washed out during the monsoon, nears completion and the Qui Nhon to An Khe pipeline began operations as a two-product line in April.

Incl 2
6. (U) The concept of shipping retrograde materiel from Vung Ro Bay proved to be impractical due to the lack of equipment for proper preparation of retrograde cargo for shipment. Retrograde activities operated out of Qui Nhon harbor continued to be successful. Project Stop/See experienced a sharp increase in frustrated and diverted cargo during the quarter, but tapered off during April. Also during this reporting period, heavy lift assets were consolidated for more effective movement of heavy equipment and retrograde material.

7. (U) The "Artillery R&R" program, which unites maintenance training for gun crews with the actual maintenance overhaul of their guns, continued successfully and was extended to the M106/M109 weapons in March. The arrival of new equipment (NCR 500 systems) brought maintenance technical supply activities up to 100 percent automation during the reporting period.

8. (C) Progress was made with the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) Modernization and Improvement Program when the equipment of the 6/84 Artillery Battalion was transferred to the South Vietnamese Army.

9. (U) Telephone accessibility to the Phu Tai Valley and to Vung Ro Bay was greatly improved during the quarter, through the installation of new trunk lines at Phu Tai and a direct line from the Qui Nhon switchboard to Vung Ro Bay. In the Long My Depot area, a problem arose with the damage done to telephone cables by friendly troops. Rounds fired from guard towers at suspected enemy targets were impacting in exposed sections of the cable, destroying lines of communication. A solution to the problem was found in burying the cable as it was replaced.

10. (U) The substantial number of Vietnamese civilians made homeless through several serious local fires during the quarter was provided with food and other emergency aid through the US Civil Affairs operations in Qui Nhon.

11. (U) The Support Command Chaplain's section initiated a highly effective campaign to reduce the use of dangerous drugs within the command. A series of lectures conducted during the quarter helped bring about a decrease in the number of instances of drug abuse and led to a substantial number of drug users within the command turning themselves in for help. The number of Special Courts Martial increased sharply during the quarter, along with the number of requests for legal assistance, while the number of personnel punished under Article 15, UCMJ, experienced a decline.

12. (C) Considerable improvements have been made within the Qui Nhon Support Command (QNSC) in the field of logistical operations, particularly in the security of critical installations, during the 89 days of the past quarter. The command mission, supplying the troops in the field, was continually performed despite concerted enemy efforts to diminish the efficiency of supply operations in the area supported by the QNSC. Work is underway for the implementation of new improvements and attention

CONFIDENTIAL
continues to be directed toward such unsolved problems as pipeline pilferage. Numerous projects, programs and other efforts are underway within the support command, striving for the fullest support of combat units with the least expenditure of resources.
SECTION II, LESSONS LEARNED: OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS

A. (U) PERSONNEL

1. (U) Character Guidance

   a. Observation: Where command emphasis has been placed on character
guidance, there has been an increase not only in character guidance
program attendance but also in chapel attendance.

   b. Evaluation: Increased emphasis on character guidance coupled with
an effort by chaplains to hold at least five services per week should
provide an effective means for reaching the 30% chapel attendance goal set
by General Heiser.

   c. Recommendation: None.

B. (U) OPERATIONS

1. (U) Pipeline Security

   a. Observation: Although the greatest source of POL loss from the
pipeline continues to be pilferage by local nationals, no adequate
deterrent has been found. Besides the loss of product and the expense
involved in repairing these man-made leaks, there is a serious fire hazard
involved. Several local nationals have been killed and a large number of
homes destroyed in fires brought about by the actions of pilferers.

   b. Evaluation: Attempts to bring pilferage under control by
coordination with local law officials have proved fruitless. Local
officials are generally reluctant to act against their friends and neighbors.
Furthermore, the local officials do not appear to be interested in the fact
that the pilferers are committing acts of sabotage against the military
forces.

   c. Recommendation: Problems of this sort should be coordinated
outside the local area with higher political organizations and officials.
In this way Vietnamese official pressure may be brought to bear on the
local political officers and their reluctance to take action thus overcome.

2. (U) Seasonal Redeployment of Engineer Units

   a. Observation: The effect of the monsoon strikes inland areas and
coastal areas at different times of the year, due to the inland mountains.
Therefore, engineer units tend to deploy in accord with the season, in
order to keep equipment operating under weather conditions most suitable
for maximum utilisation. For example, general engineer construction and
combat engineer units recently moved from Pleiku to Qui Nhon, so that they
might have a more favorable climate in which to work, the monsoon having
provided highly difficult conditions for the operation of heavy vehicles
and equipment. These moves within the Qui Nhon Support Command have
complicated support requirements, since the constant turnover in personnel
has led to many of the staff sections concerned not anticipating these
seasonal changes in engineer deployment.

b. Evaluation: As these moves are made on a fairly regular, seasonal basis, with the intention of keeping engineer equipment constantly in use instead of seasonally incapacitated, they can and should be anticipated and planned well in advance.

c. Recommendation: Where this problem exists, care should be taken to brief new personnel on these seasonal movements, so that they will be anticipated.

C. (U) TRAINING: None.

D. (U) INTELLIGENCE

1. (U) Joint TOC Organization

a. Observation: In planning for the Joint Tactical Operations Center (TOC) for the Qui Nhon area, there was a lack of agreement by all parties as to the organization of the JTOC and the role that each participant would play in its operation.

b. Evaluation: It would seem that in developing such an organization, each participant must yield a certain amount of his autonomy of action. The approval for this must come from a higher command level.

c. Recommendation: That the higher headquarters of each of the parties involved in the organization of the Qui Nhon Joint TOC meet together to discuss and approve the principles which are to be followed in its operation, and that this procedure be followed in future organizational activities of this kind.

E. (U) LOGISTICS

1. (U) Supply of Class I to Tuy Hoa

a. Observation: Due to the lack of secure roads and reliable rail service and shortage of refrigeration vans, supply of Class I to Tuy Hoa has been a serious problem.

b. Evaluation: When the Qui Nhon Support Command assumed the support mission for Class I supplies to Tuy Hoa, the Vietnamese National Railway System was relied upon primarily to transport subsistence supplies due to the lack of a secure and well surfaced highway between Qui Nhon and Tuy Hoa (Vung Ro Bay). Several derailments of the train and bridge damage due to terrorist activities indicated that the railway could not be relied upon as a mode of transportation for refrigerated subsistence. Army watercraft have been used for transporting refrigeration vans to a nearby port (Vung Ro) when the railway was inoperable. However, the long trip tied up refrigeration vans urgently required for use elsewhere in the command. Perishable items were loaded into reefer vans which in turn were
loaded aboard watercraft for the round trip to Tuy Hoa. In instances where both the railway was out of operation and seas were too rough to permit the use of watercraft, Tuy Hoa could be resupplied with Class I only by road or air. A reliable and efficient system of Class I resupply to Tuy Hoa must be established to supplement the preferred rail system. Similar problems may exist at other semi-isolated coastal installations.

c. Recommendations:

(1) That more reefer vans be made available to the command for use on watercraft in order that their use would not severely limit other Class I resupply operations. A total of 68 reefer vans are authorized but only 40 are on hand.

(2) That insulated boxes (made by Dow Corporation) be used for shipments involving watercraft. Also, the Dow boxes could be used for their intended purpose (airlift of perishable Class I) on occasions when the tactical or weather situation prohibited railroad and sea movements of Class I supplies.

2. (U) Closed Loop Problems

a. Observation: The Americal Division has due out vouchers for 306 generators, some of which were requisitioned almost a year ago. An inventory of generators (all types) at the Qui Nhon Depot showed 1,992 on hand and indicated that many of these had been on hand since mid-1968.

b. Evaluation: This and several other such instances of poor support stemmed from the fact that Closed Loop Program end items (such as the generators) could not be issued until they had been released by the Inventory Control Center, Vietnam (ICCV). Lack of communication of such releases (or denials) has been the primary element in the problem.

c. Recommendation: Action by higher headquarters is required.

3. (U) Retrograde Shipments

a. Observation: The shipping of retrograde cargo from Vung Ro Bay proved to be an unsuccessful venture, as the Collection and Evacuation (C&E) yard at Tuy Hoa does not have adequate equipment to wash and process equipment for out-of-country retrograde.

b. Evaluation: Attempts should not be made to ship retrograde cargo by deep draft vessels to off shore destinations from ports such as Vung Ro Bay where equipment cleaning capabilities, heavy lift capabilities, transportation movement and entomology personnel and quality control inspectors are inadequate or unavailable.

c. Recommendation: None.
F. (U) ORGANIZATION

1. (U) Overall Staff Security Responsibility

   a. Observation: Attacks on the Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot (ABD) and tank farms have increased the emphasis placed by the command on physical security, an area handled by the Command Provost Marshal. At times, the physical security effort overlapped the area of tactical security, creating problems in the determination of security areas of responsibility.

   b. Evaluation: The creation of a separate staff section, the Special Assistant for Combat Security (SACS), with specific responsibility for tactical security, clarified areas of responsibility and provided a single office responsible for tactical security.

   c. Recommendation: None.

