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AUTHORITY

30 Apr 1981, DoDD 5200.10; OAD D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGDA (M) (15 Aug 69) FOR OT UT 692303

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 30 April 1969 (U)

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

[Signature]

ROBERT E. LYNCH
Colonel, AG
Acting The Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS II FFORGEY
OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED
1 February 1969 - 30 April 1969

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMV
HEADQUARTERS, 11 FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
AIO San Francisco 96066

AFRGC-RH-II

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 11 Field Force Vietnam for
Period Ending 30 April 1969, RG3 COPY - (N1) (N-DNO-TU-A) (D)

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1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

a. Command.

(1) During the reporting period there were three major changes in
the command group:

(a) On 22 March, Brigadier General Burndale E. Huffman, Jr. became
Chief of Staff, replacing Brigadier General Charles Cantrell.

(b) On 3 April, Lieutenant General Julian J. Hwell became Commanding
General, replacing Lieutenant General Walter T. Herwin, Jr.

(c) On 13 April, Major General Walter D. Richardson, Deputy Command-
ing General, departed the command.

(2) During the reporting period there were two major changes in
the staff of II FFORCIV:

(a) On 2 February, Lieutenant Colonel (TC) John L. Kennedy, Jr, be-
came the Assistant Chief of Staff, OG, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Charles
E. Hill, Jr.

(b) On 16 February, Lieutenant Colonel Stephen M. Griffith became
the Assistant Chief of Staff, OG, replacing Colonel Robert M. Atkins.

(3) The overall assigned and attached strength of II FFORCIV decreased
lightly during the quarter. A comparison at the end of the last four
reporting periods follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>OFFICERS</th>
<th>WARRANT OFFICER</th>
<th>ENLISTED MEN</th>
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<tr>
<td>30 Apr 1969</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2923</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Personnel, Morale, Safety, Discipline, and Base Development.

(1) The personnel situation within units assigned, attached, and
under operational control of II FFORCIV remained satisfactory.

(2) The morale of the command remained at a satisfactory level.

(3) The awards and decorations processed, approved, and issued are
listed below.

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The military motor vehicle accident rate continued to decline during the third quarter FY 69 as shown on the chart below. The military personnel injury rate decreased slightly during the second quarter but increased during the third quarter FY 69, as shown. No specific accident trend could be attributed to the increase in injuries during the third quarter.

### II FORCEnK ASSIGNED, ATTACHED, AND CICKON UNITS, FY 69

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1st QTR</th>
<th>2nd QTR</th>
<th>3rd QTR</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Military Motor Vehicle Rate</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Personnel Injury Rate</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>47.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The status of discipline, law and order within the command continued to reflect overall improvement. Quarterly statistics for the 3d Quarter, FY 69 indicate that II FORCEnK assigned, attached and CICKON units achieved decreases in all categories of offenses except traffic, where a slight increase was noted. The decreases were attributed to the vigorous command support being rendered in behalf of command-wide crime prevention programs. Increases in traffic offenses related directly to the greater emphasis being placed on the enforcement of traffic regulations. More stringent enforcement should provide an effective deterrent to potential violators and should ultimately reduce the number of traffic accidents in the TAOR. The FY 69 comparative rates computed on the basis of 100 troops are listed below.
Development of the II FFORCEV base camp continued satisfactorily. The status of significant projects as of 30 April was as follows:

(a) Repair of perimeter defensive positions and bunkers throughout the area was continuous.

(b) Investments were completed around HHC, II FFORCEV barracks and the trailer accommodations. The IGW renovation program was initiated.

(c) A IGW dispensing point was established for plantation tenant units.

d. Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

(1) Intelligence aspects of tactical operations conducted in the II Field Force Vietnam (II FFORCEV) Tactical Area of Interest (TACI) are discussed in the Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by units under the operational control of this headquarters.

(2) Intelligence Collection.

(a) The daily briefing on selected agent reports was continued by Collection Division. The purpose of this briefing, described in detail in the preceding ORLL, is to better evaluate the intelligence produced by human sources and to determine the reliability of the sources themselves. This, in turn, enables the agency which employs the sources to decide which agents warrant retention and which should be terminated. The briefing also enables Collection Division to determine which reports are significant and plausible so that they may be utilized by the various divisions of O2 and considered in the current assessment of the situation. The method by which the evaluation is accomplished is as follows: all

Reports are indexed and filed by the Collection Division. From the total number received, certain reports are selected as significant. These are then forwarded to the Order of Battle Section where the particular intelligence analyst familiar with its subject comments upon their plausibility. Finally, the reports considered both significant and plausible are briefed. Each briefing covers a 24 hour period. A representative from each of the divisions of the G2 Section attends the briefing. In addition to the above, Collection Division prepares a daily summary and a weekly assessment of significant agent reports for the ACoS, G2. A copy is furnished to the Operations Division. The daily summary includes the most significant reports received during a 24 hour period and an analysis of each. The weekly assessment is a discussion of the current enemy situation, capability, and intentions based on the previous week's agent reports. By means of the daily summary and weekly assessment, Collection Division contributes to the finished intelligence product of G2, II FFORCV.

(b) Collection Division is also responsible for ensuring that all necessary Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements (SICR) are published and levied on the appropriate collectors. In addition, Collection Division coordinates the collection of intelligence on specific subjects and keeps subordinate units informed as to which SICR's are current by publishing a quarterly II FFORCV Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements Registry. The Registry indexes all SICR's by number and by collector. During the past quarter 11 MACV SICR's and 3 II FFORCV SICR's were cancelled, while 40 new MACV and 2 new II FFORCV SICR's were levied.

(3) Counterintelligence/PHOENIX.

(a) During the past quarter the operations of the Province Intelligence Operations and Coordination Centers (PIOCC) and the District Intelligence Operations and Coordination Centers (DIOCC) showed a continued improvement as did the support provided by the JVN. Requests for duplicating machines for the DIOCC's have been approved and the equipment is being allocated at this time. These machines will facilitate faster and wider dissemination of intelligence data to operational elements of the MACV/PHOENIX/PERIIDS Program. The BIG VAC Reports originating at the VAC have continued to improve in quality and consistency, which is further evidence of increased JVN interest and participation in the operations of the PIOCC/DIOCC. During this quarter 21 students from II FFORCV OPCON units attended the PHOENIX Advisor Course presented by the MACV - PHOENIX Committee in Saigon.

(b) Continued command emphasis has been placed on the Volunteer Informant Program during this past quarter. The G5 Section's PSYOPS elements have programmed a second edition of the VIP Kit to assist using units in their implementation of the program. VIP results for this period have shown a sharp decline. This decline has been attributed to the fact that civilian volunteers have been restricted from entering forest areas due to the tactical situation during the period. It is expected that with the easing of the tactical situation and an easing of the travel restrictions currently in existence, the results from this program will show a marked improvement.
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(a) The Counterintelligence Section of the 219th Military Intelligence Detachment (Corps) has continued its program of VIP leaflet drops and VIP turn-in points. To date the results of their efforts have been minimal, however, a marked increase in civilian interest has been noted and continued emphasis on the program should provide significant results in the near future.

(4) Ground Reconnaissance. Company D (Ranger), 151st Infantry, began its operations on 23 January 1969 in southern War Zone D and eastern Sub Region 5. It became fully operational, replacing Company F, 51st Infantry (Long Range Patrol) as II FFORCEN's long range patrol element on 15 February 1969. The company's patrols were used primarily in a screening role using saturation patrolling techniques while also providing data for targeting tactical air and D-52 strikes. A total of 357 teams were inserted resulting in 44 contacts, 69 sightings, 26 VC/NVA killed.

(5) G2 Air.

(a) Intensive aerial reconnaissance and surveillance was conducted within III CTZ throughout the reporting period. Full utilization was made of II FFORCEN air assets and requests for 7th Air Force tactical air reconnaissance support (aerial photography and infrared - Red Haze) were increased. In the visual reconnaissance (VR) field, reconnaissance of the III CTZ/Cambodian border and the inner and outer defensive rings of Saigon/Long Binh/Bien Hoa were covered daily. During the reporting period, a total of 16,136 VR sorties were flown in III CTZ, resulting in 1,723 significant sightings and an average of 39 of the 61 VR areas in III CTZ were covered each day.

(b) Aerial radar reconnaissance, utilizing the OV-1H SLAR equipped Mohawk, has covered the entire III CTZ on a nightly basis. Additional flexibility in the utilization of SLAR was realized as a result of combining the assets of the 1st US Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) Aerial Surveillance and Target Acquisition (ASTA) Platoon and the 1st US Infantry Division ASTA Platoon with those of the 75th Surveillance Airplane Company. Patterns of aerial radar surveillance were designed to provide emphasis on likely avenues of approach into Saigon, its suburbs, and the Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex. Surveillance patterns also gave heavy emphasis to the Cambodian Border area, particularly in the vicinity of the Parrot's Beak, the Angol's Wing, west of Tay Ninh City, and in the Fishhook. Locations of moving targets detected by SLAR were reported in flight whenever possible to the appropriate Artillery Warning Control Centers and to helicopter gunships (Fireflies) for immediate tactical response. The use of aerial radar as a target acquisition asset for the US Air Force Gunship Number 3 (Shadow) has also been explored. However, because of the scarcity of Shadows there is not enough data available to be able to make a final recommendation, although the SLAR/Shadow combination appears to be very promising. Ideally, the Shadow would be provided a clear or free fire zone over a known or suspected enemy area. The aerial radar aircraft would be briefed on the Shadow's time and area of operation and would report directly to the Shadow any targets located within the cleared area.
so that they could be attacked immediately. It is expected that the OV-1 Mohawk would be more compatible with the Shadow than with a helicopter because they have similar airdrop capabilities. A daylight border SLAR reconnaissance program has been initiated to study traffic levels and patterns during the day in the areas adjacent to the III Corps/Cambodian border. It is hoped that this study will provide a valuable correlation between enemy traffic across the border and enemy activities in the Republic of Vietnam.

(c) Infrared (Red Haze) surveillance patterns were flown to detect enemy activity, base camps, staging areas and assembly areas within III CTZ. Red Haze surveillance proved to be especially valuable during the post-Tet offensive when it played an important part in locating and targeting against enemy units. During this period primary emphasis was placed on surveillance of the Cambodian Border in the vicinity of the Parrot's Beak, Angel's Wing, western Tay Ninh Province and the Fishblock, and on coverage of War Zone D. Coverage was also provided, almost nightly over the Song Be Corridor, Michelin Plantation, Ho Bo and Doi Loi Woods areas, around Phuoc Vinh and in the area of the Catcher's Mitt and the Tunnel (20344). Possible rocket launch sites around the Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex, and around the Capital Military District were also given heavy surveillance. Due to the extremely dry weather that prevailed during the period the number of false heat emitters was quite significant. These heat patterns, emitted by smoldering logs, small fires, and other heated objects often gave an erroneous indication of enemy activity unless carefully read out by a skilled interpreter.

(d) The Mohawk Direct Support Concept Test ended on 19 March. The divisional after action reports were received by 11 April. Statistics derived by analysis of the data sheets from Phase I and III are being analyzed by the Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) to determine a line of best fit for future utilization of the Mohawk.

(e) Air Force Tactical Reconnaissance Mission objectives showed another 100 percent increase over the previous reporting period. III CTZ received over half of the completed tactical reconnaissance products available in South Vietnam. The entire Corps Tactical Zone was photographed by various sensor systems. The use of High Acuity camera systems at higher altitudes provided detailed studies of enemy infiltration routes from the Cambodian sanctuary. The preplanned and immediate area covers and photo strips along enemy lines of communication proved most profitable. These missions were on immediate call. Also supplementary imagery reports provided by the 460th Photo Processing Interpretation Facility (PPF) (Tan Son Nhut Air Base) and Detachment "A" MIBARS at Bien Hoa developed targets for artillery, ground and tactical air units. The rapid development of hard target areas significantly aided in deterring the enemy Winter/Spring Offensive. The increased use of Air Force infrared detection sensors and night photo cartridge strip photography supplemented Army Mohawk surveillance and detection of enemy forces during the hours of darkness. The results of air strikes developed with the aid of these sensor products helped account for the poorly executed attack against the Bien Hoa/Long Binh complex by elements of the 5th VC Division.

(f) The development of the improved K510A Infra Red Real Time viewer in the F357, contributed to the night interdiction of enemy sampan traffic in the Rung Sat Special Zone and the canals and waterways associated with the Van Go Dong and Van Go Tay. Increased emphasis on tactical response to intelligence obtained by airborne sensor systems required closer coordination between elements of the G2 Air Division and various G3 Divisions of HQ 11 FFORCEN. This coordinated effort directed available fire power on suspected enemy locations, with greater efficiency and effectiveness than has ever been realized before.

(g) G2 Targets Division.

(a) The primary function of the G2 Targets Division has continued to be the development and evaluation of B-52 targets. The all-source intelligence data base and the enemy activity indicators display within G2 targets are being utilized extensively by other divisions of G2 and other staff sections as well as the Targets Division in the development of chemical targets (herbicide and poison dart CS), cluster bomb (GBU) targets, artillery targets, and Combat Sky Spots (Radar Directed Tactical Air Striking).

(b) During this quarter 500 different targets were struck with B-52's in III CTZ. This tremendous increase from the 293 targets struck during the previous quarter is due to the same infiltration and logistic/personnel build-up of enemy VC/NVA divisions in III CTZ in preparation for the planned post- Tet offensive. Of the targets struck during this quarter 57.6 percent were in Tay Binh Province, with the majority of the strikes in north, northeastern, and western War Zone "C" targeted against enemy infiltration, staging, and supply areas of the 1st NVA Infantry Division, elements of the 9th VC Division, and elements of the 7th VC Infantry Division. Other areas which received a significant percentage of the B-52 strikes this quarter were: Binh Duong Province, with the majority of these in the Trapo (ID), a traditional logistical complex and base area of Sub Region 1; Binh Long Province, with strikes directed against elements of the 7th NVA Division; and the War Zone D area of Long Khanh Province, where strikes were directed against the 5th VC Division.

(c) The 29th Chemical Detachment assigned to Headquarters, 11 FFORCEN and under operational control of the G2 Targets Division continues to be one of the principal surveillance tools of the Targets Division, flying approximately 07 hours in this quarter on airborne personnel detector (Sniffer) missions. The detachment also flew an additional 69 hours on defoliation missions, a significant increase over the 30 defoliation hours flown during the previous quarter.

(7) Description and Recapitulation of Enemy Order of Battle.

(a) Description. The Central Office of South Vietnam (CCSVN) remains the supreme political-military headquarters controlling all Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) activities in the Republic of Vietnam. Military units in III CTZ are subordinated either directly to CCSVN or to

one of eight secondary level headquarters in III CTZ. (See Inclosure 9).
There were only two minor changes in the enemy's military-political boundaries during the quarter and the area of III CTZ continues to be divided into 13 major sub-divisions. Sub Region 3 underwent a minor boundary change and regained Chua Thanh District which places Tan An City back into Sub Region 3. In addition, the districts of Phuoc Long Province underwent a reorganization which reduced the number of districts from 8 to 4. Four of the sub regions surrounding Saigon continued to function as political, economic, and military command control structures directly subordinate to COSVN; however, Sub Region 4 was subordinated to Military Region 7 and, as such, was integrated into the military region's planning rather than acting in an independent role. The enemy continued to place first priority on the maintenance of the divisional units and, during this quarter, these units acted as the spearhead of the enemy's offensive. After several months of second priority supply and replacement support, the sub-regional battalions played a clearly secondary role in the post-Tet offensive. In the quarter ended it appeared that these battalions were preparing to play a more important role in preparation for another major offensive by the divisional forces.

(b) Significant Order of Battle Developments.

1 The number and effectiveness of enemy units in the II FFORCEN TACI underwent several significant changes. Four new regiments were confirmed in III CTZ, and the Thu Do Regiment was dissolved resulting in a net gain of three enemy infantry regiments. The number of enemy artillery units underwent a further expansion, marking the enemy's efforts to provide fire support for his greatly augmented and dispersed forces in the corps zone. The number of infantry battalions rose by two, reflecting the establishment of the Thu Do Regiment which are now operating independently, subordinate to Sub Region 4. The increase in the number of support battalions is an indication of the emphasis that the enemy has placed on these units during the past quarter. The table below portrays the combat effectiveness of regiments and separate battalions at the beginning and end of the quarter. Units which are believed to be present, but not confirmed are shown in parentheses. The overall drop in combat effectiveness of the enemy units is attributed primarily to the heavy losses suffered in the post-Tet offensive.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF ENEMY UNITS</th>
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<tr>
<td>31 Jan 69</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
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<td>IIW REGT</td>
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<td>6(4)</td>
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<td>AKD REGT</td>
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<td>2(1)</td>
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<td>IIN EN</td>
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<td>1(1)</td>
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Although the composition of the four main divisions was uncertain at the beginning of the quarter, the subordination of the major regiments had been confirmed by the end of the quarter. The reasons for the uncertainty concerning the structure of all the divisions except the 9th VC Division was the influx of new regiments from II CTZ and the redeployment of units already confirmed in III CTZ. With the advent of the post-offensive, the identification of units and their subordination was clarified by the various sources captured as an aftermath of the commitment of forces. Only the 1st NVA Division has not been confirmed as a maneuver unit since its headquarters remains unlocated.

