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<td>AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980; AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980</td>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report & Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, General Directives, 30 April 1969 (U).

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR GT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

ROBERT E. LYNCH
Colonel, Adj
Acting The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 3D BRIGADE, 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96226

15 May 1969


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   a. (U) Command. Brigadier General George W. Dickerson remained in command of the Brigade. (See Inclosure I, Roster of Key Personnel)
   b. Personnel, Health, Morale, Safety, and Discipline.
      (1) Detailed information relating to S-1 activities are as follows:
         (a) (C) Strength as of 29 April 1969.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>ASC</th>
<th>PRESENT FOR DUTY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-505</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-505</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>828</td>
<td>780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-508</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>808</td>
<td>761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-521</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82d Spt Bn</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 3d Bde</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/1-17 Cav</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co C, 307 Engr</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58th Sig</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>518th MIB</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52d Chen</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45th FIO</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37th Scout Dog</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co O, 75th (Engr) Inf</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>4651</td>
<td>4650</td>
<td>4339</td>
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FOR OT UT

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Inclosure

(b) R&R utilization for the three month period is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>INITIAL ALLOCATIONS</th>
<th>STANDBY AND REALLOCATIONS</th>
<th>CANCELLATIONS AND TURNBACKS</th>
<th>NUMBER NO-SHOW</th>
<th>ALLOCATIONS USED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>210</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taipei</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuala Lumpur</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1269</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1059</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage of allocations used for period stated .......... 82.2

(c) Postal activities for Feb, Mar and Apr.

Total amount of mail received: 231,403
Total of mail dispatched: 48,051
Total money order purchased: $405,691.12
Total money orders cashed: $47,157.46
Stamp requisition to Postmaster, San Francisco, amounted to $7,625.00

(d) (c) Total awards processed and approved in Feb, Mar and Apr.

Purple Heart ......................... 199
Army Commendation ................. 831
Air Medal ................................ 56
Bronze Star ......................... 1743
Silver Star ......................... 17
Soldiers Medal ...................... 5
Legion of Merit ..................... 1
TOTAL ................... 2852

(e) (c) Casualties suffered by the brigade during the reporting period.

KHA ............................. 30
WHA ............................. 192
Non Battle Deaths ............ 6
Non Battle Injuries ....... 47
TOTAL ................... 275

(f) (U) Red Cross services during the past quarter. Records indicate the following types of requests for the reporting period.

- Emergency leaves or extensions: 113
- Discharges or government benefits: 7
- Reporting to assist CO: 2
- Reporting for service members: 68
- Reporting for families: 253
- Personal problems: 104
- Family problems: 92

(g) (U) Chaplains activities for the reporting period.

- Services: 658
- Attendance: 12,478
- Hospital visits: 78
- Counselling: 656

(2) (C) During the reporting period Company B, 82d Support Battalion continued to support the three infantry battalions and one artillery battalion. The company provides unit level service to the rear elements of the Brigade including attachments. The brigade medical unit receives back-up medical support from Long Binh, Saigon, and Cu Chi Dustoff Control, the 3d Field Hospital, 12th, 24th and 93d Evacuation Hospitals.

(a) (C) Significant diseases: 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disease</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hepatitis</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Respiratory Infection</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venereal Diseases</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot Problems</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) (C) The state of health of the command remained satisfactory. Sanitary conditions within the brigade are satisfactory.

(c) (C) During the month of January, the brigade was faced with approximately 30% shortage of enlisted medics with primary MOS. A training program was begun in the medical company. Personnel were screened by AG for intelligence, interest, and OT score. As a result, 20 enlisted men were trained over a 2½ month period. Aiding in this project was the 5d Field Hospital. The brigade is presently up to 100% in medics.

o. (C) Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

(1) (C) Operation Toan Thang Phase III continued into April with the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division remaining in the Saigon Area of the III Corps Tactical Zone. During this period several light contacts with small elements up to platoon size resulted in 53 VC KIA, 16 VC WIA, 15 NVA KIA, and 3 NVA WIA.

(2) (C) During the period 1 February through 30 April 1969, enemy activity was characterized by low level incidents. 107mm rockets were used in a direct fire role twice during the period. In both cases the same target (53d RF Bn CP) was engaged from the same location with negative damage. Quang Trung Training Center received 122mm rockets on two occasions. In both cases the rockets were fired from outside the brigade AO. Booby traps, assassinations, terrorist activity and propaganda remained at an extremely low level even during the enemy’s Winter-Spring Offensive. Reconnaissance activity by the enemy also declined in the AO after the offensive began and has remained at a relatively low level.

(3) (C) During the period there was no contact with units of significant size. Continuous pressure was maintained on the enemy through the employment of reconnaissance-in-force, search, and cordon and search operations during the day. At night an average of 200 ARVN and US ambushes plus the employment of ground surveillance radar and sensors effectively hampered enemy movement throughout the AO. Indications are that the ultimate objective of the VC/NVA is an attack on Saigon. Aggressive allied action in and around Saigon has severely limited his ability to stockpile needed supplies while pre-emptive allied strikes far outside the Saigon area have hindered movement of enemy forces toward Saigon. This has caused the enemy to direct his primary efforts to areas outside of Saigon. Enemy units within the area of interest of the Brigade are the following:

SR - 1 Units
80th Regiment
Quyet Thang Regiment

SR - 2 Units
6th Local Force Battalion
306th Main Force Battalion
D - 12 Sapper Battalion

SR - 5 Units
Dong Dai Regiment

9th VC/NVA Division

(4) (C) During the reporting period nine significant caches were discovered. Two of them were discovered during searches of suspected possible rocket launching sites. US Troops were led to a third cache by a Hoi Chanh (rallier). SLAR, Red Haze, Firefly and Sniffer missions were employed extensively. Generally the results have been disappointing due to the populated nature of the AO. They have, however, provided a supplemental source of information from which intell-

Intelligence is gained. As was previously mentioned, ground surveillance radar and sensor devices have greatly increased the brigade's ability to detect movement in the AO.

(a) In order to gain more complete and reliable intelligence, daily liaison with all agencies in the brigade AO is maintained. As a result, intelligence was very reliable concerning the disposition, capabilities, and missions of enemy maneuver elements. Friendly units were well aware of the threat in the AO. Patterns of enemy activity and movement in the area are fairly predictable. However, it is virtually impossible to predict the movement of two to three persons in the AO.

(b) Co O (Ranger) 75th Infantry became operational on 1 March. Since that time they have been used almost continuously to cover the fringes of the AO. Primarily they have provided intelligence of a negative nature in that very little activity has been noted in their area of operations.

(c) Recapitulation of enemy losses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Within AO</th>
<th>Outside AO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VC KIA (BC)</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC FW</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVA KIA (BC)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVA FW</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapons</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew served</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ammunition</th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms Rds</td>
<td>16,948</td>
<td>13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew Served Rds</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>625</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rocket Launchers</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rockets</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B-40/B-41</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122mm</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107mm</td>
<td></td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


(1) (c) During the reporting period no operation orders were published. OPOHD 6-68 (TOAN THANG PHASE II AND PHASE III) currently in effect was amplified by publication of FRAGO 19 through 25.

(2) (c) During the reporting period two (2) operations plans were published which provided for the reinforcement and defense of critical installations in the Saigon Area and protection of Camp Red Ball.

(a) OPLAN 18-69 (FIRST BASE) to reinforce or assist forces of the 5th and 6th Ranger Groups.

(b) OPLAN 19-69 (CAMP RED BALL DEFENSE PLAN) to prevent penetration of the perimeter of Camp Red Ball.

(3) (c) During the reporting period, great emphasis was again placed on night operations. In addition to the normal night ambushes conducted by the brigade, at least one company size operation per night was conducted. Details of operations conducted by elements of the brigade are as follows:

(a) (c) During the period 1 Feb 69 to 30 Apr 69, the 1st BN (bn) 505th Inf operated out of PB All American (XT745005) and LZ Tracy (XT442068). From 1 Feb 69 to 16 Mar 69, the Bn conducted operations out of PB All American. From 17 Mar 69 to 27 Mar 69, the Bn was OPCON to the 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div. Standard procedure was to have one rifle company securing PB All American and LZ Tracy while three rifle companies operated in the Bn AO. At LZ Tracy, E Company operated in conjunction with the US Navy along the Vam Co Dong River.