G. (U) OTHER

1. (U) Damaged Telephone Cables

   a. Observation: Telephone communications between several areas in the Qui Nhon Support Command were severely hampered by damage caused by friendly forces. Cables running above ground in areas occasionally subject to fire from US guardtowers and other defensive positions were frequently damaged by stray shots. Damage was also occasionally caused by houses beneath telephone lines being burned.

   b. Evaluation: These problems could have been avoided had the telephone lines been buried underground in the areas in question.

   c. Recommendation: That careful consideration to the possible advantages of burying communication cables be given when lines are laid through areas of enemy activity to help insure maximum reliability.

2. (U) Military Banking Facility

   a. Observation: The establishment of temporary banking facilities after the destruction by fire of the Qui Nhon Military Banking Facility (MBF) has been quite successful, illustrating a need for continual availability of such facilities.

   b. Evaluation: A temporary MBF should have been established immediately after the first bank was destroyed. Such an operation would have been profitable and would have made a needed facility continually available to the troops.

   c. Recommendation: None.
AVGA GO-MH (25 May 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon for Period Ending 30 April 1969 RCS CSFOR-65, (U)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384 28 JUN 1969

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375.


2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning Pipeline Security, page 77, paragraph B1. Concur. The problem of pipeline security is being studied and coordinated between Qui Nhon Support Command, 1st Logistical Command and USARV. Proposed actions to reduce pipeline losses are being staffed between this Headquarters and USARV and will be presented to DCG, USARV for approval. These proposed actions will attack all loss problems and will include the proposed recommendations.

b. Reference item concerning Joint TOC Organization, page 78, paragraph D1. Concur. The initial organization of the Joint Tactical Operations Center in April 1969 was somewhat haphazard. However, in recent weeks organizational problems have been resolved. One matter of concern is inadequate facilities for the Joint TOC. USASUPCOM, Qui Nhon is studying the problem and, if construction of a larger facility appears to be justified by the tactical situation, the necessary work orders will be prepared.

c. Reference item concerning Supply of Class I to Tuy Hoa, page 78, paragraph E1. Concur. To alleviate the existing shortage, reefer vans have been requisitioned and are enroute to RVN. Upon arrival, the vans will be distributed, according to need, throughout the command.

d. Reference item concerning Closed Loop Problems, page 79, paragraph E2. Concur. The observation about generators is being handled by a complete reconciliation of Americal Division requisitions by the USAICC. The reconciliation is pointing out that many of the requisitions have never reached the ICC, therefore no action could be taken to supply the items. This problem was recognized and with the advent of the SVN System in Jan 69, USARV message AVMD-SP 41024, Direct Requisitioning of PEMA Principal Items dtd 9 Jan 69, was sent to all units. This msg initiated the policy whereby Direct/General Support Units are required to route all requisitions for PEMA Principal Items direct to Hq, USAICC, by-passing the depot supply system. Some DSU/GSU's are still submitting requisitions for PEMA principal items direct to the depot and many requisitions are
still not reaching the ICCV. This problem will decrease as the DSU/GSU's become educated on identifying PEMA principal items. It is essential that PEMA principal requisitions be controlled and released by the ICCV because of authorization requirements, FSN changes within line numbers, and in many cases crossing line numbers as authorized substitution. The replacement of these items is dependent on DA approved allocations. These allocations are based on authorizations and strict control is necessary.

3. Concur with the basic report as modified by this indorsement. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 4839
CP: USASUPCOM, QNH

LANNY K. KELSEY
1Lt, AGC
Asst Adjutant General
AVHGC-DST (25 May 1969) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of the US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon for Period Ending 30 April 1969 RCS CSFOR-65

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 5 JUL 69

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon and concurs with the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON
LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
USASUPCOM Qui Nhon
1st Log Comd
GPOP-DT (25 May 69) 3d Ind (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 20 AUG 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C. L. Shortt
CPT, AGC
AAG AG
TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION I: Operations

Significant Activities.

ANNEXES

A. Command Group

B. ACofS, Comptroller
C. ACofS, Personnel
D. ACofS, SP&O, Security Branch
E. ACofS, SP&O, Plans Branch
F. ACofS, SP&O, Operations Branch
G. Staff Signal Section
H. ACofS, Ammunition
I. ACofS, Supply
J. ACofS, Services
K. Command Engineer
L. ACofS, Petroleum
M. ACofS, Maintenance
N. ACofS, Retrograde & Disposal
O. ACofS, Transportation

P. Provost Marshal

Q. Inspector General

R. Civil Affairs
S. Staff Chaplain

T. Command Judge Advocate

U. Information Office
V. Special Services

Inclosure 1, Visitors to HQ

Inclosure 2, Significant Enemy Contacts

SECTION II: Lessons Learned,

Observations, Evaluations & Recommendations

A. Personnel
B. Operations
C. Training
D. Intelligence
E. Logistics
F. Organization
G. Other

Annexes A, P, Q, T, U, V and Incls 1 and 2 wd HQ, DA
The proposal for mechanization of the financial data record folders (FDRF) maintained by the 13th Finance Section (DISB) was forwarded to 1st Logistical Command on 9 April 1969. The proposal called for a pilot program of 1000 mechanized FDRFs, and this program is presently in operation. Mechanization of the remaining records is to be accomplished at the rate of 4000 per month with completion scheduled for August, 1969. At present the 1000 records in the pilot program are being processed with the facilities of the 527th Personnel Service Company and the US Army Depot, Qui Nhon (USAD, QN). The responsibility for providing computer and key punch facilities is being studied. Of the two units now supporting the program, one will be delegated prime responsibility and the other data processing activity will serve as back-up support.

After the Qui Nhon Military Banking Facility (MBF), operated by the Chase Manhattan Bank, was destroyed by fire on 19 January 1969, progress has been relatively slow toward establishing a permanent MBF. Two temporary facilities were opened, however. One of these is located on the second floor of the USD building at the Qui Nhon Airfield, and the other at the 13th Finance Inprocessing Section. These facilities are equipped only to open new accounts and take deposits, yet they average an intake of $1,500 per diem. On 29 April, the day before payday, receipts totaled almost $2,900. The results of this limited operation illustrate the need for a permanent MBF in the Qui Nhon area. Work orders have been submitted for a new temporary facility, which will afford complete banking service, and also for a permanent facility. Both work orders have been costed and reviewed by the Installation Planning Board. The temporary facility was assigned a No. 9 priority and work should be completed by the end of June.

The Comptroller recently conducted a detailed review of the complete program for reimbursable support of non-army customers. It was noted that the necessary copies of all material needed for successful reimbursement were not in the hands of the personnel needing them most. Also, some units or subordinate commands were found to have incorrect Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) dealing with this matter.

Staff visits were conducted and units were provided with the necessary Interservice Support Agreements (ISSA's) and the most current regulations. Desk office SOP have been reviewed, corrected and revised.

As a result, the error rate has diminished and the entire reimbursable support program is functioning more efficiently. Project Account officers, whose task it is to eliminate deficiencies in preparation and transmittal of documentation evidencing reimbursable support, have been assigned at each major subordinate unit. The number of documents transmitted to the Centralized Financial Management Agency (CFMA) for reimbursement for the period 26 March to 25 April was 717, a substantial increase over the previous four months' average of 343 documents.
4. (U) The following audits were completed by the Internal Review Branch:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Audit</th>
<th>Who Audited</th>
<th>Date Completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Annual</td>
<td>Toy Hoa Detachment NCO Open Mess, Qui Nhon Army Emergency Relief, Pleiku Chaplain's Fund, Qui Nhon Central Post Fund</td>
<td>25 Feb, 2 Apr, 15 Mar, 4 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Dissolution</td>
<td>Pleiku, Camp Schmidt, Open Mess Association, 387th Trans Co Sundry Fund, Qui Nhon Guard Command (PROV)</td>
<td>25 Mar, 5 Feb 69, 14 Mar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Unit Fund</td>
<td>126th Finance Det, Camp Schmidt, HHC, 45th GS Gp, Pleiku (Quarterly), 566th APU</td>
<td>15 Mar, 15 Mar, 15 Mar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Special</td>
<td>618th HEM Co, Unit Fund (Per IG), 136th Maint Co, Unit Fund (Per Request XO)</td>
<td>7 Mar, 11 Apr</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. (U) Audit teams from the US Army Audit Agency visited this command as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6-8 March</td>
<td>Retrograde and Disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-15 March</td>
<td>ISSA's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-10 April</td>
<td>ISSA's, USAD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. (U) Internal review teams from Office of the Comptroller, HQ, USARV visited this command as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24-31 March</td>
<td>Port Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-10 April</td>
<td>ISSA's, USAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-19 April</td>
<td>General Purpose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-26 April</td>
<td>General Purpose</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. (U) Zero Defects Program: The Zero Defects Program has been fully implemented in several subordinate commands. Continued publicity seems to be the major emphasis now, except at the USAD, QN where the program has progressed to error cause removal efforts and methods of evaluating improvement. An awards program has been considered but not implemented due to lack of funds.
CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX C (C) ACofS, PERSONNEL

1. (U) Safety: The rates and averages for February 1969 through April 1969 for army motor vehicle accidents and military injuries are based on an expectancy rate (FY 69) of 10.00 per 1,000,000 miles of exposure and 45.00 injuries per 1,000,000 man-days.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army Motor Vehicle Accident Rate</th>
<th>Military Injuries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>11.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>8.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>9.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVERAGE</td>
<td>9.69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. (U) The 1st Army Postal Unit processed mail and money orders as follows:

   a. Incoming mail totaled 1,155 pouches, 27,439 sacks and 22,465 outside pieces. Average transit time: Air mail 5-6 days, MOM 5-6 days, SAM 5-6 days, Surface mail 30-45 days.

   b. Outgoing mail totaled 1,531 pouches, 14,089 sacks and 24,910 outside pieces.

   c. There were 32,801 money orders sold during this period, for a total value of $2,489,364.47.