2 Documents captured following an attack on Landing Zone Grant on 23 February identified the 18B NVA Regiment for the first time in III CTZ. This regiment, which had infiltrated from II CTZ in late November or early December 1968, was subsequently identified by documents and prisoners of war as being subordinate to the 1st NVA Division. In II CTZ, the unit took part in the Tet Offensive of 1968, suffering heavy losses in an attack on Nha Trang, and experienced shortages of food and supplies and health problems. The 18B Regiment is composed of the 7th, 8th and 9th Infantry Battalions. The regimental support elements are the 13th Recoilless Rifle (75mm) Company, 14th Mortar Company, 15th Anti-Aircraft Company, 16th Signal Company, 17th Transportation Company, 18th Medical Company, 19th Engineer Company and the 20th Reconnaissance Company. The 18B NVA Regiment, with an estimated strength of 1300, has been confirmed as an enemy maneuver unit subordinate to the 1st NVA Division.

3 The 101D NVA Regiment of the 1st NVA Division, identified by documents, prisoners of war and ralliers as the unit in contact at Landing Zone Grant on 11 March, has been confirmed in the II PFORGE Order of Battle holdings. It is believed that this unit arrived from II CTZ on 1 or 2 January. The 101D Regiment, composed of three infantry battalions (the 1st, 2d and 3d), headquarters and support units, has an estimated strength of 1500.

5 The 33d NVA Regiment was confirmed as a combat maneuver element in III CTZ at the beginning of the quarter. At that time the 33d Regiment was subordinate to the 5th VC Division. It is believed that in
March the 33d Regiment probably became subordinate to Military Region 7, although this has not been confirmed. The 33d Regiment has an estimated strength of 1250.

6 The 174th NVA Regiment was changed from a possible to a confirmed combat maneuver element in III CTZ in early February. As the subordination of the 5th VC Division became finalized, it was possible to clarify the order of battle holdings. It is believed that each regiment of the 5th Division is supported by a 107mm rocket-capable company from the 56th Artillery Battalion. The strength of the 174th Regiment at the end of the quarter was placed at 1250.

7 Documents captured on 19 February south of Rang Rang indicated that the 95th NVA Regiment had relocated from II CTZ during the latter part of 1968. This unit has suffered heavy casualties since 1966 at the hands of US, ARVN and ROKA forces. The 95th Regiment is composed of the 4th, 5th and 6th Infantry Battalions. The regiment's ten support companies are the 16th Recoiless Rifle (75mm) Company, 17th Mortar Company, 18th Signal Company, 19th Engineer Company, 20th Medical Company, 21st Reconnaissance Company, 22d Anti-Aircraft Company, 23d Transportation Company, 24th Hospital Company and the 25th Support Company. Information obtained from a rallier and a prisoner of war in mid March served as the basis for confirming the 95th Regiment as an enemy maneuver element in III CTZ. The strength of this unit is estimated to be 1200.

8 Documents, prisoners of war and contacts have further identified the 209th (aka 320th Regiment) NVA Regiment in the Fishhook area. This unit infiltrated into III CTZ in the last quarter and had been held as a possible maneuver element. However, various sources have led to the confirmation of the 320th Regiment as a maneuver element in III CTZ, subordinate to the 7th NVA Division. Since the 320th Regiment was known as the 209th Regiment in II CTZ and in order to avoid confusion with the 32d NVA Regiment whose aka is the 320th Regiment, the 320th NVA Regiment subordinate to the 7th NVA Division was redesignated the 209th NVA Regiment in April. The strength of the 209th Regiment is estimated at 1100.

9 The subordination of the 32d NVA Regiment, which at the beginning of the quarter was held as possibly present in III CTZ, has been clarified. It is believed that the 32d Regiment moved from II CTZ into Dinh Long Province in May 1968 and became subordinate to the 7th NVA Division. Toward the close of the year, this regiment moved to Ba Thu to refit and resupply. The unit then deployed to Long An Province in preparation for the Winter-Spring Campaign. The 32d Regiment is composed of the K4, K5 and K6 Infantry Battalions and has at least nine and possibly ten support companies. In addition to its relocation to Sub Region 3, the 32d Regiment has been redesignated as the 1st NVA Regiment, confirmed as an enemy maneuver element in III CTZ and subordinate to COSVN. The present strength of the 1st NVA Regiment is 1350 men.

10 Documents and a prisoner reveal that there has been a reorganization of Sub Region 4's military forces in August-September 1968. The
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1. The 1st Thu Dau Regiment was disbanded as a maneuver element in III CTZ. Its II and IV Battalions were confirmed as maneuver elements subordinate to the 1st Region. The 15th Support Battalion was also confirmed as a subordinate unit. The 5th Support Company, the 234th Mechanized Company and the 236th Engineer Company were made independent companies subordinate to Sub Region 4. The 24th Support Company was strengthened and upgraded to become the 70th Water Support Battalion. The mortars, recoilless rifle, and anti-aircraft companies of the 1st Thu Dau Regiment were reformed into the 36th Heavy Weapons Battalion. All of these new units are confirmed and subordinate to Sub Region 4.

2. The Cuu Long II Regiment, which was last identified as a regiment in May 1968, has been dropped as a regimental headquarters in Sub Region 2. After the May Offensive, prisoners and documents made reference only to the unit's battalions and not to the regiment itself. On the basis of these indications, the subordination of the four battalions (the 6th, 267th, 269th and 306th Main Force Battalions) has been changed from the Cuu Long II Regiment to Sub Region 2. These units are all confirmed and have a combined strength of 1000.

3. The identification by documents and prisoners of war of various elements of the 96th Artillery Regiment has led the 62 II PYORLTY Order of Battle section to confirm the 96th Artillery Regiment as a combat support element. The 96th Regiment is composed of three battalions. These subordinate units, with a strength of approximately 200 men each, have been redesignated the K3, K4 and K5 Battalions. The K3 and K4 Battalions were previously known as K25 and K34, respectively, and are confirmed elements. The K5 Battalion is believed to have been the 332 Battalion and will be considered only possibly present until this is confirmed. The 96th Artillery Regiment is subordinate to the 69th Artillery Command and has an estimated strength of 825.

4. Documents and prisoners captured on 11 March have led to the confirmation of the 128th Artillery Battalion in III CTZ. According to a prisoner, the 128th Battalion is composed of two companies of 60 men each and has a 107mm and 122mm rocket capability. It is believed that this battalion has elements dispersed throughout Sub Region 2. On the basis of this information, the 128th Artillery Battalion has been confirmed as a combat support unit subordinate to Sub Region 2. The total strength of the battalion is estimated to be 140 men.

5. At the beginning of the quarter the 211th Artillery Battalion was carried as a possible maneuver element in III CTZ, subordinate to the
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1st NVA Division. However, when the composition of the 1st Division was clarified in mid March, the designation of the 72d Artillery Battalion was changed to the 15th NVA Artillery Battalion. At present, this unit, with an estimated strength of 225, is unable to be confirmed, but possibly with the 1st Division Headquarters.

16. Documents captured in early April by the 1st Australian Task Force indicated that the 67th Engineer Battalion of Military Region 7 may have been dissolved. Reference is made to a 67th Engineer Support Battalion, presently being carried as an administrative unit in III Corps, which probably arrived in 77 areas of operations in November 1965. This unit was composed of a headquarters unit, three companies (C25, C26 and C27), a signal unit and a reconnaissance unit. It is believed that the 675 absorbed personnel from the 67th Engineer Battalion in order to improve the combat capability in Military Region 7. Until more evidence can be obtained to confirm this development, the 67th Engineer Battalion will be carried as a possible unit subordinate to Military Region 7.

17. The organization and function of Military Region 7 has been further clarified. This command, formed in early 1966, is an intermediary between COSVN and the military force of eastern III Corps. Also it is believed that Military Region 7 and the 5th VC Division coordinated in the Spring Offensive to attack the Long Biên/Sơn Lãnh complex. Military Region 7 has command and control over the forces of III Corps, Sub Region 4, VC adultos province and possibly War Zone D. The 77th Regiment is directly subordinate to T7 and the 74th Artillery Regiment, which is subordinate to the 69th Artillery Command, is under the operational control of Military Region 7. Furthermore, the 33rd Regiment and the 567 Engineer Battalion are probably subordinate to T7. The sub regions and provinces will continue to exist for the control of their subordinate units in case T7 is no longer needed. Military Region 7 does not have a rear service group but the 81st and 84th Rear Service Groups provide logistical support.

18. Information was obtained which clarified the reorganization of VC Districts in Phuoc Long Province during July-September 1966. The number of districts was reduced from eight to four. The new districts are K-16, K-17, K-25 and K-29. The K-16 and K-17 districts were basically unchanged. The old K-14 has been redesignated the K-25 district. The K-29 District Party Committee is composed of the eastern part of the province, K-15 and part of K-16. Each new district encompasses a major populated area. This is probably to provide maximum control of these population centers both politically and militarily.

19. Documents captured in January suggest a boundary change in Sub Region 3. Listed reflect the subordination of the districts of Chan Thanh, Tan Tru, Can Duc, Can Giuoc and Nha Be to the sub region. The inclusion of Chan Thanh District (aka Ninh Phuoc District) in these documents in evidence that Tan An (aka Long An City), the capital city of Long An Province, and the capital district of Chan Thanh are now subordinate to Sub Region 3.

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20. Indications are that new enemy elements are being formed in Sub
Region 5. Documents, prisoners andKill and fire have identified various
elements such as the "Special Mobile Group (Support)" of 150 men divided
into three 50-man cells, the "24 Support Force" of 60 men organized into three
platforms and the "55 Support Battalion". There is evidence that the Dong
Kai Regiment has provided personnel and training in order to increase
the enemy reconnaissance capability in Sub Region 5. However, these
units will not be added to the order of battle holdings until more sub-
stantial information is obtained.

21. There has been a noticeable degradation of enemy air force units
in Sub Region 3 and rise in NVA participation. The arrival of the 1st
NVA Regiment in Long Ai Province brought the relative number of NVA in
the sub region to 50 percent of the enemy force. From February 1968 to
February 1969, Allied operations had resulted in a shift in the composi-
tion of forces in Sub Region 3 from 100 percent VC to 50 percent VC and
50 percent NVA with no rise in the overall enemy strength in the area.

(c) Recapitulation.

1. The VC regions, provinces and special zones in III CTZ controlled
41 local companies and 19 Local Force Platoons. (Note: Local companies
and Platoons with a strength of 40 or under are considered Platoons).

2. The battalions and regimental sized units located within III CTZ
are as follows:

UNIT
74th NVA Artillery Regiment
96th NVA Artillery Regiment
20th NVA Artillery Regiment
56th VC Anti-Aircraft Battalion
58th VC Artillery Battalion
1st NVA Regiment
66th VC MP Base Security Regiment
46th VC MP Reconnaissance Battalion
26 VC MP Guard Battalion
162 NVA Regiment
95C NVA Regiment

SUBORDINATION
69th VC Artillery Command
69th VC Artillery Command
69th VC Artillery Command
69th VC Artillery Command
69th VC Artillery Command
69th VC Artillery Command
1st NVA Division
1st NVA Division
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Table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>101st NVA Regiment</td>
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<td>275th VC Regiment</td>
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<td>88th NVA Regiment</td>
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SReC/ST: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for
Period Ending 30 April 1967, USA CFFR - (AI) (L) (USA-IV CCJ) (R)

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<td>274th VC MF Regiment</td>
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<td>D410 VC LF Battalion</td>
<td>Ba Binh Province</td>
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<td>Dien Song Ne NVA Battalion</td>
<td>Military Region 10</td>
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1. Units possibly present in III CTZ are listed below:

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<td>9th VC Artillery Battalion</td>
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<td>3rd Artillery Battalion</td>
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<td>D1 VC LP Battalion</td>
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<td>D1560 VC LP Battalion</td>
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<td>D1650 VC LP Battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>D1660 VC LP Battalion</td>
<td>Minh Long Province</td>
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(d) Summary of Recent Activity.

The quarter began with the enemy making his final preparations for his post-Vietnam offensive. By mid-February enemy divisional units were moving into the areas designated for the initiation of offensive activity. Activity in the corps zone dropped to extremely low levels in mid-February as the enemy celebrated his Tet holiday in the second week of the month and then observed a cease fire period from 17-22 February. On the night of 22 February the enemy initiated his long awaited offensive. During the last week of February enemy initiatives were very sharp as the enemy attempted to engage allied installations all over the corps zone. In March, attacks against allied units continued and attacks by fire were numerous and heavy. In general the enemy post-Vietnam offensive enjoyed heavier fire support than any previous enemy offensive. The only phase of the offensive which achieved limited military successes were sapper actions. The commitment of major enemy elements was undirected, frequently inept and invariably costly in terms of casualties. The enemy demonstrated that he still had a useful military capability but did so only at the cost of the highest casualties suffered since the May Offensive in 1968. Among the factors which helped to blunt the enemy's offensive were the massive logistical losses which the enemy suffered and the effective placement of B-52 strikes on enemy units as they attempted to move for the offensive. The enemy's efforts
during the quarter failed to bring about the results that he was striving for, but at the end of the quarter he appeared to be regrouping and re-supplying for another attempt to force the withdrawal of US forces and the acceptance of a coalition government in South Vietnam.

2 1st NVA Division: At the beginning of the quarter, the headquarters of the 1st NVA Division was unlocated, and the composition of the division was uncertain. The division was thought to be composed of the 95C and 32d NVA Regiments and an unidentified regiment. On 23 February the 10B NVA Regiment, the previously unidentified regiment, which had relocated from II CTZ, was identified in an attack on Landing Zone Grant. The 1st NVA Division did not play a major role during the Spring offensive except to attempt to tie down the 25th US Infantry Division. On 7-8 March, the 95C Regiment attacked Landing Zone Grant, losing 157 men. Ralliers and prisoners stated that the 33d Regiment had been replaced by the 101D Regiment, which had also relocated from II CTZ. This unit was identified on 11 March in an attack on Landing Zone Grant in which its 1st Battalion lost 66 men. Attacks on the Dau Tiong and Tay Kinh Convoys during March cost the 1st Division a total of 122 men. By the end of March the 95C, 16B and 101D Regiments were confirmed as being subordinate to the 1st Division. Documents indicated that on or about 10 April the 95C Regiment traded areas of operation with the 16B Regiment. The 95C Regiment is believed to have withdrawn to northern War Zone C to refit and replace its heavy losses, while the 16B Regiment moved into southeast War Zone C and eastern Tay Ninh Provinces. This unit lost 102 killed and 6 prisoners in two contacts north and northwest of Dau Tieng on 17 and 18 April. The 101D Regiment is believed to be located in western War Zone C. At the end of the quarter the strength of the division was estimated to be 4,625.

3 5th VC Division: The relocation of the 5th VC Division to War Zone D was generally completed by the beginning of February. The 33d NVA Regiment and the 275th VC Regiment were in southeastern War Zone D and the 174th NVA Regiment was located in west central War Zone D. Various sources indicated that the 5th Division had moved to forward staging areas in preparation for the offensive against the Long Binh/ Bien Hoa complex. A fourth regiment, the 95th NVA Regiment from II CTZ, had been added to the 5th Division for a total strength of 6,650 men. The 5th Division spearheaded the Spring Offensive on the night of 22-23 February with attacks against targets in the Long Binh - Bien Hoa - Bearcat area. It was supported by the 274th Regiment, local force and sapper units. These attacks during the first week of the offensive were not well executed and resulted in a total loss of nearly 600 killed or captured. Following these abortive attacks the 5th Division withdrew to base areas in War Zone D. Elements of the 5th Division were again active toward the end of March. The most significant contact took place on 24-25 March northwest of Tuy Trang with the 3d Mobile Strike Force Command which resulted in 206 enemy killed. During April the regiments of the 5th Division were out of major contact, refitting and receiving replacements. It is believed that the 33d Regiment became subordinate to Military
Region 7 at this time. At the end of the quarter, the 5th Division, with an estimated strength of 4,935, had two regiments, the 174th and 275th in War Zone D and a forward element, the 95th Regiment, deployed in U-1 Province and possibly Ba Bien Province.

4 7th VC Division: At the beginning of the quarter prisoners, ralliers and documents indicated a change in the composition of the 7th NVA Division. The 320th (aka 209th) NVA Regiment, which had formerly been held directly subordinate to COSVN, replaced the 32d NVA Regiment, which relocated to Long An Province. The 141st NVA Regiment was the only unit identified in contact during the first phase of the post-Tet offensive. Its attack on Fire Support Base Kahone on 24 February was followed by similar attacks on that base by the 165th and 320th NVA Regiments in mid March. This indicated a southward movement by the entire division. According to prisoners, allied pre-emptive actions halted this deployment. The 7th Division operations were further disrupted by Operation Atlas Wedge in March, which forced the division out of the Michelin plantation, scattered its major elements and inflicted an estimated 400 casualties on the division. In April the 141st and 320th Regiments moved north to refit and regroup, while the 165th Regiment had the mission of returning to and defending operating areas in the Michelin. The 7th Division avoided major contact throughout the month. The 320th Regiment was redesignated the 209th Regiment, its traditional I CTZ designation, to avoid confusion with the 32d Regiment which was also known as the 320th Regiment. At the end of the quarter, the 141st Regiment was believed to be located in the vicinity of the Michelin. The estimated strength of the division was revised upward to 5,050 as a result of expected replacements.