1. On 1 Feb 69, E Company destroyed 6 sampans and found various equipment and articles of clothing via XT693055. On the same day, B Company engaged 15-25 VC via XT723126, resulting in 9 VC KIA and 4 AK-47's, 1 US cal .30 carbine, 3 K-54 pistols, and 1 Chicom grenade captured. No US casualties. On 5 Feb 69, A Company suffered 1 KHA as a result of a G3W in the stomach, via XT665105. On 8 Feb 69, B Company had an officer drown while moving out to night ambush. On 11 Feb 69, E Company found a tunnel containing 3 Chinese ponchos, 1 Chicom entrenching tool, and 1 M-16 magazine via XT722152. On 12 Feb 69, B Company, 2-505 (attached to 1-505) picked up 5 VII via XT722152. On the same day, B Company- 2-505 suffered 7 casualties when a parachute flare set fire to a grassy area at the Hoc Mon Bridge. The fire set off 2 claymore mines, wounding 7 men. On 16 Feb 69, D Company found a tunnel via XT692115 and destroyed it. On 17 Feb 69, D Company picked up one Chieu Loi VC with a .38 cal pistol. On 18 Feb 69, one of A Company's ambush patrols via XT655105 engaged 12 VC, resulting in 1 VC KIA and 1 AK-50, 4 ammo pouches and 2 frag grenades captured. A Company suffered 1 WHA from G3W. On 23 Feb 69, E Company found 5 bunkers via XT724819 and destroyed them. On 24 Feb 69, B Company captured 1 IVA who claimed to be from the 7th IVA Div. On 27 Feb 69, B Company found a tunnel via XT676130 containing 1 AK-47 with 17 magazines, 2 AK-50's, 2 B-40 launchers with 3 rockets, 2 B-41 rockets and 1 box blasting caps, 2 M-1 rifles, 2 M-16 magazines, and 4 entrenching tools. On the same day, one of B Company's ambushes captured two VC, one of whom revealed that he had instructed a political rally on 26 Feb 69. Another of B Company's ambush patrols engaged an estimated 20 man enemy force after being hit with 8-10 mortar rounds. The patrol suffered 1 US KHA and 3 US WHA. The initial
Sweep of the contact area had negative results; however, at 0019 hours, the patrol found one fatigue-clad VC via XT647130 who was wounded in the leg. At this same location, they found 1,475 rds of .30 cal ammo and 100 rds of BAR ammo. In the evening, one of B Company's ambushes engaged an unknown-size enemy force, resulting in 4 VC KIA and 1 AK-47 captured.

2 On 1 Mar 69, D Company found a cache via XT725994 which yielded 1 K-54 pistol, 1 M-1 rifle, 15 .30 cal rds, .50 and .45 cal ammo, and 2 M-16 magazines. On 8 Mar 69, D Company found a 2.5" rocket with M151 warhead via XT705043. C Company, acting on an agent report, found various equipment and articles of clothing via XT723094. On 10 Mar 69, B Company found a vacated bunker complex and destroyed it. On 15 Mar 69, an individual from A Company was bitten by a snake and evacuated. On the same day, a firefly team, operating in the Bn AO, received fire from bunkers via XT690803. They returned fire on the area, killing 1 VC and destroying 5 sampans, 2 bunkers, and capturing 1 AK-47. B Company engaged 3-5 VC via XT380051, killing 3 VC and capturing 1 AK-47, 1 medical aid kit and other miscellaneous equipment. On 16 Mar 69, 1-505 was given a warning order to move to LZ Tracy (XT442069) and become OPCON to the 1st Cav Div (Air-mobile). On 17 Mar 69, the move was accomplished by CH-47 aircraft and convoy, closing LZ Tracy at 1200 hours. C Company made contact at LZ vic XT3902, resulting in 2 VC KIA and 1 M-1 carbine captured. On 18 Mar 69, D Company found 2 bunkers via XT397046 and destroyed them. On the same day, D Company had one man evacuated due to burns from a trip flare. Also, one man returned to LZ Tracy with minor frag wounds incurred in recon by fire. On the same day, C Company had 5 men wounded by booby traps via XT415965. On 20 Mar 69, E Company found 2 bunkers and a tunnel via XT430037. An Apache light scout team from the 1st Bde, 1st Cav located 4 dud 500-lb bombs and destroyed them. B Company had 2 WHA due to booby traps; both were evacuated. On 21 Mar 69, B Company came under attack at 0210 hours when B-40 rockets and mortar rounds hit their CP via XT345025. An estimated two-company NVA force attacked under the cover of rocket and mortar fire. B Company suffered 4 KIA and 16 WHA. B Company conducted a sweep of the area after the enemy broke contact and found 7 NVA KIA and 6 AK-47's, 1 RPG rd, 55 AK magazines, and 4 boxes of documents. While B Company was evacuating their wounded personnel, LZ Tracy received 2 107mm rockets. D Company was in perimeter defense and suffered 3 WHA, while E Company suffered 2 KIA and 3 WHA. A Btry, 2-321 Arty had 1 WHA. On 22 Mar 69, A Company had 2 WHA due to booby traps via XT340596. E Company engaged an estimated 3 squads of enemy with negative results. On 23 Mar 69, A Company located a large cache via XT401609 containing 222 82mm mortar rounds, 180 60mm mortar rounds, 1,550 .50 cal rounds, 24 B-40 rocket rounds, 12 B-41 rockets, 7 grenades, 4 B-40 booby traps, 1 AK-47, and 1 anti-tank rifle grenade. On the same day, D Company received 2 60mm mortar rounds, resulting in 1 WHA via XT355045. B Company engaged 5 NVA via XT405050, resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 captured. On 24 Mar 69, D Company had 1 WHA due to booby traps and also found 2 tunnels containing 1 US canteen cover, 1 VC canteen and 2 Chicom grenades. C Company found an ammo can containing an NVA gas mask, 2 anti-tank mines and 2 Chicom grenades via XT365033 and 2 WHA via XT360035 due to boobytraps. A Company also found 1 AK-47, 1 ammo belt, 5 AK magazines, 18 82mm mortar rounds.
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and 17 60mm mortar rounds vic XT387021. On 25 Mar 69, D Company suffered 3 WWA due to booby traps and 3 Chicom grenades vic XT356045. On the same day, C Company found 4 A-frames with detonation wire to three rockets. The rockets were aimed toward a house in which was found 15 lbs of rice, 1 lb of tobacco, and 1000 PSYOP pamphlets. On 26 Mar 69, D Company suffered 2 WWA, one accidental shooting and one booby trap vic XT419127. The individual was shot by a National Policeman. C Company found 2 AK-47s with 6 magazines vic XT419127; also engaged 2 VC resulting in 1 POW vic XT424125. On 27 Mar 69, A Company found 1 107mm rocket vic XT452998. On 28 Mar 69, 1-505 became OPCON to the 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div. On the same day, C Company found 2 AK-47s, 12 grenades and some documents vic XT424104. On 29 Mar 69, A Company had 1 WWA vic XT481060, due to booby traps. On the same day, B Company found 1 75mm HR round, 1 82mm mortar, 2 107mm rockets, 24 Chicom grenades, 2 pistol belts, some M-60 ammo, 500 rounds of M-16 ammo, 40 rounds of M-1 ammo and picked up three detainees vic XT498030. On 30 Mar 69, A Company vic XT481060 found one old steel pot with some AK-47 ammo in it, 50 rounds of M-60 ammo, 50 rounds of M-2 ammo, 2 magazines and 3 pair of sandals. A Company suffered 1 WWA due to booby traps at this same location. D Company found 1 AK-47 with 2 magazines, 1 aid bag, some clothes and medicine vic XT501017. Gunships located 1 concrete bunker, 2 ground bunkers, 3 sampans and 3 gun positions and destroyed them. C Company found 1 decomposed NVA KIA vic XT400032. B Company picked up 5 detainees with old ID cards and also found 5 B-40 rocket launchers and 3 drums of RPG ammo vic XT495053. D Company had 5 WWA due to booby traps vic XT474061. C Company had 5 WWA due to booby traps vic XT447066. On 31 Mar 69, E Company suffered 4 WWA due to booby traps vic XT463101. B Company had 1 KHA and 2 WWA by ambush vic XT494034. After engagement, a sweep of the area revealed 1 AK-47, 1 B-40 rocket and 1 M-72 LAW and several heavy blood trails, but no enemy bodies were found.

On 1 Apr 69, B Company suffered 2 WWA due to booby traps vic XT480049. LFT destroyed 3 sampans and 1 bunker vic XT416123. B Company also found 1 notebook, 1 VC pistol belt and detained 1 female vic XT476042. On 2 Apr 69, C Company suffered 2 WWA due to booby traps vic XT465005. On 4 Apr 69, D Company engaged 15 NVA dug in heavy bunkers, resulting in 8 NVA KIA and 2 AK-47s captured vic XT473045. D Company received fire vic XT474046. A sweep of the area revealed 3 VC KIA. US losses were 3 KHA and 4 WWA. Also, on the same day, C Company had 1 WWA due to booby traps. On 5 Apr 69, A Company found 8-10 and 1 case of small arms ammo. On the same day, C Company engaged the enemy with negative results and 1 US wounded from GSW. D Company found 1 VC KIA vic XT474046. KIA was result of contact on 4 Apr 69. On 6 Apr 69, A Company found 2 57mm HR rounds. B Company picked up 3 detainees, 1 wounded, 1 released, and 1 evacuated, vic XT430110. B Company fired on 5 VC, all of whom were taken prisoner, none wounded, vic XT427120. On the same day, C Company found 2 VC bodies vic XT504037, and B Company found 1 claymore, 15 122mm rocket rounds. On 8 Apr 69, B Company had 4 WWA due to booby traps. On 9 Apr 69, A Company had 3 WWA due to booby traps vic XT495995. On the same day, D Company found a bunker complex vic XT392040 with 6 B-40 rockets, 1 RPG, 3 AK-47 magazines, and 1 NVA pistol belt. One of E Company's ambush patrols engaged several VC vic XT469039, conducted a sweep of the area and found 2 AK-47s. E Company suffered 1 WWA due to GSW vic XT469039. On 10 Apr 69, E Company, vic XT472045, found 3 sampans, many blood trails, and a bamboo pole with blood on it. Also, at this location, E Company found 52 new