3. (C) The command enlisted strength experienced a net decrease of 2.2% from February to April.

   a. Command enlisted strength:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11,745</td>
<td>11,405</td>
<td>11,481</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   b. Number of replacements received:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>827</td>
<td>862</td>
<td>913</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   c. Number of casualty reports:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
d. E4 through E9 promotions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>E4</th>
<th>E5</th>
<th>E6</th>
<th>E7</th>
<th>E8</th>
<th>E9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>895</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. Arrival and departure of senior enlisted personnel during the period:

**Arrivals**
- Feb E8 - 6, E9 - 2
- Mar E8 - 13, E9 - 4
- Apr E8 - 7, E9 - 1

**Departures**
- Feb E8 - 7, E9 - 5
- Mar E8 - 11, E9 - 0
- Apr E8 - 6, E9 - 2

f. The command officer strength remained relatively constant during the reporting period.

1. Command officer strength:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officers</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Officer replacements received:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Officers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Grade</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company Grade</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officers</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Departure of key officer personnel:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LTC Bell</td>
<td></td>
<td>LTC Krause</td>
<td>LTC St Mary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC Sisson</td>
<td></td>
<td>LTC Eyre</td>
<td>LTC Small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ Mixson</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJ Monier</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ Baker</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJ Barber</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ Mabry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ Boyd</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18

CONFIDENTIAL
(4) Arrivals of key officer personnel:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LTC Owen</td>
<td>LTC Winter</td>
<td>LTC Smith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC Eyre</td>
<td>LTC Finter</td>
<td>LTC Ryan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC Alvarez</td>
<td>MAJ Doyen</td>
<td>LTC Burns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC Freeman</td>
<td></td>
<td>LTC Wells</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC Davaz</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ Lipinski</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ Jeffries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ Roberts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ Irving</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. (U) The following statistics pertain to civilian personnel within the Qui Nhon Support Command.

a. US Civilian employees (DAC's):

- Authorized: 79
- Actual: 49

b. Third country nationals:

None authorized

c. Local Nationals (permanent hire):

- Authorized: 4,043
- Actual: 3,798

d. A1K Funds disbursed:

- February: 2,690,540$VN
- March: 3,132,540$VN
- April: 2,678,140$VN
- TOTAL: 8,501,220$VN

5. (U) Education:

a. Correspondence Courses (New Enrollment)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EN</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-op College</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voc-Technical</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Extension Courses</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
b. Correspondence Courses (Total Active Enrollment)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EN</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-op College</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voc-Technical</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>1,008</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

= 1,158

c. Group Study Enrollment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EN</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spoken Vietnamese</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>88</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

= 100

d. Tests:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EN</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCT-GE</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U-3 Achievement</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA-EDC</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETS Tests</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>953</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

= 1,000

e. Interviews:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted Men</td>
<td>2,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officers</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX D (C) ACofS, CP&O Security Branch

1. (C) During this reporting period there were a number of significant changes in the mission and organization of the Security Branch.

   a. The development of a functional intelligence capability, initiated with the assignment of Major Richard P. Clayberg, the branch chief, in January 1969, was given further impetus by the increase in enemy activity following Tet, 1969, in late February and throughout March. In response to a greatly increased need for timely and accurate intelligence affecting northern II CTZ, comprehensive daily briefings were prepared and presented to the Commanding General and staff starting in late February; this was followed by a requirement to prepare and submit a daily intelligence summary (INTSUM) to Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, in March.

   b. This greatly increased workload led to the reassignment in March of 1LT Lawrence S. West, Jr. from the 45th General Support Group to act as Assistant Intelligence Officer. In addition, the departure of MSG Moreau led to his replacement by MSG Donald E. Mann as Intelligence NCO in late February.

   c. A requirement to monitor, coordinate, and submit reports to higher headquarters on the large scale program initiated in March 1969 to upgrade security in the Qui Nhon area led to the assignment in March of CPT William C. Kristy as Security Officer. Other personnel changes included the reassignment of CPT Thomas R. Mann in March, the departure of SP5 Claude R. Houser and the assignment of SP4 Timothy A. Tufts as Intelligence Clerk in April.

   d. In early April came further organizational changes. One of these was the creation of the Special Assistant to the Commanding General for Combat Security (SACS), authorized by Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command. LTC Jack Burns, an experienced combat arms officer, was assigned to fill this post at HQ, USAFSCOM, QN. In addition, the function of Deputy Installation Defense Coordinator was transferred from the Commanding Officer, 593d General Support Group to HQ, USAFSCOM, QN. This function was given to the SACS as a supplementary duty; to aid him in handling it he was given a staff to include: 1 Major (Major Walton), 3 Captains (CPT Moroney, CPT Dudek, and CPT Johnson), 1 Lieutenant (LT Petrosky) and several enlisted personnel.

   e. One of the key functions handled by this new staff section was the operation of the Support Command Tactical Operations Center (TOC). In early April, the TOC was moved from the 593d General Support Group at Camp Granite and collocated with the Binh Dinh Sector TOC in the Province Headquarters Compound. This resulted in improved liaison and exchange of information between the two headquarters. Consequently, further plans are being made...
to set up a collocated TOC housing representatives from all US, South Vietnamese and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) major units in the Qui Nhon area.

2. (C) Significant Incidents: Enemy activities during the past quarter that directly affected logistical operations in northern II CTZ include 26 standoff attacks, 2 mixed attacks, 24 ambushes, 8 sapper attacks, 2 ground attacks, 9 mining incidents, 22 sniper attacks and 3 miscellaneous attacks against Qui Nhon Support Command units. A brief description of some of the more important incidents is attached at Inclusion 2.

3. (U) Intelligence Activities

   a. The following numbers of counterintelligence inspections were performed by the 524th Military Intelligence Detachment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Number of Inspections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   b. The following numbers of security clearances were processed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Request For Validations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   c. There were three security violations reported to the 1st Logistical Command (1st Log) during the quarter. Two of the three subsequent investigations revealed that the violations resulted in no compromise whatsoever. The third is still under investigation.

4. (U) During this reporting period, many improvements were made in the security of the critical logistical facilities within the Qui Nhon Installation area. These were partially the result of a number of visits by inspection teams from various higher headquarters.

   a. During the period 12-15 March 1969, a committee under the chairmanship of MG Hollis, Deputy Commanding General, I Field Forces, Vietnam, met in Qui Nhon to discuss the security level of critical US logistical installations in the Qui Nhon area. This committee included representatives from higher, as well as from various local headquarters. The result was the "Hollis Report," offering detailed recommendations for improving the security of the ammunition base depot, the POL tank farms and the Vung Chua Signal Site. Many of the projects which were begun, and in some cases completed, during the reporting period were results of this report.
b. During the period 23-25 March 1969, the Qui Nhon Support Command was visited by an inspection team from Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command. The team was headed by COL Du Bois, the 1st Log Provost Marshal, and included other representatives from PMG and SP&O. They inspected all critical 1st Log facilities in the Qui Nhon area, i.e., the ABD, the tank farms and Long My Depot. A detailed report, complete with recommendations, was submitted by the inspection team and has been used recently as a guide for a program directed at improving security in the above mentioned areas.

c. Between 24-28 March 1969, this headquarters was visited by an inspection team from the USARV Inspector General's office. This team inspected the security of the entire Qui Nhon Installation, including all compounds, in addition to critical facilities such as the ABD and tank farms. The report made by the USARV IG team emphasized physical security more than combat security. Consequently, this report touched on many problem areas normally handled by the Provost Marshal rather than the AGoF S SP&O.

d. On 31 March 1969, a conference on the security and operation of the POL pipeline was held at Headquarters, IFFV. Representatives were present from the host organization as well as from Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command; Headquarters, USASUPCOM, QN; and the 2d ARVN Logistical Command. The committee was concerned with the losses of petroleum from the pipeline through pilferage and both enemy and friendly operations. It was concluded that the major problem was pilferage by local nationals. Coordination with local law enforcement officials was recommended as a means of alleviating the problem.

e. On 6 April 1969, a meeting was held in Qui Nhon to discuss the problems to be overcome in the establishment of a Joint Tactical Operations Center (JTOC) for the Qui Nhon area. Representatives from major tactical and logistical headquarters in the area were present. As conceived, the Joint TOC will contain representatives from the Qui Nhon Support Command, the Capital ROK Infantry Division, the 22d ARVN Division, the 2d ARVN Logistical Command and Binh Dinh Province. Ultimately, a joint command working through the JTDC will be established for the defense of the Qui Nhon area. Presently, USASUPCOM, QN and Binh Dinh Province have established a collocated TOC. Plans call for a new JTDC building to be constructed, if the units to be involved can agree upon the operational procedures.