5 9th VC Division: At the beginning of the reporting period, the 9th VC Division avoided major contacts and remained in its base areas along the Cambodian border. Reconnaissance elements from all three regiments were identified along approach routes to Saigon, but the 272d Regiment was the only 9th Division unit identified during the February offensive. Attacks on Fire Support Base Diamond on 23 and 25 February resulted in a total loss of 206 killed and 3 captured. During March all of the regiments were identified in a number of heavy contacts in the Angel's Wing and Ben Soi areas. Reconnaissance elements continued to be identified along approaches to Saigon in Sub Region 1, Sub Region 2 and Tay Ninh Province, but no movement to the capital was detected. Toward the end of the quarter the 9th Division was again active. On 15 April all three regiments were identified in an attack on Patrol Base Diamond, which resulted in 198 killed and 8 prisoners. The 272d Regiment was tentatively identified in another attack on 17 April, bringing the total loss in these two attacks on Patrol Base Diamond to 216 killed and 9 captured. The quarter ended with a major attack on 25 April by 9th Division elements on Patrol Base Frontier City, a newly established base north of the Angel's Wing, resulting in 213 killed and 6 captured. The regiments will probably remain in their base camps along the Cambodian border to refit and resupply. The strength of the division is estimated at 4,700.

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6 New Regiments: During the quarter three additional regiments were confirmed as having relocated from II CTZ to III CTZ. The 16B and 101D Regiments, which are believed to have arrived in III Corps in December and January respectively, became subordinate to the 1st NVA Division in Tay Ninh Province. The 95th NVA Regiment, which infiltrated in late December, became subordinate to the 5th VC Division in War Zone I. The 95th Regiment has not been positively identified in any major contacts, while the other two regiments have been quite active. Both the 101B and 95th Regiments have assumed the forward position for their respective divisions in order to maintain a presence while the other units refit and resupply.

7 1st NVA Regiment: At the beginning of the quarter it became evident that the 32d NVA Regiment had changed its subordination from the 7th NVA Division to CORDAVCA. This independent unit was identified in Long An Province in mid-March under the new designation of the 1st NVA Regiment. During the month of April the 1st Regiment lost over 100 men in a number of company sized contacts in the Ben Lu - Rach Kien area. The 1st NVA Regiment, with a strength of approximately 1,350, was dispersed in southwestern Sub Region 3 at the end of the quarter.

8 88th NVA Regiment: The 88th NVA Regiment, operating from its base area in the Bo Bo - Boi Loi area, was the only major unit involved in significant pre-offensive contacts. A total of 70 men were killed in three engagements in western Binh Duong Province on 8 and 16 February. In the regiment's only other major contact, the 3d Battalion lost 179 men in a two day battle with the 25th US Infantry Division on 4-5 March northwest of Trung Lap. The unit avoided contact in the Bo Bo - Boi Loi Woods area for the remainder of the quarter. The strength of the 88th Regiment is estimated to be 1,100.

9 101st NVA Regiment: At the beginning of the quarter the 101st NVA Regiment remained out of contact in the Boi Loi - Trapezoid area. The regiment did not take part in the first phase of the post-Tet offensive and did not commit its forces to a major contact until the end of March. On 25 March the 3d Battalion ambushed the Tay Ninh convoy northeast of Go Bau Hoa, losing 86 killed and 5 captured. Elements of the 25th US Infantry Division engaged what was later identified as the 2d Battalion, 1101st Regiment on 26 March east of Go Bau Hoa and inflicted a loss of 53 men. The identification of these battles in the southwestern Boi Loi Woods area indicated that Operation Atlas Wedge had forced a redeployment of the 1101st Regiment from the Trapezoid area. However, there were indications by the end of the quarter that the 101st Regiment, with an estimated strength of 100, had moved back to its traditional areas in the Trapezoid.

10 Dong Nai Regiment: The Dong Nai Regiment avoided major contact throughout the quarter. Prisoners and ralliers stated that a rice shortage and B-52 strikes necessitated the dispersal of the regiment into platoon sized units. At the end of the quarter the K1 Battalion was identified north of Tan Uyen, the K2 Battalion was probably in the An
Son area, the K3 Battalion was placed in the Lai Khe - Binh My area and the K4 Battalion had elements in the An Son, Lai Khe and Binh My areas. The strength of the Dong Nai Regiment is estimated to be 1,225.

11 Sub Regions: With the exception of Sub Regions 1 and 3 and the first phase of the offensive, activity in the sub regions was light to moderate. Activity in Sub Region 1 was moderate to heavy for most of the quarter as the more than divisional sized sub-regional force there exerted its strength. With the relocation of the 1st NVA Regiment to Long An Province, activity increased in April in Sub Region 3. Of the main force units, the 268th VC Main Force Battalion of Sub Region 1 suffered the heaviest losses in several March and April contacts. This activity was believed to be a possible screen for the southern movement of other units. Sub Region 1 was also the scene of the enemy’s most successful attack. On 26 February the perimeter of the Cu Chi Base Camp was breached by a newly organized task force type 3d Sapper Battalion, resulting in the destruction of several helicopters at a loss of 31 killed and 7 captured.

(a) VC/NVA Battle Losses.

(a) Overall Personal and Material Losses:

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<th></th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>FW</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>FW</th>
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<th>SA</th>
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<td>1501</td>
<td>480</td>
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(b) Losses in Caches. One of the major factors which caused the failure of the post-Tet offensive was the discovery by allied forces of large quantities of food and material in enemy caches. The enemy’s supply system, based on the clandestine movement of material and caches in intermediate and forward areas, although a potential weakness, has worked with notable success in the past. During the past quarter, however, allied operations have uncovered an unprecedented amount of material in enemy caches, including munitions, weapons and food.

MATERIEL CAPTURED FROM ENEMY CACHES

February - April 1969

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<td>122mm Rockets</td>
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<td>107mm Rockets</td>
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SUMMARY
Operational Report of Headquarters, 11 Field Force Vietnam for
Period Ending 30 April 1969, FG3 CARO - (EH) (W-BH-70-A(V)

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<td>661,066</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades</td>
<td>4066</td>
<td>3691</td>
<td>1663</td>
<td>9260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine and Booby Traps</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>1350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Weapons</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>1564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew Served Weapons</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice (tons)</td>
<td>674.6</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>200.4</td>
<td>947.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The impact of these losses played an important role in keeping the enemy from providing the massive fire support that he had planned for his offensive. In addition, the loss of this enormous quantity of rice had a sharp effect on enemy morale. This quantity of rice would have provided more than one million daily rations, enough to have fed all the enemy in III CTZ for almost one third of the period.

(9) VN/HVA Tactics.

(a) During the quarter the enemy was concerned with positioning his forces in a posture commensurate with his offensive intentions. A large number of men and supplies was moved in preparation for the corps wide offensive. Final preparation involved the deployment of forces into forward staging areas. After the major thrusts, these forces were withdrawn to intermediate areas to refit and resupply. However, one regiment from each of the main divisions was kept in a forward position to maintain an enemy presence.

(b) In this quarter there was a continued emphasis on snapper capability as more units were formed and trained as snapper teams. The enemy's emphasis on snapper units paid dividends during the post-Tet offensive when the most successful element of the offensive was snapper attacks as illustrated by the destructive attack on Cu Chi Base Camp by a snapper unit operating under the direct control of CUSB.

(c) During the reporting period the enemy broadened his fire support base. During the post-Tet offensive the enemy enjoyed a higher area of fire support than he had in any previous offensive. However, captured documents indicated that the enemy had planned to provide more fire support than he actually did. The enemy's intentions were thwarted in large measure by allied operations which captured many mortar rounds during the period than the enemy fired. Other innovations in fire support which the enemy employed during this quarter were continued use
of over-sized rockets, CS gas in limited quantities, and for two weeks time he used 107mm rockets as a direct fire weapon. The 60mm and 81mm mortars remained the enemy’s primary ordnance for attacks by fire with rockets playing an important, if secondary role. The enemy made wide use of attacks by fire in March and April as a means of maintaining offensive momentum at minimum cost.

(10) Enemy Capability, Vulnerabilities, and Relative Probability of Adoption at the End of the Quarter.

(a) Capabilities.

1 The enemy is capable of launching multi-battalion sized ground attacks throughout the corps zone. Attacks may be supported by rockets and mortar fire and suppress action.

2 The enemy is capable of widespread simultaneous attacks against province and district capitals, and fire support bases.

3 The enemy is capable of conducting multi-battalion sized ground attacks against the periphery of the CID, utilizing sub-regional battalions.

4 The enemy is capable of increasing the intensity and frequency of attacks by rocket, mortar, and direct fire heavy weapons against selected targets throughout III CTZ and military targets in the CID.

5 The enemy is capable of harassing installations and intensifying LOC Interdiction throughout III CTZ, for limited periods of time.

6 The enemy is capable of increasing terrorist, sabotage, and assassination activities in the CID and throughout the CTZ.

7 The enemy is capable of conducting propaganda, subversion, sabo-
tage, espionage, and political efforts throughout III CTZ.

8 The enemy is capable of withdrawing to out-of-country sanctuaries for the purpose of avoiding allied efforts and operations.

9 The enemy is capable of withdrawing to out-of-country sanctuaries for the purpose of avoiding allied efforts and operations.

10 The enemy is capable of positioning forces in forward base areas throughout III CTZ in order to support his efforts to subvert the population of such areas.

(b) Vulnerabilities.

1 Concentration of enemy forces are vulnerable to detection by various means of reconnaissance activity and to destruction by air, artillery or ground action.
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2. Enemy movement is vulnerable to interdiction by allied ground, artillery, and air strikes.

1. The enemy's supply system, particularly his caches, is vulnerable to discovery by allied operations.

2. The infrastructure is vulnerable to aggressive allied action.

(c) Relative Probability of Adoption at the End of the Quarter.

1. The enemy has designated the period 1-19 May as an "Emulation Campaign" period during which enemy units will commemorate Ho Chi Minh's birthday on 19 May. It is in the purpose of this campaign to prepare for the Summer Offensive, and it is expected that enemy activity will increase during the period.

2. The Summer Offensive is not considered by the enemy to be a decisive operation but is planned as an intensive military campaign to force the withdrawal of US forces and the acceptance of a coalition government. During this campaign the sub-regional forces, with the support of the enemy's divisional forces, are expected to attack the Capital Military District. The bulk of the divisional forces will operate in the intermediate area away from the capital attempting to tie down allied forces and keep the supply and replacement routes open to the Saigon front.

1. In the event that the Summer Campaign fails to accomplish its goals, CSONN will still retain a large portion of its divisional strength as a base for bargaining or occupation later in the year.


(1) General.

(a) During the reporting period II FFORCEN completed Phase II of Campaign Tuan Thang, and initiated Phase III. Operations throughout the III CTZ to locate and destroy enemy forces and to interdict infiltration routes continued. Throughout the III CTZ the enemy failed to achieve any significant tactical successes. Reports and documents revealed that a prolonged winter-spring offensive had been planned. Initial ground attacks were uncoordinated and failed. Since late February, the so-called offensive has been characterized by localized attacks by fire and ground attacks. The frequency of the attacks had diminished by the end of March that the offensive appeared to have terminated. In mid-March, a decision was made to coordinate the activity of major US commands in position along the Saigon River Corridor. Intelligence indicated extensive development of this area by elements of the 1st and 7th NVA Divisions. The focal point of the operation was the Michelin Plantation. Because of its economic importance it had been protected from D-52 strikes. On 18 March a ten battalion force from the 1st Infantry, 1st Cavalry, and 25th Infantry Divisions moved into position.

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around the Michelin as tank-infantry tank forces swept through the plantation. Heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy as he was forced out of the area and his supplies and base area were destroyed.

Following this operation, the 1st Cavalry Division deployed all three of its brigades in War Zone C, north of Tay Ninh City and east to the Fishhook. The 11th ACR (-1 squadron) was placed OPCON to the 1st Cavalry Division, and conducted operations in eastern War Zone C. The 25th Infantry Division assumed responsibility for the An Loc's Wing area and continued to operate in Hau Nghia, Tay Ninh and western Binh Duong Provinces. The 1st Infantry Division moved one brigade into the An Loc Song Be area, across the northern portion of III CTZ. The remainder of the division continued to operate primarily in Binh Duong Province, with emphasis on pacification of the densely populated southern area. The project to reopen ground lines of communications from Hau Nghia to Song Be continued. Operations consisted of combined efforts on the part of US and ARVN forces to clear the area along the road, replace bridges and culverts, and construct defensive positions to restore military and civilian traffic. The 9th Infantry Division continued offensive operations in the III CTZ with one brigade, and in the IV CTZ with two brigades. The division conducted operations Speedy Express and Quyet Thang in the IV CTZ under the operational control of the Commanding General, Delta Military Assistance Command. The Capital Military Assistance Command continued operations in and around the Capital Military District with the 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light) and the 3rd Brigade, 62d Airborne under its operational control. The 1st Australian Task Force continued operations in the southeastern portion of III CTZ. The Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force, reinforced by the arrival of its 2d Brigade in February, conducted offensive and security operations in the regions surrounding its base camp at Bearcat and to the west in the Phuoc Trach area. The 3d Mobile Strike Force Command employed its three battalions on reconnaissance in force efforts in War Zone D. At the close of this reporting period, II FFORCEN combat operations and quick reaction to intelligence continued to limit the ability of the enemy to wage large scale offensive actions.

(b) Results of Operations in the III CTZ.

1 Significant results of the United States and Free World Military Assistance Forces (US/FWMAF) participation in Campaign Toan Thang during February, March, and April were: 795 US/FWMAF killed (770 US, 8 Australians, 17 Thais); 4,965 wounded (4,659 US, 84 Australians, 202 Thais, 11 New Zealanders, 2 USN); 2 US missing; 10,971 enemy killed; 419 enemy captured. In addition, enemy losses included 3,102 small arms; 785 crew served weapons; 644,603 rounds of small arms ammunition; 20,556 high explosive rounds; 55 122mm rockets; 1,420 mines; 6,945 grenades; and 896.75 tons of rice either captured or destroyed.

2 Final cumulative results of Campaign Toan Thang, Phase II, which ended at 2400 hours on 16 February, were: 1,675 US/FWMAF killed (1,797 US, 43 Australians, 32 Thais, 3 New Zealanders), 29 US missing; 10,861 enemy killed; 10,453 US, 211 Australians, 174 Thais, 11 New Zealanders, 12 USN); 17,015 enemy captured. Other major enemy
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Losses included 5,088 small arms; 1,129 crew served weapons; 2,068,401 rounds of small arms ammunition; 33,502 high explosive rounds; 365 122mm rockets; 4,190 mines; 19,107 grenades; and 1,489.20 tons of rice, which were either captured or destroyed.

Cumulative results of Campaign Toan Thang, Phase III, which began at 0001 hours on 17 February, included 666 US/FWMAF killed (649 US, 12 Australian, 12 Thai); 4,222 wounded (3,960 US, 961 Australians, 169 Thais, 11 New Zealanders, 1 US); 9,802 enemy killed, 366 captured. Enemy losses included 2,607 small arms; 18,062 high explosive rounds; 712 crew served weapons; 731,090 rounds of small arms ammunition; 5 122mm rockets; 1,006 mines; 6,214 grenades; and 607.22 tons of rice, which were either captured or destroyed.

(2) Summary of Combat Operations.

(a) The 1st Infantry Division. The 1st Infantry Division continued Operation Toan Thang, and conducted reconnaissance in force and night patrol operations to deny enemy base area utilization, interdict infiltration to the south, and disrupt enemy logistic operations. Ground and air reconnaissance was conducted in the Bien Hoa-Saigon rocket belt to hamper enemy rocket and mortar activity. The first part of the quarter was one of low activity to include a lull over the Tet period. The enemy began his post-Tet offensive by conducting massive attacks by fire and selected ground attacks against US and FWMAF targets. The 1st Division conducted thrusts in the Thu Duc District; in the Trapezoid, and later in the Michelin. Combined operations with the 5th ARVN Division elements increased. The 1st Infantry Division conducted several coordinated operations with the 25th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division. These operations were characterized by ground operations. The 1st Brigade continued the effort to open a land line of communication to Song Be, which began on 15 January. This was a combined operation using US land clearing forces, with the bulk of the engineer and troop effort provided by elements of ARVN. The 2d Brigade continued the pacification program through population control and rice denail operations in the Bi An-Hu Loi area and continued to hamper enemy logistic operations and to neutralize VCI in the area. The 3d Brigade continued pacification operations in the vicinity of An Dien and Chanh Lau areas and continued rice denail and VCI neutralization operations in those areas. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment continued VCI neutralization and civil affairs programs in the eastern Tan Son - Cat Chanh Hitt area. The 1st Brigade conducted extensive land clearing along Highway 14 between Phuoc Vinh and Dong Xoai in combined operations with the 9th Regiment, 5th ARVN Division. The brigade conducted ambush patrolling in the Iron Triangle - Trapezoid area to deny the enemy use of the area and to prevent enemy night movement. The patrolling activity resulted in 100 enemy killed, 2 prisoners, and 47 individual weapons, 206 grenades, 2,850 rounds of small arms ammunition, and 12 mines captured. Phase 1 of the Song Be road operation was completed and the road was cleared from Phuoc Vinh to Dong Xoai. At 1405 hours on 24 February in the vicinity of Thu Duc, a hunter killer team spotted an enemy force. Two companies were inserted with gunship support and a fire fight.
followed. The contact continued until through 3 March with 5 companies participating and resulted in 73 enemy killed and 10 prisoners taken.