Chicom grenades and 2 bags of rice. E Company found a blood-soaked parachute and 3 sampans and destroyed them; however, no bodies were found. On 11 Apr 69, C Company had 3 men wounded when LZ Tracy was hit by about 17 82mm mortar rounds. D Company, via XT451039, found 45 B-40 rockets, 2 Chicom grenades, 1 MG, 1 poncho, 9 bangalore torpedoes, 3 anti-tank mines, 4 anti-tank grenades, 19 82mm mortar rounds, 3 boxes of frags, 9 cases of booby trap grenades, 4 claymores, 18 107mm rockets, 16 blasting caps, and 50 lbs of assorted explosives. D Company had 2 US wounded by booby traps via XT446041 and found 1 enemy body in the same area. On 12 Apr 69, A & D Companies had 1 and 3 WHA respectively due to booby traps. A Company found 1 AK-47 via XT464055. On 13 Apr 69, D Company had 4 WHA due to booby traps via XT454040. The company found a large cache containing 162 60mm mortar rounds, 40 anti-tank mines, 55 grenades, 27 82mm mortar rounds, 71 62mm mortar rounds, and 2 boxes of fuses. On 15 Apr 69, A Company found 64 rifle grenades, 2 20 lb water charges, and 400 rds of 7.62mm linked ammo. C Company picked up, via XT442035, 2 detainees dressed in uniforms with cooking gear and mosquito nets. On 16 Apr 69, A Company found, via XT442035, 1 anti-tank mine and 1 usable 35mm rifle, and 61 lbs of documents. On 17 Apr 69, C Company found AK-47 ammo, 1 US gas mask, and 10 trip wires. Also found were some fresh bunkers and 82mm rds, via XT424093. C Company, via XT404108, found 3 lbs of propaganda material. On 18 Apr 69, D Company picked up 6 detainees via XT398064. B Company had 4 WHA from booby traps via XT413103. B Company engaged an unknown number of VC, killing 1 and capturing 1 AK-47. On the same day, A Company had 1 WHA due to booby traps via XT490030. On 20 Apr 69, B Company engaged a company of NVA via XT459053, deeply entrenched in bunkers and foxholes, resulting in 3 US KIA and 6 WHA. A total of 20 NVA were killed and 1 captured. B Company also captured 2 KA-47's and 1 RPG round. D Company had 1 WHA due to booby traps via XT442022. On 21 Apr 69, B Company found 1 B-40 round and 1 NVA body in contact area of 20 Apr. Gunships and C&C ships fired on 4 VC, killing 3 and wounding 1, via XT396164. A Company swept the area, locating the 3 VC KIA and capturing the WI. On 22 Apr 69, D Company found 1 Chicom grenade via XT580092. A Company found some bunkers via XT492035. On 23 Apr 69, C Company had 5 WHA due to booby traps via XT442133. E Company had 1 WHA via XT419116 from GSW as a result of enemy contact. Unknown enemy results. On 24 Apr 69, E Company, via XT415114, located and destroyed 12 bunkers and 2 sampans. On the same day, C Company found 2 B-40 rockets and 1 VC body via XT424060. B Company found 2 B-40 rockets via XT489067, and later in the day, one of the company's ambush patrols engaged and killed 1 VC. On 25 Apr 69, B Company, via XT464075, engaged 4 VC; enemy KIA/WIA unknown. B Company also found vic XT488055 9 anti-tank mines and 4 booby traps. One of B Company's ambush patrols, vic XT497060, engaged 3 VC - results unknown. On the same day, A Company sank 3 sampans and destroyed 27 bunkers, vic XT381179. On 26 Apr 69, D Company found 6 VC KIA vic XT478060. They also found 3 graves in a treeline which produced 3 RPG magazines that were destroyed. D Company picked up 1 FW via XT472055. On 27 Apr 69, D Company had 1 EM wounded from booby traps via XT465053. On 28 Apr 69, D Company had 1 WHA due to booby traps via XT490054. E Company had 1 WHA due to booby traps via XT412108. C Company found 47 Chicom grenades via XT385020. D Company found 1 B-40 rocket via
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3D4960606 also picked up 3 detainees and brought them to LZ Tracy. D Company, set
up in NDP, vic XT490052, received 10-12 rounds of mortar fire, resulting in 4
WHA. One of D Company’s ambush patrols fired on 6 VC with unknown results. A
Company, vic XT447045, made contact with 3 NVA, killing all 3 and capturing 2
AK-47’s. On 29 Apr 69, A Company had one WHA due to booby traps vic XT453098.
D Company had one WHA due to booby trap vic XT455099. E Company found a 107mm
warhead about 200 meters from the Sugar Mill. On the same day, D Company re-
ceived 2 60mm rds into their NDP vic XT483062. A sweep of the suspected mortar
position revealed nothing. One of D Company’s ambush patrols fired on 4 VC vic
XT490066. A sweep of the area produced some fresh blood trails.

In summary, during the period 1 Feb 69 to 16 Mar 69, while operating out
of FB All American, contact was moderate and scattered throughout the AO. Ex-
tensive ambushes and roving patrol proved successful in stopping night enemy
movement and preventing the rocketing of targets within the AO. Waterborne
operations, eagle flights, and airmobile resource control points were extremely
helpful in preventing enemy infiltration. A large amount of enemy equipment,
bunkers, tunnels and clothing was found during the period and was either
destroyed or evacuated.

From 17 Mar to 30 Apr 69, while operating out of LZ Tracy, contact was
moderate. Estimated enemy forces varied from squad to company size elements.
Most of the major contacts were in heavily fortified bunker areas. Because
of the heavy amount of ordnance placed on these areas after contact was made,
enemy bodies were completely torn up in many cases. Many contacts resulted
in obvious blood trails, although a sizeable body count was realized, the
enemy evacuated his wounded and dead before a sweep and search of the contact
area could be made. Sixteen caches of various sizes were discovered and ap-
proximately 10 tons of enemy equipment, weapons and ammunition were destroyed
or evacuated. Companies were shifted throughout the AO at least every other day
in an effort to deny the enemy his routes of infiltration. Scout teams were
very helpful and effective in providing intelligence against which the com-
panies were deployed. The Bn AO, at times, was as large as 480 square kilo-
meters, thus requiring extensive airmobile operations to cover the area.
During the period at LZ Tracy, the Bn conducted 55 combat assaults and 77
eagle flights. To compliment the airmobile operations, small unit ambushes
were extensively used to stop enemy movement at night. The battalion encoun-
tered many heavily booby trapped areas throughout the AO. At no time did these
booby traps stop offensive movement. All precautions were taken and of the
842 armed booby traps discovered, only 6% caused casualties. The recon platoon
operated with the US Navy along the Vam Co Dong River and were inserted
on the river’s banks about dark, ambushed along the river, and then were
extracted in the morning. At other times, they remained on the boats as a
ready reaction force to exploit any contact made by the Navy. The Navy was
also used to insert and extract rifle companies. Fourteen MEDEVACs were made
during the reporting period; medical treatment was given to 1,890 VN civilians.
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**RESULTS:**

**ENEMY LOSSES:**

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<th>Item Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
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<td>RPD Machine Guns</td>
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**FRIENDLY LOSSES:**

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<td>WHA</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accidents</td>
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(b) During the reporting period 2-505 Infantry, under the command of LTC James V Irons, continued its mission of conducting day and night operations in the AO to eliminate enemy pressure and influence on Saigon and surrounding areas. This mission included assisting the local ARVN Forces in maintaining control, law, and order of populace, being prepared to assume responsibility for a portion of the AO assigned to 2-505 in the event that unit departed its AO, and being prepared to execute assigned contingency plans on order. During the period 1 February to 14 February 1969, no significant contact was made while the battalion was under operational control of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) in the vicinity of Dong Xoai. During the period 1 February to 14 February 1969, the battalion operated in AO Denver, AO Chute, and AO Extensions Red and White. The battalion CP was at FB Harrison XT739052. The battalion's AO was located northwest of Saigon. The area population was approximately 105,987 and consisted of villages and rice paddies. During the reporting period there was increased VC activity in the area of operations, an area that in the past had been used as an assembly area for enemy units attacking Saigon. The 2-505 Infantry conducted both night and day offensive operations against the enemy. Night ambushes, roving patrols, and extensive special night operations denied the enemy access to the area. Contacts with the enemy at night consisted mainly of sensor readouts, visual sightings, and radar readouts. During daylight hours, cordon and search operations, reconnaissance in force missions, and detailed searches of specified areas were fairly successful. There were no large contacts made on these operations; however, on 1 April, D Company while on an airmobile operation in the Anson area (XT820085) made significant contact resulting in 18 VC killed, 1 POW, 6 AK-47 rifles, and 1 .45 cal pistol captured. Defensive operations during the period included security of the Hoc Mon Bridge, XT720147, East Bridge, XT750470, FB Harrison, the Box Bridge, XT783967, and FB Copperhead XT805025.

(c) During the period 1 Feb 69 to 30 Apr 69, the 1st Battalion (Abn), 508th Infantry continued its mission of defending the western approach to Saigon. The 1-508 operated out of FB Hardcore (XT752937). Operations were characterized by recon in force, pacification, eagle flights, and extensive night ambushes.