f. During the period 14-20 April, the security of the Qui Nhon Installation was the subject of an inspection by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) IG Team. As in the case of the inspection by the USARV IG Team, the physical security of the installation as a whole was inspected, rather than just the combat security of a few critical logistical facilities. Action is being taken to follow up on the recommendations made by this inspection team.
5. (U) Overall, the quarter saw significant improvements in the security of the Qui Nhon Installation. Special attention was given to the ABD and the tank farms and large-scale engineering construction projects were completed in those areas. Plans now exist for extensive improvements in the security of the Long My Depot. Improvements made at all levels, down to the individual compounds, included such items as improved perimeter lighting and fencing, construction of guard towers and bunkers, defoliation, land clearing, increased guard forces, increased artillery support and improvements in tactical concepts.
CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX E (C) SP&O, PLANS BRANCH

1. (C) The following organizational changes and unit movements occurred during the reporting period:

a. Company F, (Provisional), US Army Depot (USAD), Qui Nhon, was established and assigned to the Qui Nhon depot on 1 February 1969.

b. The 387th Transportation Company (Terminal) was attached to the USAD, Qui Nhon, on 3 February 1969 for a temporary duty (TDY) period of ninety days.

c. The 205th Ordnance Platoon (Magazine) was released from the USASUPCOM, Qui Nhon and assigned to the USASUPCOM, Saigon, on 10 February 1969 for support of ordnance activities within that support command.

d. The 527th Personnel Service Company was released from the 593d General Support Group and reassigned to Headquarters, USASUPCOM, Qui Nhon on 15 February 1969.

e. On 20 February 1969 the 1st Platoon, 136th Combat Support (CS) Company, Light Maintenance, Direct Support (DS), was attached to the USASUPCOM, Cam Ranh Bay. On 10 April, the 2d Engineer Maintenance Platoon, 36th Light Maintenance (LM) Company (US) was attached to the USASUPCOM, Cam Ranh Bay. On 20 April 1969, the 136th LM Company (US) was released from the Qui Nhon Support Command and assigned to the USASUPCOM, Cam Ranh Bay, less the personnel and equipment previously attached to the aforementioned platoons. Upon assignment of the company, the platoon attachments terminated and the two platoons remained at Cam Ranh Bay with, an under the control of, the parent unit.

f. The 1st and 2d Truck Platoons (Provisional) were established on 16 February 1969 for the period through 26 February 1969, attached to the 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport), and further attached to the 34th Transportation Battalion for use in meeting special transportation requirements during that period.

g. The 1st Platoon, 510th Engineer Company was detached from duty with the USASUPCOM, Da Nang, and returned to its parent unit at Pleiku during the period 4–6 March 1969.

h. The 226th CS Company 583 (US) was reassigned from the 593d General Support Group to the Composite Service Battalion (Provisional) on 7 March 1969, effective 1 December 1968, and further attached to Tuy Hoa Detachment (Provisional).

i. The 1st Shore Platoon, 264th Transportation Company (Terminal) was detached from the Da Nang Support Command and reattached to the USASUPCOM, Qui Nhon less personnel and equipment, effective 5 April 1969.
CONFIDENTIAL

j. The Security Guard Company (Provisional) was reorganized on 10 April 1969, assigned to the HHD, USASUPCM, QN, and further attached to the 184th Ordnance Battalion, to provide physical security for that facility.

k. The 540th Transportation Detachment, BARC (Barge Amphibious Resupply Cargo) was detached from the 1058th Transportation Company (Medium Boat), and attached to Dai Hoa Detachment (Provisional), 593d General Support Group for administrative and logistical support; operational control (OPCON) went to the Commanding Officer, Vung Ro Bay Outport, effective 4 January 1969.

l. The Headquarters, Composite Service Battalion (Provisional) was inactivated effective 28 April 1969. Assigned Supply and Service Companies (226th, 304th, and 19th S&S Cos) reverted in assignment to the 593d GS GP on that date.

m. The 288th GS Heavy Material Storage Detachment was reassigned from the 1st Logistical Command to USASUPCM, Qui Nhon on 12 February 1969.

n. The 294th GS Heavy Material Storage Detachment was reassigned from the 1st Logistical Command to USASUPCM, Qui Nhon, on 12 February 1969.

o. The 529th Transportation Company (Light Truck) was inactivated by the Department of the Army on 4 March 1969.

p. The 528th GS Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company (GS) was inactivated by the Department of the Army on 17 February 1969.

q. The Headquarters and Main Support Company, 62d Maintenance Bn was reorganized by the Department of the Army on 13 March 1969.

r. The 58th Transportation Company (Lt Truck) was inactivated by the Department of the Army on 4 March 1969.

2. (U) No incoming units were processed during the quarter.

3. (U) The following operations plans and orders were published during the period:

   a. Secret OPLAN 101-69 (Steel Cable), 12 February 1969.


   c. Confidential OPLAN 4-69 (Defense of Qui Nhon Installations), 31 March 1969.

CONFIDENTIAL
4. (U) Training:

   a. One announced formal training inspection was conducted during the quarter, that being of the 8th Transportation Group (MT). A second formal inspection of the 240th Quartermaster Battalion (POL) is presently underway.

   b. Special defense training was conducted on a command-wide basis for all personnel on defense against sapper attacks and for selected personnel on the employment of the PVS-3 Starlight Scope. Also during the reporting period the scope of forward observer training was widened to include all compound areas under the control of the USASUPCOM, Qui Nhon.

   c. USASUPCOM, QN Reg 350-2, Weapons Familiarization and Qualification, was published and distributed. USASUPCOM, QN Reg 350-1, Education and Training, has been staffed and approved, with publication and distribution remaining to be completed.

   d. Also during the period, special training programs for US Army Personnel and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) were introduced and continue to develop and widen in scope. These include Project Skills I (US Army) and Project Buddy (ARVN).

   e. Another project undertaken by the training section of the Plans Branch was the Vietnamese Armed Forces (RVNAF) Modernization and Improvement Program, being conducted jointly with the ACoFS, Maintenance and ACoFS, Supply. The program involves the transfer from US to ARVN of equipment from designated artillery and engineer units.

5. (U) Personnel changes during the quarter included the assumption of duties as Training Officer by 1LT Gordon G. Chesebro on 1 February 1969 and the assumption of duties as NCOIC, Plans Section by SFC John A. Hall on 3 February 1969. SFC Hall was reassigned to the 2d Signal Brigade, Long Binh, on 20 April 1969, leaving the slot vacant.
APPENDIX F (C) ACOFS, S/P & O OP. BRANCH

1. (U) Weather conditions in the Qui Nhon Support Command's area of responsibility had no significant impact on logistical operations during this quarter. Regular resupply operations continued on Highway QL-19 to An Khe and Pleiku, on QL-1 north to LZ English, and on Highway 14 to Dak To. Resupply to Cheo Reo was primarily by air, but convoys were run twice per month. Resupply to the Tay Ninh, Phu Hiep and Vung Ro Bay areas was primarily by sea; however, special convoys on QL-1 south were conducted when required. Air cover for these convoys was coordinated by the Operations Branch, SP&D, and G-3 Air, IFFV.

2. (C) Enemy activity against QL-19 continued to hamper convoy operations throughout the period. Enemy activity was centered around the An Khe Pass area and west to the top of the Kong Giang Pass. Because of heavy enemy activity and intelligence information, convoy operations were limited to combat essential items for the periods 30 March to 1 April and 20-30 April. On 11 and 22 April, no convoys were scheduled on QL-19. In addition, security for convoys was increased and starting times were varied.

3. (C) During February and March, enemy activity against night shuttle convoys from the port and depot areas to the Cha Rang Trailer Transfer Point (TRT) increased sharply. Two ambushes on 23 February and 23 March resulted in 4 US KIA and 2 US WIA. In addition, two vehicles were destroyed and several vehicles were damaged in these incidents. On 24 March all night convoy operations were suspended between the hours of 2200 hrs and 0200 hrs. Since the restriction has been in effect, there has been a noticeable decrease in enemy contacts with US convoys in the Qui Nhon area. No major supply or transportation problems have been encountered as a result of the restriction.

4. (C) February 23rd marked the beginning of the Post Tet Offensive in the Northern II Corps Area. Principal targets in the Qui Nhon area were the Ammunition Base Depot (ABD) and petroleum tank farms. The ABD at Qui Nhon was attacked by sappers on 23 February, 10 March, and 23 March.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tonnage on Hand (O/H)</th>
<th>Tonnage Loss</th>
<th>Dollar Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23 Feb</td>
<td>19,708</td>
<td>8,374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Mar</td>
<td>14,995</td>
<td>1,729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Mar</td>
<td>16,395</td>
<td>1,321</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On 20 March, Tank Farm No. 2 was attacked by a sapper squad, completely destroying 5 tanks having a bulk fuel and storage capacity of approximately 36,000 barrels. The fire also spread to parts of the packaged POL yard destroying approximately 4,500 drums of packaged POL products. Normal resupply continued to be provided to supply points despite the loss of this tank farm. Due to increased enemy activity in the Pleiku, Kontum, and Dak To areas on Feb 23, 24 and 25, three combat essential resupply requests were received. JP-4 and 500 gallon collapsible 55 gallon bags were flown to Pleiku. Resupply by convoy during this period was delayed somewhat because
5. (U) As a result of sapper activity in the Qui Nhon area, increased security and damage control measures were implemented. Additional equipment and materials were made available to the ABD and tank farms to assist in improvement of defense facilities. Additional firefighting equipment, bulldozers, forklifts, and water trailers were designated for emergency use. At the end of the quarter, a comprehensive Area Damage Control Plan was being staffed. This plan will make maximum use of the compound complex area defense system now established in the Qui Nhon area. The Operations Branch, SP&O will serve as the Area Damage Control Center for the compound complex defense areas.