On 26 February, a troop from the 11th ACR assisted in defending III Corps Headquarters and the Bien Hoa Air Base against an enemy attack. On 12 March, the 1st Brigade relocated from Tai Kho to Quan Loi Base Camp and assumed responsibility for the area of Loc Minh, An Loc - Quan Loi, and Song Be to include base camps located along Highway 13, Quan Loi base camp, FSB Buttons, and overwatch of SF/GID. On 18 March, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was designated as the force to deploy and attack the elements of the 7th NVA Division in the Michelon Plantation. The 11th ACR engaged the 320th HVA Regiment and killed nearly 400 enemy as part of Operation ATLAS WEDGE. On 18 March at 1600 hours approximately 2 kilometers northwest of Ap So (XT575555), H/3-11th Cavalry engaged an enemy force of unknown size with the enemy returning the fire and breaking contact at 1915 hours. A search of the area located 34 enemy dead, 5 prisoners, 4 crew served weapons, and 1 HJ round. There were no friendly casualties. On 18 March the 1st Infantry Division accounted for 126 enemy dead in various contacts.

At 1100 hours on 18 March approximately 4 kilometers north of Ap So (XT595575), the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment received fire from an enemy force of unknown size. The unit returned fire, supported by artillery, light fire teams, tactical air, and Spooky. The contact resulted in 74 enemy killed, and 5 small arms weapons captured, with 1 US killed, 12 wounded, and 3 tanks destroyed. An operation was conducted and coordinated by the 1st Infantry Division in the Trapezoid area on 23 March to destroy major enemy forces located there. The use of B-52 strikes, numerous air-strikes using special munitions, and intensive artillery fire characterized this operation and the combination of these drove the enemy into special killing zones. Ground forces were used to exploit the coordinated fire and air support. This operation was successful in reducing enemy movement toward Saigon. At 1023 hours on 30 March approximately 10 kilometers northeast of Tri Tam (XT560555), TF Hapski (C/1-11th Infantry and elements of the 1-4th Cavalry) received fire from an enemy force of unknown size. Fire was returned, with artillery, tactical air, and a hunter killer team support. Contact continued until 1135 hours and the results were 31 enemy killed and 3 individual weapons captured. Friendly casualties were 8 US killed and 7 wounded, with 4 vehicles damaged. In scattered actions during April the division killed 202 enemy and captured 31. Division casualties were 37 killed and 251 wounded.

(b) The 1st Cavalry Division. The 1st Cavalry Division continued operations to interdict enemy infiltration routes through Tay Ninh, Kien Tuong, Kinh Long, and Phuoc Long Provinces and to destroy enemy forces within these areas. In early February the division extended its operations into Bien Hoa Province and War Zone D. During the quarter, the division relocated its combat power several times in response to information gained by the intelligence program and in order to maintain units between the enemy and his targets. The majority of forces moved from the northern tier of Sheridan Sabre AO to the southern section. Also, forces were deployed in the Cheyenne Sabre AO to block enemy infiltration of personnel and equipment. The division continued to secure lines of
communications in its area and provided assistance and support to other
VNAP units and indigenous personnel. The 1st Brigade continued operations
to interdict and destroy enemy forces infiltrating from Cambodia through
Base Area 355 and south of Parrot's Beak (X350390) in NAVUJU WARRON II.
The 2d Brigade continued operations in the vicinity of Fishhook
(X357090), secured Route QL-15 within the sector, and conducted
reconnaissance in force operations in rubber plantations near populated
areas. The 3d Brigade continued ground and air mobile operations against
the Sergi's Jungle Highway and Adam's Road infiltration routes. The
division also employed extensive psychological operations throughout
the quarter. On 7 February between 1100 and 1300 hours, 10 kilometers
north of LZ GRANT (X368627), A/2-12th Cavalry located 54,000 pounds
of rice, 50 B-41 rockets, 20 B-40 rockets, 15 57mm RR rounds, 15 bicycles,
and 4 82mm mortar rounds while searching a bunker complex. At 1200
hours on 12 February in the vicinity of Ap Long Ba (XT045145), B/1-9
Cavalry was inserted to extract the crew from a downed helicopter.
The troop received heavy enemy fire and engaged the enemy force. After
the troop was extracted, air strikes and artillery were called in. The
contact resulted in 66 enemy killed, 2 US wounded, 1 helicopter destroyed,
and 1 damaged. At 0930 hours on 26 February approximately 5 kilometers
east of Tri Tam (X356475), A-5th Cavalry contact resulted in 15 enemy
killed, with 16 US wounded. Other enemy losses were 1 rocket launcher,
1 small arms weapon, 7 82 rounds, and 2 mines captured. At 1345 hours
on 27 February approximately 11 kilometers northeast of Bien Hoa (XT
022622), A/2-7th Cavalry received small arms fire from a well camouflaged
position. The company engaged the enemy with small arms and called in
artillery and C/1-9 Cavalry. Results of the contact were 30 enemy killed
with friendly losses of 1 US killed and 17 wounded. At 1145 hours on
4 March approximately 10 kilometers north of Tong Le Chon (X359090),
the 1-9th Cavalry engaged an enemy force and, with support of artillery
and air strikes, killed 35 enemy. There were no friendly casualties.
On 6 March at 0030 hours in the vicinity of LZ Grant, the 2-12th Cavalry
received a ground attack from an enemy battalion size force. The contact
broke at 0615 hours. The results of the contact were 157 enemy killed,
2 prisoners, and 23 small arms, 8 crew served weapons, 2 flame throwers,
45 82 rounds, 10,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 7 grenades, and 4
bengalite torpedoes captured. Friendly losses were 15 US killed, 19
wounded, and 1 howitzer damaged. On 9 March at 0316 hours approximately
5 kilometers south of Phuoc Lom (XT349154), B/2-5th Cavalry received a
mortar and ground attack from an estimated battalion size enemy force.
Company C manoeuvred into the contact area and one platoon of Company A,
1-8th Cavalry, placed OP CON to the 2-5th Cavalry at 0026 hours, conducted
a combat assault to screen between Company B and the Cambodian border.
Results of the action were 36 enemy killed, 1 prisoner, and 2 small arms,
156 rounds of small arms ammunition, 2 grenades, and 1 gas mask captured.
Friendly losses were 14 US killed and 31 wounded. At 0145 hours on 11
March in the vicinity of LZ Grant the 2-12th Cavalry received a heavy
mortar, rocket, and ground attack from three directions by an estimated
enemy battalion. Support for the 2-12th Cavalry was provided by Spooky,
Shadow, and helicopter gunships. Contact was broken at 0330 hours and
resulted in 62 enemy killed, 2 prisoners, and 13 small arms and 2 crew
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Several weapons captured. Friendly losses were 5 US killed and 27 wounded. On 11 March at 1014 hours approximately 12 kilometers northeast of Tri Tam (XT583532), the 1-5th Cavalry located a bunker complex containing 500 pounds of rice, 6 6-40 rocket chargers, 6 inches of documents, and assorted military equipment. On 14 March at a river bank southeast of LZ Tracy, D/1-8th Cavalry located a cache containing 486 rocket rounds, 1,053 82mm and 1,100 60mm mortar rounds, 323 recoilless rifle rounds, 25,076 rounds of small arms ammunition, 1,314 grenades, 40 mines, and miscellaneous military equipment. On 16 March, the 1-5th Cavalry located 630 82mm rocket rounds in a bunker complex and B/2-5th Cavalry found 32,000 pounds of rice. During March, the 1st Cavalry Division accounted for 1,128 enemy killed and 26 prisoners. The division's casualties were 148 killed and 704 wounded. The month of April was characterized by light and scattered contacts. On 15 April, the 2-5th Cavalry located a cache containing 6.5 tons of rice and 1.5 tons of salt.

(c) The 25th Infantry Division. The 25th Infantry Division continued Operation TOAN THANG during the reporting period. The 1st Brigade continued operations in TAY NINH Province; the 2d Brigade units operated generally in the Cu Chi area; and the 3d Brigade operated in the Dau Tieng area. The 1st Brigade forces were located to provide for the defense of TAY NINH and Dau Tieng Base Camps, to include the Tay Ninh laterite pit, Bau Co, the rock crusher, signal facility, and fire support bases in the TAOI. Airmobile operations were used to locate and destroy enemy forces. Air- and tactical air strikes were employed in an economy of force role and were exploited by artillery and/or the employment of ground troops. The 2d and 3d Brigades, in conjunction with the 25th ARVN Division, HLV/RF units, and the National Police, conducted combined and unilateral offensive operations within their TAOI's. The brigades conducted reconnaissance in force operations and located and destroyed many enemy ammunition and food supplies through the employment of scout dog teams. Land clearing operations removed the jungle from many of the areas previously used for enemy base camps and supply caches. US battalion elements and ARVN battalions conducted joint operations consisting of cordon and search, combat assaults, and reconnaissance in force missions. On 2 February at 1200 hours approximately 6 kilometers north of Huu Thien (XT593313), a contact by the 3-4 Cavalry resulted in 30 enemy killed, with one US killed and 16 wounded. Operation WHEELER PLACE, which began on 22 January, ended on 3 February. This operation, during which the 2-3d Infantry, 199th Infantry Brigade was OPCON to the 2d Brigade and which was conducted in conjunction with the 7th ARVN Infantry Regiment and the Puoc Hoa District Headquarters, was a cordon and search of Phu Hoa Dong village over an extended period of time. The major results of the operation were 39 enemy killed, 8 prisoners, and 44 HE rounds and 979 rounds of small arms ammunition captured. The 2d Brigade destroyed 251 tunnels and 32 bunkers. A total of 6,031 personnel were screened and 122 detained. On 19 February air strikes in support of the 1st Brigade operations resulted in 107 tons of rice being destroyed. On 23 February at 0105 hours at Dau Tieng Base Camp (XT493473), the 3d Brigade received fire from an enemy force, followed by a ground attack. The brigade returned fire, supported by artillery, light fire teams, Spooky, and air strikes, which resulted in 73 enemy killed, 14 prisoners, and 25 rifles.
6 rocket launchers, and 142 HE rounds captured. Friendly losses were 5 US killed and 31 wounded. At 0220 hours on 2 February, elements of 3/5/27th Infantry received rounds of small arms, automatic weapons, RPG, and mortar fire in the vicinity of Patrol Base Diamond, located west of Ap Binh Hoo (X:375786). Return fire with small arms, automatic weapons, artillery, light fire teams, air support and smoke resulted in 109 enemy killed, 1 prisoner, and 15 small arms and 7 rocket launchers captured. Friendly losses were 15 US killed and 12 wounded. On 25 February at 0250 hours in the vicinity of FSB Mahone (X:316375), elements of the 1-27th Infantry contacted an enemy force of unknown size, killing 38, capturing 10 small arms, and destroying 49 grenades and 16 HE rounds. Friendly losses were 3 US killed and 13 wounded. On 25 February at 0025 hours in the vicinity of Patrol Base Diamond (X:375781), a contact by elements of the 2-27th Infantry resulted in 75 enemy killed, 2 prisoners, and 40 rocket launchers, 87 grenades, 61 HE rounds, and 1,600 rounds of small arms ammunition captured. Friendly losses were 1 US killed and 3 wounded. At 0430 hours on 26 February in the vicinity of the Cu Chi Base Camp (X:750150), a 2nd Brigade contact resulted in 31 enemy killed and 8 prisoners taken. Friendly losses were 15 US killed and 28 wounded, with 9 helicopters destroyed and 2 damaged. On 4 March at 0745 hours approximately 6 kilometers northeast of Trang Bang (X:574725), 3/5/27th Infantry and A/1-5th Infantry (H) received small arms, automatic weapons, mortar, and recoilless fire. Return fire with small arms, automatic weapons, artillery, light fire teams, and air strikes resulted in 84 enemy killed. Friendly losses were 3 US killed, 20 wounded, and 2 armored personnel carriers destroyed. At 1940 hours on 5 March approximately 6 kilometers east of Trang Bang (X:530210), A/4-5th Infantry (H) and A/2-34th Armored received small arms, automatic weapons, and rocket fire. Return fire with small arms, automatic weapons, light fire teams, artillery, and air resulted in 73 enemy killed and 34 small arms, 19 crew served weapons, 27 grenades, and 16 HE rounds captured. Friendly losses were 8 US killed, 11 wounded, and 1 armored personnel carrier destroyed. On 11 March at 0123 hours approximately 2 kilometers northeast of Trung Phat (X:376623), a contact by A/3-4th Cavalry resulted in 36 enemy killed, 3 prisoners and 600 rounds of small arms ammunition captured. There were no friendly casualties. On 11 March at 1215 hours in the vicinity of Xom Buong (X:334445), the Bau Bang convoy received enemy fire. Return fire by the elements of the 52nd Brigade supported by artillery, light fire teams, and tactical air resulted in 76 enemy killed and 2 prisoners. Friendly casualties were 3 US wounded. Contact on 19 March at 0510 hours approximately 7 kilometers east of Trang Bang (X:561199), by elements of the 2-12th Infantry, and on 25 March at 1010 hours approximately 1 kilometer south of Ap Ban Gao (X:550260), by elements of the 2-12th Armored, resulted in a total of 86 enemy killed, 5 prisoners taken, and 27 small arms, 11 crew served weapons, and 35 HE rounds captured. Friendly losses were 4 US killed and 6 wounded. On 26 March at 1600 hours approximately 7 kilometers northeast of Trang Bang (X:3469295), the 3-4th Armored Cavalry located 31 enemy bodies and destroyed 5,800 rounds of small arms ammunition and 10 HE rounds. Two contacts on 28 March, one at 1008 hours in the vicinity of Cu Ko (X:340460) by A/3-4th Armored Cavalry, and one at 1045 hours approximately 1 kilometer northeast of Gia Binh (X:470830) by elements of
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the 2-12th Infantry, resulted in a total of 81 enemy killed, and 29 small arms, and 6 crew served weapons captured, with 6 US killed and 11 wounded. On 29 March at 1110 hours approximately 8 kilometers east of Ap Tong Thoi, A/C/4-23d Infantry (H) engaged two enemy reinforced companies. The contact resulted in 34 enemy killed and 300 rounds of small arms ammunition captured. Friendly losses were 2 US killed and 3 wounded. On 2 April at 0045 hours approximately 7 kilometers northeast of Trang Bang (X556219), D/2-12th Infantry engaged an enemy force of unknown size. Results of this contact were 49 enemy killed and 7 crew served weapons, 17 small arms, and 14 HE rounds captured. There were no friendly casualties. At 0730 hours on 5 April in the vicinity of Patrol Base Diamond (X542155), 2-27th Infantry engaged an enemy force of unknown size. Supported by artillery, light fire teams, Spooky, air strikes, and ARA, the 2-27th repulsed the enemy ground attack with the following results: 81 enemy killed, 1 prisoner, and 23 small arms, 16 crew served weapons, 81 grenades, and 47 HE rounds captured; friendly losses were 4 US killed and 13 wounded. At 1045 hours on 7 April approximately 11 kilometers northeast of Trang Bang (X575244), A/C/1-5th Infantry (H) and B/2-14th Infantry located and engaged an enemy force of unknown size. The results of the contact were 35 enemy killed and 16 small arms, 9 crew served weapons, and 31 HE rounds captured with friendly losses of 3 US killed and 3 wounded. At 1224 hours on 10 April approximately 1 kilometer northeast of Ap Thu Thuan (X1007574), a 1st Brigade contact resulted in 63 enemy killed. There were no friendly casualties. On 11 April at 0520 hours approximately 12 kilometers northeast of Trang Bang (X2602280), B/1-5th Infantry (H) located and made contact with an enemy size enemy force, killing 33 enemy. There were no friendly casualties. On 15 April at 0315 hours in the vicinity of Patrol Base Diamond (X327215), the 2-27th Infantry received a heavy mortar and ground attack from an estimated two reinforced-battalion size enemy force. Return fire included small arms, automatic weapons, mortars, artillery, light fire teams, Spooky, and air strikes. Results of the contact were 190 enemy killed, 8 prisoners, and 40 small arms, 42 crew served weapons, 291 grenades, and 198 HE rounds captured. Friendly losses were 17 US killed and 9 wounded. On 16 April at 1408 hours the 4-23d Infantry (H) located 93 enemy dead and destroyed 70 HE rounds approximately 3 kilometers southwest of Thien Ngon (X1031734). On 16 April at 0045 hours approximately 10 kilometers northeast of Ap Phuoc Hoa (X434160), a helicopter was downed by enemy fire, Teams A/B/TP 1-11th Cavalry moved into the area and established contact with the enemy. The results were 80 enemy killed and 4 crew served weapons captured. Friendly losses were 7 US killed, 27 wounded, 4 tanks destroyed, and 1 helicopter damaged. On the night of 25 April at 1945 hours, G/4-7th Infantry detected movement of an estimated enemy company in the vicinity of the patrol base Frontier City (X202292). At 0335 hours on 26 April the patrol base received a mortar and rocket attack followed by a battalion size attack from the south in an attempt to breach the perimeter. Company C engaged the enemy with small arms, machineguns, recoilless rifle fire, and Claymores, supported by artillery, light fire teams, Spooky, and tactical air strikes. The enemy continued his suppressive fires until 1230 hours; by 0330 hours the heavy fire terminated and only sporadic weapons fire was received for the remainder of the battle. US forces continued to place fire on enemy targets with opportunity until
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0630 hours, at which time the engagement terminated. The results of this contact were 214 enemy killed, 6 prisoners, and 37 small arms, 40 crew served weapons, 56 US rounds, 8,700 rounds of small arms ammunition, 100 grenades, and 100 pounds of web gear captured. There was one US wounded.