1. On 6 Feb 69, D Company found four B-40 rockets vic XT69978. Company E searching vic XT69978 along Hoc Mon Canal on 12 Feb, found numerous documents, 150 rds small arms ammunition, 4 A/T mines, cooking and living facilities. On 14 Feb, Co B engaged 7 VC with small arms and automatic weapons fire. The VC returned the fire wounding 2 US. Enemy casualties were unknown. Late that day vic XT69938, B Co found 2 SKS rifles, 1 unknown rifle with grenade launcher, 4 lbs of rice, and some clothes along the bank of a stream. An airborne RCP was conducted by the recon plat, National Police, and Tan Binh 32 on 15 Feb. The RCP made 24 touchdowns, killed one enemy and captured one enemy. Dead enemy was confirmed as NVA.

2 On 17 Feb, Co B captured 2 VC and one AK-47 along with various personal equipment. Two boosters for B-41 rockets and some literature was found by Co A while searching grids X87295 and X87395 on 16 Feb. Co A sighted and killed 1 VC on 27 Feb vic X760150. On 1 Mar, A and B Company conducted a cordon and search of Vinh Tinh vic X708937 which resulted in 24 detainees. The A/T platoon conducted roving RCP's vic X682940 on 4 Mar. They found one BAR with three magazines, 30 rds of AK-47 ammo, and two pieces of paper with names and addresses known in Gia Dinh. Later, vic X686943 the same unit found 1 unknown weapon resembling a flame thrower.

On 5 Mar, vic X682948, the A/T platoon found one B-40 in cannister, one bag of pamphlets, one NVA entrenching tool, two canteens, web gear, and 200 rds of AK-47 ammo. C Company found a small food cache on 13 Mar. It is estimated that this cache held enough food to feed 25 persons. 14 Mar found Co B conducting a sweep which resulted in their finding 6 metal ammo boxes each containing 520 rds of ammunition. The recon platoon conducted a combat assault later that day and found 5 122mm rocket launchers and tripods buried vic X6591957. On 16 Mar Co B ambush patrol engaged a small enemy force resulting in 1 US KIA with enemy casualties unknown. That day vic X704915, the A/T platoon engaged one VC resulting in the capture of 1 AK-47 and 1 AK-50.

On 18 Mar Co C ambushed 4 VC, killing three and capturing one AK-47. In the vicinity of X692922, on 24 Mar, Co D found 2 122mm rocket launcher sights. On 26 Mar, Co D found one Chinese grenade, 2 RPG rounds, small amounts of medical supplies, 2 AK-50's, 4 magazines, and food, clothes and water for two men. Co B ambushes 7-10 VC on 27 Mar, killing two, wounding one, and capturing two AK-47's. On 31 Mar an ambush from Co A engaged 5 VC vic X829965. Two VC were killed and AK-47 captured. US losses were one KIA and one WIA. Ambush from Co C killed 3 VC and captured 3 AK-47's, 9 AK-47 magazines and a number of documents on 5 Apr vic X865923. On 7 Apr, Co D found one 122mm rocket launcher with tripod and one RPG-2 vic X653943.

(a) (c) The 2-321 Arty continued its mission to provide direct support artillery fires to the brigade. Operation TOAN THANG (PHASE II) began 6 October 1968 and continued through 16 November 1969. Operation TOAN THANG (PHASE III) began 16 December 1969 and continues through the end of the reporting period. Btry C, 3-197 Arty was attached to the brigade to provide general support artillery fires. At the beginning of the reporting period elements of the 2d Bn, 321st Arty were located as follows: Hq and Hq Btry and C Btry 3/197 at FSB Copperhead (XT806026), A Btry 2-321 at FSB All American (XT746605), B Btry 2-321 at FSB June (XT250794), and C Btry 2-321 at FSB Harrison (XT736055). On 4 Feb 69, B 2-321 moved by road to FSB Odessa (YT061753) in direct support of 2-505 Infantry. On 11 Feb 69, B Btry 2-321 moved by CH-47 helicopter to FSB Joe (X562652) in direct support of 2-505 Infantry. On 14 Feb 69, C Btry 2-321 moved by C-130 aircraft to Tan Son Nhut Air Force Base and then by road to replace C Btry 2-321 at FSB Harrison (XT736055). On 17 Feb 69, C Btry 2-321 moved by road to FSB Hardore (XT752937). On 17 Mar 69, A Btry 2-321 moved by road to FSB Tracy (XT426092). C Btry 2-321 made two moves by CH-47; one on 27 Mar 69 to FSB Keene (XT438079) and one on 29 Mar 69 to FSB Hardore (XT752937).

(a) (c) During this reporting period Troop B, 1-17 Cavalry performed a variety of missions to include: mounted and dismounted EFP, extensive tunnel clearing and denial operations, cordons and searches, fire base security, resource control points, and reaction missions in support of the infantry battalions. In addition, the troop has primary responsibility for 6 contingency plans in and around Saigon.

1. Three line platoons consisting of 9 ACAV's each and the CP group composed of 3 ACAV's have been the principal combat elements of the troop. In addition one tank platoon from 3-11 ACR was OPCON from the close of the last reporting period until March. From 1 April until the close of this reporting period, two platoons from Company C/4-12 Infantry 199th Light Infantry Brigade have been OPCON to the troop.

2. The largest portion of combat operations were in support of the infantry battalions. Troop B assisted in actions in which 6 VC were killed and 12 captured. In addition, this unit destroyed or assisted in the destruction of 250 tunnels with a total length in excess of 4000 feet. Equipment captured included enough medical supplies to support 75 men, several bags of documents, 4 small weapons caches, and various caches of demolitions including one of 27 Bangalore torpedoes. Most of these finds were in conjunction with the infantry battalions supported.

(a) (c) A summary of the special chemical operations conducted by the 52d Chemical Detachment during the period 1 February 1969 through 30 April 1969 is as follows:

(a) 66 blood hound (personnel detector) missions were scheduled with 50 missions completed and a total flight time of 64 hours.

(b) 350 protective masks were inspected for serviceability during 13 technical inspections.

(c) Defoliation and clearing (burning) operations continued along the banks of the Bach Tra Canal to reduce enemy ambush sites, improve visibility, and increase radar effectiveness. The results as of 30 April 1969 are as follows:

1. A 10-15 meter strip along both sides of the canal from XT753070 to XT776066 was defoliated and burned.

2. A 10-15 meter strip along the north side of the canal was defoliated from XT776066 to XT813077.

3. A 10-15 meter strip along the north side of the canal was burned from XT776066 to XT802072 and from XT812074 to XT813078.
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(d) Non-persistent CS munitions (E158) were employed in support of a recon
in force via N669963 on 25 April 1969 and via N6802092 and N7803087 on 29 April
1969.

(e) Miscellaneous support: Technical inspection of EB CS launchers and
flame field expedients used in base defense at Phu Loi was conducted. A chemical
equipment inspector was provided for the Brigade CSMI team and technical advice
and assistance provided for replacement training and brigade gas chamber exercises.

(f) GBR training conducted by the 52d Chemical Detachment during the period
1 February 1969 to 30 April 1969 included the following:

1) On 6 February instruction was given on the construction and emplacement
of flame munitions and flame illuminators for use in base defense at Phu Loi.
The instruction culminated with the detonation of flame fougasse and ignition
of incendiary flares. Approximately 75 persons attended including all sector commanders.

2) Two chemical equipment classes were conducted at Fire Base Hardcore which
included the operation, maintenance, and employment of the M2 Al-7 portable
flamethrower, the EB CS launcher, and the M106 Mity Mite. Approximately 30 persons
attended each class.

3) Instruction on the construction and emplacement of flame field expedients
for base defense was conducted at Fire Base Copperhead on 15 March 1969. Approximately 20 persons received the instruction.

4) A class on the operation and maintenance of the XM3 Airborne Personnel
Detector (APD) was conducted at Phu Loi on 15-16 April by personnel from the
Limited War Laboratory, Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland. The Brigade Chemical Officer,
Assistant S-3, 518 MIB, 52d Chemical Detachment and 503d Chemical Detachment
(199th Light Infantry Brigade) personnel attended the instruction.

5) (c) The brigade, recognizing that continuous training is essential
in combat, pursued a program to correct any shortcomings which become apparent
during combat operations. Mobile training teams moved out to unit locations
to conduct counter-booby trap and enemy rocket training. Cadre training on
night observation devices and night firing techniques was instituted to
increase the number of kills per contact during the hours of darkness.
A mobile training team from the 18th ARVN Division presented instruction
to the elements of the Brigade on VC and NVA organization and tactics.
Unit training emphasized the proper utilization of weapons in the triggering
of ambushes. In addition to this specialized training to overcome observed
operational shortcomings, elements of the brigade conducted refresher training
in subject areas prescribed in Appendix X of USARV Regulation 350-1.

e. Logistics, Transportation, and Engineer Operations.

(1) During this period the Support Battalion provided supply, direct support maintenance, medical services, and miscellaneous services for all assigned or attached elements of the brigade. This period saw the addition of the 37th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) and Company O, (Ranger), 75th Infantry to the Support Battalion. The mission of Co O is to provide long range reconnaissance patrols in the brigade AO and to conduct surveillance operations. The Scout Dog Platoon works with the Infantry Battalions providing early warning of the enemy and for booby traps.

(2) Organization for Support:

(a) The 82d Support Battalion is organized under the following MTOE:

1. Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, MTOE 29-246T PAC 1/68.
2. Company A (Administrations) MTOE 12-197 PAC 4/68.
3. Company B (Medical) MTOE 8-197 PAC 1/68.