6. (U) To increase the lift capability of the 8th Transportation Group, two provisional truck platoons were formed. Equipment and personnel were drawn from available assets within the command and attached to 8th Group for the period 17 Feb - 7 Mar. During this period, the two platoons transported 223,071 ton miles of cargo. A Heavy Lift Truck Platoon composed of assets drawn command wide, was assigned to the 8th Transportation Group on 20 March. The consolidation of heavy lift assets has resulted in more efficient movement of heavy equipment and retrograde material.

7. (C) The Forward Support Activity (FSA) at LZ English continued to provide Class I, III, and V support to tactical units in the area. Due to movement of additional units of the 173d Airborne Brigade into the area, the Class I stockage objective at LZ English was raised from 20,000 to 25,000 rations. Logistical and security requirements at An Khe were studied and adjusted as a result of the move of the 4th Division into that area. Other unit moves supported by Qui Nhon Support Command are listed below. Support requirements at old and new locations which fall in the Northern II Corps Zone were changed as the moves occurred.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OLD LOCATION</th>
<th>NEW LOCATION</th>
<th>EST CLOSING DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>90 IMS Co</td>
<td>Pleiku</td>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
<td>15 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Air Cav (Rear)</td>
<td>An Khe</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>30 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>577 Engr Bn</td>
<td>Tuy Hoa</td>
<td>Dalat</td>
<td>1 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>299 Engr Bn</td>
<td>Kontum Prov</td>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
<td>20 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84 Engr Bn</td>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
<td>N. Tuy Hoa</td>
<td>15 Jun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173d Abn (Rear)</td>
<td>An Khe</td>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
<td>15 Jun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91 Evac Hosp</td>
<td>Tuy Hoa</td>
<td>Chu Lai</td>
<td>15 Jul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Engr Bn</td>
<td>An Khe</td>
<td>Balc</td>
<td>1 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C, 7/17 Cav</td>
<td>LZ English</td>
<td>NOK Valley</td>
<td>23 Apr</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. (U) Project Align reports were reviewed by this office and problem areas discussed with the 1st Logistical Command. Project Align should be helpful in formulating future Army doctrine on the number of support troops needed to support a division equivalent in a similar war. The report demonstrated that the Qui Nhon Support Command compares favorably
with the other support commands in utilization of resources and meeting requirements. Problem areas are being examined and a constant effort to upgrade operating efficiency will continue.

9. (U) The monthly Logistical Support Conferences have continued successfully. The conferences for February, March, and April were held by the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, R&D, Supply, and Transportation, respectively. Basic problems and procedures in those areas were discussed. An average of 48 personnel attended.

10. (C) Effective 15 April, the CG, 4th Infantry Division assumed the responsibility for security and coordination of convoys on QL 19. Close coordination has been effected with the Highway Coordinator's Office and Support Command units using the highway and nearby petroleum pipeline.
ANNEX G (U) STAFF SIGNAL SECTION

1. (U) Telephone Communications:

a. Telephone communications within the Quy Nhon Support Command were substantially improved in the course of the quarter. This improvement can be traced to the loan of eight switchboard operators to the 41st Sig Bn for use at the Phu Thanh switchboard, Phu Tai Valley; the diversion of six civilian spaces to the 41st Signal for the purpose of adding extra operators in the Quy Nhon dial telephone exchange (DTE); and the command emphasis placed on the proper utilization of Class "A" and "C" telephones within the command.

b. Ten trunk lines, installed from Quy Nhon to the Phu Thanh switchboard, have vastly improved Quy Nhon accessibility to Phu Tai Valley telephone subscribers.

c. A major problem encountered by the support command regarding telephone communications has been the number of telephone cables damaged or destroyed by friendly units while engaged in repelling attacks. Communications to Long My Depot were seriously hampered during the month of March when four major cables were damaged by friendly units. Buildings under cable lines had been burned and a substantial number of rounds fired by friendly units impacted in the cable. Such problems could have been avoided had the cable been buried when originally installed. To preclude other such damage, the cable being replaced is being buried underground.

d. A direct line from Quy Nhon switchboard to Vung Ro Bay was recently installed. This circuit should provide subscribers in both areas with improved telephone communications.

e. Recent communications problems in Phu Tai Valley have demonstrated a need for temporary direct circuits from Phu Thanh switchboard to the Long Binh switchboard until the tandem (fully automatic long-distance dialing system) cutover is accomplished.

f. During April, the number of Class "A" telephones in use within the command was reduced to 30% of the total number of telephones used. This was in compliance with USARV Reg 105-4.

2. (U) FM Radio Communications:

a. FM Radio communications within the command have been excellent, with the exception of frequency interference problems experienced by some units.

b. During March 1969, an AN/VRC-49 radio set was installed on Vung Chua Mountain to provide retransmission capability for all units in the Support Command. This retransmission unit has vastly improved FM radio communications within the command.
c. A new system for distribution of Signal Operating Instructions and Standing Signal Instructions (SOI/SSI) became effective during the month of April. All units within the Support Command are now required to submit SOI/SSI items to this headquarters prior to the twenty-third day of each month. This system is designed to eliminate the last minute rush handling of critical SOI/SSI items.

3. (U) AM Radio Communications:

a. All communications with the 1st Logistical Command and the three Support Commands have been excellent with few outages. At present, units at Vung Ro Bay and Pleiku are experiencing equipment difficulties which have on occasions caused these stations to be inoperative.

b. The phone-patching capability provided this command by the AN/FRC-93, a Collins Commercial type radio, has improved the system for rapid and direct telephone communications. The number of requests for phone-patch service has increased greatly; a total of 137 such requests were made to the staff signal section during the quarter.

c. There is an anticipated increase in AM radio communication capabilities within the Support Command in the near future, due to the recent addition of several AN/SCR-142 radio sets. This radio has a long range, point to point, radio-teletype capability.

4. (U) Communications Center Operations:

a. Teletype communications overall have been excellent for the entire quarter. Some minor circuit outages occurred and were quickly restored by repairmen at the various locations. There have been few problems with the command’s secure equipment.

b. A major problem with teletype communications within the command has been the excessive amount of messages sent with overly high priority. The Message Review Board studied this problem in detail during the past few months and action was taken to reduce such over-precedent messages. The results have been clearly seen in the reduction of time needed to receive high priority communications.

c. The teletype circuit to 8th Trans Gp was operational by the end of the reporting period, but some difficulty had been encountered with the circuit and equipment involved. However, the quality of the circuit was improved to an acceptable level. The teletype circuit from USASIFUN, QN Communications Center to the 45th GS Group Communications Center is presently scheduled for deactivation since the Army Area Communication Centers are now providing adequate service between Qui Nhon and Pleiku.

d. The number of teletype messages handled by the USASC, QN Communication Center during the past quarter totaled 3,957 messages originating from the Command Comm Center and 12,686 messages terminating there.
5. (U) Sole User Voice Circuits: The reliability of sole user voice circuits within the command remained at approximately 95%. Several circuits were reterminated at Long My Depot as a result of the move of Headquarters, USAD to Long My.
1. (C) During this quarterly period, the Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot (ABD) was attacked three times by enemy sapper units. In spite of significant ammunition losses and great danger to personnel, operations were not suspended for more than 12 hours at any time. As a result of the loss of ammunition storage capacity and the vulnerability of the depot to enemy attack, stockage objectives for the ABD have been significantly reduced. On 1 March 1969 two additional ammunition storage specialists (DAC) were assigned to the support command to provide technical assistance and guidance regarding ammunition installations. Mr. Clarence Meyers (GS-11) was assigned to the ABD and Mr. David E. Brown (GS-11) was assigned to Pleiku Ammunition Supply Point (ASP).

2. (C) The Qui Nhon Support Command suffered a loss of 11,424 short tons (S/T) of ammunition and 23 storage pads, all attributed to enemy sapper activity.

   a. On 23 February 1969, the Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot was attacked by an unknown size enemy sapper unit. Losses resulting from this attack were 8,374 S/T of ammunition, and 15 storage pads.

   b. On 10 March 1969, the ABD was again attacked by an enemy sapper unit of unknown size. This resulted in a loss of 1,729 S/T of ammunition and the destruction of 5 storage pads.

   c. On 23 March 1969, the Qui Nhon ABD was attacked for the third time by an enemy sapper unit of unknown size. Three storage pads and 1,321 S/T of ammunition were destroyed during this attack.