On 26 April air strikes in support of the 1st Brigade resulted in 115 enemy killed, approximately 3 kilometers west of Ap Ben Thai (XT172293). On 27 April at 0315 hours in the vicinity of Patrol Base Frontier City (XT029292), the 4th Infantry received an enemy attack. The engagement, in which artillery, light fire teams, Spooky, air strikes, and AHA supported, resulted in 168 enemy killed, 6 prisoners, and 35 small arms, 15 crew served weapons, 56 HE rounds, 8,700 rounds of small arms ammunition, and 100 pounds of web gear were captured; one US was wounded. On 27 April at 0315 hours approximately 7 kilometers north of Thu Thua (vicinity X515798), A/2-60th Infantry engaged an enemy force of unknown size. Results of this contact were 13 enemy killed with 2 US killed and 5 wounded. On 25 February at 0350 hours approximately 5 kilometers northeast of Tan An (XT557205), A/2-47th Infantry received small arms, automatic weapons, and mortar fire followed by a ground probe. Return fire with small arms, automatic weapons, artillery, light fire teams, Spooky, and air strikes resulted in 100 enemy killed, 2 prisoners, and 31 small arms, 23 crew served weapons, and 40 grenades captured. Friendly losses were 10 US killed and 4 wounded.

During the month of April, the division accounted for 2,090 enemy killed and 61 prisoners. Division casualties were 67 killed and 236 wounded.

(d) The 9th Infantry Division. During the reporting period, the 1st and 2nd Brigades continued operations in the IV CTZ under the operational control of the Senior Advisor, IV Corps. Operations conducted in IV CTZ are discussed in the Operational Report of the 9th Infantry Division. The 3rd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG, Phase II, with two infantry battalions and one mechanized battalion. The 2-47th Infantry (M) performed the mission of road, bridge, and convoy security along Highway 4. The 3rd Brigade began Phase III of Operation TOAN THANG with three battalions in Long An Province. On 1 and 2 February approximately 7 kilometers north of Thu Thua (vicinity X515798), A/2-60th Infantry engaged an enemy force of unknown size. Results of this contact were 13 enemy killed with 2 US killed and 5 wounded. On 25 February at 0350 hours approximately 5 kilometers northeast of Tan An (XT557205), A/2-47th Infantry received small arms fire. During a sweep of the contact area, Company A located 31 enemy bodies, 1 wounded detainee (later classified as VCI), 5 small arms, 5 rocket launchers, and 1 machinegun. On 16 March B/3-17th Cavalry, while conducting a visual reconnaissance mission approximately 6 kilometers of Ap Thanh Nhut (vicinity X563855), observed signs of enemy activity along Bo Bo Canal. Elements of C/2-60th Infantry conducted an air insertion into the area, were later joined by B/2-60th. Results of the attack were 42 enemy killed, 2 prisoners, and 141 B-40 rounds, 76 107mm rocket rounds, 33 recoilless rifle rounds, and 104,000 rounds of small arms ammunition captured. Friendly losses were 2 US killed and 3 wounded. At 2:00 April in the vicinity of Ap Xom Cau (vicinity X565705), C/2-60th Infantry engaged an enemy force of unknown size. The contact resulted in 3 US wounded. The month of April was characterized by 42 small contacts. Results of these contacts were 630 enemy killed and prisoners with friendly losses of 11 killed and 161 wounded.
(a) Capital Military Assistance Command, CHAC continued Operation TOAN THANG, conducting combat assault, airmobile, riverine, search, reconnaissance in force, and land clearing operations and continuing the pacification program. Operations were characterized by reconnaissance in force and d-sided searches, utilizing waterborne and airmobile assets for movement in less accessible areas. Extensive night ambushes were employed throughout the area to detect and prevent enemy night movement. Side looking radar (SLAR), aerial red haze, aerial observers, duffelbag, and ground surveillance were employed in conjunction with the night ambushes. Contact was at a relatively low level during the period despite the opening of the post-Tet offensive by the enemy. Enemy activity consisted primarily of rocket attacks against Saigon and ARVN military installations. Active use was made of switch boundaries, extensions of areas of operations, and combined operations with adjacent units in order to counter enemy tactics of using operational boundaries to jumble friendly forces. The task organization as of 1 February consisted of the 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light) with the 3-7th Infantry (minus Company D), the 4-12th Infantry, the 5-12th Infantry, and D/4-7th Cavalry, and the 3rd Brigade, 82d Airborne with 1-505th Infantry (Airborne) with B/3-7th Infantry (OIC), 1-506th Infantry (Airborne), and B/1-17th Cavalry with 1 platoon of D/1-11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (OIC). The 3rd Brigade, 82d Airborne continued operations to the north of the Ho Chi Minh Canal. Contacts and sightings increased in that area as the enemy attempted to use this area as a staging area for attacks on Saigon. Numerous tunnels and spider holes were discovered and many caches found. Extensive land clearing operations were conducted to preclude the enemy from concealing his movement. Radar and other warning devices assisted in detecting the enemy and in providing early warning of his movement. The 2-3rd Infantry and TF Kay (C/4-12th Infantry and B/5-12th Infantry), began Operation STRANGLER on 5 February to destroy or neutralize VC, VCI and guerrilla elements; to seize and destroy enemy resources; and to enhance pacification and strengthen GVN control in the target area (XSO0760 center of mass). Operation STRANGLER resulted in 1,370 personnel being processed, with 1,342 released as innocent civilians, and 4 VCI, 6 VCI supporters, 16 draft dodgers, and 4 deserters apprehended. On 9 February, the 2-3rd Infantry and TF Kay began Operation ROUND-UP I (XSO0760) with the same objectives as Operation STRANGLER. TF Kay was terminated on 10 February. It was reorganized 12 February with C/4-12th Infantry and A/3-5-12th Infantry and it prepared for Operation ROUND-UP II. The 2-3rd Infantry terminated Operation ROUND-UP I on 12 February at 1057 hours. The operation was conducted in the Hung Long area, 10 kilometers south of Saigon with the 3rd Regional Force (RF) Battalion and National Police Field Forces conducting the search while the other forces, including two battalions from the 5th Ranger Group (ARVN), accomplished the cordon. Results of Operation ROUND-UP I were 2,713 personnel processed, 2,647 released, and 9 VCI, 25 VCI supporters, 4 VC (suspect), 23 draft dodgers, and 5 deserters apprehended. Operation ROUND-UP II was initiated on 12 February at 2200 hours (X577060), with TF Kay and 2-3rd Infantry beginning operations on 13 February in conjunction with National Police and Regional Forces/Popular Forces (RF/PMF) elements. Operation ROUND-UP II was completed on 16 February. Results were 2,504 personnel processed, 2,552 released, and 6 VC, 3 VCI, 12 VC suspects, and 11 draft
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The period from 12 to 14 March consisted of area cordon and search operations. The results were 19 enemy killed, 4 prisoners, and 6 individual weapons captured.

Friendly casualties were 10 wounded. During March, ground contact was light with the enemy utilizing attacks by fire as his tactic, firing primarily into police precincts and housing areas. During March and April, intensive surveillance and density of night ambushes made it difficult for the enemy to utilize his traditional "rocket belt" around Saigon. The period was marked by small contacts.

(f) Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command (Provisional) (PHAC). The development of the Long Binh - Bien Hoa complex continued during the quarter. The period of 11 February through 6 March demonstrated the coordination activities of PHAC. This coordination initially concerned the RTAVP and AO boundaries. As enemy activity increased around the Long Binh - Bien Hoa area, the influx of FMSF units led to more detailed coordination. Land clearing operations, defoliation, and burning projects were conducted in areas east and southeast of Long Binh Post, as well as east and north of Bien Hoa Air Base. The defoliation missions terminated on 19 February, the burning project continued to the post-Tet offensive. The clearing operations resulted in 14,301 acres of land being cleared. The period of 23 to 26 February reflected a sharp increase in enemy activity with mortars and rockets impacting on Long Binh Post, Camp Frenzell-Jones, Bien Hoa AFB, and the FMSF compound. As a result of coordinated support through the RTAVP/PHAC combined tactical operations center, friendly units accounted for 244 enemy killed and 60 prisoners from 26 February to 3 March. During the period of 17 to 18 March, 2-11th Cavalry conducted Operation Rough Rider, a combined operation with Company D/2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry (ARVAC), south of Long Binh Post. The results of this operation were six enemy killed, 1 US killed, and 1 US wounded. April was characterized by like small contacts.

(g) Company D (Ranger), 151st Infantry. Company D (Ranger), 151st Infantry continued Operation TOAN THANG in AO INDIANA as the reporting period opened. During the reporting period, the company operated in as many as nine different areas of operation. During Phase II of Operation TOAN THANG, the company committed 45% men on patrols, with over 956 men being committed thus far during Phase III. Company D continually deployed eight to eleven teams per day. Each deployed team supplied information on enemy locations and activities and maintained contact when appropriate.

(h) 1st Australian Task Force. At the beginning of the reporting period, the 1st ATF continued operations of Phase II of TOAN THANG in AO TOWNSVILLE and in the 1st ATF TAN. Headquarter, 1st ATF (Main) remained at Fire Support Base Julia (TS220810). The 1st Battalion continued to support land clearing operations in the area of Thu Ly (TS250790), while Company C concluded operations in AO MAGPIE, and returned to the 1st ATF base camp. 1st Battalion continued operations in AO RIVERSDALE with
minor contact. The 9th Battalion continued operations in AO NAMHAI. On 4 February the 1st Battalion began providing security for land clearing operations in AO HAVIN (YS360700); this operation terminated 8 February. On 8 February the 4th Battalion terminated operations in AO NAMHAI and began operations in AO ZIKI (YS180860). The 1st Battalion returned to 1st ATF base camp on 9 February and provided base camp security. On 15 February the 5th Battalion, RAR replaced the 1st Battalion, RAR, which returned to Australia. The 5th Battalion, RAR began in country training at the Australian base camp and then conducted operations in AO BURRINJUCK (YS390680). Operation COODWOOD, a four-nation Australian-directed operation that included US, Australians, New Zealand and Vietnamese troops conducted in the Hat Dich area (YS300700), ended on 16 February. Major Australian units participating in this operation were the 1st, 4th, and 9th Battalions, RAR; elements of the 12th Field Regiment; B and C Squadrons, 1st Armored Regiment; and engineers of the 1st Field Squadron. The operation resulted in enemy losses of 250 killed and 41 wounded. More than 200 individual weapons were captured along with 4 82mm mortars, 274 62mm mortar rounds, and 197 60mm mortar rounds. Also captured were 400 rockets, 52,500 rounds of small arms ammunition, and more than 10 tons of rice. Australian engineers destroyed a great number of enemy bunkers. Friendly casualties were light. The operation disrupted enemy logistic support and kept the enemy on the defensive throughout the area that he had previously regarded as his own. It denied the enemy infiltration routes to Saigon, to base camps constructed in the Hat Dich - Binh Son areas, and to other enemy base areas of importance. On 17 February, elements of the 1st ATF occupied positions in AO MAJURA astride enemy approaches into the Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex from the northeast and east and began patrolling and reconnaissance in force operations. The 5th RAR conducted Operation COODWOOD I and II during the period of 1 to 9 March. It consisted of a reconnaissance in force operation in AO BURRINJUCK and a cordon and search of Hoa Long village (YS420640). The results of the operation were 14 enemy killed, with 4 Australians killed and 5 wounded. A total of 1,170 people were screened and 11 detained. During the remainder of the reporting period, the battalions continued to operate in various areas of operation and also continued to rotate to the 1st ATF base camp. The operations were characterized by numerous small contacts.

(1) Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF). As the period opened, the 1st Brigade conducted reconnaissance in force operations in AO SAEMA and AO CHETNA GREEN and provided security for Bearcat Camp, FSB's Gray and Oak, Long Thanh District Headquarters, and a bridge (YT130644) over the Song La Bung. During the reporting period, the 2d Brigade, which began arriving in country in January, closed in RVN on 25 February 1969, when the rear party arrives. The combat elements of the 2d Increment were operational by 21 February and commenced combat operations by conducting reconnaissance in force operations. On 19 February in eastern Bien Hoa, elements of the 2-1st Infantry captured 5,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 89 HE rounds, 7 grenades, and 1 mine. The Thais engaged in two major contacts during the reporting period. On 23 February at 0220 hours approximately 4 kilometers southeast of Long Binh (YT000022), C/1-2 Infantry contacted an enemy battalion and received mortar and rocket fire. The contact continued until
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1600 hours and resulted in 56 enemy killed, with 4 friendly wounded. On 16 March at 0700 hours approximately 3 kilometers east of Long Thanh (IV 167915), the 34 Infantry Battalion command post was attacked by an enemy battalion. The Thai returned the fire, supported by artillery, an armored cavalry squadron, and light fire team. The contact resulted in 65 enemy killed, 4 friendly killed, and 32 small arms, 15 crew served weapons, 7,601 rounds of small arms ammunition, 69 grenades, and 102 HE rounds captured. Thai losses were 2 killed and 23 wounded. The remainder of the period saw numerous contacts of small size.

(i) Air Operations.

(a) B-52 Operations. B-52 operations are discussed in paragraph to (6)(a) and (b). Inclusion 5 indicates the number and distribution of B-52 strikes in III CTZ.

(b) Army Aviation Operations.

1. Resources: The following non-divisional resources were under the control of II FFV during the reporting period:

   a. Rotary Wing:
   - 14 Assault Helicopter Companies
   - 1 Aerial Weapons Company
   - 4 Assault Support Helicopter Companies (Mud)
   - 1 Assault Support Helicopter Company (Heavy)
   - 1 Aviation Company (CORS)
   - 1 Air Cavalry Squadron

   b. Fixed Wing:
   - 2 Reconnaissance Airplane Companies
   - 1 Utility Airplane Company
   - 1 Surveillance Airplane Company

   - 4 Assault Helicopter Companies and 1 Assault Support Helicopter were placed OCONUS to IV Corps on 1 December 1966.

   c. At the close of the reporting period, there were 468 helicopters and 97 airplanes assigned. These do not include 216th Combat Aviation Battalion aircraft under the operational control of IV Corps. Operational guidance was provided by the Commanding General and implemented by the G2 in surveillance and reconnaissance functions, and by G3 in air cavalry.

combat assault, airmobile, and general support functions. Command, less operational control, continued to be exercised by the 12th Combat Aviation Group.

Allocation. Aviation resources continued to be allocated to major units by Commanding General, II FFORC-EV, or as directed by higher headquarters. Support was provided all US and allied organizations under the operational control of II FFORC-EV and III Corps.

Employment. The number of assault helicopter companies (AHC) continued to be insufficient to satisfy valid requirements. The policy of allowing each AHC to stand down one day each month has improved availability and quality of maintenance. In addition, the operational limitation of six hours of flying time a day for each committed aircraft has resulted in a more efficient utilization of aviation support to II FFORC-EV and III Corps by requiring more thorough planning of tactical operations. The use of preparatory fires and smoke on landing zones prior to insertion has reduced the loss of personnel and aircraft to enemy fire.

Statistical summaries of close air support and Army aviation support are at Inclosures 4 and 5, respectively.

The following changes occurred in force structure:

(a) Gains:

  
  a 2d Brigade, RTAVF
  b 1st Infantry Battalion, 2d Brigade, RTAVF
  c 2d Infantry Battalion, 2d Brigade, RTAVF
  d 3d Infantry Battalion, 2d Brigade, RTAVF
  e 2d 105mm Artillery Battalion, Division Artillery, RTAVF
  f 3 Battery, 155mm Artillery Battalion, Division Artillery, RTAVF
  g 7th Cavalry
  h 3 Troop, 5th RAR, 7th Australian Task Force
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1 Company D (Ranger), 151st Infantry
(b) Losses:
2 1st BAR, 1st Australian Task Force
2 Company F (Long Range Patrol), 51st Infantry
(c) Inclosure 1 depicts the II FFORCEV Order of Battle.
(5) Training.
(a) Five ARVN battalions completed ARVN Infantry/Ranger Battalion
Refresher Training during the period 1 February 1969 - 30 April 1969.
Three additional battalions were in training at the end of April. The
training is progressing on schedule and is being well received.

(b) A program to provide refresher training to divisional engineer
battalions and armored cavalry regiments was reinitiated on 13 March 1969.
Training will commence at the beginning of the rainy season or earlier if
the tactical situation permits.

(c) Reciprocal Mobile Training Teams (RMTT) were exchanged between
the 1st Infantry Division and the 5th ARVN Division, the 25th Infantry
Division and the 25th ARVN Division, and the 9th Infantry Division and the
7th ARVN Division during the reporting period. The type training conducted
is determined by the needs of the individual units.

e. Logistics Operations.
(1) Programs and Projects.
(a) Considerable effort by the 64 section and the Special Liaison
Section, II Field Force, Vietnam has been devoted to expediting supply
support and improving the supply procedures of the Royal Thai Army
Volunteer Force at Bearcat. This has resulted in a greater understanding
by the Thai's of the United States Army Logistic system with particular
improvement noted in their requisitions. This support and training should
ease the transition of the third increment, due to arrive in Republic of

(b) Logistic Readiness Program.
1 During the period, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and
3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry drew 27 M551 Sheridans. Each unit's direct support
maintenance unit also drew three maintenance float vehicles.