(b) A Forward Support Element (FSE) has been established at Tan Son Nhat to provide on the spot maintenance support, supply and services to the brigade's three maneuver battalions, artillery battalion, and other forward elements. All classes of supply, except V and VI are handled at the FSE in addition to direct support maintenance of automotive, track, engineer, and miscellaneous equipment. There is also a medical section consisting of a hospital, laboratory and holding facilities.

(3) Material Services:

(a) Class I: During the three month period covered by this report, Class I section at the FSE issued its customers 924,504 pounds of perishables and 337,764 pounds of non-perishables subsistence.

(b) Class II:

1. During the period the FSE Class II and IV yard was established as a Service of the Brigade Supply Office. This was accomplished to simplify stock record accounting for expendable supplies. The only materials stocked at the FSE are fast moving expendables; i.e., paper plates, batteries, plastic products, etc. The initial level was established at 15 days of supply. The total quantity of each item stocked will be adjusted as experience is gained with the stock levels.

2 Issues of tropical fatigues clothing continued at a significant level. Issues have averaged 3,500 pair of fatigue trousers and 2,300 pair of fatigue coats per month. This usage rate when projected over a one year period is approximately 9 pair of fatigues for each man in the brigade during a normal tour.

(c) Class III.

1 The FSE opened a JP-4 helicopter refueling point in February. The fuel is stored in 4 ea 500 gallon rubber collapsible drums. The drums are connected to a self-contained 50 GPM pump unit complete with filter separator and two 40-foot 3½ inch discharge hoses and shutoff valves. The Mini-port is used by the helicopters of the brigade operating in the area of operations around Tan Son Nhut.

2 Petroleum products are stored on site and transported to using units in forward areas. Following quantities of fuel consumed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FUEL</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MOGAS</td>
<td>93,000 gal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF-2</td>
<td>77,400 gal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP-4</td>
<td>4,300 gal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4 Class IV: A sufficient quantity of barrier and fortification materials were stored at the FSE for use in a Jump TOC and Aid Station construction. The materials have been earmarked for project Jump and will only be released in the event of a major shift in the location of the brigade. The requirements for barrier material continued as a substantial workload. The following quantities are reported as representative of the Class IV materials issued:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>UNIT ISSUE</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barbed Wire</td>
<td>HI</td>
<td>616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8' Engineer Stakes</td>
<td>EA</td>
<td>8,113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6' Engineer Stakes</td>
<td>EA</td>
<td>12,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3' Engineer Stakes</td>
<td>EA</td>
<td>8,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concertina Wire</td>
<td>CI</td>
<td>3,759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sand Bags</td>
<td>HI</td>
<td>7,998 (799,800 ea)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(e) Class V: The Brigade Ammunition Office processed the following number of issues and/or turn-ins:

- Number of issues: 208
- Number of excess turn-ins: 9
- Number of salvage turn-ins: 11
- Number of unserviceable turn-ins: 23

Certain Class V items remain critical. Items such as L312 (Signal Illumination White Star Parachutes) and other illumination items will require control be placed on both issue as well as expenditure.
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(f) Class VII: The brigade continued to receive substantial quantities of TOE major end items. Receipts of significance were:

1. 2 ea Central Office Telephone AN/HTC-10 II0 AN/HTC-7
2. 20 ea Motor Generators 5 KW and under
3. 5 ea Motor Generators above 5 KW
4. 3 ea Generators PU-532 for use with the PPS-5 Radar Set
5. 15 ea 2 1/2 Ton dump Trucks
6. 12 ea Rifle Recoilless 90mm

Considerable emphasis has been placed on reporting mission essential critical items to the logistical command. There have been a total of 64 line items reported on the Commander's Critical Items List with 17 items issued as a direct result of the report.

(g) Class VIII: Requests from using units are filled at the FSE as required for unit Medical Aid Stations and MEDCAP supplies.

(h) Class IX: Repair parts are received at the FSE from the Technical Supply Account, Phu Loi, and supplied to the maintenance sections as needed. Battalion motor pools and separate companies pick up repair parts from storage bins at the FSE. Fast moving, recoverable repair parts are distributed on a direct exchange basis.

(i) Laundry services were provided to the brigade on contact basis through Saigon Support Command. Clothing is turned in and picked up from the San-Tung Mechanical Laundry, Gia Dinh, twice weekly, in bulk or individual bundles. Vouchers are checked and signed by a responsible officer at the laundry to verify the total number of items clothing laundered.

(j) Bath services are provided by one attached and three organic bath units. Two are located at the Trains area, one at FSB Tracy and one at Phu Loi. The unit at FSB Tracy will return to FSB All American when the 1-505 Inf returns from FSB Tracy.

(k) Graves registration: These services are provided by the FSE. Since the FSE is located near the mortuary, deceased personnel are delivered to the mortuary directly. An FSE graves registration representative provides the mortuary official documents for positive identification of the bodies. He also collects personal property, inventories it, and prepares a DD Form 1076 to turn in to the Personal Property Depot at the mortuary.

(1) Water Supply: A 1200 gallon tank and pump unit, mounted on a 2½ ton truck, continues to operate from the FSE furnishing water to the Brigade Trains Area and the fire bases as needed. Approximately 8 to 10 thousand gallons of water are dispersed daily.

(a) Miscellaneous Services: The FSE operates a collection point for captured enemy equipment. The equipment is segregated, logged in, and held pending disposition from the Brigade S-2. Additionally, a map distribution point is operated at the FSE. Approval is granted for the issue of those maps by the Brigade S-2. Thirty-two individual map sheets are stocked at the FSE. Additional map sheets are available through BSO.

(4) Transportation: Requirements for this period were mainly hauling equipment from depot to BSO and FSE and forward to battalion areas. The provisional truck platoon consisting of 25 2½ ton trucks administered by Company C, 82d Support Battalion, was provided back-up support by the 48th Transportation Group. Total short tons moved is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Short Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land</td>
<td>3,440.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3,440.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) Maintenance:

(a) Direct support maintenance is provided to the brigade by Company C, 82d Support Battalion. Organizational maintenance is the responsibility of the using unit. Back-up support maintenance is provided by the 29th General Support Group. Job Order status for this period is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JOB</th>
<th>RECEIVED</th>
<th>COMPLETED</th>
<th>EVALUATED</th>
<th>ON HAND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armament</td>
<td>996</td>
<td>1009</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal</td>
<td>1395</td>
<td>1397</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generator</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This status represents work received and accomplished at both the main shop and at the FSE.

(b) Repair parts supply is handled through the Repair Parts section of Company C, 82d Support Battalion. The ASL status report for the period is:

1. Request received  11,790
2. ASL issues  4,621
3. Total requests received  9,124

Total replenishment requests 3,339
Total transactions 27,625
ASL lines 3,467
Fringe lines 30
Demand satisfaction 38%
Demand accommodation 78%

(d) Engineer support to the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for the reporting period is divided into six categories.

(a) Combat engineer support for infantry battalions.

1. Mine/booby trap sweep teams.
2. Demolition teams
3. EOD

(b) General construction support for fire bases and bridges.

1. Bunkers
2. TOC's
3. Radar towers
4. Stand off's
5. Field fortifications
6. Helipads
7. Bridge protection
8. Anti-swimmer nets
9. Pier protection
10. Bunkers, towers, stand off's
11. Bridge repair
12. Road repair

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(c) General construction support for the brigade

1. Red Ball construction
2. HQ building
3. Boardwalk
4. Bunkers and stand off's
5. Helipad
6. Conference room ceiling
7. Phu Loi construction
8. Dog kennels
9. Civilian access gate
10. Trains area construction
11. Culverts
12. Guard towers
13. Vehicle grease racks

(d) Engineer equipment support for the brigade

1. Drainage for the trains area.
2. Land clearing in AO Extensions Red and White.
3. Laterite and crushed rock for gun pits.
4. Laterite and fill for fire bases and trains area.
5. Ammo berm construction and repair.
6. Road repair at fire bases and trains area.
7. Waterpoints at FSB's Harrison and Tracy.
8. Miscellaneous earth moving.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 62d Airborne Division for period
1 February 1969 to 30 April 1969.

(e) Miscellaneous activities

2. Construction design and consulting for all brigade units.
3. Construction of dummy radar towers.

The engineer support plan remained the same during the reporting period. At
all times each infantry battalion had under operational control at least one
engineer squad. This support was increased to a maximum of one platoon when
operationally necessary. The OPCON squads were stationed at the fire bases and
provided combat engineer support to maneuver elements when not engaged in
this support, the squads performed general construction work at the
fire bases and bridges. Augmentation from the engineer company was provided
as required.

(f) Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs. During the reporting
period psychological operations were carried out using leaflet drops, loudspeaker
missions (ground and aerial), leaflet distribution, face to face discussion,
and the displaying of posters. Brigade psychological operations were primarily
supported by the attached HE team from the 6th PSTOPS Battalion consisting of
one officer, one NGO, and one interpreter.