3. (C) On 13 March 1969, the Qui Nhon Support Command was relieved of the responsibility for storing ten days of class V supply in support of I Corps Tactical Zone (ICTZ). The mission for supporting the ICTZ with ten days of supply was transferred to Cam Ranh Bay, resulting in a stockage objective reduction of 6,178 S/T in the Qui Nhon Support Command.

4. (C) On 24 March 1969, the command stockage objective was further reduced from 60 to 45 days of class V supply. This lowered the stockage objective by 8,577 S/T.

5. (C) During this reporting period, the command stockage objective was additionally reduced by 757 S/T due to changes in the available supply rate (ASR) and weapons density. The total reduction in the command stockage objective was 15,512 S/T, establishing the new stockage objective at 32,032 S/T.
### Ammunition Statistical Data:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Receipt</td>
<td>26,815</td>
<td>44,812</td>
<td>17,978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues</td>
<td>42,969</td>
<td>41,457</td>
<td>23,724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rewarehouse</td>
<td>29,224</td>
<td>28,878</td>
<td>44,538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>99,008</td>
<td>115,147</td>
<td>86,240</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX I (U) ACoFS, SUPPLY

1. (U) The principal change in organization within the office of the ACoFS, Supply came about when responsibility for handling Class I supply was transferred from ACoFS, Supply to ACoFS, Services on 14 April 1969.

2. (U) The ACoFS, Supply implemented and monitored over 30 projects during this period. Statements of the status of some of the more important projects follow:

a. Project Fill: A project designed to insure that every action is taken to improve the flow of critical supplies to the theater by reporting critical items repeatedly at zero balance and screening and comparing units’ lists of critical items in order to keep accurate account of equipment lines in critical supply. During this reporting period, the trend indicates that units continue to identify more critical items each week and that very few of the critical items are becoming available. Project Fill was purified down to 1,004 lines during April, primarily due to elimination of duplicate items and items placed on the listing in error (i.e., items where the primary source of supply is cannibalization points). Present balance is 1,004 line items.

b. Project Stop/See: A program set up within the Qui Nhon port facility for the diversion and retrograding of shipments of equipment and supplies not needed by the support command. Statistics for the quarter indicate a sharp rise in February and a moderate tapering off toward April, indicating successful frustration and diversion of cargo at points of embarkation (POE) in CONUS. A total of 4,9 thousand short tons was reached in the quarter, with 3000 short tons shipped in February and 100 short tons shipped in April.

c. Project Strip: A program to assist the removal of excess supplies from units where excesses have accumulated. During the quarter, removal of excess supplies was completed at the 173d Airborne Brigade and the 4th Infantry Division. The project consisted of the redistribution and retrograde of supplies and equipment in excess of the USASIPCOM DSU/GSU authorization (measured by short tons, line items and dollar value).

Shipped this quarter:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Short Tons</th>
<th>Line Items</th>
<th>Dollars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2513</td>
<td>14,742</td>
<td>7.5 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Project Count II: A 100% location survey and inventory of all 1st Logistical Command supplies in depots, DSUs and GSUs with a goal of 95% accuracy in the locator system and inventory. An apparent shortfall in the lines counted was due to the first portion of the quarter being devoted to rewarehousing, location survey and training of personnel to inventory. The projection and actual count can be expected to meet by mid-June. Completion rate for DSUs and GSUs was 33%. The depot rate was 20% during the quarter. DSU/GSU inventory accuracy climbed from a low of 93% in February to 96% for March and April, indicating in rooted expertise in
Project Count II ended the third month. A shortfall in inventory accuracy for the depot was apparently due to difficulty in purifying machine data against inventory lots. The problem is being studied and a decided improvement was evident by the end of April, when accuracy rose to 92%. Further improvement can be expected as count teams become more expert and machine problems are solved. Depot location accuracy was 95% for the month of March and fell to 93% for April. New warehousing and location procedures being implemented can be expected to show a substantial improvement in May.

e. Project Rags: A reconciliation and cancellation of back orders at DSU and depot levels with strict control to insure the elimination of "nice to have" items. The project was first conducted in November and again in March. Analysis will have to wait further data. The total project requires both depot and Inventory Control Center (ICC) to reconcile with customers. No ICC reconciliation has been made to date. DSU/GSU are scheduled to receive a reconciliation from the ICC and will conduct customer reconciliations in May.

f. Materiel Release Denial (MRD) Program: The percentage of items showing a balance on the Availability Balance File (ABF) that can not be located for issue.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MRD is presently running at 4.7% in the depot and .1% in the DSUs and GSUs. Emphasis on purification of receipt procedures leaves fewer personnel and less time for the research of MRD's. As procedures are purified and location validity is improved the depot MRD rate should decline. The DSU/GSU MRD rate is the lowest attained this fiscal year.

g. Command Critical Items List (CCIL) Program: A huge increase in March was caused by the submission of more than 100 items by the 17th Aviation Group. The program identifies critical items at the using level, in the 17th Aviation Group case, the items were (Nomex) fireproof clothing. The list for April fell to 58 items, indicating that positive results are being obtained from the program.

h. Demand Satisfaction Program: The percentage of items requisitioned on the Authorized Stockage List which are filled.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st Log Goals</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>62%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the DSUs and GSUs, though a slight reversal was evident in the month of February, the overall trend continued to rise from 53% in Feb to a high of 71.6% in April, thus attaining the 1st Log goal. In the depot, however,
the goals were not met. There was an increase in March due to inclusion of referral orders, but a decrease came in April due to deletion of referral orders (hence the April drop is considered normal fluctuation).

3. (U) During the reporting period the following changes in office personnel occurred:

   a. On 4 March CPT Szeremi departed for the Ordnance Career Course.
   b. On 19 March CPT Smith joined the staff from MACV.
   c. On 31 March SP5 Strong departed for CONUS.
   d. On 10 April SFC Jenkins departed for CONUS.
   e. On 14 April CPT Rogers and SFC Hopper were transferred to ACoS, Services.
   f. On 18 April LTC Smith was assigned as ACoS, Supply.
1. Having been under the staff supervision of the ACofS, Supply for 3 months, the Subsistence Branch, which handles Class I Supplies within the headquarters, was returned to ACofS, Services on 14 April 1969. This action placed all food activities under one office.

2. Total Class I support to Tuy Hoa began on 23 March 1969. Between 1 January and 23 March, only dairy products and bread had been supplied to that station.

3. Requisitioning objectives (RO) for Class I supplies at the depot and supply points were reduced during the quarter to bring them into line with the strength levels of supported troop units. The result will be a smaller requirement for refrigerated storage space and should result in a more efficient operation within the depot and Class I points. Excesses have been reduced considerably during this reporting period, the number of days of Class I supply on hand being closer to the RO than at any other time within the past year. Completion of the new refrigerated warehouse, scheduled for use in early July, will enable the command to release the refrigeration ship Hibueras from duty at the port of Qui Nhon.

4. The arrival of three new field bakery ovens for support command use, and the location and subsequent movement to Qui Nhon of a retrograde field bakery dough divider greatly improved bakery operations at both field bakeries. Control of oven temperatures for better quality bread is now easier to attain. Discovery of the unserviceable dough divider has provided scarce repair parts for this high mortality item.

5. With the demand for commercial laundry service still rising, contract laundry service increased to an all-time high. In an effort to get maximum use from the field laundries in the Qui Nhon area, only personal clothing and hospital laundry are presently being processed in contract laundries. Most flat work is being handled by field laundry units. A total of seven new Kodal laundry units was placed into operation in the command during March, permitting the replacement of Standard B (old model) machines with the new Standard A units. Further, the new machines enable a maintenance float to be established for better maintenance support.

6. The Food Service Program continued to receive strong command support throughout the reporting period. The Qui Nhon Support Command Five Star Best Mess Award, initiated in January, has been influential in increasing the quality of food service operations within the command. Competition for the "5 star" award has increased each month and the award program has been well received by subordinate headquarters and participating messes.


ANNEX K (U) COMMAND ENGINEER

1. (U) During this reporting period work was initiated (on 10 February 1969) by RMK-BRJ (consortium of civilian contract engineers) to install refrigeration equipment in the Qui Nhon cold storage warehouse. The first of two new warehouses now under construction is scheduled for completion on 1 July 1969.

2. (U) A project to construct two, eight inch, welded POL pipelines from the POL jetty to Tank Farm No. 1 was brought to 50 percent completion on 4 February 1969. On this date one pipeline was completed and the first fuel was pumped through. Approximately three weeks of extra work were required after construction was finished to dig up, open the pipe and clear debris from many sections of the pipe. During construction, sections of pipe were left unguarded at night, giving the local populace ample opportunity to fill them with all manner of trash. During the initial flow tests, this trash was trapped in nearly solid masses at several ninety degree bends.

3. (U) As a result of the successful sapper attack on Tank Farm No. 2 in March 1969, operational support construction of defensive structures at a number of installations was requested through IFFV. Work done included 24 high stand-off fences around POL tanks, pump stations and tank farm manifolds; berm around POL tanks were raised to enable them to hold 100 percent of each tank's capacity plus one foot of freeboard; land clearing and construction of pioneer roads around perimeters; and improvements on perimeter lights and guard towers. This work is in progress at Tank Farms No. 1, No. 2 and No. 3 in Qui Nhon, at the tank farms in An Khe and Pleiku and at Pump Station No. 2 and the Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot in Phu Tai Valley.