2 A Quarterly Meeting for Logistic Readiness Officers of II FFORCEV
assigned and attached units was held on 27 April 1969. Topics discussed
included Organizational Maintenance and Supply Inspection (OMSI) criteria,
inspection results for first quarter of calendar year, an analysis of first
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Quarter Material Readiness Reports and the Weekly Command Deadline Reports. As of 27 April 1969, 27 Organizational Maintenance and Supply Inspections had been conducted of II FORCEV assigned and attached units. Twenty-one units received a rating of satisfactory and six units were rated unsatisfactory.

(2) Aircraft Maintenance.

(a) During the period, a plan was put into effect to fill the combat support and combat service support units, which are short OH-6A aircraft, with the OH-23 (Raven) aircraft. United States Army, Vietnam is scheduled to receive fifty of the OH-23's. Of these 50, 14 are scheduled to be issued to II FORCEV units with current status shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>USAGE FILL</th>
<th>ON HAND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23d Artillery Group</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54th Artillery Group</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) The month of March showed improvement in external load drops. During the month, only 11 drops were reported, seven of which were due to breaking of the rigging equipment. With additional command emphasis, proper training of rigging teams, and thorough sling inspections, continued improvement is expected.

(3) Ammunition.

(a) Ammunition items in short supply continue to be managed through the use of available supply ratio (ASR) allocations to insure equitable distribution of available ammunition to all II FORCEV units. Expenditures of certain high cost, high tonnage items, specifically 81mm, 4.2 in, 105mm, 155mm and 8 in high explosive ammunition are also controlled through the ASR system.

(b) During the period 1 February through 30 April 1969, the number of items under ASR control was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rise in the number of items in March is attributed to heavy expenditures during the post-Tet offensive.

(c) The Quarterly Ammunition Conference was held at II FORCEV Headquarters on 10 February 1969. Topics discussed included the ASR allocation system, stockage level status of ASR items, preparation of World Wide
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Ammunition Feeder Reports, and ASR accounting procedures at Army Aircraft Logistic Area (AALA's).

(4) Transportation.

(a) A Fixed Wing Air Force Airlift Conference was sponsored by II FFORW on 7 March 1969. Conferences were briefed on the roles of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Traffic Management Agency (MACVIMA) and 2d Aerial Port Group in airlift traffic management and port operations. Emphasis was placed on establishing requirements for using the Common Service Airlift Support (CSAS) C123 and C130 fleet whenever possible, thereby enabling dedicated C7A aircraft to be released for other II FFORW missions into airstrips that are not adequate for C123 aircraft.

(b) United States Air Force C123/C130 sorties flown in support of II FFORW units are summarized in Incl 3.

(5) ARVN/Advisor Logististics.

(a) Logistical instructions, for advisors in small teams and isolated sites, were issued by USA Advisory Group III CTZ. Detailed procedures concerning class I support, class II, IV, V and maintenance support were prescribed. Thus far, these instructions coupled with command and staff visits have been instrumental in upgrading advisor living conditions, providing maintenance support, and expediting critically needed supplies.

(b) The Commanding General recognized the tendency for representatives of RVNAF units to request logistical support, usually supply, from US units in lieu of obtaining the desired support from the specific RVNAF system or agency which was established for that purpose. Based on the premise that an adequate and responsive logistic support system is an essential element of the self-sufficiency which must be obtained, policy was formulated and instructions were issued to make maximum effort to assure that essential supplies are obtained through the RVNAF supply system. CG, II FFORW letter, 9 February 1969, warned that dependency on units of II Field Force Vietnam for normal back-up support must be promptly and firmly discouraged. However, guidance was furnished pertaining to specific authority to supply combat essential class I, class III, and class V, fortification and barrier materials, and expendable repair parts in a true emergency when such requirements cannot be met through RVNAF channels.

(6) Engineer Support.

(a) General: Engineer support was provided throughout the III Corps Tactical Zone in the form of airfield maintenance and rehabilitation, upgrading and construction of artillery fire support bases, improving lines of communications, jungle clearing, and support of tactical operations.

(b) Combat Support. Engineer activities were characterized by a wide variety of combat support during the quarter.
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1. Elements of the 20th Engineer Brigade provided support to the Commander, Naval Forces, Vietnam by initiating mine clearing operations at tactical support bases at Tra Cu and Tuyen Nhon.

2. Combat engineer support was provided the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) by elements of the 20th Engineer Brigade which were airlifted into War Zone C to assist the 8th Engineer Battalion in destruction of a large enemy bunker complex including a hospital with surgical wards, storage and recreational facilities.

3. Jungle clearing continued to be an important component of engineer combat support during the quarter. A total of 90,991 acres of jungle was cleared in support of tactical operations to deprive the enemy of some of his long-held strongholds. Major clearing operations were conducted to the north, northeast and east of Long Binh Post, an area west of Tay Ninh, the Den Tieng area, the Lai Khe - Den Cut area, and along IHL 1A and QL 14 north of Phuoc Vinh. A third land clearing company of the 20th Engineer Brigade became operational during this period.

4. Tactical Support. Organized divisional and supporting non-divisional engineers provided continuous tactical support to maneuver elements in the form of mine sweeping, clearing barriers and obstacles, clearing fields of fire, constructing pioneer roads, operating water supply points, and erecting tactical bridging.


b. The quarter showed a significant improvement in the protective construction at many of the critical bridges within III Corps Tactical Zone. Engineer effort consisted of constructing pier protections, lighting systems, mine boom, watch towers, and approach roads for contingencies.

c. Lines of Communications. Continuous effort was expended during the quarter by engineer units on the maintenance and upkeep of lines of communications. During the quarter 65.96 kilometers of roads were paved to MACV standards.

d. Airfield Maintenance and Upgrading. The continuous airfield maintenance and improvement program included work at Lai Khe, Khatum, Loc Ninh, Dong Xoai, Buvar, Song Be, Tong Chua, Quan Loi, and Buon Ma. The runway at Phuoc Vinh was surfaced with N3A1 matting. The Thien Ligon airfield was reconstructed. Paving operations were initiated at Cu Chi. Construction of a new airfield at the Special Forces camp at Luc Khe was started during this period.

e. Fixed Artillery Bases. Engineering support of the Artillery included work at Fire Support Base St. Barbara (XT736080), Fire Support Base Concord (YO10120), and Fire Support Base located at Den Luc, Con Gio, Thien Ligon, Quan Loi, Tay Ninh, Khatum, Trung Ben, Tan An, Song Be, Rach Kien, Bien Phuoc, Saigon, Bien Hoa, Long Binh support included constructing and upgrading gun pads, perimeter ditches, defensive personnel positions and access roads.

(a) Miscellaneous Engineer Support.

1. Engineer support was provided to the Signal Facility at the top of Hu Chau Chu. One of the projects under way in the laying of a power cable from the operations area of the camp to the administrative and billeting area connecting the two with common electrical power.

2. Well drilling operations were conducted by elements of the 20th Engineer Brigade at Long Binh Post, Nui Lo Don Quarry, and Camp Frenzelli-Jones. It is planned to complete most of the remaining 89 wells in the program by civilian contracts.

3. During the quarter the priority of construction on MACV advisor facilities was increased, second only to combat operational support missions. There are 93 such projects within the III ODC either completed, under construction, or in the planning stages.

(b) Status of Primary Roads of Communication as of 30 April 1969.

(a) For the purpose of this report the following items concerning the condition of land lines of communication are defined:

1. Condition I: The route is capable of carrying up to class 50 loads (all division loads).

2. Condition II: Up to class 35 loads (the majority of logistical transport, e.g., 5,000 gallon fuel tanker).

3. Condition III: Up to class 16 loads (armored personnel carriers and 20 ton trucks).

4. Condition IV: Can carry only light civilian traffic; therefore, it is only open to light reconnaissance vehicles.

5. Condition V: Closed to all traffic.

(b) Route QL-1.

1. Cambodian Border (XT286244) to Go Dau Ha (XT303025), lowest bridge capacity class 50, condition I.

2. Go Dau Ha (XT303025) to Ou Chi (XT628128), condition I.

3. Ou Chi (XT628128) to Saigon (XT793942), lowest bridge capacity class 60, condition I.

4. Saigon (XT793942) to road junction 316 (YT072130), lowest bridge capacity class 50, condition III.

5. Road junction 316 (YT072130) to Xuan Loc (YT55080), all bridges unlimited capacity, condition II.
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(c) Route QL-4.

1. Road junction QL-1 (XN045914) to Ben Lao (XN616758), lowest bridge capacity class 50, condition I.

2. Ben Lao (XN616758) to IV CTZ boundary (XN596090), lowest bridge capacity class 30, condition III.

(d) Route QL-13.

1. Road junction QL-1 (XN073977) to Thuong (XN810140), lowest bridge capacity class 30, condition III.

2. Via Thuong (XN810140) to Loc Minh (XN73074), lowest bridge capacity class 50, condition I.

3. Thu Loc Minh (XN73074) to Cambodian border (XN68233), lowest bridge capacity class 6, condition IV.

(e) Route QL-14. Dong Xoai (XN730759) to II CTZ boundary (XN682175), bridge out (XN930111), condition V.

(f) Route QL-15.

1. Bien Hoa (YN902114) to Darin (YB380607), lowest bridge capacity class 60, condition I.

2. Darin (YB380607) to Vung Tau (YB274444), lowest bridge capacity class 30, condition III.

(g) Route QL-20. Road junction QL-1 (Y7043010) to II CTZ boundary (Y715573), lowest bridge capacity class 20, condition III.

(h) Route QL-22. Go Dan Ra (Y7354290) to Tan Minh (XT198509), lowest bridge capacity class 45, condition II.

(i) Route QL-16. Bien Hoa (XT995064) to IV (XT887775), lowest bridge capacity class 50, condition I.

(j) Route QL-14.

1. Dong Xoai (YT002759) to Muco Vinh (XT870490), condition III.

2. Muco Vinh (YT079759) to road junction QL-13 (XT801240), ford (XT 662682), condition IV.

(k) Route QL-2. Road junction QL-1 (YT437045) to Darin (YB380607), lowest bridge capacity class 70, condition I.

(l) Route QL-5A.
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1. Saigon (X58616930) to Ong Thin Bridge (X58615775), lowest bridge capacity class 50 (Ong Thin Bridge included), condition I.

2. Ong Thin Bridge (X58615775) to Can Giuoc (X58607371), lowest bridge capacity class 16, condition III.

3. Can Giuoc (X58607371) to Can Ho Ferry (X5766566), lowest bridge capacity class 10, condition IV.

(a) Route LEL-23.

1. Batin (Y5606007) to Y5826553, lowest bridge capacity class 35, condition II.

2. Y5826553 to II CTF boundary (X58617000), 3 bridges out (Y5674672, Y5675071 and Y5675069), condition V.

(b) Route TL9A. Road junction QL-1 (X5875003), to Dau Boa (X5595966), lowest bridge capacity class 45, condition II.

(c) Route LEL-26 and Route 239. Tay Ninh (Y5255500) to Hau Tieng (X5954560), lowest bridge capacity class 60, condition II.

1. Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs/Civic Actions.

(a) Significant Psychological Operations Activities.

(a) The II Field Force PSYOP program has improved by the use of specific targeting, which includes identifying an enemy unit by unit designation from main force/HVN division down to battalion, company or cell and exploiting the vulnerabilities of that unit. Specific targeting and continued emphasis on face-to-face communication contributed to an increased number of Ho Chi Minh during the reporting period. Over 487 million leaflets were disseminated by Army and Air Force aircraft. Over 1400 PSYOP sorties were flown and over 1500 loudspeaker hours were broadcast in support of tactical operations. Although these totals are slightly less than the last reporting period, the number of Ho Chi Minh significantly increased to 1424; 391 more than in the previous period.

(b) Another development during the reporting period was the establishment of the Combined Psychological Operations Coordination Center (CPOCC). The purpose of the CPOCC is to:

1. Ensure compatibility of campaigns.
2. Eliminate duplication of effort.
3. Provide maximum utilization of resources.
4. Provide a center for joint planning and exploitation. The CPOCC is a significant advance in joint planning which has been constantly improving since its inception.
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(c) A reallocation of night broadcasting assets has been made, allowing a much wider distribution of broadcasting during the prime loudspeaker time for targeting V/C/HIV throughout III CTZ.

(2) Civil Affairs and Military Civic Action.

(a) During this quarter additional orphanages have been placed on closer working relationship and coordination with CONRO representatives at all echelons, local GVN officials, and RVNAH personnel. Benefits from this effort are being realized. The province-oriented civil affairs platoons continue to be an effective coordination link between US/RVNAH units and the advisory staff. Their effectiveness is improving as both US and GVN personnel become more aware of the platoon's capabilities and functions.

(b) Discussions with personnel from subordinate units, MACVORDS, and advisors to the RVN Ministry of Health Social Welfare and Relief (USMACV) indicated that the orphanage support throughout III CTZ was uncoordinated and in some cases counter-productive. Indications are that some orphanages housed goods in expectation of an interruption of support, other orphanages are established for the specific purpose of soliciting from US/RVNAH units for personal profit, while still others are registered legit.to well-managed orphanages. Our ultimate objective is to provide needed support, on an interis basis, and at the same time assist those institutions in becoming self-sufficient. The key to the attainment of our objective is a well-coordinated program which will ensure an equitable and fair distribution of our support where needed. In some cases two or more units are rendering support to a single orphanage. Another orphanage in the same locale is not being supported by any unit, yet it is just as needy. These situations arise because some institutions are more aggressive than others and solicit assistance from all units in the area. Steps have been taken to develop a well-coordinated program which will allow us to attain our orphanage support objective.

(c) As an adjunct to the existing Community Relations Program, II MACVORDS and III CTZ conducted the second quarterly Combined Civilian Orientation Conference (CCOC) aimed at middle echelon government officials, religious and educational leaders, and other opinion makers within III CTZ. The objective of this conference was to increase the degree of civilian support for GVN and US efforts in achieving security and pacification within the RVN. The conference was highly successful and extremely well-received by the attendees.

2. Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support.

(1) Revolutionary Development. With the conclusion of both the Accelerated Pacification Campaign and the 1968 RD Program on 31 January 1969, III CTZ had expanded government control virtually to the extent of the resources then available. Consequently, in addition to the normal interruption caused by the Tet holidays, the lack of additional resources impeded the initiation of the 1969 Pacification Plans. Additionally, training requirements and the need to provide additional definition in order to initiate the village and

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provincial development concepts prevented the full implementation of the 1969 programs. In terms of increasing security and initiating village self-help and provincial development projects, little was achieved in the 1969 mobilization program. On the other hand, real progress was achieved in training officials, providing definitive pacification policy guidance and developing additional security resources; all of which should begin to bear fruit during the next quarter. However, it was not reasonable to expect that the village concept could be thoroughly implemented on a corporate-wide basis in less than one year. A very strong deterrent to the village concept was found in the persistence of Saigon level officialdom in establishing hamlet goals for security expansion. Further evidence of undermining the village concept was seen by the deployment in some areas of RD Cadre Teams to specific hamlets rather than to villages. This persisted in spite of strong supervisory efforts. District chiefs stated that they understand the village concept but that they had hamlet goals to meet by 30 June. In the meantime, the completion of training of new RF companies and their deployment throughout III CTZ should provide the basis for significant advances in hamlet and population control by 30 June.

(2) Territorial Security. Regional Force/Popular Force (RF/PF) activities increased during the reporting period as compared to the previous period. Enemy activity increased sharply at the end of February with large scale attacks against military installations and population centers following the Tet holidays. After the post-Tet offensive, enemy activity was reduced to terrorist activity and attacks on small isolated outposts. However, the ability of the RF/PF to provide territorial security for III CTZ continued to show improvement. The increased fire power and improved communications resulting from issuance of M16 rifles, M60 machineguns, and AN/PRC-25 radios enabled the RF/PF to achieve greater successes in engagements with the enemy. Additionally, the advisory effort of the Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT's) in the areas of training and operations continued to improve the combat effectiveness of the RF/PF.

(3) Refugee Program.

(a) During the period 16-20 March 1969, 2066 persons were relocated within the Michelin Rubber Plantation (Tri Tam District, Binh Duong). Most of these persons, who were Michelin rubber workers, were able to continue their prior employment. The relocation was deemed necessary to improve local security. Extensive prior planning and coordination between US and ARVN military units, CORPS, the Ministry of Health, Social Welfare and Relief, and district and province authorities were affected prior to the movement. Determinations were made as to the responsibility for the various aspects of construction as well as other assistance which the people were to receive. Construction of outposts and new housing was completed prior to the movement. Deployment of security forces was adequate. The movement was executed in a coordinated manner with no major difficulties.

(b) Involuntary population relocations are highly undesirable; however, in this particular case, massive military exploitation by combined US/ARVN forces, which occurred subsequent to the evacuation of the people, deprived...
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the enemy of important base areas. The value of this move clearly out-
weighed the negative aspects of this relocation.

(A) Chieu Hoi.