(1) The themes most often used in the operations were:

(a) Chieu Hai, (Special emphasis during February - "Return to Your Family
for Tet")

(b) Support the GVN

(c) News and music

(d) Allied Forces are your friends

(e) Rewards Program

(f) Atrocities by VC

(2) Pay One accomplishments during the reporting period are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Leaflet Missions</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground Leaflet</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Loudspeaker</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground Loudspeaker</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audio-Visual Program</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers Distributed</td>
<td>3,425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaflets dropped</td>
<td>2,233,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaflets</td>
<td>24,575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Besides the stated psychological operations, the HE team was of great assistance in providing publicity for the Brigade MEDCAP program, controlling the population during cordon and search operations, providing safety information to the villagers during airstrike operations, and providing quick reaction Chieu Hoi appeals when elements of this command were in contact with VC forces.

(3) In support of the brigade psychological operations, on request by this command, missions were flown by C-47 aircraft and U-10 loudspeaker aircraft from Capital Military Assistance Command and the US Air Force. Additional support came in the form of materials obtained from JUSPAO and the 4th Psy Ops Group and the Vietnamese Information Service which provided projectors and movies, loudspeaker equipment, and cultural drama teams upon request.

(4) Of particular significance in the psy ops program was the Early Word System introduced on C-47 and U-10 psy ops flights. The system works in the following manner: The ground commander makes radio contact with the aircraft via PRC-25. Once contact is made, the ground commander can then have his psy operator, located on the ground with him, deliver the desired message over the PRC-25. It will then be rebroadcast over the aircraft's 1000 watt system. This is invaluable for units in contact in that the message broadcast can be instantly changed as new information reaches the unit commander.

(5) In order to improve the GVN image, emphasis in civil affairs has been placed on the following programs:

(a) Special support of hamlet chief/staff was increased by battalion S-5's through the use of PSTOPS/TVS to assist them in dealing with the people, publicity, reconstruction of offices and homes, and assorted administrative support. This program is felt most important, in that the hamlet chief should be present at all activities in his hamlet so that he and the GVN are given credit for the accomplishment.

(b) Battalion S-5's have provided materials and manpower to construct berms and barrier-type fences around requesting hamlets. There has also been support given the local PF/RF elements in the form of salvage uniforms, flak vests, and ammunition. Plans have also been instigated to assist in the training of the Popular Self Defense Forces in the various villages.

(c) Condolence payments: Ten solatium payments, totaling 20,800$ VN were made as condolence to persons injured or suffering loss due to accidents involving the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division.

3. (c) Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support. During this reporting period civil operations were conducted in three districts of Gia Dinh Province surrounding the metropolitan Saigon area: Loc Mon, Tan Binh, and a portion of Go Vap.

(1) Loc Mon District has a population of approximately 134,160, not including approximately 10,000 soldiers and their dependents from Quang Trung Training Center. This district is primarily an agricultural area. The land is well suited to a whole spectrum of produce. Loc Mon is located close enough to Saigon for the city to provide a ready market for excess produce. Therefore, civil operations in this district continue to place emphasis on aiding the rural economy and repairing important market roads and market places. Also, assistance to, and joint projects with, Quang Trung Training Center have helped relations between ARVN and US Forces.

(2) Tan Binh District consists of seven villages with a population of 345,542. Most of the inhabitants are located in populous villages and are engaged in trade, handicrafts, or industry. The remainder are farmers who live in two villages, Vinh Loc and Binh Hung Hoa. The village of Vinh Loc has remained a primary target for pacification in the District due to the VC activities in the area. Although this period saw a definite decrease in VC taxation in the area, attacks were launched against three newly completed schools and against one hamlet, demonstrating that the local VC forces have not given up on this area. Through a special attempt to involve district village, and hamlet official, the GVN image has definitely been enhanced and these officials have demonstrated an increasing interest in their duties. Special efforts are being undertaken to assist in the training of the local Popular Self Defense Forces and to boost the defenses of the Vinh Loc hamlets in the event of further VC attacks.

(3) Go Vap District, with a population of approximately 364,000 has become very urbanized due to its proximity to Saigon and its subsequent rapid growth. Agriculture plays a minor role in the economy, since almost 80% of the population is connected with industry and business. Go Vap was the scene of extensive military action during the first Tet offensive, and as a result, has a great number of refugees and people whose homes and belongings were completely destroyed. Consequently, in the northwest portion of this district contained in the brigade's AO, civil affairs has been primarily aimed at MEDCAPS and welfare assistance to refugees and orphanages.

(4) The following civil action projects were undertaken in these areas during the reporting period.

(a) Plague control: Through collaboration among this unit, Tan Binh District personnel, and the National Committee for Plague Control, a total of 2,000 people were inoculated against the plague in a three day period at population control points in Tan Binh.

(b) The brigade engineer company completed repair of the road net in the Vinh Loc Complex and prominent market roads in Hoi Mon Dist. Approximately 25 kilometers of roads were repaired. In addition, the engineers completed a road leveling project, returning some 40 hectares of land to productivity, after it had been damaged by track vehicles from the 25th Infantry Division. The engineers also completed defensive berms around the hamlets in Vinh Loc as well as hauling sand, fill, and telephone poles to Vinh Loc for other projects. A training program was also begun to teach the company’s two Kit Carson Scouts the fundamentals of construction, carpentry, and allied skills for the time when peace returns to the country.

(a) During the reporting period the 58th Signal Company and the Brigade Signal office completed a communication net in the Vinh Loc complex, connecting hamlets and defense forces in the village. A telephone line was also established between Camp Red Ball and the hamlet headquarters of the adjacent hamlet for security purposes. Communication nets such as in Vinh Loc can be used for other than defensive purposes. They can be used to relay market prices, accessibility of market roads, and other factors of everyday village life.

(d) Troop B, 1-17 Cavalry continued to support an orphanage and school near the Quang Trung Training Center. Visits are made weekly by members of the troop to reassess the needs and assist the staff. Organic medics from the troop have held a total of six MEDCAPS and treated in excess of 200 people.

(e) Probably one of the most important projects accomplished by the battalion/brigade 3-5 was to assist the hamlet elders in the construction of a town meeting house ("Dinh"). This project is very sensitive and must be approached at the pace of the local people. So far, one "Dinh" has been completed and two others substantially repaired.

(f) Materials have been provided to repair damages from combat actions, fires and to repair hamlet offices in order to enhance the GVN image. During the reporting period eight (8) dwellings, two (2) market places, ten (10) schools, eight (8) hamlet offices, one (1) bridge, and one (1) dispensary were repaired.

(g) Seventy-eight planned MEDCAPS were held in the AO, including AO extensions, treating 13,412 people. In conjunction with these MEDCAPS, a total of thirty DENTCAPS were held, treating 1,656 people. These DENTCAPS were held by either the US Air Force Dental Team from Tan Son Nhut AFB or the 36th Medical Detachment. NIGHT CAPS (MEDCAPS held after dark) were continued in an attempt to reach people who work in the fields during the day.

(h) In coordination with these civic action projects, the following materials and foodstuffs were distributed:

- 35,230 lbs cement
- 201 sheets tin

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- 29 gals paint
- 2,100 roofing tiles
- 7,920 bricks
- 235 cubic meters sand
- 4,696 kits (including health, school, sewing, refugees, etc)
- 7,136 lbs foodstuffs
- 527 lbs clothing
- 865 lbs health items (soap, toothpaste, etc)

Communications

(1) During the reporting period 1 February 1969 - 30 April 1969, the 58th Signal Company continued its assigned mission to install, operate, maintain, and improve the brigade communications system. Significant improvements were realized in all communications means, in operator training, and maintenance support; and a MARS station was established, during the reporting period.

(2) During previous reporting periods, four-channel VHF radio relay systems had been established between the Brigade Main Command Post at Camp Red Ball and all subordinate combat battalions. On 8 February 1969, the 58th Signal rerouted the system directly between Camp Red Ball and the 1-508th Infantry, which had previously been relayed through brigade trains. An additional system was then installed between Camp Red Ball and the Brigade Trains area to provide telephone trunking service to each of the three Infantry Battalion rear switchboards. On 8 March 1969, an additional trunk was established to the 82nd Support Battalion Forward Support Element.

(3) To alleviate the problems caused by the inexperience of communications personnel newly assigned to the brigade, by direction of the brigade signal officer, the 58th Signal established a proficiency school in February, providing the personnel with three days of instruction and on-the-job training before reporting to their units.

(4) During February and March, as equipment became available, FM radio service to the brigade was improved by remoting all brigade and CMAC radios from the radio shelter to the TOC duty officer positions at Camp Red Ball. Also, an antenna frame was constructed for improved separation of the antennas.

(5) Progress continued on improving the brigade secure AM/SSB radio teletype net. Through coordination between the Brigade Signal Officer and USARV C-E, an Electronics Command technical representative was made available to successfully repair the modems, MD-522, which were deadlining several AM/VSC-2 radio-teletypewriter sets in late February. By direction of the Brigade Signal Officer, all battalions stations entered the Brigade RATT net from 0900-1100 hours daily, regardless of traffic, with the Brigade Main and Rear stations provided by the 58th Signal continuing their 24 hour operation.

(6) In early March, 58th Signal personnel at Phu Loi relocated the Brigade Rear Communications Center to a building shared by the AG message center near the Brigade Headquarters building. The move resulted in expanded space, speedier delivery time, and increased efficiency.