4. (U) During this quarter the following unit moves were accomplished:

a. The headquarters, 93d MP Battalion moved from Camp Humper in Phu Tai Valley to Camp Granite in Qui Nhon.

b. The Transportation Management Agency (TMA) relocated its billeting area from Camp Granite to the 55th Medical Gp Compound.

c. The Korean Military Police relocated from a compound north of Binh Dinh Province hospital to temporary facilities in the old 5th Terminal Command Compound South of Qui Nhon city. This move was result of KOK facilities having been destroyed on 12 March, in a fire.

d. B Company of the 299th Engineer Battalion moved from Dak To to Camp Humper in Phu Tai.

e. The 536th Engineer Detachment (PC) relocated from Camp Humper to the 55th Medical Gp Compound in Qui Nhon.
1. Camp Swann was returned to Pacific Architects and Engineers (PA&E) Corporation when the 5th Special Forces and Mobile Strike force left the compound for Kontum.

5. (U) The principal personnel change within the Engineer office for the reporting period came when LTC Kenneth L. Winter assumed the position of Command Engineer on 4 April 1969, replacing LTC Francis A. St Mary, who departed for reassignment in CONUS.
ANNEX L  (C)  AGO'S, PETROLEUM

1.  (C) Petroleum operations during the quarter:
   
a. Product received at Qui Nhon:
      
       February - 23,488,200 gallons  
       March - 14,536,000 gallons  
       April - 23,567,000 gallons

b. Product received at Tuy Hoa:

       February - 8,536,900 gallons  
       March - 9,771,400 gallons  
       April - 8,256,000 gallons

c. Product shipped to An Khe by pipeline:

       February - 4,854,000 gallons  
       March - 7,668,000 gallons  
       April - 8,928,200 gallons

d. Product shipped to Pleiku by pipeline:

       February - 732,000 gallons  
       March - 754,000 gallons  
       April - 2,883,100 gallons

e. Product shipped to Phu Cat by pipeline:

       February - 4,929,000 gallons  
       March - 4,106,000 gallons  
       April - 5,378,000 gallons

f. Total command consumption was 73,697,900 gallons.

2.  (U) The Red Beach pipeline was relocated during this reporting period, having been frequently destroyed by monsoon tidal action at its old location. The first line of this two pipeline construction project was completed on 1 February 1969. Added to the existing "G" line, (see diagram on following page), this project has made the command capable of off-loading ships at a maximum rate of approximately 2,000 barrels per hour. There is no estimated time of completion (ETC) for the second line at present.
3 (U) The main personnel changes within the office of the ACofS, POL during the quarter were:


   b. CPT David E. Lackey replaced CPT Joseph F. Labasan as Distribution Officer on 10 February 1969. CPT Labasan assumed duties as Operations Officer on the same date.

   c. 1LT Emmett J. Goodbody replaced 1LT Michael J. Furlong as Facilities Officer on 29 April 1969.
1. (C) During this reporting period, the support responsibilities and organization of the command continued to be altered. While most of those adjustments were minor in nature, a major change occurred with the loss of the 136th Light Maintenance (LM) Company. However, since this unit had been assigned to the support command for only a short time (December 1968), it was involved in most of the mission adjustments made during the quarter. Experience proved that while the most of the support capabilities of the 136th were balanced with the Tuy Hoa requirements, the signal capability was insufficient. For this reason, a signal repair team from the 86th Maintenance Battalion was attached to the 136th LM Company. The engineer construction capability of the 136th was considered by Headquarters 1st Logistical Command to be excessive as compared to that of other support commands. As a result, one of the organic engineer construction platoons was transferred to Cam Ranh Bay Support Command on 20 February. During March and April, the supported unit density decreased at Tuy Hoa and the 136th Light Maintenance Company was returned to Cam Ranh Bay Support Command on 20 April. The Tuy Hoa support responsibility remained with this command. The mission is being accomplished by a forward support activity.

2. (C) The first phase of the "Artillery R&R" program, providing combined maintenance and crew training for the M107/M109, was completed on 20 March in Qui Nhon. The second phase of the same program was initiated in Pleiku on 21 February. Additionally, the "R&R" program was extended on 28 March to include the M108/M109 weapons. The program has proved to be beneficial by reducing the average NOR (non-operational ready) rates and improving overall equipment condition. Various factors such as sporadic shortages of repair parts, coupled with demanding transportation requirements and repair requirements for higher priority items (other NOR weapons), have caused some slippage in the program.

3. (C) The command reached 100% mechanization of maintenance technical supply activities with the arrival of three NCR (National Cash Register) 500 systems. The 63d Maintenance Battalion had received a second NCR 500 system during November 1968. The 98th Light Equipment Maintenance Company received its system in March and now operates a consolidated technical supply activity with the 552d Light Equipment Maintenance Company. The 552d Light Equipment Maintenance Company also received its system in March and now operates a consolidated supply activity with the 5th Main Support Company's system. The command thus has a total of seven NCR 500 systems which operate five maintenance supply activities. A trial automation of a supply and service company's stock records was initiated during the reporting period when the records of the 304th Supply and Service Company were added to the operation of the 560th Light Maintenance Company's NCR 500 system. The records were not combined, however, to insure that the manual system of the 304th Supply and Service Company can be resumed at any time and that either company can deploy readily.

4. (C) Starting in March, the command anticipated the transfer of the equipment of the 6/84th Artillery Battalion to the South Vietnamese Army.
under the ARVN Modernization and Improvement Program. The program is still in its early stages with only one battery transferred; however, the requirement for detailed and continuous planning and coordination was evident during this first transfer.

5. (C) Command emphasis continued to be placed on all phases of materiel readiness and, as a result, a favorable increase of units passing initial CMIs was achieved. The rate for this quarter was 91% as compared to 69% for the quarter ending 31 January 1969.

6. (C) The following personnel changes occurred during the reporting period:

**Losses:**
- MAJ Moore - ACofS, Maintenance
- LT O'Kelly - Marine Maintenance
- CW3 Snyder - Automotive Maintenance Officer

**Gains:**
- MAJ Lipinski - ACofS, Maintenance
- CW2 Walker - Automotive Maintenance Officer
ANNEX N (U) ACofS, RETROGRADE AND DISPOSAL

1. (U) Retrograde Operations:

a. During the reporting period 52,929 short tons (S/T) were shipped by this command. Of this total, 18,432 S/T were classified unserviceable repairable. Other categories of retrograde cargo included excess depot materiel, materiel returned through Project StopSee, and suspended ammunition and ammunition components. A breakdown of shipments by modes of transportation shows that 99 percent of the total cargo was shipped by surface and 1 percent by air.

b. Sea Land vans have been used to ship vehicle components and generators to CONUS, and vehicle components and empty gas bottles to Japan. This mode of transportation is continuing to prove itself ideal for shipment of this type cargo.

c. The command has retrograded one victory ship and one LST load of repairable equipment from Vung Ro Bay. This operation was largely unsuccessful, since the collection and evacuation (C&E) yard located at Tuy Hoa does not have the equipment to properly wash and process equipment for out-of-country retrograde. Also, the personnel involved were not familiar with the methods of preservation or with the entomology procedure required for making such off-shore shipments.

d. The cannibalization point, authorized by this headquarters and established by the 62d Maintenance Battalion at Pleiku, which became fully operational 1 Jan 1969, showed considerable improvement during this reporting period. The equipment is now segregated and the yard is operated in accordance with 1st Log Regulation 750-50, dated 21 January 1969. The C&E Yard is now operational as an unserviceable account. The establishment of this unserviceable account has provided assistance to the customer through obtaining credit for the equipment evacuated in an expeditious manner. Before the establishment of this account, credit for the evacuated items was not received by the customer until the item had reached the Unsizable Accounts Division in Qui Nhon. This generally caused delays of about five to six days for the equipment to arrive at Qui Nhon and another three to four days before the customer received credit. The ACofS, Retrograde and Disposal (R&D), this headquarters has suggested that the C&E yard operated by the 704th Maintenance Battalion, Fourth Infantry Division, establish an unserviceable account along the lines of the 62d Maintenance Battalion's C&E operation, located only a short distance from the 704th Maintenance Area in Pleiku.

e. The ACofS, R&D assumed the responsibility for the in-coming items from Project Closed Loop on 5 March 1969. This matter was transferred from the ACofS, Supply in order to consolidate staff attention to problem areas within the project. Among the Closed Loop problem areas observed by the ACofS, R&D during the month of April 1969 were:
(1) A reconciliation of Closed Loop generators due out from three customers was made with the ICCV and it was found that 80% of these due-out were invalid due to various reasons: Change of stock number, substitute stock number not being used, and authority for issue not correct. In addition, the customers had not been notified that their requests had been cancelled.

(2) A problem area was found in the communication of releases from ICCV on Closed Loop end items. In some cases, due-out items had been on requisition for nearly a year and, although on hand, could not be issued without receipt of ICCV approval.