(a) During the reporting period the Chieu Hoi program was credited with 1,424 ralliers. This is a 30 percent increase from the previous quarter (1,053). Additionally, a favorable trend developed showing a significantly greater number of Ho Chi Minh rallying each succeeding month. In February there were 772 ralliers, increasing to 473 in March and 609 in April. The returnee rate for April was the largest input for any single month since July 1967 when 742 rallied. In November, December, and January, 540 or 53 percent of the total ralliers (1,053) were credited to the Third Party Inducement Program. Of the number who rallied in the past quarter (February - April), 995 or 70 percent of the total (1,424) were attributed to the cash awards program.

(b) It is apparent that the Chieu Hoi Program was not harmed by the enemy's post- Tet offensive. The marked improvement in the number of ralliers in March and April was attributed in part to the enemy's failure to achieve a decisive victory, thus creating a psychological climate which prompted defections. Other factors which have influenced the upward trend in Ho Chi Minh during the quarter were the military pressures brought to bear by POW/K, the impact of the intensified POL/ES effort, and the declining influence of Viet Cong propaganda. Many of the Ho Chi Minh reported fear and hardship as the major reason for their defection. Others said that they have become disillusioned with the Viet Cong's promise of victory and a better way of life.

(5) New Life Development.

(a) The 1969 Pacification Campaign placed greater emphasis on participation by the people. The theme was village development which included the establishment of a viable body to manage all affairs. Funding self-help projects by the village government was a primary aspect of Village Development.

(b) The 1969 2n-3/5 rice objectives were to plant 53,500 hectares, with 42,500 hectares planned as the first crop and 11,000 hectares as a second crop.

h. Communications. Significant changes in communications in support of II FR/10545 operations during their reporting period are outlined below:

(i) During mid-February, the 1st Australian Task Force moved its forward element into a new location. The forward element was supported with a twelve-channel radio carrier system which provided direct telephone communications to the tactical and corps area switchboard located at Plantation. This system is in addition to the normal twelve-channel system to the 1st ATTF base camp at Bai Dat.

(2) Two fixed station AN/WRC-5 Mode V terminals were installed in the II FFORCVY Communications Center (Commmcenter) during February 1969. The two terminals are owned, operated, and maintained by the 1st Signal Brigade (USA/STARCOM). The overload teletype circuit installed in December 1968 to handle message traffic backlogs destined for the Phu Lam Major Relay was deactivated upon acceptance of the two Mode V terminals.

(3) On 17 March 1969, the II FFORCVY Tactical Operations Center (TOC) Communication Center became operational in the underground TOC, having been relocated from the ground-level facility previously used. The new location permits instantaneous service to action agencies of the TOC and provides rapid response to the perishable, critical information passed on their circuits. Revised procedures concerning the new TOC Commmcenter's use were promulgated in II FFORCVY Regulation 115-3 and in a II FFORCVY Staff Memorandum. The new procedures were directed to reduce the flow of non-critical information being passed through the II FFORCVY TOC teletype network and, therefore, will enable the system to provide responsive, expeditious service for operational and intelligence communications.

(4) During early March, three teletype circuits were moved from the TOC Commmcenter to the main commmcenter: 5th SFG, RTA/F, and 11th ACR. These three units have only one commmcenter, necessitating the processing of all teletype messages over one circuit. This means that the TOC Commmcenter now handles only operations and intelligence traffic and greatly reduces the need to relay messages between the main and TOC Commmcenters, lowering the workload on both.

(5) During mid-March, a 100-pair underground cable was installed between the main distribution frame and the main commmcenter. This cable makes possible direct rerouting of main commmcenter circuits should the frames, located at the patch panel, be destroyed. With the installation of this cable, all circuits handled by the patch panel could be directly rerouted through the main frame, and vice versa, should either of the frames be destroyed.

(6) New Joint SEA Ground Tactical Nestor Keylists are to be issued to each of the four Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ) in RVN. The keylists are designed, to the maximum extent possible, to replace existing unique keylists held by numerous units throughout each CTZ and to provide significant improvement in compatibility of secure voice communications between adjacent divisions and simplify command and control where elements of one division are placed under operational control of another division. Nestor keylists are used with FM radio speech security equipment (X-4/J-28/J-8 cryptographic devices). Complete instructions for use of the new keylists have been disseminated to all concerned and implementation is pending receipt of the keylists by all users.

(7) A conference concerning FM radio frequency interference on Nui Ba Den was held at Headquarters, II FFORCVY on 3 April 1969. Representatives of all units utilizing Nui Ba Den were in attendance. Members of the signal
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SUBJECTS:


Section had made a prior on-the-spot study of the problem and several suggestions concerning frequency coordination, testing, and control were prepared and established as policy. FM radio net priorities were designated and alternate possible means of FM radio reradiation were discussed. Since the policies were adopted, significant progress has been made in solving the frequency interference problem on Route 74, through mutual cooperation of all II CPFOR units concerned.

(6) On 20 April 1969, Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command (HINAC) moved from its old location on Bien Hoa Air Force Base to its present location in the II CPFOR Administrative TOC in the ARVN II Corps Compound. Detailed pre-planning for communications at the new location and close coordination between the HINAC Signal Officer, II CPFOR Signal Section, and the 53rd Signal Battalion (Corps) assured continuous and highly reliable communications during and after the move. The new TOC provides not only better protection for the personnel and equipment, but also more operational working space. The new TOC includes a computer with secure teletype capability to II CPFOR TOC Command and a three-position switchboard which provides faster telephone service with increased line and trunk capacity.

I. Information.

(1) "The Hurricane", II CPFOR's monthly magazine continued at its increased circulation of 36,000 copies while receiving favorable mention in the US Army Vietnam publications judging. During the reporting period, the February, March and April issues contained 24 feature articles and two spot stories. Two of these articles featured General officers, three detailed stories dealt with America and pacification; US Army units were described in five stories while ARVN activities were reported in four. Unique people or places were profiled in two stories and the US Air Force and Navy were covered in three. The special art layout highlighted Viet Cong/NAVA bravery, uniforms, and weapons. During this same period, the official US Army magazine, "Army Digest" published eight "Hurricane" stories in its February, March, and April issues.

(2) As a result of personnel turbulence, television production was temporarily suspended; however, the Radio/Television Section increased its radio production by more than 37 percent. A total of 669 home town radio tapes and nine feature stories were released.

(3) The Public Information Section produced and released 121 general news stories which came within five releases of doubling the output of the previous reporting period. Hometown news releases submitted during the reporting period totaled 254.

J. Inspector General. During the reporting period the Inspector General completed 8 inspections and conducted 7 investigations/inquiries.

K. Staff Judge Advocate.

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(1) During the reporting period personnel of the Staff Judge Advocate's section continued to visit units in the field to provide legal assistance and guidance in the handling of military justice matters. This program improved substantially during the latter part of the period due to the temporary assignment of two enlisted lawyers who were utilized primarily in legal assistance, military affairs, and as individual counsel in trials before special courts-martial. A JAG officer visited 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment's base camp for one day or more each week to provide any legal services required.

(2) The Staff Judge Advocate verified the classification by the 219th Military Intelligence Detachment of a number of detainees as to their status as civil defendants or prisoners of war.

(3) Four general courts-martial were conducted for such offenses as assault with intent to murder, aggravated assault, absence without authority, desertion, wrongful appropriation, bad check offenses, and violation of postal regulations.

(4) The Office of the Staff Judge Advocate continued to provide legal support for post, camp, and station functions.

(5) Foreign claims (AR 27-20) showed a decrease, whereas claims incident to service (AR 27-29) by military personnel showed a substantial increase during the reporting period. These trends are attributed to better education in claims matters by claims officers down to unit level and better dissemination of this information to all personnel.

2. (C) Section II. Immediate Commanders' Observations and Recommendations.


(1) OBSERVATION. Shortage of qualified mechanics and adult mechanic trainees exists due to the manpower shortages.

(2) EVALUATION. The program for recruiting, training, and retention of A11 Chanh mechanic trainee has produced less than satisfactory results. Conversely, the program for recruitment and training of teenage mechanic apprentices is proceeding well.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. Provinces experiencing difficulties in recruiting province maintenance shop mechanic trainees should attempt to recruit and train selected teenagers.

b. Operations.
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(1) Security of Refugee Sites in Phuoc Long Province.

(a) OBSERVATION. It was realized after the February VC attacks in Phuoc Long Province that certain refugee hamlets could not be properly defended.

(b) EVALUATION. To improve the situation, four refugee hamlets, which had been scattered and difficult to defend separately, were regrouped into a more defensible area. The new refugee location was called the Son Trung Security Area. The hamlets were relocated with local leadership intact and were close to local agricultural areas, thereby minimizing the population's objection to the movement. The movement of these refugees resulted in an improved state of security because it allowed a better deployment to be made of the available security forces and the new location is easier to defend than the old sites.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. If the security conditions dictate the necessity to relocate refugees, consideration should be given to the adverse effect of an involuntary movement. If the relocation is planned and carried out efficiently, with adequate support, such a movement can actually improve popular support as well as enhance the security posture of the hamlets.

(2) Defense Against Sapper Attacks.

(a) OBSERVATION. The enemy is placing greater importance on the use of sapper techniques and is increasing his employment of sapper attacks. However, such attacks can be thwarted.

(b) EVALUATION.

The standard pattern employed in sapper attacks is as follows:

a The primary objective of a sapper attack is to penetrate the defenses of the friendly force, inflict the maximum number of casualties, destroy equipment and bunker complexes within the perimeter, and withdraw.

b The sapper is a hardened, well-trained, and highly motivated soldier. He is combat experienced, has received extensive specialized training, and is a volunteer. His primary mission is to inflict casualties and to destroy equipment, weapons, and installations. His primary weapon is the explosive charge.

c Sapper training consists of two phases. During the first phase, the trainee receives instruction to enable him to approach an objective without being detected, to penetrate the perimeter of the defending force, and to fight the defending soldier at close range. In the second phase, the trainee receives detailed instruction in the technical aspects of explosives.
In conducting a sapper operation, the enemy commander first formulates his plan. Then he and his subordinate element commanders spend days reconnoitering the objective to determine routes of approach and withdrawal. They determine the amount and location of defensive positions and protective devices, the exact strength around the perimeter and within the objective area, and plot the location of trenches, bunkers, weapon positions, command posts, and ammunition storage areas.

The time between the reconnoissance and the actual attack is spent in rehearsals and briefings, using sketches and sand tables to apprise each man of exactly what he must do throughout the attack. A fire support plan is developed and appropriate signals for attack and withdrawal are formulated.

On the day of the attack, the enemy frequently spends almost an entire day to approach within a few hundred meters of the perimeter wire, advancing the remaining distance during hours of darkness. The sapper frequently utilizes the least likely and most difficult avenues of approach. He takes his time in doing so because the use of these avenues offers the best opportunity to work his way between listening posts. The success of the attack is dependent upon his ability to breach the wire without being detected.

The assault, itself, is violent, beginning with a preparation (normally mortar fire) to attempt to force the defenders to seek shelter within bunkers. Then RIG fire is placed in the selected points of penetration. Small arms fire is not employed except to cover the withdrawal as the enemy does not wish to reveal the presence of attacking forces prior to the attack.

The actual attack is characterized by violence and speed. Once the actual attack commences, mortars cease firing. The impression of incoming fire is maintained through the use of RPGs, grenades, and explosive charges. Once inside the perimeter, sapper teams move "on the double" to their assigned objectives, without consideration for personal safety. Selected members of the unit continue to fire RPGs and to detonate explosives in order to keep the defending troops in their bunkers.

Upon completion of its mission, each team then moves rapidly to the planned point of withdrawal and exits the objective area. During this exit operation, explosive charges are thrown into all bunkers not previously destroyed by RIG fire.

There is one major weakness in the tactics employed. The sapper must have time. He will sacrifice speed to achieve surprise. The defending force can prevent the enemy from having the time he needs. The unit that remains in its position, following a standard pattern and making no effort to interdict either the initial sapper reconnoissance or the time consuming approach to the objective invites disaster.

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Commanders must always be aware of the requirements for adequate fields of fire, properly located internal defensive positions, and coordinated final protective forces. However, increased emphasis must be given to the defense against sapper attacks.

(c) RECOMMENDATION.

1. That commanders take positive action to insure that personnel of their commands are thoroughly and properly oriented on their responsibilities prior to performance of security duties.

2. That physical security training be emphasized during replacement training.

3. That counter sapper training be instituted and delegated to the lowest element having the ability to conduct effective training. Properly trained personnel and effective leadership can thwart sapper attacks.

4. That continuous effective perimeter and internal security, and early detection techniques be emphasized to prevent successful sapper attacks.

3. BOoby Trap Technology and Information.

(a) OBSERVATION. Personnel must be continuously alert for booby traps for it is the action and reaction of the individual soldier that will detect booby traps and insure his and his fellow soldier's safety.

(b) EVALUATION. Analysis of data concerning booby traps reveals the following:

1. Almost all booby traps are detected visually. Very few have been detected as the result of informants or scout dogs. Therefore, personnel must be always alert for the presence of booby traps.

2. The peak of booby trap detection occurs at 1100 hours in the morning when the troops are fresh and alert. The average peak of detonations occurs at 1600 hours when the troops are tired and not as alert. The majority of booby trap casualties occur on reconnaissance in force missions. Consideration should be given to rotating units as well as local personnel as the day progresses in order to have alert troops up front. Point men should be rotated often when the troops are tired.

3. In rice paddy areas, booby traps were previously located predominantly along trails and rice paddy dikes. Many are now located in jungle growth. Recent prisoner interrogations have indicated that the VC employ booby traps as a defensive measure around perimeters of bunkered positions and that these booby trap fields are normally one or two strings in depth. Personnel must be alert for booby traps around the complete perimeter of rice or build-up enemy positions.
With the coming wet season there will probably be a smaller number of booby traps located in rice paddies because of muddy utilization for the planting of crops. More booby traps will then probably be placed along trails and rice paddy dikes as the movement of troops is canalized along these routes.

4. The majority of all booby traps are trip-wire devices attached to a grenade. These can be detected visually or can be activated with heavy objects thrown ahead and dragged over the surface. Excellent dragging devices can be made by utilizing 155mm shrapnel plugs. Every squad going into the field should have some sort of dragging device.

5. Troops moving in a single file sometimes move too closely together. This results in multiple casualties from booby trap detonations. Also, troops should not congregate in the area where a booby trap is being dismantled.

6. A person detecting a booby trap should inform other personnel with him of this fact.

(c) Recommendations.

1. That troops observe correct dispersal procedures in the field.

2. That commanders insure that all personnel under their commands are aware of dangers of booby traps and the techniques used by the enemy in the employment of booby traps.

3. That periodic refresher training in this subject be given.

4. That every squad going into the field have some sort of dragging device for detonating booby traps.

(4) US Tactics - VC View.

(a) Observation. Some tactics employed by VC units allow Viet Cong to evade US forces.

(b) Evaluation. A prisoner captured during an operation on 11 April, provided the following information during initial interrogation:

1. When US helicopters land, the Viet Cong immediately enter their bunkers. When US troops sweep areas, the Viet Cong hold their fire and remain silent even when US troops come within one or two meters of their positions. They do not cry out if wounded.

2. To break out of US encirclements, Viet Cong reconnaissance elements conduct continuous and extensive reconnaissance to attempt to locate a gap in the seal. When a gap is located, the Viet Cong commander gives the order to withdraw at the time he deems most favorable, with night withdrawal the preferred method. The headquarters and reconnaissance
elements secure each side of the gap while the companies filter through the gap in small groups and in single file. A small force is left behind in the contact area to cover the withdrawal; the size varies from a squad to a platoon, depending upon the tactical situation.

2 Local guerrillas are used to lay booby traps to protect the flanks of the enemy force. These booby traps are often laid in two to four rows along the flanks and astride possible avenues of approach into the enemy defensive positions. The local guerrillas also provide a screening and delaying force for the enemy.

US helicopter assaults are very fast and well done, allowing the Viet Cong no time to move out. Immediately after the first two helicopters released smoke, US troops came in.

US troops stay too close together during movement, rest, and withdrawal. The troops move in one group allowing the Viet Cong to easily pin them down with one machinegun. US troops believe that because they cannot immediately see Viet Cong in an area, the Viet Cong are not there. They fail to check all canals and bunkers.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS.

1 That personnel be instructed on utilizing thorough search methods when sweeping an area of contact.

2 That personnel be informed of the fact that the enemy employ booby traps in two to four rows along the flanks of his position and astride possible avenues of approach to his position areas.

3 That personnel be continually made aware of proper dispersal procedures.

4 That the effectiveness of helicopter assaults be brought to the attention of commanders.

(5) River Patrol Boat (PBR) Operations

(a) OBSERVATION. To effectively utilize PBR's, close coordination is required at lower levels. The experience of the PBR division commanders and their crews should be heavily relied upon.

(b) EVALUATION.

1 PBR's, with their 50 caliber machine guns and other organic weapons, can provide a large amount of firepower, to include effective grazing fire, for short periods of time. They can be utilized for the fast movement of small groups of personnel, the insertion of night ambushes, and the quick extraction of these ambushes through the use of cargo nets.

2 When employing PBR's in new areas, problems have been encountered
caused by unfamiliarity of the crew with the area, and by the ground commander's lack of familiarity with the FIBR tactics.

(c) MAT THERAPY.