(7) Command readiness inspections of Headquarters Company, 3d Brigade, conducted in March revealed the unit's serious lack of maintenance capability. To resolve the problem, on 1 April 1969 the 58th Signal Company assumed the organizational maintenance responsibility (including repair, FLM, maintenance management, and scheduled services) for Headquarters and Headquarters Company radio sets. Later in April, the 58th Signal assumed the same responsibility for the 518th MI Detachment.

(8) Also effective 1 April 1969, the 58th Signal Company established the Brigade MARS station at Camp Red Ball, primarily to enable combat soldiers to place telephone calls home. During its first month of operation, the MARS station has already patched 404 completed calls for troops of the 3d Brigade and 10 American Red Cross emergency calls. An additional 179 calls were not complete because of wrong numbers or no answer at home. Work is still in progress to construct a mobile MARS station as well, which will rotate between the battalion fire support bases, making the service even more available to the troops in the field.

1. Information. (U) During the reporting period the Public Information Offices accomplished the following activities:

(1) Hometown news releases: 667
(2) Photographs with caption released: 32
(3) Features/news stories: 29
(4) Radio Broadcasts: 36
(5) Number of National news media representatives escorted: 7

j. (C) Inspector General. From 1 February 1969 to 30 April 1969, there were ten (10) pre-AGI inspections given which completed the brigade's pre-AGI prior to the USARV-AG inspection which took place from 21 April to 26 April 1969. There were nine requests for assistance processed, three justified complaints, and five unjustified complaints investigated. A trend report of shortcomings was sent to the Commanding General. Coordination with the SJA, AG, and Finance Sections was made to ascertain if the units were receiving and giving support within their areas of interest. USARV conducted its annual general inspection for FY 69 on 22 thru 25 April. Results of this inspection have not been published as of this date.

k. (c) Staff Judge Advocate. During the reporting period the following Staff Judge Advocate activities were accomplished:

1. Total persons punished: 300
   a. E-4 or below: 263
   b. E-5 or above: 27
   c. Commissioned: 0

2. Personnel who were offered and refused to accept nonjudicial punishment under Article 15 UCMJ: 8

3. Actions favorable to persons, ie suspension of sentence: 9
4. Actions unfavorable to persons, ie vacation of suspension: 5
5. Total number of appeals: 6
6. Summary Courts: 5
7. Special Courts: 9
8. Legal Assistance: 36

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF ASSISTANCE</th>
<th>INTERVIEW</th>
<th>CORRESPONDENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adoption and change of name</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship, Immigration, and Passports</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic relations and paternity</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notarizations</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Finances, Debts, Insurance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wills and Real Estate</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.
   a. Personnel. None
   b. (C) Operations.
      (1) Firing Positions
         (a) OBSERVATION. Firing positions occupied by small elements of this unit have been improperly selected at times with respect to observation, fire, proximity of enemy, direction of enemy approach and terrain.
         (b) EVALUATION. Firing positions occupied by individuals or groups of soldiers should be selected so that the enemy may be observed and fired upon before he can observe or engage the friendly position. On one occasion, a two man team occupied a position too close to an earthen berm near a hamlet. The enemy force approached the berm from the opposite side, unobserved by the two soldiers and engaged them with automatic weapons and grenades, killing both soldiers.
         (c) RECOMMENDATION. Troop leaders at all levels will consider the factors of observation, fire, cover, concealment, proximity of enemy force, and direction of enemy movement when analyzing terrain prior to selecting positions. Positions should not be within hand grenade range of any terrain that hinders observation. All leaders should inspect the positions that are occupied by their elements.
      (2) Ambushes
         (a) OBSERVATION. Some ambushes conducted by this unit have not inflicted maximum destruction on the enemy.
         (b) EVALUATION. Actual body and weapon count is far below the number of enemy sighted. FM 21-75 states that a destruction ambush should assault the enemy. Such an aggressive assault would hinder enemy escape from the killing zone and reduce the number of wounded, dead, weapons, and equipment carried away by the enemy.
         (c) RECOMMENDATION. When feasible the ambush force should assault the enemy in the killing zone once fire superiority has been achieved.
      (3) Use of airmobile checkpoints.
         (a) OBSERVATION. During this period, airmobile assets were used to conduct airmobile checkpoints using one platoon of US personnel and National Police teams which were sent to likely areas of enemy activity or to locate caches pointed out by Vietnamese Nationals.

(b) EVALUATION. This method has been used successfully in that it is a fast and reliable means of checking personnel and likely areas of enemy activity.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That airmobile checkpoints be used extensively when aircraft are available.

(4) Roving Ambush Patrols

(a) OBSERVATION. Roving ambush patrols are used to cover large areas at night.

(b) EVALUATION. The use of roving ambush patrols enables a unit to cover larger areas during the night and does not restrict any one ambush to an immediate area. Coordination between units is maintained prior to departing from the starting point. Terrain features are used to coordinate unit boundaries.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. By the use of roving ambush patrols, the enemy is denied freedom of movement and cannot scope out friendly positions.

(5) Joint US-ARVN cordon and search operations.

(a) OBSERVATION. There is a tendency for ARVN units to select too large an area to be adequately searched by the number of troops employed.

(b) EVALUATION. The size of the area to be searched must be carefully considered. It is better to cordon and have excess search troops than not to have enough.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Extensive planning must be accomplished prior to a joint US-ARVN cordon and search operation. In many instances the cordon area will have to be reduced to permit a successful operation.

(6) Movement on mined roads.

(a) OBSERVATION. While on a direct support mission to a task force, one of the batteries in the artillery battalion was forced to work in an area where road mining was a major threat.

(b) EVALUATION. Approximately one hour after a wheeled convoy entered the fire base, an outgoing wheeled convoy departed. The lead vehicle, a \(\frac{3}{4}\) ton truck, hit a mine a few hundred meters outside the gate. The result was one KIA and the total destruction of the \(\frac{3}{4}\) ton vehicle, \(\frac{1}{2}\) ton trailer, and radio.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. When operating in an area where enemy road mining is prevalent, vehicular activity must be stopped until the roads can be both cleared and secured. This would preclude mines being emplaced after the road had been cleared. In addition, vehicles must be sandbagged for additional protection.
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(7) Body, armor, fragmentation, protective.

(a) OBSERVATION. Operating in areas of heavy concentration of booby traps and daylight enemy activity, this unit discovered that some sort of extra protection was needed for point and flank men. The flak jacket proved to be excellent at fulfilling this need.

(b) EVALUATION. The point and flank men, by the nature of their jobs, travel lighter than the average rifleman and, consequently, are not over burdened by the added weight of flak jacket. It was found that point and flank men wearing flak jackets felt more secure and therefore could perform better in their very essential jobs. On numerous occasions wearing of the flak jacket has prevented serious injury from mines, booby traps or enemy initiated actions.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That all units be urged to outfit their point and flank men with protective flak jackets in an effort to cut down on casualties and bolster efficiency.

(8) Mines and booby traps.

(a) OBSERVATION. This unit has recently been operating in an area with a heavy concentration of mines and booby traps. Roads and trails which did not show signs of recent activity were usually mined and booby trapped while roads and trails with indications of heavy recent activity were relatively clear of mines, with trip wire type booby traps set up two or three meters from the trail running parallel to it. In marshy areas with high grass, booby traps were of the trip wire type emplaced on a stake or a pole approximately three feet above land surface to keep them dry. Mines and booby traps were also placed at the natural opening of tree squares. Various methods were used to detect or predetermine these mines and booby traps.

(b) EVALUATION. Among the most effective mine detectors, responsible for discovering 15-20 mines and booby traps per day, were grappling hooks, thrown down the trail and then dragged in, long ropes with heavy weights (155 shell nose plugs), and the pole string method. Using this technique, the pole was held high with a thick white string attached to one end and something of light weight, such as M16 round, tied to the bottom of the string and advanced down the trail ahead of the point man. The string would bend noticeably when it hit a trip wire while not exerting enough pressure to activate the booby trap. Many casualties were avoided by the use of one or more of these methods. In addition, it became apparent that the majority of the unit's booby trap casualties occurred either in the early morning or late afternoon when the troops were not as alert as they should have been.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That all units operating in suspected booby trap areas be encouraged to utilize all available means, to include experimentation with field expedient methods, to detect booby traps. Every effort should be made to

keep troops alert to dangers of mines and booby traps 24 hours a day. An alert soldier is the best defense against booby traps.

(9) Night Defensive Positions

(a) OBSERVATION. VC/NVA elements contacted by this unit did not employ variable time fuses on mortars. However, they would attempt to get an effective airburst by firing RPG rockets into trees.

(b) EVALUATION. When setting up in open areas, a great deal of overhead cover was not needed. When establishing NDP's in wooded areas, positions with thick overhead cover should be constructed. When a night defensive position is in an open area, it should be at least 500 meters from the nearest treeline. This forces the enemy to expose himself in order to place effective small arms fire on the perimeter.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That all units utilize field fortifications to their best advantage, keeping especially alert to the applicability of overhead cover.

(10) Grenade, hand, fragmentation.

(a) OBSERVATION. The majority of enemy contact made by this unit has been made at close range. It has been discovered that troops were sometimes reluctant to fully utilize the fragmentation grenade.

(b) EVALUATION. The fragmentation grenade has proven to be an excellent weapon for close fighting. Hand grenades not only inflict casualties but also produce shock and confusion among enemy troops.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That all personnel be thoroughly informed as to the use of the fragmentation grenades and urged to use them in close combat.