2. (U) Property Disposal Activities:

   a. The Property Disposal Activity had 13,478 S/T of scrap and 1,799 S/T of usable on-hand equipment as of 30 April 1969. The amount of scrap on hand is being reduced through placing command emphasis on contractors moving scrap material and through increasing the tonnages allowed under contracts for scrap.

   b. The property disposal (PDO) yard being in need of increased personnel and equipment, a request for equipment from 1st Log on a loan basis was submitted and, on denial, has been resubmitted with additional justification.
1. (C) In the course of the quarter, the tonnage of cargo moved by rail totaled: for the month of February, 3,341.8 Short Tons (S/T); for March, 3,100 S/T; and for April, 1,742 S/T. This steady decrease in cargo moved is attributed to the interdiction of the rail line between Qui Nhon and Thu Hiep. This segment of the line was out of service for 17 days in March and 12 days in April. During the period that the line of communication (LOC) was interrupted, it was necessary to divert essential cargo for sea or air movement.

2. (FUO) During the month of March 1969, a provisional heavy lift truck platoon was organized and attached to the 8th Transportation Group (MT). Units already within the command were tasked to provide personnel and vehicles for this new platoon. Prior to the formation of the heavy lift truck platoon, subordinate commands had been tasked to provide individual heavy lift vehicles as required. This provisional unit now provides a readily available, controlled heavy lift capability for the command.

3. (U) Motor transport performance for February totaled 259,025 S/T, the March total was 272,800 S/T and the April total was 260,588 S/T, for an overall sum of 792,413 S/T moved by motor transport vehicles during the quarter.

4. (FUO) As a result of rail interdiction, the 5th Transportation Command (Terminal) was required to utilize its organic LCUs and LCMs to support the Tuy Hoa area as well as the areas normally served by these watercraft. Total tonnage handled by the Qui Nhon Port in February was 87,110 S/T; in March, 124,100 S/T and in April, 96,275 S/T. Total port tonnage for the quarter was 307,485 S/T.

5. (FUO) Continued use of the Air Force C-7A aircraft has enabled the command to react quickly to rapidly changing requirements. Total air cargo moved during February was 1,247 S/T; during March, 1,800 S/T and during April, 1,432 S/T, for a quarterly total of 4,479 S/T.

6. (U) The principal personnel changes within the Transportation office during the report period were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gains</th>
<th>Losses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LTC Wright</td>
<td>LTC Kendrick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT Kosak</td>
<td>ILT Sprague</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SSG Kane</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

48
ANNEX R (U) CIVIL AFFAIRS

1. (U) The quarter began with preparation for support of Tet (lunar new year) holiday activities. Many units and activities sponsored parties for Vietnamese employees and for schools and orphanages. Numerous individual soldiers presented gifts to Vietnamese employees and friends—a person-to-person participation in building better community relations. Also, Civil Affairs (CA) personnel participated in local Vietnamese civic festivities as invited guests.

2. (U) Enemy activity during Tet indirectly caused considerable fire damage in the Qui Nhon Refugee Village. A friendly signal flare landed in one of the refugee dwelling areas and, as a result, 24 houses were destroyed by fire. Residents were able to salvage most of their belongings and there were no civilian casualties. All families received assistance in the form of food and temporary shelter through the Vietnamese Welfare Agency. The Welfare Advisor, Mr. Feldstein, requested and received assistance from the Civil Affairs Office. Excess food items were made available to supplement the agency's emergency supply. This and other such fires, often spread by pilfered US fuel stored in Vietnamese houses, led to the destruction or damage of approximately 300 homes in Binh Dinh Province during this period.

3. (U) Also, during the post-Tet offensive, the Qui Nhon Army Airfield came under enemy attack the night of 22-23 February 1969. Five members of the Ham Nghi Hamlet People's Self-Defense Force were wounded and one female was killed. Their contribution to the counterattack at the airfield was instrumental in minimizing damage and casualties at that installation.

4. (U) Units of the Vietnamese Boy Scout Association (VNBSA) in Binh Dinh Province conducted a "Camporee" at the La San School in Qui Nhon, 1-2 February 1969. An American ex-boy scout, SP5 Brown, provided much assistance in organization and procurement of necessary tentage, supplies and transportation. His participation in ceremonies and events also contributed to the program. The 593d GS Group and the US Army Depot were key supporters of this event, providing personnel, supplies and transportation.

5. (U) Other significant CA projects which have been initiated or advanced during the quarter are:

   a. MEDCAPS (Medical Civil Action Projects), and DENCAPS (Dental Civil Action Projects) continued as highly effective and beneficial programs.

   b. ARVN Dependent Housing: Continuing priority assistance is being rendered to this program. 1LT Jackson, Civil Affairs Officer, and CPT Smith, AGofS, Supply, attended on ARVN Dependent Housing Council meeting at LZ English on 30 April 1969.
c. Project Better Relations is still in the planning and organizing stages.

d. The Civil Affairs office has coordinated with the Provost Marshal and the Safety Office to help formulate a program directed at traffic safety, primarily as it concerns school children. CA is maintaining liaison between the Provost Marshal, Safety and the Province Headquarters.
1. (U) Visits to the Qui Nhon Support Command were made in February by Chaplain (MG) Francis L. Sampson, Chief of Chaplains, Chaplain (COL) Gerard J. Gefell, USAVE Chaplain, Chaplain (COL) Ray M. Rowland, 1st Log Chaplain, and Chaplain (COL) Richard R. Bell, IPPV Chaplain.

2. (U) During the same month, the Catholic Chaplain transferred from the 67th Evacuation Hospital, since which time Catholic religious coverage at the 67th Evac Hospital has been provided by the Support Command Chaplain.

3. (U) Beginning in February, monthly Chaplain Training Conferences were held outside of the Qui Nhon Compound. It was decided that each chaplain would assume the responsibility for holding the training conference in his own command. The first such opportunity was given to Chaplain (CPT) Janzen, 184th Ordnance Battalion. The program has been successful and through these conferences, chaplains are acquiring a better grasp of support activities and the specified mission of each organization. The mission and organization of the 184th was ably explained by that unit's commander, LTC Busick. In March, the Chaplains' Training Conference was held at the 67th Evacuation Hospital, Qui Nhon Airfield. The sponsoring chaplain was Chaplain Jarvis. Visitors included 1st Log Chaplain (COL) Ray M. Rowland, USAVE Chaplain (COL) Gerard Gefell, Assistant 1st Log Chaplain (LTC) Edward Christoph, and Chaplain (LTC) Nick Nybro of the 444th Medical Bn. A lecture was given by Colonel Broadus, commander of the hospital, and a tour of the hospital was made by all the chaplains. In April, the training conference was held in the Cha Rang Valley at Camp Addison, home of the 54th Transportation Battalion. Chaplains Polito and Mize hosted the chaplains and Major Fugmire, the Battalion XO, gave a description of the mission of the 54th. Chaplain (COL) Ray M. Rowland, 1st Log Chaplain, was present.

4. (U) During this period, a panel made up of a psychiatrist, a lawyer, a representative of the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) and a chaplain was organized to give talks on drugs and their abuse. Also, a seminar on drug abuse, conducted by the psychiatrists at the 67th Evac for the chaplains under the supervision of the Support Command Chaplain, was highly successful. A series of lectures being given under chaplain supervision to support command personnel by Sergeant Gomez is proving to be highly successful. By the end of the reporting period, there was a noticeable decline in incidents of drug abuse and 41 persons had turned themselves in for help with drug abuse problems.

5. (U) In the course of the quarter, the Staff Chaplain's section moved its office to a location closer to the Chapel of Peace. This was accomplished entirely by personnel in the Chaplain's Section as a self-help program. A beautification program has also been underway in the chaplain's area of operation.
6. (U) Regular Sunday and weekday services were conducted by all chaplains of the command. Also, special services were conducted in observance of the Lenten Season, Easter, and Passover.

7. (U) In addition to the 19 chaplains of the Support Command, seven more chaplains are assigned to units in this area which are not part of the QNSG. Coordination and cooperation with these chaplains is a duty of the Staff Chaplain. The following information indicates Support Command Chaplains' Activities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total attendance at all services</td>
<td>35,851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of services conducted</td>
<td>1,729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of attendance at C.G. classes</td>
<td>17,748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of visits made to the hospital</td>
<td>835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of counsels and interviews</td>
<td>4,916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community relations (meetings, services, etc)</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other parish administrations</td>
<td>1,214</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. (U) Civic Action by chaplains has been accomplished within the units to which each chaplain is assigned. Statistics for the quarter on funds received and disbursed through the Consolidated Chaplains' Fund for civic actions are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For churches</td>
<td>$1,193.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For schools and orphanages</td>
<td>$2,570.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous and charitable and benevolent causes</td>
<td>$3,540.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

52
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb 69 to 30 Apr 69.

CG, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon

**Report Date**

25 May 1969

**Report Title**

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon

**Organizing Activity (Corporate Author)**

HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

**Confidentiality Classification**

CONFIDENTIAL

**Total Number of Pages**

55

**Contract or Grant No.**

N/A

**Project No.**

692316

**Originator's report number**

692316

**Sponsoring Military Activity**

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

**Distribution Statement**

N/A

**Supplementary Notes**

N/A