1. That the FIBR division commanders and his boat captains be permitted to conduct an aerial reconnaissance of a new area of operations prior to beginning the operation. This would allow familiarization of the terrain and provide information on possible ambush sites (friendly and enemy), possible enemy escape routes, and the location of friendly villages, military installations, bridges, and hazards such as fish stakes;

2. That preoperational briefing be conducted to orient the FIBR division commanders with the operation and its objectives and to acquaint the ground commander with FIBR tactics and capabilities;

3. That the ground commanders consult frequently with the FIBR commanders during the operation to ensure the most effective utilization of assets.

(b) TECHNIQUES FOR DISCOVERING HIDEOUTS.

(a) OBSESSION. Emphasis must be placed on thorough searches in order to discover enemy hideouts. During many operations, friendly forces encountered intensive enemy resistance prior to the occupation of an objective but, although the area was sealed off, the enemy seemingly disappeared and left no traces once the objective was occupied.

(b) EVALUATION. Three types of hideouts were found and they were often constructed in accordance with the terrain features rather than after designed models.

1. The most common hideouts are found under bamboo bushes, with techniques employed and the camouflage of these hideouts varying. Most hideouts are constructed near bamboo bushes and have skillfully camouflaged covers which fit very tightly over the openings of the hide-outs. Bamboos are placed on top of some covers. Several covers are camouflaged with leaves, rocks, or other materials. Another characteristic is that the vents of these hideouts are made of bamboo that are planted in the ground and camouflaged.

2. The second type hideout is called the "sand trench". This hideout is built in sandy ground and the walls of it are covered with wooden boards to hold the sand from sliding. The cover of this hideout is difficult to discover because it is normally under the sand. However, it can be discovered by its vents. The vents are usually camouflaged and hidden in the houses of fishermen or in cactus bushes that grow on the dunes along the beach.

3. The third hideout, the "under-water opening", is not in common
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use. This hideout is built near a stream or crater of water. Normally
this hideout has no cover; its mouth is covered by woods or grass, with
some mouths completely under the water level.

During all searches, attention must be paid to hedges, village
corners, and edges of trails or ditches. The enemy usually constructs
his hideouts at those places. From there, the enemy can observe friendly
troops, while remaining unobserved, himself. Women, who may assist the
enemy by camouflaging the mouths of hideouts; rubbish heaps; small trails
with traces; newly cooked food; and newly discharged excrement are in-
dications of the possible enemy hideouts in the area.

(c) RECOMMENDATION.

That personnel be informed of these type hideouts as utilized
by the Viet Cong.

2. That personnel be alerted as to the specific indications of these
type hideouts.

(c) Critical Bridge Security.

(a) OBSERVATION. III Corps bridges continue to be targets for enemy
attacks.

(b) EVALUATION. The enemy continues his efforts to interdict lines
of communication by attempting to destroy critical bridges in III Corps.
Two such bridges are the Gant and Rach Cat Bridges in Bien Hoa Province.
As a result of Hoi Chanh information on 25 April 1969, the 363rd RF
Company, assigned as the security element on the two bridges, made con-
tact with an estimated VC platoon on Hiep Hoa Island. The results of the
action were 12 VC KIA, eight VC captured, and three VC suspects detained.
In addition to a number of weapons and radios captured, the RF seized 450
pounds of Tnt, 50 feet of time fuse, six demolition floats, and four
snorkels. The VC platoon was preparing to destroy the bridges mentioned
above.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS. Continued emphasis be placed on the impor-
tance of securing the critical bridges in III Corps.

(c) Training. Sniper Program.

(a) OBSERVATION. A sniper program can be instituted and developed
into a valuable asset. The program has demonstrated that imaginative
use of available Army assets can materially improve the combat posture
of the command.

(b) EVALUATION.

1. Placing snipers with ambush patrols has been the most successful
method of employment, with two techniques being used extensively. In the
first technique, the sniper team accompanies a platoon on an ambush/
sniper position. In the second, the team, with a security element of five to eight men, establishes an ambush/sniper position.

a When employed with a platoon ambush, the sniper team remains close to the platoon command post. In this technique, snipers are used to engage any lone enemy in the area and any enemy who probe the ambush site, so as not to reveal the presence of the ambush, itself. During the ambush, the snipers engage the enemy leaders and radio operators while the platoon fires into the general kill zone. Snipers are also utilized to fire tracers to mark the flanks of an enemy force which has approached the position in an area other than the specified kill zone.

b In the second technique, the sniper team and security element are placed in a carefully selected sniper/ambush position. The general area is selected by the battalion commander who considers enemy activity and the advice of the sniper team. The exact location, which is occupied just prior to dark, is selected to provide maximum range of fire and is located within a reasonable distance of a friendly unit. The snipers maintain continuous surveillance of the area, minimizing fatigue a night by alternating the use of the starlight scope throughout the night. The security element is equipped with R16’s, an M79, and an AN/PRC-25 radio. The M79 is especially useful in forcing partially hidden enemy troops to move and expose themselves to sniper fire.

2. Snipers, having a long range capability, are extremely effective in engaging Viet Cong as it moves from one location to another. A sniper team with a security element is selected to provide long range observation of the route over which the unit has travelled. Snipers, with their telescopic sights, are able to engage Viet Cong at ranges out to 900 meters. At extreme ranges, the Viet Cong frequently are not cautious about their cover and concealment and, thus, present excellent targets for the sniper team.

3. By using a pink filter in a xenon searchlight, an area can be illuminated with invisible light that registers in the starlight scope. This technique has been used successfully in two types of sniper activity: berm security and ambush operations.

a A sniper team with starlight scopes has been utilized with a searchlight-equipped ½ ton vehicle. The vehicle is placed approximately 1200 to 1500 meters from the road intersection, thereby not alerting the enemy in the kill zone by the noise of a running engine, and the snipers are placed approximately 300 meters from the intersection. The snipers control the covert illumination through radio contact. When Viet Cong appear in the kill zone, they are easily engaged by the sniper team.

b The pink light/sniper combination has been successfully employed in base camp security operations. The searchlight, mounted on a ½ ton vehicle, responds to radio equipped sniper teams in position either on a berm or in ambush positions outside the berm. In forward base camps, the searchlight remains in the center of the camp and covertly illuminates avenues of approach into the position. It is essential that the
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Sniper teams maintain radio contact with the searchlight crew.

Sniper teams are effective in countering Viet Cong sniper activity. Each team, equipped with its telescopic sight and M49 Spotting Scope, searches the area of suspected sniper activity. The optical equipment permits a detailed search of distant areas.

Night Hunter operations have made extensive use of snipers to mark targets. A sniper team is placed in the lead helicopter and observes the ground with starlight scopes mounted on rifles. When the enemy is sighted, the snipers engage with tracers. The gunships, following at a higher altitude, then engage the target.

RECOMMENDATION. That commanders consider the establishment of a sniper school and the training and employment of sniper teams.

Intelligence. Bomb Damage Assessment.

Observation. The best method of determining the damage inflicted by a B-52 strike is ground follow-up by troops.

Evaluation. Because the area covered by a B-52 strike is quite large and the enemy thoroughly polices it immediately following a strike, low level visual reconnaissance by air observers and the use of small reconnaissance teams has not always provided the desired damage assessment. Although there are occasions when ground follow-up by troops may not be possible, generally if a target is of sufficient value to warrant a B-52 strike, it should be of sufficient interest to plan a ground follow-up. Also, additional intelligence gained from a good damage assessment will assist in future target planning.

RECOMMENDATION. That troops be inserted to perform a follow-up of all B-52 strikes for bomb damage assessment.

Logistics.

Observation. The livestock production program is largely dependent on imported corn (Food for Peace) for support. Also, the quality of hogs in Vietnam is degenerating and inefficient meat producers are the result.

Evaluation. Feed grains are being imported at high cost to support the present livestock programs. There is a lack of good sires (boars).

RECOMMENDATION. There is a need to augment imported grain with local corn and sorghum. Also, good sires should be imported to upgrade the quality of hogs produced in III CTZ.
CONFLICT


(2) Reduction in Utilization of Military Support of Pacification Fund

(a) (W-DMO-TG-A). Utilization of the Military Support of Pacification Fund (MSP) in some areas undermines the 1969 Village Development Program.

(b) (W-DMO-TG-A). Utilization of the AIX Funds to support those projects, which should be supported by the 1969 Village Self Help Program, tends to disrupt priorities established by the people thereby undermining their participating role in government.

(c) (W-DMO-TG-A). The use of AIX Funds should continue at a high level; however, prior to expenditure of funds, a thorough screening should take place to ensure that their use will not undermine but supplement the GHF program.

(3) Economic Utilization of Indigenous Resources

(a) (W-DMO-TG-A). Off-shore purchases by the United States of a variety of products in support of assistance programs for Vietnam frequently compete with and inhibit the development of local private industry. An example of this is the importation of large quantities of aluminum roofing sheets.

(b) (W-DMO-TG-A). Lacking and potential capacity in III CTZ for the production of fiber-cement roofing and clay tiles is sufficient to cover current requirements for most of Vietnam. The durability and appearance characteristics of these products are superior to that of aluminum and warrant their slightly higher cost. A reduction in giveaway aluminum roofing would be instrumental in raising the commercial price of this aluminum above that of locally produced materials and would bring into play the market forces of supply and demand.

(c) (W-DMO-TG-A). The importation of aluminum roofing for US-supported projects should be phased out, retaining only sufficient aluminum roofing in stock to meet emergency situation.

6. Organization: Organizing Defense of RD Cadre

(a) (W-DMO-TG-A). RD Cadre losses in III CTZ indicate the need for better coordination of security forces.

(b) (W-DMO-TG-A). III CTZ Revolutionary Development Cadre have been the target of 179 attacks in the past quarter. Thirty-nine RD Cadre have been killed as a result of these attacks. There have been instances when RF/PF units were nearby, but failed to assist the RD Cadre. When RD Cadre teams were reduced in size in late 1968, the RF/PF were tasked to provide the security for the cadre. Due to insufficient coordination and communications, adequate security has not been provided. RF/PF must be cognizant of their responsibilities to the RD Cadre and must develop and coordinate reduction force plans. Communications between the two elements can be improved by issuing the
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1969, HCS COTTON - (M) (M-HDC-70-4) (D)

The cadre team any of the units or by issuing HI-i radio to the FF/P.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: FF/P must be emphasized with particular regard to reaction plan and communication.

2. OTHER:

(1) 1969 Pacification Program.

(a) OBSERVATION. The implementation of the 1969 Pacification Program was hampered by the establishment of hamlet goals and the lack of adequate resources.

(b) EVALUATION. The superimposing of hamlet goals on the village concept has had a deleterious effect upon the implementation of that concept, while the establishment of goals is a management tool, assisting in measuring achievements, the requirement the G72s complete 75 percent of the annual goals within the first five months of the 1969 Pacification program is hampering and to some extent unrealistic. This is particularly true considering that a significant portion of the resources and means to reach these goals were not available during the quarter. As an example, the 1969 Province Pacification Plans required a sizable number of additional HF companies. Therefore, the late allocation of new HF companies resulted in a majority of the companies not being available for the early phases of the 1969 Program.

(c) RECOMMENDATION:

1. Assessment of 1969 pacification goals should be by villages rather than hamlets.

2. The preponderance of goals assigned should be assessed during the portion of the year when required resources are available.

3. The allocation of HF and PF to support the 1970 Pacification Program should be made in July 1969.

(2) Attack on MAT III-14.

(a) OBSERVATION. In order to provide adequate security to Mobile advisory Teams, defense plans must be coordinated and supervised by those having operational control over MAT’s.

(b) EVALUATION. At 0110 hours on 28 March 1969 an estimated VC battalion executed a well-planned attack against the 6th PF Platoon Outpost, located at Duc Vinh 3, Dinh Long Province. Mobile Advisory Team III-14 was the principal target of the attack. At the time the attack began, the PF platoon was occupying three ambush positions to the east of the village. The western portion of the perimeter was defended by People’s Self Defense Forces (PSDF). The north and south
AVFBC-RE-H

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR - (R1) (W-DHO-TO-A) (U)

sides were unprotected. The south was particularly vulnerable due to the proximity of the village which prevented the use of claymore mines. The attack began when the area around the HAT house began receiving B-40 rounds. Some diversionary fires were used to keep the troops on the east and west occupied. The VC attack force was already in the hamlet when the B-40 fires began. The two officers of the HAT were wounded during the initial fires. However, one managed to notify the Sector TCC that they were being attacked. After the wounded had been moved to a bunker, another transmission was sent requesting a light fire team and reaction forces. By that time, however, the enemy was about to overrun the MAT position. The light fire team was unable to assist due to prevailing weather conditions. Also, there were no supporting fires. The reaction force did not arrive until 0235 hours and since the contact lasted only 15 minutes they did not influence the outcome. As a result of the action two US advisors were killed and two wounded; the HAT interpreter also was killed. The outpost defense plan was inadequate as evidenced by the lack of local reaction forces, the absence of listening posts or ambushes on the north and south sides of the perimeter, the lack of planned supporting fires, and the length of time required for reinforcements, though mechanized, to reach the outpost.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. District advisors having operational control over HAT's should ensure that adequate defense plans exist. Defense plans should call for listening posts or ambushes on all likely avenues of approach. A local reaction force should be immediately available to counter an enemy attack. In this respect, the MAT leader should remain with the Vietnamese commander to influence the employment of reaction forces. Fire support plans should be developed and defensive concentrations registered. The MAT leader should coordinate his fire support plan with the commander of the supporting unit, and communications with the supporting unit must be routinely checked. The defense plan must include an adequate reinforcement plan which designates the forces to be used and the manner in which they will be employed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

E. E. HUFFMAN, JR.

9 Incl
1. II FFV Order of Battle
2. II FFV Area of Operations
3. Statistical Summary USAF C130/C123 Sorties
4. Statistical Summary, Close Air Support
5. Aviation Statistics
6. Statistical Summary B-52 Bombing Missions
7. Enemy Disposition
8. II FFORCSV Troop List
9. Enemy Organization in the III CTZ
Incl 1 wd Hq, DA

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AGF CC II

Copy Furnished:

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CO, USAARNG - 1
CO, USAF - 1
CO, USAFAS - 1
ACOF, G1, II FFV - 1
ACOF, G2, II FFV - 1
ACOF, G3, II FFV - 3
ACOF, G4, II FFV - 1
ACOF, G5, II FFV - 1
ACOF, II FFV - 1
7th HHC Hist Det - 5
CO, II FFV arty
SA
ID
Signal Officer
Engineer Officer
Aviation Officer
ID
PH
DPA

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AVHC-DST (30 April 1969) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (W-DHO-TO-A) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 962752 1 JUN 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPO-UT, APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning Mechanic Trainees, section II, page 49, paragraph a(3); concur. The manpower shortage in RVN hinders the identification and hiring of qualified adult mechanics and mechanic trainees. Employing teenage mechanic apprentices can be an effective solution to the manpower shortage. The proposal to recruit potential teenage trainees will be forwarded to MAC-CORDS for consideration. No further action required.

   b. Reference item concerning Techniques for Discovering Enemy Hideouts, section II, page 55, paragraph b(6); concur. This item will be extracted and published in the Fall issue of USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons.

   c. Reference item concerning Livestock Production, section II, page 58, paragraph e(1); concur. Local supplies of feed are required to support livestock such as hogs which require high energy food. The benefits of introducing such livestock into grain deficient areas are questionable. Improved breeding is needed to raise the quality of Vietnamese stock. Current USAID agricultural programs take both of these problems into consideration. No further action required.

   d. Reference item concerning Pacification Fund, section II, page 59, paragraph e(2); concur. The MACV Pacification Fund and Civic Action PSYWAR Fund should be used to supplement existing programs and support unprogrammed high impact projects in coordination with local MAC-CORDS advisors. MACV Directive 37-2 and MACV Directive 37-13 state that these funds will be employed where their use will not be detrimental to existing programs. No further action required.

   e. Reference item concerning Economic Utilization of Indigenous Resources, section II, page 59, paragraph e(3); concur. The use of fiber cement roofing could well replace the aluminum roofing used in the Popular
Forces Self Help Dependent Housing and ARVN Dependent Housing Programs. II Field Force has been advised to initiate action recommending that the MACV Engineer Advisory Division study the matter for incorporation into future construction. No further action required.

f. Reference item concerning the 1969 Pacification Program, section II, page 60, paragraph g(1); concur. If the goals of the pacification program are modified, resources and means available to support the program must be adjusted accordingly. The recommendation will be forwarded to MAC-CORUS for consideration. No further action required.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, II Field Force Vietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-63 (R1) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 28 JUL 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsement and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

D. A. TUCKER
CPT, AGG
Asst AG
### STATISTICAL SUMMARY
**UHAF 0130/0183 SORTIES**  
1 Feb 69 - 30 Apr 69

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**TOTAL SHORT TONS** 23,663  
**TOTAL PASSENGERS** 34,034

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**Note:**

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**STATISTICAL SUMMARY**
**CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (U)**
1 February - 30 April 1969

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End of Report

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*The above statistics include all 12th Combat Aviation Group assets.*
STATISTICAL SUMMARY
B-52 BOMBARING MILESIONS (0)
1 February - 30 April

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CONFIDENTIAL

Excel 6

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**Incl 8**

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, II Field Force Vietnam

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb 69 to 30 Apr 69.

CG, II Field Force Vietnam

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ABSTRACT