(11) Fighting in Tree-Squares.

(a) OBSERVATION. The area west of the Vam Co Dong River between the Angel's Wing and the Parrot's Beak is an extremely flat open area with tree-squares scattered throughout. These tree-squares are in single rows formed into squares or rectangles. The side of a tree-square may vary from 100-200 meters. The enemy will set up in the corner of the square and wait until someone moves through the tree line into the square's middle. He will wound the first two or three men and then escape in the confusion.

(b) RECOMMENDATION. In order to prevent unnecessary casualties, tree-squares must be approached at a corner and then worked down each side until they are completely neutralized before anyone is allowed to move into the center.

e. Training. None

d. (c) Intelligence

(1) Intelligence positions within Infantry Battalions.

(a) OBSERVATION. The current TOE of a battalion S2 section is not adequate to accomplish the intelligence mission in stability operations.

(b) EVALUATION. The approved TOE for a battalion S2 section is composed of one (1) officer, one (1) intelligence sergeant and one (1) driver/clerk. This section must accomplish such tasks as daily liaison with local agencies, plotting of order of battle maps, recruitment of low level informants, monitoring of sensors, and exploitation of ratters and prisoners to name only a few. If it were not for a very overstrength MDS at Brigade level and the fact the Brigade can send IFW, OB and CI support down to Battalions on a permanent basis, the units could not accomplish their intelligence mission.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That battalion S2 section TOE's be modified to reflect one (1) officer O5-S2, one (1) officer O2 Asst S2, one (1) intelligence sergeant, one (1) Order of Battle Specialist and one (1) driver/clerk.

(2) Personnel Detector used in conjunction with lights.

(a) OBSERVATION. The airborne personnel detector (Sniffer) and light ships with armed helicopters (Firefly) are best utilised in a dual function.

(b) EVALUATION. The best time for flying sniffer or firefly missions is, of course, during the hours of darkness. When the firefly is flown alone with the lights continuously on, the enemy has adequate warning time to hide. When the sniffer is flown alone it may detect the enemy but there is no light capability to illuminate the battlefield.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That a given number of helicopters be equipped with built-in light and personnel detector capabilities. That the concept of employment be for the armed helicopters to escort the aircraft into the operational area with all lights off but with the personnel detector operating. When activations are received by the sniffer machine, lights would be turned on and the target would be taken under fire by the armed helicopters.

(3) Surveillance Task Force.

(a) OBSERVATION. On the battle field of today, combat units of Brigade size and higher must have a centralised organization to control and monitor all of the various surveillance devices available.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for period 1 February 1969 to 30 April 1969

(b) EVALUATION. It is imperative that the Commanders of today maintain a 24 hour a day "watch" over the battlefield. They do this with a myriad of devices to include ground surveillance radar, seismar intrusion devices, infrared intrusions devices and night observation scopes. The commander must have a system of centralized control of all of these devices so enemy movements can be acted upon quickly. Artillery fires must be closely coordinated so communications to all radars and sensor fields must be tied in. This problem has been solved in this unit by developing a "Surveillance Task Force". All organic radar teams have been attached to the Task Force as well as all trained personnel arriving in the unit. The Task Force is under the control of the Brigade S2.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That studies be conducted Army wide to determine the feasibility of organizing TOE positions for surveillance personnel in Brigade and larger size units. These personnel could then form the nucleus of centralized surveillance task forces. Due to the constant changing of battalion areas of operation, it is felt that much more continuity can be gained at Brigade level.

e. Logistics

(1) Storage and protection of supplies in base areas.

(a) OBSERVATION. The only storage area for Class II, IV and VII supplies at the brigade base camp was open storage.

(b) EVALUATION. There was no covering available for protection of supplies once the level A package was opened for partial issues. During the first 10 months of existence of the Brigade Supply Office, the only covered storage was provided by 30 connex containers. Though the containers offered protection from the weather, the major disadvantages of marginal storage and difficulty of identification of supplies added substantially to the workload of the Supply Platoon.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. The supply platoon requisitioned and received a 48' by 100' warehouse building with 16' interior height. Through self-help construction the building has been erected and all supplies stored in connexes have been relocated in the warehouse. This has permitted increased accuracy in storage locations and recording of inventories. The addition of the warehouse to the storage yard will permit more effective support to the brigade.

f. Organization. None

g. Other.

(1) (C) Tactical Communications CP

(a) OBSERVATION. During fast moving operations, or upon the deployment of a task force, no existing single communications configuration is adequate

TO provide all communications required to control combat operations.

(b) EVALUATION. A number of separate vehicles mounting communications equipment must be deployed to support TOC operations. A Brigade mobile TOC has been developed consisting of a 3/4 ton prime mover carrying personnel and tentage and with an AN/VSC-2 (mounted on a 1/2 ton) which provides full TOC capabilities consisting of the following:

1. Six (6) PM nets of which 3 are secure
2. One AM SSB Command
3. 29 line switchboard
4. Ten miles WD-1
5. Power (AC and DC)

Approximately two hours is required to package equipment, gather operating personnel, and be ready for deployment.

(2) (c) Signal Civil Action Team (SCAT)

(a) OBSERVATION. TOE signal units, working in conjunction with USARV signal elements and RF, FP, and Vietnamese civilian personnel have established a limited communications system within the six hamlets of Vinh Loc village. This communications system ties each hamlet chief with his PF and EF defense unit and connects the hamlets together by radio and cable. This system has considerably increased the security of Vinh Loc.

(b) EVALUATION. The "self-help" principle was pursued in the conduct of this project. This undoubtedly produced a strong feeling of identification within the Vietnamese community which has resulted so far in no disturbances of the installation.

(3) (e) MEDCAPS.

(a) OBSERVATION. While MEDCAPS provide immediate medical assistance to the Vietnamese, they have not substantially improved the general health and sanitary conditions of the people.

(b) EVALUATION. An extensive program stressing sanitation and the means of preventing disease is needed.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Units should make an effort to encourage and assist the Vietnamese in organizing a health training program in the schools. This type of program would provide great long range benefits for the people.
(4) (c) Mine detectors.

(a) OBSERVATION. Mine detectors are being used to search for booby traps.

(b) EVALUATION. The mine detector has extremely limited use in locating trip wired EBT's. Trip wires are often non-metallic and well concealed in grass or other vegetation. Even metallic trip wires are difficult to detect, and the insensitivity of the detector head and handle to the "feel" of the trip wire is likely to result in tripping the EBT with the detector head.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Location of trip wires is best done by slow, careful, hands and knees search. Once the trip wire has been located by this or other means, the mine detector may be used to locate the explosive device.
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AVFBC-BB-H (15 May 69) 1st Ind


DA, HQ II FORCENV, APO San Francisco 96266 14 JUN 1969

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for the period ending 30 April 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

B. G. MACDONALD
IIT, AGC
Assl AG

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AVHGC-DST (15 May 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for period 1 February 1969 to 30 April 1969. (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 3 JUL 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. (U) Reference item concerning "Intelligence positions within Infantry Battalions", section II, page 34, paragraph d(1); nonconcur. The organizational structure of the battalion 32 section is not designed to provide sufficient personnel for all the intelligence functions within the battalion. IPW, OB and CI support is available, as needed, from the Military Intelligence Detachment. The referenced item indicates that this support is available and is being furnished. All infantry battalions currently are organized under one standard MTOE. Any change to one unit must be applicable to all. In view of this and the fact that the support is available from the Military Intelligence Detachment, MTOE action is not deemed appropriate. No further action is required.

   b. (C) Reference item concerning "Personnel Detector used in conjunction with lights", section II, page 34, paragraph d(2). Nonconcur that a given number of helicopters be equipped with built-in light and personnel detector capabilities, since dedicated aircraft would be required. The Airborne Personnel Detector (XM 3), now being distributed in operational quantities, and the Airborne Searchlight (ENSURE 260), currently being evaluated in RVN, are designed to be installed or removed quickly from production aircraft without modification to the aircraft. Concur in the concept of using the Airborne Personnel Detector and light ships in a dual function. Unit will be advised of above comment.

   c. (C) Reference item concerning "Surveillance Task Force", section II, page 34, paragraph d(3). Concur with recommendation that studies be conducted Army wide to determine the feasibility of organizing TOE staff positions for surveillance personnel in brigade and larger size units. With the great number and variety of sensor devices currently being employed, it is considered that commanders do not now have the necessary capability to provide adequate centralized management and control over these devices. This is particularly true when one considers the numerous unmanned sensors being utilized. It is believed that the addition of staff
AVHEC-DET (15 May 69) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for period 1 February 1969 to 30 April 1969. (U)

The lessons learned are:

1. Surveillance positions to brigade and higher level unit TOEs to provide this capability would alleviate this problem. Recommend that USARPAC and DA study the recommendation of establishing TOE staff positions for surveillance personnel at brigade and higher level units.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON
C. D. WILSON
1LT. AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy Furr
3d Bde, 82d Abn Div
II FFV
GPOP-DT (17 May 69) 3d Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 | AUG 6:

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

2. (C) Reference paragraph 2c, 2d Indorsement. Recommend that DA conduct a study for purpose of determining advisability of establishing TOE staff positions for surveillance personnel at brigade and higher level units.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

D. A. TUCKER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

Cy furn:
CG USARV

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD Directive 5200.20
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb 69 to 30 Apr 69.

CG, 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division